Department of Defense COR HANDBOOK March 22,

Department of Defense

COR HANDBOOK

March 22, 2012

Director, Defense Procurement
and Acquisition Policy

OUSD(AT&L)

1

Foreword

The Department of Defense (DoD) relies heavily on the private
sector to carry out aspects

of the Department’s mission. Because of the critical reliance on
contractor support and
the large expenditures involved, contract surveillance is vital to
ensure contractors are
providing quality services and supplies in a timely manner; to
mitigate contractor
performance problems; and to ensure the Federal Government
(Government) receives
best value for the Warfighter.

Contract quality performance is the responsibility of both the
contractor and the
Government. The contractor is responsible for carrying out its
obligations under the
contract in terms of quality, timeliness and cost. The
Government is responsible for
ensuring that services and supplies acquired conform to the
quality and performance
requirements of the contract.

Contract quality surveillance is an essential activity. In most
cases, contract quality
surveillance is the responsibility of the requiring organization
— the organization most
familiar with the technical complexities and nuances of the
requirement — with
assistance from the contracting office. The requiring
organization prescribes contract
quality requirements that the contracting office includes in
contracts. Members of the
requiring organization are designated specific authority by the
Contracting Officer to
conduct contract surveillance as a Contracting Officer’s
Representative (COR) in order to
verify that the contractor is fulfilling contract requirements and
to document performance

for the contract record. These CORs function as the eyes and
ears of the Contracting
Officer and are a liaison between the Government and
contractor when executing
surveillance responsibilities.

DoD1 policy requires that the requiring activity/COR
management participate in
nominating CORs and assess their performance of COR
responsibilities. COR
management affirms that the COR will be afforded necessary
resources (time, equipment,
opportunity) to perform designated COR responsibilities.

This COR handbook addresses key aspects of contract quality
surveillance and the roles
and responsibilities of the Contracting Officer, the COR and the
requiring activity/COR
management. It is a comprehensive resource for the Contracting
Officer, COR

1
Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Monitoring Contr
act Performance in Contracts for Services,” 22

August 2008, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2
008‐0468‐DPAP.pdf.

3

Contents

Introduction

Chapter 1: The Importance of Contract Surveillance
Related Duties
Chapter 1. Key Points

Chapter 2: Roles and Responsibilities for Contract Surveillance
Nomination, Designation, and Appointment of the COR
Performance of COR Functions
Termination of COR Appointment
DoD COR Tracking (CORT) Tool
Chapter 2. Key Points

Chapter 3: Ethics and Integrity
Review of Standards
Working with Contractor Employees
Transportation and Travel
Awards and Certificates
Procurement Integrity
Compensation after Leaving Federal Employment
Penalties
Personal Conflicts of Interest for Contractor Employees
Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest
Organizational Conflicts of Interest
Bribery
Anti-Kickback Act
Gratuities
Gifts
Reporting Gifts
Protecting the Integrity of the Acquisition Process
Chapter 3. Key Points

Chapter 4: The Acquisition Team and Process
The Acquisition Team
The Acquisition Process
Chapter 4. Key Points

4

Chapter 5: COR Responsibilities
Post-Award Duties
Understanding the Contract
Keeping Files Current and Complete
Correspondence and Responses
Correspondence with the Contractor
Notifications to the Contracting Officer
Monitoring Contract Performance
Inspect and Accept/Reject Deliverables
Proprietary and Classified Information
Managing Problems
Handling Unsatisfactory Performance
Tracking Modifications
Conclude Appointment/Designation Appropriately
Technical Expertise
Limitations
Protecting Sensitive or Government Information
Related Duties
Pre-Award Duties
Chapter 5. Key Points

Chapter 6: Contract Structure
Categories and Types of Contracts
Categories of Contracts
Types of Contracts

Fixed-Price Contracts
Cost-Reimbursement Contracts
Contracts for Commercial Items
Contract Structure
UCF Part I — The Schedule
UCF Part II — Contract Clauses
UCF Part III — List of Documents, Exhibits, and Other
Attachments
UCF Part IV — Representations and Instructions
Order of Precedence
Contract Structure – Solicitations/Contracts for Commercial
Items
Structure – Task or Delivery Orders
Contract Language Rules
Contract Numbers (For Example: N00062-90-C-0001)
Chapter 6. Key Points

Chapter 7: Contract Administration
Post-Award Orientation (Kick-Off)

5

Conducting the Post-Award Orientation
Topics for Discussion at the Post-Award Meeting
Contractor/System Compliance
Contractor Accountability through SPOT
Performance Monitoring
Contract Modifications
Reasons for Contract Modifications
Types of Contract Modifications
Contract Options
Contract Changes
Constructive Changes

Unauthorized Commitments
Ratification of Unauthorized Commitments
Ratification Process
Technical Evaluation
Cost/Price Evaluation
Completion/Payment
Acceptance
Documenting Acceptance
Wide Area Workflow
Nonconformance
Remedies for Nonconformance
Acceptance of Nonconforming Supplies or Services
Invoice and Payment
Contents of a Valid Invoice
Voucher and Invoice Review
Overtime
Interest Penalties
Warranties
Implied Warranties
Express Warranties
Past Performance
Contract Closeout
DOs and DON’Ts: Contract Administration
Chapter 7. Key Points

Chapter 8: Monitoring the Contractor
Contractor Progress Reports
Assessing Performance
Acceptable Inspection Methods
Random or Stratified Sampling
100 Percent Inspection

6

Periodic Inspection or Planned Sampling
User Feedback
Documenting Performance
Remedies for Poor Contract Performance
DOs and DON’Ts: Remedies
Delays
Identifying and Verifying a Delay
Notifying the Contracting Officer of the Technical Impact of a
Delay
Assisting the Contracting Officer with Evaluating the
Contractor’s Response
Fraud
Combating Trafficking in Persons
Government Property
Property Responsibilities
Reporting, Reutilization, and Disposition of Government
Property
Contract Termination
Termination for Convenience of the Government
Termination for Cause/Default
Disputes
COR Working File
DOs and DON’Ts: Contract Monitoring
Chapter 8. Key Points

Chapter 9: Monitoring Service Contracts
Personal and Non personal Services
Contractor Inspection Clauses for Service Contracts
Performance Work Statements for Service Contracts
Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans for Service Contracts
QASP Composition and Method
Contract Surveillance Checklist
Incident Reporting
Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act
Chapter 9. Key Points

Chapter 10: Monitoring Construction Contracts
Performance and Payment Bonds
Contractor Inspection Clauses
COR Labor Compliance Checking
Correction of Deficiencies
Liquidated Damages
Differing Site Conditions
Contractual Rights of the Government
Progress Payments

7

Suspension of Work
Chapter 10. Key Points

Chapter 11: Foreign Acquisition and International
Relationships
Domestic Trade
International Trade
Prohibited Sources
U.S. Domestic Preference Legislation
The Buy American Act
Coverage of the Buy American Act
Exceptions to the Buy American Act
The Berry Amendment
Trade Agreements
International Relationships
Business Culture
Additional Guidance
Chapter 11. Key Points

Appendices

Appendix A. Forms
Appendix B. Contract Planning and Source Selection
Appendix C. COR Qualifications and Training
Appendix D. Acronyms and Terms
Appendix E. COR Resources and References
Appendix F. COR Checklists
Appendix G. Metric Conversion Table

Figures
Figure 4-1. Acquisition Team Functions
Figure 4-2. Acquisition Process by Activity
Figure 6-1. Risks of Firm-Fixed-Price versus Cost-
Reimbursable Contracts
Figure 6-2. Contract Structure
Figure 7-1. The Contracting Process
Figure 11-1. A Comparison of the Berry Amendment and the
Buy American Act

Tables
Table 5-1. General COR/Requiring Activity and Contracting
Office Responsibilities
Table 6-1. Contract Types

8

Introduction

This edition of the DoD Contracting Officer’s Representative
Handbook provides basic
knowledge and tools for Contracting Officer’s Representatives
(CORs) to perform
effective contract quality surveillance. The information in this
handbook is extracted

from numerous sources including the Federal Acquisition
Regulation (FAR); the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS); the Joint
Ethics Regulation; and
various other DoD directives, instructions, publications, and
policies.

The handbook is comprehensive in nature to provide as much
information as possible for
the COR. It is organized to aid the COR in finding exactly what
is needed for the
situation at hand. This handbook provides relevant and
comprehensive guidance on
performance of COR functions and the appendices offer
supplemental data for instances
where additional or more specific information is needed.

Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the importance of contract
surveillance and the roles and
responsibilities of the COR, the Contracting Officer and COR
management. Chapter 3
addresses the importance of ethics and integrity in the
acquisition process. Those
discussions serve as the backdrop to discussion of the
acquisition team and acquisition
process (Chapter 4), COR responsibilities (Chapter 5) and an
overview of contracts,
including their categories, types and structure (Chapter 6).

The next four chapters describe various aspects of the COR’s
role in monitoring contract
performance. Chapter 7 provides general information on
contract administration.
Chapter 8 contains information on monitoring contractor
performance, in general, while
Chapters 9 and 10 address monitoring services contracts and

construction contracts,
respectively. Appendices define common terms and
abbreviations and contain resources
and references that CORs may find useful, including
information on COR qualifications
and training, independent government cost estimates (IGCEs),
contract planning, and
source selection.

This handbook is a guide intended to supplement, not replace,
formal COR training.
CORs should refer to their letter of appointment/designation for
their specific duties and
responsibilities assigned by the Contracting Officer. For
information on COR training
refer to Defense Acquisition University (DAU)2.

2
The COR Community of Practice website is located at https://a
cc.dau.mil/cor.

9

Chapter 1:
The Importance of Contract Surveillance

DoD relies on the private sector to carry out many aspects of
the Department’s mission.
The critical nature of contractor support and the large
expenditures involved require that
the Government conduct contract surveillance to ensure that

contractors are providing
quality services and supplies in a timely manner, within cost; to
mitigate contractor
performance problems; and to ensure that the Government
receives best value for the
Warfighter.

The Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) states that the
Contracting Officer is
responsible for ensuring performance of all necessary actions
for effective contracting,
ensuring compliance with the terms of the contract, and
safeguarding the interests of the
United States in its contractual relationships. To perform these
responsibilities,
Contracting Officers are afforded wide latitude to exercise
sound business judgment.
Contracting Officers must ensure that no contract is entered into
unless all requirements
of law, executive orders, regulations, and all other applicable
procedures, including
clearances and approvals, have been met and that contractors
receive impartial, fair, and
equitable treatment. The FAR recognizes that the Contracting
Officer may need advice
and assistance in areas of audit, law, engineering, information
security, transportation,
and other fields, as appropriate.

The requiring organization prescribes contract quality
requirements that the contracting
office includes in contracts. As experts on the contract
requirement, members of the
requiring organization are often delegated specific authority
from the Contracting Officer
to conduct contract surveillance to verify that the contractor is

fulfilling contract delivery
and quality requirements and to document performance for the
contract record. The
requiring activity, coordinating with the contracting office, is
responsible in developing
contract quality assurance, surveillance and performance
assessment plans. These
individuals —Contracting Officer’s Representatives (CORs3) —
function as the eyes and
ears of the Contracting Officer and liaison between the
Government and contractor when
executing surveillance responsibilities. Note, however,
contract surveillance is not
solely the responsibility of the Contracting Officer and the
COR. Others may have
designated surveillance responsibilities under Parts 42, 45, or
46 of the FAR.

The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) 252.201-7000
defines a COR as “an individual designated in accordance with
subsection 201.602-2 of

3
The term “Contracting Officer’s Representative” is used primar
ily by the Army, DoD, DLA and DCMA. The Air
Force uses the term “Quality Assurance Personnel” for an equiv
alent position. Other terms commonly used
include Contracting Officer’s Technical Representative, Task O
rder Manager. “COR” is used throughout this
handbook for simplicity.

10

the DFARS and authorized in writing by the Contracting Officer
to perform specific
technical and administrative functions.” Designation shall be
pursuant to the procedures
at DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI)
201.602-2. CORs monitor
contract performance and provide the Contracting Officer with
documentation that
identifies the contractor’s compliance or noncompliance with
the terms and conditions of
the contract. This documentation becomes part of the official
contract file. It is
important that the COR documents everything, including
conversations and meetings
with the contractor, contractor performance or any other issues.

To ensure that the COR performs contract surveillance, it is
DoD policy that COR
management participate in nominating CORs and assessing their
performance of COR
responsibilities. COR management must also affirm that the
COR will be afforded
necessary resources (time, equipment, opportunity) to perform
designated COR
responsibilities.

The DoD COR standard4 stipulates that the training and
qualifications for, and
surveillance duties assigned to CORs must be commensurate
with the complexity of the
contract requirement (detail on the DoD COR Standard is in
Appendix C). Requirement
types are:

-price requirements without incentives, low
performance risk;
-price requirements without
incentives, low performance

risk; and,
ments that necessitate a
professional license,

higher education, or specialized training beyond the Type B
requirements.

Related Duties

During the pre-award phase (Chapter 4 discusses the
Acquisition Process), the COR
candidate works with the contracting team in requirements
development, preparing the
Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE), developing the
Performance Work
Statement/Statement of Work/Statement of Objectives,
developing quality assurance
surveillance plans (QASPs), etc. During the post-award phase,
the COR may monitor
and assess contractor performance and perform other
responsibilities as assigned by the
Contracting Officer. Again, the COR functions as the eyes and
ears of the Contracting
Officer.

4
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logist

ics) Memorandum, “DoD Standard for Certification

of Contracting Officer’s Representatives (COR) for Services Ac
quisitions,” 29 March 2010,

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA005569‐0
9‐DPAP.pdf.

11

Chapter 1. Key Points

1. The Contracting Officer is the primary Government official
responsible for
ensuring compliance with contractual agreements.

2. Contract surveillance is key to ensuring contractors perform
in accordance with
the terms and conditions of the contract.

3. The COR is a critical individual in supporting the
Contracting Officer, ensuring
successful contractor performance and the fulfillment of the
requiring activities
mission needs.

4. COR training and qualifications are tied to three requirement
types:
a. Type A: Fixed-price requirements without incentives, low
performance

risk;
b. Type B: Other than fixed-price requirements without
incentives, low

performance risk; and,
c. Type C: Unique contract requirements that necessitate a
professional

license, higher education, or specialized training beyond the
Type B
requirements.

12

Chapter 2:
Roles and Responsibilities for Contract Surveillance

The three major phases in the COR process are 1) nomination,
designation and
appointment of the COR based on competencies, experience and
training; 2) performance
of COR functions; and 3) termination of COR appointment. The
Contracting Officer, the
COR, and COR management have specific roles and
responsibilities in each of these
phases.

Nomination, Designation, and Appointment of the COR

The Contracting Officer shall:

o Review the requirement to determine if it requires assistance
in technical

monitoring or administration of the anticipated contract;
o Identify, by the complexity of the work/requirement (Type A,
B, or C), the

duties/responsibilities to be performed by a COR, the
qualification
requirements mandated by the DoD COR Standard; and

o Advise the requiring activity for the need of COR(s) support.
Note: Considerations for multiple CORs include: multiple
locations of
performance, need for constant surveillance, size of
requirement, and subject
technical matter skill sets.

activity/COR

management,
o Review to determine if the COR nominee is trained and
qualified;
o Notify the requiring activity that the COR nominee is
acceptable or identify

deficiencies and request additional nominations as applicable
(Nomination/appointment shall be completed through the COR
Tracking
Tool (CORT Tool) unless a specific waiver is granted by

OUSD(AT&L)
Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, Program
Development and
Implementation (PDI) Directorate);

o Provide an orientation to the COR nominee to address
duties/responsibilities to be delegated; unique terms and
conditions of the
contract; importance of performance; personal conflicts of
interest (COI)
and potential COI; informal commitments/ unauthorized
commitments; and
ethics/integrity in relationships with Contracting Officer/COR
management/contractor; and,

o Designate specific duties/responsibilities to the COR prior to
award and
ensure that the letter of appointment/designation is included in
the contract

13

file. The COR letter of appointment/designation must be signed
by the
Contracting Officer, acknowledged by the COR, and copies
furnished to the
contractor and Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO).

The Requiring Activity/COR Management shall, concurrent with
requirements development or upon receipt of a request from the
Contracting Officer for
COR support:

Identify a prospective COR;
duties/responsibilities to be designated

and the importance of performance of COR
duties/responsibilities;
interest with performing

the duties/responsibilities to be delegated by completing the
Office of
Government Ethics () Form 450, Confidential Financial
Disclosure Report, upon
appointment and prior to contract award;

prior to
contract award;
nominee/COR’s

performance objectives for performance evaluation; and,
Contracting Officer using

the CORT Tool.

The COR Nominee shall:

training to ensure
required training is completed prior to contract award;

and to determine
absence of personal conflicts of interest. COR nominees and
CORs, once
designated, must notify the Contracting Officer and appropriate
COR management
if a potential or actual conflict of interest subsequently arises;

ements
definition/acquisition planning and
contract formation processes; and,

-award process and
performance of COR
duties/responsibilities are properly addressed in individual
performance appraisals.

Performance of COR Functions

The COR shall:

in accordance with
DFARS PGI 201.602-2(ii), Chapter 5 of this handbook, and the
CORT Tool (if
necessary). COR files shall be available for review by the
Contracting Officer,

14

Inspector General, the U.S. Government Accountability Office,
internal review

officials or other officials as authorized by the Contracting
Officer;

erform COR duties/responsibilities as designated by the
Contracting Officer;
-designate or sub-designate COR
duties/responsibilities

to other persons;
Officer. If advised by

the Contracting Officer that reports are inadequate, ensure that
follow-on reports
address issues expected by the Contracting Officer to meet the
adequate standard
in the QASP;

COR designation
will be terminated, ensure all reports/records/communications
are made available
to management, the successor COR and the Contracting Officer;
and,

that the COR cannot
perform effectively, (i.e., personal COI, change in assignment,
etc.), notify COR
management and the Contracting Officer to request that a
successor COR be
designated.

The COR Management shall:

the Contracting
Officer (e.g., time, supplies, equipment, opportunity) for
performance of COR
duties/responsibilities;

performance
assessment throughout the period of the contract. COR
management is
encouraged to solicit input on performance of COR duties from
the Contracting
Officer;

is inadequate, address
issues with COR, reemphasizing need for performance of COR
function. Notify
Contracting Officer of actions completed;

remains inadequate
and that the letter of appointment/designation will be
terminated, take action to
identify/nominate replacement COR and address deficient
performance in the
terminated COR’s performance assessment; and,

and the COR files to
COR management or successor COR, as appropriate.

The Contracting Officer shall:

supervisor;

15

performance with the COR. If
reports/performance continues to be inadequate, discuss COR
performance with
COR management. If reports/performance continue to be
inadequate, notify both
the COR and COR management that the COR designation will
be terminated and
request nomination of the replacement COR; and,

nate COR designation and review nomination of
successor COR.

Termination of COR Appointment

The Contracting Officer shall:

address concerns with the
COR. If performance remains unsatisfactory, notify COR
management of
performance issues. Request COR management to address
performance with the

COR or to nominate a successor COR. Only the Contracting
Officer has the
authority to terminate the COR designation;

activity requests termination of COR
designation due to
transfer, retirement or other causes, the Contracting Officer
must terminate COR
designation. The Requiring Activity/COR Management may not
terminate a COR
designation; and,

of Termination in writing, ensure it is
acknowledged by the
COR and COR management and posted in the CORT Tool.

The COR Management shall:

Officer and
nominate a qualified successor COR, if the COR is unable to
perform for any
reason, including unsatisfactory performance, transfer or
retirement;

nominate a successor
COR, if the Contracting Officer notifies COR management of
COR performance
issues. Issues in performance of COR duties/responsibilities
shall be addressed in
the COR performance assessment; and,

-delegate to

a successor COR any
duties/responsibilities that were delegated to the terminated
COR.

The COR shall:

management in advance of
reassignment or separation from the Government to permit the
requiring activity to
have adequate time to select, train and nominate a successor,
per nomination
procedures defined herein; and,

16

Contracting Officer, as
required.

DoD COR Tracking (CORT) Tool

The DoD CORT Tool is a web based capability for the
appointment and management of
CORs. It provides for the collection of COR training
certificates and the posting of
monthly status reports. It provides built in workflows for the
nomination process to
include email alerts/status reminders for monthly status report
due-ins and delinquencies.

The CORT Tool5 provides contracting personnel and requiring
activities/COR
management the means to track and manage COR assignments
across multiple contracts
DoD-wide. This tool allows a prospective COR, COR
management and Contracting
Officer to electronically process the nomination and
appointment of CORs for one or
multiple contracts.

The CORT Tool is Common Access Card (CAC) enabled and is
available to all DoD
personnel with an Army or Defense Knowledge Online
(AKO/DKO) account. Note:
Your CAC must be registered with AKO/DKO before access to
the DoD CORT Tool can
be obtained.

Chapter 2. Key Points

1. Three COR process phases:
a. nomination and designation of the COR based on
competencies, experience
and training;
b. performance of COR functions; and
c. termination of COR appointment.

2. The requiring activity is critical to identifying and
nominating individuals who
have the right skill set and experience, in addition to requisite
COR certification
requirements.

3. It is mandatory for the COR to maintain individual COR files

for each contract or
order.

4. If a COR knows in advance that he/she will be reassigned or
separated from the
COR duties it’s critical that he/she notify the Contracting
Officer in advance in
order to ensure continued COR support.

5. The DoD CORT Tool is a web based management capability
for the appointment
and management of CORs.

5
More details on the CORT Tool are available at http://www.acq
.osd.mil/dpap/pdi/eb/cor.html.

17

Chapter 3:
Ethics and Integrity

Review of Standards

U.S. Government personnel engaged in contracting and related
activities must be above
reproach in their business dealings with industry. At the same
time, they must protect the
Government’s interests and maintain its reputation for dealing
fairly with contractors.

DoD Directive (DoDD) 5500.07-R, Joint Ethics Regulation,
specifies standards for
contracting and related activities.6 All COR letters of
appointment/designation require
CORs to certify that they have read and understand the Joint
Ethics Regulation. CORs
also should be familiar with the Procurement Integrity Act, § 41
U.S.C. 2101-2107,
which is implemented by regulation at FAR 3.104. To maintain
public confidence in the
U.S Government’s conduct of business with the private sector,
CORs must avoid even
the appearance of a COI.7 CORs who may have direct or
indirect financial interest in an
organization that they are monitoring must advise their
supervisor of the conflict so that
appropriate action may be taken. An organizational or personal
COI is one in which the
COR, because of other activities or relationships with other
people,8 is unable or
potentially unable to render impartial assistance or advice to the
Government, or may
have impaired objectivity in performing the contract work, or a
contractor may have an
unfair competitive advantage due to action or relationships with
the COR.

Every COR and his/her supervisor must certify to the
Contracting Officer that the COR
has officially filed an OGE Form 450, Confidential Financial
Disclosure Report. The
purpose of this report is to assist personnel and their agencies in
avoiding conflicts
between official duties and private financial interests or
affiliations.

Working with Contractor Employees

Contractors are an important component of the total DoD force,
but they are not
Government employees. COI rules do not apply to contractor
employees, even when
they are performing the same or similar work as, or working
side-by-side with,
Government employees. In contrast, Government employees —
public servants — are
accountable for the public trust. The COR’s duties are to the
Government. Although
professional relationships with contractor employees are not
prohibited, favoritism and
preferential treatment are. It is the COR’s duty to always avoid
conflicts of interest and
even the appearance of conflicts of interest. Personal services
contracts (contracts under
which contractor employees appear to be working as
Government employees) are

6
The Joint Ethics Regulation is available at http://www.dod.mil/
dodgc/defense_ethics/ethics_regulation.

7
A conflict of interest is a conflict between an individual’s pers
onal and professional responsibilities.

8
See the full definition at FAR 2.101.

18

prohibited unless specifically authorized by statute.9
Contractor personnel cannot
perform inherently governmental functions. In monitoring
contractor performance, the
COR should avoid interfering with contractor employee
relations. Further, the COR must
not tell contractors to do any of the following:

Transportation and Travel

As a general rule, official travel of a Government employee
must be funded by the
Government. Therefore, sharing a vehicle with a contractor can
pose a problem.
Transportation is acceptable if it is included in a contract
between the Government and a
contractor. Contracts for onsite inspections may contain a
provision requiring the
contractor to make available to the Government employee
reasonable assistance in
carrying out those official duties.

Awards and Certificates

Awards programs are based on statute. Sections 1124–1125 of
Title 10 of the United
States Code (U.S.C.) address military programs, and 5 U.S.C.

4511–4513 address
civilian. There is no statutory authority for giving commander's
coins or similar non-
monetary incentive tokens to contractors; therefore,
appropriated funds cannot be used to
purchase coins that will be given to individuals other than
Government employees.
Further, the Government cannot use certificates to recognize a
contractor or individual
contractor employees, because this could complicate the source
selection process on
future contracts. Contractors may be recognized through a
letter of commendation from
the Government to the contractor organization, which may
choose to in turn recognize an
individual contractor employee. In no event shall a letter of
commendation or any other
recognition be given to a contractor or contractor employee
without first coordinating
such commendation or recognition with the Contracting Officer.

Procurement Integrity

t prohibits the Government
(e.g., COR) from
disclosing contractor bid or proposal information (see FAR
3.104-3). This
includes the following types of information:

o Cost or pricing data;

9
See FAR 37.104, “Personal Services Contracts.”

19

o Indirect costs, direct labor rates, and overhead rates; and,
o Proprietary information about manufacturing processes,
operations, or

techniques marked as such by the contractor.
tor bid or proposal information not restricted or
prohibited from disclosure

includes the following:
o Information already disclosed or made available to public;
o Information disclosed by contractors10; and,
o Information disclosed pursuant to a proper request from
Congress,

Comptroller General, or Inspector General (if certain conditions
are met)
(see FAR 3.104-4(f) and 5.403).

Compensation after Leaving Federal Employment

The Procurement Integrity Act places a 1-year ban on accepting
compensation from
certain contractors after leaving federal employment (see 41
U.S.C. § 2104 and FAR
3.104-3(b)). Procurement officials are required to report any
employment contacts with
contractors. If a member of the acquisition team (e.g., COR) is
participating personally

and substantially in a competitive procurement valued in excess
of the simplified
acquisition threshold, and he or she contacts or is contacted by
a bidder or offeror in the
procurement about employment, it is imperative that the federal
employee:

and ethics counselor
and either;

olvement in the
procurement.

Penalties

Individuals who violate the Procurement Integrity Act11 may be
subject to criminal and
civil penalties: imprisonment of up to 5 years and/or up to a
$50,000 fine per violation
plus twice the amount of compensation an individual or
organization received or was
offered for the prohibited conduct.

Under FAR 3.104-7, contractor penalties may include the
following:

sion of the contract; or

10
FAR 3.104 does not restrict or prohibit a contractor from disclo
sing its own bid or proposal information, nor does

it restrict or prohibit the recipient from receiving that informati
on.
11
See 41 U.S.C. § 2105(a) and FAR 3.104‐3.

20

with the severity

and effect of the violation; or
Government.

Personal Conflicts of Interest for Contractor Employees

The Government’s increased reliance on contracted technical,
business, and procurement
expertise has increased the potential for personal COIs. Unlike
Government employees,
contractor employees are not required to disclose financial or
other personal interests to
the Government that may conflict with the responsibilities they
are performing on behalf
of the Government. The risk associated with personal COIs is
directly related to the
supply or service being acquired and the type of contract used

to secure the supply or
service. The risk increases when contractor employees are
involved with subjective
judgmental work.

Section 841 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2009 directed the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP)
to issue policy to prevent
personal COIs by contractor employees performing acquisition
functions closely
associated with inherently governmental functions. DoD is
following the policies and
procedures of FAR Subpart 9.5.

Organizational and Consultant Conflicts of Interest12

Government decisions in the procurement process must be
objective in fact and
appearance. Favoritism or other improper motives have no
place in the award or
administration of public contracts. Thus, the Government has,
by statute and regulation,
prohibited activity that would improperly influence decision
making or would appear to
do so. Key areas of concern include organizational conflicts of
interest (OCI), bribery,
gratuities, and gifts.

Organizational Conflicts of Interest

OCIs are a circumstance in which a contractor may have
unequal access to Government
information, or the existence of conflicting roles that might bias
a contractor’s
judgment—either of which could lead to an unfair competitive

advantage. OCIs may
occur when a contractor is providing engineering and technical
direction or advisory,
analysis, assistance, and evaluation services; preparing
specifications and work

12
USD (AT&L) Memorandum, “Personal Conflicts of Interest of
Contractors’ Employees,” 24 November 2009,

https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=336117.

21

statement; or acting in a capacity that gives them access to
proprietary data. It is the
Government professional’s duty and legal obligation to ensure
that this is not permitted to
occur. The potential for OCI is a growing concern as the
Government outsources more
technical work to private companies and the defense industry
continues to consolidate.
As the Government partners more with industry, the
opportunities for OCI increase.

Bribery

The term “bribery” means offering or giving something of value
to a Government official

or for a Government official to solicit or receive something of
value in return for
preferential treatment. Bribery is a criminal offense13.

Anti-Kickback Act

The Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 modernized and closed the
loopholes of previous statutes
applying to Government contracts. The act does the following:

include any money,
fees, commission, credit, gift, gratuity, thing of value, or
compensation of any
kind. The inclusion of kickback amounts in contract prices is
prohibited conduct
in itself.

obtaining or rewarding
favorable treatment.”

employees,
subcontractors, and subcontractor employees.

Congress intended the act to embrace the full range of
Government contracting.

Note: “Any person who knowingly and willfully engages in
conduct prohibited by the
Anti- Kickback Act shall be imprisoned for not more than 10
years or shall be subject to
a fine … or both.”14

Never solicit gifts of any type, regardless of their nature or
dollar value. A small number
of contractors and potential contractors are willing to offer
favors in exchange for
business. CORs must understand that a bribe occurs when
someone “directly or
indirectly gives, offers, or promises anything of value to any
public official, former
public official, or person selected to be a public official, for or
because of any official act
performed or to be performed by such public official.” (Note
that the value need not be

13
See 18 U.S.C. § 201.

14
See 41 U.S.C 54 and Articles 92 and 134 of the Uniform Code
of Military Justice.

22

monetary.) Giving or accepting a bribe is a crime punishable by
a fine, imprisonment, or
both.15

Gratuities

Gratuities constitute a crime when offered or given to a
Government official or when a
Government official solicits or receives a gratuity (see 18

U.S.C. § 201 and FAR Subpart
3.2). To be categorized as a gratuity, the item being offered
must be a thing of value and
be presented with the intent of corruption. As a participant in
the acquisition process, the
COR must constantly keep himself or herself on guard to
improper actions or those that
can be construed as such.

Gifts

The term “gift” includes any gratuity, favor, discount,
entertainment, hospitality, loan,
forbearance, or other item having monetary value. It includes
services as well as gifts of
training, transportation, local travel, lodgings and meals,
whether provided in-kind by
purchase of a ticket, payment in advance, or reimbursement
after the expense has been
incurred.

Contractor personnel may offer CORs welcome gifts upon
arrival or souvenirs to take
home in a possible attempt to gain favor provided the gift value
is $20 or less per source
per occasion, not to exceed $50 in the aggregate in a calendar
year from the same
source16. FAR 3.101-2 provides the overarching rule about
accepting gifts from
contractor personnel: do not accept any gratuity, gift, favor,
entertainment, loan, or
anything of value from a prospective or current contractor. In
Government-contractor
relationships, the COR must strictly avoid any conflict of
interest or even the appearance
of a conflict of interest.

Remember, a COR should not accept a gift in return for being
influenced to perform an
official act. Also he or she should not accept gifts so frequently
that a reasonable person
would think the COR is using the position for private gain.

When in doubt, the COR should call an ethics official about
accepting a gift.

15
See 18 U.S.C. 201 and Articles 92 and 134 of the Uniform Cod
e of Military Justice.

16
See 5 C.F.R. § 2635.204.

23

Reporting Gifts

If a gratuity17 is delivered to a COR (e.g., left on the COR’s
desk or car), the COR must
return it. If a contractor insists on giving the COR a gratuity,
the COR must take one of
the following steps:

Explain to the

contractor your inability to accept gratuities as a COR and the
repercussions you
could face if you accept the gratuity.

consult the legal
office.

the contractor appears to be offended, do
the following:
o Accept the gratuity.
o Contact legal counsel immediately.
o Safeguard the gratuity. If necessary, have the finance officer
put the

gratuity in a safe and obtain a receipt from the finance officer.
o Turn the gratuity over to counsel.
o Write a memorandum for the record (MFR) that describes the

circumstances and indicates the approximate value of the
gratuity. Mention
in the MFR that legal advice was obtained.

o If the gratuity is perishable (e.g., food or flowers), share the
gratuity within
the office or dispose of it. Be cautious when consuming food
from
unknown sources.

If there is any doubt about whether a gift should or should not
be accepted, the COR
should consult either the ethics advisor or the legal office. If
neither is available, contact
the Contracting Officer.

Note: Whenever a contractor delivers a gratuity (leaves the
gratuity on the COR’s desk,
slides it under the door, etc.), the COR must return it. If that is
not possible, the COR
must document the incident and turn over the gratuity to the
ethics advisor or legal office
along with his suspicions. The COR must play it safe and be
safe. Whenever in doubt,
consult your ethics advisor or legal office.

Protecting the Integrity of the Acquisition Process

Private firms must be able to compete for the Government’s
business on a scrupulously
fair basis. Fairness is a prerequisite of Government acquisition
due to the Government’s
unique position as representatives of the citizens of the United
States. Fairness also helps
ensure that the Government will obtain its supplies and services
at the best price
available. Government personnel who are associated with the
acquisition process have a

17
See FAR 3.203, “Reporting Suspected Violations of the Gratuit
ies Clause”, for reporting procedures.

24

responsibility to protect its integrity by maintaining fairness in
the Government’s

treatment of all firms.

There are numerous points within the acquisition process where
the potential to lose this
fairness is elevated. For example:

-solicitation: Allowing a vendor or vendors access to
information on a
particular acquisition (especially the specification or work
statement), before such
information is available to the business community at large,
may give the vendor
receiving the information an unfair advantage over others.

ing an unnecessarily
restrictive specification or
work statement that would effectively exclude the products or
services of a vendor
and/or increase the prospects for award to another vendor is an
obviously unfair
practice. Not only does this give advantage to one or more
vendors over others, it
also restricts competition and makes it more likely that the
Government will
ultimately pay a higher price.

Chapter 3. Key Points

1. When performing COR functions an individual must adhere
to the highest
ethical standards.

2. Contact your Ethics attorney when you have any questions or

concerns
regarding any dealings with contractors.

3. There are post-employment restrictions that a COR needs to
understand when
performing as a COR.

4. Key ethics and integrity areas include:
a. Procurement Integrity Act;
b. Personal Conflicts of Interest; and,
c. Gratuities, Gifts, Anti-Kickback Act.

25

Chapter 4:
The Acquisition Team and Process

The acquisition team consists of all participants in the
acquisition process: requiring
activity, contractor, finance, Contracting Officer, legal counsel,
COR, resource manager,
quality assurance representative, and others, as applicable. No
one person has all the
necessary skills for successful contract management. It requires
a team with each
member having specialized expertise and responsibilities. This
chapter identifies and
defines the roles of the acquisition team members and the
importance of team cohesion
and cooperation to ensure the successful delivery of required

supplies and services.
Successful acquisition teams typically assign specific duties,
develop performance
measures and milestones, and hold team members individually
and collectively
accountable. Everyone ensures the team has the target in sight
— it is a team effort.
Figure 4-1 illustrates the acquisition team functions involved in
the successful completion
of the acquisition process.

Figure 4-1. Acquisition Team Functions

26

The Acquisition Team

Contracting Officer

The Contracting Officer is the only individual authorized to
enter into, administer,
change, and terminate contracts. Contracting Officers are
responsible for ensuring that
all contract actions comply with appropriate laws, executive
orders, regulations and other
applicable procedures, and approvals. Appointed/designated
through a warrant with
dollar limitations, Contracting Officers may bind the
Government only to the extent of
the authority delegated to them. The Contracting Officer is the

only person authorized to
designate CORs.

Depending on the nature of the effort and agency procedures, a
contract may require
different types of Contracting Officers:

planning and contract
actions up to and including award of a contract;

responsibility for
administering the day-to-day contractual activities after award
has been made;
and,

Officer (TCO), who assumes
responsibility for
negotiating any termination settlements with the contractor.

Sometimes all three responsibilities reside in one person.

A contract specialist may also be assigned to assist with
contract issuance and
administration; however, he or she does not hold the same
authority as a Contracting
Officer.

Requiring Activity

The requiring activity is the entity that has a requirement for
supplies or services and

requests the initiation of the acquisition. The requiring activity
has personnel who are
responsible for developing command resource requirements,
identifying sources of
funding, determining costs, acquiring funds, distributing and
controlling funds, and
tracking costs and obligations. CORs routinely interface
between the requiring activity
(which is most likely the COR’s organization), the contractor,
and the Contracting
Officer.

27

Legal Counsel

The legal counsel provides legal advice to the acquisition team
and reviews acquisition
documents for legal sufficiency.

COR

The COR is nominated by the requiring activity and is
designated, in writing, by the
Contracting Officer. The COR appointment shall be
acknowledged by both the COR and
COR management. The Contracting Officer shall provide the
contractor notification of

COR assignment. The COR, who will have technical expertise
related to the
requirement, shall monitor the technical or performance aspects
of the contract and
perform other duties specified by the appointment/designation
letter. Ideally, the COR
participates in pre-award activities (such as defining the
requirement) so he or she is
familiar with all aspects of the contract. The COR acts as the
eyes and ears of the
Contracting Officer. Appendix C provides additional
information on COR qualifications
and training.

Quality Assurance Representative

If a Quality Assurance Representative (QAR) from DCMA is
assigned, the COR may
work closely with the QAR. The QAR ensures the contractor is
in compliance with
contractual requirements, evaluates and documents contractor
performance, follows up
with the contractor on documented deficiencies, and provides
input for the Performance
Evaluation Board through the ACO.

Contractor

Once the contract is awarded, the contractor becomes a member
of the Acquisition Team.
FAR 46.105, “Contractor Responsibilities”, directs that the
contractor be responsible,
under the contract, for the following:

or services;
supplies or services that

conform to contract requirements;
required quality

requirements, are within the expected cost, and are delivered on
time; and,

28

Property Administrator

In accordance with FAR 45.201, Government Furnished
Property (GFP) must be
identified and appropriately listed in the contract. The
Contracting Officer may designate
management of GFP to the COR or a Property Administrator.
The Property
Administrator should be a member of the Acquisition Team.

Framework for Team Success

A successful contract often depends on a successful acquisition
team. The key
framework for a successful acquisition team is as follows:

Note: The COR is responsible for bringing any issues or
performance problems to the
attention of the Contracting Officer.

The Acquisition Process

Figure 4-2 depicts a generalized acquisition process as it relates
to the responsibility of
each member on the acquisition team.

Figure 4-2. Acquisition Process by Activity18

18
The Acquisition Review Board (ARB) normally occurs at or abo
ve the requiring activity.

29

The acquisition process begins with acquisition planning
(requirements definition and
funding); proceeds to solicitation, source selection, and award;

and then proceeds to
contract administration, which results in
performance/deliveries. Upon COR acceptance
of the supply or service (if the duty has been authorized by the
Contracting Officer in the
COR’s appointment/designation letter), the acquisition process
concludes with invoicing,
payment, and closeout.

The COR’s primary roles occur during the contract
administration segment of the
acquisition process. It is here that the COR monitors the
contractor’s performance,
ensures quality, documents performance, supports the
Contracting Officer with any
options or modifications, and assists the Contracting Officer
with contract closeout.

Chapter 4. Key Points

1. The acquisition team consists of all participants in the
acquisition process:
a. Contracting Officer;
b. Requiring activity;
c. Legal counsel;
d. COR;
e. Quality assurance representative;
f. Property administrator;
g. Others, as applicable; and
h. Contractor.

2. The Acquisition Process includes the full spectrum of a
procurement to include
pre-award (e.g., developing the requirement), and post-award

(e.g., dispositioning
equipment, final payment, close-out) activities.

30

Chapter 5:
COR Responsibilities

General information about COR responsibilities is provided in
FAR 1.602 and DFARS
201.602, “Contracting Authority and Responsibilities,” and in a
companion resource,
DFARS PGI 201.602-2,“Responsibilities.” The Contracting
Officer specifies the COR’s
responsibilities in the letter of COR appointment/designation.
All duties delegated to the
COR by the Contracting Officer must be in the
appointment/designation letter. If the
duty is not in the letter, then the COR is NOT authorized to
perform that duty. The
COR’s actions or inactions can subject the Government to
disputes or claims and, in
some cases, can result in the COR being personally liable for
his or her actions.
Therefore, the COR must carefully observe the scope and
limitations of the delegated
authorities and should contact the Contracting Officer about any
doubts as to the correct
course of action to be taken.

Post-Award Duties

A COR’s specific duties and responsibilities are detailed in the
letter of COR
appointment/designation. The COR’s responsibilities begin
with understanding the
contract and establishing the COR file. Monitoring the contract
includes such activities
as evaluating and maintaining data, documenting performance,
and review/verification of
invoices. The COR responsibilities end at contract close-out or
when the Contracting
Officer terminates the COR delegation.

Typical COR post-award responsibilities include:

e;

o Correspondence with the contractor;
o Notifications to the Contracting Officer;

o Training;
o Travel;
o GFP
o Personnel and labor;

of deliverables;

31

standing COR limitations;

Understanding the Contract

The COR must:

— know the
Government’s
responsibility as well as the contractor’s. Questions about
content or interpretation
must be directed to the Contracting Officer.

-
award conference to
ensure that all parties have a clear understanding of the scope of
the contract, the
technical requirements, and the rights and obligations of the
parties.

surveillance checklists
and schedules, and related files.

ions and
regulations referenced in the
contract.

Keeping Files Current and Complete

The COR shall maintain good records not only for the next
COR, but also to document
contractor performance under the contract. To maintain good
files, the COR must:

-to-know”
documents prior to

Contracting Officer approval. This also includes verification of
classification
status (e.g., “Secret”).

instructions to the
contractor in writing, and provide a copy to the Contracting
Officer.

on the content of any
contractually significant correspondence addressed to the
contractor to prevent
possible misunderstanding or the creation of a condition that
may be the basis of a
later claim against the Government.

Government/contractor conference
reports, trip reports, telephone conversation records,
memoranda for the record,
and correspondence.

32

appropriate
correspondence, and other related documents using your name
and title, followed
by “Contracting Officer’s Representative.”

Correspondence and Responses

The COR must sign all correspondence, reports, findings,
recommendations, and other
documents using name and title, followed by “Contracting
Officer’s Representative.”
The COR should communicate with the contractor, Contracting
Officer, disbursing
officer, and others directly concerned with contract
performance. All correspondence
must reference the contract number.

Correspondence with the Contractor

The COR must forward to the Contracting Officer a copy of any
correspondence to the
contractor along with an explanation if not apparent from the
text. The COR must also
forward to the Contracting Officer the original of the
correspondence received from the
contractor. In addition, the COR should coordinate with the
Contracting Officer on the
content of any contractually significant correspondence to the

contractor in order to
prevent possible misunderstandings or the creation of a
condition that may be the basis of
a later claim. The Contracting Officer will advise the COR of
the appropriate mail
system to be used.

Notifications to the Contracting Officer

The COR must promptly inform the Contracting Officer of the
following:

The COR should

specify the applicable paragraph of the contract that has been
violated by the
contractor and the circumstances surrounding the violation,
including names, dates
and places, and estimated damages that have been incurred by
the Government.

Government. The COR
should include recommendations regarding any extension of the
contract
completion date.

represented in the contract
provisions, specifications, or drawings.

The COR must advise the Contracting Officer of the
contractor’s failure to complete
performance or delivery in accordance with the contract
schedule. Reporting of
contractor failures should not be held for the monthly report.
Only the Contracting

33

Officer may issue Suspension of or Stop Work orders (FAR
52.242-14 and 52.242-15,
respectively).

Monitoring Contract Performance

The COR must:

addresses or clarifies only
the Government’s “intent”.

dically, inspect and carefully monitor and keep the
Contracting Officer

informed of contractor performance of the technical
requirements of the contract.
scope of the work.
acting Officer if the contractor is behind
schedule, document the

reasons, and coordinate with the Contracting Officer on actions
necessary to
restore the contract schedule.

services in addition
to, less than, or different from those required by the contract.

used through
surveillance of technical performance.

performance as specified in
the letter of appointment/designation or more frequently if
appropriate.

-
deployment Operational
Tracker (SPOT) data to ensure the contractor correctly enters
SPOT data.

As required by the contract and appointment, use both
quantitative and qualitative
methods to evaluate monthly cost and performance data,
including trends and
projections.

rement fraud, bribery, conflicts of
interest or other

improper conduct on the part of the contractor, contractor
employees, or
Government personnel to the appropriate authorities.

Factors to consider while monitoring contractor performance:

raining: Any training for contractor personnel must be
within the scope of the
contract. Contractor training not required by the contract shall
not be paid for by
the Government. The Contracting Officer may designate to the
COR the approval
of contractor training requests. If so, the COR shall ensure that
Government-
financed training for contractor personnel is within the scope of
the contract.

scope of the contract.

The Contracting Officer may designate to the COR the approval
of contractor

34

travel requests. If so, the COR shall evaluate travel requests to
determine if
within scope and the reasonableness of estimated costs.

ntractor properly
accounts for and

dispositions Government property if authorized under the
contract.

personnel in
performance of a contract. If designated, the COR shall review
contractor
invoices to ensure that labor hours and materials charged to the
contract are
accurate. The hours worked should equal the hours charged and
invoiced to the
contract. This may be done by reviewing time cards or in/out
signing cards, and,
for materials, by obtaining copies of invoices. Typical COR
tasks include:

o Verifying work completed and materials purchased are
required under the

contract.
o Ensure the contractor is paid for acceptable performance and
not paid for

unacceptable performance (supplies or services).
o Reporting performance deficiencies to the contractor’s
manager and

Contracting Officer.
o Reporting labor disputes or problems that could impair
contractor

performance to the Contracting Officer.
o Validating the need for contractor overtime when requested by
the

contractor and inform the Contracting Officer.

o Report actual overtime if required under the contract.
o Ensure satisfactory subcontractor performance by observing
contractor’s

surveillance.
o Report inadequate or no contractor surveillance to the
Contracting Officer.
o Validate that contractor personnel have the licenses,
certifications, security

clearances, theater business clearance, and letter of
authorization (if
applicable) required by contract (e.g., electrical, plumbing, food
service,
security licenses).

Inspect and Accept/Reject Deliverables

If designated, the COR must:

determine acceptability. In
other words, ensure that the Government receives the supplies
or services for
which it is paying. Reject those that do not meet the contract
requirements and
standards.

documents.
ce of satisfactory or
unsatisfactory delivery.

35

accurately so that the
Contracting Officer can properly evaluate the contractor.

d
deliverables. Verify the
timeliness and accuracy of contractor reports and data to be
delivered to the
Government. Ensure prompt review of draft reports and provide
approval/disapproval/comments to the contractor through the
Contracting Officer.

Validate that the contractor’s reimbursable purchases are
actually received before
being billed to the Government.

required), prepare a
memorandum for the PCO’s signature, addressed to the
contractor, “Subject:
Notice of Acceptance of Final Technical Report.” Upon receipt
of the PCO’s
signature, forward the original memorandum to the contractor;
place a copy in the
contract work file and forward one copy to the ACO and one to
the PCO for
inclusion in the official contract file and upload to the CORT
Tool.

Form 250s or, if
available, use Wide Area Workflow (discussed later in the

handbook). Keep the
originals in the contract work file and distribute copies to the
Contracting Officer,
the payment office, and any other entities as required.

Proprietary and Classified Information

The COR must:

contractor maintains a current facility
security clearance if required

under the contract.
contract and need

access to classified information have the proper security
clearances. Classified
information must not be released to anyone who does not have a
security clearance
and a need to know.

Contracting Officer and
consider the response prior to accepting or rejecting the
technical data.

contractor requests
to publicly release information about work being performed
under the contract.

Managing Problems

The COR must:

administrative issues that
arise. Refer disputes
between the COR and contractor to the Contracting Officer.

36

completion of the
contract, foster full and complete coordination, cooperation, and
communication
among the contractor, Contracting Officer, and all Government
personnel assigned
to monitor contract performance.

Handling Unsatisfactory Performance

The COR must:

performance is
unsatisfactory. Differences of opinion between the COR and
the contractor that
cannot be resolved by the COR should be referred to the

Contracting Officer.

actions, if necessary.
Officer’s decisions are

final. Take care not to take any action that may be construed as
an actual or
constructive change.

personally supervise, or
direct the work of, any contractor employee.

Tracking Modifications

The COR must:

, and resulting
effects on delivery
schedule are formalized in a written supplemental agreement or
change order
issued by the Contracting Officer. The contractor must not
proceed with the
changes until formally approved and documented.

inancial management controls. Coordinate with
Government resource
managers on all actions relating to funding and changes in the
contract.

Conclude Appointment/Designation Appropriately

The COR must do the following:

Officer with a formal request for
termination of the COR
appointment/designation signed by the COR supervisor, when it
is required.

verbally and in writing,
on all important issues.

37

Note: Report suspected violations of ethics policies, incidents
of fraud or bribery,
conflicts of interest, and any other improper conduct to the
Contracting Officer, legal
counsel, chain of command, or DoD Inspector General.

Table 5-1 highlights the relationship between COR and
Contracting Officer
responsibilities.

Table 5-1. General COR/Requiring Activity and Contracting
Office Responsibilities

Technical Expertise

To monitor a contractor providing services, the COR should
have technical expertise in
the services being performed and outcomes required. For some
services requirements, a
single COR may not be adequately versed in all technical issues
that may arise.
Therefore, the COR may need to consult additional personnel,
such as the Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA) as the technical subject
matter expert on FAR
Part 42 delegation. If the COR consults additional personnel,
he or she should inform the
Contracting Officer. The COR may involve additional
personnel in communications with
the contractor, but the COR remains the official liaison for any
technical communications
with the contractor, including technical interpretations.
(Chapter 9 provides additional
details on monitoring service contracts.)

Action COR/Functional Office Contracting Office

Conduct market research Responsible Assist
Prepare SOW/PWS Responsible Assist

Prepare QASP Responsible Assist
Prepare IGCE Responsible Assist

Prepare GFP list Responsible Assist
Develop sources Assist Responsible

Prepare solicitation Assist Responsible
Conduct pre-bid conference Assist Responsible

Evaluate proposals Assist Responsible
Award contract N/A Responsible

Conduct contract
surveillance

Responsible Assist

Request modifications Responsible Assist
Make modifications Assist Responsible

Conduct progress meetings Assist Responsible
Conduct

inspection/acceptance
Responsible Assist

Evaluate contractor’s
performance

Responsible Assist

CPARS Responsible/Assist Responsible

38

Limitations

The COR must understand the limits of his or her authority.
Although the Contracting
Officer delegates certain responsibilities to the COR, authority

to legally bind the
Government remains with the Contracting Officer. Remember,
CORs do not have the
authority to:

funds.
delivery, or any other

term or condition of the contract.
ontractor to perform any work
beyond or outside the

scope of the contract.
including “supervising”

or directing the work of the employees.
required by
the contract.
another contract.
advantage in future

procurements.
t award
date.
stop work.

The COR must be mindful of the limitations to his or her
authority and avoid the

following:

t
of interest (financial or
otherwise) between private and public interests.

conflict of interest
exists. Report the matter immediately to your supervisor and
the Contracting
Officer for determination.

not have the time to
perform a thorough and complete job of the duties in the letter
of
appointment/designation and this handbook. On some types of
contracts,
performance as COR may be a full-time effort. The COR is
responsible for his or
her own work/time management.

influence anyone for
personal gain.

ce
of obligating, the
Government financially or otherwise. Only the Contracting
Officer has this
authority.

39

them information about
upcoming

procurements.
being solicited or offers

are being evaluated.
offers or quotations.
having read and understood DoDD 5500.7-R,
Joint Ethics Regulation,

without understanding the contents.
loans, or favors from

a contractor or from its employees.
mmediately to the Contracting Officer and
legal counsel. This

applies both to the COR and to his or her family members.
approvals required

for higher dollar-value procurements.
g the contractor how to run its operation. This includes
telling the contractor

to fire an individual. Terminations of employment are actions
for the contractor.

contractor.
tractor to proceed on work outside the
scope of the contract. It

may be in the contractor’s interests to exceed the contractual
limitation with the
intent of claiming additional consideration for additional effort.

es, or personnel of the
contractor for use by
others. The contractor and the Contracting Officer control all
such matters.

personal services contract,
for example, when contractor personnel appear, in effect, to be
Government
employees.

-employer relationship where
contractor personnel are
subject to relatively continuous supervision and control by a
Government
employee. The contract determines what, how and when the
contractor does
particular tasks, and the contractor is responsible for managing
his work force.

-delegating COR authority to any other person, such as a
technical point of
contact.

Additionally, while the COR limitations could simply be stated
in a letter, in the real

world ensuring that the COR does not exceed the authority
granted is much more
complex. In the course of performing COR responsibilities,
situations might result in an
implied change to the contract which, in turn, may impact the
delivery, schedule, funds,
or other areas outside the authority of the COR. CORs might
exceed the scope of their
authority by inaction or improper action. For example, a COR
on an equipment
installation contract fails to ensure the Government installs
electrical outlets and a raised

19
Refer to FAR Subpart 15.6, “Unsolicited Proposals.”

40

floor in preparation for the equipment installation. When the
contractor arrives to install
the equipment, they are unable to do so as the site had not been
properly prepared. By
inaction, the COR allowed a potential claim to be made for
Government-caused delay.

Protecting Sensitive or Government Information

Government employees may not divulge information received in
the course of their
employment or official duties [See 18 U.S.C. 1905,
implemented at 3.104-2(b) (4),

3.104-3, 3.104-4, and others]. The penalty is a fine, a prison
sentence of up to 1 year, or
both. The COR should take care not to discuss acquisition or
sensitive information in
areas that are not secure (e.g., hallways) or in meetings that are
not Government only.
Additionally, the COR should take care to discuss acquisition or
sensitive information
only with Government personnel with a specific need-to-know.

Related Duties

DoD policy20 encourages the COR's participation throughout
the acquisition process.
Here are some functions that the COR may be expected to
complete but as an agent of his
activity, not as the representative of the Contracting Officer.

Pre-Award Duties

One of the key pre-award duties in which the COR may be
involved is documenting
requirements. The requirements package is critical to the
success of an acquisition,
because it commits the funds and establishes the basis for a
contractual action. The
package documents both the requirement and its approvals. In
other words, it is through
the requirements package that the contracting office is told what
the user wants, when the
user wants it, and whom to contact for more information.

A key element of the requirements package is the purchase
request document. This

document:

oordinated and signed by a responsible official of the
initiating office;
resulting contract;

and,
availability of funds.

20
See DSD Memorandum, “Monitoring Contract Performance in
Contracts for Services,” 22 August 2008,

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2008‐0468‐D
PAP.pdf.

41

The requirements package also may include:

or Performance Work
Statement (PWS);

curity Classification Specification, DD Form
254;
-furnished property (GFP);
-source justification, including justification review
document and justification

and approval (J&A) coordination;

rable list;

3953, Air Force Form 9,

or Navy Comptroller Form 2276;
w memorandum; and,

The time it takes to assemble the contents of the requirements
package varies based on
the dollar value of the requirement and the command. The
following considerations
apply when assembling the package:

-accountable
items21.
thresholds.

The COR also may be involved in pre-award activities such as
the following:

the SOO/SOW/PWS.

The package should use clear, accurate, performance-oriented
language and
express only the Government’s actual minimum needs in the
work statement.

her than obtaining them from a
prospective contractor.
(Appendix B provides more information on preparing IGCEs.)

foreign made.

21
Reference DoDI 5000.64.

42

packet to request funds.
-R, “Joint Ethics Regulation for

Department of Defense

Personnel,” and its implementations.
3.104).

Chapter 5. Key Points

1. CORs need to understand the contract they are overseeing.
2. CORs must establish current and complete files associated
with overseeing

contractor performance. These files will eventually become
part of the
Contracting Officer’s contract file.

3. Monitoring contractor performance is key to successful
contract execution.
4. CORs may be called upon to review contractor training
requests, travel, contractor

time cards, and requests for using Government-furnished
property.
5. CORs are often the primary person to accept or reject
supplies/services.
6. CORs need to be careful in performing their duties in order to
ensure contract

claims are not filed by the contractor, or that there is not the
appearance of
preference for one contractor that may result in harming another
contractor.

