196837202 cases-rule-126

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1. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
1

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs BELEN MARIACOS
FACTS:
October 27, 2005 in BrgyBalbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret
agent of the Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that
a baggage of marijuana had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that
was about to leave for the poblacion. The agent mentioned 3 bags
and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a backpack bag with
O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana
wrapped in newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about
the owner of the bag, but no one know.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted
together with other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not noticed
who took the black backpack from atop the jeepney. He only
realized a few moments later that the said bag and 3 other bags
were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told
them that they were under arrest, but on the women got away.
DOCTRINES:ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTION PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue

2. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
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except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the
Judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be
seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
1. This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of
motor vehicles makes it possible for the vehicle to be
searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which
the warrant must be sought.
2. This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited
discretion to conduct warrantless searches of automobiles in
the absence of probable cause when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe
before the search that they will find the instrumentality or
evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or
transportation of prohibited drugs, the ownership thereof is
immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of the confiscated
marijuana is not necessary.
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid
defence. Lack of criminal intent and good faith are not exempting
circumstances where the crime charge is malumprohibitum
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 ( 1986)
F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The
petitioner”s house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles
listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers conducting the
search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they
confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the
petitioner.

RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared
null and void and accordingly set aside. The petitioner claims that
no depositions were taken by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule
126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions
were taken of the complainant”s 2 witnesses in addition to the
affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the
complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation.
By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt.
Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only “to ascertain among
others, if he knew and understood the same,” and only bec. “the
application was not yet subscribed and sworn to.” The suggestion is
that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had
already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case,
he did not ask his own searching questions.
He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take
the applicant”s deposition in writing and attach them to the record,
together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition
is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly
determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to

3. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
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hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later
that his declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was
asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and
not of info. personally known to him. His application, standing
alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought.
It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their
own personal info., to establish the applicant”s claims.
Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the
deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself,
there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. A
study of the deposition taken from witnesessEsmaelMorada and
Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be “intelligence informers,”
shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their
allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the
form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge.
One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask
how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the
guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the
first floor or second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all,
or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the
witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These
would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously
omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily
accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN
ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER
DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED
TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN
WRITING. We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted
by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to
sign the supposed waiver as guaranty
Solid Triangle Sales Corp. vs. Sitchon [GR 144309, 23 November
2001]
Facts: Both Sanly and Solid Triangle sell genuine Mitsubishi
products. Solid Triangle acquires its goods from
Japan on the basis of its exclusive distributorship with Mitsubishi
Corporation. While Sanly buys its goods from Hongkong, claiming
it is a parallel importer (one which imports, distributes, and sells
genuine products in the market, independently of an exclusive
distributorship or agency agreement with the manufacturer), not an
unfair competitor. On 28 January 1999, Judge Apolinario D.
Bruselas, Jr., Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 93, Quezon City,
upon application of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation
Bureau (EIIB), issued Search Warrant 3324 (99) against Sanly
Corporation (Sanly), for violation of Section 168 of RA 8293 (unfair
competition). By virtue of Search Warrant, EIIB agents seized 451
boxes of Mitsubishi photographic colorpaper from Sanly. Forthwith,
Solid Triangle, through Robert Sitchon, its Marketing and
Communication Manager, filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Quezon City, an affidavit complaint for unfair
competition against the members of the Board of Sanly and LWT
Co., Inc. (LWT) [IS 1-99-2870], alleging that ERA Radio and
Electrical Supply (ERA), owned and operated by LWT, is in
conspiracy with Sanly in selling and/or distributing Mitsubishi
brand photo paper to the damage and prejudice of Solid Triangle,
which claims to be the sole and exclusive distributor thereof,
pursuant to an agreement with the Mitsubishi Corporation. On 4
February 1999, Solid Triangle filed with Judge Bruselas' sala an
urgent ex parte motion for the transfer of custody of the seized
Mitsubishi photo color paper stored in the office of EIIB. On 8
February 1999, Sanly, LWT and ERA moved to quash the search
warrant which was denied by Judge Bruselas in an order dated 5
March 1999. Sanly, LWT and ERA filed a motion for
reconsideration which was granted by Judge Bruselas on 18 March
1999, where the latter hekd that there is doubt whether the act
complained of (unfair competition) is criminal in nature. Solid
Triangle filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the

4. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
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quashal of the search warrant is not proper considering the
pendency of the preliminary investigation in IS 1-99-2870 for unfair
competition wherein the seized items will be used as evidence. On
26 March 1999, Judge Bruselas issued an order denying Solid
Triangle's motion for reconsideration. Meanwhile, on 29 March
1999, Solid Triangle filed with Branch 91 of the same Court,
presided by Judge Lita S. Tolentino-Genilo (Civil Case Q-99-37206)
for damages and injunction with prayer for writs of preliminary
injunction and attachment against Sanly, LWT and ERA. On 31
March 1999, Judge Genilo denied Solid Triangle's application for a
preliminary attachment on the ground that the application is not
supported with an affidavit by the applicant, through its authorized
officer, who personally knows the facts. Meanwhile, on 20 April
1999, Judge Bruselasissued an order, directing the (1) EIIB, Sitchon
and Solid Triangle to divulge and report to the court the exact
location of the warehouse where the goods subject of the proceeding
were kept within 72 hours from receipt thereof; (2) Sitchon and
Solid Triangle to appear and show cause why they should not be
held in contempt of court for failure to obey a lawful order of the
court at a hearing for the purpose on 12 May 1999 at 8:30 a.m.; (3)
the Deputy Sheriff of the Court to take custody of the seized goods
and cause their delivery to the person from whom the goods were
seized without further loss of time. Solid Triangle filed a petition for
certiorari before the Court of Appeals on 26 April 1999, and the
latter issued a temporary restraining order to prevent Judge
Bruselas from implementing the Order dated 20 April 1999. On 6
July 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment initially
granting certiorari, and held that the quashing of the warrant
deprived the prosecution of vital evidence to determine probable
cause. Upon motion by Sanly, etc., however, the Court of Appeals
reversed itself. In its "Amendatory Decision," the appellate court
held that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrant, and accordingly, held that the evidence obtained by virtue
of said warrant was inadmissible in the preliminary investigation.
Hence, the petition by Solid Triangle.
Issue: Whether the court that issued the warrant may resolve the
motions to suppress evidence while a preliminary investigation is
ongoing.
Held: The proceedings for the issuance/quashal of a search warrant
before a court on the one hand, and the preliminary investigation
before an authorized officer on the other, are proceedings entirely
independent of each other. One is not bound by the other's finding
as regards the existence of a crime. The purpose of each proceeding
differs from the other. The first is to determine whether a warrant
should issue or be quashed, and
the second, whether an information should be filed in court.
Section 14, Rule 126, expressly provides that a motion to quash a
search warrant and/or to suppress evidence obtained thereby may
be filed in and acted upon only by the court where the action has
been instituted. Under the same section, the court which issued the
search warrant may be prevented from resolving a motion to quash
or suppress evidence only when a criminal case is subsequently filed
in another court, in which case, the motion is to be resolved by the
latter court. It is therefore puerile to argue that the court that issued
the warrant cannot entertain motions to suppress evidence while a
preliminary investigation is ongoing. Such erroneous interpretation
would place a person whose property has been seized by virtue of an
invalid warrant without a remedy while the goods procured by
virtue thereof are subject of a preliminary investigation.
Nevertheless, the evidence presented before the trial court does not
prove unfair competition under Section 168 of the Intellectual
Property Code. Sanly Corporation did not pass off the subject goods
as that of another. Indeed, it admits that the goods are genuine
Mitsubishi photographic paper, which it purchased from a supplier
in Hong Kong. Assuming that the acts of Sanly, etc. to make "it
appear that they were duly authorized to sell or distribute
Mitsubishi Photo Paper in the Philippines" constitutes a crime,
there is no proof to establish such an allegation. The court, thus,
ordered Solid Triangle and EIIB to return to Sanly Corporation the

5. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
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451 boxes of Mitsubishi photographic color paper seized by virtue of
Search Warrant 3324 (99) issued by the Quezon City Regional Trial
Court, Branch 93
























FIRST DIVISION

SPOUSES JOEL AND
MARIETTA MARIMLA,
Petitioners,

- versus -
PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINESAND HON.
OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC Judge,
Branch 57, Angeles City,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 158467


Promulgated:

October 16, 2009
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

6. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
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Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court. It seeks to annul the Order
[1 ]
dated September 6,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57,
denying petitioner spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla’s Motion to
Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized,
and the Order
[2]
dated April 21, 2003 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On February 15, 2002, Special Investigator (SI) Ray C.
Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime Division filed two (2)
applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila seeking
permission to search: (1) petitioners’ house located on RD Reyes St.,
Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City
[3]
and (2) the premises on Maria
Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga,
[4]
both for
Violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425,
as amended. The said applications uniformly alleged that SI
Lagasca’s request for the issuance of the search warrants was
founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness
Roland D. Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of
surveillance operations and a test buy made at petitioners’
house. The purpose of the application for search warrants was to
seize the following articles/items:

