The Commons 7
Openness, co- ownership and self- management can result in a constantly
improving collective repository of material and immaterial resources (best ideas
and practices); hence, the free/ open- source technologies of the Internet and the
digital commons add up to local (rural and urban) commons, thus forming the
cosmo- local commons.
The commons favour decentralisation over central control, bottom- up
self- management over hierarchical top- down management, sustainability over
growth at no cost, open access over privacy, cooperation over competition,
solidarity over self- interest, and distribution of value over profit maximisa-
tion (Bauwens, Kostakis & Pazaitis 2019; Bollier & Helfrich 2015; Kostakis &
Bauwens 2014). CBPP (Benkler 2006) introduces new and radical forms of
ownership, governance, operation and financialisation in a mission to empower
communities against the pervasive economic inequalities and power asym-
metries of neoliberalism. CBPP is considered to enhance gender balance,
increase flexibility, diffuse knowledge and reduce waste and transaction costs,
thereby reaching higher levels of social innovation, democratic inclusion and
environmental sustainability (Bauwens, Kostakis & Pazaitis 2019). Eventually,
commoning and open sourcing become mechanisms to scale the impact of
eco- techno- social innovation.
Local Commons
The commons can be classified in two basic types: local and global commons
(Kostakis & Bauwens 2014; Bollier & Helfrich 2012, 2015, 2019). Local
commons comprise rural and urban commons. Rural commons include
ecovillages (e.g. the Cloughjordan ecovillage), community- supported agricul-
ture, community land trusts, biocultural commons (e.g. the Potato Park of Peru)
and all types of commons examined by Elinor Ostrom (1990), such as forests,
fisheries, pastures, groundwater basins and irrigation fields. Urban commons
include community gardens, housing associations, cultural commons, fab labs
(digital fabrication laboratories), food co- ops, energy co- ops, neighbourhood
budgeting and local currencies, among others (Foster & Iaione 2016).
The Tragedy of the Commons
Garrett Hardin’s (1968) famous argument on the tragedy of the commons holds
that an open- access commons such as a pasture cannot sustain itself due to the
free- rider problem. In the absence of contracts, self- interest induces farmers
either to underuse or overuse the pasture. Self- interest prevails over collective
action, resulting either in the underuse or depletion of the common- pool
resource. A real- world example is the Grand Banks Fisheries off the coast of
Newfoundland, Canada. For centuries the supply of codfish was plentiful. In the
1960s and 1970s fishing technology improved and allowed much larger catches.
By the 1990s cod populations were so depleted that the Grand Banks Fisheries
became bankrupt. The cod stocks had been damaged irreparably (Maples 2018).