7. The Contracting Officer will rely upon the COR for their
technical expertise
relating to contract performance over and above performing the
traditional COR
functions for such areas as developing performance work
statements, developing
independent government estimates, or involvement in source
selections.

43

Chapter 6:
Contract Structure

Categories and Types of Contracts

As stated in FAR 16.103(a), the objective in federal contracting
is to negotiate a contract
type and price (or estimated cost and fee) that will result in a
reasonable contractor risk
and provide the contractor with the greatest incentive to
perform efficiently and
economically.

Categories of Contracts

CORs deal with contracts for supplies, services, and
construction. In addition to the
general duties discussed in Chapter 5, each type of contract
adds specifically related

duties. The COR’s duties vary with the category of contract, as
explained below:

dentifiable
end item. The item
may be an individual component (e.g., paint or lumber) or an
entire system (e.g., a
computer).

contractor’s time and
effort to perform an identifiable task (e.g., transportation or
latrine cleaning).

construction, alteration,
improvement, or repair of real property (e.g., buildings,
airfields, and roads).
COR duties tend to be the most complex for construction
contracts.

Chapters 9 and 10 address COR duties specific to service and
construction contracts,
respectively.

Types of Contracts

The Government uses different types of contracts to acquire the
supplies and services
needed to support mission objectives. The contract type used
depends on the requirement
to be met. Contract types vary according to:

contractor for the costs
of performance; and,

re of the profit incentive offered to the
contractor for
achieving or exceeding specified standards or goals.

The Contracting Officer considers these factors along with the
SOO/SOW/PWS and
specifications when deciding which contract type is best suited
to a specific procurement.

44

The Contracting Officer also considers the amount of risk
involved in performing the
contract work, as well as, how much risk the contractor will
assume (and the impact of
risk on price) and whether it is in the Government’s best
interest to assume part of the
risk.

Table 6-1 highlights the two main types of contracts: fixed-
price and cost-reimbursement.

Table 6-1. Contract Types
Fixed Price Cost Reimbursement
Firm fixed price
Firm fixed price with economic price
adjustments

Fixed price incentive
Firm fixed price level of effort

Cost
Cost plus incentive fee
Cost plus award fee
Cost plus fixed fee
Time and material
Labor hour

Fixed-Price Contracts

When the Government has a specific, well-defined requirement
(such as a requirement
for certain office supplies), it uses a fixed-price contract. The
price remains fixed
throughout the contract life unless the Government makes a
change. The Government’s
only obligation is to pay the price agreed to at the time of
award, regardless of whether
the costs to the contractor increase or decrease during
performance. When a product has
a history of large price increases (such as petroleum), the
Government may use a fixed-
price contract with an economic price adjustment (EPA). The
fixed price with EPA is
still a fixed-price contract because the limits and conditions are
stated in the contract.

Cost-Reimbursement Contracts

When the Government cannot provide sufficient, detailed
information about a
requirement, it must assume some of the cost risk and use a
cost-reimbursement contract.

Instead of paying a predefined price, the Government
reimburses the contractor for all
allowable, allocable, and reasonable costs, defined as follows:

— costs that are not prohibited by statute or
regulation.
— costs that add value and are directly
related to a particular

contract.
— costs that a prudent business person
would pay.

Figure 6-1 compares the risks of FFP versus cost-reimbursement
contracts.

45

Figure 6-1. Risks of Firm-Fixed-Price versus Cost-
Reimbursable Contracts

Contracts for Commercial Items

There is a Federal preference for acquisition of commercial
items. FAR Part 12
establishes acquisition procedures closely resembling those of

the commercial
marketplace to facilitate the acquisition of commercial items.
Commercial items are any
item or service customarily used by the general public or non-
governmental entities for
purposes other than governmental purposes, and:

public.

Contract Structure

Government solicitations and contracts, other than
solicitations/contracts for commercial
items, are usually organized in accordance with the Uniform
Contract Format (UCF)
which specifies the distinct sections of a contract and the
sequence in which they must be
arranged22.

22
See DFARS 204.70, “Uniform Procurement Instrument Identific
ation Numbers” and 204.71, “Uniform Contract

Line Item Numbering System.”

46

Figure 6-2. Contract Structure

UCF Part I—The Schedule

Section A, Solicitation/Contract Form, contains basic
information such as the issuing
office, address, and contract number. Normally, a Standard
Form (SF) 33 is used as the
solicitation, offer, and award page for sealed bids. An Optional
Form (OF) 308 or SF 33
may be used for Requests for Proposals. SF 33 can also be used
as the face page of the
contract.

Section B, Supplies or Services and Prices/Costs, contains a
brief description of the
supplies or services, quantity required, and their prices. CORs
should read this section
very carefully.

Section C, Description/Specifications/Statement of Work,
contains a detailed description
of the required supplies or services. In contracts for services,
Section C will contain the
SOO/SOW/PWS.

47

Note: Section C (SOW) defines the technical/performance
requirements of the contract.
CORs should read this section very carefully.

Section D, Packaging and Marking, provides packaging,
packing, preservation, and
marking requirements.

Section E, Inspection and Acceptance, contains inspection,
acceptance, quality
assurance, and reliability requirements.

Note: If inspection/receiving is part of the COR designated
functions, the COR must
inspect deliverables in accordance with the inspection plan to
determine satisfactory
compliance with the contract. Remember, it is too late to reject
deliverables after signing
the receiving report.

Section F, Deliveries or Performance, specifies the time, place,
and method of delivery
or performance.

Section G, Contract Administration Data, contains any required
accounting and
appropriation data and required contract administration
information, or instructions other
than those on the solicitation form.

Section H, Special Contract Requirements, contains a clear
statement of any special
contract requirements that are not included in Part I, Part II, or
any other part of the
contract (e.g., ordering details for task or delivery orders). This

section requires very
close reading by the COR.

UCF Part II—Contract Clauses

Although it is commonly viewed as standard information, Part
II, Section I, of the
contract cannot be overlooked, because it contains clauses
defining the rights and
responsibilities of the contracting parties. Part II also contains
clauses required by
procurement regulations or laws that pertain to the procurement.
Some of the more
prominent clauses in Part II include:

-1 through - 4), which enables
the Government to
make changes to the contract during performance, as long as
those changes fall
within the contract’s scope in any one or more of the following:
(1) Drawings,
designs, or specifications when the supplies to be furnished are
to be specially
manufactured for the Government in accordance with the
drawings, designs, or
specifications; (2) Method of shipment or packing; or (3) Place
of delivery. The
contractor is entitled to an “equitable adjustment” to the
contract if the change

48

results in increased contract costs or performance time. This
clause is probably
the most powerful clause in the Government’s arsenal of
standard terms and
conditions.

-1 through -
7), which permits
the Government to terminate the contract without cause (in part
or total) at any
time when doing so is in “the Government’s best interest.”
When this clause is
exercised, the contractor is entitled to recover certain costs
associated with
performance to date and the timely and orderly ending of the
terminated portion of
the contract.

-8 and -9), which permits the
Government to terminate
a contract if the contractor breaches the contract by failing to
(1) deliver the
supplies or perform the services within the time specified in the
contract; (2) make
progress, thereby endangering performance of the contract; or
(3) perform any
other material provision in the contract. If the Government
intends to exercise its
right to terminate the contract under the second or third
circumstances, the
Government must first notify the contractor in writing and allow
the contractor to
“cure” its deficient performance if there are at least 10 days left
in the contract
delivery schedule. If the performance deficiencies are not
corrected, the

Contracting Officer may terminate the contract for default.
Under fixed-price
contracts, the default clause entitles the Government to re-
procure the supplies or
services required under the terminated contract and charge the
excess costs to the
terminated contractor.

— Commercial Items clause
(FAR 52.212-4),
which incorporates all the major contract administration topics:
changes, disputes,
invoicing, payment, and termination.

UCF Part III—List of Documents, Exhibits, and Other
Attachments

In Part III, which consists of Section J, List of Documents,
Exhibits, and Other
Attachments, the Contracting Officer lists the titles of each
exhibit or attachment in Part
III. The following are the most common attachments:

UCF Part IV—Representations and Instructions

Part IV, which appears only in the solicitation and is not
transferred to the contract,

comprises Sections K, L, and M:

49

Statements of Bidders,

includes solicitation provisions that require representations,
certifications, or
submission of other information by bidders, offerors, or quoters.

Offerors, or Quoters,
contains information to guide bidders, offerors, or quoters in
the preparation of
bids, offers, and quotations, respectively.

evaluation factors and
significant sub-factors by which offers will be evaluated. It also
specifies the
relative importance that the Government places on these
evaluation factors and
sub-factors.

Order of Precedence

In the event of an inconsistency in the contract, FAR 52.215-8
(Order of Precedence —
Uniform Contract Format (UCF)) gives precedence in the
following order:

— Sections A
through H;
— Sections K through
M;
— Section I;
s — Section J;
and,

Contract Structure – Solicitations/Contracts for Commercial
Items

Solicitations/contracts for commercial items are significantly
simpler than those for non-
commercial items. The solicitation/contract format consists of
these sections:

a. SF 1449 – Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items
(a separate continuation

sheet may be included as needed).

b. Contract Clauses:
-4, Contract Terms and Conditions — Commercial
Items, by reference (see

SF 1449 block 27a);
-4; and,
-5, Contract Terms and Conditions Required to
Implement Statutes and Executive

Orders.

c. Any contract documents, exhibits or attachments; and,

d. Solicitation provisions:

-1, Instructions to Offerors — Commercial Items;

50

-1;
-2, Evaluation — Commercial Items, or other
description of evaluation

factor for award, if used; and,
-3, Offeror Representations and Certifications —
Commercial Items.

Structure – Task or Delivery Orders

Task or delivery orders may be placed using any indefinite-
delivery type contract and
must contain the following information:

description, quantity, and unit

price or estimated cost or fee;

tructions;

the contract.

Contract Language Rules

Some terms used in contracts have specific meanings:

ot limited to.

the contractor must

perform the specified action.

Contract Numbers (For Example: N00062-90-C-0001)

Because the COR will be referencing the contract, it is
important to be familiar with the
structure of a contract number (also called a Procurement
Instrument Identification (PII)
Number). A contract number consists of 13 alphanumeric
characters grouped to convey
certain information:

DoD Activity Address
Code (DoDAAC) that identifies the department/agency and
office issuing the
contract.23

23
DoDAACs can be found at https://www.daas.dla.mil/daasinq/.

51

the last two digits of
the fiscal year in which the procurement instrument
identification (PII) number
was assigned.

instrument: “A”— blanket
purchase agreement, “C”— contracts of all types, “D”—
indefinite-delivery
contract, “F”— purchase from UNICOR, and “P”— purchase
order.24

by the contracting
activity. Numbers are assigned sequentially.

number to identify
(1) Amendments to solicitations; (2) Modifications to contracts
and agreements,
including provisioned item orders; and (3) Calls or orders under
contracts, basic
ordering agreements, or blanket purchase agreements, issued by
the contracting
office or by a DoD activity other than the contracting office,
including DoD orders

against Federal supply schedules.25

Chapter 6. Key Points

1. The Government uses different contract types depending on:
a. The degree and timing of the responsibility assumed by the
contractor for

the costs of performance; and,
b. The amount and nature of the profit incentive offered to the
contractor for

achieving or exceeding specified standards or goals.
2. Performance risk is higher for the Government under a firm-
fixed price contract,

while cost reimbursable contracts place a higher cost risk to the
Government. The
inverse is true for contractors on these two broad contract types.

3. The Uniform Contract Format is used for contracts awarded
under FAR Parts 14
and 15. The UCF provides a structured, logical, and
standardized approach in
developing the contract documentation and administering the
subsequent contract.

a. DFARS 204.7003 and 204.7004 discuss the numbering
conventions for
solicitations, contracts, amendments, modifications, task and
delivery
orders.

4. There are some contract principles relating to contract
interpretation and the force-
and-effect of certain words (i.e., may and shall).

24
See DFARS 204.7003, “Basic PII Number”, for additional code
s, if needed.

25
See DFARS 204.7003 for a more complete explanation of Suppl
ementary Numbers.

52

Chapter 7:
Contract Administration

Contracting is usually carried out in three stages–contract
planning (Pre-Award and
Solicitation), contract formation (Evaluation and Award), and
contract management
(Contract Administration). Figure 7-1 shows the major phases
of the entire contracting
process. The COR or the COR nominee may become involved in
all stages of this
process. For example, even before the Contracting Officer
prepares the letter of COR
appointment/designation, a nominee may be asked by their
management to provide
technical expertise to the pre-award/solicitation and the
evaluation/award phases of the

process. (Appendix B contains further discussion of a COR
nominee’s involvement in
these two phases.) The third phase, contract administration,
begins the official duties of
a COR and is the focus of this chapter.

Figure 7-1. Contracting Process

Contract administration comprises the activities performed by
Government officials after
a contract is awarded. It encompasses all dealings between the
Government and the
contractor, from the award of the contract until the work is
completed and accepted by

53

the Government, payment is made, any disputes are resolved,
and the contract is closed
out.

The focus of contract administration is on obtaining supplies
and services of the required
quality, on time and within the expected cost. Although the
contract’s legal requirements
take precedence, the skill and judgment of the Contracting
Officer and COR often are
required to protect the Government’s interests during the
contract administration process.

Post-Award Orientation (Kick-off)

Before a contractor begins working on the contract, the
Contracting Officer must ensure
that the contractor understands the following:

irements;

The best way to ensure that the contractor and the Government
have a complete
understanding of their roles is for the Contracting Officer to
conduct a Post-Award
Orientation. At this meeting, all interested parties, including
the COR, discuss the
contract and the SOO/SOW/PWS. The discussion helps both the
contractor and the
Government to (1) achieve a clear and mutual understanding of
contract requirements,
terms, and conditions and (2) identify and resolve potential or
actual problems. However,
the Post-Award Orientation is not a substitute for a contractor
fully understanding the
requirement, nor is it to be used to alter the final agreement
arrived at in any negotiations
leading to contract award.

The decision to conduct a Post-Award Orientation is up to the
Contracting Officer in
accordance with FAR Part 42. The Contracting Officer may
want to convene a meeting

of the multifunctional team to outline the individuals’ roles and
responsibilities as they
may have changed slightly since contract award. In some
circumstances, a letter or other
form of written communication to the contractor may be
adequate in lieu of a full Post-
Award Orientation. Such a letter should identify the
Government representative
responsible for administering the contract and cite any unusual
or significant contract
requirements.

Conducting the Post-Award Orientation

The orientation should be held as soon as possible after contract
award and always prior
to commencement of work. Normally, the orientation should be
scheduled at a date and

54

time acceptable to the contractor and then arranged with other
attendees. Government
attendees should include anyone who has a vested interest in the
successful completion of
the contract.

Topics for Discussion at the Post-Award Orientation Meeting

The Post-Award Orientation gives everyone the opportunity to
clear the air about any
questions concerning the contract. The meeting demonstrates to
the contractor that the

Government expects to get what it contracted for, that the
contractor is responsible for
delivering the supply or service, and that the Government will
commit people and
resources to ensure compliance with the contract. After the
meeting, the Contracting
Officer prepares a report summarizing, for the record, the issues
discussed. A DD Form
1484, Post-award Conference Record, may be used for this
record. This meeting can also
be used to ensure that everyone clearly understands the role and
authority of all
Government participants during contract performance. For
example, all personnel must
understand that the Contracting Officer is the only individual
authorized to make changes
to the contract.

Finally, the Post-Award Orientation meeting is an ideal setting
to discuss formal or
informal partnering agreements, the use of contractor metrics,
and the importance and use
of past performance information. The contractor must
understand that they are part of the
multifunctional team and that they have roles and
responsibilities just like any other
member of the team.

Contractor/System Compliance

In preparation for the contract monitoring phase, the COR must
be aware of the contract
requirements and regulatory standards related to the supply or
service being acquired.

Contractor Accountability through SPOT

The Synchronized Pre-deployment Operational Tracker
(SPOT)26 is a web-based joint
database used for tracking contractor personnel who accompany
the U.S. armed forces.
SPOT is the current system mandated for use in tracking
contractor personnel movements
within the forward area and for validating individual contractor
personnel, their
authorization for access to specific DoD facilities, and their
individual eligibility for
specific DoD support services. SPOT is the authoritative source
for near real-time
reporting on globally deployed individuals, by name, by
location, and by contract. SPOT
also provides for tracking the use of and accountability for DoD
equipment in the custody
of contractors. Contractors are responsible for entering
employee data. The database

26
The SPOT database can be accessed at https://spot.altess.army.
mil.

55

continues to evolve and, ultimately, will incorporate secure
functionality and web
services with additional authoritative data sources.

Currently, SPOT is used in Iraq and Afghanistan by DoD,
Department of State, and the

U.S. Agency for International Development. If SPOT reporting
is required in the
contract, CORs should work with the contractor to ensure timely
and accurate reporting if
the duty has been authorized by the Contracting Officer in the
COR’s
appointment/designation letter.

All contractors in Iraq or Afghanistan must have a letter of
authorization (LOA). SPOT
generates the LOA which is digitally signed by the appropriate
Government agency’s
Contracting Officer or COR (if authorized by the Contracting
Officer). LOAs can be
retrieved and printed in portable document format (PDF). LOAs
are supplied to
contingency contractor personnel to be carried and presented for
obtaining Government-
furnished services within the area of operations to which they
are assigned. Official
identification must be presented with the LOA. Appendix A
provides a sample LOA.

Performance Monitoring

The COR must document contractor performance, review and
evaluate progress reports,
review invoices, and perform site visits. Chapter 8 contains a
detailed discussion of this
topic.

Contract Modifications

Many things can affect a contract once it has been awarded. The
requiring activity may
need to reduce or increase the supplies or services, performance

levels could change, or
any number of unanticipated events may occur. A contract
modification is a written
change in the terms of the contract. Only Contracting Officers
acting within the scope of
their authority can execute contract modifications on behalf of
the Government.

Reasons for Contract Modifications

A contract may need to be modified to, for example, do the
following:

rrect a mistake;

contract (including

attachments);

56

requirements); or

Types of Contract Modifications

There are two types of contract modifications:

teral contract modification is
official upon
signature by the Contracting Officer; it does not require the
contractor’s
signature/assent. A unilateral modification may be used to do
the following:

o Issue change orders;
o Execute incremental funding actions;
o Implement terms or conditions previously authorized in the
contract

(exercise of options, stop work orders, termination); and
o Make administrative changes. Administrative changes are
simple changes

to the contract that have no impact on the terms and conditions
or price of
the work, for example, changing the name of the Contracting
Officer or
COR, updating a payment office, or correcting a fund citation.

signed first by the
contractor and then by the Contracting Officer. It is used to
make negotiated
equitable adjustments resulting from the issuance of a change
order and reflect
other agreements of the parties modifying the terms and
conditions of contracts. A
bilateral modification may be used to do the following:

o Change the terms and conditions of a contract;

o Negotiate equitable adjustments;
o Execute a supplemental agreement that reflects other
agreements between;

the parties modifying the terms 27; or
o Definitize change orders.

Contract Options

Options provide the Government with the ability to order
additional quantities of supplies
or additional periods of service beyond those established in the
initial contract.
Normally, contract options establish the quantity, price, and
delivery schedule for these
additional supplies or services. The Government uses options
when (i) there is a defined
quantity, quantity range, or additional requirement for the
supplies or services beyond
what is being purchased on the basic contract, and when (ii)
such additional requirement

27
A supplemental agreement is a contract modification based on t
he parties’ prior agreement regarding a change.

It incorporates an equitable adjustment to the contract cost, sche
dule, or both, as a result of the change.
Supplemental agreements often involve the submission, by the c
ontractor, of a proposal and detailed negotiations.

57

may be finalized and funded during the performance period of
the basic contract.
Options are executed by unilateral modification. Contract
options may be exercised in
the following circumstances:

exercise the option;

the contract;

of fulfilling the

Government’s need, price, and other factors considered.

The COR’s role with options is to make the need for them
known prior to contract award.
When exercising an option, the COR may assist the Contracting
Officer by assessing the
available options, determining the continuing need, determining
whether the option is in
the Government’s best interests, and conducting market research
on current pricing.

Contract Changes

The Changes clauses — FAR 52.243-1 through 52.243-4 —
distinguishes Government
contracts from other contracts. These clauses allow the

Contracting Officer to order a
change within the general scope of the contract in the areas of
(i) specifications (for
supplies) or description of required services (for service
contracts); (ii) place of delivery
or performance; or (iii) method of shipment or packing (for
supplies); or time of
performance (for services). Legally, a change outside the scope
of the contract is a new
procurement that the Contracting Officer is not authorized to
execute and that the
contractor is not obligated to perform under the Changes clause.

Note: CORs who are “following the boss’s orders” are the
primary source of
unauthorized commitments or constructive changes. The
Government is not liable for
unauthorized acts of its employees. CORs making unauthorized
commitments or
constructive changes may be financially responsible for their
actions.

Constructive Changes

Statements, acts, or inaction by employees who are not
authorized to make contractual
changes may be deemed constructive changes . These acts can
contractually bind the
Government if the result is that the contractor performs work
beyond that which is
required by the contract. A constructive change is an oral or
written act or failure to act
by the Government official (in position of authority) that is
construed by the contractor as
having the same effect as a written change order. Constructive
changes may arise from

situations such as the following:

58

Inadequate or defective requirements documents;

performance (e.g., not

responding in a timely manner to requests, or not being present
to receive a
service);

misleading information;

-caused delays;

inish sooner than
what is stated in the

contract schedule.

The COR may play a role in helping the Contracting Officer
resolve a constructive
change by doing the following:

Officer;
Identifying the actual changes to the contract that have
occurred;

submits a proposal

based on the change;

tractor regarding the proper notification
and handling of

changes.

Unauthorized Commitments

Under contracts in the private sector, a company may be bound
by the acts of agents with
apparent authority, or authority based on the individual’s
position or title. In federal
procurement, the Government may be legally bound only by the
actions of personnel with
actual authority — the Contracting Officer. Disputes between
the Government and the
contractor often occur when the Government representative who
ordered a change did not
have the authority to do so. This places a burden on the
contractor to ensure that the
person ordering a change has actual authority.

Government employees who are not Contracting Officers do not
have the authority to
order or authorize changes. There is a lot of litigation based on
Government personnel,
who are not Contracting Officers, making contract changes. In
some cases, personnel
who are not Contracting Officers have limited authority to
represent the Contracting
Officer (e.g., to inspect the services being provided to the
Government).

FAR 1.602-3(a) defines an “unauthorized commitment” as “an
agreement that is not
binding solely because the Government representative who
made it lacked the authority
to enter into that agreement on behalf of the Government.”
Unauthorized commitments

59

violate federal law, federal regulations, and the Government-
wide Standards of Conduct
for Federal Employees, and the DFARS.

The following are examples of unauthorized commitments:

another contractor
because the Government is supposed to supply the equipment
but did not have it
available.

ss
mowed before a big
event, but the contactor has already mowed the grass to
specification for the
period.

been delivered. The
contractor is told to leave the old copier in place, because it is
important to the

mission.

The COR should report any perceived unauthorized
commitments immediately to the
Contracting Officer. At the same time, CORs themselves must
take great care not to
instruct a contractor to perform a task that may be outside the
scope of the contract.
CORs are reminded that they, or any unwarranted Government
official, may be
financially obligated for any costs or damages incurred as a
result of their directing
contractor performance beyond the scope of their authority.

If a COR exceeds his or her authority, the circumstances of the
action and the procedures
in FAR 1.602-3 concerning ratification will dictate what action
should be taken. The
Contracting Officer may decide to revoke the COR’s
appointment. The revocation shall
be in writing and provided to the contractor and other
appropriate officials. The
Contracting Officer will also take other actions required by law
or regulation.

Ratification of Unauthorized Commitments

In some cases, an unauthorized commitment may be
subsequently adopted, or “ratified”
(see FAR 1.602-3). This long and time-consuming process
involves, among other things,
preparing statements and summaries of facts and investigating
relevant documents,
recommendations, and approvals, in accordance with individual
agency procedures.

Only an action that would otherwise be proper can be ratified.
The Anti-Deficiency Act
prohibits authorizing or incurring obligations or expenditures in
excess of amounts
apportioned by the Office of Management and Budget or in
excess of amounts permitted
by agency regulations. An unauthorized commitment could
potentially be a violation of
the Anti-Deficiency Act subject to fines and other penalties. If
the price is determined
not to be fair and reasonable, then the price must be
renegotiated.

60

Cases that cannot be ratified under FAR 1.602-3 may be subject
to resolution as
authorized by FAR Subpart 33.2, Disputes and Appeals. If the
approval official does not
elect to use his or her discretion to reimburse the contractor for
acts exceeding the COR’s
authority, the COR may be held personally liable for any costs
or damages incurred by
the contractor or the Government. In fact, the consequences for
all parties involved with
an unauthorized commitment are severe. Regardless of dollar
amounts involved,
unauthorized commitments may result in disciplinary or
administrative action against the
individual making the unauthorized commitment, especially if
the violations are flagrant

or repetitive.

Ratification Process

As the first step in the ratification process, the individual
responsible for making the
unauthorized commitment must draft a statement detailing the
circumstances and
addressing, at a minimum, the following questions:

Next, the Contracting Officer, legal counsel, and requiring
activity officials must review
the statement of actions leading to the unauthorized
commitment. Once satisfied, they
must determine that:

service;
nt recurrence are adequate;
was taken;
available, and the

requirement is legitimate), and,

The Contracting Officer must then provide the ratifying
authority a written determination
and finding, addressing the facts and including a complete
purchase description and
funding for the ratification, and determining:

ade to evade normal
statutes/regulations, but was the
result of an urgent requirement or a mistake of fact by
Government personnel;

contract would otherwise be proper (e.g., funds are
available, and the

requirement is legitimate);

61

The ratifying official shall review the file, and if ratification is
proper, sign the
determination and findings authorizing the Contracting Officer
to ratify the unauthorized
commitment.

Technical Evaluation

Upon receipt of a contractor’s proposal for a modification
(including ratification of an

unauthorized commitment), the COR may be requested to
prepare a documented analysis
of the technical aspects of the proposal. This document will be
used by the Contracting
Officer to support negotiations and documentation of the change
to the contract. When
performing a technical evaluation, the COR should do the
following:

requirement;
ery implications versus technical merit
(impact);

nical merit versus
proposed costs.

Cost/Price Evaluation

The Contracting Officer will analyze the cost/price proposal for
accuracy and
allowability. Then, with receipt of the technical evaluation,
develop a pre-negotiation
objective.

Completion/Payment

Acceptance

Acceptance is the responsibility of the Contracting Officer but

this responsibility may be
delegated to the COR. Acceptance can take place before, at the
time of, or after delivery.
However, supplies or services ordinarily should not be accepted
before completion of
Government contract quality assurance actions. Before services
or supplies furnished by
the contractor can be accepted, the COR must determine
acceptability by review or
inspection. Final acceptance by the Contracting Officer of
supplies received or services
rendered concludes performance by the contractor, except for
administrative details
relating to contract closeout. After final acceptance, the
contractor can no longer be held

62

responsible for unsatisfactory effort unless otherwise specified
in the contract. Therefore,
the COR must ensure that the work performed under the
contract is measured against the
contract terms and quality requirements. If performance does
not meet contract quality
requirements, it is incumbent upon the COR to identify
deficiencies and to advise the
Contracting Officer. Acceptance is evidenced by execution of
an acceptance certificate
on an inspection or receiving report form or on a commercial
shipping document/packing
list.

Exceptions to final acceptance include:

A latent defect is one that is not readily noticeable upon
reasonable inspection at the time
of acceptance. The burden is on the Government to prove that
defective material and
workmanship was the probable cause of product failure. Latent
defects can also apply to
design and manufacture contracts; in those cases, the contractor
may have to replace the
designed product at no charge to the Government.

Documenting Acceptance

CORs are often the designated officials authorized to accept
supplies or services for the
Government (see COR appointment/designation letter for
delegated duties and
authorities). Acceptance prior to payment is accomplished in
one of four ways:

Chapter 10);
Chapter 10);
other forms, in
Chapter 10); or
(WAWF) system.

Wide Area Workflow

The 2001 Defense Authorization Act established the
requirement that all contract
invoicing must be done electronically. DoD implemented this
requirement via Wide
Area Workflow (WAWF). The WAWF system28 is a secure,
web-based system for
Government contractors and authorized DoD users to generate,
capture, and process
receipt and payment documents. It enables electronic
submission of contractor invoices
and of Government inspection and acceptance documents.

28
The WAWF system is found at https://wawf.eb.mil.

63

The WAWF system creates a virtual folder to combine the three
documents required to
pay a contractor: the contract, the invoice, and the receiving
report. Authorized DoD
users are notified of pending actions by e-mail and are
presented with a collection of
documents required to process the contracting or financial
action.

WAWF is envisioned to ultimately be the single DoD system for
all contractor invoicing

and Government acceptance actions (where required).
Processing invoices electronically
will reduce the likelihood that the Government will have to pay
an interest penalty;
however, it is still important for the COR to understand his or
her role in processing these
invoices. WAWF training is required prior to appointment as a
COR. A copy of the
training certificate should be provided to the contracting office
prior to appointment and
saved in the CORT Tool.

Nonconformance

Nonconformance occurs when the contractor presents a
deliverable to the Government
that does not conform to the contract requirements.

Remedies for Nonconformance

Remedies for nonconformance include the following:

Show Cause,
Liquidated Damages, Warranty, or Termination);

allow rework);

exercising an option or

award term);

claims or consideration;

The COR’s key role with regard to remedies is monitoring.
Heavy reliance is placed on
the COR’s observations and documentation. The COR must
keep good records and
promptly notify the Contracting Officer of any noncompliance
issues. In addition, the
COR should be prepared to suggest remedies to the Contracting
Officer.

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Acceptance of Nonconforming Supplies or Services

Only the Contracting Officer can authorize acceptance of
nonconforming supplies or
services. The Government may deal with noncompliance in one
of three ways:

-and most preferable- action is to require the
contractor to correct the
nonconforming items or services.

nonconforming supplies or

services. This is useful only if the deficiencies are minor.
Remember the COR
cannot accept nonconforming supplies or services. Only the
Contracting Officer
can make this decision.
Although a contractual right of the Government cannot be
waived, nor may a
contract be modified for the convenience of a contractor, it may
be in the best
interest of the Government not to reject the supplies or services
because of the
following:

o The urgency of the need for the supplies or services and the
period of time
required to obtain them from other sources, as compared with
the time
delivery could be obtained from the contractor.

o The availability of the supplies or services from other
sources.
o Any other pertinent facts and circumstances.

If it is desired to accept work that essentially meets the needs of
the Government
but does not conform to the requirements of the contract, the
COR must furnish
the Contracting Officer with a documented recommendation to
accept the work, a
description of all points in which the work fails to meet contract
requirements, and
an estimate of the time required for the contractor to complete
performance. The
Contracting Officer may extend the contract completion date by
formal
modification to allow the contractor to correct deficient work.

o
reject the noncompliant
supplies and services and terminate the contract. (Remember the
COR cannot
terminate a contract.)

Invoice and Payment

Cash flow is the lifeblood of any company. Contractors need to
be paid for the supplies
and services they have provided so that they can pay their own
bills and employees.
Timely payment of contractors also encourages them to continue
to do business with the
Government. Congress, recognizing the importance of timely
payments, passed the
Prompt Payment Act. The act specifies that, if the Government
does not make payment
on a valid contractor invoice within a specified period of time,
the Government is liable
to pay interest, computed at the federal funds rate.

65

Note: The COR should ensure that invoices receive prompt
attention and are reviewed
for accuracy and consistency with contract terms.

The following are important terms regarding invoice and

payment procedures:

plies or
services accepted by
the Government.

disbursement of
monies for supplies or services accepted by the Government.

payment procedures,
payment due dates, and interest penalties for late invoice
payment. Unless
specifically prohibited by the contract, the contractor is entitled
to payment for
accepted partial deliveries of supplies or partial performance of
services that
comply with all applicable contract requirements and for which
prices can be
calculated from the contract terms.

The contractor may request payment via an invoice or via the
SF 1449 or DD1155.
Appendix A contains a sample SF 1449. In reviewing the
payment request, the COR
should be familiar with the following:

identifies a separate supply

or service to be required under contract);

Contents of a Valid Invoice

According to FAR 32.905, the following are the minimum
requirements for a valid
invoice:

ontract number, including delivery/task order
number (if applicable);

–as specified in the “Schedule of Supplies”;
the contract;

66

transportation (as applicable), if authorized by
the contract to ship

“Prepay and Add” include the transportation cost (parcel post,

UPS, etc.) as a
separate line;

–as required by the contract, e.g.,
certification of
conformance, ACO approval, etc.;

registered in the
Central Contractor Registration (CCR);

information for foreign

contractors who are CCR exempt, when applicable; and,
-directed requirements.

Inaccurate/invalid invoices must be returned within seven days.

DFARS 252.232-7003 requires contractors to submit payment
requests electronically, but
the clause lists exceptions. For a contingency contracting
situation, two exceptions are
key:

acceptance in electronic
form.

ng the contract has
determined, and
documented in writing, that electronic submission would be
unduly burdensome to
the contractor.

Voucher and Invoice Review

The Contracting Officer is responsible for monitoring invoice
payments according to the
terms and conditions of the contract and local policy/guidance.

CORs can approve invoices on fixed-price contracts. However,
for cost-reimbursement,
time and-materials, and labor-hour contracts, CORs can review
— but not approve —
invoices. For other than fixed-price contracts, DCAA has the
sole authority for verifying
claimed costs and approving interim payment requests. Only
the Contracting Officer can
approve final payment requests.

Note: CORs must understand local finance office procedures
and requirements for
proper invoicing. CORs should ask their Contracting Officers
for additional details.
Note: Payment to a contractor implies work is progressing
according to the contract.
Therefore, CORs must ensure the Government is getting what it
is paying for. CORs
must monitor contractor performance through review of monthly
reports, onsite visits,
and surveillance reviews. It is vital that CORs review billing
statements thoroughly and

67

on time.
Note: If problems are identified in performance of the contract
or in the CORs review of
invoices, the COR must communicate the issues to DCAA
through the Contracting
Officer so the issues can be appropriately considered during the
auditor’s voucher
approval process.

COR approval of a voucher or invoice implies that, to the best
of the COR’s knowledge,
the nature, type, and quality of effort or materials being
expended are in accord with the
progress of work under the contract. In other words, the COR
supports the Contracting
Officer by ensuring that payments are made for performance in
accordance with the
contract terms and conditions.

The following are examples of typical problems that may be
found on invoices:

d other direct costs (ODCs), e.g., poor
descriptions that cannot be tied

to specific tasks;

g invoice;

ce address; and,

Overtime

Overtime (OT) cannot be paid unless specifically authorized by
the contract. Only the
Contracting Officer can authorize the use of OT. When
reviewing a contractor’s OT
claims, the COR should consider whether or not OT was
authorized.

68

Interest Penalties

The COR must process invoices promptly. If the Government
fails to make payment by
the due date, the designated payment office must automatically
pay an interest penalty.
The due date is the later of two events (1) the 30th day after the
designated billing office
receives a proper invoice from the contractor or (2) 30th day
after Government

acceptance of supplies delivered or services performed.
Specific due dates are as stated
in each individual contract.29

Warranties

A warranty is a promise or affirmation given by a contractor to
the purchaser regarding
the nature, usefulness, condition, or performance of the supply
or service to be delivered
under of the contract.

Implied Warranties

There are two types of implied warranties: warranty of
merchantability and warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose. The warranty of
merchantability implies that supplies
must be fit for the ordinary purposes for which such supplies
are normally used. This
type of warranty is incorporated in the contract unless stated
otherwise. The warranty of
fitness for a particular purpose implies special protection for a
buyer that relies on the
seller’s expertise in selecting suitable supplies.

Express Warranties

An express warranty may be purchased to cover the risk of a
product defect. Express
warranties are based on the following:

bargain;

bargain; and,

Because expressed warranties must be purchased, the costs must
be weighed against the
need for protection against risk30.

The warranty takes effect at time of delivery. If an item is
delivered for storage or later
use, the warranty provides a starting time after delivery. The
length of the warranty
period must be specified.

29
Refer to FAR Subpart 32.9 and DFARS Subpart 232.9 for Prom
pt Payment discussions.

30
For more information, reference DFARS 246.704, “Authority f
or Use of Warranties”

69

Warranties can be enforced when a defect within the warranty
scope arises during the
warranted period.

Past Performance

The Government relies on past performance data to assist with

making award decisions.
Therefore, in support of future acquisition efforts, the
performance of contractors under
current contracts should always be documented. The COR will
be tasked with collecting
and reporting contractor performance information. The COR
should be fair in assigning
a performance rating and should provide narrative explaining
the reasons for the rating.

Contractor performance information is entered into the
Contractor Performance
Assessment Reporting System (CPARS), at intervals specified
in the contract, when
contractor performance warrants reporting, and at the end of the
contract. CPARS
documents the following aspects of the contractor’s
performance:

good workmanship;

story of reasonable and cooperative behavior and
commitment to customer

satisfaction; and,
-like concern for the interest of the customer.

The Government’s CPARS assessment should reflect the
contractor’s performance as
documented by the COR during the monitoring process.

Contract Closeout

Contract closeout actions are primarily the Contracting
Officer’s responsibility, but COR
assistance may be required. COR assistance is indispensable
when disputes or litigation
is involved.

A contract is not completed until it has been closed. Timely
contract closeout does the
following:

future requirements;

the need for additional funds.

70

The COR is to physically transfer their records to become part
of the official contract file.
The Contracting Officer, with the assistance of the COR, must
ensure that the following
actions are accomplished:

en

obtained from the

contractor.
the contractor.

DOs and DON’Ts: Contract Administration

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION

DO DON’T

of the U.S. government, with only
the authority delegated by the
Contracting Officer.

personnel authorized to represent the
contractor.

contractor personnel. Does the
person you are dealing with have the
authority to obligate the contractor?

or consents are timely.

less than what is required by
the contract.

ambiguous contract language, which
would be favorable to the
Government. Remember: if the
contractor’s interpretation is
reasonable, it will prevail.

ess
performance is deficient or
defective.

complete inspection.

deletions, or additions to the
contract requirements. Work
through the Contracting Officer.

consider all
contractor claims unreasonable. Be
fair and impartial.

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Chapter 7. Key Points

1. Contract Administration is the primary focus area where a
COR will generally

spend most of their time

2. After contract award, a Post-Award Orientation (kick-off)
meeting is critical to
successful contract performance. This meeting will highlight
the roles and
responsibilities, along with expectations, of all the interested
parties.

a. The Contracting Officer will prepare minutes of the meeting
and provide
copies to all interested parties, including the COR.

3. Contractor personnel deploying to a contingency arena must
be registered in the
SPOT database.

4. Monitoring contractor performance is the key to contract
oversight and ensuring
compliance with the contract.

5. Key contract administration concepts a COR must be familiar
with:
a. The Changes Clause – This FAR clause allows the flexibility
to make in

scope changes to the contract without impacting contractor
performance
and allowing the contractor an equitable adjustment.

i. Unilateral change – The changes clause allows for three
specific
criteria where the Government can issue a modification without
first
requesting a proposal from the contractor.

ii. Bilateral changes – When a unilateral change is not possible
then
the Government will request a proposal from the contractor so a
supplemental agreement can be negotiated and signed by the
contractor and the Government.

b. The Options Clause – Many contracts for recurring
requirements may
contain option clauses which allow the Government the ability
to order
additional quantities of supplies or additional period of services
beyond
those in the initial contract.

c. Constructive Change Concept – When a contractor performs
work that is
not part of the contract scope but the contractor relied upon
some degree of
Government direction then a constructive change may have
occurred,
which will result in a contractor submitting a request for
equitable
adjustment.

d. Unauthorized Commitments – Where a Government
representative who
does not have the authority binds the Government to a
commitment.

e. Ratification process – Each component or agency has
established
procedures for ratifying unauthorized commitments. Refer to
local
procedures for additional guidance.

f. Technical Evaluation – The COR may be requested by the

Contracting
Officer to assist in validating proposed contract changes, assist
in
developing an IGCE, and evaluating the contractor’s proposed
costs for
reasonableness.

72

g. Contract Closeout – The COR’s documentation is key to
ensuring
successful contract closeout. It is important that the COR
understands the
steps associated with closeout and his/her role in closeout.
Contract
closeout is the Contracting Officer’s responsibility, but COR
assistance
may be required.

h. Invoices and payment – CORs will often review
invoices/vouchers to verify
that charges for the supplies/services delivered are reasonable
and in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract. This
section of
the handbook provides a discussion of what should be contained
in an
invoice or voucher. In addition, this section also discusses
some of the
typical problems associated with an improper/incorrect invoice
or voucher.

6. Good, clear communications with the contractor and the

Contracting Officer is
critical.

7. A COR may be required to administer warranty terms and
conditions. It’s
important to understand warranty basics.

8. The COR may report on contractor performance so it can be
captured in the
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System
(CPARS).

73

Chapter 8:
Monitoring the Contractor

To properly monitor the contractor, the COR must know and
understand the requirements
of the contract, as specified in the SOO/SOW/PWS in Section C
of, or an attachment to,
the contract. The COR should have a copy of the
SOO/SOW/PWS readily available to
check that the contractor is verifying and enforcing contract
requirements as stated in the
SOO/SOW/PWS. Interpreting the contract requirements can be
difficult if the
SOO/SOW/PWS is poorly written, displaying a lack of technical
knowledge, inadequate
planning or research, lack of communication, differing
interpretations, and carelessness.

With the proper SOO/SOW/PWS and performance-based metrics
(see Chapter 9),
contract performance is more likely to be successful.

Note: The COR monitors the contractor based on the contract
requirements specified in
the SOO/SOW/PWS and according to the COR
appointment/designation letter from the
Contracting Officer.

The COR must notify the Contracting Officer in a timely
manner, orally and in writing,
if the contractor is not performing well, i.e., if contractor
performance deviates from the
SOO/SOW/PWS. It is the responsibility of the Contracting
Officer — and only the
Contracting Officer — to give verbal or written directions to the
contractor. These
directions should be made a part of the record in the official
contract file. The requiring
activity should not attempt to interpret the SOO/SOW/PWS for
the contractor and may
not direct changes or accept substitute performance. Many
people have improperly cost
the Government, or themselves, money by making seemingly
nonchalant remarks asking
the contractor to act outside the scope of the contract.

Contractor Progress Reports

The contract may require the contractor to provide progress
reports. Contractor progress
reports provide the first early warning of potential changes,
delays, or other problems in
contractor performance. Submitted by the contractor, these

reports summarize progress
since the preceding report, so earlier reports are summarized,
subsumed, and superseded
by the new report. They vary in form from a single-page memo
or letter to several
hundred pages of detail by task, with supporting graphs and
tables. Progress reports
normally address the following topics:

;

74

Progress reports do not relieve the contractor of a separate
obligation to report anticipated
or actual delays to the COR and Contracting Officer.

For indefinite-delivery type contracts, each delivery or task
order must be covered by a
separate progress report, except that one report per contract may
be used to identify those
orders on which no work was performed during the period being
reported.

The contractor must forward the progress reports in accordance
with the instructions of
the Contracting Officer.

The COR must ensure that each progress report is factually
accurate and complete and
should check each progress report to determine the following:

problems foreseen?
with the work planned?
funds expended?
texts) compare to the

progress report?

The COR should discuss and document any ambiguities or
discrepancies with the
contractor and Contracting Officer. The COR should document
any discussions with the
contractor and keep a copy of this document in the COR file.
The COR should also
inform the Contracting Officer of any ambiguities or
discrepancies in the progress report.

The Government should not expect a one-to-one correlation
between the expenditures
identified in the progress report and those in the invoice. The
coverage dates may be
different, and the progress reports may not reflect lags in the
accounting system.

Assessing Performance

The contractor has the primary responsibility for quality
assurance and timeliness of its
supplies or services. However, the COR must assess the
contractor’s performance to
ensure that the supply or service delivered conforms to contract
requirements.
Unsatisfactory performance under a contract may jeopardize a
project or may directly
affect an activity’s ability to perform its mission.

75

The COR must continually monitor the contractor’s
performance, both formally and
informally, throughout the contract. The COR should consider
the following:

requirements are being met,
ctivity is satisfied,

The following are key assessment factors:

to meet contractual

requirements? Did the contractor meet the contractual delivery
requirements?
Does the contract include a reward for early delivery, or a
penalty for late
delivery?

Do they conform to
the contract specifications, standards, SOO/SOW/PWS, and
quality assurance
plan?

professional, and courteous?
qualified and

effective in performing the required services? Do they meet the
skill level stated
in the contract? Are an appropriate number of personnel
assigned to the project?
Do delivered supplies reflect the skill and standardization
required by the user?

atisfaction. Will the requiring activity be satisfied in
terms of cost, quality,
and timeliness of the delivered supplies or services? What
percentage of the
deliverable meets the user’s expectations? How long has the
contractor taken to
address any user complaints? How many user complaints have
there been?

Occupational Safety
and Health Administration, Environmental Protection Agency,
and Department of
Labor regulations or local standards?

Acceptable Inspection Methods

The assessment of quality is particularly important because if
the quality of a supply or
service does not meet contract requirements, the safety of the
requiring activity could be
jeopardized. The Government has the right to inspect all
contract deliverables at any
time prior to acceptance. Inspections may be announced or
unannounced, but they must
not unduly delay work, nor must they include directions that
would change the contract.
The Government also has the right to reject any deliverables
that do not meet contract
requirements.

76

For commercial item acquisitions, FAR 46.202-1 requires that
the Government rely on
contractors’ quality assurance systems as a substitute for
Government inspection and
testing before tender for acceptance, unless customary practices
for the supply being

acquired include in-process inspection. Any in-process
inspection by the Government
must be consistent with commercial practice.

For services, the COR can monitor contractor performance
using a variety of inspection
methods. Before an inspection, the COR should check the
contract for any specific
inspection and testing requirements. The COR should use a
systematic approach and
should ensure that the inspection methods do not interfere with
the contractor’s progress,
or at least only to the extent that disruption is absolutely
necessary. The following
subsections briefly describe the most common inspection
method and their use.

Random or Stratified Sampling

With random sampling, deliverables are sampled to determine if
the level of performance
is acceptable. Random sampling works best when the number
of instances in which the
supplies or services is very large, allowing a statistically valid
sample to be obtained.
Stratified sampling focuses on selected parts of total contractor
output for sampling.
Computer programs may be available to assist with establishing
sampling procedures.
This is the preferred surveillance method, because it is an
efficient way to obtain an
unbiased, comprehensive evaluation of the contractor’s
performance. The COR need
only make relatively few observations from which he or she can
project the quality of the

entire lot. The contractor does not know which service output
will be observed.
Consequently, all must be done correctly, and the COR is
prevented from biasing the
sample by his or her own judgment. The advantage is that the
results can be projected to
the lot, without inspecting the entire lot.

100 Percent Inspection

This inspection method is too expensive for most cases. As the
name implies, all outputs
in the designated lot would be observed by the inspector. For
example, with a service
requirement for required reports, all reports listed in the lot
would be examined for
acceptance. The Government uses 100-percent inspection for
stringent performance
requirements concerning health and safety.

Periodic Inspection or Planned Sampling

This method consists of the evaluation of tasks selected on
other than a 100 percent
inspection or random basis. This type of sampling is normally
used to check the
contractor’s quality control system to ensure that it is capable
of meeting the
Government’s quality requirements. Because defects found as
the result of planned

77

sampling cannot be considered statistically valid for evaluating
the entire work lot,
monetary deductions for other than satisfactory performance are
limited to only the work
specifically found defective. For this reason, planned sampling
should not be used as the
only method of surveillance.

When planned sampling is used, work process outputs are
selected in accordance with
subjective criteria established in the QASP. These criteria
should be documented and
applied consistently throughout the observation period and from
one period to the next.
Surveillance consistency enables the inspector to detect trends
in performance and
requires less inspector retraining time and document/report
revisions. The advantages to
this method are that Government inspectors can focus their
attention on known problem
areas and the contractor or in-house work force has a greater
incentive to improve those
deficient areas that they know will be observed. The
disadvantage is that because the
observations are not selected randomly, comparisons of quality
cannot be made between
the sampled outputs and the lot.

User Feedback

This method requires documentation and is not usually a
primary surveillance method.
However, user feedback is a valuable supplement to more
systematic surveillance
methods. Performance to be observed is not selected by the

COR, but is based on written
or telephonic complaints made by users. Once the COR
receives a complaint, he or she
will investigate and, if valid, will document it as a contractor
performance deficiency.

Further guidance on these surveillance tools is set forth in the
Office of Federal
Procurement Policy (OFPP) Pamphlet 4, “A Guide to Best
Practices for Performance-
Based Service Contracting” Chapter 5, “The Quality Assurance
Surveillance Plan.”31

The COR should notify the Contracting Officer whenever
supplies or services do not
meet requirements and should provide the Contracting Officer
with documentation on the
number of observations made, the number and type of problems,
actions taken to notify
the contractor, and any corrective actions already taken by the
contractor. A COR can
use the receiving report or other method provided by the
Contracting Officer to document
the reasons for rejecting a deliverable.

Contractors will reply to a notice of rejection by one of the
following methods:

ost or price as a basis
for accepting

nonconforming services; or

31
The OFPP Pamphlet can be found at http://georgewbush‐

whitehouse.archives.gov/omb/procurement/pbsa/guide_pbsc.htm
l.

78

If authorized to reject supplies or services, the COR may
approve a contractor’s proposed
course of action to repair or correct deficiencies. However,
only the Contracting Officer
may approve courses of action that require a change in the
contract (e.g., a price
reduction) or result in a dispute (e.g., the contractor challenges
the assessment). The
COR must forward these cases to the Contracting Officer for
resolution.

The Contracting Officer normally consults with the COR when
considering the
contractor’s reply. The COR can provide advice on the
appropriateness of the
contractor’s corrective action plan, the impact of accepting
nonconforming services, and
the validity of the contractor’s rebuttal.

Documenting Performance

Documenting how well a contractor performs on a contract is an

important part of the
performance assessment process. When documenting a
contractor’s performance, the
COR should follow the advice below:

Comments should be:

sible,
and

Comments should not be:

or disciplinary action);

simply copied and pasted from one month to the next without
verifying whether
the condition still exists.

Following are some examples of poorly—and better—written
comments.

Sample Comment 1
Poor: “Contractor met the Class I requirements this month.”

79

Better: “During October, contractor exceeded the Class I
requirement to have all
incoming rations and bottled water placed into inventory within
24 hours. The daily
average to place stock into inventory was only 4 hours!”

Sample Comment 2
Poor: “Contractor was late in meeting the link-up time.”
Better: “On 12 Oct 06 at 2130 hrs, the contractor team linked
up with the military escorts
at East ECP one hour after notification. This didn’t meet the
contractual requirement of
40 minutes for link-up as provided under Section C.”

Sample Comment 3
Poor: “Contractor management was especially responsive this
month.”
Better: “On 12 Oct 06, contractor responded within two hours
to a DCMA request for
DFAC statistics. This allowed a quick turnaround to the user
for a high-visibility area.”

Sample Comment 4
Poor: “My audit for MHE showed that several of the guys
weren’t certified for the
forklifts.”
Better: “On 23 Oct 06, an audit revealed that three employees
operating 9K forklifts did
not have a forklift drivers license when prompted. Their badge
numbers were XXX,
YYY, and ZZZ.”

Note: The COR must always ensure that all comments relate to
a specific contract
requirement. Contractor performance is judged solely on the
contract.
Note: When possible, it is helpful for a COR to use a digital
camera to document
deliveries of supplies and services.

Remedies for Poor Contract Performance32

The Contracting Officer has several remedies available to
address items or services that
do not conform to contract requirements. The Contracting
Officer will rely heavily on
the COR’s observations and documentation on supplies or
services that do not conform to
contract requirements. When unsatisfactory contract
performance is identified, the COR
should notify the Contracting Officer promptly so remedial
steps can be taken. Silence
on the part of the Government could be interpreted by the
contractor as the Government’s
acceptance of substandard supplies or services. Such situations
could adversely affect the
Government’s right to withhold payments, terminate for cause
or default, or otherwise
exercise certain rights under the contract.

32
This section is on contract performance and not the business sy
stem rule. Refer to DFARS for the business

system rule.

80

Depending on the Contracting Officer’s evaluation of the
seriousness of the
unsatisfactory performance, he or she may do the following:

contractor by letter or
through a meeting and obtain a commitment for appropriate
corrective action.

performance are involved
(such as combat situations or extreme weather conditions).

with delivery or
reporting provisions of the contract.

After a complete review of the situation, the Contracting
Officer may send an official
notice of failure of performance to the contractor. This notice
requires the contractor to
inform the Contracting Officer of the cause of the delinquency
so a proper determination
can be made concerning continuation or termination of the
contract. In some cases,
liquidated damages can be assessed against the contractor
performing the service.

Liquidated damages are amounts agreed to in advance that
reflect the financial damage
the Government may incur if the contract is not completed on
time.

Note: COR records are vital for determining the amount of
money the contractor may be
entitled to if a suspension is determined to be unreasonable.

DOs and DON’Ts: Remedies

REMEDIES
DO DON’T

warranties. Make sure to deal with
any problems before the warranty
period runs out.

ersonnel to
prevent problems before they arise.

rights before delivery is due.

Contracting Officer. Work with the
contract administration team and
Contracting Officer.

Allow interim or final delivery dates
to be waived.

Delays

The COR is required to notify the Contracting Officer about any
delay in the delivery or
performance schedule. Specifically, the COR must (1) identify
and verify the delay, (2)
notify the Contracting Officer of the technical impact of the
delay, and (3) assist the

81

Contracting Officer with evaluating the contractor’s response.
The COR should be able
to correctly identify the cause of a delay and work with the
Contracting Officer for
resolution. The technical analysis should be sufficient to
support the action taken by the
Contracting Officer to address the delay.

Identifying and Verifying a Delay

A delay has occurred if the contractor fails to meet the delivery
or performance schedule
in the contract, or if the Government caused the contractor to
stop performing. The COR
should review the contract for any applicable clauses and any
modifications to ensure that
the performance or delivery schedule was not previously
extended by the Contracting
Officer. The COR can confirm the delay by doing the

following:

for monitoring the
performance or delivery schedule.

documents from the
contractor regarding the
delay.

The contractor may not be liable for any excess costs if the
failure to perform the contract
arises from causes beyond the control and without the fault or
negligence of the
contractor. For instance, the delay may have been caused by the
Government, hostile
actions, or natural disasters.

Notifying the Contracting Officer of the Technical Impact of a
Delay

Once a delay is confirmed, the COR should prepare
documentation to assist the
Contracting Officer with developing the Government’s position
on the delay.
Documentation should include facts and relevant information
about the delay, such as the
following:

th factual knowledge of the delay;

contract began, when

work deviated from the performance, and when the work
stopped.

Below are other issues that may be covered in a technical
analysis:

excusable;
obligations;

atives and resolution; and,

82

quality).

Assisting the Contracting Officer with Evaluating the
Contractor’s
Response

The COR may be asked to assist the Contracting Officer with
evaluating the contractor’s
response. The Contracting Officer may ask the contractor to do
the following:

r
commingled delays.

Before allowing the contractor to recover costs as a result of the
delay, the contractor’s
response must provide verifiable documentation of the expenses
incurred. The
Contracting Officer, with the assistance of the COR, must
consider each expense and
determine if the contractor should receive compensation.
Compensation may be in the
form of money or time extensions.

Fraud

Fraud is the intentional presentation of a falsehood as a truth
with the intent of causing
someone to part with something of value. Various types of
improper contractor
activities fall within the general heading of procurement fraud
and can lead to criminal
and civil punishment. Only the U.S. Department of Justice may
prosecute and resolve
fraud cases on behalf of the U.S. Government. However, that
does not mean CORs
should ignore suspicions of fraud or other dubious conduct.
The Department of Defense
has an obligation to administer its contracts effectively and
efficiently for the U.S.
taxpayer, and has the ability to, with appropriate coordination
with the relevant criminal
investigative organizations, take contractual and administrative

remedies (e.g.,
suspension and debarment) as appropriate to address contractor
misconduct while
criminal investigators work to punish the misconduct. This
requires a coordinated
approach to assessing and dealing with procurement fraud
indicators.

Primary procurement fraud indicators include:

-payment;

scope of duties;

83

tests or inspections;

COR’s responsibilities:

CORs are not investigators and should not personally
investigate suspected cases of

fraud. CORs are responsible for alerting the following
stakeholders of fraud indicators or
suspected fraud:

local DCIS, AFOSI,

NCIS or Army CID agent).