Undetermined amount of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, popularly known as “SHABU,”
“MARIJUANA,” weighing scale, plastic sachets,
tooters, burner, rolling papers, and paraphernalia, all
of which articles/items are being used or intended to
be used in Violation of Republic Act 6425 as
amended, and are hidden or being kept in said
house/premises.
[5]


Executive Judge Mario Guariña III (Judge Guariña III)
examined in writing and under oath SI Lagasca and Fernandez, in
the form of searching questions and answers, and found that based
on facts personally known to SI Lagasca and Fernandez, petitioners
had in their possession and control, inside their house located on
RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City, an undetermined
amount of methamphetamine hydrochloride known
as shabu and marijuana. Pursuant these findings, Judge Guariña
III issued a search warrant docketed as Search Warrant No. 02-
2677, which commanded any peace officer “to make immediate
search, at any time of the day or night, not beyond 10 days from

7. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
7

date hereof, of the premises above-mentioned and forthwith seize
and take possession of the properties subject of the offense and
bring to his court said properties to be dealt with as the law
directs.”
[6]


On the strength of this warrant, members of the NBI Anti-
Organized Crime Division, namely, SI Lagasca, Primitivo M. Najera,
Jr., Jesusa D. Jamasali, HortenHernaez, and Ritche N. Oblanca, in
coordination with the Philippine National Police of Angeles City,
searched petitioners’ house on February 19, 2002 at around 5:00 in
the morning.
[7 ]
They were able to seize cash in the amount
of P15,200.00
[8]
and the following items:

1. One (1) brick of dried flowering tops wrapped in a
packing tape marked “RCL-1-2677,” (net weight - 915.7
grams);
2. One (1) small brick of dried flowering tape wrapped in a
newsprint marked “RCL-2-2677” (net weight - 491.5
grams);
3. Dried flowering tops separately contained in sixteen
(16) transparent plastic bags, altogether wrapped in a
newsprint marked “RCL-3-2677” (net weight - 127.9
grams); and
4. Dried flowering tops separately contained in nine (9)
plastic tea bags, altogether placed in a yellow plastic bag
marked “RCL-4-2677” (net weight - 18.2736 grams).
[9]


On February 20, 2002, an Information
[1 0]
for Violation of
Section 8, Article II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by R.A. No. 7659,
was filed against petitioners before the RTC of Angeles City, Branch
57, presided by herein respondent Judge Omar T. Viola.

On March 25, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized
[1 1 ]
on the
following grounds: (1) the application for search warrant was filed
outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court
where the alleged crime was committed; (2) the court which issued
the questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion
when it issued the same because under the law it cannot issue a
search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; (3) the questioned
search warrant is void ab initio; and (4) the evidence illegally seized
by virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible
in evidence.

In support of the above motion, petitioners filed a Motion to
Admit Documentary Evidence,
[1 2]
asking the court to admit the
following documents: (1) application for Search Warrant No. 02-

8. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
8

2677; (2) authorization letter dated February 12, 2002 with the
signature of NBI Director Reynaldo G. Wycoco (Director Wycoco);
(3) NBI ID No. 5370 of Agent Victor Emmanuel G. Lansang with the
Signature ofDirectorWycoco; and (4) Administrative Matter (A.M.)
No. 00-5-03-SC (Re: Proposed Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
[Rules 110-127, Revised Rules of Court]). Petitioners claim that the
issuance of Search Warrant No. 02-2677 was “defective considering
the application was not personally endorsed by [Dir.] Wycoco,” and
that the latter’s signature in the authorization letter is different
from that as appearing in the identification card, and therefore it is
“not the true and genuine signature of [Dir.] Wycoco.”
[1 3]


In its Comment/Opposition to the Motion to Quash,
[1 4]
the
Office of the City Prosecutor, Angeles City claims that the
questioned search warrant does not fall within the coverage of Sec.
2 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, but
under A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC,
[1 5]
which authorizes the Executive
Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and
Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving
dangerous drugs, among others, filed by the NBI, and provides that
said warrants may be served in places outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.

