1-23-24_Tuesday PM_Extending Downstream Mechanical Integrity Concepts to Midstream Facilities_ CCDs.pdf

Extending Downstream Mechanical Integrity Concepts to Midstream Facilities_ CCDs

1. January 23 - 25, 2024 | Henry B. Gonzales Center | San Antonio, TX
Extending Downstream MI Tools to Mid-
Stream Facilities: CCDs, IOWs, DMRs, & RBI

2. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
BIO SLIDE – Presenting Author
•Nathaniel Sutton
•E
2
G | The Equity Engineering Group, Inc.
•Senior Engineer
•8 years in the Industry
•Field of Expertise: Downstream & Midstream Corrosion Engineering & Metallurgy
•Industry Involvement/Recognition: MTI Representative & Project Champion, NACE
Member and Symposium Chair, API 938B Vice-Chair
Thanks to Co-Authors Rick Seaver (Williams) & John Hargrove (E
2
G)

3. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
CCDs & IOWs
•Corrosion Control Document (CCD) – document/repository summarizing a
unit’s process and corrosion circuits (“loops”), API RP 970.
•Includes damage mechanism(s) in each loop – loop tables
•Contains and rationalizes IOWs for each loop
•Within IOW limits, the CCD DM’s remain valid (used for RBI)
•Includes Corrosion & Materials Drawings (Loop diagrams)
•Integrity Operating Window (IOW), API RP 584 –
•Established limits for process variables that – when violated for a period of time – can
affect the integrity of the equipment
•Ensure communication between Process, Ops, & Mechanical integrity Won’t eliminate
corrosion, keeps rates predictable and reasonably low

4. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
DMR and RBI
•Risk-Based Inspection - use of probability and consequence of failure (POF *
COF = Risk) to plan inspections, API 580, 581
•API 510, 570 allow risk–based instead of conventional time- based intervals.
•Maximum intervals exist (code- defined and sometimes operator-defined)
•Objectives of RBI are to
•Minimize high risk failures
•Lower overall unit/facility risk
•Focus maintenance & inspection resources on highest risk items & lower life cycle cost
•Proactively target inspection and monitoring on equipment with anticipated degradation

5. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
DMR and RBI

6. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
DMR and RBI
•The Damage Mechanism Review, DMR is a crucial part of RBI analysis
•A Materials SME must assign the applicable DM’s, and determine corrosion rates, and
cracking susceptibilities for the POF Analysis
•DMR results from the Materials SME are used in Risk Calculation
•Past inspections “graded” against effectiveness tables for the Damage Mech.
•Improper/non-optimized techniques (or no inspections) receive poor grades (D, E)
•Good coverage with proper techniques receive A’s, B’s
•Efficiency to executing the DMR for RBI in tandem with the CCD
•Equipment information only needs to be verified once
•Corrosion SME can ensure that the RBI DMR is consistent with CCD

7. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
DMR Comparison –CCD vs RBI
•The CCD is typically done at the PFD level
•Typically does not provide corrosion rates
•May provide H/M/L (“High”, “Medium” or “Low”) susceptibility/qualitative likelihood for
each DM.
•All primary relevant DMs are selected for each loop – can be zero to 5 or more if
applicable.
•Fixed equipment will typically
be identified in the corrosion loop table
•If a unit/facility is circuitized, piping circuits may also be listed
•The DMR for RBI is done at the “P&ID” level (note quotes)
•Not really marked on the P&IDs, but is more detailed than a CCD level DM assignment.
•Really, DMR for RBI is done at the equipment component list level and circuit list level (if not circuitized, done at the line list level) in spreadsheets

8. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
Benefits of Combined CCD/IOW/RBI/DMR
•PFDs – not considered “PSM
Info” while P&IDs are
•Not all midstream facilities
have PFDs
•(can be developed as part
of CCD work process)

9. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
CCD Work Process
1.Define Corrosion Loops on PFD
Color-coded
Loops on PFD
match Loop
tables
Applicable DM’s in each shown loop are identified:
DM #, material of
Construction legend
Included for clarity

10. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
CCD Work Process
2. Populate Loop Tables
Date: Rev: 0 LOOP IDENTIFICATION
Loop Number and Name CL1 Inlet Gas (Dry Pipeline Gas and Dry Fuel Gas/Pilot Gas)
Loop Description
Relevant Material & Corrosion Loop Diagrams
Equipment Components in this Loop
Piping Circuits In this Loop
LOOP CONDITIONS
Primary Corrodents of Concern
Normal Op. Conditions
LOOP MATERIALS
Materials of Construction
Materials Suitability
LOOP DAMAGE MECHANISMS (INTERNAL)
Damage Mechanism Number
Description Rationale
Susceptibility
L/M/H
Inspection, Corrosion Monitoring,
and Mitigation Techniques
Key History Issues
INJECTION AND MIX POINTS IN THIS LOOP
Number Description CMD Number Notes/Comments Into Circuit
KEY IOWs AND SAMPLES FOR THIS LOOP-SEE DETAIL IOW TABLE
Parameter Sample/Reading Location Notes on ROL Recent Readings/Results
KEY ISSUES/CONCERNS
Issue/Concern Recommendation

11. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
CCD Work Process
3.Compile IOWs for the whole unit/facility from individual loops
•IOWs that impact one loop may be measured or tracked in another loop.
4.Develop Summary Report
•List of primary concerns and Key Recommendations
•Description of Damage Mechanisms
•Optionally, a description of each corrosion loop (to complement information
in loop tables).
5.CCD Draft Review meetings with owner-operator personnel can serve as RBI
process validation meetings.
6.“Extend” Loop DMR to individual circuits and equipment components in that
corrosion loop

12. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
Detail IOW Table Example for Midstream Facility
#
Corr.
Loop
#
IOW Name &
location
Process
Variable to
Monitor
(Units)
Process
Tag/ Lab
ID/
Calculated
Parameter
API
584
IOW
Type
C/S/I*
Limits
Sample
/ Calc.
Freq.
Related Damage
Mechanism
Operation's Response to
Excursion
Inspection's Response to Excursion Comments
Max/Min/
Target
11, 2
CO
2 –Inlet
Gas
Partial
pressure
(psia)
Lab I Trend
3
Months
CO
2Corrosion
Report to Equipment
Integrity Team
Evaluate impact on feed system corrosion
and increase inspection frequency -UT
scanning, RT of turbulent/high-velocity
areas
As CO2 content increases,
predicted corrosion rates increase.
Liquid water is required for CO2
corrosion to occur
31, 2
H
2O -Inlet
Gas
lb/MMSCF or
mg/m
3
Inst.
(Tag#)
S
7.0/-/-
Contin-
uously
Hydrates,
Corrosion
Report to Equipment
Integrity Team
Evaluate impact on feed system corrosion
and increase inspection frequency -UT
scanning, RT.
Inspect Deadlegs where water drop-out is
feasible
Liquid water is required for
corrosion to occur. Water vapor, or
water in condensate as an
emulsion will not cause corrosion.
58
Glycol Temp–
Dehy. Unit
surge tank
Temp (°F)
Inst.
(Tag#)
S
C
390°F/--/--
405°F/--/--
Contin-
uously
Glycol degradation,
corrosion of equipment
and piping
Work with operations to
ensure the temperature is
controlled below 390°F.
Immediately reduce glycol
temperature to below
405°F.
Check for glycol degradation and
potential corrosion in glycol corrosion
loops if glycol temperature remains
above 405°F for a significant period.
The IOW of 390°F allows for a 15°F
buffer.
Confer with Glycol supplier/vendor
to confirm temperature limits
78
Glycol
Appearance
Dehy. Unit
surge tank
appearance
& odor
Lab I
Clear, not dark
with no odor
Confer with glycol
supplier and test
lab.
3
months
Glycol degradation,
corrosion of equipment
and piping
Check the appearance of
glycol. Add or replace
glycol as necessary.
Check for glycol degradation and
potential corrosion in glycol corrosion
loops and downstream.
Dark appearance/Aromatic odor
suggests degradation and the possibility
of increased corrosion in the glycol
corrosion loops and downstream.
98
Glycol
Acidity–
Dehy. Unit
surge tank
pH Lab I
Trend. Note
decreases in pH.
Confer with glycol
supplier and test
lab.
3
months
Glycol degradation,
corrosion of equipment
and piping
Check pH of glycol. Add or
replace glycol as necessary.
Check for glycol degradation, potential
chloride corrosion and chloride SCC of
stainless steel in glycol corrosion loops
and downstream with long low pH.
Low glycol pH suggests degradation and
the possibility of increased corrosion in
the glycol corrosion loops and
downstream.

13. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
RBI Work Process
1.Scope and Equipment Validation
•Team Members identified and roles defined
•Equipment and schedule proposed
2.Data Collection (most CCD/IOW items are utilized)
•Data gaps are identified
3.Process Overview (very efficient meeting due to knowledge gained
from the CCD Implementation)
•Operating parameters and previous damage are prioritized
•The unit’s history, detection measures, and inspections are
discussed
•Financial information discussed when required

14. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
RBI Work Process(continued)
4. Damage Review (leveraging CCDs-Damage Mechanisms receive a
second pass)
•Applicable DMs/Corrosion Rates/Cracking susceptibilities assigned
•Inspection Effectiveness assigned to previous inspections
5. Data Validation
•Any outstanding gaps are reconciled
•Operating and Damage finalized
6. Risk Analysis and Inspection Planning
•Schedule philosophy and future inspections are finalized
7. Final Documentation and Reporting

15. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
Unique aspects of CCD-IOW-RBI for Midstream
•Available information *tends* to be more limited than for refineries
•Remoteness – Engineering/Inspection/etc. personnel for the client are often not located at
the assets – can delay information gathering & clarifications
•Far Fewer Damage Mechanisms
•Areas of midstream with familiar (API 571) DMs: Amine treatment, BAHX/Cryo, glycol
(aqueous organic acids), underground storage (brine/MIC/oxygenated process water)
•Ambient temperature & cryogenic – no high- temp DMs usually (though some facilities
have hot/heat-transfer oil heaters)
•Focus is on different corrodents – CO
2, trace water, glycolic acid, others.
•Intermittent operation is more of an issue (pipeline/storage variable demand vs process plant
operating at capacity year round*)
•Lack of conventional utilities – typically no cooling water, no steam/BFW/condensate
•Lack of diversity in materials – CS and some 304L or Al for carbonic acid for low-temp
•BAHX – refineries may not have these.

16. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
Case Histories CCD-IOW-RBI for Midstream
Cryogenic/De-methanizing
•Methanol Injections
shown on CMDs
•Fewer DMs –
•54 Fatigue
•31 Brittle Fracture
•64A MeOH SCC (CS)
•88 MeOH Corr (Al)
•66A Organic Acid Corr
(glycol)
More DMs for other parts
of facility – e.g. inlet
liquids/gases (only cryo
section shown here)
Note – DM numbers come
from 571 or SME “extra”
DMs

17. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
Case Histories CCD-IOW-RBI for Midstream
Dehydration (Mole Sieve before Cryo )
Unit
Inventory Group
PFD
P&ID
Type
Flow Order
Equip. ID
Circuit
Description
CL #
Governing DM 1 / Suscept
DM 2 / Suscept
Est. CR, mpy
Cracking DM
Susceptibility,
VL, L, M, H
Inspection Comments
PWHT
Material
Op Pressure
Op Temp
Entered in PCMS
RBI
Fluid Description
Basic Asset/Component Info
RBI Input/Info
DMR info from Materials SME/CCD
Process Info
RBI Input
Information

18. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
Case Histories CCD-IOW-RBI for Midstream
Example RBI Inspection Plant Deliverable
Reference to
inspection
tables
(coverage,
technique)
Due dates
for each
asset & type
of inspection

19. API INSPECTION & MECHANICAL INTEGRITY SUMMIT
Conclusions
•One of the main challenges for RBI and CCD-IOW is collecting and organizing the
necessary data. A simultaneous or staggered CCD study minimizes duplicating
these efforts.
•Corrosion SME ensures that the RBI Damage Review is consistent with CCD.
•Inspection and Maintenance activities are synchronized based on the CCDs,
IOWs and RBI studies resulting in improved reliability and availability.
•Prioritized inspection and maintenance activities, resulting in resources, time and
money being used effectively and efficiently.
•Internal/onstream inspection intervals are optimized which in turn lowers the risk
associated with vessel entry.
•RBI and CCD’s with IOWs are gaining traction in midstream and have been
applied already to a variety of process/facilities/assets