Note: If local agents are not readily available, the COR may
report suspicion of
procurement fraud to the following hotline:

hotline): 1-800-424-
9098, DSN 664-8799, http://www.dodig.mil/HOTLINE

CORs must keep a record of ALL suspected fraud
communication.

Combating Trafficking in Persons

According to the United Nations, human trafficking “involves
the movement of people
through violence, deception, or coercion for the purpose of
forced labor, servitude, or
slavery-like practices.” Human trafficking is the third largest
criminal activity in the
world. Traffickers use violence, threats, and other forms of
coercion to force their
victims to work against their will. For example, they control
the victims’ freedom of

movement; where and when they will work; and what pay, if
any, they will receive.
Traffickers treat their victims as nothing more than goods for
sale to the highest bidder.
Victims of human trafficking no longer control their lives. Their
lives belong to the
trafficker who is holding them against their will. Human
trafficking is not new and is
actively practiced globally, especially in third-world countries.

84

DoD has a particular duty to act, because human trafficking is a
direct threat to our
national security. FAR 52.222-50 – Combating Trafficking in
Persons is a mandatory
clause on all contracts. CORs must be aware of how contractors
treat their employees.
CORs are the first line of defense in the battle against human
trafficking.

CORs must complete Combating Trafficking in Persons training
annually. CORs must
be diligent in ensuring that contractors and contractor personnel
are not trafficking in
persons.

The COR must inform the Contracting Officer if the contractor,
contractor personnel,
subcontractor, or subcontractor personnel have failed to comply
with the requirements of
the clause at FAR 52.222-50. After receiving this information,

the Contracting Officer
shall provide information for any investigation and enforcement
to:
Program Manager
DoD CTIP Law Enforcement and Support

OUSD (P&R) DHRA
4800 Mark Center Dr Suite 06J25-01
Alexandria, VA 22350-4000

Reports may also be made:

On-line at http://ctip.defense.gov/;
-line via the National CTIP Hotline website at
http://www.polarisproject.org/;
-mail to [email protected]; or
-888-373-7888.

Note: DoD has a zero tolerance policy for human trafficking.
As the COR monitors the
contractor and its employees, Combating Trafficking in Persons
should rank among the
COR’s chief priorities.
Note: The COR must correct and report any suspected violations
or activities to the
Contracting Officer (See FAR Subpart 22.17 and DFARS
Subpart 222.17).
Note: CORs should not personally investigate suspected
incidents of Trafficking in
Persons but should forward all reported or suspected violations
to the Contracting Officer
immediately.

Government Property

Government property means all property owned or leased by the
Government and
includes both Government-furnished property (GFP) and
contractor-acquired property
(CAP) to which the Government has title. Normally,
contractors furnish all equipment
and material necessary to perform Government contracts.
However, sometimes it is in
the best interest of the Government to provide the contractor
with GFP for performance
of a contract.

85

The COR may be asked to assist the Contracting Officer with
administering the
contractor’s use of GFP. The property administrator acts on
behalf of the Contracting
Officer to oversee Government property in the possession of a
contractor. If a property
administrator is not assigned, the COR must be Level I certified
in Contract Property
Management in order to perform specific functions of property
administration as
specified by the Contracting Officer. Specific functions may
include:

any delay of GFP that
may delay contractor
performance;

and advising the
Contracting Officer of deficiencies and recommendations;

destruction (LTDD) of
GFP during contract performance to the Contracting Officer33;
and,

instructions given by the
Contracting Officer for the disposal of Government property.

Property Responsibilities

The contractor is required to follow the FAR and DFARS when
it comes to Government
property34 along with the contract. The contractor has inherent
responsibilities related to
the control, use, preservation, repair and maintenance of
Government Property (GFP and
CAP).

Reporting, Reutilization, and Disposal of Government Property

Typically upon contract closeout, Government property is
transferred, abandoned,
destroyed, donated or sold to relieve the contractor of
stewardship responsibility.
Determining the correct disposition procedures for Government
property that will not be
transferred to a follow on contract takes a great amount of
experience and training to

correctly accomplish. The Contracting Officer and/or appointed
Plant Clearance Officers
have the inherent fiduciary responsibility of correctly
determining what avenues and
priorities will be utilized to dispose of excess Government
property. With this in mind, it
is imperative that only minimal duties are delegated to the COR
unless the individual has
the appropriate training and experience commensurate with the
tasks stated in FAR
Subpart 45.6

Contract Termination

33
Reference DFARS Clause 252.245‐7002, “Reporting Loss of G
overnment Property.”

34
Reference FAR Part 45 and DFARS Part 245.

86

There are two types of contract termination, termination for
convenience of the
Government and termination for cause/default.

Termination for Convenience of the Government

Under the Termination for Convenience clause, the Government

has the right to cancel a
contract when doing so is in the best interest of the
Government, notwithstanding the
contractor’s ability and readiness to perform. The Government
may terminate a contract
for convenience if the supply or service is no longer needed, the
contract is no longer
affordable, it is impossible for the contractor to perform as
specified in the contract
(through no fault of the contractor), or the requirement has
changed radically.

A termination for convenience allows the contractor to submit a
settlement proposal for
the work that has been accomplished under the contract up to
the effective date of the
termination, including the cost associated with any work in
progress. The Contracting
Officer and the contractor then negotiate a settlement
agreement. The contractor is
entitled to be reimbursed for costs for work completed.

Termination for Cause/Default

The Government may, by written notice, terminate the contract
for the contractor’s
failure to do the following:

s of the contract.

Because the Government is not liable for work not accepted, the
termination for

cause/default has a greater adverse consequence on contracts for
supplies than on service
contracts.

A termination for cause/default is improper if the required
notice and opportunity to
“cure” the situation is not given to the contractor. There must
be at least 10 days
remaining in the contract delivery schedule to use the “Cure
Notice”.
Another type of delinquency notice is called “Show Cause
Notice.” This is used as a
means of discovering any excusable cause/default of the
contractor’s failure to perform.
The “Show Cause Notice” is used when there are fewer than 10
days remaining on the
contract delivery schedule.

The following are examples of excusable failure to perform:

87

embargoes.

Note: The COR’s responsibilities are essentially the same in
terminations for
convenience, default, or cause – (1) Keep the Contracting
Officer informed, (2) Provide
recommendations to the Contracting Officer and requiring
activity, (3) Review settlement
proposals, and (4) Document the file.

Disputes

Disputes between a contractor and the Government may occur
when a controversy
develops as to the interpretation of the contract terms. Any
differences with the
contractor should not interfere with timely performance of the
contract. All contracts
contain a Disputes clause (FAR 52.233-1) that presents the
procedures to be followed in
case of any unresolved disagreements between contractors and
the Contracting Officer.
The COR will play a key role in advising the Contracting
Officer as to the intent of
specifications or provisions of the contract that may be the
subject of dispute. Therefore,
the COR should know the contract and create and keep the
documentation required to
state a position, in writing, to help the Contracting Officer. The
Contracting Officer must
respond promptly with a written decision, including the reasons
for each dispute received.
Unless appealed within certain time limits, the Contracting
Officer’s decision becomes
final and is not subject to review. Because the Government

must pay interest on claims
that are in dispute, the COR must provide the Contracting
Officer with the necessary
documentation promptly. DFARS Subpart 233.2 provides
specific instructions
concerning disputes, Contracting Officer decisions, and appeals.

CORs should be prepared to submit various forms of
documentation and correspondence
developed during the course of a contract. CORs also should be
prepared to give verbal
testimony before the U.S. Government Accountability Office
(GAO), the General
Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals (GSBCA),
the Armed Services
Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA), or a court of the judicial
system in connection with
disputes or other contractual matters. The completeness,
accuracy, and currency of the
COR’s records may determine who prevails — the Government
or the contractor.

The following are warning signs of potential disputes:

nes;

88

inspectors; and,
ors.

Disputes often can be resolved through an alternative disputes
resolution (ADR) process.
The ADR process offers the following advantages:

educed costs.

The COR supports the ADR process by providing surveillance
documentation and reports
supporting the Government’s position.

COR Working File

The COR is required to maintain a working file — in hard copy,
electronically, or both
— containing records relating to his or her COR duties during
the life of the contract and
to dispose of those records as directed by the Contracting
Officer. In addition, the COR
is charged with safeguarding all procurement sensitive, business
sensitive, and
proprietary information in the files. The contents of the COR
working file will vary
according to the size and complexity of the contract. At
minimum, the file must contain
(1) A copy of the Contracting Officer’s letter of
appointment/designation and other

documentation describing the COR’s duties and responsibilities;
and (2) Documentation
of actions taken in accordance with the delegation as well as
any other documentation
required by the Contracting Officer and referenced in the COR’s
appointment/designation
letter. Appendix F contains a checklist of minimum COR file
contents. However, good
judgment and experience on the part of the COR will determine
what is necessary for
CORs to maintain in their files.

Note: The COR working file is business sensitive and must be
safeguarded
appropriately.

The COR working file is a part of the official contract file and
must be maintained
according to the Contracting Officer’s instructions. The
following are key procedures
related to the COR file:

89

contract and each delivery
or task order.

later than 1 business

day after significant meetings or discussions with the contractor
or the Contracting
Officer, including telephone conversations and trip reports.

chronological order, in a

suitable folder. Examples of document categories are
memoranda for record,
inspections, trip reports, minutes of meetings, and conferences.
The goal is to
organize the records in a way that allows for rapid access to
information by the
COR and inspection by the Contracting Officer and other
authorized officials.

the Contracting

Officer, and retain a copy in the COR working file.

Contracting Officer.

ber clearly on all documents and file
folders.

Contracting Officer and
other authorized officials. The Contracting Officer will
schedule an appointment

with the COR for review of the COR file. At a minimum, the
Contracting Officer
should review the COR file on a yearly basis and annotate the
file with the results
of the review to include finding and any recommended actions.

investigations, cases under

litigation, or similar matters until final clearance or settlement.

otherwise directed by the
Contracting Officer), forward the COR working file to the
Contracting Officer for
retention in the official contract file.

promptly transfer the COR

files to the successor COR, or forward them to the Contracting
Officer, as
instructed by the Contracting Officer.

DOs And DON’Ts: Contract Monitoring

CONTRACT MONITORING

90

DO DON’T

with the type of contract, the
complexity of the supply or service,
and the importance of the contract to
the overall program.

Read progress reports and
immediately act on problems they
reveal.

with every requirement of the
contract.

Officer when deficiencies or
delinquencies are noted.

the contractor’s invoices to help
monitor technical progress.

news.”

to check progress.

contractor on your own. Work
through the Contracting Officer.

the contractor do work that is not
called for by the contract.

personnel manager. The COR
reviews and approves or
disapproves; the contractor
supervises contractor personnel.

correct.

Chapter 8. Key Points

1. To properly monitor the contractor, the COR must know and
understand the
contract requirements, as specified in the SOO/SOW/PWS.

2. The COR monitors the contractor based on the contract
requirements specified in
the SOO/SOW/PWS and according to the COR
appointment/designation letter
from the Contracting Officer.

3. The COR must notify the Contracting Officer, orally and in
writing, if the
contractor is not performing well, i.e., if contractor performance
deviates from the
SOO/SOW/PWS.

4. The Contracting Officer — and only the Contracting Officer
— has authority to
give verbal or written directions to the contractor

5. Progress reports, when applicable to a contract, are critical in
monitoring
contractor performance, especially as a way to gauge early
warning of potential
changes, delays, or other problems in contractor performance.

6. The contractor has the primary responsibility for quality
assurance and timeliness
of its supplies or services. However, the COR must assess the
contractor’s
performance to ensure that the supply or service delivered
conforms to contract
requirements.

7. For services, the COR can monitor contractor performance
using a variety of
inspection methods:

91

a. Random sampling or stratified sampling.
b. Use 100-percent inspection for stringent performance
requirements

concerning health and safety.
c. Use periodic inspection or planned sampling to evaluate tasks
selected on

other than a 100 percent inspection or random basis.

d. User feedback is a valuable supplement to more systematic
surveillance

methods.
8. Documenting how well a contractor performs on a contract is
an important part of

the performance assessment process.
9. The Contracting Officer has several remedies available to
address items or

services that do not conform to contract requirements:
a. Bring the particular deficiency to the attention of the
contractor by letter or

through a meeting and obtain a commitment for appropriate
corrective
action.

b. Extend the contract schedule if excusable delays in
performance are
involved (such as combat situations or extreme weather
conditions).

c. Withhold contract payments if the contractor fails to comply
with delivery
or reporting provisions of the contract.

d. Terminate the contract for cause or default.
10. The COR is required to notify the Contracting Officer about
any delay in the

delivery or performance schedule.
11. CORs are not investigators. CORs should not personally
investigate suspected

cases of fraud. Rather, CORs should determine the facts of the
questionable
circumstances and occurrences and advise the Contracting
Officer, commander,
supervisor, or cognizant defense criminal investigative agency.

12. According to the United Nations, human trafficking
“involves the movement of
people through violence, deception, or coercion for the purpose
of forced labor,
servitude, or slavery-like practices.” CORs must be diligent in
ensuring that
contractors and contractor personnel are not trafficking in
persons.

13. When there is a dispute or request for equitable adjustment,
CORs should be
prepared to submit documentation developed during the course
of contract
performance in support of the Contracting Officer.

14. The COR is required to maintain a working file — in hard
copy, electronically, or
both — containing records relating to his or her COR duties
during the life of the
contract and to dispose of those records as directed by the
Contracting Officer.
The COR working file should be considered confidential and be
safeguarded
appropriately. If key documents are missing from the file, the
COR should contact
the Contracting Officer to obtain copies.

92

Chapter 9:
Monitoring Service Contracts

Personal and Non Personal Services

A service contract may be either for personal services or for
nonpersonal services. It can
also cover services performed by either a professional or
nonprofessional entity, whether
an individual or an organization. A personal services contract
is a contract that, by its
express terms or as administered, makes the contractor
personnel appear to be, in effect,
Government employees.

Personal services are characterized by the employer-employee
relationship created
between the Government and the contractor’s personnel.
Obtaining personal services by
contract rather than by direct hire circumvents civil service laws
unless Congress has
specifically authorized acquisition of the services by contract.
(Agencies may not award
personal service contracts unless specifically authorized by
statute.35) An employer-
employee relationship under a service contract occurs when, as
a result of the contract’s
terms or the manner of its administration during performance,
contractor personnel are
subject to the relatively continuous supervision and control of a
Government officer or
employee. The following are typical of a personal services

contract:

Government.
accomplish its assigned

function or mission.
ing comparable needs, are
performed in the same or

similar agencies using civil service personnel.
inherent nature of the

service, or the manner in which it is provided, reasonably
requires, directly or
indirectly, Government direction or supervision of contractor
employees in order
to:

- adequately protect the Government's interest;
- retain control of the function involved; or,
- retain full personal responsibility for the function supported in
a duly

authorized Federal officer or employee.

The FAR defines a nonpersonal services contract as “a contract
under which the
personnel rendering the services are not subject, either by the
contract’s terms or by the
manner of its administration, to the supervision and control
usually prevailing in

35
See 5 U.S.C. 3109.

93

relationships between the Government and its employees.”
Stipulating the employees’
duty hours, requiring individuals to report to a Government
person, requiring the
contractor’s employees to complete certain Government forms,
maintaining contractor
personnel records such as time cards, and granting leave
requests are examples of actions
that are grounds for the nonpersonal services contractor to
initiate a claim against the
Government. The post-award administration of a non personal
services contract is a
critical time to use caution to prevent nonpersonal service
contracts from becoming
personal. The COR must be vigilant. This is a critical area and
one that exposes the
COR and the Government to liability. The solution is to write a
SOO/SOW/PWS that
specifies the duty hours and the contractor’s arrangement for
supervising its employees.

When contracting for services, it is Government policy to use
performance-based
contracting methods and to contract for nonpersonal services
rather than personal
services to the maximum extent practicable.

Contractor Inspection Clauses for Service Contracts

FAR 52.246-1 addresses contractor inspection requirements as
follows:

performed all inspections
and tests necessary to substantiate that the supplies or services
furnished under this
contract conform to contract requirements, including any
applicable technical
requirements for specified manufacturers’ parts.

The related clauses specific to services contracts include the
following:

-4 (“Inspection of Services — Fixed-Price”),
FAR 52.246-5
(“Inspection of Services — Cost-Reimbursement”), and FAR
52.246-6
(“Inspection — Time-and-Material and Labor-Hour”) require
the contractor to
provide and maintain an inspection system acceptable to the
Government covering
the services to be performed under the contract, to keep
complete records of
contractor performed inspections, and to make such records
available to the
Government during the term of the contract.

-14 (“Inspection of Transportation”) requires the
contractor to furnish

Government representatives with the free access and reasonable
facilities and
assistance required to accomplish their inspections and tests.

At a minimum, the contractor’s records must indicate the nature
of the observations, the
number of observations made, and the number and type of
deficiencies found. The
inspection records must also indicate the acceptability of the
services and actions taken to
correct deficiencies. The COR must ensure that the contractor
complies with this
contract requirement.

94

Performance Work Statements for Service Contracts

The PWS defines the contract’s performance requirements, that
is, the work to be
accomplished. Defining the performance requirements includes
identifying required
outputs, key performance indicators or performance
characteristics, and acceptance
standards.

There is no standard template or outline for a PWS. The
Contracting Officer will provide
specific guidance on the development of a PWS. The DAU
Service Acquisition Mall36
provides tools and templates to assist with creating a PWS.

FAR 37.602 requires that
agencies, to the maximum extent practicable, do the following:

the work is to be
done or the number of hours to be provided.

performance
standards.

incentives in a
competitive environment to encourage innovation and cost-
effective methods of
performing the work.

Quality Assurance Surveillance Plans for Service Contracts

A QASP is an important tool that the COR can use as a guide
for systematically and
effectively monitoring the quality of the services received and
in compliance with the
terms of the contract. It also is used as a guide for determining
if and when the
Government needs to intercede and perhaps terminate a
contract, as well as for
determining if and when the Government needs to exercise
contract options. (Options
should be exercised after assessing the incumbent’s
performance under the current
contract and testing the market to ensure a fair and reasonable
price for conduct of
services.) In FFP contracts, the purpose of surveillance is to

identify any factors that may
delay performance, particularly when it becomes necessary for
the Government to accept
performance shortfalls from contractually established standards.

Typically, the requiring activity that drafts the SOO/SOW/PWS
also develops the QASP
and surveillance methods, tailoring them to meet specific
contract requirements and
operating conditions. The QASP details how and when the
Government will survey,
observe, test, sample, evaluate, and document contractor
performance. The QASP shall
include procedures to monitor the contractor’s performance
regarding trafficking in

36
The DAU Service Acquisition Mall website is located at http://
sam.dau.mil/. DAU also provides Service

Acquisition Mall training workshops.

95

persons such that non-compliance with FAR 52.222-50,
“Combating Trafficking in
Persons”, is brought to the immediate attention of the
Contracting Officer. It also
outlines the corrective procedures to be taken against the
contractor for deficient
performance, for example, issuing discrepancy reports that
require corrective action

responses, taking deductions from payments in FFP contracts
(where such provisions
have been made), and submitting recommendations to the
Contracting Officer about the
nature and significance of any performance shortfalls. The
QASP may be adjusted to
address contract risk not originally anticipated or no longer a
risk to contract success.
The Performance Requirements Summary (PRS) is releasable to
the contractor but the
QASP is an internal Government document.

Not every contract, delivery order, or task order requires a
QASP. Such a plan is
mandatory, though, for any contract, task order, or delivery
order for services over the
simplified acquisition threshold. Therefore, contracts for
services, including time-and-
material and labor-hour contracts, must include QASPs to
facilitate assessment of
contractor performance. These plans must be prepared in
conjunction with the
preparation of the SOO/SOW/PWS and should be tailored to
address the performance
risks inherent in the specific contract type and the work effort
addressed by contract.

The objective of contract surveillance is to monitor contractor
performance to assure the
services received are consistent with contract quality
requirements and received in a
timely manner. To be effective, contract surveillance requires
appropriate and immediate
on-site monitoring of the services being performed. On-site
monitoring should include
periodic verification and analysis of the services performed.

The effectiveness of
contract surveillance depends on keeping the Contracting
Officer informed of deviations
from the contractual requirements in a timely manner. The
objective of surveillance is to
determine if and when to intercede and terminate a contract,
when to take other
appropriate corrective actions, and if and when to exercise
contractual options.

The surveillance procedures must be discussed at the post-award
orientation meeting (if
held) to ensure understanding by all parties. Because it is
developed and used by the
Government, the QASP can be modified at any time. The
decision to change the plan
depends largely on the contractor’s demonstrated capability to
carry out its quality
control plan effectively.

QASP Composition and Method

The QASP should address the following topics:

96

At a minimum, the QASP should do the following:

-site inspections, floor
checks, and audits of
contractor’s billings to ensure that costs being charged to the
contract are
legitimate and reasonable. Specify how often (weekly, monthly,
etc.) inspections
will occur.

will be checked, and
what type of sample will be used (random, 100 percent, etc.).
For example, “Once
every month, technical bulletin revisions will be inspected to
assess the quality of
work and progress toward completion. The revisions will be
read for quality and
accuracy. Random sampling will be done as work progresses.
Near contract
completion, a 100 percent inspection will be done.”

hat will be used for checking cost-type
contract invoices to
ensure that only those labor categories used for the performance
of a task or
project are invoiced to the Government. Describe how material
or supplies will be
delivered and accepted under a cost or fixed-price type contract.

Identify the
frequency of inspections of time cards and payroll records.
Specify the policy for
delivery and acceptance procedures.

will ensure that the
prime contractor has obtained adequate competition when
acquiring materials.
For example, state in the QASP that contractor’s acquisition of
materials by
competition will be checked for charges over a certain amount
of money.

tracting Officer will ensure that progress
payments on fixed-
price contracts do not exceed the quality and quantity of work
completed and that
payment is made in accordance with the progress payment
clause. For example,
state that the quantity and quality of work will be inspected to
determine if the
work completed to date justifies the amount of payment to be
made.

Effective use of the QASP, in conjunction with the contractor’s
quality control plan, will
allow the Government to evaluate the contractor’s success in
meeting the specified
contract requirements. Surveillance should be increased if the
contractor begins to
experience problems or difficulties in performance, financial
strength, management,
quality assurance, or accounting system.

97

Each inspection made by Government inspectors must be
scheduled and the results must
be documented and filed for further reference, audit, and proof
of inspection. User
complaints, unsatisfactory contract performance, equipment
breakdown, meetings, and so
on should also be documented and filed. This documentation
could be in the form of a
contract deficiency report, minutes of meetings, annotations on
tally checklists,
correspondence, and so forth.

Contract Surveillance Checklist

The COR should use a contract surveillance checklist to ensure
correct performance of
COR duties. Appendix F contains a checklist for contract
surveillance.

Incident Reporting

It is important for CORs to know that contractors are required
to report offenses alleged
to have been committed by or against contractor personnel to
appropriate investigative
authorities and may need to assist the contractor in locating the
appropriate authority.
Victim and witness protection and assistance to contractor
personnel in connection with
alleged offenses will be provided.

Contract Work Hours and Safety Standards Act

Depending on the nature of the contract and the COR’s
appointment/designation letter,
the COR may get involved with reviews of the contractor’s time
charges. The Contract
Work Hours and Safety Standards Act (40 U.S.C. 327-333)
requires that certain contracts
contain a clause (FAR 52.222- 4, “Contract Work Hours and
Safety Standards Act –
Overtime Compensation”) specifying that no laborer or
mechanic doing any part of the
work contemplated by the contract may be required or permitted
to work more than 40
hours in any work week unless paid for all additional hours at
not less than one and a half
times the basic rate of pay.

Violations of the act may be detected during a labor interview.
A part of the interview
requires the employee to divulge the total number of hours he
has worked during the
previous week. Contractors and subcontractors in violation of
this contract provision
must pay back wages owed the employee plus liquidated
damages per day per affected
employee. This amount can be withheld from monies owed the
contractor under the
contract or from any other contract that the contractor has with
the Government. The
approval of the use of overtime may only be granted by an
authorized agency approving
official (i.e. Contracting Officer) after determining in writing
that overtime is necessary.

98

Chapter 9. Key Points

1. The majority of Government service contracts are for
nonpersonal services.
2. A personal services contract is a contract that, by its express
terms or as

administered, makes the contractor personnel appear to be, in
effect, Government
employees.

3. The acquisition regulation inspection clauses are key in
providing the COR the
statutory authority with the contractor to allow the COR to
oversee contract
performance.

4. The PWS is a critical document in that it defines the
contract’s performance
requirements.

5. To assist the COR in ensuring the contractor is meeting
performance requirements
a QASP is utilized and included in the contract. The QASP
establishes the metrics
that will be used by the COR to assess successful contract
performance.

99

Chapter 10:
Monitoring Construction Contracts

Performance and Payment Bonds

The Miller Act requires contractors to furnish performance and
payment bonds for
construction contracts over $150,000. Bonds are similar to an
insurance policy. A bond
is a written instrument between the contractor and a third-party
surety to ensure
fulfillment of the contractor’s obligation to the Government and
to suppliers of labor and
material for a given project. Performance bonds protect the
Government from default by
the prime contractor and are required in the amount of 100
percent of the original
contract price in construction contracts (See FAR 52.228- 15,
“Performance and Payment
Bonds — Construction”). Payment bonds protect suppliers of
labor and materials in the
event that the prime contractor does not reimburse the
subcontractors. Payment bonds
are required because construction subcontractors do not have
the legal right to place liens
against real property of the Government in the form of
mechanics’ liens. Such liens can
be placed against real property by subcontractors in civilian

contracting if the prime
contractor does not reimburse the subcontractors.

Contractor Inspection Clauses

When construction contracts are in excess of the simplified
acquisition threshold, the
contractor is required by FAR 52.246-12, “Inspection of
Construction,” to maintain an
inspection system:

The Contractor is responsible for performing or having
performed all inspections
and tests necessary to substantiate that the supplies or services
furnished under this
contract conform to contract requirements, including any
applicable technical
requirements for specified manufacturers’ parts.

The contractor must make its records of inspection available to
the Government. At a
minimum, the contractor’s records must indicate the nature of
the observations, the
number of observations made, and the number and types of
deficiencies found. The
records also must indicate the acceptability of the work and the
actions taken to correct
deficiencies. The COR must ensure that the contractor complies
with this contract
requirement.

COR Compliance Checking

The COR must make the following compliance checks for

construction contracts:

100

certified payrolls.

Correction of Deficiencies

In accordance with the Inspection of Construction clause, the
contractor must replace
materials or must correct workmanship not conforming to the
contract requirements at no
additional cost to the Government. In addition, the contractor is
subject to any liquidated
damages specified in the contract or actual damages incurred by
the Government. If the
contractor fails to correct deficiencies, the general provisions of
the contract provide for
specific actions to be taken by the Contracting Officer, as
follows:

the item or work at the contractor’s
expense. This may be
accomplished by award of a new contract or by use of the
Government’s own
resources.

accomplished by formal
modification to the contract. The reduced price is based upon
the reasonable value
of the item, considering the possible cost of correcting the item.

as a last resort. If the
item or work must be re-procured, the contractor is normally
liable for excess
costs incurred by the Government.

The COR may not take any of these actions, but must ensure
timely notice of deficiencies
to the Contracting Officer.

Liquidated Damages

Liquidated damages are required in DoD construction contracts
over $500,000 but may
be used in contracts under this threshold if the Contracting
Officer determines that the
Government may suffer a loss if the project is not completed on
time. Liquidated
damages are amounts agreed to and settled on in advance to
avoid litigation. They are
based on the damage one party may incur if the other does not
complete the contract on
time. Because they are determined prior to award of the
contract, they can be only
estimates and may not be the actual damages that the party
ultimately may incur. The
amount does not have to be the exact damages that may be
incurred, but must show some

reasonable relationship to the anticipated damages. If there is
no reasonable relationship
to the anticipated damages, these damages will be determined a
penalty and will not be
enforced. The contract must contain a clause limiting the
amount of liquidated damages

101

that can be assessed a contractor. The Government is entitled to
the amount of liquidated
damages agreed to unless the contractor has encountered an
excusable delay.

The COR must keep accurate notes and records. For example,
contractors normally
dispute the number of days that have been assessed and not the
liquidated damage rate.
Consequently, the COR must keep adequate daily records of
weather or any conditions
that may affect the completion of the contract. Contracting
Officers have the final
authority as to whether or not they will enforce liquidated
damages if the delay is not
excusable.

Differing Site Conditions

One of the major risks of a construction project is the type of
subsurface or other latent
physical condition that will be encountered. If bidders were
required to assume the full
risk of these conditions, they would either have to examine the

site extensively or include
contingencies in their bids to protect themselves against
potential unfavorable conditions.
On the other hand, the Government normally has obtained
information concerning site
conditions during its design of the project prior to soliciting
bids and wants to avoid the
disruption and bidding expense that would be involved if each
bidder were to make
borings or other extensive investigations. The Government’s
response to this situation
has been to make its information about the site available to
bidders, to admonish bidders
to make reasonable site investigations, and to relieve the
contractor from the risk of
certain types of unexpected unfavorable conditions while
protecting the Government if
the conditions turn out to be more favorable than expected. The
contractor has an
affirmative duty to notify the Government when a differing site
condition is encountered.

Contractual Rights of The Government

A contractual right of the Government cannot be waived, nor
may a contract be modified
for the convenience of a contractor. However, it may be in the
best interest of the
Government not to reject the materials or services of a
construction contract because of
resultant utilities shut-off, downtime of equipment or facilities,
excessive inconvenience
to users or occupants, or other reasons unique to the contract —
costs that may not be
recoverable from the contractor as damages. If it is desired to
accept work that

essentially meets the needs of the Government but does not
conform to the requirements
of the contract, the COR must furnish the Contracting Officer
recommendations to accept
the work, along with findings on all points in which the work
fails to meet contractual
requirements and an estimate of the time required (and cost
decrease, if applicable) for
the contractor to complete performance. The Contracting
Officer may extend the
contract completion date by formal modification to allow the
contractor to correct
deficient work.

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Progress Payments

FAR 52.232-5, “Payment under Fixed-Price Construction
Contracts,” provides that the
contractor is entitled to progress payments monthly as the work
proceeds, or at more
frequent intervals as determined by the Contracting Officer.
This clause further permits a
maximum retention of 10 percent of the amount of the payment
until satisfactory
progress is achieved, unless a lesser retention percentage is
approved by the Contracting
Officer. For progress payments, the Contracting Officer should
advise the contractor
prior to commencement of on-site work to furnish a breakdown
of the total contract price

showing the amount for each principal category of the work.
Such breakdown should be
in as much detail as requested by the Contracting Officer, to
provide a basis for
processing progress payments. The categories of work shown
on the contractor’s request
for progress payment may be the same as set forth in the
progress schedule approved by
the Contracting Officer in accordance with FAR 52.236-15,
“Schedules for Construction
Contracts,” which is included in all construction contracts
having a performance period
exceeding 60 days. A detailed breakdown is not needed for
final payments under a
contract line item.

FAR 52.232-5 also requires the following:

Along with each request for progress payments, the contractor
shall furnish the
following certification, or payment shall not be made: I hereby
certify, to the best
of my knowledge and belief, that (1) The amounts requested are
only for
performance in accordance with the specifications, terms, and
conditions of the
contract; (2) Payments to subcontractors and suppliers have
been made for
previous payments received under the contract, and timely
payments will be made
from the proceeds of the payment covered by this certification,
in accordance with
the subcontract agreements and the requirements of 31 U.S.C.
39; and (3) This
request for progress payments does not include any amounts

that the prime
contractor intends to withhold or retain from a subcontractor or
supplier in
accordance with the terms and conditions of the subcontract.
This certification is
not to be construed as final acceptance of a subcontractor’s
performance.

The COR must screen each invoice for progress payments and
the above certification,
and compare the total amount invoiced with the progress reports
to ensure that the
percentage of the amount invoiced is not excessive relative to
the percentage of work
accomplished. The COR must ensure that quantities, percentage
of work completed, list
of materials delivered to the job site, and monetary amounts are
accurately stated on all
receipts and acceptance documents. The COR must forward a
copy of each receipt and
acceptance document, processed in connection with progress or
final payments, to the
Contracting Officer concurrent with forwarding the document to
the paying office. The
COR is responsible for ensuring that payments to the contractor
are processed promptly.

103

Suspension of Work

The Government includes the Suspension of Work clause in all
fixed-price construction
contracts and in architect-engineer contracts. The Suspension
of Work clause allows the
Contracting Officer to suspend a contractor’s performance for a
reasonable period of
time. If the suspension is unreasonable, the contractor may be
entitled to reimbursement
of certain costs that can be attributed to the delay. Ordered
suspensions covered by the
Suspension of Work clause can be compensated for only if they
result in unreasonable
delay. A suspension of work differs from a stop work order,
which is used in negotiated
contracts for supplies and services.

The CORs must maintain adequate records for any actions taken
under the Suspension of
Work clause. Adequate records may reveal that the contractor
contributed to the
suspension, that the contractor may not have been damaged by
the suspension, or that the
Government’s suspension was reasonable. COR records are
vital in determining the
amount of monies that the contractor may be entitled to if the
suspension is determined to
be unreasonable.

As prescribed in FAR 42.1305 (a), the Contracting Officer must
insert the “Suspension of
Work” clause in solicitations and contracts when a fixed-price
construction or architect-
engineer contract is contemplated. “Suspension of Work: The
Contracting Officer may
order the Contractor, in writing, to suspend, delay or interrupt
all or any part of the work

of this contract for the period of time that the Contracting
Officer determines appropriate
for the convenience of the Government.”

If the performance of all or any part of the work is, for an
unreasonable period of time,
suspended, delayed, or interrupted (1) by an act of the
Contracting Officer in the
administration of this contract, or (2) by the Contracting
Officer’s failure to act within the
time specified in this contract (or within a reasonable time if
not specified), an adjustment
must be made for any increase in the cost of performance of this
contract (excluding
profit) necessarily caused by the unreasonable suspension,
delay, or interruption, and the
contract modified in writing accordingly. However, no
adjustment may be made under
this clause for any suspension, delay, or interruption to the
extent that performance would
have been so suspended, delayed, or interrupted by any other
cause, including the fault or
negligence of the contractor, or for which an equitable
adjustment is provided for or
excluded under any other term or condition of this contract. A
claim under this clause
must not be allowed (1) for any cost incurred more than 20 days
before the contractor has
notified the Contracting Officer in writing of the act or failure
to act involved (but this
requirement may not apply as to a claim resulting from a
suspension order), and (2)
unless the claim, in an amount stated, is asserted in writing as
soon as practicable after
the termination of the suspension, delay, or interruption, but not
later than the date of

final payment under the contract.

104

Chapter 10. Key Points

1. Performance and Payment Bonds are critical tools in ensuring
satisfactory
contractor performance for construction contracts in excess of
the simplified
acquisition threshold.

2. The acquisition regulations inspection clause for construction
is key in providing
the COR the authority to oversee contract performance.

3. Just like service contracts the COR must ensure the
contractor is complying with
the terms and conditions of the contract and correct any
contractor caused
deficiencies in a timely manner.

4. Liquidated damages are another key tool of construction
contracts and acts as a
motivator to ensure timely completion. Liquidated damages
cannot be considered
a penalty but must adequately reflect what costs the
Government will incur if the
project is not completed according to the contract schedule.

5. The unique nature of construction is that there will be

something discovered
during performance that differs from the original contract
documentation.
Addressing these changes is accomplished through differing site
conditions.
There are two types of differing site conditions: 1) Category I,
and,2) Category II.
The changes clause process is used to definitize these actions.

6. Progress payments are typically provided under a
construction contract due to the
length of time it takes to complete a project and the incremental
nature of the costs
incurred under a construction contract.

7. It is imperative for a COR to maintain good records if a
suspension of work is
issued. The COR records may be vital in determining the
amounts the contractor
may be entitled to if the suspension is determined to be
unreasonable.

105

Chapter 11:
Foreign Acquisition and International Relationships

Domestic Trade

Many countries, including the U.S., have established domestic
preference laws to protect

the domestic economy and industry. However, in today’s global
economy, no one
country is immune from the economic benefits to international
trade.

International Trade

International Trade is the exchange of capital, goods and
services across international
borders. Generally, however, international trade is more
expensive than domestic trade
because of tariffs, time costs in border delays and packaging,
and costs directly related to
differences in language, culture and legal requirements. Also,
factors of production such
as capital and labor are more mobile within a country than
across borders. To offset the
increased costs of international trade, countries often enter into
trade agreements, which
eliminate tariffs, import quotas, and preferences for most goods
and services traded.

Prohibited Sources37

DoD is prohibited from awarding contracts or allowing
subcontracts to a firm or a
subsidiary of a firm if the government of a terrorist country.
Currently the Department of
State lists Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria as terrorist countries.

U.S. Domestic Preference Legislation

The Buy American Act

The Buy American Act (BAA) is the major domestic preference
statute governing

procurement by the Government. Essentially, the BAA protects
domestic labor by
providing a preference for domestic goods in Government
purchases. In determining
what are or are not American goods, the place of mining,
production, or manufacture is
the determining factor. The nationality of the contractor is not
considered when
determining if a product is of domestic origin. The BAA does
not apply to articles

37
For more information about policies toward foreign countries f
or the export of defense articles and defense

services, visit http://www.pmddtc.state.gov/embargoed_countrie
s/index.html.

106

procured for “use outside the U.S.”, nor is it applicable to
procurements below the micro-
purchase threshold. (See definition in FAR 2.101)

The Trade Agreements Act of 1979 authorizes the President to
waive any otherwise
applicable “law, regulation or procedure regarding Government
procurement” that would
accord foreign products less favorable treatment than that given
to domestic products.
Other treaties and agreements also place limitations on the

application of the Act and
must be considered when looking at any Buy American
question.

Coverage of the Buy American Act

The Act applies to all federal procurements, but has separate
provisions for supply
contracts and construction contracts. Most of the rules and
definitions used in applying
the Act are found in the FAR Part 25 and DFARS Part 225, not
in the Act itself.

The Act differentiates between manufactured and un-
manufactured articles. An un-
manufactured article will be deemed a domestic end product or
construction material if it
has been mined or produced in the U.S. Manufactured articles
are considered domestic if
they have been manufactured in the U.S. from components,
substantially all of which
have been mined, produced, or manufactured in the U.S.
Substantially all means that the
cost of foreign components does not exceed 50% of the cost of
all components.

Exceptions to the Buy American Act

The primary exceptions to the Buy American Act are:

onsistent with the Public Interest

The Head of the Agency may waive the requirements of the Act

if a determination is
made that the application of the Act would be inconsistent with
the public interest. This
public interest exception has often been used like a national
security exception by the
DoD, but is also available for non-defense purposes. This
exception places considerable
discretion in the head of the agency.

A federal agency is permitted to use a foreign product if the
Contracting Officer
determines that the cost of the lowest priced domestic product is
“unreasonable.” A 50%
differential is applied to DoD procurements.38 The differential
is added to the lowest
acceptable foreign offer and then compared to the lowest
acceptable domestic offer. The
differential is applied only to the bid price for material to be
delivered under the contract,

38
Outside DoD, the differential is 6% or 12% if the contract inv
olves a small business or labor surplus area.

107

not the total contract price. In most cases, the differential is
applied on an item by item
basis; however, a solicitation may provide that, for purposes of

the BAA, certain items
will be lumped together.

Reasonably Available Commercial Quantities and of
Satisfactory Quality

FAR 25.104 provides a list of articles which fall under this
exemption.

The Berry Amendment

The Berry Amendment is a statutory requirement that restricts
the DoD from using funds
appropriated or otherwise available to DoD for procurement of
food, clothing, fabrics,
fibers, yarns, other made-up textiles, and hand or measuring
tools that are not grown,
reprocessed, reused, or produced in the U.S. This includes
foreign military sale
transactions and any time a DoD buying activity is purchasing
on behalf of another
agency. Likewise, any purchase on behalf of DoD by another
agency, for example the
General Services Administration (GSA), must also comply.
Berry Amendment rules
apply even if the DoD-funded purchase is not a DoD-awarded
contract. The Berry
Amendment follows the funds – if DoD funds are sent to
another federal agency, the
Berry Amendment still applies.

The Berry Amendment applies to BOTH end items and
components. The requirement

for domestic origin flows down through all the tiers of
suppliers, e.g., it does not stop
with what the prime contractor manufactures or assembles. The
prime contractor is
responsible for verifying the source of all materials and
components from subcontractors.

If an acquisition involves items covered by the Berry
Amendment, and the contractor
cannot locate a domestic source, a Domestic Non-Availability
Determination (DNAD)
may be appropriate. The prime contractor must request a
DNAD through the Contracting
Officer. DFARS PGI 225.7002-2(b) establishes the process for
requesting a DNAD.

In accordance with DFARS 225.7002-2(b), the Secretaries of
the Military Departments
and the Director, Defense Logistics Agency, without power of
redelegation, have
authority to approve DNADs for their respective requirements.
The Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics is the DNAD
approval authority for the
other defense components.

Note: A comparison of the Berry Amendment and the BAA is
provided in figure 11.1.
The figure is another way to see the differences discussed above
between the Berry
Amendment and the BAA.

108

Figure 11.1 – A Comparison of the Berry Amendment and the
Buy American Act

Name Ref Law
Applies

to
Flow down

Covered
Items

Thresholds
Domestic
Content

Commercial
Exception?

Qualifying Country
Exception

Where
Contract

Performed

Berry
10USC
2533a

DoD
All tiers of

contractors

Specified in
law

> Simplified
Acquisition
Threshold

100% No

Applies to Chemical
Warfare Protective

Clothing ( all
qualifying countries)

and par-aramid
fibers (Netherlands

only))

Anywhere

BAA
41 USC

10a - 10d
Gov't
wide

End item
only

Supply

Purchases

> Micro-
purchase
Threshold

50% Yes - for IT Applies to all items
In U.S.
Only

Trade Agreements

The U.S. is party to many trade agreements worldwide
including:

Agreement (WTO GPA)

allows for reciprocal acquisition of items with the 39 signatory
countries if it is an
authorized item (specified broadly by the Federal Supply Code)
and meets a certain
dollar value threshold (see FAR Part 25);

Trade Representative in

acquisitions covered by the WTO GPA (this includes
Afghanistan); and
Panama, must be treated

as eligible products in acquisitions covered by the WTO GPA.

For more information on Trade Agreements, please go to the
Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative website at http://www.ustr.gov/trade-
agreements.

International Relationships

CORs need to consider cultural differences when monitoring
contracts performed
overseas. CORs who work with non-U.S. contractors should be
aware of the total
spectrum of communication: language, nonverbal
communication, customs and
perceived values. Examples of cultural differences that can
effect contract performance
include:

109

become
successful if they work

hard. In the Middle East, family status is more important to
success. For example, to
become a police officer in Saudi Arabia, a person must be
related to the King, even if
remotely, like a third cousin.

alue competition, but in many places of the
world, cooperation is more
important. This cultural difference can lead to collusion among

contractors proposing
on contracts. Also, nepotism, whereby multiple family
members are involved in one
or more business units, is very common. For example,
contractors may decide which
one of them will get the next contract and some of the
competing offerors may be
extended family members of multiple business units.

the Middle
East, the group or tribe is
more important than individuals and may be key to an
individual’s success.

extended family is very
important.

To work effectively with people from other cultures, the COR
should keep the following
tips in mind:

lifelong relationship.

Therefore, be careful to use only last names unless the
relationship is sincerely close.
Using first names too freely may hurt the COR’s reputation and
possibly the business
relationship.

Be careful on providing
criticism and making a negative point. Foreign cultures handle
criticism differently.

Always try to make the point without too much criticism unless
you have a lot of
back-up documentation.

“no”. For example, the
COR could say “I’ll see what I can do.” Americans appreciate
an honest answer, but
in many cultures, an evasive answer is the norm. People from
such cultures do not
want to disappoint others. In some cultures, “no” is interpreted
as an expression of
personal dislike.

ional sensitivities. For example,
do not refer to people
from Okinawa as Japanese, and do not refer to the Arabian Gulf
as the Persian Gulf
when speaking to a Saudi. In other cases, not knowing or not
distinguishing the
difference between nationalities can cause hard feelings. Do
Canadians like being
grouped in with Americans? Do the Scots like being referred to
as English?

foreign cultures do not have
either a legal or ethical limit regarding providing gifts, food,
money, or other items or
services of value to people in positions of influence or power.
Be very careful to not
cross over the legal boundary to violate U.S. Law. It is your
responsibility to find the
most appropriate tone and phrase to say ‘no’ when you need to.

110

Working in another culture can be an exciting experience.
CORs may make friends for
life and do things they never thought possible. However, CORs
must be careful when
dealing with foreign contractors. There is a thin line between
working within the foreign
culture and violating U.S. Laws. Even the best intentions can
land someone in jail.
CORs must be careful and understand their limitations. Even if
it is legal to do
something, it does not necessarily mean it should be done. The
COR should consult with
the legal office about such concerns.

Business Culture

CORs meet with contractors routinely. When scheduling
meetings with non-U.S.
contractors, remember non-U.S. contractors may routinely start
meetings with small talk
and even a meal before turning to business. The COR should
discuss this issue –
particularly the need to accept meals – with their leadership,
legal office and the
Contracting Officer.

Third world contractors may view time differently than
Americans. Americans place a
great emphasis on timeliness. A COR may find that a
contractor’s approach to time is
much slower and more relaxed than in American culture. This

cultural difference can
frustrate a COR to the point of being counterproductive. To be
most effective, the COR
needs to understand the differences and work within the system,
rather than forcing
American ideas of urgency.

Americans love their personal space, but in many countries,
such as in the Middle East,
personal space is very small. In those countries, moving away
from the person gives the
perception you do not like them (and may be considered rude).
Touching may be more
or less prevalent. In the Middle East, holding hands for a long
time, compared to a
normal handshake, is common. Their handshake may be soft
and may hold your hand for
30 seconds to a minute, which may be awkward for those who
are not used to it.

Living patterns in some countries are very different. For
example, in Saudi Arabia,
transactions are slower from June to September due to
vacations. In Europe, many
individuals take their vacations for the entire month of August.
Also CORs should be
prepared for contractors to accomplish very little during
Ramadan, a month long Muslim
holiday.

Note: CORs should use their understanding of the local culture
to achieve successful
outcomes. It takes understanding, planning and patience when
working with non-U.S.
contractors. When communicating, CORs should use clear and
concise language and

should avoid jargon and acronyms. Above all, CORs should
keep a professional working
relationship. They should take cultural factors into account, but
should discern between
cultural differences and excuses.

111

Additional Guidance

Listed below are some sources of additional guidance on
cultural awareness.

• The US Marine Corps Center for Advanced Operational
Culture Learning (CAOCL)
provides information about regional cultures and languages to
help planning and
operations in a Joint expeditionary environment. The CAOCL
Web site
(http://www.tecom.usmc.mil/caocl/) provides specific cultural
links related to Operation
Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom, United States
Africa Command, United
States Pacific Command, United States Southern Command, and
United States Central
Command.

• The Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
offers culturally based
education (including predeployment materials) in more than 40
languages. The center’s
Web site offers downloadable products for predeployment

training, deployment use, or
refresher training at http://www.dliflc.edu/products.html.

• The Air Force Air University Web site offers sociocultural and
language resources at
http://www.au.af.mil/culture/index.htm. One such resource is
the Air Force Culture and
Language Center’s Expeditionary Skills Training Portal
(http://www.culture.af.edu/estPortal.html) for those who are
preparing to deploy.

Chapter 11. Key Points

1. The BAA applies to acquisitions by any organization of the
Federal Government.
The BAA applies to end products only, not to components. It
does not flow down
to subcontractors, and there are many exceptions. Two of the
most commonly
used by DoD are the exception for 21 Qualifying Countries and
the exception for
items “not reasonably available commercial quantities and of
satisfactory quality.”

2. The Berry Amendment applies to acquisitions for DoD funds.
It requires that 100
percent of the covered products be produced in the U.S. It
applies to all
components in the product and to suppliers at every tier of the
supply chain. There
are very few exceptions.

3. The exception allowing overseas purchase for goods to be
used only outside the

U.S. is very helpful in a deployed theatre.

4. CORs need to consider cultural differences when monitoring
contracts performed
outside the U.S. CORs who work with non-U.S. contractors
should speak clearly
and avoid acronyms. The COR may need to take more time to
explain what’s
required in the contract. If there are any problems, the COR
must contact the
Contracting Officer.

112

5. Be sensitive to ethnic or national sensitivities.
6. The offering of gifts, food, money, or other items or services
of value is common

in foreign cultures. Be very careful not to cross over the legal
boundary to violate
U.S. Law. It is the COR’s responsibility to find the balance
between tone and the
correct phrase to use saying “no”. There are many ways to say
“no” to a non-U.S.
contractor.

113

Appendix A: Forms

Contents

rts:

or Services

:

114

Contract Forms

CORs need to understand the terms and conditions of the
contract as well as the Uniform
Contract Format.

Figure A.1: SF 26 – Award/ Contract

115

Figure A.2: SF 30 - Amendment of Solicitation/Modification of
Contract

116

Figure A.3: SF 33 - Solicitation, Offer & Award

Receiving Reports

Depending on the kind of contract, the COR uses one of the
following receiving reports
to document the Government’s acceptance of the delivered
supply or service:

der for Supplies or Services;

The COR most likely will use the SF 1449, DD 1155, or DD 250
(Table A.1 is a
crosswalk between the key blocks on these three forms). The
COR also may use an
agency-specific requirements package or SF 26,
Award/Contract.

When partial supplies or services are required, once the initial
receiving report is done on
the SF 1449, the subsequent receiving reports are made with a
DD 250.

This section depicts the three forms and contains some
instructions on completing them.
The Office of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
(DPAP) provides further
instructions on completing these forms, and links to the forms
themselves, at

117

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/HTML/forms.html.
There is also a
discussion on invoices used as receiving reports.

The SF 1449, Solicitation/Contract/Order for Commercial Items,
Figure A.3, is the
most common receiving report for supplies and services for
commercial items and is
usually the first page of the contract. It is a streamlined
document, but it still contains
contract line item numbers (CLIN), delivery dates, funding,
clauses, and the Statement of
Objectives, Statement of Work, or Performance Work Statement
(SOO/SOW/PWS).

When preparing the SF 1449, the COR should ensure
completion of blocks 32a (check
received and accepted), 32b (signature of official authorized to
accept supplies/services),
32c (date supplies/services accepted), 32d (printed name and
title of authorized
representative), 32e (mailing address of authorized
representative), 32f (telephone
number), 32g (e-mail address), 33 (shipment number), 35
(amount verified correct), 36
(payment: complete, partial, or final), 42a (printed name of
receiver), and 42c (date
received). The same name may appear in blocks 32d and 42a if
the same individual both
receives and accepts the supplies or services. If the receiver
and acceptor are different
individuals, the names in these two blocks will be different.

If partial payment is authorized, the COR should document the
number of items or
amount of services that have been received and accepted and the
total dollars per line
item to be paid.

Note: CORs must document partial payments carefully. Some
contractors will
understand the system better than the COR and may try to
obtain double payments for the
same work completed.

As noted above, DPAP provides instructions for completing
blocks 1 through 31c of the
SF 1449. The Contracting Officer will complete blocks 1
through 30, with the exception
of blocks 12, 17, 23, 24, and 30, which are completed by the
contractor. The remaining
blocks are the responsibility of those performing the receiving
and payment functions.

Note: CORs may see versions of SF 1449s that do not have the
receiving information
blocks at the bottom of the back of the form. If that is the case,
CORs should use DD 250
as the receiving report.

118

Figure A.4: Sample SF 1449

119

DD Form 250, Material Inspection and Receiving Report

The DD Form 250, shown in Figure A.4, is a multi-purpose
report used for the following.
• To provide evidence of Government contract quality assurance
at origin or

destination;
• To provide evidence of acceptance at origin or destination;
• For packing lists;
• For receiving;
• For shipping;
• As a contractor invoice; and
• As commercial invoice support.

DD 250 is used as the receiving report for procurement actions
awarded using SF 1449 or
DD 1155. When filling in the DD 250, the COR can find
related information on the SF
1449 and DD 1155 as identified in Table A.1.

The receiving or acceptance activity will complete blocks 1 to

20, 21a, 21b, and 22,
including signatures, typed names, titles, mailing address, and
phone numbers. If there
are separate receiving and acceptance officials, blocks 21 and
22 must reflect each
individual appropriately. The acceptance authority (signer) is
designated in Section E of
the contract.

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
Appendix F provides
instructions for preparing and completing the DD 250. The
following instructions
provide guidance for the COR and quality assurance personnel,
as appropriate.

120

Figure A.5: Sample DD 250

121

Table A.1: SF1449/DD1155/DD250 Crosswalk

Invoices Used as Receiving Reports

A contractor’s invoice can be used as a receiving report if the
contract or purchase order
provides for use of Government certified invoices instead of a
separate receiving report.

If the COR is accepting contractor performance or delivery by
using a Government
certified invoice, he or she should include this statement: “I
certify the supplies/services
have been received and accepted on (day, month, and year).”
This statement may be on
an invoice, delivery ticket, voucher, or separate piece of paper,
and it must contain
printed name, title, telephone number, date, and signature of the
Government official
authorized to receive and accept the supplies or services.

Other Reports

The DD 2772, Contractor Discrepancy Report (CDR), Figure
A.5, is generally

prepared by a COR to notify the contractor of a pending
discrepancy. In most instances
the purpose of the form is to allow the contractor to correct the
discrepancy without
interference from the Government.

SF 1449

DD 1155

DD 250

Block 2 and/or 4 Block 1 Block 1 (procurement
instrument identification
number)

Block 11 Block 8 Block 8 (acceptance point)

Block 17a Block 9 Block 9 (prime contractor)

Block 16 Block 7 Block 10(administered by)

Block 18a Block 15
Block 12 (payment will be
made by)

Block 15 Block 14 Block 13 (shipped to)

Page with CLINs Page with CLINs
Blocks 15-20 (item no,
description, quantity, unit, unit

price, total amount)

122

Figure A.6: Sample DD 2772

COR Monthly Report to the Contracting Officer: A sample
form for the COR’s
monthly report to the Contracting Officer appears in Figure A.6.

123

Figure A.7: Sample COR Monthly Report

Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT)
Letter of Authorization

The letter of authorization (LOA) form generated by SPOT
states that “the Government
organization specified above, in its mission support capacity
under the contract,
authorizes the individual employee identified herein, to proceed
to the location(s) listed

for the designated deployment period set forth above.” It
identifies specific privileges,
and it addresses travel and emergency medical support. The
LOA must include the
Contracting Officer’s signature, or the COR’s signature (if
authorized by the Contracting
Officer), and contact information. Figure A.7 shows a sample
LOA.

124

Figure A.8: Sample SPOT Letter of Authorization

Funding Forms

Refer to local procedures for identification of funding forms.

125

Appendix B: Contract Planning and Source Selection

Contents

• Planning and Source Selection

• Pre-award and Solicitation:

• Market Research
• Independent Government Cost Estimate
• Performance Work Statements
• Socio-economic Development Programs
• Planning for the Evaluation of Proposals
• Types of Source Selections
• Competition
• Amending the Solicitation
• DOs and DON’Ts for Pre-award and Solicitation

• Evaluation and Award:

• Receiving and Managing Proposals
• Evaluating Proposals
• Technical Evaluation Reports
• Assisting in the Review of Business/Cost Proposals

• Communicating with Proposed Contractors:

• Determining the Competitive Range
• Communications after Establishing the Competitive Range
• Selecting the Right Contractor
• Debriefing Proposed Contractors
• Handling Protests
• Handling Freedom of Information Act Requests
• DOs and DON’Ts for Evaluation and Award

126

Planning and Source Selection

This appendix provides an overview of contract planning (pre-
award and solicitation) and
of source selection (evaluation and award). Figure B.1 depicts
the overall acquisition
process.

127

Figure B.1: Acquisition Process Overview

Pre-award and Solicitation

The requiring activity has the responsibility to determine the
need for supplies and
services. This is the first and most critical step in the planning
process. The follow-on
steps focus on forecasting, planning, and defining the
acquisition requirements;
developing and updating acquisition plans and strategies,
justifications, and
authorizations; conducting market research; preparing program

plans, cost estimates, and
schedules; and determining priorities. FAR 7.102(a) requires
that “agencies shall
perform acquisition planning and conduct market research for
all acquisitions.” In
addition to ensuring compliance with the FAR requirement,
contract planning helps
anticipate problems, save time in the future, save money, stay
on schedule, communicate
to higher management, and generate the commitment.