On August 14, 2009, SI Lagasca filed his Opposition and/or
Answer to the Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress
Evidence Illegally Seized.
[1 6]
He avers that Judge Guariña III issued
Search Warrant No. 02-2677 by virtue of Administrative Order No.
20-97
[1 7 ]
issued on February 12, 1997. He also claims that it was
NBI Deputy Director for Special Investigation FerminNasol who
signed the authorization letter in behalf of Director Wycoco, for
him to apply for a search warrant in the house/premises of
petitioners on RD Reyes St., Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and
Maria Aquino St., Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga for
violation of R.A. No. 6425.

In an Order
[1 8]
dated September 6, 2002, Judge Omar T.
Viola denied petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to
Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized for lack of merit, ratiocinating as
follows:

The public prosecutor was able to point out
that the search warrant issued by Judge Mario

9. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
9

Guariña III, the Executive Judge of the Manila
Regional Trial Court, is in order considering that AM
99-10-09-SC allows or authorizes executive judges
and vice executive judges of the Regional Trial Court
of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which
may be served in places outside their territorial
jurisdiction in cases where the same was filed and,
among others, by the NBI.

The NBI also was able to explain that the
authority to apply search warrant was personally
signed by Deputy Director for Special Investigation
FerminNasol who is authorized to sign and that he
was delegated the authority to sign for and in behalf
of the NBI Director on documents of this
like. Deputy Director FerminNasol having that
authority to sign for and in behalf of the NBI
Director, Reynaldo Wycoco, there is, therefore,
compliance with the law regarding the issuance of
authority to apply search warrant.

WHEREFORE, in view of the revelation, the
Court has no other recourse but to agree with the
views of the prosecution as well as the NBI. And this
being so, the Court finds not enough ground to quash
the search warrant issued against Spouses Joel and
Marietta Marilma.

The motion filed by them and their
supplement, is therefore denied, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
[1 9]


On September 23, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration
[20]
on the ground that the denial of their Motion to
Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized is
not in accordance with the law and existing jurisprudence. They
claim that no evidence was presented by Deputy Director Nasol that
he was authorized to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco.

Said Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by
respondent court on the ground that the issues raised therein were
mere reiterations of petitioners’ arguments that had already been
considered and passed upon in the Motion to Quash Search
Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized. Respondent
court added:

To elaborate, this Court believes and is of the
opinion that the Deputy Director of the NBI
possesses the authority to sign for and in behalf of
the NBI Director requesting for the issuance of a
search warrant and nothing in the Administrative
Matter 99-10-09 prohibits the delegation of such
ministerial act to the Deputy Director who is an alter
ego of the NBI Director. It is also quite clear that the
NBI Director approved said authorization for SI Ray
Lagasca to apply for a search warrant because said
document was never recalled or amended by the
Office of the Bureau Director up to the present.

10. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
10

The Court is also of the view that A.M. 99-10-
09 is still valid, binding and legal by virtue of the fact
that not even the Supreme Court (sic) did not make
any pronouncement … withdrawing and or declaring
the same ineffective, hence, until such order is
issued, this Court must interpret and rule for its
continued validity and applicability.
[21 ]


Hence, this petition.

Petitioners claim that the search warrant was issued in
violation of A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC and Section 2 of Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.

The pivotal issue to be resolved in this petition is whether or
not the respondent court acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed
Orders dated September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, denying
petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress
Evidence Illegally Seized and their Motion for Reconsideration,
respectively.

At the onset, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) prays
for the dismissal of this petition on the ground that the filing of the
said petition directly with this Court runs afoul of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. The OSG argues that while this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals (CA) over
petitions for certiorari, this petition should have been filed with the
CA. The OSG contends that the petitioners have not shown any
compelling reason to justify the filing of the petition directly with
this Court.

The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the
hierarchy of courts. However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for
compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues
raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly before
it.
[22]
In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition,
as it involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court
in the exercise of its rule-making power under the Constitution.
[23]


At the heart of the present controversy are A.M. No. 99-10-09-
SC, Clarifying the Guidelines on the Application for the
Enforceability of Search Warrants, which was enacted on January
25, 2000; and A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, specifically,

11. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
11

Section 2, Rule 126 thereof. We quote the pertinent portions of the
two issuances below:

Administrative Matter No. 99-10-09-SC

Resolution Clarifying the Guidelines on the
Application for the Enforceability of Search Warrants

In the interest of an effective administration of
justice and pursuant to the powers vested in the
Supreme Court by the Constitution, the following are
authorized to act on all applications for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling,
dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms.

