Collective Security (challenges and weaknesses) a LoN presentation.pptx

kofiasarpong13 7 views 13 slides Sep 16, 2025
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Collective security and the League’s involvement in the resolution of disputes (Challenges) Kofi Sarpong

Vilna 1920 The first successful challenge to the League of Nations’ authority came as early as 1920. A disagreement arose between Poland and Lithuania, two countries whose borders had been defined by the post-First World War settlement agreed at the Paris Peace Conference. Vilna (Vilnius) was the capital of Lithuania, but its population was mostly Polish. In 1920, Polish troops occupied Vilna, the capital of Lithuania. Following a request by Lithuania, the League of Nations ordered Poland to remove its forces and tried to arrange a plebiscite to decide the region’s future. Although the Polish government originally agreed, it subsequently reinforced its troops in Vilna, and in 1922 Poland formally occupied the city and its surrounding area. This territory remained in Polish hands until 1939. One of the main reasons for the League’s failure to resolve this incident is the fact that both Britain and France supported the Polish claim to Vilna . The key to understanding the League’s failure in this case is the role played by Britain and France, both of which supported Poland’s claim to Vilna. France in particular was keen to keep Poland as an ally in the event of any future conflict with Germany. Without the support of these two major powers, the League of Nations was powerless to enforce its decision. As early as 1920, therefore, the fundamental weaknesses of the League of Nations were fatally visible. Britain and France were putting their own national interests ahead of their commitment to the League.

The Treaty of Riga 1923 In 1920, Poland invaded Russian territory. By 1921, the Russians had no choice but to sign the Treaty of Riga, by which Poland gained some 80,000 square kilometres (31,000 square miles) of land. The League of Nations took no action against Poland’s open aggression. This was because Russia was not a member of the League at that time and its communist government was unpopular in Britain and France, neither of which had any interest in defending it.

The invasion of the Ruhr 1923 German failure to pay war reparations led France and Belgium to invade the Ruhr, Germany’s most important industrial region, in 1923. By taking this action, two members of the League of Nations were effectively breaking the rules to which they had committed themselves by signing the League’s Covenant. Both France and Belgium were represented on the League of Nations’ Council – France as a permanent member, Belgium as a non-permanent member. Since decisions of the Council had to be unanimous, the League was effectively prevented from taking action to deal with this incident. It was the Dawes Plan of 1924 that finally led to the withdrawal of French and Belgian troops from the Ruhr region.

The Corfu Incident In 1923, Italy blamed Greece for the death of three Italian officials monitoring the border between Greece and Albania. Mussolini demanded compensation and occupied the Greek island of Corfu. Greece appealed to the League of Nations, which ordered the Italian troops to withdraw. Mussolini refused to accept that the League had the authority to deal with this issue. He threatened to withdraw Italy from the League and referred the matter instead to the Council of Ambassadors. The Council decided that Greece should pay considerable compensation to Italy. This incident exposed two major weaknesses of the League of Nations . First, as a member of the League of Nations Council, Italy was in a position to prevent the League from taking any action. Second, the League’s decision was effectively overruled by another body – the Council of Ambassadors. During the 1920s, therefore, it became clear that the League of Nation’s effectiveness was heavily dependent on the attitudes of its most powerful members. With their support, the League was able to arrange and enforce peaceful settlements to a number of international disputes. Although disagreeing with the League’s decision over the Åland Islands, for example, Sweden had no alternative but to accept it because of the threat of collective action backed by the economic and military strength of Britain, France and Italy. However, the League was ineffective when these powerful nations put their own interests above their commitment to the League of Nations as, for example, over the issues of the Ruhr invasion and the Corfu Incident. Even during the 1920s, therefore, many member states were already expressing concern that the League provided no real guarantee of international peace and security.

Weaknesses of the League of Nations

Created by an unpopular peace settlement The League emerged from the treaties agreed at the Paris peace settlement. From the beginning, therefore, the League was closely associated with treaties that were unpopular in many countries and which inevitably led to several territorial disputes. To many observers, the League of Nations was an organisation created by, and for the benefit of, the First World War’s victorious nations – a perception reinforced by the fact that none of the defeated nations was initially allowed to join.

Member states The League of Nations had been conceived as a global organisation. However, of the world’s major powers only Britain and France were members of the League throughout the period 1919–39. Of the other major powers: Germany was not allowed to join until 1926, and withdrew in 1933 Japan, a founder member, also withdrew in 1933 the USSR, in the wake of its communist revolution, had not been invited to take part in the Paris Peace Conference, and did not join the League of Nations until 1934 Italy, a founder member, withdrew in 1935 the USA never joined the League.

The USA’S refusal to join the League of Nations It is, perhaps, the supreme irony that the USA rejected the post-war peace settlement and the League of Nations, despite the fact that its president had been so instrumental in the creation of both. By the time Wilson returned to the USA from the Paris Peace Conference, the Republican Party had gained control of the Senate. For all Wilson’s attempts to convince the American people of the League’s importance, both to the world in general and to the USA in particular, the Senate voted against him on 19 November 1919. To most Americans, the best way of ensuring that the USA did not become involved in another war was a return to the policy of isolationism. The USA’s refusal to join the League was a significant blow to its prospects of success, reducing both its trustworthiness and its financial security.

Other organisations The League’s authority was frequently undermined. For example, the Council of Ambassadors had been established to oversee the post-war treaties until such time as the League of Nations was fully effective. In reality, it continued to function until 1931 and on several occasions it disagreed with and took precedence over the League’s decisions (as in the Corfu Incident). Similarly, countries often chose to ignore the League entirely, preferring to make separate agreements, such as the Locarno Treaties of 1925.

The need for unanimity The Covenant of the League of Nations required that decisions, both within the General Assembly and the Council, must be unanimous. Countries would clearly not be willing to accept the possibility that their actions might be determined by the decisions of other nations. Thus the requirement for unanimity provided them with the right of veto – the ability to prevent a decision being reached and acted upon. However, this need for everyone to be in agreement slowed down the League’s decision-making process, especially since many decisions required approval by the General Assembly, which met only once a year. As a result, the League appeared both slow and indecisive.

Collective Security The League’s ability to confront aggression and threats to world peace was entirely dependent upon the notion of collective security – League members working together to impose economic sanctions or, in the worst case situation, taking military action. This is reflected in Article 11 of the Covenant, which states ‘Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.’ In the absence of its own army, the League expected member states to provide troops if military action became necessary (Article 16). However, a resolution passed in 1923 established that each member state could decide for itself whether or not to provide armed forces in a crisis. This clearly undermined the entire principle on which collective security was based. In both Britain and France, where public opinion was strongly anti-war, there was an comprehensible unwillingness to commit to military action. Governments in both countries believed that they were militarily weak and that war must be avoided at all costs.

National interests At times, countries discovered that their commitments to the League of Nations were at odds with their own national interests. In 1921, for example, the League took no action in response to Poland’s conflict with the USSR because neither Britain nor France had any desire to help a country that was not a member of the League and whose communist government they saw as a threat. Similarly, France would clearly not endorse any League action against its own occupation of the Ruhr in 1923. In the final analysis, the League of Nations was only as strong as the willingness of its member states to support it. That willingness was often found wanting.