Market Research

Acquisitions of supplies and services begin with a description
of the Government’s needs
stated in terms sufficient to allow the acquisition team to
conduct market research. The
results of the market research form the basis for developing new
requirement documents

128

and issuing solicitations. Market research is an ongoing process
used to collect, organize,
maintain, analyze, and present data. Its purpose is to maximize
the capabilities,
technology, and competitive forces of the marketplace to meet
an organization’s needs
for supplies and services. The COR may be asked to assist with
gathering market
research information for use by decision makers to determine
the best approach for

acquiring the needed supply or service.

The research will vary, depending on such factors as urgency,
estimated dollar value,
complexity, and past experience. This research involves
obtaining information specific
to the item being acquired and determining whether the
Government’s needs can be met
by items that are customarily available in the commercial
marketplace, by items that are
customarily available in the commercial marketplace but need
modifying, or by items
used exclusively for governmental purposes. Results should be
documented in a manner
appropriate to the size and complexity of the acquisition.
Market research also helps the
Government develop independent government cost estimates
(IGCE) when conducting
cost analysis.

Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE)

• Cost Estimates

o Labor Costs
o Burden of Labor Costs
o Other Direct Costs
o Indirect Costs (Overhead)
o General and Administrative Expenses
o Profit and Fee
o Escalation Considerations for the IGCE

• Price Estimates
• Other Guidance

The IGCE is the Government’s estimate of the resources and
projected cost of the
resources a contractor will incur in the performance of a
contract. These costs include
direct costs such as labor, products, equipment, travel, and
transportation; indirect costs
such as labor overhead, material overhead, and general and
administrative (G&A)
expenses; and profit or fee (amount above costs incurred to
remunerate the contractor for
the risks involved in undertaking the contract).

This discussion addresses key elements of an IGCE; it is not
intended to cover every
possible acquisition. Large, complicated acquisitions costing
millions of dollars have
dozens of cost elements, while acquisitions for single items of
relatively low dollar value
have only a few cost elements. Their application will vary with
the circumstances of the
specific acquisition and market situations. The IGCE should
include only those elements

129

applicable to and developed from the statement of objectives/
statement of work/
performance work statement (SOO/SOW/PWS) or description of
the supplies, services,
or construction to be acquired. An IGCE is required for every
procurement action in
excess of the simplified acquisition threshold at FAR 2.101.

Commercial items are supplies or services sold to the general
public that require no major
modification to meet the government’s specific requirements.

The IGCE is developed by the requiring activity and used to
establish a realistic
price/cost for budget purposes. In addition, the Contracting
Officer uses the IGCE for
technical and management information. The IGCE is the
baseline for evaluating an
offeror’s contract price/cost. The format and contents of the
IGCE vary with the
complexity and value of the requirement.

Acquisition statutes require analysis of price/cost to determine
either a reasonable price in
the event of a fixed-priced contract or a realistic cost resulting
from award of a cost-
reimbursement contract. The results of any contract action in
terms of quality and
reasonableness of price/cost rely heavily on the accuracy and
reliability of the IGCE.
Any significant variation between an offeror’s proposal and the
IGCE requires analysis.
When variations exist, the Government can identify and correct
inaccuracies in the IGCE
or use the IGCE to negotiate a more realistic price.

The IGCE is a procurement-sensitive document and should be
handled accordingly.
Access to the IGCE is on a need-to-know basis.

The first step in developing the IGCE is establishing a mindset
as if the developers would
be working in a commercial environment. Standards, practices,

and procedures that are
normally used by industry should be used as the basis for
developing the IGCE.

A simple estimate of current market prices or historical prices
may be adequate for
requirements up to the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT).
Above that level, a
more complete cost or price estimate is required.

The differences between a cost estimate and a price estimate
can be summarized as
follows:

requires a breakdown
of costs anticipated in performance of the contract. A detailed
estimate is required
for services, construction, and noncommercial products
estimated to exceed the
SAT. Review of current or previous contract documents and the
previous IGCE is
usually an excellent place to start research. These documents
may be obtained
from the supporting contracting office files.

130

products, equipment, and

simple services that are routinely available on the open market
at competitive
prices. The price estimate is required on all contract
requirements over the SAT
and must be independently developed based on a comparison
and analysis of
factors such as published catalog prices, historical prices paid,
market survey
information, and contractor price quotes. The price estimate is
not broken down
into specific cost elements and depends more upon bottom-line
prices paid or
available in the marketplace. The Contracting Officer or
specialist may help with
research for pricing information.

The following sections contain basics on developing an IGCE.

Cost Estimates

Costs are generally divided into the following primary cost
elements: labor, burden on
labor costs, other direct costs, indirect costs (overhead), G&A,
and profit/fee. This
section describes these cost elements, as well as escalation
considerations.

Labor Costs

Labor costs are often the most significant part of the IGCE in
terms of dollars for either
services or construction contracts. Direct labor is the labor
directly applied to the
performance of the contract requirements. In contracts for

services and construction
performed within the Continental United States (CONUS), most
direct labor is covered
by the Department of Labor wage determinations provided
under the provisions of the
Service Contract Act (SCA) for services or the Davis-Bacon Act
(DBA) for construction.
Neither the statutes nor the related wage determinations apply
to declared contingency or
peacekeeping operations OCONUS.

Labor categories and skills that, in CONUS operations, are
covered by the SCA or DBA,
are considered nonexempt. All nonexempt wages must be paid
at a rate no less than that
identified on the applicable wage determination. Exempt
personnel (management and
professional salaried staff) are not paid on an hourly basis and
are not covered by the
wage determinations. They will receive comparable benefits
and wages to like
employees in comparable industries or the Government.

Setting reasonable estimates for required labor categories will
also assist the COR with
combating coercive and abusive labor practices during contract
administration.

The IGCE should identify the labor categories and the level of
effort (work hours)
required for each category. For instance, the effort of a
carpenter for renovation of one

131

set of kitchen cabinets may be limited to 100 hours, with
proportional benefits, whereas a
contract requiring a full-time carpenter working under the terms
of a contract year, would
project a full-year cost with all benefits.

The IGCE must consider realities of the work environment.
Employee benefits (leave
and holidays) must be factored into the cost estimate of any
Government contract. To
estimate costs for a typical service contract year, the COR
should begin with the average
work year of 2,080 hours (40 hours per week, 52 weeks per
year). These are available
hours, which are used to estimate how much each employee will
be paid under the
contract. However, the COR’s estimate must be adjusted to also
consider productive
hours to determine the number of contract employees required.
Productive hours are the
number of hours an employee actually performs his or her
duties. When full-time
employees are anticipated, a good rule of thumb is to use 1,880
hours (2,080 hours less
80 hours for holidays, 80 hours for vacation, and 40 hours for
sick leave) as productive
hours. When part-time employees are anticipated, productive
hours may be estimated
using a basis of 1,920 hours per year (2,080 hours less 80 hours
for holidays, 80 hours for
vacation, and 0 hours for sick leave). Actual available/

productive hour patterns may
vary by host nation, service/industry, or contract requirement.

Burden on Labor Costs

Once the basic labor categories and hours have been determined
labor burdens must be
calculated39. Typical burdens on labor costs are:

• Health and welfare (H&W). H&W includes life, accident, and
health insurance
plans; pension plans; civic and personal leave (vacation and
holidays); severance pay;
savings and thrift plans; and so on. H&W costs are based on
the most recent wage
determination issued by the Department of Labor. Currently,
the figure of $2.15 is
approved for all wage categories covered by the SCA (services).
Refer to individual
DBA wage determinations for specific fringe benefits for H&W.
Because all figures are
subject to change, they should be verified before developing the
IGCE. The rate should
then be multiplied by available hours. Similar fringe benefits
should also be projected for
exempt labor hours.

• Federal Insurance Contributions Act (FICA). The FICA tax
rate is 7.65 percent
(6.2 percent for Social Security and 1.45 percent for Medicare).
This rate has been
constant for a number of years and rarely changes. Multiply
7.65 percent by total wages
up to the FICA maximum rate of $84,900 (as of 2003).

• Federal unemployment taxes. Federal unemployment taxes are
paid on the first

39
The BLS publishes the Employer Cost of Employee Compensati
on (ECEC) at http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ect/. This

website publishes current information and provides a statistical
basis for the numbers.

132

$7K of total wages, multiplied by a factor of 0.8 percent. This
rate changes periodically;
the current rate is available on the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) Web page at
http://www.irs.gov/formspubs.

• State unemployment taxes. State unemployment taxes are set
by individual state
governments and are paid on the first $9K of total wages. The
tax rate varies based on
the type of business involved. Rates may be available from the
states’ workers
compensation Web sites. However, if state unemployment tax
rates are not available, the
COR could use an average rate of 3.0 percent. This percentage
is then multiplied by the
first $9K in wages per employee.

• Workers compensation. Workers compensation is insurance
designed to cover

injuries and associated benefits that arise from work-related
injuries. The rate varies
from state to state and, for the most part, depends on a
contractor’s years of business in
the state and claims-related experience. Workers compensation
is applied to total wages
and will vary between 2 and 5 percent of the total payroll. The
state tax code should
contain details.

A straight-line approach using an average overall burden rate
may be used to estimate
fringe benefits. It may be used in place of the separate
computation of benefits as
outlined above. This may not be adequate for some high-cost
areas of the country or for
all DBA categories. Whichever method is used, the rationale
for the method used should
be documented on the IGCE.

For foreign (outside the United States) operations, some of
these additives may not be
encountered, depending on the host nation and common
practices within their industry.
Contact authorities from the host nation to inquire about
applicable host nation labor
practices and common burdens on labor costs. For CONUS,
comparable information
may also be available from the Defense Contract Audit Agency
(DCAA), the Defense
Contract Management Agency (DCMA), or the local pricing
personnel.

Other Direct Costs

When estimating other direct costs, the emphasis should be on
accuracy of type and
quantity required to complete the contracted work. The
following are general groupings
of other direct costs.

• Materials and equipment. Item descriptions and related cost
estimates can be
obtained using catalogs, price quotes, market surveys, historical
data, and so on.

• Travel. To estimate travel costs, first determine the need for
travel by the
contractor, including destinations (both local and long
distance), the number of trips

133

anticipated, the number of personnel traveling, and the number
of days per trip. Using
that information as a starting point, the cost per trip can be
calculated. Then the
individual trip totals must be summed to arrive at a total for all
travel under the contract.

The Joint Travel Regulation (JTR), Volume 2, managed by the
Defense Travel
Management Office, contains useful information on travel costs.
It establishes per
diem rates (lodging, meals) that may be used to estimate such
costs under any type of
proposed contract. The JTR also establishes the reimbursable

mileage rates for travel
by privately owned automobile. Other travel costs (airfare,
rental car) can easily be
obtained from commercial Web sites (See also FAR Subpart
31.2, “Contracts with
Commercial Organizations”).

• Consultants. Any tasks or work that may require the use of
consultants must be
identified. For example, some tasks may require unique,
specialized expertise, not
normally available to the contractors performing the work
required by the contract. The
COR should estimate the number of hours needed for each
consultant.

• Subcontracts. Some efforts may need to be subcontracted. For
example, the prime
contractor may not have (and would not be expected have) some
specialized labor,
equipment, or facilities needed to complete the contract. The
COR can estimate the other
direct costs for each potential subcontract using the same
estimation techniques as those
used for the prime contract.

• Bonds. Most common in construction contracts, the direct
costs of these securities
must be identified and incorporated into the IGCE.
Performance and payment bonds will
generally cost the contractor anywhere from 1 percent to 3
percent of the total bid or
proposal price. A review of past bonding requirements may
provide a reasonable range
for the IGCE. In the absence of specific data on similar
contracts, the COR may use 2

percent of the total cost estimate to cover bonding costs, when
applicable to the
acquisition.

Indirect Costs (Overhead)

Overhead includes any costs not directly identified with a
single, final cost objective,
individual project, or contract. In other words, indirect costs
are general business costs
such as rent, utilities, general office supplies,
telecommunications, and depreciation.
Indirect costs are recouped by the contractor by applying a
percentage to direct labor
costs, manufacturing costs, or another appropriate base
consistent with the firm’s
established accounting practices.

Methods and rates to recover indirect costs can vary
significantly. One firm may pool all
indirect costs and apply one percentage rate to total direct costs
to recoup its expenses.

134

Another may group costs associated with labor costs into one
overhead account and
separately group its corporate-level expenses (G&A expenses).

General and Administrative Expenses

G&A expense accounts capture the costs of company-wide
support functions
(accounting, personnel, purchasing, legal) that are not directly
chargeable to any single
project or contract. G&A expenses also may include executive
compensation for
corporate officers and management, financial, or other expenses
incurred for the overall
operation of a business. These costs are distributed equally
across all of the company’s
contracts, both Government and private sector.

Like overhead, G&A expenses are grouped together and
recouped by applying a
percentage to other cost categories consistent with the cost
accounting practices of the
firm. These costs vary significantly with the size of the firm
and within industry
groupings (construction, service, information technology).
Thus, the use of a set
percentage number or range for the IGCE is not appropriate.
Instead, consult with the
Contracting Officer to obtain any historical information from
similar purchases and
industry practices relevant to the current acquisition. DCAA
may also be able to provide
a representative G&A rate based on prior audit information
concerning similar contract
situations.

Profit and Fee

Profit and fee are generally regarded as remuneration for the
risk involved in undertaking
the contract tasks. Profit or fee is the amount of money that the
contractor expects to earn

above and beyond the costs incurred to complete the contract.
Under fixed-price
contracts, profit is the amount of money (if any) remaining after
all contract costs have
been covered. Under cost-plus fixed-fee contracts, profit is a
set amount that the
contractor is guaranteed as long as it puts forth its best effort to
perform the contract.

For the IGCE, profit or fee may be calculated and expressed as
a percentage of the total
estimated cost. (For example, if the estimated cost totals $500K
and a profit margin of 10
percent is deemed appropriate, the profit will be $50K.). In
very general terms, 7 percent
should be the upper limit for routine efforts under a cost-
reimbursement contract and 12
percent for routine efforts under a fixed price contract. Add 1
percent for moderately
complex work, and add 2 percent for highly complex work
(state-of-the art work) or
work that will involve significant cost or performance risk to
the contractor. These are by
no means absolutes; other percentages may be more realistic
and should be based on risk,
market factors, and any unique factors that may affect the
contingency operation or
location. In all cases, estimating the profit or fee must be
documented.

135

Escalation Considerations for the IGCE

The impact of inflation should be considered when developing
an IGCE for a contract
with option years. After developing the estimated costs for the
base year, the costs for
option years can be estimated by applying appropriate
escalation factors. Different
escalation factors may be applied to different cost elements,
depending on the
labor/material mix as appropriate. The following methods may
be used.

• The Consumer Price Index (CPI) provides data and percentage
of change in
inflation/escalation factors. CPI information is available at
http://www.bls.gov/cpi/.
When projecting inflation, major cost factors for the specific
requirement should be
reviewed. Inflation rates for specific supplies depend on the
circumstances specific to the
acquisition. In addition, geographic locations for work
performance must be considered.
Based on a long term view of changes in the CPI, an average
factor between 2 percent
and 4 percent is generally considered reasonable.

• Market trends should be considered when projecting escalation
rates for option
years and should be justified in a short narrative. A market
survey will provide
information on current market prices and potential volatility of
prices in the marketplace.
In addition, a review of previous Treasury interest rates may be
useful.

• DCAA and DCMA tend to use IHS Global Insights as the
source for escalation
factors40. A subscription is required; however the information
is readily available to
DCMA personnel through the DCMA Portal.

Price Estimates

A commercial item (supplies or services) IGCE is considered a
price estimate and is
much less complicated than the IGCE discussed above. It is a
matter of determining the
market value of the supplies or services, using that figure as the
IGCE, documenting the
research, and furnishing this information along with the funded
requisition to the
Contracting Officer.

Although IGCE documentation is a part of the Government
procurement cycle, statutes
or regulations do not contain detailed guidance on preparing
IGCEs. The following are
general guidelines that apply to most situations.

• Know the requirement. The first, and perhaps most crucial,
step is to ensure that
the cost estimate is based on the Government’s actual needs.
Review the
SOO/SOW/PWS or specification and make sure that it
accurately identifies the contract

40
http://www.ihs.com/products/global‐insight/index.aspx

136

requirements, clearly defines, and logically divides or
aggregates the work (tasks), and
includes all required supplies and services to be delivered.
Then, estimate the labor
categories and level of effort required, plus equipment,
materials, and any other direct
costs. Apply cost inflation factors if the contract covers
multiple years.

• Use historical cost information. Like budgeting, cost
estimation uses existing
(past) information as a basis for projecting future costs. The
same or similar work may
have been done under contract before. It can be very useful to
obtain the cost
information submitted and negotiated during the award of any
previous contracts.
Consult the Contracting Officer to obtain this information and
technical assistance in
analyzing it.

• Know the marketplace. Costs and prices are often specific to
geographic areas.
There may be going rates for competitive businesses for certain
costs. Rates of profit
may also vary by locality (especially for construction and
commercial services). Costs
for the same type of work may also vary significantly from
place to place and over time.
It is crucial, therefore, for the estimator to know the market.

• Consult contracting personnel. The contract specialist and
Contracting Officer
have considerable expertise in evaluating contract costs. The
contracting office may also
have historical cost data. Consult them, particularly when
estimating overhead, fringe
benefits, G&A, and profit or fee.

• Estimate one piece at a time. If preparing a detailed IGCE, do
not try to estimate
the cost of the contract as a whole. Take it one task (or other
division of the required
work) at a time and, for each, estimate the types of costs
involved.

Other Guidance

When buying a commercial item with stable specifications, the
estimator should research
past price history and adjust for any changes in specifications,
quantities, or inflation
factors. For items that do not have a detailed pricing history, a
detailed analysis of
individual cost elements will be necessary. The IGCE should
include a brief narrative
describing how the costs were developed and what reference
materials were used.
Below are methods that can be used to determine the market
value.

• GSA schedules. The schedules are pre-priced and awarded to
multiple firms for
specific supplies and services. GSA schedules may be found at
http://www.gsaadvantage.gov/.

• Published price lists. These lists are published by individual
companies for use by

137

the general public.

• Catalogs. Many manufacturers publish catalogs describing
their offerings and
stating their prices. The catalogs may be made available to
customers in hard copy, on a
Web site, or some other format.

• Market surveys. A market survey is a comparison of the
prices offered within the
local area for an item. A survey is normally done in
conjunction with the Contracting
Officer.

• Previous buys. Previous purchases of the same item can be
used as the basis for
an estimate, assuming comparability in quantities, conditions,
terms, and performance
times. Adjustments should be considered for inflation and
quantity discounts, when
appropriate.

Pricing should not be obtained directly by contacting vendors,
because disclosure of
advance procurement information is considered sensitive, and
because the vendor might
consider the contact a commitment by the Government. Only
purchase card holders

acting within their spending limits and Contracting Officers or
their representatives may
commit the Government. Any other person may be held
personally liable and may be
subject to disciplinary action.

Performance Work Statements

Performance work statements (PWS) describe the required
results in clear, specific, and
objective terms with measurable outcomes. Typically, a PWS
covers the following
topics:

• Introduction
• Background information
• Scope
• Applicable documents
• Performance requirements
• Special requirements or constraints (such as security)

Best practices and lessons learned for developing a PWS
include the following:

• The requirement should not be so specific that all offerors
propose the same solution,
eliminating creativity and innovation.

• A performance-based acquisition requires that the integrated
solutions team abandon

138

some traditional approaches to buying services.

Specifying labor categories, educational requirements, or
number of hours of support
required should be avoided because they are how to approaches.
Instead, let contractors
propose the best people with the best skill sets to meet the need
and fit the solution. The
Government can then evaluate the proposal based both on the
quality of the solution and
the experience of the proposed personnel.

Prescribing manpower requirements limits the ability of offerors
to propose their best
solutions and it could preclude the use of qualified contractor
personnel who may be well
suited for performing the requirement but may be lacking, for
example, a college degree
or the exact years of specified experience. For some services,
in fact, such practices are
prohibited. Section 813 of the National Defense Authorization,
Fiscal Year 2001, now
implemented in the FAR, states that solicitations for
information technology services may
not describe any minimum experience or educational
requirements for proposed
contractor personnel unless the Contracting Officer determines
that the agency either (1)
cannot meet its needs without that requirement, or (2) requires
the use of other than a
performance-based contract.

Planning for the Evaluation of Proposals

The statement of objectives/statement of work/performance

work statement
(SOO/SOW/PWS), along with Sections L (“Instructions,
Conditions, and Notices to
Bidders, Offerors, or Quoters”) and M (“Evaluation Factors for
Award”) of the
solicitation, establish the principal ground rules for
acquisitions. The SOO/SOW/PWS is
the portion of the contract that describes the work to be done
through the use of
specifications, minimum requirements, quantities, performance
dates, time and place of
performance, and quality. It identifies the supplies or services
the United States (U.S.)
Government is requesting. The PWS is a statement of work for
performance-based
acquisitions that describes the required results in clear, specific,
and objective terms with
measurable outcomes.

Evaluation factors generally fall into four groups:

• Technical/Management
• Cost or price
• Past performance
• Other (Socio-Economic Programs)

However, specific evaluation factors are identified in Section M
of the solicitation.

139

Types of Source Selections41

In different types of acquisitions, the relative importance of
cost or price may vary. For
example, in acquisitions for which the requirement is clearly
definable and the risk of
unsuccessful contract performance is minimal, cost or price may
play a dominant role in
source selection.

However, if the requirement is less definitive, involves more
development work, or
entails greater performance risk, technical or past performance
considerations may play a
more dominant role in source selection than cost or price.

Under either approach, the COR, because of his/her technical
knowledge and
background, may become part of the team of technical personnel
assembled to evaluate
contractor proposals. During this process, the Contracting
Officer and the technical
evaluation team lead will provide the COR with detailed
instructions concerning role and
responsibilities.

The Contracting Officer is responsible for preparing the
solicitation with assistance from
other experts. However, the Contracting Officer gets much of
the information directly
from supporting documentation and the COR.

The U.S. Government uses requests for proposals (RFP) in
negotiated acquisitions to
communicate Government requirements to prospective
contractors and to solicit
proposals. The RFP must describe the Government’s
requirement, the anticipated terms

and conditions of the contract, and the factors used to evaluate
proposals.

For all planned acquisitions above the SAT, the FAR requires
the Contracting Officer to
consider both price and non-price factors (past performance and
quality in particular)
when evaluating proposals. The relative importance of those
factors is up to the
Contracting Officer or other source selection authority.

Competition

Federal statutes and the FAR establish the policy for describing
agency needs, and they
stipulate that requirements be written in a way that promotes
full and open competition
under the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA). FAR Subpart
6.3, “Other Than Full
and Open Competition”, explains when it is appropriate to
contract without providing for
full and open competition. Contracting without providing for
competition cannot be

41
For more details on the DoD Source Selection Guide see FAR S
ubpart 15.3 and OUSD (AT&L/DPAP)

Memorandum, “Department of Defense Source Selection Proced
ures,” 4 March2011,

http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/USA007183‐1
0‐DPAP.pdf.

140

based on lack of advance planning or concerns related to the
amount of funds available
for the acquisition. Statutory authorities permit contracting
without providing for full and
open competition when one of the criteria listed in FAR 6.302,
“Circumstances
Permitting Other Than Full and Open Competition”, can be
justified.

-1 — only one or limited number of responsible
sources that can provide

the supplies or services needed to satisfy requirements;
-2 — unusual and compelling urgency;
-3 — industrial mobilization, engineering, or
research capability, expert

services;
-4 — international agreement;
-5 — authorized or required by statute;
-6 — national security; or
-7 — public interest.

Restrictive provisions and conditions severely restrict
competition, and they are limited to
the extent necessary to satisfy the Government’s needs. When
restrictive provisions are
used, they must be justified in writing.

Amending the Solicitation

It may be necessary to amend the solicitation after release and
prior to contract award.
This circumstance could occur for a variety of reasons (for
example, changes to the
specifications, terms or conditions, or quantities required).
However, amendments to
solicitations increase administrative effort and cost, and they
may delay contract award
and performance.

DOs and DON’Ts for Pre-award and Solicitation are outlined in
Table B.1.

PRE-AWARD AND SOLICITATION

DO DON’T

Use market research. Look for commercial
solutions.

Write vague specifications, assuming that
“the contractor will do whatever is necessary
to satisfy us.”

Promote full and open competition. Write design specifications,
prescribing in
detail what materials should be use and how
the work should be performed.

141

Think about contract administration
requirements while writing the
SOO/SOW/PWS or the specifications.

Ask for progress reports, test samples, or
other items from the contractor unless the
items are needed for the program or for
efficient administration and monitoring.

Use performance-based or functional
(rather than design) specifications to
describe an objective or standard to be
achieved, allowing the contractor to
exercise ingenuity in achieving that
objective or standard, select the means, and
assume corresponding responsibility.

Limit use of restrictive provisions to satisfy
agency needs. Limit use of specifications
and instead focus on function,
performance, and physical characteristics.

In the SOO/SOW/PWS and specifications,
separate discussion of administrative and
progress reporting requirements from
discussion of required procedures and
deliverables.

Table B.1: DOs and DON’Ts for Pre-award and Solicitation

Evaluation and Award

Receiving and Managing Proposals

Offerors must submit their proposals, any proposal revisions,
and modifications to the
Government office designated in the solicitation by the time
specified in the solicitation.
Offerors may use any transmission method authorized by the
solicitation (such as
electronically, by regular mail, or by fax). Upon receipt,
proposals must be safeguarded
from unauthorized disclosure throughout the source selection
process.

After the closing date, the Contracting Officer will forward the
technical proposals to the
technical evaluation team lead for analysis. The Contracting
Officer will retain the
business/cost proposals until the technical evaluation is
completed.

142

Evaluating Proposals

Note: The source selection team must not reveal any
information related to the identity

of or number of offerors and information concerning any
proposal or the status of any
proposal in relation to others. Release of such information
could jeopardize any
resultant award and subject the individuals involved to
disciplinary action, as well as to
civil and, in some cases, criminal penalties. 42

The Source Selection Board will review and evaluate all
proposals submitted in response
to an applicable solicitation, based on the evaluation factors
provided in Section M of the
solicitation. The technical evaluation team is responsible for
evaluating the technical
proposals; rating them in order of merit; making
recommendations to the Contracting
Officer regarding clarifications needed and deficiencies
identified; reviewing
supplemental and revised offers; and, if required, assisting the
Contracting Officer during
negotiations. The same evaluators should be available
throughout the entire evaluation
and selection process to ensure continuity and consistency in
the treatment of proposals.

Technical Evaluation Reports

When the Contracting Officer forwards the technical proposals
to the technical evaluation
team for analysis, the technical proposals are accompanied by
specific guidance for
conducting the evaluation and preparing the technical
evaluation report. The team lead
prepares and signs the report and submits it to the Contracting

Officer, who maintains it
as a permanent record in the contract file. The report should
present the proposal ratings
and identify each proposal in accordance with the evaluation
plan and set forth in Section
M of the solicitation.

The technical evaluation report must include a narrative
evaluation specifying the
strengths and weaknesses of each proposal and any
uncertainties, reservations,
qualifications, or areas to be addressed that might affect the
selection of the source for
award. The report should include specific points and questions
for subsequent
discussions with the proposed contractors. If the technical
evaluation team determines a
proposal is technically unacceptable, the report is passed to the
Contracting Officer for
his or her final determination.

Assisting in the Review of Business and Cost Proposals

The Contracting Officer is responsible for evaluating the factors
related to cost and price
analysis and determining the contractor’s responsibility (for
example, adequacy of
resources, ability to comply with delivery or performance
schedule, and satisfactory

42
Refer to FAR Subpart 15.3 and the DoD Source Selection Proce
dures for those individuals who are on the source

selection team.

143

record of performance). The Contracting Officer may need the
COR’s assistance to
effectively accomplish this evaluation.

Communicating with Proposed Contractors

In the interval between the release of the solicitation and
contract award, all contact with
offerors relating to the particular acquisition must be
coordinated through the Contracting
Officer.

The COR may be asked to assist the Contracting Officer when
clarifications (limited
exchanges) between the Government and the proposed
contractors are needed, when
awarding contracts without discussions, or when
communications are needed for
establishing the competitive range.

Determining the Competitive Range

Considering the ratings of each proposal against all evaluation
criteria, the Contracting
Officer may establish a competitive range consisting of the most
highly rated proposals.
Provided the solicitation notifies proposed contractors that the

competitive range can be
limited for purposes of efficiency, the Contracting Officer may
limit the number of
proposals in the competitive range to permit an efficient
competition among the most
highly rated proposals. The COR may be asked to assist the
Contracting Officer with
debriefing proposed contractors that are excluded or otherwise
eliminated from the
competitive range.

Communications after Establishing the Competitive Range

In either a competitive or sole-source environment, negotiations
are exchanges
undertaken between the Government and proposed contractor
with the intent of allowing
the proposed contractor to revise its proposal. Negotiations in a
competitive acquisition
take place after establishing the competitive range. Negotiation
may include bargaining,
alteration of assumptions and positions, and give-and-take
discussion. Discussions may
focus on price, schedule, technical requirements, type of
contract, or other terms of a
proposed contract. Discussions are conducted through the
release of Evaluation Notices
which identify what type of exchange is being conducted.

The Contracting Officer tailors discussions to each proposed
contractor’s proposal. The
Contracting Officer must conduct discussions with each
contractor within the competitive
range. The primary objective of discussions is to maximize the
Government’s ability to

obtain best value, based on the requirement and the evaluation
factors identified in the
solicitation.

144

During discussions, the Contracting Officer should discuss with
each proposed contractor
any deficiencies, significant weaknesses, and adverse past
performance information to
which the proposed contractor has not yet had an opportunity to
respond. This may
include other aspects of the proposed contractor’s proposal that
could be altered or
explained to materially enhance the proposal’s potential for
award. However, this does
not mean that the Contracting Officer is required to discuss
every area where the proposal
could improve.

The scope and extent of discussions are at the discretion of the
Contracting Officer’s
judgment. The COR may be asked to participate in discussions
with proposed contractors
in the competitive range.

145

Selecting the Right Contractor

Note: Under no circumstances may anyone in the Government
discuss one offeror’s
proposal with any of the other offerors.
Note: Debriefings must not include point-by-point comparisons
of the proposed
contractors’ proposals, nor may debriefings divulge any other
prohibited information
about other proposed contractors.

Upon receipt of revised proposals or other responses to
questions raised during
discussions, the technical evaluation team will reevaluate the
proposals in the competitive
range. The results of these evaluations will be documented in
writing and submitted to
the Contracting Officer.

The Contracting Officer will review the latest set of
evaluations. Based on a comparative
assessment of proposals against all source selection criteria in
the solicitation, the
Contracting Officer will then rate the proposals. Although the
Contracting Officer may
use reports and analyses prepared by others, the source
selection authority’s decision
represents an independent judgment. Documentation for the
source selection authority’s
decision includes the rationale for any business judgments and
tradeoffs made or relied
on by the Contracting Officer, including benefits associated
with additional costs.

Debriefing Proposed Contractors

Contracting Officers may debrief successful and unsuccessful
offerors orally, in writing,
or by any other method. The Contracting Officer normally
chairs the debriefing session.
Individuals from the evaluation teams provide support at the
debriefing.

At a minimum, the following information must be included in
the debriefing.

• Significant weaknesses or deficiencies in the proposed
contractor’s proposal, if

applicable;
• Overall evaluated cost or price (including unit prices) and
technical rating (if

applicable) of the selected contractor and the unsuccessful
proposed contractor;
• Past performance information of the unsuccessful proposed
contractor;
• Overall ranking of all offerors, when any ranking was
developed by the agency during

the source selection;
• Summary of the rationale for the contract award;
• For acquisitions of commercial items, the make and model of
the item to be delivered

by the winning offeror; and
• Reasonable responses to relevant questions about whether
source selection procedures

contained in the solicitation, applicable regulations, and other
applicable authorities
were followed.

146

Handling Protests

Any interested party may file a protest against the Government
concerning a contracting
action. Interested parties can file such protests directly with the
contracting agency or
with the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Interested
parties must file protests
by the later of the following:

• 10 days after contract award,
• 5 days after a debriefing, or
• 10 calendar days after the basis of the protest is known (or
should have been known).

An agency is required to make its best efforts to resolve agency
protests within 35 days
after the protest filing date, while the GAO has 100 days to
resolve the protest. In the
case of a protest filed with the GAO, either party can request a
65-day express option.

After contract award, if an interested party files a protest with
the GAO, the Contracting
Officer must suspend work on the contract unless the Head of

the Contracting Activity
determines doing so would not be in the best interest of the
Government.

If an interested party files a protest to an agency within 10 days
after contract award, the
Contracting Officer must suspend work on the contract unless
continued performance is
justified, in writing, to be in the best interest of the
Government. An official one level
above the Contracting Officer must approve such justification
or determination.43

Note: The Government does not accept late protest
submissions.

Handling Freedom of Information Act Requests

The Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) specifies how federal
agencies will make their
records available for public review (upon request), sets time
standards for compliance
actions, and details those records that are exempt from public
disclosure. A Government
contract is a public document. The reports that a contractor
must submit in compliance
with the terms and conditions of a service contract are likewise
public documents with
certain exceptions, such as the following.

• Classified information;
• Source selection information;
• Trade secrets and confidential commercial or financial
information (sometimes

referred to as proprietary information);
• Interagency or intra-agency memoranda or correspondence; or

43
For more information on protest, see FAR Subpart 33.1.

147

• Personal and medical information pertaining to an individual.

If a contractor asks you for information under the provisions of
FOIA, immediately refer
the contractor to the Contracting Officer or agency FOIA
monitor. The FOIA monitor
will establish a suspense period not to exceed 20 calendar days,
for each request.
Remember it is not the COR’s job to determine whether
information is releasable.

DOs and DON’Ts for Evaluation and Award are provided in
Table B.2.

EVALUATION AND AWARD

DO DON’T

Carefully review the contract, especially
the technical requirements.

Divulge budget information to prospective

contractors.

Develop, or obtain from the contractor, a
detailed schedule of performance.

Assume without reading it that the
SOO/SOW/PWS is complete, clear, and fully
understandable.

Work with the Contracting Officer and the
contractor to clear up any
misunderstandings and to establish
organized contract administration and
monitoring procedures.

Allow planning to become an end in itself.
Remember: the goal is to get results, not just
pretty charts showing the “plan.”

Forget to update plans and schedules as the
situation changes.

Overlook or ignore contract requirements for
GFP, timely reviews and approvals, or technical
assistance and direction.

Table B.2: DOs and DON’Ts for Evaluation and Award

148

APPENDIX C:
COR QUALIFICATIONS AND TRAINING

Contents

• DoD Standard for Certification of Contracting Officer’s
Representatives (COR)
for Service Acquisitions
• COR Responsibilities
• COR Nomination
• COR Appointment or Designation
• COR Performance Appraisals
• COR Termination
• COR Training
• Alternate CORs
• Delegated Authority

DoD Standard for Certification of CORs for Service
Acquisitions

The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology,
and Logistics
memorandum of March 29, 2010, established the “DoD Standard
for COR for Service
Acquisitions” (DoD COR Standard). The Standard defines
minimum COR
competencies, experience, and training based on the nature and
complexity of the
requirement and contract performance risk. The Standard
identifies three types of
requirements.

-price, no incentive, low performance risk
requirements;
-price, no incentive, low
performance risk requirements; or

license, higher education,

or specialized training.

Tables C.1, C.2 and C.3 address the training and experience
necessary for each of
these three types of requirements. The Standard introduces
structure and rigor to
COR responsibilities and performance, and will be the basis for
a DoD instruction
establishing a comprehensive COR certification program that
addresses roles and
responsibilities for the COR, COR management, and
Contracting Officer.

149

Table C.1

150

Table C.2

151

Table C.3

FAR 1.602-2(d) was changed to require the appointment of a
COR on any contract that is
not firm fixed price, and allows for appointment of a COR for
firm fixed price contracts
when the contracting offices determines it appropriate. CORs
on any contract that is not
firm fixed price shall meet Type B requirements for education,
training and experience.

COR Responsibilities

A COR assists in the technical monitoring and administration of
a contract. DFARS PGI
201.602-2(i)(A) requires designation of a properly trained COR,
in writing, before
contract award. The surveillance activities performed by CORs
should be tailored to the

152

complexity/dollar value of the specific contract for which they
are designated. CORs
may not be delegated responsibility to perform functions at a
contractor’s location that
have been delegated under FAR 42.202(a) to a contract
administration office. CORs
have no authority to make any commitments or changes that
affect price, quality,
quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract.
The COR may not re-
delegate/sub-delegate any authority. Also, CORs may be

personally liable for
unauthorized acts.

COR Nomination

To ensure the COR has a thorough understanding of the
contract, the COR should be
involved in the acquisition process, acting on behalf of the
requiring activity in
assisting with the development of the technical requirements,
QASP, and other pre-
award activities. The COR should be identified by the requiring
activity as early in
the acquisition process as practicable, often when the
procurement package is
submitted to the contracting office.

To be nominated as a COR, the individual must be an employee,
military or civilian,
of the U.S. Government, a foreign government, or a North
Atlantic Treaty
Organization/coalition partner; have the requisite security
clearance; and have training
and experience commensurate with the responsibilities the
Contracting Officer will
delegate.

To nominate a COR, the requiring activity submits a request for
COR designation to
the Contracting Officer through the Contracting Officer’s
Representative Tracking
Tool (CORT Tool). At a minimum, the request will include the
following
information:

nominated;

t:

o The COR nominee was notified of the requirement to
complete an Office of

Government Ethics (OGE) Form 450, Confidential Financial
Disclosure Report,
within 30 days of appointment;

o The COR duties will be reflected in the nominee’s annual
performance standards;
and

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o The nominee will be afforded sufficient time, resources and
opportunity to
accomplish the duties.

COR Appointment or Designation

The Contracting Officer issues the COR appointment or
designation via a letter of
appointment/designation through the CORT Tool or equivalent
approved web based tool.

This letter establishes the COR’s dual lines of responsibility:
(1) to the requiring activity,
via the rating chain, and (2) to the Contracting Officer, via the
appointment/designation
letter. The COR is authorized, within the established
limitations of the letter of
appointment/designation, to ensure timely progress of contract
performance and to
provide effective technical guidance and advice to the
Contracting Officer. Although a
COR may act for the Contracting Officer in technical phases of
the contract, the COR
may not commit the Government in matters that would change
contract price, quantity,
delivery schedule, or other requirements of the contract.

The appointment/ designation letter identifies the following:

intenance requirements;

After the Contracting Officer, the COR, and COR management
have signed the COR
letter of appointment/designation, the Contracting Officer will
furnish two copies to the
contractor. The contractor must acknowledge receipt of the
letter by counter-signing one
copy and returning it to the Contracting Officer. The
Contracting Officer will make
appropriate distribution of this contractor acknowledgement and
upload the signed letter

of appointment/designation to the CORT Tool.

COR Performance Appraisals

The requiring activity must allow adequate resources (time,
products, equipment,
opportunity) for the COR to perform his or her COR functions.
COR management will
evaluate the individual’s performance of COR duties as part of
their performance
assessment throughout the period of the contract. COR
management is encouraged to
solicit input on performance of COR duties from the
Contracting Officer.

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COR Termination

The Contracting Officer may terminate the COR appointment or
designation at any time,
upon written request from the COR’s management, at the
discretion of the Contracting
Officer, or upon approval of a COR’s termination request.
When a contract is completed,
or a COR requests termination of the COR status due to
transfer, retirement, or other
causes, the Contracting Officer must immediately terminate the
COR’s designation in
writing. Both the Contracting Officer and the COR must sign
the termination letter. The

termination document will be uploaded to the CORT Tool.

If a COR requests relief from his or her duties, he/she must do
so sufficiently in advance
of reassignment or separation from the Government to permit
the requiring activity to
have adequate time to nominate a successor and to permit the
Contracting Officer to have
adequate time to train and appoint/designate that successor.

A COR may be terminated either without prejudice or for cause.
A termination without
prejudice is made upon the termination date on the COR’s
appointment or designation
letter. Termination for cause is made according to a termination
letter issued by the
Contracting Officer. A copy of a termination letter must be
provided to the COR, COR
management, and the contractor with the original in the contract
file.

COR Training

The following COR training is available from the Defense
Acquisition University (DAU)
at https://acc.dau.mil/cor.

• Continuous Learning-Contracting (CLC) 106, “Contracting
Officer’s Representative

with a Mission Focus” (8-hour online course)
• CLC 206, “CORs in the Contingency Environment” (3 hour
on-line course)
• CLC 222, “Contracting Officer’s Representative” (32 hour on-
line course)
• COR 222, “Contracting Officer’s Representative” (32 hour

customer support in

residence offering of CLC222)

CLC106, CLC222 and COR 222 were developed to address the
competencies identified
in the DoD COR Standard. CLC 206 is designed to supplement
CLC106 and
CLC/COR222 for CORs deploying to a contingency
environment.

Component-sponsored and commercial training must be
equivalent to the DAU baseline
training for Type B and C work/requirements to meet the
standard training requirements.
Equivalency requirements are addressed at http://
icatalog.dau.mil/learning/equivalency.aspx.
http://icatalog.dau.mil/learning/equivalency.aspx

155

Trafficking in Persons: CORs are required to complete the
Trafficking in Persons
training available at
http://www.dodig.mil/inspections/ipo/combatinghuman.htm.

The following are additional courses available to the COR
depending on the COR
functions delegated.

Note: Learn more about DAU continuous learning modules
(CL*) and Harvard Business
School (HBS) continuous learning modules at:
http://icatalog.dau.mil/onlinecatalog/tabnavcl.aspx.

CLB 018 Earned Value and Financial Management Reports
CLB 02 Software Cost Estimating
CLC 004 Market Research
CLC 006 Contract Terminations
CLC 007 Contract Source Selection
CLC 011 Contracting for the Rest of Us
CLC 013 Performance-Based Services Acquisition
CLC 055 Competition Requirements for DoD Acquisition
CLC 133 Contract Payment Instructions
CLM 013 Work Breakdown Structure
CLM 024 Contracting Overview
CLM 031 Improved Statement of Work
CLM 039 Foundations of Government Property

HBS 204 Customer Focus
HBS 205 Decision Making
HBS 212 Time Management
HBS 220 Meeting Management
HBS 224 Writing Skills

In addition, CORs must annually complete DAU CLM 003,
“Ethics” for AT&L
Workforce (or Agency provided training).

Regardless of their experience or formal training, CORs will
receive contract-specific
training from their Contracting Officers.

Multiple/Alternate CORs

Any individual appointed or designated by the Contracting
Officer under the authority of
FAR 1.602, is, by definition, a COR and must comply with the
DoD COR Standard.

156

There may be only one COR, or multiple CORs, for any specific
contract. A COR
alternate may be designated to cover periods when the primary
COR would not be
available. Multiple CORs may be designated when contract
performance takes place in
multiple locations, over multiple functions, 24 hour operations.
The Contracting Officer
is responsible for ensuring that the appointment/designation
letters are specific when
delegating functions to COR(s) and that COR(s) are familiar
with their respective roles
and responsibilities.

Delegated Authority

Contracting Officers delegate contract administration
responsibility under the following
authorities of: (1) FAR 42.302(a)(27), “property
administration”; (2) FAR Part 46,
“quality assurance”; and (3)DFARS 201.602-2, “COR
responsibilities”.

The Contracting Officer is responsible for ensuring that all
parties understand their
relative roles and responsibilities. If there is any question,

contact the Contracting
Officer.

157

APPENDIX D:
ACRONYMS AND TERMS

ACRONYMS

ACO Administrative Contracting Officer
ADR Alternative Dispute Resolution
AKO Army Knowledge Online
ASBCA Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals
BAA Berry Amendment Act
CAC Common Access Card
CAO Contract Administration Office
CAP Contractor-Acquired Property
CCO Contingency Contracting Officer
CCR Central Contractor Registration
CDR Contractor Discrepancy Report
CDRL Contract Data Requirements List
CI Commercial Item
CICA Competition in Contracting Act
CLC Continuous Learning - Contracting
CLIN Contract Line Item Number
COI Conflict of Interest
CONUS Continental United States
COR Contracting Officer’s Representative
CORT Tool COR Tracking Tool

CPARS Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System
CPI Consumer Price Index
DD Department of Defense When Used With Form
DA Department of the Army
DAU Defense Acquisition University
DBA Davis-Bacon Act
DCAA Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency
DAEO Designated Agency Ethics Official
DFARS Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DID Data Item Description
DKO Defense Knowledge Online
DNAD Domestic Non-Availability Determination
DO Delivery Order
DoD Department of Defense
DoDAAC DoD Activity Address Code

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DoDD DoD Directive
DPAP Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
EPA Economic Price Adjustment
ETF Electronic Funds Transfer
FAR Federal Acquisition Regulation
FedBizOpps Federal Business Opportunities
FFP Firm Fixed Price
FICA Federal Insurance Contributions Act
FSS Federal Supply Schedule
FTA Free Trade Agreements
FTR Federal Travel Regulation
FOB Free on Board
FOIA Freedom of Information Act
G&A General & Administrative

GAO Government Accountability Office
GBL Government Bill of Lading
GFP Government-Furnished Property
GPC Government Purchase Card
GSA General Services Administration
GSBCA General Services Administration Board of Contract
Appeals
H&A Health and Welfare
HCA Head of the Contracting Activity
IGCE Independent Government Cost Estimate
IRS Internal Revenue Service
IT Information Technology
IFB Invitation for Bids
J&A Justification & Approval
LOA Letter of Authorization
LTDD Loss, Theft, Damage or Destruction
MFR Memorandum for the Record
OCI Organizational Conflicts of Interest
OCONUS Outside Continental United States
ODC Other Direct Costs
OFPP Office of Federal Procurement Policy
OGE 450 Office of Government Ethics Form 450
OF Optional Form
OT Overtime
PAS Pre-award Survey
PBSA Performance-Based Services Acquisition
PCO Procuring Contracting Officer
PDI Program Development and Implementation Directorate of
DPAP
PGI DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information
POC Point of Contact

159

POP Period of Performance
PR Procurement Request
PR&C Purchase Request and Commitment
PRS Performance Requirements Summary
PWS Performance Work Statement
QAR Quality Assurance Representative
QASP Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan
RFP Request For Proposal
RIK Replacement in Kind
SAP Simplified Acquisition Procedures
SAT Simplified Acquisition Threshold
SCA Service Contract Act
SF Standard Form
SOO Statement of Objectives
SOW Statement of Work
SPE Senior Procurement Executive
SPOT Synchronized Pre-deployment Operational Tracker
T&M Time & Materials
TCO Terminating Contracting Officer
U.S. United States
UCA Undefinitized Contract Action
UCF Uniform Contract Format
U.S.C. United States Code
WAWF Wide Area Work Flow
WTO GPA World Trade Organization Government Procurement
Agreement

Definitions

Acceptance: Act of an authorized representative of the
Government by which the
Government for itself, or as an agent of another, assumes
ownership of identified
supplies tendered or approves specific services rendered as

partial or complete
performance of a contract.

Acquisition: Process of acquiring by contract, with
appropriated funds, supplies or
services (including construction) by and for the use of the
Federal Government through
purchase or lease, whether the supplies or services already exist
or must be created,
developed, demonstrated, and evaluated.

Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO): Individual who
administers a contract and
enforces its provisions. The Procuring Contracting Officer
(PCO) sometimes serves as
the ACO, especially for contracts performed on a Government
installation.

160

Acquisition Team: All participants in the acquisition process:
requiring activity,
finance, Contracting Officer, legal counsel, COR, resource
manager, quality assurance
representative, and others, as applicable. No one person has all
the necessary skills for
successful contract management. It requires a team with each
member having specialized
expertise and responsibilities.

Agent: Individual appointed or designated by another party
(principal) to enter into a

business or contractual relationship with third parties. These
relationships are legally
binding on the principal and the third parties. A Contracting
Officer signing a
Government contract does so as an agent of the U.S.
Government.

Allocable Costs: Costs that are incurred specifically for the
contract, that benefit both
the contract and other work and can be distributed in reasonable
proportion to the benefits
received, or that are necessary to the overall operation of the
business, although a direct
relationship to any particular cost objective cannot be shown.

Allowable Costs: Costs that are allowable on a Government
contract when in keeping
with the rules set forth in FAR Part 31, “Contract Cost
Principles and Procedures”, and
not otherwise disallowed.

Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR): Any type of procedure
or combination of
procedures used voluntarily to resolve issues in controversy.
Examples of ADR
procedures are conciliation, facilitation, mediation, fact-
finding, mini-trials, arbitration,
and use of ombudsmen.

Amendment: Change made to a solicitation.

Bid: Offer. In the sealed bidding method of contracting, the
offer takes the form of a
sealed bid. A bid is fixed as of the time of bid opening, and
there is no possibility of
negotiating even a relatively minor change in it, even if the

change would be to the
Government’s advantage. It must be accepted or rejected as
submitted.

Bilateral Modification: Contract modification (supplemental
agreement) signed by the
contractor and the Contracting Officer.

Change Order: Written order, signed by the Contracting Officer,
directing the contractor
to make a change that the Changes clause authorizes.

Civil Augmentation Program: Standing, long-term contracts
designed to augment
service logistic capabilities with contract support in both
preplanned and short-notice
contingencies. Examples are U.S. Army Logistics Civilian
Augmentation Program, U.S.
Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, and U.S. Navy
Construction Capabilities
Contract.

161

Claim: Assertion by one of the parties to a contract seeking
adjustment or interpretation
of an existing contract, subject to the dispute clause in the
contract.

Clause: Term or condition used in a contract or both the
contract and solicitation.

Commercial Item (CI): Any item, other than real property,
customarily used for
nongovernmental purposes and that has been sold, leased, or
licensed to the general
public; or has been offered for sale, lease, or license to the
general public; or any item
evolved through advances in technology or performance and
that is not available in the
commercial marketplace but will be available in the commercial
marketplace to satisfy
the Government delivery requirements.

Competition: Acquisition strategy in which more than one
contractor is sought to bid on
procurement. In acquisitions at or below the micro-purchase
threshold, only assurance of
a fair and reasonable price is required. In simplified
acquisitions, maximum practicable
competition is obtained by soliciting at least three sources. In
actions using other than
simplified acquisition procedures, full and open competition is
to be used unless there are
valid exemptions or exceptions.

Constructive Change: A contract change without formal written
authority.

Contract: Agreement, enforceable by law, between two or more
competent parties to do
or not do something not prohibited by law for a legal
consideration. FAR 2.101,
“Definitions”, defines a contract as a mutually binding legal
relationship obligating the
seller to furnish the supplies or services (including
construction) and the buyer to pay for
them.

Contract Administration Office (CAO): Activity identified in
the DoD Directory of
Contract Administration Services Components assigned to
perform contract
administration responsibilities. For DoD, the CAO is often a
Defense Contract
Management Agency (DCMA) regional office servicing the
contract.

Contract Administration Plan: Plan describing the procedures
and tasks to be used by
the Government to administer a contract. Those tasks include
file documentation and
quality assurance functions. Implementation of the plan will
establish a quality audit trail
of contract performance with respect to the specifications, cost,
delivery requirements,
and applicable laws, regulations, and contract clauses.

Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL): List of contract data
requirements
authorized for a specific acquisition and made a part of the
contract. CDRLs are
specified by DD Form 1423-1, “Contract Data Requirements
List”.

162

Contract Discrepancy Report (CDR): Report issued for any
supply or service found to
be unacceptable during contract performance. The CDR is

notification to the contractor
of failure to meet the contract requirements.

Contract Line Item Number (CLIN): Number that identifies a
separate supply or
service to be provided under contract. Each CLIN should have
a single unit price,
separate identification, separate delivery schedule, and single
accounting classification
citation.

Contracting Officer: Individual who is duly appointed and
designated with specific
authority to enter into, administer, and terminate contracts and
to make related
determinations and findings on behalf of the U.S. Government.

Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR): Individual,
including a Contracting
Officer’s Technical Representative (COTR), designated and
authorized in writing by the
Contracting Officer to perform specific technical or
administrative functions related to
monitoring a contract. According to Defense Federal
Acquisition Regulation Supplement
(DFARS) 201.602-2, “Responsibilities”, the COR must be (1) a
Government employee,
military or civilian, a foreign government, or a North Atlantic
Treaty
Organization/coalition partner(the latter two are applicable in a
deployed theater), (2)
qualified by training and experience commensurate with
responsibilities to be delegated
in accordance with department or agency guidelines, and (3)
designated in writing. The
COR has no authority to make any commitments or changes that

affect price, quality,
quantity, delivery, or other terms and conditions of the contract.

Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Nominee:
Individual identified by the
requiring activity and accepted by the Contracting Officer as
having the general
competencies, agency experience, relevant technical experience,
and training (or a
training plan if not yet trained) to perform those COR functions
delegated by the
Contracting Officer. When appropriate, the COR should be
nominated as early in the
acquisition cycle as practicable. This allows the COR nominee
to provide subject matter
expertise and to ensure that he or she is familiar with the
requirements, specific terms and
conditions of the resultant contract, and the functions to be
delegated.

Contractor-Acquired Property: Property acquired or otherwise
provided by the
contractor for its use in performing a contract and to which the
government has or will
acquire title.

CORT Tool: A web based application, designated by the
Undersecretary of Defense,
Acquisition Technology and Logistics, to track CORs within the
Department of Defense.

Cost-Reimbursement Contract: Agreement that provides for
payment of allowable
incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract.

163

Cure Notice: Document the Contracting Officer sends to a
contractor to notify the
contractor that the contract may be terminated by reason of
default if the condition
endangering performance of the contract is not corrected. There
must be 10 days for the
contractor to make the cure.

Customer Complaint: Form of feedback that can be used to
monitor quality assurance;
this is particularly useful in service contracts.

Data Item Description (DID): Document that defines the data
required of a contractor.
The DID specifically defines the data content, format, and
intended use.

Data Rights: Rights to use recorded information, regardless of
its form or the media on
which it may be recorded. The term includes rights to technical
data and computer
software. The term does not include rights to information
incidental to contract
administration, such as financial, administrative, cost or price,
or management
information. The Government can acquire three types of data
rights: (1) unlimited rights
to all data, which is costly; (2) limited rights or restricted rights
(a few essential rights for
Government personnel only, which has a relatively low cost);
and (3) government

purpose rights, which includes rights for Government
contractors as long as the use is for
a Government purpose, at a moderate cost.

Default: Omission or failure to perform a legal or contractual
duty to observe a promise,
discharge an obligation, or perform an agreement.

Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA): Agency that audits
all DoD contracts and
provides accounting and financial advisory services regarding
contracts and subcontracts
to DoD components responsible for procurement and contract
administration. These
services are provided in connection with negotiation,
administration, and settlement of
contracts and subcontracts. DCAA also provides contract audit
services to some other
Government agencies.

Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA): Independent
agency within DoD
that serves as DoD’s contract manager. DCMA is responsible
for ensuring that federal
acquisition programs (systems, supplies, and services) are
delivered on time, delivered
within projected cost or price, and meet performance
requirements.

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS):
Supplement to the
FAR that provides DoD-specific acquisition regulations.

Delivery Order (DO): Order for supplies placed against an
established contract or with
Government sources.

164

Delivery Order Contract: Contract for supplies that does not
procure or specify a firm
quantity of supplies (other than a minimum or maximum
quantity) and that provides for
the issuance of orders for the delivery of supplies during the
period of the contract.

Department of Defense (DoD): Federal department responsible
for coordinating and
supervising all agencies and functions of the Government
relating directly to the military
and national security.

Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO): Individual
appointed or designated by the
Attorney General to administer, coordinate, and manage a
department’s ethics program.
The Assistant Attorney General for Administration has been
designated to serve as the
DAEO.

Dispute: Disagreement between the contractor and Contracting
Officer regarding the
rights of the parties under a contract.

Economic Price Adjustment (EPA): Provision in a fixed-price
contract that allows for
upward or downward revision of the stated contract price under
specified contingencies.

Equitable Adjustment: Adjustment of price, including an
adjustment for profit, due to a
change in contracted work, such as a change in the delivery
schedule or any other terms
of the contract.

Excusable Delay: Delay arising from causes beyond the control
and without the fault or
negligence of the contractor. Examples are (1) acts of a public
enemy, (2) acts of the
Government in its sovereign or contractual capacity, (3) fires,
(4) floods, (5) epidemics,
(6) quarantine restrictions, (7) strikes, (8) freight embargoes,
and (9) unusually severe
weather.

Executive Agency: Instrumentality of the U.S. Government
bound by the FAR.
Executive agencies include the executive departments, the
military departments, any
independent establishment, and any wholly owned Government
corporation within the
meaning of 31 U.S.C. 102, “Executive Agency”.