The Executive Judge and Vice Executive
Judges of Regional Trial Courts, Manila and Quezon
City filed by the Philippine National Police (PNP),
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOC-TF) and the Reaction Against Crime Task
Force (REACT-TF) with the Regional Trial Courts of
Manila and Quezon City.

The applications shall be personally endorsed
by the Heads of the said agencies, for the search of
places to be particularly described therein, and the
seizure of property of things as prescribed in the
Rules of Court, and to issue the warrants of arrest, if
justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of said courts.

The authorized judges shall keep a special
docket book listing the details of the applications and
the result of the searches and seizures made
pursuant to the warrants issued.

This Resolution is effective immediately and
shall continue until further orders from this Court
and shall be an exemption to the provisions of
Circular No. 13 dated 1 October 1985 and Circular
No. 19 dated 4 August 1987. x xx

A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure

Rule 126

SEARCH AND SEIZURE

Sec. 2. Court where application for search
warrant shall be filed. – An application for search
warrant shall be filed with the following:

(a) Any court within whose territorial
jurisdiction a crime was committed.
(b) For compelling reasons stated in
the application, any court within the judicial region
where the crime was committed if the place of the
commission of the crime is known, or any court
within the judicial region where the warrant shall be
enforced.

12. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
12

However, if the criminal action has already
been filed, the application shall only be made in the
court where the criminal action is pending.

From the above, it may be seen that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC
authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the
RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search
warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous
drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the
PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF. On the other hand, Rule 126
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that the
application for search warrant shall be filed with: (a) any court
within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, and (b)
for compelling reasons, any court within the judicial region where
the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime
is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant
shall be enforced.

Petitioners contend that the application for search warrant
was defective. They aver that the application for search warrant
filed by SI Lagasca was not personally endorsed by the NBI Head,
Director Wycoco, but instead endorsed only by Deputy Director
Nasol and that while SI Lagasca declared that Deputy Director
Nasol was commissioned to sign the authorization letter in behalf of
Director Wycoco, the same was not duly substantiated. Petitioners
conclude that the absence of the signature of Director Wycoco was a
fatal defect that rendered the application on the questioned search
warrant void per se, and the issued search warrant null and void
“because the spring cannot rise above its source.”
[24]


We disagree. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the
heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating
their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search
warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book
IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other
subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be
specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent
with law. The said provision reads:

Chapter 6 – POWERS AND DUTIES OF HEADS OF
BUREAUS AND OFFICES

Sec. 31. Duties of Assistant Heads and
Subordinates. – (1) Assistant heads and other
subordinates in every bureau or office shall perform
such duties as may be required by law or

13. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
13

regulations, or as may be specified by their
superiors not otherwise inconsistent with law.

(2) The head of bureau or office may, in the
interest of economy, designate the assistant head to
act as chief of any division or unit within the
organization, in addition to his duties, without
additional compensation, and

(3) In the absence of special restriction
prescribed by law, nothing shall prevent a
subordinate officer or employee from being assigned
additional duties by proper authority, when not
inconsistent with the performance of the duties
imposed by law.

Director Wycoco’s act of delegating his task of endorsing the
application for search warrant to Deputy Director Nasol is allowed
by the above quoted provision of law unless it is shown to be
inconsistent with any law. Thus, Deputy Director Nasol’s
endorsement had the same force and effect as an endorsement
issued by Director Wycoco himself. The finding of the RTC in the
questioned Orders that Deputy Director Nasol possessed the
authority to sign for and in behalf of Director Wycoco is
unassailable.

Petitioners also assert that the questioned Search Warrant was
void ab initio. They maintain that A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC, which
was enacted on January 25, 2000, was no longer in effect when the
application for search warrant was filed on February 15, 2002. They
argue that the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, should have been applied, being the
later law. Hence, the enforcement of the search warrant in Angeles
City, which was outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC Manila,
was in violation of the law.

The petitioners’ contention lacks merit.

