Beneath the Surface Navigating the Depths of Internet Connectivity

Beneath the Surface Navigating the Depths of Internet Connectivity

1. Beneath the Surface: Navigating the Depths of Internet Connectivity Mr. Rupesh Mittal

2. World Map with submarine cable route

3. A complete undersea telecommunication cable system includes fiber-optic cable encased in layers of material (e.g., plastic, steel, aluminum) for protection from water damage and for insulation.

4. Ownership Commercial undersea cables can be owned by a single company or a consortium of companies. Cable owners include telecommunication providers, undersea cable companies, content providers (e.g., Facebook), and cloud computing service providers (e.g., Google, Microsoft, Amazon). Owners are investing in new undersea telecommunication cables to: increase capacity to meet an expected increase in demand for mobile data, internet services, and cloud services; expand coverage to serve new regions and customers; and, generate new revenue.

5. Maritime Zones Based on the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)

6. Damage to cables may be caused by intentional acts (e.g., cutting of cables) and unintentional damage (e.g., fishing, anchoring, or natural disasters), Threats to Undersea Telecommunication Cables

7. Intentional Damage Intentional acts of damage to cables occur, but are rare, according to TeleGeography. While some intentional incidents (e.g., cutting of cables, vandalism) are publicly reported, the actual number of incidents globally or in the Asia-Pacific remains unknown . Intentional damage to undersea telecommunication cable systems may include physical damage to cables, such as cutting cables at sea or on land, or attacking cable landing stations. In 2022, two separate attacks on undersea telecommunication cables in France consisted of individuals cutting cables after breaking into cement casings at several cable landing sites These attacks were described as “coordinated” and “unprecedented” in scale by telecommunication industry representatives. The cable cuts disrupted communications in several parts of France, and slowed traffic globally.

8. Un- Intentional Damage Unintentional damage to undersea telecommunications cables can be caused by human activities such as anchoring (most commonly related to shipping) and commercial fishing. Natural hazards such as submarine landslides, volcanos, earthquakes, tsunamis, and strong waves and currents Animal threats (e.g., sharks or barracuda that may bite cables), although rare. As stated earlier, TeleGeography estimates there are, on average, 100 cable breaks a year globally. The majority of incidents (about 75%) are caused by human activities, mainly fishing, anchoring, and other activities. About 14% of cable breaks are caused by natural hazards (e.g., earthquakes), and 6% by equipment failure.

9. Unintentional damage due to an volcanic eruption in January 2022 near Tonga. Tonga is an archipelago situated along the series of fault lines called the ‘Ring of Fire’ in the Pacific region, is quite prone to earthquakes and volcanic activities.

10. Challenges in Protecting Cables

11. Private Sector and Multinational Ownership Cables are mostly owned by private entities, raising concerns about vulnerabilities due to: Consortiums: Ownership by multiple companies from different countries might create security gaps. Foreign involvement: Foreign companies may have access to cables and landing stations, potentially affecting Asia-Pacific / Global communication. Varying standards: Security practices differ across companies and countries, leading to potential weaknesses.

12. Cross-Jurisdictional and Cross-Cutting Nature of Cables Multiple jurisdictions: Cables span various areas with different governing bodies (local, state, federal, international) each having distinct laws and procedures. Varying regulations: These jurisdictions may have conflicting or insufficient regulations for cable protection, leading to inconsistencies in their safety. Conflicting priorities: Different jurisdictions may prioritize other interests like environmental protection or infrastructure development, potentially compromising cable security. Overlapping responsibilities: In some cases, multiple agencies share responsibility for cable security, leading to confusion and potential gaps in oversight. Cross-cutting issues: Cables touch on various fields (environment, security, commerce etc.), making it hard for a single agency or committee to handle them comprehensively. Federal-state conflicts: Federal policies might clash with state/local regulations, hindering consistent protection across landing sites.

13. Emerging Risks from Other Offshore Activities Increased activity: Offshore wind farms, deep-sea mining, and oil & gas exploration pose risks to existing cables during installation, operation, and access. Lack of awareness: Project planners and permitting agencies often lack knowledge of existing cables and their protection needs. Clustering risk: Decisions favoring other activities may limit cable route options, forcing cables to cluster together. Damage at such "single points of failure" could cripple the entire network. Risk to new and existing cables: New infrastructure may damage existing cables, while new cables may struggle to find diverse routes and landing sites, increasing their vulnerability.

14. Lack of a Robust Strategy to Protect Cables Asia Pacific Countries At-large lacks robust undersea cable protection : APAC lacks a dedicated strategy, desp ite focus by agencies in safegaurding critical infrastructure protection. Existing plans don't address cables: Even relevant plans like the 2015 Communication Sector Plan mention cables vaguely without concrete actions or risk mitigation. Global challenge: Other countries face similar issues and are starting to address them, highlighting the need for the APAC countries to catch up.

15. Lack of a Lead Federal/Nodal Agency on Cable Protection Urgent need for a lead agency: Reports call for a single point of contact to raise awareness, guide protection efforts, and ensure communication continuity. Current system fragmented: No agency handles cable owner inquiries, investigates suspicious activity, or coordinates issue resolution. Existing regulations ineffective without better coordination: Fragmented approach hinders the effectiveness of existing cable protection measures.

16. Multiple Entities Involved in Review and Permitting Multiple agencies involved: Different federal entities with varying mandates and laws oversee cable projects, potentially overlooking crucial protection aspects. State and local involvement adds complexity: Further complicating the process, state and local agencies also have a say in cable permitting.

17. Lack of Coordination During Review and Permitting Lack of coordination between agencies and lack of awareness of cable protection needs. Permitting processes for cables and other marine infrastructure are not coordinated. The FCC and other U.S. agencies responsible for critical infrastructure security do not have direct input into other agencies’ permitting decisions. Agencies making decisions about cables or other marine activities may not always be aware of existing cables and cable protection needs. Challenges to coordinating include the increasingly crowded marine environment, competing stakeholder interests, differing agency interests and mandates, and complex jurisdictional authorities.

18. Lack of Awareness of Cable Protection Needs Agencies planning undersea projects may not be aware of existing cables. Agencies and companies often don't consider cable impact or best practices for protection. Cable industry proposes "call before you dig" approach for cables. FCC recommended as central point of contact and information clearinghouse for cables. Similar to Australia's model for cable coordination.

19. APAC Actions to Protect Cables The APAC countries has taken various actions to protect cables landing in the APAC from physical damage, as discussed below: Cable Protection Consideration in Establishing Anchorages Enhanced Access to Repair Vessels Penalties for Damages Cable Outage Reporting System

20. Australia's model for cable coordination Central Authority: Communication regulatory agency acts as the central point of contact for cable issues. Information Clearinghouse: Maintains database of existing & planned cables, installation/repair needs, and cable protection guidelines. Stakeholder Engagement: Coordinates with cable companies, marine activities (fishing, development) to facilitate awareness and communication.

21. The Way Ahead ..