Fair and Reasonable Price: Basic tenet of Government
contracting that an award be
made at a fair and reasonable price to both parties to the
contract. If the contract is set up
with the correct contract type allowing for appropriate cost risk,
a good contractor should
be able to make a reasonable profit.

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR): Regulation that applies
to all acquisitions of
the executive branch of the U.S. Government. DoD-specific

policies and procedures are
established in the DFARS.

165

Federal Business Opportunities (FedBizOpps): Media used by
U.S. Government
agencies to notify the public of proposed contract actions and
contract awards.

Federal Government (Government): The federal government of
the constitutional
republic of fifty states and one district that is the United States
of America.

Federal Supply Schedule (FSS): Program, directed and
managed by the General
Services Administration, that provides U.S. Government
agencies with a simplified
process for obtaining common supplies and services at prices
associated with volume
buying.

Firm-Fixed-Price (FFP) Contract: Agreement to pay a specified
price when the
supplies or services called for by the contract have been
delivered and accepted within a
specified time.

Free on Board (FOB) Destination: Title of the goods passes at
destination. Contractor
has total responsibility until shipment is delivered. Ownership

(title and control) remains
with contractor until goods are delivered. The contractor is
responsible for all of the
transportation arrangements.

Free on Board (FOB) Origin: Title passes at origin, and the
Government has total
responsibility over the goods while in shipment. The
Government takes ownership (title
and control) of the goods at the origin (when the carrier signs
for goods) and is
responsible for transportation of the goods beyond this point.

Full and Open Competition: Procurement environment in which
all responsible
sources are permitted to compete.

General Services Administration (GSA): Agency in the
executive branch of the U.S.
Government that procures common supplies and services
(including construction) used
by Government agencies.

Government Accountability Office (GAO): Independent
government entity known as
“the investigative arm of Congress” and “the congressional
watchdog.” GAO supports
Congress in meeting its constitutional responsibilities and helps
improve the performance
and accountability of the Federal Government.

Government Bill of Lading (GBL): Accountable transportation
document authorized
and prepared by a Government official.

Government-Furnished Property (GFP): Property in the

possession of or directly
acquired by the Government and subsequently made available to
the contractor.

166

Government Purchase Card (GPC): Card, similar to a
commercial charge card, issued
to authorize agency personnel to use to acquire and pay for
supplies and services.

Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA): Individual who has
overall responsibility for
managing the contracting activity.

Indefinite-Delivery Contract: Contract used to acquire supplies
or services when the
exact times and/or exact quantities of future deliveries are not
known at the time of
contract award. There are three types of indefinite-delivery
contracts: definite-quantity
contracts, requirements contracts, and indefinite-quantity
contracts.

Independent Government Cost Estimate (IGCE): Estimate of
the cost for supplies or
services to be procured by contract. Government personnel
independent of contractors
prepare IGCEs.

Information Resources: All resources and activities employed
in the acquisition,

development, collection, processing, integration, transmission,
dissemination,
distribution, use, retention, storage, retrieval, maintenance,
access, disposal, security, and
management of information. Information resources include
doctrine, policy, data,
equipment, and software applications, as well as related
personnel, services, facilities,
and organizations.

Information Technology (IT): Any equipment, or
interconnected system or subsystem
of equipment, used for the automatic acquisition, storage,
manipulation, management,
movement, control, display, switching, interchange,
transmission, or receipt of data or
information. IT includes computers, ancillary equipment,
software, firmware, and similar
procedures, services (including support services), and related
resources.

Inspection: Process broadly defined as “the examination of an
item by comparing it with
predetermined standards to determine conformance to
requirements.” The narrow
definition of inspection is “a visual examination which does not
use special laboratory
equipment or procedures.” In the phrase inspection and
acceptance, the broad definition
applies. In the phrase test and inspection, the narrow one
applies.

Invitation for Bids (IFB): Solicitation used by the Government
(in the sealed bidding
method of contracting) to invite offerors to make a bid on a
specific requirement and to

describe the conditions under which offers will be received.

Justification and Approval (J&A): Document that justifies and
obtains approval for
contract solicitations that use other than full and open
competition.

167

Labor-Hour Contract: Contract that provides for the
procurement of services on the
basis of direct labor hours at specified, fixed hourly rates
(which include direct and
indirect labor, overhead, and profit).

Legal Counsel: Judge Advocate General, or Staff Judge
Advocate, or civilian counsel
providing legal services.

Letter Contract: Written preliminary contractual instrument
that authorizes the
contractor to begin immediately manufacturing supplies or
performing services.

Market Research: Process used for collecting and analyzing
information about the
market available to satisfy the minimum agency needs to arrive
at the most suitable
approach to acquiring, distributing, and supporting supplies
and services.

Modification: Written change in the terms of the contract. It

can be unilateral (signed by
the Government only) or bilateral (signed by both the
Government and the contractor).

Negotiation: Contracting approach that uses either competitive
or other than competitive
proposals and discussions. Any contract awarded without using
sealed bidding
procedures is a negotiated contract. Negotiation may also be
used to modify the contract
after award.

Nonexcusable Delay: Delay that could have been prevented by
the contractor. Such a
delay would not be a reason to extend the delivery schedule
without consideration.

Nonpersonal Services Contract: Contract under which the
personnel rendering the
services are not subject, either by the contract’s terms or by the
manner of its
administration, to the supervision and control usually prevailing
in relationships between
the Government and its employees.

Offer: One of the five elements of a contract. As a response to
a Government
solicitation, an offer, if accepted by the Government’s
Contracting Officer, would legally
bind the offeror to perform the resultant contract. An offer
could be in the form of a bid
or a proposal.

Offeror: Entity that offers, via a proposal, to provide supplies
or perform services
needed by the Government. An offeror becomes a contractor

when the Government
accepts the offer. In sealed bidding the offeror is called a
bidder.

168

Operational Contract Support (OCS)44: The process of
planning for and obtaining
supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in
support of joint
operations along with the associated contractor management
functions.

Option: Contract term giving the Government the unilateral
right, for a specified time,
to purchase additional supplies or services called for by the
contract or to extend the term
of the contract. Examples are an increase in the quantity of
supplies beyond that
originally stipulated, an extension of time for services beyond
that originally stipulated,
and a change to the principal period of performance (such as the
hours of the workday in
a maintenance contract). A critical factor in an option is the
window during which an
option can be exercised. Missing the window voids the
unilateral nature of the option.

Order: Instrument used to order work under a task order or
delivery order contract.
Orders are written and, when obligating funds, must be on a
form prescribed by the FAR

or DFARS. Orders are made a part of the contract file.

Organizational Conflict of Interest: Situation that exists when
the nature of the work
to be performed under a proposed Government contract may,
without some restriction on
future activities, result in an unfair competitive advantage to the
contractor or impair the
contractor’s objectivity in performing the contract work.

Partial Payment: Payment for supplies or services delivered to,
and accepted by, the
Government, that represent only part of the contract
requirements.

Past Performance: History of how well a contractor performs
on a contract or contracts.
The Government tracks contractor performance to assess the
risk of using the same
contractor on a similar project sometime in the future. (The
Government supplements
past performance data with data from other sources.)

Performance Specification: Description of the end item in
terms of output, function, or
operation. The contractor is responsible for determining the
specific design necessary to
achieve the performance levels stated. Performance
specifications are preferred over
design specifications.

Performance Work Statement (PWS): Description of the
required results in clear,
specific, and objective terms with measurable outcomes.

Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA): Acquisitions

that focus on the
purpose of the services to be performed rather than the manner
in which the work is to be
performed. A PBSA is designed to ensure that contractors are
given the freedom to
determine how to meet the Government’s performance
objectives so that appropriate

44
See Joint Publication 1‐02 “DoD Dictionary of Military and A
ssociated Terms”.

169

performance quality levels are achieved, and that payment is
made only for services that
meet these levels.

Personal Services Contract: Contract that creates an employer-
employee relationship
between the Government and the contractor’s personnel. The
Government is normally
required to obtain its employees by direct hire under
competitive appointment,
designation, or other procedures required by the civil service
laws. Obtaining personal
services by contract, rather than by direct hire, circumvents
those laws unless Congress
has specifically authorized acquisition of the services by
contract. In addition, converting
a legal nonpersonal service contract into a personal service
contract removes it from

being enforceable in a court of law.

Pre-award Survey (PAS): Study of a prospective contractor’s
financial, organizational,
and operational status. A PAS is conducted prior to contract
award to determine the
contractor’s responsibility and eligibility for Government
procurement.

Procurement Request: Initial request for a contracting action,
submitted by the
requiring activity. The procurement request consists of all the
documentation required to
establish a contract, a purchase order, or a construction
contract.

Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO) (sometimes referred as
“Contracting
Officer”): The individual who has the authority to award the
contract. This individual
may also administer the contract and may handle termination
settlements, functions that,
in many instances, are handled by an ACO and a TCO,
respectively.

Progress Payment: Method of contract financing in which the
Government pays a
contractor as work progresses even though supplies or services
have not been delivered.
Progress payments may be based on costs incurred, percentage
of work completed, or
completion of particular phases.

Prompt Payment Act: Law defining the standard amount of time
allowed for payment
to Government contractors.

Proposal: Document submitted by an offeror in response to a
request for proposals,
issued by the Government, for providing supplies or performing
services.

Proprietary Data: Data that belong to an offeror or contractor,
and apply to
manufacturing processes, operations, or techniques that may
distinguish that entity from
its competition. The entity must label its proprietary data, and
the Government must
prevent the release of proprietary data to unauthorized parties.

170

Protest: An interested party’s written objection to an agency’s
solicitation of offers for a
proposed contract to acquire supplies or services. A protest
also may be an interested
party’s written objection to the proposed or actual award of a
contract.

Provision: Term or condition that is used in the solicitation and
applies before contract
award.

Purchase Order: Order for supplies or services (used in the
simplified acquisition
method of contracting). Normally used above the micro-
purchase level, purchase orders
may be unilateral (requiring only a Government signature) or

bilateral (requiring the
signature of both the Contracting Officer and the contractor).

Quality: Combined attributes (performance features and
characteristics) that indicate the
ability of a supply or service to satisfy a given need.

Quality Assurance: Process consisting of planned, systemic
actions necessary to
provide confidence that adequate technical requirements are
established; supplies and
services conform to established technical requirements; and,
satisfactory performance is
achieved.

Quality Assurance Representative (QAR): When a contract has
been delegated to the
Defense Contract Management Agency to administer, the COR
will work closely with
the QAR. The QAR ensures the contractor is in compliance
with contractual
requirements, evaluates and documents contractor performance,
follows up with the
contractor on documented deficiencies, and provides input for
the Performance
Evaluation Board through the Administrative Contracting
Officer.

Quality Assurance Surveillance Plan (QASP): Guide that
describes the contract
monitoring methods in detail. The QASP is usually written by
the same team that
develops the work statement and is used in monitoring a
contract. A QASP is mandatory
for contracts, task orders, or delivery orders over the simplified
acquisition threshold,

including service contracts and construction contracts45.

Quality Control Plan: Method put into place by a contractor to
monitor or control the
performance of services to meet contract requirements. This
plan is also known as a
quality assurance plan (QAP).

Random Sampling: Method of inspection used when it is not
feasible to examine all
items presented prior to acceptance. Under this method, a
predetermined quantity is
inspected at random. In this way, the contractor does not know
which items will be

45
Reference DFARS 246.401.

171

inspected. In theory, random sampling is highly reliable as an
indicator of overall
quality.

Ratification: Approval, by an official with the required
authority, of an unauthorized
commitment. A ratifying official is never compelled to ratify
an unauthorized
commitment.

Reasonable Cost: Cost which, in its nature and amount, does
not exceed that which

would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of a
competitive business. In
determining reasonableness of a specific cost, the Contracting
Officer shall consider:
Whether it is the type of cost generally recognized as ordinary
and necessary for the
conduct of a contractor’s business or the contract performance;
Generally accepted sound business practices, arm’s length
bargaining, and federal and
state laws and regulations;
The contractor’s responsibilities to the Government, other
customers, the owners of the
business, employees, and public at large; and
Any significant deviation from the contractor’s established
practices.

Replacement in Kind (RIK): Type of payment on an acquisition
and cross-servicing
agreement in which logistics support, supplies, or services are
transferred to an activity
and that activity pays by providing the same kind of logistics
support, supplies, or
services at a later date.

Request for Proposals (RFP): The solicitation used for
negotiated acquisitions to
communicate Government requirements to prospective
contractors and to obtain
proposals.

Requirements Contract: Indefinite-delivery type of contract
that commits the
Government to the exclusive use of the contractor to provide
supplies or services as
outlined in the contract for the period stated. This type of
contract does not commit the

Government to a specific quantity of supplies or services.
Delivery orders are used to
request supplies and task orders are used to request services
when needed. Delivery
orders and task orders also give the location and time of
delivery or performance. Under
this type of contract, the Government is at risk of a breach of
contract suit if, for any
reason, it gives a competitor the work promised before the
contractor has a chance to
refuse it.

Responsibility: Determination that the contractor has the
capability to perform a
contract successfully. Because the responsibility decision must
be made prior to award, it
is somewhat speculative. It can be based on a formal pre-award
survey of technical
capability, production capability, quality assurance capability,
financial capability,
accounting system, and other factors such as property control,
transportation, packaging,
security, safety, environmental or energy conservation, and
flight operation or flight

172

safety. It is also possible to make a responsibility
determination without a formal pre-
award survey when data are available to support a positive
decision.

Sealed Bidding: Method of contracting that employs

competitive bids, involves public
opening of bids, and makes an award to the responsive,
responsible bidder, considering
only price and price-related factors.

Senior Procurement Executive (SPE): Individual who is
responsible for management
direction of the acquisition system of an executive agency,
including implementation of
agency-unique acquisition policies, regulations, and standards.

Set-aside: Reserving of an acquisition or portion of an
acquisition exclusively for
participation by an identified group.

Show-Cause Letter: Document sent by the Contracting Officer
to a contractor that is
failing to perform in accordance with the terms of the contract.
The letter notifies the
contractor that the contract may be terminated by reason of
default unless the contractor
can prove within 10 days that the condition was not the fault of
the contractor.

Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT): Generally, the SAT
threshold is $150K.
However, when the supplies or services are needed to support a
declared contingency
operation or to facilitate defense against or recovery from
nuclear, biological, or
radiological attack, the SAT threshold is:

$250K for any contract to be awarded and performed, or
purchase to be made, inside the
United States; and
$1M for any contract to be awarded and performed, or purchase

to be made, outside the
United States.

Small Business: Entity, including its affiliates, that is
independently owned and
operated, is not normally dominant in the field of operation in
which it is performing on
Government contracts, and meets certain other size criteria set
by the SBA.

Small Business Program: Program designed to ensure that small
businesses —
including small disadvantaged businesses, 8(a) firms, women-
owned businesses, minority
colleges, and labor surplus area firms, among others identified
by law — receive a fair
share of DoD procurement dollars. In furtherance of economic
objectives, various public
laws and executive orders have designated that these groups be
provided special
opportunities in solicitation and award of federal contracts.

Sole Source: Source that is characterized as the one and only
source, regardless of the
marketplace, possessing a unique and singularly available
performance capability for the
purpose of the contract award.

173

Sole-Source Acquisition: Contract for the purchase of supplies
or services that is

entered into, or proposed to be entered into, by an agency after
soliciting and negotiating
with only one source. Sole-source contracts require special
approvals.

Solicitation: Request for proposal or invitation for bids issued
to prospective offerors or
bidders.

Source Selection: Process in which the requirements, facts,
recommendations, and
Government policy relevant to an award decision in a
competitive procurement are
examined and a decision is made.

Specification: A document used in development and
procurement that describes the
technical requirements for items, materials, and services. A
specification also describes
the procedures that the Government will use to determine if the
requirements have been
met. Specifications may be unique to a specific program or
common to several
applications.

Statement of Objectives (SOO): Statement, provided in the
RFP, that specifies the
basic top-level objectives of the acquisition, but does not
include how to instructions.
With a SOO, potential offerors have the flexibility to develop
cost-effective solutions and
the opportunity to propose innovative alternatives meeting the
requirement. By
reviewing an offeror’s solutions, the Government can assess the
extent to which the
offeror understands all aspects of the effort to be performed.

Statement of Work (SOW): Statement, provided in the RFP,
that specifies the basic,
top-level objectives of the acquisition, as well as the detailed
requirements of the
Government. The SOW also provides the contractor with how
to instructions to
accomplish the required effort, and it forms the basis for
successful performance by the
contractor and effective administration of the contract by the
Government.

Supplemental Agreement: Contract modification accomplished
by the mutual action of
the Contracting Officer and contractor. This is a bilateral
agreement and must be
executed by both the contractor and the Contracting Officer.

Supplies: All property except land or interest in land (as
defined by the FAR).

Synchronized Pre-deployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT):
Joint, web-
accessible database used for tracking contractor personnel
movements within the forward
deployed area and for validating individual contractor personnel
associated with specific
contracts, their authorization for access to specific DoD
facilities, and their individual
eligibility for specific DoD support services.

174

Synopsis: Government’s notice in the FedBizOpps (FBO)
announcing the specific
requirement for supplies or services and the procedure for
receiving a copy of the
solicitation document. The Government is required to use this
vehicle for ensuring full
and open competition unless a valid exception exists.

System Support Contract: Contracts awarded by service
acquisition program
management offices to obtain technical support, maintenance
support, and, in some cases,
Class IX support for selected military weapons and support
systems.

System Support Contractor: Entity, normally with high levels
of technical expertise,
hired to support specific military systems.

Task Order: Instrument used to order work under a task order
contract (see below).
Task orders are always written by the Contracting Officer, and
when obligating funds,
must be on a form prescribed by FAR or DFARS. Task orders
are made a part of the
contract file and the COR’s working file.

Task Order Contract: Contract for services that does not
procure or specify a firm
quantity of services (other than a minimum or maximum
quantity) and that provides for
the issuance of orders for the performance of tasks during the
period of the contract.

Terminating Contracting Officer (TCO): The individual who

has the authority to
settle terminated contracts.

Termination: Cancellation of all or part of the work that has
not been completed and
accepted under a contract. Under specific circumstances,
termination may be for default
of the contractor or for convenience of the Government.

Time-and-Materials (T&M) Contract: Contract that provides
for acquiring supplies or
services on the basis of (1) direct labor hours at specified fixed
hourly rates that include
wages, overhead, general and administrative expenses, and
profit and (2) materials at
cost, including, if appropriate, material handling costs as part of
material costs. A T&M
contract establishes a ceiling price that the contractor may not
exceed. Substantial
surveillance on the Government’s part is required to ensure that
efficient methods are
used. A QASP is mandatory for any contract, task order, or
delivery order that involves a
T&M service contract or for a T&M construction contract over
the micro-purchase
threshold.

Unauthorized Commitment: Agreement that is not binding,
because the Government
representative who made the agreement lacked the authority to
obligate the Government
contractually. An unauthorized commitment must be ratified at
very high levels. If the
approval authority decides not to ratify the unauthorized
commitment, the person who

175

caused it may be held personally and financially liable. Even if
the action is ratified, the
person who caused it may be subjected to administrative or
other penalties.

Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA): Any contract action for
which the terms,
specifications, or price are not agreed upon before performance
is begun under the action.
Examples are letter contracts, orders under basic ordering
agreements, and provisioned
item orders.

Uniform Contract Format (UCF): Standard Federal contract
format.

Unilateral Modification: Modification that is effective upon
signature by the
Contracting Officer; the contractor’s signature or assent is not
required. Unilateral
modifications are used to:

Make administrative changes;
Issue change orders;
Make changes authorized by clauses other than a Changes
clause (such as Property,
Options, or Suspension of Work clauses); and
Issue termination notices.

Warranty: Promise given by the contractor regarding the
nature, usefulness, or

condition of the supplies or services furnished under a contract.
Warranties normally
provide a contractual right for the correction of defects,
notwithstanding any other
contract provision. Warranties also establish a time period for
exercising this right. The
Government should take advantage of commercial warranty
provisions normally offered
by contractors rather than designing unique warranty
provisions. However, the use of
warranties is not mandatory; they should be used only when in
the best interest of the
Government.

Wide Area Work Flow (WAWF): Web-based system that
enables contractors to
transmit invoices and shipping notices electronically and
enables DoD to record
inspection, receipt, acceptance, and invoice approval
electronically. WAWF distributes
data to downstream systems, including entitlement (payment)
systems, accounting
systems, property records, and others.

Work Plan: Guideline for monitoring contract performance.

176

APPENDIX E:
COR Resources and References

Air Force Contract Augmentation Program (AFCAP):
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/usaf/afcap.htm
AFCAP was initially conceived and implemented to provide
civil engineers and
services personnel a contract force multiplier.
Anti-deficiency Act:
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi‐
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse_usc&docid=Cite:+31USC1351
and http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=browse_usc&docid=Cite:+31USC1517
Codified at 31 U.S.C. 1351 and 31 U.S.C. 1517(a), the Anti-
deficiency Act
prohibits authorizing or incurring obligations or expenditures in
excess of amounts
apportioned by the Office of Management and Budget or in
excess of amounts
permitted by agency regulations.
Combating Trafficking in Persons:
http://ctip.defense.gov/
This DoD site provides links to Trafficking in Persons (TIP)
training, including
mandatory general awareness course J3TA-US030, Combating
Trafficking in
Persons.
Defense Contingency Contracting Handbook:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/jcchb/index.html
This handbook provides contingency contracting tools,
information, and training.
Defense Contingency Contracting Officer Representative (COR)
Handbook:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/ccap/cc/corhb/
This handbook provides information, tools, and training for
DoD Contingency
CORs.

Contingency Contracting Reports (Department of Defense):
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/reports.html
This site lists contingency contracting reports and provides
links.
Contract Management Process Guide:
http://www.hqmc.usmc.mil/CMPG/
This Web-enabled guide was designed to benefit contracting
personnel within the
Marine Corps Field Contracting System and their customers.
Contracting Officers Representative Course:
www.almc.army.mil
The Army Logistics Management College offers this 4-day
residence course
equivalent of DAU COR222/DAU CLC -222 (See courses and
schedules under
Academic Info.)

177

Contractor and Vendor Payment Information Guidebook:
http://www.dfas.mil/contractorpay/ContractPayInformation0111
10.pdf
This Defense Finance and Accounting Service guidebook assists
with preparing
payment documentation to avoid billing errors that cause
payment delays.
Contractor on the Battlefield Resource Library:
http://www.aschq.army.mil/Home/BattlefieldResourceLibrary.as
px
The purpose of this Army Sustainment Command site is to
accumulate and offer
materials helpful to the resolution of legal issues arising from
operational contract

support.
Contractor Performance Assessment Reporting System:
http://www.cpars.csd.disa.mil/
This Web-based system is used to input data on contractor
performance.
Contractors Accompanying the Force:
https://scoe.learn.army.mil/webapps/portal/frameset.jsp
The Sustainment Center of Excellence offers a contracting
basics familiarization
course. (See Course Catalogs; select SCOE Courses; and select
Contractors
Accompanying the Force.)
DAU Contracting Officer’s Representative (COR) Community
of Practice:
(CoP) https://acc.dau.mil/cor
DAU’s COR community of practice (CoP) provides a central
clearinghouse of
knowledge and learning assets and enables sharing of best
practices and lessons
learned. The basic COR training module CLC 106 Contracting
Officer’s
Representative with a Mission Focus (https://acc.dau.mil/cor) is
an 8-hour online
course. DAU also offers additional COR-related training
modules. COR
nominees should also complete Contracting for the Rest of Us, a
2-hour online
course.
DAU Community of Practice : Contractors Accompanying the
Force:
https://acc.dau.mil/CommunityBrowser.aspx?id=18014&view=w
This CoP includes links to policy and best practices.
Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA):
www.dcaa.mil
DCAA performs all contract audits for the DoD, and provides
accounting and

financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts
to all DoD
components responsible for procurement and contract
administration.
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA):
www.dcma.mil
DCMA provides contract administration services to DoD.
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS)
and
Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI):
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/dfarspgi/current/index.html
DFARS 201.602-2 and DFARS PGI 201.602-2, Contracting
Officer
Responsibility

178

DFARS 201.602-70, Contract Clause prescribes use of clause
252.201-7000,
Contracting Officer’s Representative
DFARS 204.70, Uniform Procurement Instrument Identification
Numbers DFARS
252.201-7000 Contracting Officer’s Representative DFARS
Appendix F, Material
Inspection and Receiving Report
Defense Hotline:
http://www.dodig.mil/hotline/
Anyone, whether uniformed or civilian, who witnesses what he
or she believes to
be a violation of ethical standards or the law (such as fraud,
waste, or abuse of
authority; potential leaks of classified information; or potential
acts of terrorism)

should report such conduct through the chain of command or
directly to the
inspector general of his or her respective service or directly to
the Inspector
General of the Department of Defense Hotline at 800-424-9098
(e-mail:
[email protected]).
Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center:
http://www.dliflc.edu/index.html
This Web site provides instruction in foreign languages.
Defense Security Service (DSS):
https://www.dss.mil
DSS is a DoD agency that provides security support services.
DoD Guide to Collection and Use of Past Performance
Information:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/PPI_Guide_2003_final.pdf
This guide is designed to articulate the key techniques and
practices for the use
and collection of past performance information.
DoD Specifications and Standards Homepage:
http://www.dsp.dla.mil
This site contains information about DoD standardization, key
points of contact,
frequently asked questions (FAQs), MilSpec Reform,
newsletters, training, non-
Government standards, and links to related sites.
Developing a Performance Work Statement in a Deployed
Environment
Handbook:
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/docs/09-48/09-48.pdf
Army Handbook 09-48 published September 2009
Embassies and More:
http://www.allstays.com/
Resources/embassies.htm This Web site covers “embassies,
official offices, and
more away from home.”

Federal Acquisition Jump Station:
http://prod.nais.nasa.gov/pub/fedproc/home.html
This Web site covers procurement and acquisition services by
contracting activity.
Federal Acquisition Regulation:
https://www.acquisition.gov/far/

179

FAR Part 7–Acquisition Planning
FAR Part 10–Market Research
FAR Part 11–Describing Agency Needs
FAR Part 12–Acquisition of Commercial Items
FAR 15.304–Evaluation Factors and Significant Sub-Factors
FAR Part 16–Types of Contracts
FAR Subpart 22.10–Service Contract Act
FAR Subpart 32.7–Contract Funding
FAR Part 37–Service Contracts
FAR Part 46–Quality Assurance
FAR 3.104–Procurement Integrity
FAR Subpart 5.1–Dissemination of Information
FAR Part 15–Contracting by Negotiations
FAR 37.602(b)(2)–Quality Assurance for Service Contract
FAR Subpart 42.5–Postaward Orientation
FAR 12.208–Contract Quality Assurance
FAR 12.402–Acceptance
FAR 43.104–Notification of Contract Changes (Constructive)
FAR Part 42–Contract Administration and Audit Services
FAR Subpart 42.11–Production Surveillance and Reporting
FAR 52.232-25–Prompt Payment
FAR Part 45–Government Property
FAR Subpart 17.2–Options
FAR Part 49–Termination of Contracts

FedWorld Information:
http://www.fedworld.gov
FedWorld was established by the National Technical
Information Service (NTIS),
an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce, to serve as the
online locator
service for a comprehensive inventory of information
disseminated by the Federal
Government.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA):
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
This Web site provides statute, recent legislative history,
opinions, and other
information related to the FCPA.
GSA [General Services Administration] Advantage:
https://www.gsaadvantage.gov/advgsa/advantage/main/start_Pag
e.do
GSA Advantage is the GSA Web site for supplies and services.
Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) Areas of
Responsibility (AOR):
Map
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/areas_of_responsibility.ht
ml
This Web site contains links to GCC AORs.
Guidebook for Performance-Based Services Acquisition (PBSA)
in the
Department of Defense:

180

https://www.acquisition.gov/SevenSteps/library/DODguidebook
-pbsa.pdf
DoD developed this guidebook as a cooperative effort among

the components to
help the acquisition team, and any other stakeholder, better
understand the basic
principles of PBSA and better implement performance-based
methods in services
acquisitions.
A Guide for Writing and Administering Performance Statements
of Work
for Service Contracts:
https://acc.dau.mil/GetAttachment.aspx?id=30609&pname=file
&aid=5448&lang=
en-US
OFPP Pamphlet 4.
A Guide to Best Practices for Contract Administration:
https://acc.dau.mil/GetAttachment.aspx?id=31456&pname=file
&aid=5687&lang=
en-US
OFPP’s guide “contains best practices in contract administration
that should be
useful tools to program and contracting officials in
administering federal
contracts.”
Joint Ethics Regulation (JER):
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics
The JER, DoD 5500.7-R, explains standards of conduct relating
to possible
conflicts between private interests and official duties,
regardless of assignment.
Library of Congress:
http://www.loc.gov
The Library of Congress’s Web site is a research tool offering
resources such as
the Country Studies Series (http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/),
which presents a
description and analysis of the historical setting and the social,
economic,

political, and national security systems and institutions of
countries throughout the
world.
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP):
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/agency/army/logcap.htm
LOGCAP is a U.S. Army initiative for peacetime planning for
the use of civilian
contractors in wartime and other contingencies.
Marine Corps Acquisition Workforce Development:
http://www.marcorsyscom.usmc.mil/sites/acqworkforce/
This Web site provides workforce developmental policy,
planning, and
consultation services and individualized education and training
services, including
recurrent military training services that facilitate the individual
and collective
development of the Marine Corps’ acquisition workforce and
the Marine Corps
System Command’s support personnel.
Monitoring Contract Performance in Contracts for Services:
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2008-0468-
DPAP.pdf
This memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense, issued 22
August 2008,
includes COR requirements.

181

The Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) Guide on
PBSA:
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/pbsa/
This guide is a good reference for anyone involved in
Government services

contracts.
Office of Government Ethics (OGE):
http://www.usoge.gov/
Offerings include ethics training, forms, library, and
international assistance.
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, and
Logistics:
www.acq.osd.mil/
This Web site offers a library of DoD acquisition and
technology documents and
links to many other valuable sites.
Seven Steps to Performance Based Services Acquisition:
http://acquisition.gov/comp/seven_steps/home.html
OFPP guidebook.
Special Instructions for Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan:
http://www2.centcom.mil/sites/contracts/Pages/Default.aspx
These instructions include mandatory requirements/guidance for
Contracting
Officers.
Standards of Conduct Office (DoD):
http://www.dod.mil/dodgc/defense_ethics
A resource to understand the ethical standards that apply to
every DoD employee,
both civilian and military.
Standard Industrial Codes (SICs):
http://www.sba.gov/regulations/siccodes/
SICs are product numbers for supplies and services.
Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT):
http://www.bta.mil/products/spot.html
SPOT has been designated as the Joint enterprise contractor
management and
accountability system to provide a central source of contingency
contractor
information.
Trafficking in Persons:

http://www.dodig.mil/Inspections/IPO/TIP_17JUL2008.pdf
This site contains awareness training on TIP from the DoD
Awareness Initiative.
U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID):
http://www.usaid.gov
USAID is an independent Government agency that receives
overall foreign policy
guidance from the Secretary of State.
Wage Determinations Online:
http://www.wdol.gov/
This Department of Labor web site presents prevailing wage
rates to be paid on
Government contracts.

182

Wide Area Workflow (WAWF):
https://wawf.eb.mil/
WAWF includes instructions, registration assistance, and
system updates and
messages.
World Factbook:
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
This Central Intelligence Agency site provides information on
the history, people,
government, economy, geography, communications,
transportation, military, and
transnational issues for 266 world entities.

OTHER REFERENCES

Other Available References

1. Ashton B. Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, “Personal Conflicts of Interest (PCIs) of Contract
Employees,”
Washington, DC, 24 November 2009.

2. Ashton B. Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, “DoD Standard for Certification of Contracting
Officer’s Representatives
(COR) for Service Acquisitions,” Washington, DC, 29 March
2010.

3. Ashton B. Carter, Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition, Technology, and
Logistics, “Better Buying Power: Guidance for Obtaining
Greater Efficiency and
Productivity in Defense Spending,” Washington, DC, 14
September 2010.

4. Defense Acquisition University, “Acquisition Community
Connection,” [Online]
Available: https://acc.dau.mil/ CommunityBrowser.aspx.

5. Defense Acquisition University, “Contracting Officer’s
Representative,” Course No
222, January 2009.

6. Defense Acquisition University, “COR With a Mission
Focus,” Course CLC 106,
presentation (undated).

7. Defense Acquisition University, Student Guide for

Performance-Based Service
Acquisition and the Seven Step Process, ACQ 265, November
2009.

8. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
204.7003, Basic PII Number, 27
September 2010.

9. Department of the Army, Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC), Independent
Government Estimate Preparation Guide, TRADOC Pamphlet
715-6, 19 July 2000.

183

Appendix F: COR Checklists

The following checklists were developed to assist you during
performance of your
designated COR responsibilities. These checklists are
representative of functions
normally designated. There may be functions designated that
are not contained within
this selection of checklists. It is recommended that you become
familiar with the format
of these checklists and, if necessary, develop checklists to cover
the functions delegated.

Note: Refer to the letter of appointment/designation from the
Contracting Officer to

determine all functions you have been designated to perform.

Content

F.1 DOs and DON’Ts - Contract Administration and Remedies
Checklist

F.2 Contents of a COR Working File

F.3 COR Surveillance

F.4 DOs and DON’Ts - Contract Monitoring and Pre-award and
Solicitation

F.5 DOs and DON’Ts - Evaluation and Award

F.6 Considerations for the Performance Work Statement

F.7 Contractor Performance Assessment

F.8 Contractor Delay Assessment

F.9 COR Compliance-Surveillance of Construction Contracts

184

F.1: DOs and DON’Ts:

Contract Administration and Remedies Checklist

CONTRACT ADMINISTRATION
DO DON’T
Remember that the COR is an agent of
the U.S. Government, with only the
authority
delegated by the Contracting Officer.

Accept less than what is required by the
contract.

Get the names of contractor personnel
authorized to represent the contractor.

Assume an interpretation of ambiguous
contract language, which would be
favorable to the Government. Remember:
if the contractor’s interpretation is
reasonable, it will prevail.

Find out the specific authority of contractor
personnel. Does the person you are
dealing with have the authority to obligate
the contractor?

Hold up payment unless performance is
deficient or defective.

See that all Government approvals or
consents are timely.

Accept supplies or services without
complete inspection.

Make any change, modification, deletions,
or additions to the contract requirements.
Work through the Contracting Officer.

Automatically consider all contractor
claims unreasonable. Be fair and impartial.

REMEDIES
DO DON’T
Exercise Government rights, such as
warranties. Make sure to deal with any
problems before the warranty period runs
out.

Act without consulting the contracting
officer. Work through the contract
administration team.

Work with the contracting personnel to
prevent problems before they arise.

Allow interim or final delivery dates to be
waived.

Take actions to protect Government rights
before delivery is due.

185

F.2: Contents of a COR Working File

A copy of the COR letter of appointment or designation from
the Contracting

Officer; copies of any changes to that letter; and a copy of any
termination letter.
A copy of the contract and/or delivery/task order and all
contract modifications.
A copy of the contract data requirements lists (CDRLs)
submitted to the COR as

required by the contract, as well as the COR’s analysis of the
CDRLs and any
resulting actions taken.

A copy of the QASP and a record of each individual
surveillance conducted, the
results, and any actions taken.

The notice of award or notice to proceed.
A copy of the required training certificates.
The names and position titles of contractor personnel who
serve on the contract.
All correspondence between COR and the contractor,
Contracting Officer, or

others concerning performance of the contract; together with
English translations
of all correspondence written in a foreign language.

Copies of all data, reports, and other documentation furnished
by the contractor,
along with the COR’s analysis of those items, actions taken, and
the date of each
action.

A copy of the trip report of every visit to the contractor’s
facility. A copy of this
report must be provided to the Contracting Officer within 7
days after each visit.
The trip report must identify people contacted, dates, items
discussed, and actions
taken.

Memoranda for record of minutes of any meetings, site visits,
telephone
conversations, and other discussions with the contractor or
others pertaining to the
contract or contract performance. These minutes should include
persons present,
dates, matters discussed, and actions taken.

Records relating to the contractor’s quality control system and
plan and the results
of the quality control effort.

A copy of the surveillance schedule, progress schedules, and
schedule of
cumulative payments approved.

A list of Government-furnished property.
A copy of all approvals the COR has given to the contractor.
These approvals must

be a COR-designated authority.
Documentation pertaining to the COR’s receipt and acceptance
(or rejection) of

services performed and/or supplies delivered, including
receipts, reports, and other
data.

Copies of all DD Form 250s, invoices, vouchers, and receipt
documents processed,
including COR recommendations relating to them.

Samples, photographs, witness statements, and other factual
data to support
documentation.

Records of all weather conditions. This is particularly
important for administering

186

construction contracts and any other contracts that call for out-
door performance,
where severe weather or bad weather conditions could delay
contract performance
or completion.

Records of any Government actions that affected or influenced
contractor
performance.

Applicable laboratory test reports.
Copies of deficiency reports.
A copy of each COR monthly report.
Any other documentation and data necessary to provide a
complete history of all

actions taken by the COR under, or in connection with, the
contract.

F.3: COR Surveillance

Is the COR maintaining a separate file for each contract?
Is the file clearly indexed to enable ready access to pertinent
records?
Has the COR been trained within the past 3 years and is the
certificate present?
Is a copy of the COR’s letter of appointment or designation in
the file?
Does the COR file include the following items:

Copy of the contract
All modifications
All invoices
All DD 250s
Deficiency reports
Copy of QASP
Copy of required regulations
Memos for the record and other correspondence/e-mail
Surveillance checklist
Surveillance schedule
Environmental plan
Maintenance plan
Work plan
GFP inventory
Safety plan
Test reports
GFP validation

Has the COR reported contractor full time equivalents (CFTE)
or validated the
contractor’s input?46

If the COR is responsible for contractor performance reporting,
has the COR

46
Refer to OSD Memorandum, “Guidance for the Submission and
Review of the FY 2011 Inventory of Contracts for

Services” 29 December 2011.

187

completed CPARS report inputs?
Has the COR performed contractor surveillance/site visits?
Are the results of surveillance/inspection documented?
Does the COR complete a periodic contract performance report
and forward it to

the Contracting Officer?

F.4: DOs and DON’Ts:
Contract Monitoring and Pre-award and Solicitation

CONTRACT MONITORING
DO DON’T
Set a level of monitoring consistent with
the type of contract, the complexity of the
supply or service, and the importance of the
contract to the overall program.

Assume that “no news is good news.”

Read progress reports and immediately act

on problems they reveal. See that the
contractor complies with every requirement
of the contract.

Wait until delivery is due or overdue to
check progress.

Immediately contact the Contracting
Officer when deficiencies or delinquencies
are noted. Use the contractor’s invoices to
help monitor technical progress.

Take action against a delinquent contractor
on your own. Work through the
Contracting Officer.

Order, request, or even suggest that the
contractor do work that is not called for by
the contract.

Act as if you are the contractor’s personnel
manager. The COR reviews and approves
or disapproves; the contractor supervises
contractor personnel.

Assume the contractor billings are correct.

188

PRE-AWARD AND SOLICITATION

DO DON’T
Use market research. Write vague specifications, assuming that

“the contractor will do whatever is
necessary to satisfy us.”

Look for commercial solutions. Write design specifications,
prescribing in
detail what materials should be use and
how the work should be performed.

Promote full and open competition. Ask for progress reports,
test samples, or
other items from the contractor unless the
items are needed for the program or for
efficient administration and monitoring.

Think about contract administration
requirements while writing the
SOO/SOW/PWS or the specifications.

Use performance-based or functional
(rather than design) specifications to
describe an objective or standard to be
achieved, allowing the contractor to
exercise ingenuity in achieving that
objective or standard, select the means, and
assume corresponding responsibility.

Limit use of restrictive provisions to satisfy
agency needs.

Limit use of specifications and instead
focus on function, performance, and
physical characteristics.

In the SOO/SOW/PWS and specifications,
separate discussion of administrative and
progress reporting requirements from
discussion of required procedures and
deliverables.

189

F.5: DOs and DON’Ts:
Evaluation and Award

EVALUATION AND AWARD
DO DON’T
Carefully review the contract, especially
the technical requirements.

Divulge budget information.

Develop, or obtain from the contractor, a
detailed schedule of performance.

Assume without reading it that the
SOO/SOW/PWS is complete, clear, and
fully understandable.

Work with the Contracting Officer and the
contractor to clear up any
misunderstandings and to establish
organized contract administration and
monitoring procedures.

Allow planning to become an end in itself.
Remember the goal is to get results, not just
pretty charts showing the plan.

Forget to update plans and schedules as the
situation changes.

Overlook or ignore contract requirements
for GFP, timely reviews and approvals, or
technical assistance and direction.

F.6: Considerations for the Performance Work Statement

Considerations for the Performance Work Statement
Does the PWS describe the outcomes (or results) rather than
how to do the work?
Does the PWS avoid specifying the number of contract workers
required to

perform the work (except when absolutely necessary)?
Does the PWS avoid specifying the educational or skill level of
the contract

workers (except when absolutely necessary)?
Can the contractor implement new technology to improve
performance or to lower

cost?
Can the contractor use lower cost materials and still meet the
performance

standards?
Are the situations documented when tightly controlled
materials or supplies are

essential?
Are commercial performance standards utilized?
Do the performance standards address quantity, quality, and
timeliness?
Are the performance standards objective, easy to measure, and
timely?
Is the assessment of quality a quantitative or qualitative
assessment?
Will two different evaluators come to the same conclusion
about the contractor’s

performance based on the performance standards?

190

Are acceptable quality levels clearly defined?
Is the time period for the acceptable quality level clearly
defined?
Are the people who will perform the evaluations identified?
Are the acceptable quality levels realistic and achievable?
Will the user be satisfied if the acceptable quality levels are
exactly met? (Or will

they be satisfied only at a higher quality level?)
Do the acceptable quality levels allow for improvement?

Is the value of evaluating the contractor’s performance on a
certain task worth the

cost of surveillance?
Has random sampling or periodic sampling been utilized in the
QASP?
Has user feedback been incorporated into the QASP?
Does the PWS make use of the contractor’s own quality control
plan and

management information systems to reduce costs?
Are there incentives to motivate the contractor to improve
performance or to

reduce costs?
Are there negative incentives to handle poor performance?
Will the contractor focus on continuous improvement?

F.7: Contractor Performance Assessment

Contractor Performance Assessment
Cost control.
Timeliness (schedule/delivery). Is the contractor on schedule
to meet contractual

requirements? Did the contractor meet the contractual delivery
requirements?
Does the contract include a reward for early delivery, or a
penalty for late delivery?

Quality. Do the supplies or services meet the requirements?
Do they conform to
the contract specifications, standards, SOO/SOW/PWS, and
quality assurance
plan?

Business relations. Is the contractor responsive, professional,
and courteous?
Management of key personnel. Are technical experts highly
qualified and effective

in performing the required services? Do they meet the skill
level stated in the
contract? Are an appropriate number of personnel assigned to
the project? Do
delivered supplies reflect the skill and standardization required
by the customer?

Customer satisfaction. Will the customer be satisfied in terms
of cost, quality, and
timeliness of the delivered supplies or services? What
percentage of the
deliverable meets the customer’s expectations? How long has
the contractor taken
to answer any customer complaints? How many customer
complaints have there
been?

Compliance. Has the contractor complied with Occupational
Safety and Health
Administration, Environmental Protection Agency, Department
of Labor, and other
pertinent regulations?

191

F.8: Contractor Delay Assessment

Before making a final determination, the COR must be certain
that the contractor (1) had
little or no control over the circumstances that caused the delay,
and (2) could not have
taken any preemptive action to reduce the negative
consequences of the delay. If the
organization can prove these two assertions, then a “Yes”
answer to any of the following
questions means the delay was probably excusable.
1. Was the delay caused by a labor strike?

If “no,” go to 2.
If “yes,” did the contractor:
File a charge with the appropriate labor relations board to seek
injunctive relief in
court?
Use other available Government procedures or private boards or
organizations in
an attempt to settle or arbitrate disputes that caused the strike?

2. Was the delay caused by Government interference or
disruption?
If “no,” go to 3.
If “yes,” did the Government:
Delay in making payments due to the contractor?
Deliver GFP late?
Fail to reply to a contractor request for clarification?
Fail to disclose all facts applicable to performance?
Cite or misrepresent conditions that were different from those
portrayed?
Experience scarcity of supplies due to Defense Production Act
priorities over
commercial or nonrated orders?
Delay issuing a required notice to proceed?

Delay issuing changes?
Delay performance by other Government contractors?
Experience delays because of an interested party protesting the
contract award?
Delay making the site available?
Delay providing funding?
Delay inspection or acceptance?
Delay because of defective or ambiguous specifications?
Delay granting approvals?

3. Was the delay caused by a subcontractor?
If “no,” go to 4. The determination is “no” if either of the
following occurred:
Did a dispute between the subcontractor and prime cause the
delay?
Were subcontracted products or services available from other
sources in time for
the prime to complete performance?

4. Was the delay caused by any other occurrence specifically
characterized in
Default or Excusable Delays (or other clauses), as generally
excusable?
If “no,” go to 5.

192

If “yes,” was the delay caused by:
Acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual
capacity?
Acts of God or the public enemy?
Fire?
Flood?

Unusually severe weather?
Epidemics?
Quarantine restrictions?
Labor disputes resulting in strikes?
Freight embargoes?
Common carrier delays?

5. Was the delay caused by other circumstances not previously
mentioned?
If “yes,” did the contractor:
Not cause the delay?
Not have any control over the circumstances that caused delay?

F.9: COR Compliance - Surveillance of Construction Contracts

COR Compliance - Surveillance of Construction Contracts
Review the contractor’s certified payrolls.
Check work sites for required postings.
Conduct labor standard interviews.
Compare payrolls and on-site interviews.
Resolve discrepancies/violations.

193

Appendix G: Metric Conversion Table

Exercise 11-3 (Algo) Accounting for par, stated, and no-par
stock issuances LO P1
Rodriguez Corporation issues 8,000 shares of its common stock
for $69,600 cash on February 20. Prepare journal entries to
record this event under each of the following separate
situations.

1. The stock has a $6 par value.
2. The stock has neither par nor stated value.
3. The stock has a $3 stated value.

· Record the issue of 8,000 shares of $6 par value common
stock for $69,600 cash.
Note: Enter debits before credits.

Transaction
General Journal
Debit
Credit
1

· Record the issue of 8,000 shares of no-par, no-stated value
common stock for $69,600 cash.
Note: Enter debits before credits.

Transaction
General Journal
Debit
Credit
2

· Record the issue of 8,000 shares of $3 stated value common
stock for $69,600 cash.
Note: Enter debits before credits.

Transaction
General Journal
Debit
Credit
3

Exercise 11-6 (Algo) Stock issuance for noncash assets LO P1
Sudoku Company issues 33,000 shares of $7 par value common
stock in exchange for land and a building. The land is valued at
$243,000 and the building at $372,000. Prepare the journal
entry to record issuance of the stock in exchange for the land
and building.

Record the issue of 33,000 shares of $7 par value common
stock in exchange for land valued at $243,000 and a building
valued at $372,000.
Note: Enter debits before credits.

Transaction
General Journal
Debit
Credit
1

QS 11-8 (Algo) Reporting a small stock dividend LO P2
The stockholders’ equity section of Jun Company’s balance
sheet as of April 1 follows. On April 2, Jun declares and
distributes a 20% stock dividend. The stock’s per share market
value on April 2 is $10 (prior to the dividend).
Prepare the stockholders’ equity section immediately after the
stock dividend is distributed.

JUN COMPANY
Stockholders' Equity
April 2 (after stock dividend)
Common stock

Paid-in capital in excess of par value, common stock

Total paid-in capital

Retained earnings

Total stockholders' equity

Exercise 11-8 (Algo) Large stock dividend LO P2
Required information
Use the following information for the Exercises 8-9 below.
(Algo)

On June 30, Sharper Corporation’s stockholders' equity section
of its balance sheet appears as follows before any stock
dividend or split. Sharper declares and immediately distributes a
50% stock dividend.

Common stock—$10 par value, 82,000 shares issued and
outstanding $ 820,000
Paid-in capital in excess of par value, common stock

360,000
Retained earnings 740,000
Total stockholders’ equity $ 1,920,000
(1) Prepare the updated stockholders' equity section after the
distribution is made.
(2) Compute the number of shares outstanding after the
distribution is made.
·

Prepare the updated stockholders' equity section after the
distribution is made.

SHARPER CORPORATION
Stockholders’ Equity Section of the Balance Sheet
June 30
Common stock, no-par value

Paid-in capital in excess of par value, common stock

Retained earnings

Total stockholders’ equity

Compute the number of shares outstanding after the distribution
is made.

Number of common shares outstanding

Exercise 11-9 (Algo) Stock split LO P2

Use the following information for the Exercises 8-9 below.
(Algo)

On June 30, Sharper Corporation’s stockholders' equity section
of its balance sheet appears as follows before any stock
dividend or split. Sharper declares and immediately distributes a
50% stock dividend.

Common stock—$10 par value, 82,000 shares issued and
outstanding $ 820,000
Paid-in capital in excess of par value, common stock
360,000
Retained earnings 740,000
Total stockholders’ equity $ 1,920,000
Assume that instead of distributing a stock dividend, Sharper
did a 3-for-1 stock split.

(1) Prepare the updated stockholders' equity section after the
split.

(2) Compute the number of shares outstanding after the split.

Prepare the updated stockholders' equity section after the split.

SHARPER CORPORATION
Stockholders’ Equity Section of the Balance Sheet
June 30
Common stock dividend distributable

Paid-in capital in excess of par value, common stock

Retained earnings

Total stockholders’ equity

Compute the number of shares outstanding after the split.

Number of common shares outstanding

D
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IS W E' LL D E F E N D

Joint Publication 3-0

Joint Operations

17 January 2017
Incorporating Change 1

22 October 2018

i

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication is the keystone document of the joint
operations series. It provides
the doctrinal foundation and fundamental principles that guide
the Armed Forces of the
United States in all joint operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the
activities and performance of the
Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations, and it
provides considerations for
military interaction with governmental and nongovernmental
agencies, multinational
forces, and other interorganizational partners. It provides
military guidance for the exercise

of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force
commanders (JFCs), and
prescribes joint doctrine for operations and training. It provides
military guidance for use
by the Armed Forces in preparing and executing their plans and
orders. It is not the intent
of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from
organizing the force and
executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most
appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of objectives.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the
Joint Staff, commanders
of combatant commands, subordinate unified commands, joint
task forces, subordinate
components of these commands, the Services, and combat
support agencies.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such,
this doctrine will be
followed except when, in the judgment of the commander,
exceptional circumstances
dictate otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this
publication and the
contents of Service publications, this publication will take
precedence unless the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the
other members of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, has provided more current and specific
guidance. Commanders of forces
operating as part of a multinational (alliance or coalition)
military command should follow
multinational doctrine and procedures ratified by the United

States. For doctrine and
procedures not ratified by the US, commanders should evaluate
and follow the
multinational command’s doctrine and procedures, where
applicable and consistent with
US law, regulations, and doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

KEVIN D. SCOTT
Vice Admiral, USN

Director, Joint Force Development

Preface

ii JP 3-0 CH 1

Intentionally Blank

iii

SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 3 -0

DATED 17 JANUARY 201 7

Continuum,” to
expand the discussion of the changing balance of military
activities in different
types of military operations.

Operations Across
the Conflict Continuum,” into Chapters VI, “Military
Engagement, Security
Cooperation, and Deterrence,” VII, “Crisis Response and
Limited
Contingency Operations,” and VIII, “Large-Scale Combat
Operations” to
enhance readability.

arifies notional phasing model construct and associated
graphics.

spectrum
management operations and protection of civilians.

Publication
(JP) 3-0, Joint Operations; JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces
of the United
States, and JP 5-0; Joint Planning.

-20, Security
Cooperation.

Joint Functions,” to incorporate the

information joint
function as the seventh joint function.

Chapter IV.

Appendix C.

Summary of Changes

iv JP 3-0 CH1

Intentionally Blank

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
...............................................................................................
ix

CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

...............................................................................................
.................. I-1
.......................................... I-2
...................................... I-4
...............................................................................................
....... I-5
...............................................................................................
............. I-8
...............................................................................................
...... I-12
................................................... I-14

CHAPTER II
THE ART OF JOINT COMMAND

...............................................................................................
.................II-1
-Centric Leadership
................................................................................II-1
...............................................................................................
...........II-3
...............................................................................................
.....II-4

Planning..................................................................................
...........................II-5
...............................................................................................
..................II-8

CHAPTER III
JOINT FUNCTIONS

...............................................................................................
............... III-1
.............................................................................................
III-2
...............................................................................................
............. III-17
...............................................................................................
.............. III-27
...............................................................................................
........................ III-30
...................................................................................... III-
37
...............................................................................................
................ III-39
...............................................................................................
............. III-47

CHAPTER IV

ORGANIZING FOR JOINT OPERAT IONS

...............................................................................................
............... IV-1
.......................................................... IV-1
zing the Joint Force
....................................................................................... IV-4
................................................................ IV-8
as
................................................................................. IV-9

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vi JP 3-0 CH1

CHAPTER V
JOINT OPERATIONS ACROSS THE CONFLICT
CONTINUUM

...............................................................................................
................ V-1
............................... V-1
............................................................................ V-4
....................................................................... V-5
.......................................................................................... V-
7

....................................................................................... V-
12
.................................... V-15
tions
............................................................................ V-17

CHAPTER VI
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION,
AND DETERRENCE

...............................................................................................
............... VI-1
........................................................................... VI-5
.............................................................................................
VI-12

CHAPTER VII
CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS

...............................................................................................
.............. VII-1
tingency Operations
.......................................... VII-1
...............................................................................................
... VII-2
..............................................................................................
VII-6

CHAPTER VIII
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

...............................................................................................
............ VIII-1
Command Planning
............................................................................ VIII-2
........................................................... VIII-4
.............................................................................. VIII-6
Initiative............................................................. VIII-11
........................................................................... VIII-19
.......................................................................... VIII-24
...................................................... VIII-28

APPENDIX

A Principles of Joint Operations
................................................................... A-1
B Religious Affairs
........................................................................................B-1
C References
...............................................................................................
...C-1
D Administrative Instructions
....................................................................... D-1

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vii

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations, Acronyms, and Initialisms
.............................................. GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions
............................................................................. GL-6

FIGURE

I-1 Principles of Joint Operations
..................................................................... I-2
I-2 Common Operating Precepts
...................................................................... I-3
I-3 Unified Action
.............................................................................................
I-9
I-4 Relationship Between Strategy and Operational Art
................................ I-13
II-1 Joint Planning Process
................................................................................II-6
II-2 Assessment Interaction
.............................................................................II-11
III-1 Command Relationships Synopsis
........................................................... III-3
III-2 Building Shared Understanding
............................................................. III-15
III-3 Risk Management Process
..................................................................... III-16
IV-1 A Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment
......................... IV-4
IV-2 Notional Joint Force Headquarters and Cross-Functional
Staff Organization

.................................................................................... IV-9
IV-3 Operational Areas within a Theater
....................................................... IV-11
IV-4 Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas
............................... IV-13
V-1 Examples of Military Operations and Activities
....................................... V-2
V-2 Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum
............................... V-4
V-3 Notional Joint Operations in a Combatant Command
Campaign Context
..................................................................................... V-6
V-4 A Notional Joint Combat Operation Model
.............................................. V-8
V-5 Notional Balance of Activities for a Joint Strike
.................................... V-11
V-6 Notional Balance of Activities for a Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance Operation
............................................................................... V-12
V-7 Phasing an Operation Based on Predominant
Military Activities
................................................................................... V-13
V-8 Notional Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stability
Activities ............. V-16
V-9 Combinations of Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear
Operations
...............................................................................................
V-19
VI-1 The Conflict Continuum
........................................................................... VI-2

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viii JP 3-0 CH1

Intentionally Blank

ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Presents the Fundamentals of Joint Operations

• Describes the Art of Joint Command

• Covers Joint Functions

• Explains Organizing for Joint Operations

• Characterizes Joint Operations across the Conflict Continuum

• Discusses Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and
Deterrence

• Addresses Crisis Response and Limited Contingency
Operations

• Describes Large-Scale Combat Operations

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

Joint operations are military
actions conducted by joint forces
and those Service forces
employed in specified command
relationships with each other,
which of themselves do not
establish joint forces. A joint
force is one composed of
significant elements, assigned or
attached, of two or more Military
Departments operating under a
single joint force commander.

Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document
in the joint operations series and is a companion to
joint doctrine’s capstone JP 1, Doctrine for the
Armed Forces of the United States. It provides
guidance to joint force commanders (JFCs) and
their subordinates to plan, execute, and assess joint
military operations. It also informs interagency
and multinational partners, international
organizations, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and other civilian decision makers of
fundamental principles, precepts, and philosophies
that guide the employment of the Armed Forces of
the United States.

Principles of Joint Operations Joint doctrine recognizes the nine
principles of war
(objective, offensive, mass, maneuver, economy of
force, unity of command, security, surprise, and
simplicity). Experience gained in a variety of
irregular warfare situations has reinforced the

value of three additional principles—restraint,
perseverance, and legitimacy.

Strategic Environment and
National Security Challenges

The strategic environment is fluid, with
continually changing alliances, partnerships, and

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national and transnational threats that rapidly
emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. Significant
and emerging challenges include, but are not
limited to, traditional armed conflict, cyberspace
attacks, terrorism involving weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), adversary information
operations campaigns, and proliferation of
adversary antiaccess and area denial capabilities.

Instruments of National Power
and the Conflict Continuum

US instruments of national power are the national-
level means our national leaders can apply in
various ways to achieve strategic objectives (ends).
US national leaders can use military capabilities in
a wide variety of activities, tasks, missions, and
operations that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and
combat intensity along the conflict continuum.

The potential range of military activities and
operations extends from military engagement,
security cooperation, and deterrence in times of
relative peace up through major operations and
campaigns that typically involve large-scale
combat.

Strategic Direction

National strategic direction is
governed by the Constitution,
federal law, United States
Government policy,
internationally recognized law,
and the national interest as
represented by national security
policy.

In general, the President frames the strategic
context by defining national interests and goals in
documents such as the National Security Strategy
(NSS), Presidential policy directives, executive
orders, and other national strategic documents, in
conjunction with the National Security Council
and Homeland Security Council. The documents
outline how the Department of Defense (DOD)
will support NSS objectives and provide a
framework for other DOD policy and planning
guidance, such as the Guidance for Employment of
the Force (GEF); Defense Planning Guidance;
Global Force Management Guidance; and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction
3110.01, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan (JSCP) (simply known as the JSCP).

Unified Action Unified action is a comprehensive approach that
focuses on coordination and cooperation of the US
military and other interorganizational participants
toward common objectives, even if the participants
are not necessarily part of the same command or
organization. This publication uses the term

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interorganizational participants to refer
collectively to US Government departments and
agencies (i.e., interagency partners); state,
territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign
military forces and government agencies (i.e.,
multinational partners); NGOs; and the private
sector. Joint forces must be prepared to plan and
execute operations with forces from partner
nations (PNs) within the framework of an alliance
or coalition under US or other-than-US
leadership. By law, the President retains
command authority over US forces.

Levels of Warfare

Three levels of warfare—strategic, operational,
and tactical—model the relationship between
national objectives and tactical actions. The
operational level of warfare links the tactical

employment of forces to national strategic
objectives.

The Art of Joint Command

Introduction Command is the authority that a commander in the
armed forces lawfully exercises over subordinates
by virtue of rank or assignment. While command
authority stems from orders and other directives,
the art of command resides in the commander’s
ability to use leadership to maximize performance.

Commander-Centric Leadership Clear commander’s guidance
and intent, enriched
by the commander’s experience and intuition,
enable joint forces to achieve objectives. The
command and control (C2) function is
commander-centric and network-enabled to
facilitate initiative and decision making at the
lowest appropriate level. If a commander loses
reliable communications, mission command—a
key component of the C2 [joint] function—enables
military operations through decentralized
execution based on mission-type orders.
Commanders delegate decisions to subordinates
wherever possible, which minimizes detailed
control and empowers subordinates’ initiative to
make decisions based on the commander’s
guidance rather than constant communications.

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Operational Art

The commander is the central
figure in operational art, not
only due to education and
experience, but also because the
commander’s judgment and
decisions guide the staff
throughout joint planning and
execution.

Operational art is the cognitive approach by
commanders and staffs–supported by their skill,
knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment–
to develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to
organize and employ military forces by integrating
ends, ways, and means. The foundation of
operational art encompasses broad vision; the
ability to anticipate; and the skill to plan, prepare,
execute, and assess. It helps commanders and their
staffs organize their thoughts and envision the
conditions necessary to accomplish the mission
and reach the desired military end state in support
of national objectives.

Operational Design Operational design is the conception and
construction of the framework that underpins a
campaign or major operation plan and its
subsequent execution. Operational design
supports operational art with a methodology
designed to enhance understanding the situation
and the problem. Elements of operational

design—such as objective, center of gravity
(COG), line of operation (LOO), line of effort, and
termination—are tools that help the JFC and the
staff visualize and describe the broad operational
approach to achieve objectives and accomplish the
mission.

Joint Planning Planning translates guidance into plans or orders
to
achieve a desired objective or attain an end state.
The joint planning process aligns military
activities and resources to achieve national
objectives and enables leaders to examine cost-
benefit relationships, risks, and trade-offs to
determine a preferred course of action (COA) to
achieve that objective or attain an end state.

Assessment Assessment is a continuous process that measures
the overall effectiveness of employing joint force
capabilities during military operations. Theater-
strategic and operational-level assessments
provide a methodology for joint commands and
Services to adjust planning and execution to be
more effective, match the dynamic operational
environment (OE), and better identify their risks
and opportunities.

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xiii

Joint Functions

Introduction
Joint functions are related capabilities and
activities grouped together to help JFCs
integrate, synchronize, and direct joint
operations. Functions that are common to joint
operations at all levels of warfare fall into seven
basic groups—C2, information, intelligence, fires,
movement and maneuver, protection, and
sustainment. Some functions, such as C2,
information, and intelligence, apply to all
operations. Others, such as fires, apply as the
JFC’s mission requires. A number of subordinate
tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define
each function, and some could apply to more than
one joint function.

Command and Control C2 encompasses the exercise of authority
and
direction by a commander over assigned and
attached forces to accomplish the mission.
Command includes both the authority and
responsibility to use resources to accomplish
assigned missions. Control is inherent in
command. To control is to manage and direct
forces and functions consistent with a
commander’s command authority. Control
provides the means for commanders to maintain
freedom of action, delegate authority, direct
operations from any location, and integrate and
synchronize actions throughout the operational
area (OA).

Information

The information function encompasses the
management and application of information and its
deliberate integration with other joint functions to
change or maintain perceptions, attitudes, and
other elements that drive desired behaviors and to
support human and automated decision making.
The information function helps commanders and
staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature
of information, its military uses, and its application
during all military operations. This function
provides JFCs the ability to integrate the
generation and preservation of friendly
information while leveraging the inherent

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xiv JP 3-0 CH1

Intelligence

informational aspects of military activities to
achieve the commander’s objectives and attain the
end state.

The intelligence function supports this
understanding with analysis of the OE to inform
JFCs about adversary capabilities, COGs,
vulnerabilities, and future COAs and to help
commanders and staffs understand and map
friendly, neutral, and threat networks. Using the
continuous joint intelligence preparation of the
operational environment (JIPOE) analysis process,
properly tailored JIPOE products can enhance OE
understanding and enable the JFC to act inside the
enemy’s decision cycle.

Fires To employ fires is to use available weapons and
other systems to create a specific effect on a target.
Joint fires are those delivered during the
employment of forces from two or more
components in coordinated action to produce
desired results in support of a common objective.

Movement and Maneuver This function encompasses the
disposition of joint
forces to conduct operations by securing positional
advantages before or during combat operations and

by exploiting tactical success to achieve
operational and strategic objectives. Maneuver is
the employment of forces in the OA through
movement in combination with fires to achieve a
position of advantage in respect to the enemy.

Protection The protection function encompasses force
protection, force health protection (FHP), and
other protection activities. The function focuses
on force protection, which preserves the joint
force’s fighting potential in four primary ways
(active defense, passive defense, application of
technology and procedures to reduce the risk of
friendly fire incidents, and emergency
management and response). FHP complements
force protection efforts by promoting, improving,
preserving, or restoring the mental or physical
well-being of Service members. As the JFC’s
mission requires, the protection function also

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xv

extends beyond force protection to encompass
protection of US noncombatants.

Sustainment Sustainment is the provision of logistics and
personnel services to maintain operations through
mission accomplishment and redeployment of the
force. Sustainment provides the JFC the means to
enable freedom of action and endurance and to

extend operational reach. Sustainment determines
the depth to which the joint force can conduct
decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize,
retain, and exploit the initiative.

Organizing for Joint Operations

Understanding the Operational
Environment

The JFC’s OE is the composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences that affect
employment of capabilities and bear on the
decisions of the commander. It encompasses
physical areas of the air, land, maritime, and space
domains; the information environment (which
includes cyberspace); as well as the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and involve
conventional, special operations, ballistic missile,
electronic warfare (EW), information, strike,
cyberspace, and space capabilities. . Included
within these are enemy, friendly, and neutral
systems that are relevant to a specific joint
operation. The nature and interaction of these
systems will affect how the commander plans,
organizes for, and conducts joint operations.

Organizing the Joint Force The JFC’s mission and operational
approach, as
well as the principle of unity of command and a
mission command philosophy, are guiding
principles to organize the joint force for
operations. Joint forces can be established on a
geographic or functional basis. When JFCs

organize their forces, they should also consider the
degree of interoperability among Service
components, with multinational forces and other
potential participants. Joint force options include
combatant commands (CCMDs), subordinate
unified commands, and joint task forces. All JFCs
may conduct operations through their Service
component commanders, lower-echelon Service
force commanders, and functional component

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commanders. Commander, United States Special
Operations Command, exercises combatant
command (command authority) of all special
operations forces (SOF). Geographic combatant
commanders (GCCs) exercise operational control
(OPCON) of their supporting theater special
operations commands and most often exercise
OPCON of SOF deployed in their areas of
responsibility (AORs).

Organizing the Joint Force
Headquarters

While each headquarters (HQ) organizes to
accommodate the nature of the JFC’s OA, mission,
tasks, and preferences, all generally follow a
traditional functional staff alignment (i.e.,
personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans,
and communications). HQ also have personal and

special staff sections or elements, which perform
specialized duties as prescribed by the JFC and
handle special matters over which the JFC wishes
to exercise personal control.

Organizing Operational Areas Except for AORs, which are
assigned in the
Unified Command Plan (UCP), GCCs and other
JFCs designate smaller OAs (e.g., joint operational
area [JOA] and area of operations [AO]) on a
temporary basis. OAs have physical dimensions
comprised of some combination of air, land,
maritime, and space domains. GCCs conduct
operations in their assigned AORs. When
warranted, the President, Secretary of Defense
(SecDef), or GCCs may designate a theater of war
and/or theater of operations for each operation. An
AOR is an area established by the UCP that defines
geographic responsibilities for a GCC. A theater
of war is established primarily when there is a
formal declaration of war or it is necessary to
encompass more than one theater of operations (or
a JOA and a separate theater of operations) within
a single boundary for the purposes of C2,
sustainment, protection, or mutual support. A
theater of operations is an OA defined by the GCC
for the conduct or support of specific military
operations. For operations somewhat limited in
scope and duration, or for specialized activities, the
commander can establish the following OAs: JOA,

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joint special operations area, joint security area,
amphibious objective area, and AO.

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

Introduction Threats to US and allied interests throughout the
world can sometimes only be countered by US
forces able to respond to a wide variety of
challenges along a conflict continuum that spans
from peace to war.

Military Operations and Related
Missions, Tasks, and Actions

Although the US military is
organized, trained, and equipped
for sustained, large-scale combat
anywhere in the world, the
capabilities to conduct these
operations also enable a wide
variety of other operations and
activities.

In general, a military operation is a set of actions
intended to accomplish a task or mission. Military
operations are often categorized by their focus.
Examples include stability activities; defense
support to civil authorities; foreign humanitarian
assistance (FHA); recovery; noncombatant
evacuation operation (NEO); peace operations
(PO); countering weapons of mass destruction;
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear

response; foreign internal defense (FID);
counterdrug (CD) operations; combating
terrorism; counterinsurgency (COIN); homeland
defense (HD); and mass atrocities response.

The Range of Military
Operations

The range of military operations
is a fundamental construct that
helps relate military activities
and operations in scope and
purpose.

The range encompasses three primary categories:
military engagement, security cooperation, and
deterrence; crisis response and limited contingency
operations; and large-scale combat operations.
Military engagement, security cooperation, and
deterrence activities develop local and regional
situational awareness, build networks and
relationships with partners, shape the OE, keep
day-to-day tensions between nations or groups
below the threshold of armed conflict, and
maintain US global influence. Many missions
associated with crisis response and limited
contingencies, such as defense support of civil
authorities (DSCA) and FHA, may not require
combat. But others, such as Operation RESTORE
HOPE in Somalia, can be dangerous and may
require combat operations to protect US forces.
Large-scale combat often occurs in the form of
major operations and campaigns that achieve
national objectives or contribute to a larger, long-

term effort (e.g., Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM).

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The Theater Campaign Military operations, actions, and
activities in a

GCC’s AOR, from security cooperation through
large-scale combat, are conducted in the context of
the GCC’s ongoing theater campaign. The
combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) theater
campaign is the overarching framework that
ensures all activities and operations within the
theater are synchronized to achieve theater and
national strategic objectives. A theater campaign
plan operationalizes the GCC’s strategy and
approach to achieve these objectives within two to
five years by organizing and aligning available
resources.

A Joint Operation Model Most individual joint operations share
certain
activities or actions in common. There are six
general groups (shape, deter, seize initiative,
dominate, stabilize, and enable civil authorities) of
military activities that may typically occur in
preparation for and during a single large-scale joint
combat operation.

Phasing a Joint Operation The six general groups of activity
provide a
convenient basis for thinking about a joint
operation in notional phases. A phase is a
definitive stage or period during a joint operation
in which a large portion of the forces and
capabilities are involved in similar or mutually
supporting activities for a common purpose that
often is represented by intermediate objectives.
Phasing helps JFCs and staffs visualize, plan, and
execute the entire operation and define
requirements in terms of forces, resources, time,
space, and purpose. Actual phases of an operation
will vary (e.g., compressed, expanded, or omitted
entirely) according to the nature of the operation
and the JFC’s decisions. Phases may be conducted
sequentially, but some activities from a phase may
begin in a previous phase and continue into
subsequent phases.

The Balance of Offense,
Defense, and Stability
Operations

Most combat operations will require the
commander to balance offensive, defensive, and
stability activities. This is particularly evident in a
campaign or major operation, where combat can

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xix

occur during several phases and stability activities
may occur throughout. Commanders strive to
apply the many dimensions of military power
simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and
height of the OA. The challenge of balance and
simultaneity affects all operations involving
combat, particularly campaigns, due to their scope.
Consequently, JFCs often concentrate in some
areas or on specific functions, and require
economy of force in others.

Linear and Nonlinear
Operations

In linear operations, each commander directs and
sustains combat power toward enemy forces in
concert with adjacent units. Linearity refers
primarily to the conduct of operations with
identified forward lines of own troops. In linear
operations, emphasis is placed on maintaining the
position of friendly forces in relation to other
friendly forces. From this relative positioning of
forces, security is enhanced and massing of forces
can be facilitated. In nonlinear operations, forces
orient on objectives without geographic reference
to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically
focus on creating specific effects on multiple
decisive points. Nonlinear operations emphasize
simultaneous operations along multiple LOOs
from selected bases (ashore or afloat).
Simultaneity overwhelms opposing C2 and allows
the JFC to retain the initiative.

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Introduction Military engagement, security cooperation, and
deterrence activities provide the foundation of the
CCDR’s theater campaign. The goal is to prevent
and deter conflict by keeping adversary activities
within a desired state of cooperation and
competition. Military engagement is the routine
contact and interaction between individuals or
elements of the Armed Forces of the United States
and those of another nation’s armed forces, or
foreign and domestic civilian authorities or
agencies, to build trust and confidence, share
information, coordinate mutual activities, and
maintain influence. Security cooperation
involves all DOD interactions with foreign defense
establishments to build defense relationships that

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xx JP 3-0 CH1

promote specific US security interests, develop
allied and friendly military capabilities for self-
defense and multinational operations, and provide
US forces with peacetime and contingency access
to the host nation (HN). Deterrence prevents
adversary action through the presentation of a
credible threat of unacceptable counteraction and
belief that the cost of the action outweighs the
perceived benefits.

Typical Operations and

Activities

Typical operations include: military engagement;
emergency preparedness; arms control,
nonproliferation, and disarmament;
counterterrorism; support to CD operations;
sanction enforcement; enforcement of exclusion
zones; freedom of navigation and overflight;
foreign assistance; security assistance; security
force assistance; FID; humanitarian assistance
programs; protection of shipping; show of force
operations; support to insurgency; and COIN.

Other Considerations Other considerations include: interagency,
international, and nongovernmental organizations
and HN coordination; information sharing; and
cultural awareness.

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Combatant commanders plan for
various situations that require
military operations in response
to natural disasters, terrorists,
subversives, or other
contingencies and crises as
directed by appropriate
authority. The level of
complexity, duration, and
resources depends on the
circumstances.

When crises develop and the President directs,
CCDRs respond. If the crisis revolves around

external threats to a regional partner, CCDRs
employ joint forces to deter aggression and signal
US commitment (e.g., deploying joint forces to
train in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an
internal conflict that threatens regional stability,
US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee
stability (e.g., Operation RESTORE
DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If
the crisis is within US territory (e.g., natural or
man-made disaster, deliberate attack), US joint
forces will conduct DSCA and HD operations as
directed by the President and SecDef.

Typical Operations NEOs are operations directed by Department
of
State (DOS) or other appropriate authority, in
conjunction with DOD, whereby noncombatants
are evacuated from locations within foreign

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xxi

countries to safe havens designated by DOS when
their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or
natural disaster.

PO are multiagency and multinational operations
involving all instruments of national power—
including international humanitarian and
reconstruction efforts and military missions—to
contain conflict, restore the peace, and shape the
environment to support reconciliation and

rebuilding and facilitate the transition to legitimate
governance.

FHA operations relieve or reduce human
suffering, disease, hunger, or privation in countries
outside the US. These operations are different
from foreign assistance primarily because they
occur on short notice as a contingency operation to
provide aid in specific crises or similar events
rather than as more deliberate foreign assistance
programs to promote long-term stability.

Strikes are attacks conducted to damage or destroy
an objective or a capability.

Raids are operations to temporarily seize an area,
usually through forcible entry, in order to secure
information, confuse an enemy, capture personnel
or equipment, or destroy an objective or capability.

HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory,
domestic population, and critical defense
infrastructure against external threats and
aggression or other threats as directed by the
President. DOD is the federal agency with lead
responsibility, supported by other agencies, to
defend against external threats and aggression.

DSCA is support provided by US federal military
forces, DOD civilians, DOD contract personnel,
DOD component assets, DOD agencies, and
National Guard forces (when SecDef, in
coordination with the governors of the affected
states, elects and requests to use those forces in
Title 32, United States Code, status) in response to
requests for assistance from civil authorities for

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domestic emergencies, law enforcement support,
and other domestic activities, or from qualifying
entities for special events. For DSCA operations,
DOD supports and does not supplant civil
authorities.

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Traditionally, campaigns are the
most extensive joint operations,
in terms of the amount of forces
and other capabilities committed
and duration of operations.

In the context of large-scale combat, a campaign is
a series of related major operations aimed at
achieving strategic and operational objectives
within a given time and space. A major operation
is a series of tactical actions, such as battles,
engagements, and strikes, and is the primary
building block of a campaign. Campaigns are joint
in nature—functional and Service components of
the joint force conduct supporting operations, not
independent campaigns.

Combatant Command Planning CCDRs document the full scope
of their

campaigns in the set of plans that includes the
theater or functional campaign plan, and all of its
GEF- and JSCP-directed plans, subordinate and
supporting plans, posture or master plans, country
plans (for the geographic CCMDs), operation
plans of operations currently in execution,
contingency plans, and crisis action plans.

Setting Conditions for Theater
Operations

CCDRs and JFCs execute their campaigns and
operations in pursuit of US national objectives and
to shape the OE. In pursuit of national objectives,
these campaigns and operations also seek to
prevent, prepare for, or mitigate the impact of a
crisis or contingency.

Considerations for Deterrence The deter phase is characterized
by preparatory
actions that indicate resolve to commit resources
and respond to the situation. Deterrence should be
based on capability (having the means to influence
behavior), credibility (maintaining a level of
believability that the proposed actions may
actually be employed), and communication
(transmitting the intended message to the desired
audience) to ensure greater effectiveness
(effectiveness of deterrence must be viewed from
the perspective of the agent/actor that is to be
deterred). Considerations include: preparing the

Executive Summary

xxiii

OA, isolating the enemy, flexible deterrent option
and flexible response option, protection, space
operations, geospatial intelligence support to
operations, and physical environment.

Considerations for Seizing the
Initiative

As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit
friendly advantages and capabilities to shock,
demoralize, and disrupt the enemy immediately.
The JFC seeks decisive advantage through the use
of all available elements of combat power to seize
and maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the
opportunity to achieve its objectives, and generate
in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and
defeat. Considerations for seizing the initiative
include: force protection, unit integrity during
deployment, entry operations, attack of enemy’s
COGs, full-spectrum superiority, C2 in littoral
areas, SOF-conventional force integration,
stability activities, protection, and prevention of
friendly fire incidents.

Considerations for Dominance JFCs conduct sustained combat
operations when a
swift victory is not possible. During sustained
combat operations, JFCs simultaneously employ
conventional forces and SOF throughout the OA.
The JFC may designate one component or LOO to

be the main effort, with other components
providing support and other LOOs as supporting
efforts. When conditions or plans change, the main
effort might shift. Considerations for the
dominance include: operating in littoral areas,
attack on enemy’s COGs, synchronization and/or
integrating maneuver and interdiction, operations
when WMD are employed or located, and stability
activities.

Considerations for Stabilization Operations in a stabilize phase
typically begin with
significant military involvement, to include some
combat and the potential for longer-term
occupation. Operations then move increasingly
toward transitioning to an interim civilian
authority and enabling civil authority as the threat
wanes and civil infrastructures are reestablished.
The JFC’s mission accomplishment requires fully
integrating US military operations with the efforts
of interorganizational participants in a

Executive Summary

xxiv JP 3-0 CH1

comprehensive approach to accomplish assigned
and implied tasks. Considerations for the
stabilization phase include: several LOOs may be
initiated immediately (e.g., providing FHA,
establishing security), forces and capabilities mix
[need to realign], stability activities, measures to
prevent complacency and be ready to counter

activity that could bring harm to units or jeopardize
the operation, restraint, perseverance, legitimacy,
and operations security.

Considerations for Enabling
Civil Authority

In this phase, the joint operation is assessed and
enabling objectives are established for
transitioning from large-scale combat operations to
FID and security cooperation. The new
government obtains legitimacy, and authority is
transitioned from an interim civilian authority or
transitional military authority to the new
indigenous government. This situation may
require a change in the joint operation as a result of
an extension of the required stability activities in
support of US diplomatic, HN, international
organization, and/or NGO stabilization efforts.
Considerations for enabling civil authority include:
peace building, transfer to civil authority, and
redeployment.

CONCLUSION

This publication is the keystone document of the
joint operations series. It provides the doctrinal
foundation and fundamental principles that guide
the Armed Forces of the United States in all joint
operations.

I-1

CHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

a. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 is the keystone document in the
joint operations series
and is a companion to joint doctrine’s capstone JP 1, Doctrine
for the Armed Forces of the
United States. It provides guidance to joint force commanders
(JFCs) and their
subordinates to plan, execute, and assess joint military
operations. It also informs
interagency and multinational partners, international
organizations, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs), and other civilian decision makers of
fundamental principles,
precepts, and philosophies that guide the employment of the
Armed Forces of the United
States. This publication describes fundamental keystone
constructs—such as unified
action and joint functions—that apply regardless of the nature
or circumstances of a
specific joint operation. This publication provides context not
only for the joint operations
series, but also for other keystone doctrine publications that
describe supporting functions
and processes.

b. The primary way the Department of Defense (DOD) employs
two or more Services

(from at least two Military Departments) in a single operation is
through joint operations.
Joint operations are military actions conducted by joint forces
and those Service forces
employed in specified command relationships with each other,
which of themselves do not
establish joint forces. A joint force is one composed of
significant elements, assigned or
attached, of two or more Military Departments operating under
a single JFC.

c. Joint operations doctrine is built on warfighting philosophy
and theory
derived from experience. Its foundation rests upon the
principles of war and the
associated fundamentals of joint warfare, described in JP 1,
Doctrine for the Armed Forces
of the United States. These principles and fundamentals apply
to both traditional and
irregular forms of warfare. Joint doctrine recognizes the utility
of unity of command and
the synergy created by the integration and synchronization of
military operations in time,
space, and purpose. Our leaders employ the Armed Forces of
the United States—the
military instrument of national power—in coordination with
diplomatic, informational,
and economic instruments to advance and defend US values and
interests, achieve
objectives consistent with national strategy, and conclude
operations on terms favorable to
the US.

Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States, for more information
on traditional warfare and irregular warfare (IW) and the

instruments of national power.

“The US military’s purpose is to protect our Nation and win our
wars. We do
this through military operations to defend the homeland, build
security globally,
and project power and win decisively.”

The National Military Strategy of the United States of America,
2015

Chapter I

I-2 JP 3-0 CH1

d. Joint Warfare is Team Warfare. The Armed Forces of the
United States—every
military organization at all levels—are a team. The capacity of
our Armed Forces to
operate as a cohesive joint team is a key advantage in any
operational environment (OE).
Success depends on well-integrated command headquarters
(HQ), supporting
organizations, and forces that operate as a team. Integrating
Service components’
capabilities under a single JFC maximizes the effectiveness and
efficiency of the force.
However, a joint operation does not require that all forces
participate merely because they
are available; the JFC has the authority and responsibility to
tailor forces to the mission.

e. Principles of Joint Operations. Joint doctrine recognizes the
nine principles of

war. Experience gained in a variety of IW situations has
reinforced the value of three
additional principles—restraint, perseverance, and legitimacy.
Together, they comprise
the 12 principles of joint operations (see Figure I-1). See
Appendix A, “Principles of
Joint Operations.”

f. Common Operating Precepts. In addition to the principles of
joint operations, 10
common operating precepts underlie successful joint operations.
Listed in Figure I-2,
these precepts flow from broad challenges in the strategic
environment to specific
conditions, circumstances, and influences in a JFC’s OE. The
precepts can apply in all
joint operations, although some may not be relevant activities,
such as military
engagement.

2. Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges

a. The strategic environment consists of a variety of national,
international, and global
factors that affect the decisions of senior civilian and military
leaders with respect to the
employment of US instruments of national power in peace and
periods of conflict. The
strategic environment is uncertain, contested, complex, and can
change rapidly, requiring
military leaders to maintain persistent military engagement with
multinational partners.
Although the basic character of war has not changed, the
character of conflict has evolved.
The military environment and the threats it presents are
increasingly transregional, multi-

domain, and multifunctional (TMM) in nature. By TMM, we
mean the crises and

Figure I-1. Principles of Joint Operations

Principles of Joint Operations

Objective

Offensive

Mass

Maneuver

Economy of force

Unity of command

Security

Surprise

Simplicity

Restraint

Perseverance

Legitimacy

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

I-3

contingencies joint forces face today cut across multiple
combatant commands (CCMDs);
the physical domains of land, maritime, air, and space; and the
information environment
(which includes cyberspace), as well as the electromagnetic
spectrum (EMS), and involve
conventional, special operations, ballistic missile, electronic
warfare (EW), information,
strike, cyberspace, and space capabilities. The strategic
environment is fluid, with

continually changing alliances, partnerships, and national and
transnational threats that
rapidly emerge, disaggregate, and reemerge. While it is
impossible to predict precisely
how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we
can expect that uncertainty,
ambiguity, and surprise will persist. The commander’s OE is
influenced by the strategic
environment.

b. By acquiring advanced technologies, adversaries are
changing the conditions of
warfare the US has become accustomed to in the past half
century. Today’s threats can
increasingly synchronize, integrate, and direct operations and
other elements of power to
create lethal and nonlethal effects with greater sophistication
and are less constrained by
geographic, functional, legal, or phasing boundaries. Conflict
is now, and will remain,
inherently transregional as enemies’ interests, influence,
capabilities, and reach extend
beyond single areas of operation. Significant and emerging
challenges include, but are not
limited to, traditional armed conflict, attacks in cyberspace and
the EMS, terrorism
involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), adversary
information activities, and
proliferation of adversary antiaccess (A2) and area denial (AD)
capabilities. A2
capabilities, usually long range, prevent or inhibit an advancing
force from entering an

Figure I-2. Common Operating Precepts

Common Operating Precepts

Achieve and maintain unity of effort within the joint force and
between the joint force and
US Government, international, and other partners.

Leverage the benefits of operating indirectly through partners
when strategic and
operational circumstances dictate or permit.

Integrate joint capabilities to be complementary rather than
merely additive.

Focus on objectives whose achievement suggests the broadest
and most enduring
results.

Ensure freedom of action.

Drive synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managed
effectively.

Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and
space.

Avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity
without compensating
advantage.

Inform domestic audiences and shape the perceptions and
attitudes of key foreign
audiences as an explicit and continuous operational
requirement.

Maintain operational and organizational flexibility.

Chapter I

I-4 JP 3-0 CH1

operational area (OA). If a force is able to overcome an
enemy’s A2 capabilities, additional
AD capabilities can limit a force’s freedom of action within an
OA.

c. These challenges are not specific to any single theater of
operations and create
problematic consequences for international security. Such an
environment induces
instability; erodes the credibility of US national power; can

necessitate escalation in US
and allied responses; and weakens US alliances that promote
trade, economic development,
and diplomatic agreements. In the most challenging scenarios,
the US may be unable to
deploy, employ, and sustain forces the way it has in the recent
past (i.e., build up combat
power in an area, perform detailed rehearsals and integration
activities, and then conduct
operations when and where desired). JFCs should consider a
wide range of options
consistent with current realities of an OE not solely defined by
state-on-state and force-on-
force engagements. A JFC’s OE, which encompasses all enemy,
friendly, and neutral
factors relevant to a specific joint operation, can include actions
directed against a variety
of state forces and non-state actors, to include insurgents,
proxies, local warlords,
criminals, and others. Civilians and organizations other than an
enemy may also affect
strategic outcomes. These actors may include the civilian
population, host nation (HN)
government, potential opposition leaders, international
organizations, and NGOs.

d. Enemies who attack the US homeland and US interests are
likely to use asymmetric
tactics and techniques. They will avoid hard (well-secured and
heavily defended) targets
and attack vulnerable ones. Vulnerable targets may include US
and partner nations’ (PNs’)
lines of communications (LOCs), ports, airports, staging areas,
civilian populations, critical
infrastructure, information centers, economic centers, and
military and police personnel

and facilities. Advances in information technology increase the
tempo, lethality, and depth
of warfare. Developments in cyberspace can provide the US
military, its allies, and PNs
leverage to improve economic and physical security. However,
this also provides
adversaries increased access to open-source information and
intelligence, the Department
of Defense information network (DODIN), critical
infrastructure and key resources, and a
limitless propaganda platform with global reach. Asymmetric
attacks can be countered
with well-planned joint operations synchronized with actions of
interagency partners,
international organizations, NGOs, multinational forces, and
elements of the private sector.
Achieving unity of effort with these partners requires
coordination, cooperation, and a
comprehensive approach to achieve common objectives.

Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States, and the Defense Strategy
Review (DSR) for more information on the strategic security
environment. Refer to JP 3-
08, Interorganizational Cooperation, for more information on
interorganizational
coordination.

3. Instruments of National Power and the Conflict Continuum

a. US instruments of national power are the national-level
means our national
leaders can apply in various ways to achieve strategic objectives
(ends). Institutions that
represent these instruments of national power are active
continuously as the President

directs along a conflict continuum that ranges from peace to
war.

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

I-5

b. The ability of the US to advance its national interests
depends on how the United
States Government (USG) employs the instruments of national
power to achieve national
strategic objectives based on global security priorities. USG
officials, with National
Security Council (NSC) advice and Presidential direction,
coordinate the instruments of
national power. The USG routinely uses the instruments of
national power to advance
national interests. Interactions between the various instruments
of national power can
enhance results as US culture, industry, science and technology,
academic institutions,
geography, and national will combine to deliver synergistic
benefit.

c. The ultimate purpose of the US Armed Forces is to fight and
win the nation’s wars.
Although much of DOD’s focus is on war and war preparation,
opportunities also exist to
prevent or mitigate the severity of conflict, legitimize US
positions, reward PNs, provide
expertise to multinational operations, and enhance the positive
perception of the US. US
national leaders can use military capabilities in a wide variety
of activities, tasks, missions,

and operations that vary in purpose, scale, risk, and combat
intensity along the conflict
continuum. The military’s role increases relative to the other
instruments as the need to
compel an adversary through force increases. The potential
range of military activities
and operations extends from military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence
in times of relative peace up through major operations and
campaigns that typically involve
large-scale combat. For more information on the range of
military activities and operations
across the conflict continuum, see Chapter V, “Joint Operations
Across the Conflict
Continuum,” paragraph 3, “The Range of Military Operations.”

d. Under an umbrella of security cooperation, DOD supports
USG strategic objectives
by developing security relationships, building partner capacity
and capability, and assuring
access with selected PNs that enable them to act alongside, in
support of, or in lieu of US
forces around the globe. These strategic initiatives help
advance national security
objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts, and reduce the
risk of employing US
military forces in a conflict. Security cooperation activities
comprise an essential element
of a geographic combatant commander’s (GCC’s) combatant
command campaign plan
(CCP).

Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States, for more information
on the instruments of national power. Refer to JP 3-20,
Security Cooperation, for more

information about a GCC’s role in security cooperation. Refer
to Chapter V, “Joint
Operations Across the Conflict Continuum,” for more
information on the conflict
continuum and range of military operations.

4. Strategic Direction

a. National strategic direction is governed by federal law, USG
policy,
internationally recognized law, and the national interest as
represented by national security
policy. This direction provides strategic context for the
employment of the instruments
of national power and defines the strategic purpose that guides
employment of the military
as part of a global strategy. Strategic direction is typically
published in key documents,
generally referred to as strategic guidance, but it may be
communicated through any means
available. Strategic direction may change rapidly in response to
changes in the global

Chapter I

I-6 JP 3-0 CH1

environment, whereas strategic guidance documents are
typically updated cyclically and
may not reflect the most current strategic direction.

(1) In general, the President frames the strategic context by
defining national
interests and goals in documents such as the National Security

Strategy (NSS), Presidential
policy directives, executive orders, and other national strategic
documents, in conjunction
with the NSC and Homeland Security Council.

(2) DOD derives its strategic-level documents from guidance in
the NSS. The
documents outline how DOD will support NSS objectives and
provide a framework for
other DOD policy and planning guidance, such as the National
Defense Strategy; Guidance
for Employment of the Force (GEF); Defense Planning
Guidance; Global Force
Management Implementation Guidance; and Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction (CJCSI) 3110.01, (U) Joint Strategic Campaign Plan
(JSCP) (simply known
as the JSCP).

(3) The President approves the contingency planning guidance
contained in the
GEF, which is developed by the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. The GEF translates
national security strategic objectives into a prioritized and
comprehensive planning tool to
guide the employment of DOD forces. It consolidates guidance
for campaign planning,
security cooperation, global defense posture, and global force
management. The Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) translates guidance from the
GEF and publishes the
JSCP, which provides the framework for military direction to
the joint force, implementing
and augmenting the President’s and Secretary of Defense’s
(SecDef’s) guidance. The
President also signs the Unified Command Plan (UCP), which is

developed by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff in coordination
with the NSC. The UCP
establishes the missions, responsibilities, and areas of
responsibility (AORs) for
commanders of CCMDs (combatant commanders [CCDRs]).

b. From this broad strategic guidance, more specific national,
functional, and theater-
strategic and supporting objectives help focus and refine the
context and guide the
military’s joint planning and execution related to these
objectives or a specific crisis.
Integrated planning, coordination, and guidance among the Joint
Staff, CCMD staffs,
Service chiefs, and USG departments and agencies translate
strategic priorities into clear
planning guidance, tailored force packages, operational-level
objectives, joint operation
plans (OPLANs), and logistical support for the joint force to
accomplish its mission.

For more information on national strategic direction, refer to
National Security
Presidential Memorandum-4, Organization of the National
Security Council, and
Subcommittees; CJCSI 5715.01, Joint Staff Participation in
Interagency Affairs; JP 1,
Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States; and JP 5-0,
Joint Planning.

c. The CCDR’s Strategic Role

(1) Based on guidance from the President and SecDef, GCCs
and functional
combatant commanders (FCCs) translate national security

policy, strategy, and available
military forces into theater and functional strategies to achieve
national and theater

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

I-7

strategic objectives. CCMD strategies are broad statements of
the GCC’s long-term vision
for the AOR and the FCC’s long-term vision for the global
employment of functional
capabilities guided by and prepared in the context of SecDef
priorities outlined in the GEF
and the CJCS’s objectives articulated in the National Military
Strategy (NMS). A
prerequisite to preparing the theater strategy is development of
a strategic estimate. It
contains factors and trends that influence the CCMD’s strategic
environment and inform
the ends, ways, means, and risk involved in pursuit of GEF-
directed objectives.

(2) Using their strategic estimates and theater or functional
strategies, GCCs and
FCCs develop CCPs consistent with guidance in the UCP, GEF,
and JSCP, as well as in
accordance with (IAW) planning architecture described in the
Adaptive Planning and
Execution (APEX) enterprise. In some cases, a CCDR may be
required to develop a global
campaign plan. FCCs develop operational support plans based
on guidance in the UCP
and their priorities and objectives in the GEF. FCCs may be

responsible for developing
functional-related global or subordinate campaign plans or both.
As required, both GCCs
and FCCs develop contingency plans, which are branch plans to
the overarching CCP.

(3) In joint operations, the supported CCDR will often have a
role in achieving
more than one national strategic objective. Some national
strategic objectives will be the
primary responsibility of the supported CCDR. Others may
require a more balanced use
of many or all instruments of national power, with the CCDR in
support of another CCDR
or other agencies. Supporting CCDRs coordinate and
synchronize their supporting plans
with the supported commander’s plan. CCDRs provide planning
guidance; assign missions
and tasks; organize forces and resources; designate objectives;
may establish operational
limitations, such as rules of engagement (ROE), constraints, and
restraints; and implement
policies and the concept of operations (CONOPS) to be
integrated into plans and operation
orders (OPORDs). In applying military power, CCDRs use the
capabilities of assigned,
attached, and supporting military forces. They also integrate
other instruments of national
power and the capabilities of multinational partners to gain and
maintain strategic
advantage. Supporting and supported CCDRs coordinate with
each other across
geographic and functional boundaries to facilitate mission
accomplishment within the
capabilities of assigned, attached, and supporting military
forces.

Refer to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States, for more information
on the strategic environment, strategic guidance, strategy and
estimates, and the role of
CCDRs. For more information on APEX and joint planning,
refer to CJCS Guide 3130,
Adaptive Planning and Execution Overview and Policy
Framework.

(4) Termination

(a) Terminating joint operations and transforming conflict into
lasting
stability is an aspect of the CCDR’s functional or theater
strategy that links to achievement
of national objectives. Successful military operations can
create conditions so the other
instruments of national power can achieve national security
objectives. Based on the
President’s strategic objectives, the supported CCDR develops
and proposes termination
criteria—the specified conditions approved by the President or
SecDef that must be met
before a named operation or campaign can be concluded. These
termination criteria help

Chapter I

I-8 JP 3-0 CH1

define the desired military end state, which normally represents
a point in time or a set of
conditions beyond which the President does not require the

military instrument of national
power as the primary means to achieve remaining national
objectives. This period or set
of circumstances usually signals a transition from military to
civilian lead of subsequent
activities.

(b) Creating the conditions for lasting stability extends beyond
the large-
scale combat that dominates the enemy’s will to resist. Often,
overmatching the enemy’s
capabilities at critical times and places does not lead to the
resolution of the drivers of
conflict nor initiate the transformation to eliminate the root
causes of conflict. The Armed
Forces of the United States often remain in a supporting role to
assist in reducing the means
and motives for violence, focusing on the sources of instability,
developing opportunities
to promote stability. Military operations during this time can
be leveraged to shape the
necessary perceptions in key audiences to create conditions for
PN capabilities. Strategic-
and operational-level commanders plan for the termination of
operations to enable civil
authority as part of the initial planning process. Understanding
transitions is key to
operational design and planning.

For more information on end state and termination, refer to JP
5-0, Joint Planning.

5. Unified Action

a. General

(1) Whereas the term joint operation focuses on the integrated
actions of the
Armed Forces of the United States, the term unified action has a
broader connotation.
Unified action refers to the synchronization, coordination, and
integration of the activities
of governmental and nongovernmental entities to achieve unity
of effort. Failure to
achieve unity of effort can cost lives, create conditions that
enhance instability, and
jeopardize mission accomplishment.

(2) Unified action is based on national strategic direction,
which is governed by
the Constitution, federal law, and USG policy. Unified action is
a comprehensive approach
that focuses on coordination and cooperation of the US military
and other
interorganizational participants toward common objectives,
even if the participants are not
necessarily part of the same command or organization.

(3) Enabled by the principle of unity of command, military
leaders understand
the effective mechanisms to achieve military unity of effort.
The goal of unified action is
to achieve a similar unity of effort between participants, as
Figure I-3 shows. This
publication uses the term interorganizational participants to
refer collectively to USG
departments and agencies (i.e., interagency partners); state,
territorial, local, and tribal

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Achieve and maintain unity of effort between the joint force and

interorganizational participants.

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

I-9

agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies (i.e.,
multinational partners);
NGOs; and the private sector. This aligns with the term and
definition of
interorganizational cooperation established in JP 3-08,
Interorganizational Cooperation.

(4) The US Department of State (DOS) has a complementary
approach, which
defines unity of effort as a cooperative concept that refers to
coordination and
communication among USG organizations toward the same
common goals for success.
The basis is the necessity of each agency’s efforts to be in
harmony with the short- and
long-range goals of the mission.

b. The JFC’s Role. JFCs are challenged to achieve and
maintain operational
coherence given the requirement to operate in conjunction with
interorganizational
partners. CCDRs play a pivotal role in unifying joint force
actions, since all of the elements
and actions that compose unified action normally are present at
their level. However,
subordinate JFCs also integrate and synchronize their operations
directly with the
operations of other military forces and the activities of

nonmilitary organizations in the OA
to promote unified action.

c. Multinational Participation in Unified Action

Figure I-3. Unified Action

Unified Action

Unified
Action

International
Organizations

Multinational
Forces

US Joint Forces

Private Sector
and Others

Nongovernmental
Organizations

US, State, Territorial,
and Local

Governments

The joint force commander plans, coordinates, synchronizes,
and, when appropriate, integrates
military operations with the activities of other governmental
and nongovernmental entities to achieve

unity of effort.

Chapter I

I-10 JP 3-0 CH1

(1) General. Joint forces must be prepared to plan and execute
operations with
forces from PNs within the framework of an alliance or
coalition under US or other-than-
US leadership. US military leaders often are expected to play a
central leadership role
regardless of the US Armed Forces’ predominance, capability,
or capacity. Commanders
should expect the military leaders of contributing member
nations to emphasize common
objectives, as well as to expect mutual support and respect.
Although individual nations
may place greater emphasis on some objectives than on others,
the key is to find
commonality within the objectives to promote synchronized
progress to achieving the
objectives. Cultivation and maintenance of personal
relationships among counterparts
enable success. Language and communication differences,
cultural diversity, historical
animosities, and the varying capabilities of allies and
multinational partners are factors that
complicate the integration and synchronization of activities
during multinational
operations. Likewise, differing national obligations derived
from international treaties,
agreements, and national legislation complicate multinational
operations. Regardless of

whether other members participate in their treaty or agreement
obligations, US forces will
remain bound by US treaties and agreements.

(2) Command and Control (C2) of US Forces. By law, the
President retains
command authority over US forces. This includes the authority
and responsibility to
effectively plan for, organize, coordinate, control, employ, and
protect these forces.
Nevertheless, the President may deem it prudent or
advantageous (for reasons such as
maximizing military effectiveness and ensuring unified action)
to place specific US forces
under the control of a foreign commander to achieve specified
military objectives. Even
when operating under the operational control (OPCON) of a
foreign commander, US
Armed Forces remain in the chain of command of US military
authorities.

(3) C2 Structures. Alliances typically develop C2 structures,
systems, and
procedures, with the predominant contributing nation providing
the allied force
commander. Staffs are integrated, and subordinate commands
often are led by senior
representatives from member nations. Shared doctrine,
standardization agreements, close
military cooperation, training, and robust diplomatic relations
should characterize
alliances. Coalitions are less standardized and may adopt a
parallel or lead-nation C2
structure or a combination of the two. In a parallel command
construct, nations retain
control of their deployed forces and operate under their own

doctrine and procedures, and
in a lead nation command construct, the PN providing the
preponderance of forces and
resources typically provides the commander of the coalition
force. These command
structures can also exist simultaneously within a coalition.

For more information on unified action with respect to
multinational participation, refer
to JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.
For more information on all
aspects of multinational operations, refer to JP 3-16,
Multinational Operations. For more
information on multinational logistics, refer to JP 4-08,
Logistics in Support of
Multinational Operations. For North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO)-specific
doctrine ratified by the US, see Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-
01, Allied Joint Doctrine,
and AJP-3, Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations.

d. Interorganizational Coordination in Unified Action

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

I-11

(1) General. Previous paragraphs summarized US interaction
with multinational
partners. CCDRs and subordinate JFCs often interact with a
variety of interorganizational
participants. This interaction varies according to the nature of
participant (capability,
capacity, objectives, etc.) and type of operation. JFCs and

planners consider the potential
contributions of other agencies and determine which can best
contribute to achieving
specific objectives. Often, other interagency partners, primarily
DOS, can facilitate a
JFC’s coordination with multinational and HN agencies, NGOs,
and the private sector.
DOD may support other agencies during operations; however,
under US law, US military
forces will remain under the DOD command structure. Federal
lead agency responsibility
may be prescribed by law or regulation, Presidential directive,
policy, or agreement among
or between agencies. Even then, because of its resources and
well-established planning
methods, the joint force will likely provide significant support
to the lead agency.

(2) Civil-Military Integration

(a) Military operations require civil-military integration. The
degree of
integration depends on the mission, objectives, organizations,
governments, and people
involved. Presidential directives guide participation by all USG
departments and agencies.
Military leaders work with the other USG partners to promote
unified action. Differences
in policies, procedure, decision-making processes, terminology,
and organizational
cultures, as well as the nature and extent of resourcing across
the various USG departments
and agencies, will often complicate and may initially create
some conflict challenges to
successful civil-military integration.

(b) Integration, cooperation, and coordination between military
forces and
interorganizational participants are much less structured than
military C2. Some
organizations may have policies that conflict with those of the
USG, particularly those of
the US military. Formal agreements, robust liaison, and
information sharing through
disciplined interorganizational coordination should facilitate
common understanding,
informed decision making, and unity of effort. Information
sharing with NGOs and the
private sector may be more restrictive, but options such as the
CCMD-level joint
interagency coordination group (JIACG) and operational-level
civil-military operations
center (CMOC) are available to the commanders to facilitate
interorganizational
coordination and information sharing. DOD, in collaboration
with federal, state, local,
territorial, and tribal governments, uses the structures and
procedures provided by the
National Response Framework (NRF) and the National Incident
Management System to
prepare for, plan, coordinate, and respond to disasters within
the US and its territories.
Similar structures and processes, incorporating the capabilities
and interests of foreign
partners, can be incorporated into disaster-response and civil-
military operations (CMO)
in connection with US operations in foreign countries.

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Leverage the benefits of operating indirectly through partners
when

strategic and operational circumstances dictate or permit.

Chapter I

I-12 JP 3-0 CH1

For more information on interorganizational coordination, refer
to JP 3-08,
Interorganizational Cooperation. For more information on CMO
and the CMOC, refer to
JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations. For more information on
DOD’s coordination and
involvement with other government agencies within the context
of homeland security and
role within the NRF, refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil
Authorities.

e. The US has neither the capacity nor responsibility to directly
lead the response to
every crisis. US military operations abroad invite diplomatic
repercussions from enemies,
adversaries, and even allies with whom our objectives do not
precisely align. In some
circumstances, friendly surrogates assisted by US military
support may be able to
conduct operations and achieve mutually agreeable objectives
when the direct
employment of US forces would be objectionable or infeasible.
In other instances, such
as counterinsurgency (COIN), success depends on the
indigenous government
demonstrating its own sovereignty; the overt exercise of force
by the US military may
ultimately be counterproductive. JFCs may increasingly find it

advantageous or necessary
to pursue objectives by enabling and supporting one or more
interorganizational partners.

6. Levels of Warfare

a. General. Three levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and
tactical—model the
relationship between national objectives and tactical actions.
There are no fixed limits or
boundaries between these levels, but they help commanders
visualize a logical arrangement
of operations, allocate resources, and assign tasks to appropriate
commands. Echelon of
command, size of units, types of equipment, and types and
location of forces or components
may often be associated with a particular level, but the
strategic, operational, or tactical
purpose of their employment depends on the nature of their
task, mission, or objective. For
example, intelligence and communications satellites, previously
considered principally
strategic assets, are also significant resources for tactical
operations. Likewise, tactical
actions can cause both intended and unintended strategic
consequences, particularly in
today’s environment of pervasive and immediate global
communications and networked
threats. Figure I-4 depicts the role of operational art in linking
tactical- and operational-
level actions and objectives to strategic objectives and
highlights leaders who typically
focus at these levels.

b. Strategic Level of Warfare. In the context of national
interests, strategy develops

an idea or set of ideas of the ways to employ the instruments of
national power in a
synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve national,
multinational, and theater
objectives. Through development of strategy (e.g., the NSS,
DSR, and NMS), a nation’s
leader, often with other nations’ leaders, determines national or
multinational strategic
objectives with specific guidance to shape and allocate national
resources to achieve these
objectives. The President, aided by the NSC, establishes policy
and national strategic
objectives. SecDef translates these objectives into strategic
military objectives that
facilitate theater strategic planning. CCDRs usually participate
in strategic discussions
with the President and SecDef through the CJCS. CCDRs also
participate in strategic
discussions with allies and multinational members. Thus, the
CCDR’s strategy relates
to both US national strategy and operational-level activities
within the theater.

Fundamentals of Joint Operations

I-13

Military strategy, derived from national policy and strategy and
informed by doctrine,
provides a framework for conducting operations.

c. Operational Level

(1) The operational level of warfare links the tactical

employment of forces to
national strategic objectives. The focus at this level is on the
planning and execution of
operations using operational art: the cognitive approach by
commanders and staffs—
supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to plan
and execute (when required)
strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ
military capabilities by
integrating ends, ways, and available means. JFCs and
component commanders use
operational art to determine how, when, where, and for what
purpose military forces will
be employed, to influence the adversary’s disposition before
combat, to deter adversaries
from supporting enemy activities, and to assure our
multinational partners achieve
operational and strategic objectives.

(2) Many factors affect relationships among leaders at these
levels. Service and
functional component commanders of a joint force do not plan
the actions of their forces
in a vacuum; they and their staffs collaborate with the
operational-level JFC to plan the
joint operation. This collaboration facilitates the components’
planning and execution.
Likewise, the operational-level JFC and staff typically
collaborate with the CCDR to frame
theater strategic objectives, as well as tasks the CCDR will
eventually assign to the
subordinate joint force.

Figure I-4. Relationship Between Strategy and Operational Art

Relationship Between Strategy and Operational Art

Operational art links tactical action to strategic purpose.
Operational art governs the deployment of
forces and the arrangement of operations to achieve operational
and strategic objectives.

Unified Action

National
Strategic

Objectives

Strategy Operational Art

Theater/
Functional
Strategic

Objectives

Operational-Level
Objectives

Tactical-Level
Objectives

President

National Security
Staff

Agency Heads

Chief of Mission

Combatant
Commander

Chief of Mission

Operational-Level
Joint Force
Commander

Department and
Agency

Representatives

Tactical
Commander

Chapter I

I-14 JP 3-0 CH1

d. Tactical Level. Tactics is the employment, ordered
arrangement, and directed
actions of forces in relation to each other. Joint doctrine
focuses this term on planning and
executing battles, engagements, and activities at the tactical
level to achieve military
objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (TFs). An
engagement can include a
wide variety of noncombat tasks and activities and combat
between opposing forces
normally of short duration. A battle consists of a set of related
engagements. Battles
typically last longer than engagements, involve larger forces,

and have greater potential to
affect the course of an operation or a campaign.

7. Characterizing Military Operations and Activities

a. The US employs military capabilities in support of national
security objectives in a
variety of military operations and activities. The purpose of
military action may be
specified in a mission statement or implied from an order.
Operations and activities are
characterized as “joint” when they are conducted by a force
composed of significant
elements, assigned or attached, of two or more Military
Departments operating under a
single JFC.

b. Distinct military operations and activities may occur
simultaneously with or
independently of others even within the same OA. For example,
a noncombatant
evacuation operation (NEO) may be in the same OA where US
forces are conducting COIN
operations. Additionally, each may have different root causes
and objectives. Chapter V,
“Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum,” discusses
the simultaneous nature of
theater operations and activities and describes various joint
operations and considerations
in the context of the three broad areas of the range of military
operations.

II-1

CHAPTER II
THE ART OF JOINT COMMAND

1. Introduction

a. Command is the authority a commander in the armed forces
lawfully exercises
over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment.
Accompanying this authority is the
responsibility to effectively organize, direct, coordinate, and
control military forces to
accomplish assigned missions. Command includes
responsibility for health, welfare,
morale, and discipline of assigned personnel.

b. While command authority stems from orders and other
directives, the art of
command resides in the commander’s ability to use leadership
to maximize
performance. The combination of courage, ethical leadership,
judgment, intuition,
situational awareness, and the capacity to consider contrary
views helps commanders make
insightful decisions in complex situations. These attributes can
be gained over time
through training, education, and experience. Joint training and
joint doctrine are designed
to enable the conscious and skillful exercise of command
authority through visualization,
decision making, and leadership. Effective commanders
combine judgment and
visualization with information to determine whether a decision
is required, when to decide,

and what to decide with sufficient speed to maintain the
initiative. Information
management (IM), situational awareness, and a sound battle
rhythm facilitate decision
making.

2. Commander-Centric Leadership

a. A commander’s perspective of challenges in the OE is broad
and comprehensive
due to the interaction with USG civilian leaders; senior, peer,
subordinate, and supporting
commanders; and interorganizational partners. Clear
commander’s guidance and intent,
enriched by the commander’s experience and intuition, enable
joint forces to achieve
objectives. Employing the “art of war,” which has been the
commander’s central historical
command role, remains critical regardless of technological and
informational
improvements in control—the “science of war.”

b. The C2 function is commander-centric and network-enabled
to facilitate initiative
and decision making at the lowest appropriate level. Although
joint forces have grown
accustomed to communicating freely without fear of jamming or
interception, US enemies
and adversaries are likely to use technological advances in
cyberspace and vulnerabilities
in the EMS to conduct cyberspace or EMS attacks.
Commanders should be prepared to
operate in an environment degraded by electromagnetic
interference. This is especially
true at the lower echelons. If a commander loses reliable
communications, mission

“When all is said and done, it is really the commander’s coup
d’oeil, his ability
to see things simply, to identify the whole business of war
completely with
himself, that is the essence of good generalship.”