A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC provides that the guidelines on the
enforceability of search warrants provided therein shall continue
until further orders from this Court. In fact, the guidelines in A.M.
No. 99-10-09-SC are reiterated in A.M. No. 03 -8-02-SC
entitled Guidelines On The Selection And Designation Of Executive
Judges And Defining Their Powers, Prerogatives And
Duties, which explicitly stated that the guidelines in the issuance of
search warrants in special criminal cases by the RTCs of Manila and

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14

Quezon City shall be an exception to Section 2 of Rule 126 of the
Rules of Court, to wit:
[25]


Chapter V. Specific Powers, Prerogatives and Duties
of
Executive Judges in Judicial Supervision

Sec. 12. Issuance of search warrants in
special criminal cases by the Regional Trial Courts
of Manila and Quezon City. – The Executive Judges
and, whenever they are on official leave of absence or
are not physically present in the station, the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon
City shall have authority to act on applications filed
by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the
Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime
Task Force (ACTAF), for search warrants involving
heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the
Intellectual Property Code, the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs
Code, as amended, and other relevant laws that may
hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included
herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be personally endorsed
by the heads of such agencies and shall particularly
describe therein the places to be searched and/or the
property or things to be seized as prescribed in the
Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-
Executive Judges concerned shall issue the warrants,
if justified, which may be served in places outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the said courts.
The Executive Judges and the authorized
Judges shall keep a special docket book listing names
of Judges to whom the applications are assigned, the
details of the applications and the results of the
searches and seizures made pursuant to the warrants
issued.
This Section shall be an exception to Section
2 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. (italics ours)

In sum, we cannot find any irregularity or abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying
petitioners’ Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress
Evidence Illegally Seized. On the contrary, Judge Guariña III had
complied with the procedural and substantive requirements for
issuing the questioned search warrant.

WHEREFORE , the petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED. The Orders dated September 6, 2002 and
April 21, 2003, both issued by respondent Judge Omar T. Viola of
the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

15. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
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SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 117412. December 8, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and VALENTINO C. ORTIZ, respondents.

16. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
16

D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals promulgated on September 27, 1994, in CA-G.R. SP No.
301291. The decretal portion of the assailed decision reads:
“WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly the
respondent court’s Order of 25 January 1993 is hereby SET ASIDE
and the firearms and ammunition irregularly and unreasonably
seized pursuant to the search warrant of 13 August 1992 are
declared inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any
proceeding, consequently to be disposed of by the respondent court
pursuant to applicable law.
“SO ORDERED.”
[1 ]

The facts of the present case, as adopted from the findings of
the Office of the Solicitor General, are as follows:
On August 13, 1992, operatives of the Philippine National
Police- Special Investigation Service Command (PNP-CISC) were
conducting a surveillance of suspected drug-pushing activities at the
Regine Condominium, Makati Avenue, Makati City. Among their
targeted suspects was private respondent Valentino “Toto” Ortiz.
Spotting the latter alighting from his Cherokee jeep and noting that
he had a suspiciously bulging pants pocket,
[2]
the police officers
immediately moved in and accosted him. Ortiz was frisked and
yielded an unlicensed .25 caliber “Raven” automatic pistol SN-
930291 with one magazine and seven rounds of live .25 caliber
ammunition. A search of his vehicle resulted in the retrieval of a
sealed cellophane packet of methylamphetaminehyrdrochloride or
“shabu” from the glove compartment. The police then took private
respondent into custody.
Later that same day, the PNP-CISC applied for a search warrant
against private respondent for violation of P. D. 1866
[3]
with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parañaque, Branch 77.
Supporting the application were the depositions of two police
officers asserting that they had personal knowledge that private
respondent was keeping in his residence at 148-D Peru Street,
Better Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila, the following
unlicensed firearms: “Baby armalite M-16;
[4]
Shotgun, 12 g; pistol
cal. 9mm; pistol cal. 45 and with corresponding ammunitions
(sic)”
[5]

On the same day, the MTC judge issued Search Warrant No.
92-94 commanding the PNP officers “to make an immediate search
at any reasonable hour of the day or night of the house/s, closed
receptacles and premises above-described and forthwith seize and
take possession”
[6]
the personal property subject of the offense
described in the warrant.
Armed with aforesaid warrant, a PNP CISC -Special
Investigation Group (SIG) team, accompanied by a representative of
the MTC judge and a barangay security officer, went to private
respondent’s residence in Parañaque at about 7:30 P.M. of the same
date to search said premises. Private respondent’s wife and their
child’s nanny were both present during the search, but neither
consented to be a witness to the search. The search resulted in the
seizure of the following unlicensed firearms and ammunition:
“a. One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923
b. One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-9015620
c. One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449
d. Six (6) live ammo. for shotgun.
e. One hundred eighteen (118) live ammo for pistol cal. 9mm

17. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
17

f. Sixteen (16) live ammo. for M16 rifle
g. Thirty (30) live ammo. for pistol cal. 45
h. One (1) magazine for pistol cal. 9mm
i. One (1) magazine (short) for M16 rifle.”
[7 ]

Private respondent’s wife signed a receipt for the seized
firearms and ammunition.
On August 17, 1992, a return of search warrant was executed
and filed by the police with the issuing court.
At the preliminary investigation, the investigating state
prosecutor ruled the warrantless search of private respondent’s
person and jeep in Makati invalid for violating his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
[8]
However, the
prosecutor found the search conducted in Parañaque valid.
On August 25, 1992, private respondent was charged before the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, in Criminal Case No.92-5475, with
violating Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866. The information alleged:
“That on or about August 13, 1992 in the Municipality of Parañaque,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, did then and there,
wilfully (sic), unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession,
a. One (1) pistol cal. 9mm SN-1928923
b. One (1) M16 Rifle (Baby Armalite) SN-9015620
c. One (1) 12 gauge shotgun SN-K593449
d. Six (6) live ammo. for shotgun.
e. One hundred eighteen (118) rds ammo for pistol cal. 9mm
f. Sixteen (16) live ammos (sic). for M16 rifle
g. Thirty (30) live ammo for pistol cal. 45
without lawful authority therefore.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
[9]

On September 25, 1992, private respondent moved for
reinvestigation alleging that the dismissal of the charges against
him arising from the illegal search and seizure in Makati also
applied to the search conducted in his house in Parañaque. The trial
court denied the same. Private respondent moved for
reconsideration and deferral of arraignment, but said motions were
likewise denied.
On November 23, 1992, private respondent moved to quash the
search warrant on the following grounds: (1) that he was not
present when his house was searched since he was then detained at
Camp Crame; (2) that the search warrant was not shown to his wife;
and (3) that the search was conducted in violation of the witness-to-
search rule. The trial court denied the motion to quash for lack of
merit.
On February 5, 1993, private respondent filed with the Court of
Appeals, CA-G.R. SP No. 30129, for certiorari and prohibition of the
order of the trial court denying his motion to quash search warrant.
On September 27, 1994, the appellate court promulgated its
decision declaring as inadmissible in evidence the firearms and
ammunition seized pursuant to Search Warrant No. 92-94.
Hence, the instant case anchored on the following assignments
of error:

18. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
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I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT EXECUTION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
AT 7:30 P.M. WAS UNREASONABLE, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE WARRANT ITSELF AUTHORIZED SEARCH AT
NIGHT.
II
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH
WARRANT VIOLATED SECTION 7 RULE 126 OF THE RULES
OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.
III
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT NO RETURN WAS PREPARED WHEN
ANNEX “G” WAS PREPARED AND SUBMITTED BY CHIEF
INSP. JESUS A. VERSOZA, GROUP COMMANDER OF SIG,
CISC, CAMP CRAME.
IV
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT THE PROSECUTION INVOKED A
PRESUMPTION WITHOUT SHOWING BY LEGALLY
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT
WAS IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAW.
Petitioner’s grounds for this petition may be reduced to one
issue: Whether or not the court a quo erred in holding that the
firearms and ammunition seized from private respondent’s house
are inadmissible as evidence for being the fruits of an illegal search.
The appellate court ruled the search wanting in due process for
having been done at an unreasonable time of the evening causing
“inconvenience” to the occupants of private respondent’s house,
especially as there was no showing how long the nighttime search
lasted. The court a quo applied the doctrine in Asian Surety &
Insurance Co. v. Herrera, 54 SCRA 312 (1973), where we
invalidated a nighttime search conducted on the basis of a warrant
which did not specify the time during which the search was to be
made.
Before us, petitioner contends that Asian Surety is inapplicable
since the search warrant specified that the search be made at a
reasonable hour of day or night.
The rule governing the time of service of search warrants is
Section 8 of Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
“Sec. 8. Time of making search. – The warrant must direct that it be
served in the day time, unless the affidavit asserts that the property
is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched, in which
case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the
day or night.”
The general rule is that search warrants must be served during
the daytime. However, the rule allows an exception, namely, a
search at any reasonable hour of the day or night, when the
application asserts that the property is on the person or place
ordered to be searched. In the instant case, the judge issuing the
warrant relied on the positive assertion of the applicant and his
witnesses that the firearms and ammunition were kept at private
respondent’s residence. Evidently, the court issuing the warrant was
satisfied that the affidavits of the applicants clearly satisfied the
requirements of Section 8, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. The rule
on issuance of a search warrant allows for the exercise of judicial
discretion in fixing the time within which the warrant may be
served, subject to the statutory requirement
[1 0]
fixing the maximum

19. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
19

time for the execution of a warrant.
[1 1 ]
We have examined the
application for search warrant,
[1 2]
and the deposition of the
witnesses supporting said application,
[1 3]
and find that both
satisfactorily comply with the requirements of Section 8, Rule 126.
The inescapable conclusion is that the judge who issued the
questioned warrant did not abuse his discretion in allowing a search
“at any reasonable hour of the day or night.” Absent such abuse of
discretion, a search conducted at night where so allowed, is not
improper.
[1 4]

As prescribed in Adm. Circular No. 13 of the Supreme Court
dated October 1, 1985:
“e. Search warrants must be in duplicate, both signed by the
judge. The duplicate copy thereof must be given to the person
against whom the warrant is issued and served. Both copies of the
warrant must indicate the date until when the warrant shall be valid
and must direct that it be served in the daytime. If the judge is
satisfied that the property is in the person or in the place ordered to
be searched, a direction may be inserted in the warrants that it be
served at any time of the day or night;”
But was the time during which the search was effected
“reasonable?”
Petitioner submits that 7:30 P.M. is a reasonable time for
executing a search warrant in the metropolis. We find no reason to
declare the contrary. The exact time of the execution of a warrant
should be left to the discretion of the law enforcement
officers.
[1 5]
And in judging the conduct of said officers, judicial
notice may be taken not just of the realities of law enforcement, but
also the prevailing conditions in the place to be searched. We take
judicial notice that 7:30 P.M. in a suburban subdivision in Metro
Manila is an hour at which the residents are still up-and-about. To
hold said hour as an unreasonable time to serve a warrant would
not only hamper law enforcement, but could also lead to absurd
results, enabling criminals to conceal their illegal activities by
pursuing such activities only at night.
[1 6]

The policy behind the prohibition of nighttime searches in the
absence of specific judicial authorization is to protect the public
from the abrasiveness of official intrusions.
[1 7 ]
A nighttime search is
a serious violation of privacy.
[1 8]
In the instant case, there is no
showing that the search which began at 7:30 P.M. caused an “abrupt
intrusion upon sleeping residents in the dark”
[1 9]
or that it caused
private respondent’s family such prejudice as to make the execution
of the warrant a voidable act. In finding that the duration of the
search could have caused “inconvenience” for private respondent’s
family, the appellate court resorted to surmises and conjectures.
Moreover, no exact time limit can be placed on the duration of a
search.
[20]

But was the witness-to-search rule violated by the police
officers who conducted the search notwithstanding the absence of
private respondent and despite the refusal of the members of his
household to act as witnesses to the search?
The witness-to-search rule is embodied in Section 7 of Rule
126, which reads:
“Sec. 7. Search of house, room, or premise, to be made in presence
of two witnesses. – No search of a house, room, or any other
premise shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant
thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter,
in the presence of two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.”
Petitioner submits that there was no violation of the
aforementioned rule since the searchers were justified in availing of
two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion, after respondent’s
wife and maid refused. The regularity of the search is best evidenced
by the “Certification of Orderly Search” and the receipt of the
property seized signed by respondent’s wife.

20. ALLFORJESUS CRIMPRO RULE126
20

We find merit in the petitioner’s argument that private
respondent’s wife had no justifiable reason to refuse to be a witness
to the search and that her refusal to be a witness cannot hamper the
performance of official duty. In the absence of the lawful occupant
of the premises or any member of his family, the witness-to-search
rule allows the search to be made “in the presence of two witnesses
of sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality.” There
was no irregularity when the PNP-CISC team asked the bailiff of the
Parañaque court and the barangay security officer to act as
witnesses to the search. To hold otherwise would allow lawful
searches to be frustrated by the mere refusal of those required by
law to be witnesses.
In our view, the conduct of the nighttime search was reasonable
under the circumstances in this case. The unlicensed firearms and
ammunition taken from private respondent’s residence pursuant to
Search Warrant No. 92-94, are admissible in evidence against
private respondent.
WHEREFORE , the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision
dated September 24, 1994 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No.
SP 30129 is REVERSED and NULLIFIED. The firearms and
ammunition seized from the residence of the Valentino C. Ortiz,
pursuant to the search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Parañaque, dated August 13, 1992, shall be admissible as
evidence in proceedings instituted by the State.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr.,
JJ., concur.