Carl von Clausewitz
On War

Chapter II

II-2 JP 3-0 CH1

command (a key component of the C2 function described in
Chapter III, “Joint
Functions”) enables military operations through decentralized
execution based on mission-
type orders. Mission command is built on subordinate leaders
at all echelons who exercise
disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to
accomplish the mission.
Mission-type orders focus on the purpose of the operation rather
than details of how to
perform assigned tasks. Commanders delegate decisions to
subordinates wherever
possible, which minimizes detailed control and empowers
subordinates’ initiative to make
decisions based on the commander’s guidance rather than
constant communications.
Subordinates’ understanding of the commander’s intent at every
level of command is
essential to mission command. See paragraph 5.e., “Key
Planning Elements,” for a

discussion of commander’s intent as a planning element.

c. Commanders should interact with other leaders to build
personal relationships and
develop trust and confidence. Developing these associations is
a conscious, collaborative
act. Commanders build trust through words and actions and
continue to reinforce it not
only during operations but also during training, education, and
practice. Trust and
confidence are essential to synergy and harmony, both within
the joint force and with our
interagency and multinational partners and other
interorganizational stakeholders.
Commanders may also interact with other political, societal, and
economic leaders and
other influential people who may influence joint operations.
This interaction supports
mission accomplishment. The JFC emphasizes the importance
of key leader engagement
(KLE) to subordinate commanders and encourages them to
extend the process to lower
levels, based on mission requirements.

d. Commanders should provide subordinate commands
sufficient time to plan,
particularly in a time-sensitive crisis situation. They do so by
issuing a warning order to
subordinates at the earliest opportunity and by collaborating
with other commanders,
agency leaders, and multinational partners to develop a clear
understanding of the
commander’s mission, intent, guidance, and priorities.
Commanders resolve issues that
are beyond the staff’s authority. Examples include highly
classified, limited-access

planning for sensitive operations and allowing multinational
partners’ planners restricted
access to US classified information systems.

e. Commanders collaborate with their seniors and peers to
resolve differences of
interpretation of higher-level objectives and the ways and
means to accomplish these
objectives. Commanders generally expect their higher HQ has
accurately described the
OE, framed the problem, and devised a sound approach to
achieve the best solution.
Strategic guidance, however, can be vague, and the commander
must interpret and clarify
it for the staff. While national leaders and CCDRs may have a
broader perspective of the
problem, subordinate JFCs and their component commanders
often have a better
perspective of the situation at the operational level. Both
perspectives are essential to a
sound solution. During a commander’s decision cycle,
subordinate commanders should
aggressively share their perspective with senior leaders to
resolve issues at the earliest
opportunity.

f. An essential skill of a JFC is the ability to assign missions
and tasks that integrate
the components’ capabilities consistent with the JFC’s
envisioned CONOPS. Each

The Art of Joint Command

II-3

component’s mission should complement the others’. This
enables each component to
enhance the capabilities and limit the vulnerabilities of the
others. Achieving this synergy
requires more than just understanding the capabilities and
limitations of each component.
The JFC should also visualize operations holistically, identify
the preconditions that enable
each component to optimize its own contribution, and then
determine how the other
components might help to produce them. The JFC should
compare alternative component
missions and mixes solely from the perspective of combined
effectiveness, unhampered by
Service parochialism. This approach also requires mutual trust
among commanders that
the missions assigned to components will be consistent with
their capabilities and
limitations, those capabilities will not be risked for insufficient
overall return, and
components will execute their assignments.

g. Successful leaders encourage the exchange of information
and ideas throughout
their staffs to ensure decisions are based on the best
understanding of the situation and
available options. Such exchanges promote critical reviews of
assumptions; facilitate
consideration of all aspects of the situation, including cultural
issues; stimulate broad
consideration of military and nonmilitary alternatives; and
emphasize efforts to minimize
organizational and human sources of error and bias.

h. The JFC leads using operational art and operational design,

joint planning, rigorous
assessment of progress, and timely decision making.

3. Operational Art

a. Operational art is the cognitive approach by commanders and
staffs—
supported by their skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and
judgment—to develop
strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and employ
military forces by
integrating ends, ways, and means. It is a thought process to
mitigate the ambiguity and
uncertainty of a complex OE and develop insight into the
problems at hand. Operational
art also promotes unified action by enabling JFCs and staffs to
consider the capabilities,
actions, goals, priorities, and operating processes of interagency
partners and other
interorganizational participants, when they determine
objectives, establish priorities, and
assign tasks to subordinate forces. It facilitates the
coordination, synchronization, and,
where appropriate, the integration of military operations with
activities of other
participants, thereby promoting unity of effort.

b. The foundation of operational art encompasses broad vision;
the ability to
anticipate; and the skill to plan, prepare, execute, and assess. It
helps commanders and
their staffs organize their thoughts and envision the conditions
necessary to accomplish the
mission and reach the desired military end state in support of
national objectives. Without
operational art, campaigns and operations could be sets of

disconnected events.

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Integrate joint capabilities to be complementary rather than
merely
additive.

Chapter II

II-4 JP 3-0 CH1

Operational art informs the deployment of forces and the
arrangement of operations to
achieve military operational and strategic objectives.

c. The commander is the central figure in operational art, not
only due to education
and experience but also because the commander’s judgment and
decisions guide the staff
throughout joint planning and execution. Commanders leverage
their knowledge,
experience, judgment, and intuition to focus effort and achieve
success. Operational art
helps broaden perspectives to deepen understanding and enable
visualization.
Commanders compare similarities of the existing situation with
their own experiences or
history to distinguish unique features and then tailor innovative
and adaptive solutions to
each situation.

d. The commander’s ability to think creatively enhances the
ability to employ

operational art to answer the following questions:

(1) What are the objectives and desired military end state?
(Ends)

(2) What sequence of actions is most likely to achieve those
objectives and
military end state? (Ways)

(3) What resources are required to accomplish that sequence of
actions?
(Means)

(4) What is the likely chance of failure or unacceptable results
in performing
that sequence of actions? (Risk)

e. Operational art encompasses operational design—the
conception and
construction of the framework that underpins a joint operation
or campaign plan and
its subsequent execution. Together, operational art and
operational design strengthen the
relationship between strategic objectives and the tactics
employed to achieve them.

4. Operational Design

a. Operational design is the conception and construction of the
framework that
underpins a campaign or major OPLAN and its subsequent
execution. It extends
operational art’s vision with a creative process to help
commanders and planners answer
the ends-ways-means-risk questions. Commanders and staffs
can use operational design

when planning any joint operation.

b. Operational design supports operational art with a
methodology designed to
enhance understanding the situation and the problem. The
methodology helps the JFC and
staff identify broad solutions for mission accomplishment.
Elements of operational
design—such as objective, center of gravity (COG), line of
operation (LOO), line of
effort (LOE), and termination—are tools that help the JFC and
the staff visualize and
describe the broad operational approach to achieve objectives
and accomplish the mission.
These operational design elements are useful throughout the
joint planning process (JPP).
Using these elements helps the commander and staff analyze the
questions posed in
paragraph 3.d. For example, properly framing strategic- and
operational-level objectives

The Art of Joint Command

II-5

is essential to mission accomplishment. Identifying critical
objectives will depend more
on judgment than on calculation, because framing objectives is
more art than science.

c. Operational design works best when commanders encourage
discourse and
leverage dialogue and collaboration to identify and solve
complex, ill-defined problems.

To that end, the commander should empower organizational
learning and develop methods
to determine whether the operational approach should be
modified during the course of an
operation. This requires continuous assessment and reflection
that challenge
understanding of the existing problem and the relevance of
actions addressing that problem.

d. Commanders and their staffs blend operational art,
operational design, and the JPP
to produce plans and orders that drive joint operations.
Effective operational design results
in more efficient detailed planning and increases the chances of
mission accomplishment.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for the details of operational
design.

5. Joint Planning

a. Planning translates guidance into plans or orders to achieve a
desired objective or
attain an end state. The joint planning and execution
community begins planning when a
potential or actual event is recognized that may require a
military response. Objectives
provide a unifying purpose around which to focus actions and
resources. The JPP aligns
military activities and resources to achieve national objectives
and enables leaders to
examine cost-benefit relationships, risks, and trade-offs to
determine a preferred course of
action (COA) to achieve that objective or attain an end state.
Joint planning occurs within
the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System and the

APEX enterprise, which
encompasses department-level joint planning policies,
processes, procedures, and
reporting structures.

b. Joint planning consists of planning activities that help
CCDRs and their subordinate
commanders transform national objectives into actions that
mobilize, deploy, employ,
sustain, redeploy, and demobilize joint forces. It ties the
employment of the Armed Forces
to the achievement of national objectives during peacetime and
war.

c. Based on understanding gained through the application of
operational design, more
detailed planning takes place within the steps of the JPP. The
JPP is an orderly, analytical
process, which consists of a set of logical steps to analyze a
mission; develop, analyze, and
compare alternative COAs; select the best COA; and produce a
plan or order.

d. The JPP underpins planning at all levels and for missions
across the range of
military operations. It applies to both supported and supporting
JFCs and to component
and subordinate commands when they participate in joint
planning. Together with
operational design, the JPP facilitates interaction between the
commander, staff, and their
HQ throughout planning. The JPP helps commanders and their
staffs organize their
planning activities, share a common understanding of the
mission and commander’s intent,
and develop effective plans and orders. Figure II-1 shows the

primary steps of the JPP.

Chapter II

II-6 JP 3-0 CH1

e. Key Planning Elements. Commanders participate in
planning to the greatest
extent possible from early operational design through approval
of the plan or order.
Regardless of the commander’s level of involvement, certain
key planning elements
require the commander’s participation and decisions. These
include the operational
approach, mission statement, commander’s planning guidance,
commander’s intent,
commander’s critical information requirements (CCIRs), and
CONOPS.

(1) Operational Approach. The operational approach is a
commander’s initial
description, to help guide further planning, of the broad actions
the force must take to
achieve objectives and accomplish the mission. It is the
commander’s visualization of how
the operation should transform current conditions into the
desired conditions—the way the
commander wants the OE to look at the conclusion of
operations. The operational
approach is based largely on an understanding of the OE and the
problem facing the JFC.
Once the JFC approves the approach, it provides the basis to
begin, continue, or complete
detailed planning. The JFC and staff should continually review,

update, and modify the
approach as the OE, objectives, or problem change.

(2) Mission Statement. The joint force’s mission is what the
joint force must
accomplish. It is described in the mission statement, which is a
sentence or short paragraph
that describes the organization’s essential task (or set of tasks)
and purpose—a clear
statement of the action to be taken and the reason for doing so.
The mission statement—
approved by the commander—contains the elements of who,
what, when, where, and why
of the operation. The eventual CONOPS will specify how the
joint force will accomplish
the mission. The mission statement forms the basis for planning
and is included in the
commander’s planning guidance, the planning directive, staff
estimates, commander’s
estimate, and the CONOPS. The JFC should develop clear
mission statements and ensure
they are understood by subordinates.

Figure II-1. Joint Planning Process

Joint Planning Process

Step 1

Step 2

Step 3

Step 4

Step 5

Step 6

Step 7

Planning Initiation

Mission Analysis

Course of Action (COA) Development

COA Analysis and Wargaming

COA Comparison

COA Approval

Plan or Order Development

The Art of Joint Command

II-7

(3) Commander’s Planning Guidance. JFCs guide the joint
force’s actions
throughout planning and execution. However, the staff and
component commanders
typically expect the JFC to issue initial guidance soon after
receipt of a mission or tasks
from higher authority and provide more detailed planning
guidance after the JFC approves
an operational approach. This guidance is an important input to
subsequent mission

analysis, but the completion of mission analysis is another point
at which the JFC may
provide updated planning guidance that affects COA
development.

(4) Commander’s Intent. Commander’s intent is the
commander’s clear and
concise expression of what the force must do and the conditions
the force must establish to
accomplish the mission. It includes the purpose, end state, and
associated risks.
Commander’s intent supports mission command and allows
subordinates the greatest
possible freedom of action. It provides focus to the staff and
helps subordinate and
supporting commanders act to achieve the commander’s
objectives without further orders
once the operation begins, even when the operation does not
unfold as planned. Successful
commanders demand subordinate leaders at all echelons
exercise disciplined initiative and
act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission
within the commander’s
intent. Subordinates emphasize timely decision making,
understanding the higher
commander’s intent, and clearly identifying tasks to achieve
desired objectives. Well-
crafted commander’s intent improves subordinates’ situational
awareness, which enables
effective actions in fluid, chaotic situations.

(5) CCIRs. CCIRs are elements of friendly and enemy
information the
commander identifies as critical to timely decision making.
They focus IM and help the
JFC and staff assess the OE. The CCIR list is normally a

product of mission analysis, and
JFCs add, delete, and update CCIRs throughout an operation.

(6) CONOPS. The CONOPS, included in paragraph 3
(Execution) of the plan
or order, describes how the JFC intends to integrate,
synchronize, and phase actions of the
joint force components and supporting organizations to
accomplish the mission. A
CONOPS generally includes potential branches and sequels.
The CONOPS is typically a
detailed extension of the operational approach but incorporates
modifications based on
updated information and intelligence gained during planning, as
well as the JFC’s approved
COA. The staff writes (or graphically portrays) the CONOPS in
sufficient detail so
subordinate and supporting commanders understand their
mission, tasks, and other
requirements and can develop their supporting plans
accordingly. The CONOPS also
provides the basis to develop the concept of fires, concept of
intelligence operations, and
theater logistics overview (TLO), which are also included in the
final OPLAN or OPORD.

f. Freedom of Action. The JFC should maintain freedom of
action throughout the
operation. Freedom of action in the OA is linked to freedom to
act beyond the OA. For
example, operational reach—the distance and duration across
which a joint force can
successfully employ military capabilities—can extend far
beyond the limits of a JFC’s joint
operations area (JOA) and is inextricably tied to LOOs and the
capacity and ability to

Chapter II

II-8 JP 3-0 CH1

throughput logistics to the point of destination. Consequently,
the joint force must protect
LOOs to ensure freedom of action. Effective operational reach
requires gaining and
maintaining operational access in the face of enemy A2/AD
capabilities and actions.
Likewise, the C2 and intelligence functions depend on
operations within the EMS and
cyberspace. Losing the capability to operate effectively in the
EMS and cyberspace can
greatly diminish the JFC’s freedom of action. While various
actions (e.g., cybersecurity,
cyberspace defense, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
[JEMSO], and the
consideration of branches to current operations) contribute
individually to freedom of
action, operational design and joint planning are the processes
that coherently link these
actions. The JFC and staff should consider freedom of action
from the outset of operational
design and remain alert to indicators during operations that
freedom of action is in
jeopardy.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on the
JPP. Refer to JP 3-09, Joint
Fire Support; JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support; and JP 3-60, Joint
Targeting, for more
information on fires and joint fire support planning. Refer to JP

2-0, Joint Intelligence,
and other intelligence series publications for more information
on intelligence support and
planning. Refer to JP 4-0, Joint Logistics, and other logistics
series publications for more
information on logistic planning. Refer to JP 3-12, Cyberspace
Operations, for more
information on cyberspace operations (CO). Refer to the
National Military Strategic Plan
for Electronic Warfare; DOD Electromagnetic Spectrum (EMS)
Strategy; and Joint
Doctrine Note (JDN) 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations, for more
information on JEMSO/EMS superiority. Refer to JP 3-05,
Special Operations, for more
information on special operations planning.

6. Assessment

a. Assessment is a continuous process that measures the overall
effectiveness of
employing joint force capabilities during military operations. It
involves monitoring and
evaluating the current situation and progress toward mission
completion. Assessments can
help determine whether a particular activity contributes to
progress with respect to a set of
standards or desired objective or end state.

b. DOD and its components use a wide range of assessment
tools and methods. In
peacetime and periods of conflict, assessments gauge the ability
of the military instrument
of national power to prepare for and respond to national
security challenges described in
Chapter I, “Fundamentals of Joint Operations.” Leaders assess

operations and activities
across the levels of warfare and in all joint functions. At the
strategic level, the CJCS
conducts deliberate and continuous assessments such as the
Annual Joint Assessment and
the CJCS’s Readiness System, respectively. Theater-strategic
and operational-level
assessments provide a methodology for joint commands and
Services to adjust planning
and execution to be more effective, match the dynamic OE, and
better identify their risks

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Ensure freedom of action.

The Art of Joint Command

II-9

and opportunities. At all levels, staff estimates are evaluations
that assess factors in staff
sections functional areas (e.g., intelligence, logistics). Staff
estimates complement the
overall operation assessment activity.

Refer to CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3130.01, Campaign Planning
Procedures and Responsibilities,
for more information on CJCS and campaign assessments.
Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning,
for more information on staff estimates, integration of
assessment during planning, and

conducting operation assessment during execution.

c. Operation assessment refers specifically to the process the
JFC and staff use
during planning and execution to measure progress toward
accomplishing tasks, creating
conditions or effects, and achieving objectives. Commanders
continuously observe the OE
and the progress of operations; compare the results to their
initial visualization,
understanding, and intent; and adjust planning and operations
based on this analysis. Staffs
monitor key factors that can influence operations and provide
the commander information
needed for decisions. Without mistaking level of activity for
progress, commanders devise
ways to update their understanding of the OE and assess their
progress toward mission
accomplishment. The fundamental aspects of assessment apply
in all types of joint
operations, although commanders and staffs may need to adjust
the operation assessment
process to fit the nature and requirements of a specific
operation. In operations that do not
include combat, assessments can be more complex.

d. The operation assessment process begins during mission
analysis when the
commander and staff consider what to measure and how to
measure it. Throughout COA
development, analysis, comparison, approval, and CONOPS
finalization, the commander
and staff devise the operation assessment plan and process to
incorporate in the overall
plan and order. They will follow this process during plan
development, refinement,

adaptation, and execution. Key operation assessment indicators
can be included in the
CCIR process to provide timely support to the commander’s
planning and execution
decisions.

e. There is no uniform method by which joint forces assign
management
responsibilities for the assessment. The chief of staff’s role
will vary according to the
commander’s desires. The plans directorate of a joint staff (J-
5), assisted by the training
directorate of a joint staff (J-7) and intelligence directorate of a
joint staff (J-2), develops
the assessment plan during the planning process, while the
operations directorate of a joint
staff (J-3), assisted by the J-7 and J-2, coordinates assessment
activities during execution.
The assessment activity can also be overseen and managed by a
separate analysis
directorate or analysis element of an existing directorate if
established. Various elements
of the JFC’s staff use assessment results to adjust both current
operations and the J-5’s
future plans effort. Assessment is an entire staff effort
requiring expertise and inputs across
the staff. Formalizing assessment roles and responsibilities in
each command is essential
to an effective and efficient process.

f. During execution, assessment helps commanders decide
whether and when to
execute branches and sequels to align current and future
operations with the mission and

Chapter II

II-10 JP 3-0 CH1

military end states. By including assessment key indicators
within the CCIRs, the staff can
better advise the commander whether the original operational
approach is still valid.

g. Actions by a wide variety of entities affect military actions
and objectives. These
actors include interorganizational participants, the civilian
population, neutral non-partner
organizations in the JOA, and other countries outside the JOA
in the GCC’s AOR. Since
assessment resources are limited, the commander must prioritize
assessment activities.
This typically requires collaboration with interorganizational
participants—preferably
in a common, accepted process—in the interest of unified
action. Since most of these
organizations are outside the JFC’s authority, the JFC is
responsible only for assessments
of the activities of assigned, attached, and supporting military
forces. Nevertheless, the
JFC should grant some joint force organizations (e.g., civil
affairs [CA] directorate or
CMOC) authority to coordinate directly with organizations,
such as DOS and Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), and other CCMDs to facilitate
effective integration and
synchronization of assigned, attached, and supporting military
forces, as well as timely and
effective assessments by participants not under the JFC’s
authority.

h. Operation Assessment and Levels of Warfare

(1) Interrelated and interdependent assessment occurs at all
levels of warfare.
Although each level of warfare may have a specific focus and a
unique battle rhythm,
together they form a hierarchical structure through which
operation assessments interact
(see Figure II-2). Typically, assessments at the theater-strategic
and operational levels
concentrate on broader tasks, effects, objectives, and military
end state, while assessments
at the tactical level primarily focus on tasks, effects, and
objectives. Properly focused
analysis and collection at each level of warfare reduces
redundancy and enhances the
efficiency of the overall assessment.

(2) Operation assessment is most effective when supported and
supporting plans
and their assessments are linked. As Figure II-2 depicts, each
level of assessment should
be linked with adjacent levels, both to provide a conduit for
guidance and provide
information. For instance, assessment plans at the tactical level
should delineate how they
link to or support operational-level assessments. Similarly,
guidance from the operational-
level JFC should specify the relationship and mechanisms (e.g.,
tasks to subordinate
organizations) by which tactical-level assessment data can be
gathered and synthesized into
the operational-level assessment.

(3) JFCs and their staffs consider assessment ways, means, and

measures during
planning, preparation, and execution. To optimize the
assessment process given the
scarcity of intelligence collection assets, JFCs and their staffs
can include key assessment
indicators in the CCIRs. This focuses assessment and collection
at each level, reduces
redundancy, and enhances the efficiency of the assessment
process. At all levels,
commanders and staffs develop operation assessment indicators
to track progress toward
mission accomplishment. An optimal method for developing
indicators is to identify key
assessment indicators associated with tasks, effects, objectives,
and end states for inclusion
in the assessment design. The most critical indicators of
progress or regression should also
be included in CCIRs to guide the collection and assessment
activity. These indicators

The Art of Joint Command

II-11

include measures of effectiveness (MOEs) and measures of
performance (MOPs).
MOEs help answer the question, “Are we creating the effect(s)
or conditions in the OE that
we desire?” MOPs help answer the question, “Are we
accomplishing tasks to standard?”

(4) Tactical-level assessment also uses MOEs and MOPs.
Tactical tasks are often
physical activities, but they can affect higher-level functions

and systems. Tactical
assessment may evaluate progress by phase lines; destruction of
enemy forces; control of
key terrain, peoples, or resources; and other tasks. Combat
assessment evaluates the results
of weapons engagement and the employment of capabilities to
create lethal and nonlethal
effects and, thus, provides data for joint fires and the joint
targeting processes at all levels.
Combat assessment is composed of three related elements:
battle damage assessment,
munitions effectiveness assessment, and reattack
recommendations or future targeting.
Assessment of tactical results helps commanders determine
progress at the operational and
strategic levels and can affect operational and strategic
targeting and engagement
decisions. Tactical-level results provide JFCs comprehensive,
integrated information to
link tactical actions to operational and strategic objectives.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on
operation assessment (e.g.,
integration of assessment design during the planning effort,
roles and responsibilities,

Figure II-2. Assessment Interaction

Assessment Interaction

Legend

operations and intelligence report flow assessment report flow

Strategic priorities

End state and
missions

Objectives
Effects

Tasks

End state and
missions

Objectives
Effects

Tasks

End state and
missions

Objectives
Effects

Tasks

Levels of
Warfare

National Strategic

Theater Strategic

Operational

Tactical

Operational Approach

Operational Approach

Operational Approach

Assessment

Assessment

Assessment

Guidance

F
e
e
d
b
a
c
k

Chapter II

II-12 JP 3-0 CH1

tenets of an effective assessment, the assessment process, and
development and use of
assessment indicators). Refer to JP 3-60, Joint Targeting, for
more information on combat
assessment.

III-1

CHAPTER III
JOINT FUNCTIONS

1. Introduction

a. This chapter discusses joint functions, related tasks, and key
considerations. Joint
functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together
to help JFCs
integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions
common to joint
operations at all levels of warfare fall into seven basic groups—
C2, information,
intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and
sustainment. Some
functions, such as C2, information, and intelligence, apply to all
operations. Others, such
as fires, apply as the JFC’s mission requires. A number of
subordinate tasks, missions, and
related capabilities help define each function, and some could
apply to more than one joint
function.

b. Joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and
integration across the
functions is essential to mission accomplishment. For example,
joint fires can enhance
the protection of a joint security area (JSA) by dispersing or
disrupting enemy assets
threatening the JSA. In any joint operation, the JFC can choose
from a wide variety of
joint and Service capabilities and combine them in various ways

to perform joint functions
and accomplish the mission. Plans describe how the JFC uses
military capabilities (i.e.,
organizations, people, and systems) to perform tasks associated
with each joint function.
However, forces and other assets are not characterized by the
functions for which the JFC
is employing them. Individual Service capabilities can often
support multiple functions
simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing
a single task. For example,
an aviation asset might support all seven functions in a single
combat operation. Just as
component commanders integrate activities across functions to
accomplish tasks and
missions, the JFC and staff do likewise for the joint force.
Various factors complicate the
JFC’s integration challenge, such as competing demands for
high-priority capabilities and
the fact that joint force components have different function-
oriented approaches,

“There are significant complexities to effectively integrating
and synchronizing
Service and combat support agency (CSA) capabilities in joint
operations.
These challenges are not new, and they present themselves with
consistency.
For example, simply getting the joint force to form and deploy
in a coherent
and desired manner requires integration of organization,
planning, and
communication capabilities and activities. But to fully employ
the joint force in
extensive and complex operations requires a much greater array
of

capabilities and procedures to help the commander and staff
integrate and
synchronize the joint force’s actions. These types of activities
and capabilities
center on the commander’s ability to employ the joint force and
are grouped
under one functional area called command and control. In a
similar manner,
many other functionally related capabilities and activities can
be grouped.
These groupings, we call joint functions, facilitate planning and
employment
of the joint force.”

Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the
United States

Chapter III

III-2 JP 3-0 CH1

procedures, and perspectives. JFCs and USG interagency
partners synchronize,
coordinate, and integrate military operations with the activities
of interorganizational
participants to achieve unity of effort toward US objectives.
Military forces support the
USG lead agency, department, or organization, which is usually
DOS for overseas
operations and DHS for domestic operations.

2. Command and Control

a. C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a

commander over
assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The
JFC provides operational
vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2
function encompasses a number
of tasks, including:

(1) Establish, organize, and operate a joint force HQ.

(2) Command subordinate forces.

(3) Prepare, modify, and publish plans, orders, and guidance.

(4) Establish command authorities among subordinate
commanders.

(5) Assign tasks, prescribe task performance standards, and
designate OAs.

(6) Prioritize and allocate resources.

(7) Manage risk.

(8) Communicate and ensure the flow of information across the
staff and joint
force.

(9) Assess progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating
conditions, and
achieving objectives.

(10) Coordinate and control the employment of joint
capabilities to create lethal
and nonlethal effects.

(11) Coordinate, synchronize, and, when appropriate, integrate

joint operations
with the operations and activities of other participants.

(12) Ensure the flow of information and reports to and from
higher authority.

b. Command includes both the authority and responsibility to
use resources to
accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art
of motivating and directing
people and organizations to accomplish missions. The C2
function supports an efficient
decision-making process. Timely and relevant intelligence
enables commanders to make
decisions and execute those decisions more rapidly and
effectively than the enemy.
This decreases risk and allows the commander more control
over the timing and tempo of
operations.

Joint Functions

III-3

c. Command Authority. JFCs exercise various command
authorities (i.e.,
combatant command [command authority] {COCOM}, OPCON,
and tactical control
[TACON]) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and
commanders over assigned and
attached forces. Command relationship is a term that describes
the relationships
established through the designation of these authorities. JP 1,
Doctrine for the Armed

Forces of the United States, provides details on each authority
and Figure III-1 summarizes
their relationships. Unity of command among US forces is
maintained through the
application of the various command relationships.

(1) COCOM is the nontransferable command authority
established by Title 10,
United States Code (USC), Section 164, exercised only by
commanders of unified or
specified CCMDs unless otherwise directed by the President or
SecDef. COCOM, which
cannot be delegated, is the authority of a CCDR to perform
those functions of command
over assigned forces involving organizing and employing
commands and forces; assigning
tasks; designating objectives; and giving authoritative direction
over all aspects of military
operations, joint training, and logistics necessary to accomplish
the missions assigned to

Figure III-1. Command Relationships Synopsis

Command Relationships Synopsis

Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint
training
Organize and employ commands and forces
Assign command functions to subordinates
Establish plans and requirements for intelligence, surveillance,
and
reconnaissance activities
Suspend subordinate commanders from duty

Operational control when delegated

Tactical control when
delegated

Support relationship when
assigned

Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process input
Assignment of subordinate commanders
Relationships with Department of Defense agencies
Directive authority for logistics

Combatant Command (Command Authority)

(Unique to Combatant Commander)

Local direction and control of
movements or maneuvers to

accomplish mission

Aid, assist, protect, or sustain
another organization

Chapter III

III-4 JP 3-0 CH1

the command. COCOM should be exercised through the
commanders of subordinate
organizations. Normally, this authority is exercised through
subordinate JFCs and Service
and/or functional component commanders. COCOM provides
full authority to organize
and employ commands and forces as the CCDR considers
necessary to accomplish

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS DURING OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM

In December 2002, representatives from United States Central
Command
(USCENTCOM) and United States European Command
(USEUCOM) met
in Stuttgart, Germany, to discuss Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
(OIF). The
two broad issues were organizing the operational area and
coordinating
the command relationships for all OIF phases.

The USCENTCOM OIF theater of operations would, by
necessity, cross

the Unified Command Plan (UCP)-designated USCENTCOM
and
USEUCOM areas of responsibility (AORs) boundary.
Specifically, the
land and airspace of Turkey was recognized for its potential to
contribute to opening a northern line of operation.

Discussions over the potential options for organizing the OIF
operational area led to an agreement not to request a temporary
change
in the UCP modifying the AORs, but to rely on the
establishment of
appropriate command relationships between the two combatant
commanders (CCDRs).

Discussions over the potential command and control options led
to the
decision to establish a support relationship between
USCENTCOM
(supported) and USEUCOM (supporting). This relationship was
established by the Secretary of Defense. It enabled the
development of
coherent and supporting campaign plans.

In the campaign plan, USEUCOM retained tactical control for
the
coordination and execution of operational movement (i.e.,
reception,
staging, onward movement, and integration); intelligence,
surveillance,
and reconnaissance; logistics and personnel support; and
protection in
support of USCENTCOM forces transiting the USEUCOM
AOR,
specifically Turkey. Once USCENTCOM-allocated joint forces
were

positioned and prepared to cross the Turkish–Iraqi border (to
commence offensive operations) operational control would be
given to
USCENTCOM.

Maintaining UCP AOR boundaries and the establishment of an
umbrella
support relationship between the CCDRs with conditional
command
authorities exercised over the participating forces based on their
readiness and operation phase provided a workable solution to
the
integration and employment of joint forces on the boundary of
two
AORs.

Various Sources

Joint Functions

III-5

assigned missions. During crisis response and combat, or where
critical situations require
changing the normal logistics process, the CCDRs’ directive
authority for logistics (DAFL)
enables them to use all logistic capabilities of all forces
assigned and attached to their
commands as necessary to accomplish their mission. The
CCDR will exercise logistics
authority consistent with the limitations imposed by legislation,
DOD policy or regulations,
budgetary considerations, local conditions, and other specific
conditions prescribed by

SecDef or the CJCS.

(2) OPCON is inherent in COCOM and may be delegated
within the command.
OPCON is command authority that may be exercised by
commanders at any echelon at or
below the level of CCMD to perform those functions of
command over subordinate forces.
It involves organizing and employing commands and forces,
assigning tasks, designating
objectives, and giving authoritative direction necessary to
accomplish the mission.
OPCON includes authoritative direction over all aspects of
military operations and joint
training necessary to accomplish missions assigned to the
command. This authority should
be exercised through the commanders of subordinate
organizations, normally through
subordinate JFCs and Service and/or functional component
commanders. OPCON
normally provides full authority to organize commands and
forces and to employ those
forces as the commander exercising OPCON considers
necessary to accomplish assigned
missions; it does not, in and of itself, include DAFL or matters
of administration, discipline,
internal organization, or unit training.

(3) TACON is inherent in OPCON. TACON is an authority
over assigned or
attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces,
made available for tasking.
It is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements
or maneuvers within the
OA necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks assigned
by the commander

exercising OPCON or TACON of the attached force. TACON
may be delegated to, and
exercised at, any level at or below the level of CCMD. TACON
provides sufficient
authority for controlling and directing the application of force
or tactical use of combat
support assets within the assigned mission or task.
Commanders may delegate TACON to
subordinate commanders at any echelon at or below CCMD and
may exercise TACON
over assigned or attached forces or military capabilities or
forces made available for
tasking. TACON does not provide organizational authority or
authoritative direction for
administrative and logistic support or discipline (Uniform Code
of Military Justice
authority); the commander of the parent unit continues to
exercise those responsibilities
unless the establishing directive specifies otherwise. Except for
special operations forces
(SOF), functional component commanders typically exercise
TACON over military
capabilities or forces made available for tasking.

(4) Support. Establishing support relationships between
components (as
described in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United
States) is a useful option to
accomplish needed tasks. The JFC can establish support
relationships among all
functional and Service component commanders, such as for the
coordination of
operations in depth involving the joint force land component
commander (JFLCC) and the
joint force air component commander (JFACC). Within a joint
force, the JFC may

designate more than one supported commander simultaneously,
and components may
simultaneously receive and provide support for different
missions, functions, or operations.

Chapter III

III-6 JP 3-0 CH1

For instance, a joint force special operations component
commander (JFSOCC) may be
supported for a direct-action mission while simultaneously
supporting a JFLCC for a raid.
Similarly, a joint force maritime component commander
(JFMCC) may be supported for a
sea control mission while simultaneously supporting a JFACC
to achieve control of the air
throughout the OA.

(5) Other authorities granted to commanders, and to
subordinates as required,
include administrative control, coordinating authority, directive
authority for CO,
and direct liaison authorized. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed
Forces of the United States,
outlines the specific details for each command relationship. See
JP 3-12, Cyberspace
Operations, for additional guidance on CO.

(6) The perceived benefits of operations by joint forces do not
occur naturally
just by virtue of command relationships. The integration
necessary for effective joint
operations requires explicit effort; can increase operational

complexity; and will require
additional training, technical and technological interoperability,
liaison, and planning.
Although effectiveness is typically more important than
efficiency in joint operations, the
JFC and component commanders must determine when the
potential benefits of joint
integration cannot compensate for the additional complicating
factors. Synergy is a means
to greater operational effectiveness, not an end in itself. The
joint operations principle of
simplicity is always a key consideration.

d. Control is inherent in command. To control is to manage
and direct forces and
functions consistent with a commander’s command authority.
Control of forces and
functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements,
allocate means, and
integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of
organizational
effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct
deviations from these
standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply
means to support the mission
and develop specific instructions from general guidance.
Control provides the means for
commanders to maintain freedom of action, delegate authority,
direct operations from any
location, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the
OA. Ultimately, it provides
commanders a means to measure, report, and correct
performance.

e. Area of Operations (AO) and Functional Considerations

(1) C2 in an AO. The land and maritime force commanders are
the
supported commanders within their designated AOs. Through
C2, JFLCCs and
JFMCCs integrate and synchronize movement and maneuver
with information,
intelligence, fires, protection, and sustainment and supporting
activities and operations. To
facilitate this integration and synchronization, they have the
authority to designate target
priority, effects, and timing of fires within their AOs.

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Avoid combining capabilities where doing so adds complexity
without
compensating advantage.

Joint Functions

III-7

(a) To facilitate synchronization of efforts within land or
maritime AOs with
theater- and/or JOA-wide operations, the JFC establishes
priorities that will guide or inform
execution decisions throughout the theater and/or JOA,
including within the land,
maritime, and SOF commander’s AOs. The JFACC is normally
the supported
commander for the JFC’s overall air interdiction effort, while
JFLCCs and JFMCCs
are supported commanders for interdiction in their AOs.

(b) In coordination with JFLCCs and JFMCCs, other
commanders tasked by
the JFC to execute theater- or JOA-wide operations have the
latitude to plan and execute
them within land and maritime AOs. Commanders executing
such operations within a land
or maritime AO must coordinate the operation with the
appropriate commander to avoid
adverse effects and friendly fire incidents. If planned
operations would have adverse
impact within a land or maritime AO, the commander assigned
to execute the JOA-
wide functions must readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the
land or maritime
component commander, or consult with the JFC for resolution.

For additional guidance on C2 of land or maritime operations,
refer to JP 3-31, Command
and Control for Joint Land Operations, and JP 3-32, Command
and Control for Joint
Maritime Operations.

(2) C2 of Space Operations. A supported JFC normally
designates a space
coordinating authority (SCA) to coordinate joint space
operations and integrate space
capabilities. Based on the complexity and scope of operations,
the JFC can either retain
SCA or designate a component commander as the SCA. The
JFC considers the mission,
nature, and duration of the operation; preponderance of space
force capabilities made
available; and resident C2 capabilities (including reachback)
when selecting the
appropriate option. The SCA determines the joint force’s space
requirements; coordinates

and integrates space capabilities in the OA; and assists the joint
force staff to plan, execute,
and assess joint space operations. The SCA is normally
supported by either assigned or
attached embedded space personnel. There are established
doctrinal processes for
articulating requirements for space-based force enhancement
products, which are
specifically tailored to the functional area they support and
result in prioritized
requirements lists. Thus, the SCA typically has no role in
prioritizing the JFC’s day-to-
day, space-based force enhancement requirements. However,
the SCA gathers operational
requirements that may be satisfied by space capabilities and
facilitates the use of
established processes by joint force staff to plan and conduct
space operations. Following
coordination, the SCA provides the JFC a prioritized list of
recommended space
requirements based on joint force objectives. To ensure prompt
and timely support, the
supported CCDR and Commander, United States Strategic
Command
(CDRUSSTRATCOM), may authorize direct liaison between the
SCA and applicable
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM)
component(s). Joint force
component commands should communicate their requirements
to the SCA or designated
representative to integrate and synchronize all space activities.

Refer to JP 3-14, Space Operations, for detailed guidance on C2
of space operations.

Chapter III

III-8 JP 3-0 CH1

(3) C2 of Joint Air Operations. The JFC normally designates a
JFACC to
establish unity of command and unity of effort for joint air
operations. The JFC delegates
the JFACC the authority necessary to accomplish assigned
missions and tasks. The JFC
may also establish support relationships between the JFACC and
other components to
facilitate operations. The JFACC conducts joint air operations
IAW the JFC’s intent and
CONOPS. The JFC may designate the JFACC as the supported
commander for strategic
attack; air interdiction; personnel recovery (PR); and airborne
intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) (among other missions). As such, the
JFACC plans, coordinates,
executes, and assesses these missions for the JFC.
Additionally, the JFC normally
designates the JFACC as the area air defense commander
(AADC) and airspace control
authority (ACA) because the three functions are integral to one
another and require an OA-
wide perspective. When appropriate, the JFC may designate a
separate AADC or ACA.
In those joint operations where separate commanders are
designated, close coordination is
essential for unity of effort, prevention of friendly fire
incidents, and deconfliction of joint
air operations.

(a) ACA. The JFC is ultimately responsible for airspace

control within the
OA but normally delegates the authority to the ACA. The ACA,
in conjunction with the
Service and functional components, coordinates and integrates
the use of the airspace and
develops guidance, techniques, and procedures for airspace
control and for units operating
within the OA. The ACA establishes an airspace control system
(ACS) that is responsive
to the JFC’s needs, integrates the ACS with the HN, and
coordinates and deconflicts user
requirements. The airspace control plan (ACP) and airspace
control order (ACO) express
how the airspace will be used to support mission
accomplishment. The ACA develops the
ACP, coordinates it with other joint force component
commanders, and, after JFC
approval, distributes it throughout the OA and to all supporting
airspace users. The ACP
establishes guidance for the development of the ACS and
distribution of the ACO. The
ACA publishes the ACO to maximize the combat effectiveness
of the joint force and to
support mission accomplishment IAW JFC priorities. See JP 3-
52, Joint Airspace Control,
and JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations, for
more information.

(b) AADC. The AADC is responsible for defensive counterair
(DCA)
(which includes both air and missile threats) operations. The
AADC must identify those
volumes of airspace and control measures that support and
enhance DCA operations,
identify required airspace management systems, establish
procedures for systems to

operate within the airspace, and ensure they are incorporated
into the ACS. During
complex operations or campaigns conducted in a large theater of
operations, the AADC
may recommend, and the JFC may choose, to divide the JOA
into separate air defense
regions, each with a regional air defense commander who could
be delegated
responsibilities and decision-making authority for DCA
operations within the region. See
JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, for more
information.

(4) C2 of Joint Maritime Operations. JFCs establish maritime
AOs to achieve
unity of command over the execution of maritime component
operations involving the
interrelated employment of joint air, surface, and subsurface
forces. The maritime AO
should be of sufficient size to allow for movement, maneuver,
and employment of weapons
systems and effective use of warfighting capabilities and
provide operational depth for

Joint Functions

III-9

sustainment and force protection. The JFMCC is the supported
commander for operations
within the JFC-designated maritime AO. The AADC will
normally establish a congruent
air defense region, covering the open ocean and littorals, with a
regional air defense

commander, who is delegated decision-making authority for
counterair operations within
the region. The maritime regional air defense commander and
AADC will coordinate to
ensure the JFACC can accomplish theater-wide responsibilities
assigned by the JFC.

(5) C2 of Joint CO

(a) Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver
and action in
cyberspace, accomplish the JFC’s objectives, deny freedom of
action to enemies, and
enable other operational activities. Some of the capabilities the
JFC may employ to enable
CO include significant portions of JEMSO, C2, intelligence
collection, navigation warfare,
and some space mission areas.

(b) The CCDR will organize a staff capable of planning,
synchronizing, and
controlling CO in support of their assigned mission. Each
CCMD supports subordinate
JFCs through their CO supporting staff and assigned United
States Cyber Command
(USCYBERCOM) cyberspace operations-integrated planning
element (CO-IPE). Clearly
established command relationships are crucial for ensuring
timely and effective
employment of cyberspace capabilities. While Commander,
United States Cyber
Command (CDRUSCYBER COM), exercises directive authority
for CO, all actions with
the affected CCMDs are coordinated through their CO-IPEs to
facilitate unity of effort and
mission accomplishment. The CCMD coordinates and

deconflicts all cyberspace missions
in the AOR with other operations, including nationally tasked
actions and the cyberspace
actions initiated in the CCMD. The CCMD coordinates and
integrates cyberspace
capabilities in the AOR and has primary responsibility for joint
CO planning, to include
determining cyberspace requirements within the joint force.

(c) Leveraging USCYBERCOM capacity, through the CO-IPE,
the CCMD
will integrate cyberspace capabilities into plans, deconflict and
synchronize supporting
cyberspace fires, prepare the OE, and conduct operational
assessments and readiness
functions. Additionally, in partnership with USCYBERCOM,
the CCMD will coordinate
regionally with interagency and allied participants as necessary.
They will integrate
cyberspace command, planning, operations, intelligence,
targeting, and readiness
processes for creating cyberspace effects with the CCDR’s plans
and operations through
the three CO missions: offensive cyberspace operations (OCO),
defensive cyberspace
operations (DCO), and DODIN operations. The CCMD may be
supported by assigned or
attached embedded cyberspace forces. CCMDs will collaborate
with their counterparts in
the other CCMDs and with USCYBERCOM when initiating
cyberspace actions with
possible effects outside their AOR.

For guidance on C2 of cyberspace forces, refer to JP 3-12,
Cyberspace Operations.

(d) DODIN Operations. The DODIN is the set of information
capabilities
and associated processes to collect, process, store, disseminate,
and manage information
on demand for warfighters, policy makers, and support
personnel, whether interconnected

Chapter III

III-10 JP 3-0 CH1

or stand-alone. CO are enabled by the DODIN, and DODIN
operations are CO missions.
CDRUSCYBERCOM is the supported commander for global
DODIN operations and
synchronizes planning for other CO. USCYBERCOM directs
security, operations, and
defense of the DODIN. USCYBERCOM conducts military CO
to enable US freedom of
action in cyberspace, enable actions throughout the OE, and
deny the same to our
adversaries and enemies. CDRUSCYBERCOM is also a
supporting commander for
regional DODIN operations and provides support to affected
CCMDs, Services, and DOD
agencies. Other USG departments and agencies may also
provide support per intra-
governmental agreements.

For additional guidance on DODIN operations, refer to JP 6-0,
Joint Communications
System, and JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

(6) C2 of JEMSO. JEMSO are those activities consisting of

EW and joint EMS
management operations used to exploit, attack, protect, and
manage the electromagnetic
environment (EME) to achieve the commander’s objectives.
The electronic warfare
control authority (EWCA) develops guidance to execute
electronic attack (EA) on behalf
of the JFC. EWCA can either be retained by the JFC or
executed by the JFC’s designated
representative, normally the J-3. When so authorized, the J-3
will have primary staff
responsibility to plan, coordinate, integrate, and monitor
execution of joint force EW
operations. Frequency allotment and assignment authority is
normally delegated to the
joint frequency management office, who may further delegate
this authority to facilitate
decentralization and to provide components with the maximum
latitude and flexibility in
support of combat operations.

For additional guidance on the communications and intelligence
systems support and
JEMSO, refer to JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence
Support to Military Operations;
JP 6-0, Joint Communications System; JP 6-01, Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum
Management Operations; JDN 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic
Spectrum Operations; and JP
3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

f. C2 System. JFCs exercise authority and direction through a
C2 system, which
consists of the facilities; equipment; communications; staff
functions and procedures; and
personnel essential for planning, preparing for, monitoring, and

assessing operations. The
C2 system must enable the JFC to maintain communication with
higher, supporting, and
subordinate commands to control all aspects of current
operations while planning for future
operations.

(1) The joint force staff is the linchpin of the C2 system, since
the JFC
understands, plans, directs, and controls most aspects of
operations through the staff’s
expertise and efforts.

(2) Liaison is an important aspect of C2. Commanders may
exchange liaison
teams or individuals between higher, supporting, and
subordinate commands as required.
Liaison personnel generally represent the interests of the
sending commander to the
receiving commander but can greatly promote understanding of
the commander’s intent at
both the sending and receiving HQ; they should be assigned
early during joint planning.

Joint Functions

III-11

Liaison officers (LNOs) from supporting to supported
commanders are particularly
essential in ensuring supporting units receive required guidance,
communicating
requirements for tasks, and coordinating supporting actions.

(3) Control and Coordination Measures. JFCs establish various
maneuver and
movement control, airspace coordination, fire support
coordination, and communication
measures to facilitate effective joint operations. These
measures include boundaries, phase
lines, objectives, coordinating altitudes to deconflict air
operations, air defense areas, OAs,
submarine operating patrol areas, no-fire areas, public affairs
(PA) and other
communication-related guidance, and others as required.

For additional guidance on C2 of air operations, refer to JP 3-
30, Command and Control
of Joint Air Operations. For additional guidance on control and
coordination measures,
refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-52, Joint Airspace
Control. See Military
Standard-2525, Department of Defense Interface Standard Joint
Military Symbology, for
additional guidance on the use and discussion of graphic control
measures and symbols
for the joint force.

(4) Communications and intelligence systems provide
communications,
intelligence, targeting data, and missile warning. The precision,
speed, and interoperability
with which these systems operate improve access to the
information available to all
command levels, thereby enhancing a common perspective of
the OE. Effective command
at varying operational tempos requires timely, reliable, secure,
interoperable, and
sustainable communications. Communications and ISR
planning increases options

available to JFCs by providing the communications sensor
systems necessary to collect,
process, store, protect, and disseminate information at decisive
times. These
communications and sensor systems permit JFCs to exploit
tactical success and facilitate
future operations.

(a) Communications System Planning. The purpose of the joint
communications system is to assist the JFC in C2 of military
operations. Effective
communication system planning is essential for effective C2 and
integration and
employment of the joint force’s capabilities. The mission and
structure of the joint force
determine specific information flow and processing
requirements. These requirements
dictate the general architecture and specific configuration of the
communications system.
Therefore, communications system planning must be integrated
and synchronized with
joint planning. Through effective communications system
planning, the JFC is able to
apply capabilities at the critical time and place for mission
success. Communications
system planning should enable collaboration, knowledge sharing
(KS), IM, and
information and intelligence sharing activities that are essential
to assist the JFC. This
includes considerations and, when appropriate, accommodation
of communications links
with relevant commanders and leaders and their C2 (or
equivalent) centers.
Interoperability, foreign disclosure authorities, information
sharing, and communications
security planning with these stakeholders is essential to ensure

secure communications and
protect sensitive information. Routine communications and
backup systems may be
disrupted, and civil authorities might have to rely on available
military communications
equipment. Communications system planning must also
consider termination of US

Chapter III

III-12 JP 3-0 CH1

involvement and procedures to transfer communications system
control to another agency
such as the United Nations (UN). Planning should consider that
it may be necessary to
leave some communications resources behind to continue
support of the ongoing effort.

(b) Joint communications system planning and management
involves the
employment and technical control of assigned communications
systems. Communications
system planning allows the planners to maintain an accurate and
detailed status of the
network down to the modular level. Essential elements of the
communications system are
driven by the mission and determined by the C2 organization
and location of forces
available to the JFC. Specific command relationships and the
organization of units and
staffs drive the interconnecting communications methods and
means. The communications
system must support and provide for assured flow of

information to and from commanders
at all levels.

(c) Communications system planners ensure the organization’s
communications network can facilitate a rapid, unconstrained
flow of information from its
source through intermediate collection and processing nodes to
its delivery to the user.
Typically, the combined system will provide voice, data, and
video communications.
Building the communications system to support the JFC requires
knowledge of the joint
force organization, the commander’s CONOPS, communications
available, and how they
are employed. The ability to command, control, and
communicate with globally deployed
forces is a key enabler for protection of US national interests
and, as such, is also a key
target for adversaries. Thus, it is essential to consider risk and
mitigation measures when
developing the plan. Key planning considerations include
protecting the DODIN, which
requires cybersecurity and cyberspace defense measures to
protect, detect, respond to,
restore, and react to shield and preserve information and
information systems. A related
consideration is to ensure the aggregation of data within the
communications systems does
not compile information that must be protected at a higher level
of security than the system
provides (e.g., classified information on an unclassified
system).

(d) The communications system being planned is the primary
means through
which intelligence flows to the JFC and throughout the OE.

Communications system
planning must be conducted in close coordination with the
intelligence community to
identify specialized equipment and dissemination requirements
for some types of
information.

(e) Homeland Security and Defense Communications System
Planning.
DOD contributes to homeland security through its military
missions overseas, homeland
defense (HD), and defense support of civil authorities (DSCA).
The disparity of
communications systems, use of allocated bandwidth (both
civilian and military), and
limited system interoperability hinders the capability of
collaborative incident management
and response in the US. Commanders and communications
system planners should
conduct detailed planning and analysis to determine US-based
communications system
requirements in support of federal, state, and local agencies.

(f) DOD intelligence component capabilities, resources, and
personnel may
not be used for intelligence activities other than foreign
intelligence or counterintelligence

Joint Functions

III-13

(CI), unless SecDef specifically approves that use. Also,
requests for direct DOD support

to civilian law enforcement agencies (LEAs) are closely
reviewed and processed separately
for approval to ensure compliance with the Posse Comitatus
Act. When approved, use of
intelligence capabilities for domestic non-intelligence activities
is limited to incident
awareness and assessment. All incident awareness and
assessment support within the
US is subject to USG intelligence oversight regulations and
Department of Defense
Directive (DODD) 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities.

g. CCIRs

(1) CCIRs are elements of information the commander
identifies as critical
to timely and effective decision making. CCIRs focus IM and
help the commander assess
the OE and identify decision points during operations. CCIRs
belong exclusively to the
commander. The CCIR list is normally short so the staff can
focus its efforts and allocate
scarce resources. But, the CCIR list is not static; JFCs, through
operation assessment, add,
delete, adjust, and update CCIRs throughout planning and
execution based on the
information they need to make decisions. At a minimum,
CCIRs should be reviewed and
updated throughout mission analysis, plan development,
refinement, and adaptation and
during each phase of order execution.

(2) Categories. Priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) and
friendly force
information requirements (FFIRs) constitute the total list of
CCIRs.

(a) PIRs are designated by the commander to focus information
collection
on the enemy or adversary and the OE to provide information
required for decision making.
All staff sections can recommend potential PIRs that may
support the JFC’s decision-
making process. However, the J-2 consolidates the staff’s
recommended PIRs to the
commander. PIRs are continuously updated in synchronization
with the commander’s
decision points. PIRs are periodically reviewed to support plan
refinement and adaptation
based on the OE and prior to each execution phase transition to
ensure the PIRs remain
relevant to the commander’s anticipated decision points.

Refer to JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence, for more information on
PIRs.

(b) FFIRs focus on information the JFC must have to assess the
status of the
friendly force and supporting capabilities. All staff sections
can recommend potential
FFIRs that meet the JFC’s guidance. The J-5 typically
consolidates FFIR nominations and
provides staff recommendation to the commander during
planning prior to execution.
During execution, the joint force J-3 consolidates these
nominations and provides the
recommendation for FFIRs that relate to current operations.
The J-5 consolidates
nominations and recommends FFIRs related to the future plans
effort. JFC-approved
FFIRs are automatically CCIRs.

h. Battle Rhythm. The HQ battle rhythm is its daily operations
cycle of briefings,
meetings, and report requirements. A stable battle rhythm
facilitates effective decision
making, efficient staff actions, and management of information
within the HQ and with
higher, supporting, and subordinate HQ. The commander and
staff should develop a battle

Chapter III

III-14 JP 3-0 CH1

rhythm that minimizes meeting requirements while providing
venues for command and
staff interaction internal to the joint force HQ and with
subordinate commands. Joint and
component HQ’s battle rhythms should be synchronized to
accommodate operations in
multiple time zones and the battle rhythm of higher,
subordinate, and adjacent commands.
Other factors such as planning, decision making, and operating
cycles (i.e., intelligence
collection, targeting, and joint air tasking cycle) influence the
battle rhythm. Further,
meetings of the staff organizations must be synchronized. The
chief of staff normally
manages the joint force HQ’s battle rhythm. When coordinating
with other USG
departments and agencies, the joint force HQ should consider
that those organizations often
have limited capabilities and restricted access to some
information.

i. Building Shared Understanding. Unified and synchronized
actions, narratives,
and messaging are the most important products of the C2
function because they guide the
force toward objectives and mission accomplishment.
Commanders and staff require not
only information to make these decisions but also the
knowledge and shared understanding
that aid in the wisdom essential to sound decision making
(Figure III-2). Building shared
understanding results from the effective exercise of leadership
and the ability to influence
and inspire others. To build shared understanding, commanders
provide vision, guidance,
and direction to the joint force. These collaborative processes
and products vary across
joint commands based on the commander’s needs and
preferences. Refer to paragraph 3,
“Information,” for a discussion of these and other activities as
they relate to the processes
of facilitating shared understanding.

(1) Facilitating Shared Understanding. Related to the concept
of building
shared understanding is the concept of facilitating shared
understanding. The distinction
between these concepts centers on the purpose for building
shared understanding versus
the processes that facilitate shared understanding. The purpose
for building shared
understanding is an element of C2, whereas the process (i.e., the
methods) for facilitating
shared understanding is an element of the information joint
function. See paragraph 3,
“Information,” for further discussion of facilitating shared
understanding.

(2) Collaboration, KS, IM, and information and intelligence
sharing activities are
essential to assist the commander in providing vision, guidance,
and direction to the joint
force. How these activities support understanding and decision
making are addressed in
paragraph 3, “Information.”

(3) Collaboration. Effective collaboration builds shared
understanding. For
more details on the process of collaboration relevant to
facilitating shared understanding,
see paragraph 3, “Information.”

(4) IM. IM is not only critical to understanding the OE, but it
also supports
decision making. IM involves numerous decision support tools
and technologies that are
integrated throughout the CCIR process. Refer to paragraph 3,
“Information,” for more
details on the process of IM relevant to the process of
facilitating shared understanding.

(5) KS. KS complements the value of IM with processes to
create an
organizational culture that encourages and rewards team-
learning activities to facilitate

Joint Functions

III-15

shared understanding. Refer to paragraph 3, “Information,” for

a more detailed
description of KS relevant to the process of facilitating shared
understanding.

(a) KS is the free exchange of ideas between the commander
and staff that
should typify early operational design is an activity that shares
the individual knowledge
of numerous functional experts, modifies and increases their
collective knowledge, and
promotes shared understanding. In a similar way, the after
action sessions a commander
conducts with subordinate commanders and staff during and
following an operation create
an environment of learning in which participants share
knowledge and increase their
collective understanding.

(b) Certain products are particularly relevant to KS.
Commander’s intent
is a knowledge-based product commanders use to share their
insight and direction with the
joint force. The intent creates shared purpose and
understanding, provides focus to the
staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to
achieve objectives without
further orders, even when operations do not unfold as planned.

j. Risk Management

Figure III-2. Building Shared Understanding

Building Shared Understanding

Processing

Individual
Learning

Team
Learning

Insight

Data

Shared
Understanding

Wisdom
Making Decisions

Sharing Knowledge to
Create Shared
Understanding

Managing
Information

Experience

Art and
Leadership

Science
and
Systems

Knowledge

Information

Chapter III

III-16 JP 3-0 CH1

(1) Risk management is the process to identifying and
assessing hazards arising
from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk
cost with mission benefits.
It assists organizations and individuals in making informed
decisions to reduce or offset
risk, thereby increasing operational effectiveness and the
probability of mission success.
The commander determines the level of risk that is acceptable,
with respect to aspects of
operations, and should state this determination in commander’s
intent. Risk is one of the
key outputs of mission analysis and should be reviewed at every
successive step in the JPP.
The assessment of risk to mission includes an overall risk to
mission analysis (e.g., low,
moderate, significant, or high) along multiple criteria (e.g.,
authorities and permissions;
policy; forces, basing, and agreements; resources; capabilities;
PN contributions; and other
USG support). To assist in risk management, commanders and
their staffs may develop or
institute a risk management process tailored to their mission or
OA. The joint risk analysis
methodology described in CJCSM 3105.01, Joint Risk Analysis,
provides a consistent,
standardized way to analyze and manage risk. Figure III-3 is a
generic model that contains
the likely elements of a risk management process.

(2) Risk management is a function of command and a key
planning consideration
that focuses on designing, implementing, and monitoring risk
decisions. Risk management
helps commanders preserve lives and resources; accept, avoid,
or mitigate (reduce or
transfer) unnecessary risk; identify feasible and effective
control measures where specific
standards do not exist; and develop valid COAs. Prevention of
friendly fire incidents is a

Figure III-3. Risk Management Process

Risk Management Process

Identify Hazards

Supervise and
Evaluate

Implement
Controls

Assess Hazards

Develop
Controls

Joint Functions

III-17

key consideration in risk management. However, risk
management does not inhibit a
commander’s flexibility and initiative, remove risk altogether
(or support a zero-defects
mindset), dictate a go/no-go decision to take a specific action,
sanction or justify violating
the law, or remove the necessity for standard operating
procedures (SOPs). Risk
management is relevant at all levels, across the range of
military operations, and through
all phases of an operation and its branches and sequels. To
mitigate risk, commanders may
take a variety of actions, such as changing the CONOPS,
changing the plan for employment
of fires, executing a branch to the original plan, or employing
countermeasures.

(3) Safety preserves military power. High-tempo operations
may increase the
risk of injury and death due to mishaps. Command interest,
discipline, risk mitigation
measures, education, and training lessen those risks. The JFC
reduces the chance of mishap
by conducting risk assessments, assigning a safety officer and
staff, implementing a safety
program, and seeking advice from local personnel. Safety
planning factors could include
geospatial and weather data, local road conditions and driving
habits, identification of
uncharted or uncleared mine fields, and special equipment
hazards.

For additional and more detailed guidance on C2 of joint forces,
refer to JP 1, Doctrine
for the Armed Forces of the United States.

For additional guidance on C2 of air, land, or maritime
operations, refer to JP 3-30,
Command and Control of Joint Air Operations; JP 3-31,
Command and Control for Joint
Land Operations; and JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint
Maritime Operations.

For additional guidance on C2 of SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Special
Operations.

3. Information

a. The information function encompasses the management and
application of
information and its deliberate integration with other joint
functions to change or maintain
perceptions, attitudes, and other elements that drive desired
behaviors and to support
human and automated decision making. The information
function helps commanders and
staffs understand and leverage the pervasive nature of
information, its military uses, and
its application during all military operations. This function
provides JFCs the ability to
integrate the generation and preservation of friendly
information while leveraging the
inherent informational aspects of military activities to achieve
the commander’s objectives
and attain the end state.

b. All military activities produce information. Informational
aspects are the features
and details of military activities observers interpret and use to
assign meaning and gain
understanding. Those aspects affect the perceptions and
attitudes that drive behavior and

decision making. The JFC leverages informational aspects of
military activities to gain an
advantage; failing to leverage those aspects may cede this
advantage to others. Leveraging
the informational aspects of military activities ultimately
affects strategic outcomes.

c. The information function includes activities that facilitate
the JFC’s understanding
of the role of information in the OE, facilitate the JFC’s ability
to leverage information to
affect behavior, and support human and automated decision
making.

Chapter III

III-18 JP 3-0 CH1

(1) Understand Information in the OE. In conjunction with
activities under
the intelligence joint function, this activity facilitates the JFC’s
understanding of the
pervasive nature of information in the OE, its impact on
relevant actors, and its effect on
military operations. It includes determining relevant actor
perceptions, attitudes, and
decision-making processes and requires an appreciation of their
culture, history, and
narratives, as well as knowledge of the means, context, and
established patterns of their
communication.

(a) Information affects the perceptions and attitudes that drive
the behavior

and decision making of humans and automated systems. In
order to affect behavior, the
JFC must understand the perceptions, attitudes, and decision-
making processes of humans
and automated systems. These processes reflect the aggregate
of social, cultural, and
technical attributes that act upon and impact knowledge,
understanding, beliefs, world
views, and actions.

(b) The human and automated systems whose behavior the JFC
wants to
affect are referred to as relevant actors. Relevant actors may
include any individuals,
groups, and populations, or any automated systems, the
behavior of which has the potential
to substantially help or hinder the success of a particular
campaign, operation, or tactical
action. For the purpose of military activities intended to inform
audiences, relevant actors
may include US audiences; however, US audiences are not
considered targets for influence.

(c) Language, Regional, and Cultural Expertise. Language
skills,
regional knowledge, and cultural awareness enable effective
joint operations. Deployed
joint forces should understand and effectively communicate
with HN populations; local
and national government officials; multinational partners;
national, regional, and
international media; and other key stakeholders, including
NGOs. This capability includes
knowledge about the human aspects of the OE and the skills
associated with
communicating with foreign audiences. Knowledge about the

human aspects of the OE is
derived from the analysis of national, regional, and local
culture, economy, politics,
religion, and customs. Consequently, commanders should
integrate training and
capabilities for foreign language and regional expertise in
contingency, campaign, and
supporting plans and provide for them in support of daily
operations and activities.
Commanders should place particular emphasis on foreign
language proficiency in technical
areas identified as key to mission accomplishment.

For specific planning guidance and procedures regarding
language and regional
expertise, refer to CJCSI 3126.01, Language, Regional
Expertise, and Culture (LREC)
Capability Identification, Planning, and Sourcing.

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Inform domestic audiences and shape the perception and
attitudes of
key foreign audiences as an explicit and continuous operational
requirement.

Joint Functions

III-19

(2) Leverage Information to Affect Behavior. Tasks aligned
under this activity
apply the JFC’s understanding of the impact information has on

perceptions, attitudes, and
decision-making processes to affect the behaviors of relevant
actors in ways favorable to
joint force objectives.

(a) Influence Relevant Actors. Regardless of its mission, the
joint force
considers the likely impact of all operations on relevant actor
perceptions, attitudes, and
other drivers of behavior. The JFC then plans and conducts
every operation in ways that
create desired effects that include maintaining or inducing
relevant actor behaviors. These
ways may include the timing, duration, scope, scale, and even
visibility of an operation;
the deliberately planned presence, posture, or profile of
assigned or attached forces in an
area; the use of signature management in deception operations;
the conduct of activities
and operations to similarly impact behavioral drivers; and the
employment of specialized
capabilities (e.g., KLE, CO, military information support
operations [MISO], EW, CA) to
reinforce the JFC’s efforts. Since some relevant actors will be
located outside of the JFC’s
OA, coordination, planning, and synchronization of activities
with other commands or
mission partners is vital.

(b) Inform Domestic, International, and Internal Audiences.
Inform
activities involve the release of accurate information to
domestic and international
audiences to put joint operations in context; facilitate informed
perceptions about military
operations; and counter adversarial misinformation,

disinformation, and propaganda.
Inform activities help to assure the trust and confidence of the
US population, allies, and
partners and to deter and dissuade adversaries and enemies.

(c) Attack and Exploit Information, Information Networks, and
Systems. The joint force attacks and exploits information,
information networks, and
systems to affect the ability of relevant actors to leverage
information in support of their
own objectives. This includes the manipulation, modification,
or destruction of
information or disruption of the flow of information for the
purpose of gaining a position
of military advantage. This also includes targeting the
credibility of information.

(3) Support human and automated decision making. The
management aspect
of the information joint function includes activities that
facilitate shared understanding
across the joint force and that protect friendly information,
information networks, and
systems to ensure the availability of timely, accurate, and
relevant information necessary
for JFC decision making.

(a) Facilitating Shared Understanding. Facilitating shared
understanding
is related to building shared understanding in the C2 joint
function. Where building shared
understanding is an element of C2 and focuses on purpose (i.e.,
the commander’s
objective), facilitating shared understanding is concerned with
process (i.e., the methods).
Key components of facilitating understanding are collaboration,

KS, and IM.

1. Collaboration. Although the value of face-to-face
interaction is
indisputably preferred, capabilities that improve long-distance,
asynchronous collaboration
among dispersed forces enhance both planning and execution of
joint operations.

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III-20 JP 3-0 CH1

However, the added risk of reliance on long-distance
collaboration may create a critical
vulnerability an adversary can exploit. These capabilities not
only improve efficiency and
common understanding during routine, peacetime interaction
among participants, but they
also enhance effectiveness during time-compressed operations
associated with both
combat and noncombat operations.

a. Collaborative Environment. A collaborative environment is
one in which participants are encouraged to use critical
thinking; solve problems; and share
information, knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and concepts in a
spirit of mutual cooperation
that extends beyond required staffing. In joint and
multinational operations, JFCs and
staffs tend to collaborate due to an established common
purpose. Collaboration can be
enhanced when personnel leverage social networks, establish
trusted relationships, and

share knowledge. This is particularly important in relationships
with interorganizational
and multinational partners, since their objectives, perceptions,
and desired results will not
always coincide with those of the US military. Furthermore,
collaboration with
multinational partners is often more challenging due to the extra
considerations regarding
network configuration, access to workspaces, and releasability
of classified information to
ensure the full range of partner capabilities is integrated.

b. Collaboration Capabilities. Collaboration capabilities
enable
planners and operators worldwide to build a plan without being
collocated. Collaboration
also allows planners to see the big picture while working on
various sections of a plan,
which helps them identify and resolve planning conflicts early.
JFCs can participate more
readily in COA analysis even when away from the HQ, with the
potential to select a COA
without the traditional sequential briefing process. The staff
can post plans and orders on
interactive web pages or portals for immediate use by
subordinate elements (e.g., as
facilitated by automated machine-to-machine interfaces or
publish and subscribe
mechanisms). Collaboration capabilities require effective and
efficient processes, trained
and disciplined users, and a usable collaborative tool
infrastructure.

c. Information and Intelligence Sharing. Sharing of
information
and intelligence with relevant USG departments and agencies,

foreign governments and
security forces, interorganizational participants, NGOs, and
members of the private sector
is vital to national security. Commanders at all levels should
determine and provide
guidance on what information and intelligence needs to be
shared with whom and when.
DOD information should be secured, shared, and made available
throughout the
information life cycle to the maximum extent necessary and
allowed by US law and DOD
policy for foreign disclosure. Commanders and their staffs
should share information from
the outset of complex operations.

For additional guidance on collaboration and related
capabilities, refer to JP 6-0, Joint
Communications System. For additional information on
intelligence sharing, refer to JP
2-0, Joint Intelligence, and JP 2-01, Joint and National
Intelligence Support to Military
Operations.

2. KS. KS involves taking a deliberate, cross-organizational,
and
functional approach to gaining, sharing, and maintaining
knowledge that facilitates

Joint Functions

III-21

understanding, which is necessary to have an advantage in the
OE. While information can

be collected, processed, and stored as structured or unstructured
content, such as in reports
and databases, individuals acquire knowledge through a
cognitive process. Certain
products are particularly relevant to the process of KS. For
example, lessons-learned
databases are knowledge-based products that help users avoid
repeating previous mistakes
and adopt proven best practices. These databases exemplify
how IM and decision support
processes can improve future operations by sharing knowledge
gained through experience.

3. IM. IM is critical to understanding the OE and supports
decision
making. IM is an essential process that receives, organizes,
stores, controls, and secures
an organization’s wide range of data and information. It
facilitates availability of
information to users through KS, while preventing inadvertent
disclosure of sensitive or
proprietary information. IM is more than an information
technology process; IM involves
numerous decision support tools integrated with the CCIRs. IM
includes hard-copy
decision support matrixes for the chief of staff and staff
officers, wall charts with PIR and
FFIR statuses, report logs, call logs, video feeds, and
information storage directives. IM is
important for the commander’s battle rhythm and for the
development and sharing of
information to increase both individual and collective
knowledge. Effective IM improves
the speed and accuracy of information flow and supports
execution through reliable
communications. The process is used to manage the

organization’s information resources
and optimize access to information by all who need it.

a. Roles in the IM Process. As the primary joint force staff
integrator, the chief of staff facilitates KS and may also manage
the IM process. The
communications system directorate of a joint staff ensures the
operation and connectivity
of the supporting C2 communications systems and processes.
Many joint HQ will also
have an IM officer and an IM plan. HQ may also form a joint
IM board to serve as a focal
point for information oversight and coordination. SOPs will
normally describe specific IM
procedures and responsibilities. IM feeds the development and
sharing of knowledge-
based information products.

b. KS complements the value of IM with processes to create an
organizational culture that encourages and rewards team
learning activities to facilitate
shared understanding. IM feeds the development and sharing of
knowledge-based
information products.

c. Specific IM, KS, and other collaborative processes and
products
vary across joint commands based on the JFC’s needs and
preferences. The SOP should
specify these procedures and products and describe the
relationship between IM, KS, and
the HQ battle rhythm.

(b) Protecting Friendly Information, Information Networks, and
Systems. The information function reinforces the protection
function and focuses on

protecting friendly information, information networks, and
systems. This aspect of the
information function includes the preservation of friendly
information across the staff and
the joint force and any information shared with allies and
partners. These activities
reinforce the requirement to assure the flow of information
important to the joint force,

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III-22 JP 3-0 CH1

both by protecting the information and by assessing and
mitigating risks to that
information. The preservation of information includes both
passive and active measures
to prevent and mitigate adversary collection, manipulation, and
destruction of friendly
information, to include attempts to undermine the credibility of
friendly information.

For further guidance on IM, refer to JP 6-0, Joint
Communications System, and JP 3-33,
Joint Task Force Headquarters.

d. Joint Force Capabilities, Operations, and Activities for
Leveraging
Information. In addition to planning all operations to benefit
from the inherent
informational aspects of physical power and influence relevant
actors, the JFC also has
additional means with which to leverage information in support
of enduring outcomes. The

following capabilities, operations, and activities may reinforce
the actions of assigned or
attached forces, support LOOs or LOEs, or constitute the
primary activity in a LOE.

(1) KLE. Most operations require commanders and other
leaders to engage key
local and regional leaders to affect their attitudes and gain their
support. Building
relationships to the point of effective engagement and influence
usually takes time.
Language, regional expertise, and culture knowledge and skills
are keys to successfully
communicate with and, therefore, manage KLE. Commanders
can be challenged to
identify key leaders, develop messages, establish dialogue, and
determine other ways and
means of delivery, especially in societies where interpersonal
relationships are paramount.
Interaction opportunities with friendly and neutral leaders could
include face-to-face
meetings, town meetings, and community events.
Understanding cultural context,
cognitive orientation patterns, and communication methods is
essential. The J-2’s joint
intelligence preparation of the operational environment (JIPOE)
should identify key
friendly, neutral, and threat leaders who are not in the
commander’s sphere of influence.
However, the entire staff should identify leaders relative to
their functional areas as part of
JIPOE.

(2) PA. PA contributes to the achievement of military
objectives by countering
incorrect information and propaganda through the dissemination

of accurate information.
PA also supports operations security (OPSEC) procedures by
determining if information
is appropriate for public release and working with the OPSEC
team to prevent information
from being released to the media and public prematurely. PA
works closely with planners
to educate the force and build understanding with the media on
the implications of
premature release of operational information or the inadvertent
release of classified or
sensitive information identified in CCIRs. PA personnel advise
the JFCs on the possible
direct and indirect effects of joint force actions on public
perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs,
and work to formulate and deliver timely and culturally attuned
messages.

(a) The speed of modern communication, the tempo of military
operations,
and the number and variety of competing information sources
means that information about
joint force activities will likely be rapidly disseminated. That
information can often be
incomplete, lack important context, and be intentionally biased
or factually incorrect.

Joint Functions

III-23

(b) PA support is important in every phase of operations. JFCs
and PA
officers should evaluate current and future operations to

identify public information and
visual information requirements, as well as the means to acquire
and move those products
in a timely manner. PA informs and participates in staff
planning, including the
development of constraints and restraints, identification of
potential intended and
unintended consequences of planned actions, and an
appreciation of the nature of
information flow in varying cultural contexts. Supporting
communication plans highlight
higher HQ guidance and messaging, identify the communication
problem or opportunity,
identify and segment key publics, define communication
objectives that support command/
mission goals, develop measurable objectives to achieve these
goals, and employ
communication activities appropriate to the situation and
desired outcome. Throughout
the planning process, PA professionals will lead communication
synchronization to
maximize alignment. Communication plans should provide for
proactive, timely, and
accurate release of information about joint force operations and
activities with maximum
disclosure and minimum delay, while maintaining OPSEC.

For additional guidance on PA, refer to JP 3-61, Public Affairs.
For additional guidance
on OPSEC, refer to JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(3) CMO. CMO are activities that establish, maintain,
influence, or exploit
relationships between military forces and indigenous
populations and institutions with the
objective to reestablish or maintain stability in a region or HN.

During all military
operations, CMO can coordinate the integration of military and
nonmilitary instruments of
national power. CA support CMO by conducting military
engagement and humanitarian and
civic assistance to influence the populations of the HN and
other PNs in the OA. These
activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other
military actions. CA forces
enhance awareness of and manage the interaction with the civil
component of the OE,
identify and mitigate underlying causes of instability within
civil society, and/or involve the
application of functional specialty skills normally the
responsibility of civil government.

For additional guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-
Military Operations.

(4) Military Deception (MILDEC). Commanders conduct
MILDEC to mislead
enemy decision makers and commanders and cause them to take
or not take specific
actions. The intent is to cause enemy commanders to form
inaccurate impressions about
friendly force dispositions, capabilities, vulnerabilities, and
intentions; misuse their
intelligence collection assets; and fail to employ their combat or
support units to best
advantage. As executed by JFCs, MILDEC targets enemy
leaders and decision makers
through the manipulation of their intelligence collection,
analysis, and dissemination
systems. MILDEC depends on intelligence to identify
deception targets, assist in
developing credible stories, identify and orient on appropriate

receivers (the readers of the
story), and assess the effectiveness of the deception effort.
Deception requires a thorough
knowledge of the enemy and their decision-making processes.
During the formulation of
the CONOPS, planners determine how the JFC wants the enemy
to act at critical points in
the operation. Those desired enemy actions then become the
MILDEC objective.
MILDEC is focused on causing the enemy to act in a desired
manner, not simply to be
misled in their thinking.

Chapter III

III-24 JP 3-0 CH1

For additional guidance on MILDEC, refer to JP 3-13.4,
Military Deception.

(5) MISO. Psychological operations forces conduct MISO to
convey selected
information and indicators to foreign audiences to influence
their emotions, motives, and
objective reasoning and ultimately induce or reinforce foreign
attitudes and behavior
favorable to the originator’s objectives. Psychological
operations forces devise and
execute psychological actions and craft persuasive messages
using a variety of audio,
visual, and audiovisual products, which can then be delivered to
both targets and audiences.
MISO have strategic, operational, and tactical applications and
should be considered early

in planning to maximize effectiveness. The JFC should address
the approval authorities
for MISO during planning to ensure integration and unity of
effort.

MILITARY DECEPTION IN THE YOM K IPPUR WAR, 1973

On 6 October 1973, the Egyptian 3rd Army surprised the Israeli
Defense
Force by attacking across the Suez Canal. Egyptian forces
gained a
significant foothold in the Sinai and began to drive deeper until
a
determined defense and counterattack drove them back.

To achieve the initial surprise, Egyptian forces conducted
deception
operations of strategic, operational, and tactical significance to
exploit
Israeli weaknesses. At the strategic level, they conveyed the
notions
that they would not attack without both a concerted Arab effort
and an
ability to neutralize the Israeli Air Force and that tactical
preparations
were merely in response to feared Israeli retaliation for Arab
terrorist
activity. At the operational level, Egyptian forces portrayed
their
mobilization, force buildup, and maneuvers as part of their
annual
exercises. Egyptian exercises portraying an intent to cross the
canal
were repeated until the Israelis became conditioned to them and
therefore did not react when the actual attack occurred. At the
tactical

level, Egyptian forces expertly camouflaged their equipment,
denying
information to Israeli observers and creating a false impression
of the
purpose of the increased activity.

For their part, Israeli forces were overconfident and indecisive
at the
operational and strategic levels. In spite of the deception,
tactical
observers reported with increasing urgency that the Egyptian
buildup
and activity were significant. Their reports caused concern, but
no
action. Egyptian forces exploited these vulnerabilities and
timed the
attack to occur on Yom Kippur, the Jewish Day of Atonement,
when they
perceived the response of Israeli forces would be reduced. The
Israeli
Defense Force intelligence convinced itself that the Arabs
would be
unable to attack for a number of years, and they ignored
warning
intelligence.

As a result of their deception efforts, synchronized with other
operations
of the force, Egyptian forces quickly and decisively
overwhelmed Israeli
forces in the early stages of the Yom Kippur War.

Various Sources

Joint Functions

III-25

For additional guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military
Information Support
Operations. MISO support to non-US military is outlined in
DODI O-3607.02, Military
Information Support Operations (MISO).

(6) OPSEC

(a) OPSEC uses a process to preserve friendly essential secrecy
by
identifying, controlling, and protecting critical information and
indicators that would allow
adversaries to identify and exploit friendly vulnerabilities. The
purpose of OPSEC is to
reduce vulnerabilities of US and multinational forces to
adversary exploitation, and it
applies to all activities that prepare, sustain, or employ forces.

(b) The effective integration, coordination, and application of
other joint
functions are critical components in the execution of OPSEC.
Because a specified task is
“to protect our own” information, OPSEC planners require
complete situational awareness
regarding friendly activities to facilitate the safeguarding of
critical information. This kind
of situational awareness exists within the joint force where a
wide range of planners work
in concert to protect friendly information, information
networks, and systems. OPSEC
practices must balance the responsibility to account to the
American public with the need

to protect critical information and indicators. The need to
practice OPSEC should not be
used as an excuse to deny noncritical information to the public.

For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to CJCSI 3213.01,
Joint Operations Security,
and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(7) EW. EW is the military action ultimately responsible for
securing and
maintaining freedom of action in the EMS for friendly forces
while exploiting or denying
it to adversaries. EW is an enabler for other activities that
communicate or maneuver
through the EMS, such as MISO, PA, or CO.

For additional guidance on EW, refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic
Warfare.

(8) Combat Camera (COMCAM). Imagery is one of the most
powerful tools
available for informing internal and domestic audiences and for
influencing foreign
audiences. COMCAM forces provide imagery support in the
form of a directed imagery
capability to the JFC across the range of military operations.
COMCAM imagery supports
capabilities that use imagery for their products and efforts,
including MISO, MILDEC, PA,
and CMO, and provides critical operational documentation for
sensitive site exploitation,
legal and evidentiary requirements, and imagery for battle
damage assessment/MOE
analysis, as well as operational documentation and imagery for
narrative development
during foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) operations and

NEOs.

(9) Space Operations. Space operations support joint
operations throughout the
OE by providing information in the form of ISR; missile
warning; environment monitoring;
satellite communications; and space-based positioning,
navigation, and timing (PNT).
Space operations also integrate offensive and defensive
activities to achieve and maintain
space superiority. Offensive activities prevent the use of space
to provide information to
enemy forces. Defensive activities protect friendly space
capabilities from attack,

Chapter III

III-26 JP 3-0 CH1

interference, or unintentional hazards to enable access to the
information provided by space
capabilities to friendly forces.

For additional guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14,
Space Operations.

(10) Special Technical Operations (STO). STO should be
deconflicted and
synchronized with other activities. Detailed information related
to STO and its
contribution to joint force operations can be obtained from the
STO planners at CCMD or
Service component HQ.

(11) CO. CO include the missions of OCO, DCO, and DODIN
operations.
These missions include the use of technical capabilities in
cyberspace and cyberspace as a
medium to leverage information in and through cyberspace.
Refer to paragraph 7,
“Protection,” for a discussion of DCO.

(a) DODIN Operations. The DODIN includes DOD-owned and
leased
communications and computing systems and services, software
(including applications),
data, security services, other associated services, and national
security systems. DODIN
operations configure, secure, operate, maintain, extend, and
sustain the DODIN. Since all
actions taken for the sake of performance impact security and
vice versa, DODIN
operations and DCO internal defensive measures are
intrinsically linked activities. DODIN
operations are the means by which DOD manages the flow of
information over its
information networks. The purpose of DODIN operations is
assured system and network
availability, assured information protection, and assured
information delivery, which
protect and maintain freedom of action for DOD missions
within cyberspace. DODIN
operations require centralized coordination because they have
the potential to impact the
integrity and operational readiness of an interconnected global
enterprise; however,
mission execution is generally decentralized. The DODIN
supports all military operations
by enabling DOD, multinational, international,
nongovernmental, and interagency mission

partners to securely and seamlessly share required information.
The aggregate effect of
DODIN operations activities establishes the security framework
on which all DOD
missions ultimately depend.

(b) Cyberspace-Enabled Activities. Most DOD CO are uses of
cyberspace
to enable other types of activities, which employ cyberspace
capabilities to complete tasks but
are not undertaken as part of one of the three CO missions.
These uses include actions like
sending information in an e-mail or researching information
using the Internet. These
activities do not require special authorities for DOD personnel;
however, they are the source
of most vulnerabilities to the DODIN when proper cybersecurity
procedures are not followed.

For additional guidance on all CO missions, refer to JP 3-12,
Cyberspace Operations, and
for additional specific guidance on DODIN operations, refer to
JP 6-0, Joint
Communications System.

e. Commander’s Communication Synchronization (CCS). CCS
is a process by
which the commander aligns communication.

Joint Functions

III-27

For further information on CCS, see JDN 2-13, Commander’s

Communication
Synchronization, and JP 3-61, Public Affairs. Also, see JP 5-0,
Joint Planning, for
information on communication synchronization planning.

f. Key Considerations

(1) Intelligence Support to Information. Intelligence is critical
to the
effectiveness of information activities. The intelligence
function supports the information
function by providing all-source intelligence analysis of
processed information.
Intelligence facilitates understanding the interrelationship of the
informational, physical,
and human aspects that are shared by the OE and the
information environment. By
providing population-centric, sociocultural understanding of
relevant actors, intelligence
can greatly assist planning, integration, execution, and
assessment of information activities
to create desired effects. Intelligence in support of information
activities may require
greater-than-normal lead times to establish behavior baselines
for human decision making.

(2) Information in the Targeting Process. Information
activities and
capabilities are integrated in the targeting process during
planning and execution to create
and synchronize effects in support of JFC objectives. Many
information activities and
capabilities have interagency execution approval levels that may
increase time required to
plan, coordinate, and integrate into the joint force targeting
process. Other USG

departments and agencies lack trained personnel and procedures
to satisfy interagency
planning, execution, and assessment requirements. Fully
analyzing and developing target
sets for nonlethal action may also increase coordination time
required. Information
activities may be compartmented. However, effective
integration of information activities
and capabilities in the targeting process results in improved
understanding for the entire
joint and multinational force and increased opportunities to
achieve JFC objectives.

(3) Legal Considerations. Planners deal with diverse and
complex legal
considerations. Legal interpretations can occasionally differ,
given the complexity of
technologies involved, the significance of legal interests
potentially affected, and the
challenges inherent for law and policy to keep pace with the
technological changes and
implementation. Additionally, policies are regularly added,
amended, and rescinded in an
effort to provide clarity. As a result, legal restraints and
constraints on information
activities are dynamic and are further complicated by
multinational considerations, since
each nation has its own laws, policies, and processes for
approving plans.

4. Intelligence

a. Understanding the OE is fundamental to joint operations.
The intelligence
function supports this understanding with analysis of the OE to
inform JFCs about

adversary capabilities, COGs, vulnerabilities, and future COAs
and to help commanders
and staffs understand and map friendly, neutral, and threat
networks. Using the continuous
JIPOE analysis process, properly tailored JIPOE products can
enhance OE understanding
and enable the JFC to act inside the enemy’s decision cycle.
Intelligence activities and
assessments also occur while defending the homeland within the
guidelines of applicable
regulations and laws.

Chapter III

III-28 JP 3-0 CH1

b. Tailored, continuous JIPOE products support JPP steps 2-7
and the four planning
functions starting with an OE baseline characterization to
facilitate planning. Throughout
execution, tailored, continuous JIPOE products capture the
dynamic OE in support of the
assessment process to facilitate risk management and operations
adjustments and to
identify new opportunities. Joint forces may suffer casualties
due to various health threats
such as disease, including infectious disease, and combat or
noncombat injuries, including
injury from environmental health hazards that limit operational
functions and adversely
affect combat power. Medical intelligence preparation of the
operational environment
(MIPOE) products help decision makers devise protection
measures to mitigate these

threats.

For further information on MIPOE, refer to JP 4-02, Joint
Health Services.

c. Understanding Human, Physical, and Informational Aspects
of Military
Operations. Intelligence is critical to the JFC’s ability to
leverage information to affect
behavior. People and organizations other than the enemy may
positively or negatively
affect the friendly mission. These actors may include the
population, HN government, and
potential opposition leaders. Other relevant actors may include
international organizations,
non-state actors, and NGOs. By first identifying the relevant
actors and learning as much
as possible about them and their interrelationships, the JFC can
develop an approach that
will facilitate decision making and behavior (active or passive)
among relevant actors that
is consistent with the desired end state of the operation.
Sociocultural analysis and identity
intelligence (I2) activities enable a better understanding of the
relevant actors. Individuals
may fit into more than one category of actor. For example, a
tribal leader may also work
as a district governor, while also working behind the scenes to
provide financial and
material support to an insurgency.

d. JIPOE

(1) JFCs use assigned and attached intelligence forces and
coordinate with
supporting interagency intelligence capabilities to develop a

current intelligence picture
and analyze the OE. These supporting capabilities include
combat support agencies (e.g.,
National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and
National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency [NGA]) and national intelligence agencies
(e.g., Central Intelligence
Agency). National intelligence support may be provided to the
J-2 as requested to integrate
national intelligence capabilities into a comprehensive
intelligence effort designed to
support the joint force. The J-2 should integrate these
supporting capabilities with the
efforts of the assigned and attached intelligence forces. Liaison
personnel from the various
agencies provide access to the entire range of capabilities
resident in their agencies and can
focus those capabilities on the JFC’s intelligence requirements.

(2) As crises emerge that potentially require military action,
JFCs examine
available intelligence estimates. As part of the JIPOE process,
JFCs focus intelligence
efforts to determine or confirm enemy COGs and refine
estimates of enemy capabilities,
dispositions, intentions, and probable COAs within the context
of the current situation.
They look for specific warning intelligence of imminent enemy
activity that may require
an immediate response or an acceleration of friendly decision
cycles.

Joint Functions

III-29

For additional guidance on intelligence support to JIPOE, refer
to JP 2-01.3, Joint
Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment.

e. The intelligence function encompasses the joint intelligence
process. The joint
intelligence process consists of six interrelated categories of
intelligence operations:

(1) Planning and direction of intelligence activities.

(2) Collection of data.

(3) Processing and exploitation of collected data to produce
relevant information.

(4) Analysis of information and production of intelligence.

(5) Dissemination and integration of intelligence with
operations.

(6) Evaluation and feedback regarding intelligence
effectiveness and quality.

f. Key Considerations

(1) Responsibilities. JFCs and their component commanders
are the key
players in planning and conducting intelligence tasks.
Commanders are more than just
consumers of intelligence. They are responsible for fully
integrating intelligence into their
plans and operations. They are also responsible for distributing
intelligence and

information to subordinate commands and, when appropriate, to
relevant participants
through established protocols and systems. Commanders
establish operational and
intelligence requirements and continuous feedback to ensure
optimum intelligence support
to planning and operations. This interface supports the
commander and operational
planning and execution. It also mitigates surprise, assists
friendly deception efforts, and
enables joint operation assessment.

(2) Surveillance and Reconnaissance. Surveillance and
reconnaissance support
information collection throughout the OE. These activities
focus on planned collection
requirements but are also sufficiently flexible to respond to
time-sensitive and emerging
requirements. Commanders will also require persistent
surveillance of specific targets that
are mission-essential and support guidance and intent. ISR
includes activities in
cyberspace conducted under an execute order to gather
intelligence to support future
operations. ISR activities focus on tactical and operational
intelligence and require
appropriate deconfliction of capabilities, including the forces
that are trained and certified
to a common standard with the intelligence community.

(3) CI and Human Intelligence (HUMINT). JFCs rely on
intelligence acquired
through CI and HUMINT capabilities throughout all phases of
joint operations. CI and
HUMINT both use human sources to collect information, and
while their activities may at

times be overlapping, each has its own distinct purpose and
function. CI support is used
to protect the force and must be fully integrated into planning
and execution. CI collection
gathers information that will assist in identifying, exploiting,
and neutralizing threats posed
by terrorists and foreign intelligence entities. HUMINT
collection strives to satisfy

Chapter III

III-30 JP 3-0 CH1

commander’s PIRs. CI attempts to deny or shape the enemy’s
or adversary’s knowledge
of the US while HUMINT shapes the joint force’s understanding
of the enemy or
adversary.

(4) I2. I2 is gathered from identity attributes of individuals,
groups, networks, or
populations of interest. Regional and global trends have placed
greater requirements on
the JFC to be able to recognize and differentiate one person
from another to support
protection and intelligence functions. I2 activities help the
joint force protect and control
relevant populations. I2 products, such as biometric watch lists
and persons of interest
overlays, assist US forces, the HN, and PNs to positively
identify, track, characterize, and
disrupt threat actors. These products enhance understanding of
how these actors and
networks can affect the OE.

For additional information on CI and I2, refer to JP 2-01.2,
Counterintelligence and
Human Intelligence in Joint Operations.

For additional guidance on the intelligence function, refer to JP
2-0, Joint Intelligence; JP
2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military
Operations; and other subordinate
JPs that address intelligence support to targeting, CI, HUMINT,
geospatial intelligence
(GEOINT), and JIPOE.

5. Fires

a. To employ fires is to use available weapons and other
systems to create a specific
effect on a target. Joint fires are those delivered during the
employment of forces from two
or more components in coordinated action to produce desired
results in support of a
common objective. Fires typically produce destructive effects,
but various other tools and
methods can be employed with little or no associated physical
destruction. This function
encompasses the fires associated with a number of tasks,
missions, and processes,
including:

(1) Conduct Joint Targeting. This is the process of selecting
and prioritizing
targets and matching the appropriate response to them, taking
account of command
objectives, operational requirements, and capabilities.

(2) Provide Joint Fire Support. This task includes joint fires

that assist joint
forces to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations,
space, cyberspace, airspace,
and key waters.

(3) Countering Air and Missile Threats. This task integrates
offensive and
defensive operations and capabilities to achieve and maintain a
desired degree of air
superiority and force protection. These operations are planned
to destroy or negate enemy
manned and unmanned aircraft and missiles, both before and
after launch.

(4) Interdict Enemy Capabilities. Interdiction diverts, disrupts,
delays, or
destroys the enemy’s military surface capabilities before they
can be used effectively
against friendly forces or to otherwise achieve their objectives.

Joint Functions

III-31

(5) Conduct Strategic Attack. This task includes offensive
action against
targets—whether military, political, economic, or other—which
are selected specifically
to achieve national or military strategic objectives.

(6) Assess the Results of Employing Fires. This task includes
assessing the
effectiveness and performance of fires, as well as their
contribution to the larger operation

or objective.

b. Key Considerations. The following are key considerations
associated with the
above tasks:

(1) Targeting supports the process of linking the desired effects
of fires to
actions and tasks at the component level. Commanders and
their staffs must consider
strategic- and operational-level objectives, the potential for
friendly fire incidents and other
undesired fires effects, and operational limitations (e.g.,
constraints and restraints) when
making targeting decisions. Impact on all systems in the OE
should be considered during
this process. Successful integration of engagement options to
create nonlethal effects
through cyberspace into the targeting process is important to
mission accomplishment in
many operations.

(a) Oversight. JFCs may task their staff to accomplish broad
targeting
oversight functions or may delegate the responsibility to a
subordinate commander.
Typically, JFCs organize joint targeting coordination boards
(JTCBs). If the JFC so
designates, a JTCB may be either an integrating center for this
effort or a JFC-level review
mechanism. In either case, it should be composed of
representatives from the staff, all
components and, if required, their subordinate units. The
primary focus of the JTCB is to
link target priorities, guidance, and the associated effects to the
JFC’s objectives. JTCB

participants should ensure all components and applicable staff
elements coordinate and
synchronize targeting efforts with intelligence and operations.

(b) Delegation of Joint Targeting Process Authority. The JFC
is
responsible for all aspects of the targeting process and may
conduct joint targeting at the
joint force HQ level or authorize a component commander to do
so. The JFC normally
appoints the deputy JFC or a component commander to chair the
JTCB. When the JFC
does not delegate targeting authority and does not establish a
JTCB, the JFC performs this
task at the joint force HQ with the assistance of the J-3. In this
instance, the JFC may
approve the formation within the J-3 of a joint fires element to
provide recommendations
to the J-3. The JFC ensures this process is a joint effort
involving applicable subordinate
commands. Whomever the JFC authorizes to plan, coordinate,
and deconflict joint
targeting must possess or have access to a sufficient C2
infrastructure, adequate facilities,
joint planning expertise, appropriate intelligence, and sufficient
legal advice.

For additional targeting guidance, refer to JP 3-60, Joint
Targeting.

(c) Air Apportionment. In the context of joint fires, air
apportionment is
part of the targeting process. The JFACC uses air
apportionment to ensure the weight of
joint force air effort is consistent with the JFC’s intent and
objectives. After consulting

Chapter III

III-32 JP 3-0 CH1

with other component commanders, the JFACC recommends air
apportionment to the JFC,
who makes the air apportionment decision. The JFACC’s
rationale for the
recommendation may include priority or percentage of effort
based on the JFC’s CONOPS,
specific tasks for which air assets are essential, and other
factors such as the component
commanders’ joint fires requirements. Following the JFC’s air
apportionment decision,
the JFACC allocates and tasks the capabilities/forces made
available.

For additional guidance on air apportionment, refer to JP 3-30,
Command and Control of
Joint Air Operations.

(2) Joint fire support includes joint fires that assist air, land,
maritime,
cyberspace, and special operations forces to move, maneuver,
and control territory,
populations, airspace, cyberspace, EMS, and key waters. Joint
fire support may include,
but is not limited to, manned and unmanned fixed-wing, rotary-
wing, and tiltrotor aircraft;
naval surface fire support; artillery, mortars, rockets, and
missiles; and other effects of
some cyberspace attack, space control operations, EA, and other
capabilities to create

nonlethal effects. Close air support is a critical element of joint
fire support that requires
detailed planning, coordination, and training of ground and
supporting air forces for safe
and effective execution. Integration and synchronization of
joint fires and joint fire support
with the fire and maneuver of the supported force are essential.

For additional guidance on joint fire support, refer to JP 3-09,
Joint Fire Support. For
more information on close air support, see JP 3-09.3, Close Air
Support.

(3) Countering Air and Missile Threats

(a) The JFC counters air and missile threats to ensure friendly
freedom of
action, provide protection, and deny enemy freedom of action.
Counterair integrates
offensive and defensive operations to achieve and maintain the
JFC’s desired degrees of
control of the air and protection by neutralizing or destroying
enemy aircraft and missiles,
both before and after launch. The counterair mission is
inherently a joint and
interdependent endeavor. Each component of the joint force
contributes capabilities
necessary for mission success. In addition, Service capability
and force structure
development reflect a purposeful reliance on all components to
maximize complementary
and reinforcing effects while minimizing relative
vulnerabilities. Due to the joint and
interdependent nature, all components of the joint force
normally are tasked to conduct
operations in support of the counterair mission. The JFC will

normally designate an AADC
and a JFACC to enhance unity of command (or unity of effort),
centralized planning and
direction, and decentralized execution for countering air and
missile threats.

(b) Offensive counterair (OCA) operations are the preferred
method of
countering theater air and missile threats. OCA typically seeks
to dominate enemy airspace
and destroy, disrupt, or neutralize enemy aircraft, missiles,
launch platforms, and their
supporting structures as close to their sources as possible before
and after launch. OCA
includes attack operations, fighter sweep, fighter escort, and
suppression of enemy air
defenses. DCA normally attempts to degrade, neutralize, or
defeat enemy air and missile
attacks attempting to penetrate friendly airspace. Both OCA
and DCA may also be

Joint Functions

III-33

conducted to ensure access and freedom of action in
international airspace. These
operations may use aircraft, surface-to-surface missiles,
surface-to-air missiles, artillery,
ground forces, special operations, cyberspace attack, and EA.
US forces must be capable
of countering the air and missile threats during all phases of an
operation.

(c) Control of the Air. Control of the air is a prerequisite to
success for
modern operations or campaigns because it prevents enemy air
and missile threats from
effectively interfering with operations thus facilitating freedom
of action and movement.
Control of the air cannot be assumed. In the air, the degree of
control can range from no
control, to parity where neither opponent can claim any level of
control over the other, to
local air superiority, to air supremacy over the entire OA.
Control of the air may vary over
time. It is important to remember that the degree of control of
the air is scalable and can
be localized geographically (horizontally and vertically) or
defined in the context of an
entire theater. The desired degree of control will be at the
direction of the JFC and based
on the JFC’s CONOPS and will typically be an initial priority
objective of joint air
operations. Air superiority is that degree of control of the air
by one force that permits the
conduct of its operations at a given time and place without
prohibitive interference from
air and missile threats. Air supremacy is that degree of control
of the air wherein the
opposing force is incapable of effective interference within the
OA using air and missile
threats. Counterair operations usually begin early in the
conduct of an operation or
campaign to produce the desired degree of control of the air at
the times and places chosen
by the JFC.

(d) Integrating Air and Missile Defense. While joint combat
focuses on

operations within one or more OAs, threats to joint forces can
come from well outside
assigned JOAs, and even outside a GCC’s AOR. In particular,
an enemy’s missiles and
long-range aircraft can pose significant challenges that require
integration of defensive
capabilities from both within and beyond a GCC’s AOR. The
GCC integrates air and
missile defense capabilities and activities within the theater. In
support, SecDef establishes
command relationships for global missile defense, global strike,
and other cross-AOR
operations. CDRUSSTRATCOM exercises coordinating
authority for planning of global
missile defense, in coordination with other CCDRs, the Service
component commanders,
and, as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies.
The intended result is
integration of OCA attack operations, DCA operations, and
other capabilities as required
to create the JFC’s desired effects.

Refer to JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats, for
additional guidance on air
superiority and countering air and missile threats.

(4) Interdiction

(a) Interdiction is a powerful tool for JFCs. Interdiction
operations are
actions that divert, disrupt, delay, or destroy the enemy’s
military land or surface capability
before it can be used effectively against friendly forces to
achieve enemy objectives. Air
interdiction is conducted at such a distance from friendly forces

that detailed integration of
each air mission with the fire and movement of friendly forces
is not required. The JFC
plans and synchronizes the overall interdiction effort in the
assigned JOA. The JFACC is

Chapter III

III-34 JP 3-0 CH1

normally the supported commander for the JFC’s overall air
interdiction effort, while
JFLCCs and JFMCCs are supported commanders for interdiction
in their AOs.

(b) Interdiction can include operations conducted under lawful
authority to
track, identify, divert, delay, intercept, board, detain, or destroy
vessels, vehicles, aircraft,
people, cargo, and money. At the direction of appropriate
authorities, forces conducting
HD or DSCA may perform interdiction against specific targets.
For example, military
forces also provide DSCA to USG departments or agencies
responsible for domestic law
enforcement interdiction activities when requested and approved
by SecDef or the
President. These activities include actions to divert, disrupt,
delay, intercept, board, detain,
or destroy, as appropriate, suspect vessels, vehicles, aircraft,
people, and cargo.
Counterproliferation interdiction is a proactive USG mission
intended to deter, make more
costly, inhibit, disrupt, and prevent trafficking in shipments of

proliferation concern. All
such DOD operations and activities shall be consistent with US
domestic law and
international law, applicable DOD policy, and SecDef-approved
execution orders. Federal
law and DOD policy impose limitations on the types of support
the US military may
provide and what type of military mission (e.g., HD or DSCA)
is being conducted.

See Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 3025.21,
Defense Support of Law
Enforcement Agencies, and DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities
(DSCA), for more information on DSCA regarding domestic law
enforcement interdiction
activities.

(c) Many elements of the joint force can conduct interdiction
operations.
Air, land, maritime, space, cyberspace, and special operations
forces can conduct
interdiction operations as part of their larger or overall mission.
For example, an
amphibious force charged with seizing and securing a
beachhead along a coast may include
the interdiction of opposing land and maritime forces inside the
amphibious objective area
(AOA) as part of the overall amphibious plan.

(d) JFCs may choose to employ interdiction as a principal
means to achieve
an objective (with other components supporting the component
leading the interdiction
effort). For example, one of the JFC’s objectives associated
with the seize initiative phase

of an operation might be to prevent the enemy’s navy from
interfering with friendly force
sea transit through a choke point in the JOA. The JFC might
task the JFACC to accomplish
this through an interdiction effort supported by SOF.
Interdiction during warfighting is not
limited to any particular region of the OA but is generally
conducted forward of or at a
distance from friendly surface forces. Likewise, military
interdiction that supports HD is
guided and restricted by domestic law to a greater extent than
other interdiction. Joint
interdiction can be planned to create tactical, operational, or
strategic advantages for the
joint force, with corresponding adverse effects on the enemy.
Interdiction deep in the
enemy’s rear area can have broad operational effects; however,
deep interdiction may have
a delayed effect on land, maritime, and selected special
operations. Interdiction closer to
joint forces will have more immediate operational and tactical
effects. Thus, JFCs vary the
emphasis upon interdiction operations and surface maneuvers,
depending on the situation
confronting them.

Joint Functions

III-35

(e) Counter threat finance (CTF) is an activity used in
countering threat
networks and refers to the activities and actions taken by the
JFC to deny, disrupt, destroy,

or defeat the generation, storage, movement, and use of assets
to fund activities that support
a threat network’s ability to negatively affect the JFC’s ability
to attain the desired end
state. Threat networks utilize both licit and illicit financial
transactions and institutions,
and each could be a critical vulnerability of state and non-state
adversaries threatening US
national security. Monitoring, assessing, analyzing, and
exploiting financial information
are key support functions for CTF activities.

Refer to JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction, for more guidance on joint
interdiction operations.
Refer to JP 3-25, Countering Threat Networks, for more
information on CTF.

(5) Strategic Attack. A strategic attack is a JFC-directed
offensive action
against a target—whether military or other—that is selected to
achieve national or military
strategic objectives. These attacks seek to weaken the enemy’s
ability or will to engage in
conflict or continue an action and, as such, could be part of a
campaign or major operation,
or conducted independently as directed by the President or
SecDef. Additionally, these
attacks may achieve strategic objectives without necessarily
having to achieve operational
objectives as a precondition. Suitable targets may include, but
are not limited to, enemy
strategic COGs. All components of a joint force may have
capabilities to conduct strategic
attacks.

(6) Global Strike

(a) Global strike is the capability to rapidly plan and deliver
extended-range
attacks, limited in duration and scope, to create precision
effects against enemy assets in
support of national and theater commander objectives. Global
strike missions employ
capabilities against a wide variety of targets to create lethal and
nonlethal effects.

AIR INTERDICTION DURING OPERATION IRAQI
FREEDOM

During Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, most of the effort against
Iraqi
ground troops was focused on Republican Guard divisions and
on a
handful of stalwart regular divisions that formed part of the
defensive
ring south of Baghdad.

One prominent air interdiction success story involved the Iraqi
Republican Guard’s redeployment of elements of the
Hammurabi,
Nebuchadnezzar, and Al Nida divisions after 25 March 2003 to
the south
of Baghdad toward Karbala, Hillah, and Al Kut. Their road
movements
were steadily bombed by US Air Force A-10s and B-52s
(dropping 500-
pound bombs) and British Tornados. An Iraqi commander
concluded
that their movement south had been one of the Iraqi regime’s
major
errors because it exposed the Republican Guard to coalition air
power

and resulted in large casualty figures.

Source: Project on Defense Alternatives Briefing Memo #30
Carl Conetta, 26 September 2003

Chapter III

III-36 JP 3-0 CH1

(b) The UCP assigns CDRUSSTRATCOM the responsibility for
global
strike. CDRUSTRATCOM plans global strike in full
partnership with affected CCDRs.
The CJCS or SecDef determines supporting and supported
command relationships for
execution. In some circumstances, USSTRATCOM may act in a
supporting role to a
supported CCMD for both global strike planning and execution.

(7) Limiting Collateral Damage. Collateral damage is
unintentional or
incidental injury or damage to persons or objects that would not
be lawful military targets
based on the circumstances existing at the time. Causing
collateral damage does not violate
the law of war so long as the collateral damage caused is not
excessive in relation to the
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated from the
attack. Under the law of war,
the balancing of military necessity in relation to collateral
damage is known as the principle
of proportionality. Moreover, limiting collateral damage is
often an operational or
strategic imperative. Further, limiting collateral damage will

not only reduce the
requirement to address civilian claims but may help better
support friendly and HN actions
to influence the population and reduce the magnitude and
duration of stability activities.
Collateral damage assessment is conducted during targeting and
is especially important
when considering strikes against WMD storage and production
targets.

(8) Capabilities That Can Create Nonlethal Effects. Some
capabilities can
generate nonlethal effects that limit collateral damage, reduce
risk to civilians, and may
reduce opportunities for enemy or adversary propaganda. They
may also reduce the
number of casualties associated with excessive use of force,
limit reconstruction costs, and
maintain the good will of the local populace. Some capabilities
are nonlethal by design
and include, but are not limited to, blunt impact and warning
munitions, acoustic and
optical warning devices, and vehicle and vessel stopping
systems.

(a) Cyberspace Attack. Cyberspace attack actions create
various direct
denial effects in cyberspace (i.e., degradation, disruption, or
destruction) and manipulation
that leads to denial that is hidden or that manifests in the
physical domains.

(b) EA. EA involves the use of electromagnetic energy,
directed energy, or
anti-radiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or
equipment to degrade, neutralize,

or destroy enemy combat capability. EA can be used against a
computer when the attack
occurs through the EMS. Cyberspace attacks use the data
stream through the network to
deliver logical payloads that create desired effects such as
degradation, disruption, and
destruction. Integration and synchronization of EA with
maneuver, C2, and other joint
fires are essential. EW is a component of JEMSO used to
exploit, attack, protect, and
manage the EME to achieve commander’s objectives. EW can
be used as a primary
capability or used to facilitate delivery of other information-
related activities through the
targeting process.

For additional guidance on cyberspace attack, refer to JP 3-12,
Cyberspace Operations.
For additional guidance on EA, refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic
Warfare. For additional
guidance on JEMSO, refer to CJCSI 3320.01, (U) Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations (JEMSO), and JDN 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic
Spectrum Operations.

Joint Functions

III-37

(c) MISO. MISO actions and messages can generate effects
that gain
support for JFC objectives; reduce the will of the enemy,
adversary, and sympathizer; and
decrease the combat effectiveness of enemy forces. MISO are

an effective capability that
creates effects throughout the entire conflict continuum.
However, MISO require unique
dissemination, budget, attribution, and series approval
authorities, which often require
longer lead times than other authorities.

For additional guidance on MISO, refer to JP 3-13.2, Military
Information Support
Operations. MISO support to non-US military is outlined in
DODI O-3607.02, Military
Information Support Operations (MISO).

(d) Nonlethal Weapons. Nonlethal weapons are weapons,
devices, and
munitions that are explicitly designed and primarily employed
to incapacitate targeted
personnel or materiel immediately, while minimizing fatalities,
permanent injury to
personnel, and undesired damage to property in the target area
or environment. Nonlethal
weapons are intended to have reversible effects on personnel
and materiel. Planners should
consider nonlethal weapons to minimize loss of life and damage
to property that could
negatively influence public perception.

6. Movement and Maneuver

a. This function encompasses the disposition of joint forces to
conduct operations by
securing positional advantages before or during combat
operations and by exploiting
tactical success to achieve operational and strategic objectives.
This function includes
moving or deploying forces into an OA and maneuvering them

to operational depths for
offensive and defensive purposes. It also includes assuring the
mobility of friendly forces.
The movement and maneuver function encompasses a number of
tasks including:

(1) Deploy, shift, regroup, or move joint and/or component
force formations
within the OA by any means or mode (i.e., air, land, or sea).

(2) Maneuver joint forces to achieve a position of advantage
over an enemy.

(3) Provide mobility for joint forces to facilitate their
movement and maneuver
without delays caused by terrain or obstacles.

(4) Delay, channel, or stop movement and maneuver by enemy
formations. This
includes operations that employ obstacles (i.e.,
countermobility), enforce sanctions and
embargoes, and conduct blockades.

(5) Control significant areas in the OA whose possession or
control provides
either side an operational advantage.

b. Movement to Extend and Maintain Operational Reach

(1) Forces, sometimes limited to those that are forward-
deployed or even
multinational forces formed specifically for the task at hand,
can be positioned within
operational reach of enemy COGs or decisive points to achieve
decisive force at the

Chapter III

III-38 JP 3-0 CH1

appropriate time and place. Operational reach is the distance
and duration across which a
joint force can successfully employ its military capabilities. At
other times, mobilization
and deployment processes can be called up to begin the
movement of reinforcing forces
from the continental United States (CONUS) or other theaters to
redress any unfavorable
balance of forces and to achieve decisive force at the
appropriate time and place.

(2) JFCs must carefully consider the movement of forces and
whether to
recommend the formation and/or movement of multinational
forces. They must be aware
of A2/AD threats, which may slow or disrupt the deployment of
friendly forces. At times,
movement of forces can contribute to the escalation of tension;
while at other times, its
deterrent effect can reduce those tensions. Movement of forces
may deter adversary
aggression or movement.

Refer to JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations,
for more information on the
deployment process.

c. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the OA through
movement in
combination with fires and information to gain a position of

advantage in respect to
the enemy. Maneuver of forces relative to enemy COGs can be
key to the JFC’s mission
accomplishment. Through maneuver, the JFC can concentrate
forces at decisive points to
achieve surprise, psychological effects, and physical
momentum. Maneuver may also
enable or exploit the effects of massed or precision fires.

(1) The principal purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy at
a disadvantage
through the flexible application of movement and fires. The
goal of maneuver is to render
opponents incapable of resisting by shattering their morale and
physical cohesion (i.e., their
ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole) by moving to
a point of advantage to
deliver a decisive blow. This may be achieved by attacking
enemy forces and controlling
territory, airspace, EMS, populations, key waters, and LOCs
through air, land, and
maritime maneuvers.

(2) There are multiple ways to gain positional advantage. An
amphibious force
with aircraft, cruise missiles, and amphibious assault capability,
within operational reach
of an enemy’s COG, has positional advantage. In like manner,
land and air expeditionary
forces that are within operational reach of an enemy’s COG and
have the means and
opportunity to strike and maneuver on such a COG also have
positional advantage.
Maintaining full-spectrum superiority contributes to positional
advantage by facilitating
freedom of action. See Chapter VIII, “Large-Scale Combat

Operations,” paragraph 5.g,
“Full-Spectrum Superiority.”

(3) At all levels of warfare, successful maneuver requires not
only fire and
movement but also agility and versatility of thought, plans,
operations, and organizations.
It requires designating and then, if necessary, shifting the main
effort and applying the
principles of mass and economy of force.

(a) At the strategic level, deploying units to and positioning
units within an
OA are forms of maneuver if such movements seek to gain
positional advantage. Strategic

Joint Functions

III-39

maneuver should place forces in position to begin the phases or
major operations of a
campaign.

(b) At the operational level, maneuver is a means by which
JFCs set the
terms of battle by time and location, decline battle, or exploit
existing situations.
Operational maneuver usually takes large forces from a base of
operations to an area where
they are in position of operational reach from which to achieve
operational objectives. The
enemy may use AD actions to impede friendly operations when
A2 actions fail. The

objective for operational maneuver is usually a COG or decisive
point.

(c) At the tactical level, maneuver is a means by which
component
commanders employ their forces in combination with fires and
information to gain
positional advantage in respect to the enemy.

(4) Force posture (forces, footprints, and agreements) affects
operational reach
and is an essential maneuver-related consideration during
theater strategy development and
adaptive planning. Force posture is the starting position from
which planners determine
additional contingency basing requirements to support specific
contingency plans and
crisis responses. These requirements directly support the
development of operational
LOCs and LOOs and affect the combat power and other
capabilities a joint force can
generate. In particular, the arrangement and positioning of
temporary contingency bases
underwrite the ability of the joint force to project power by
shielding its components from
enemy action and protecting critical factors such as sortie or
resupply rates. Incomplete
planning for contingency base operations can unnecessarily
increase the sustainment
requirements of the joint force, leading to unanticipated risk.
Political and diplomatic
considerations can often affect basing decisions. US force
basing options span the range
from permanently based forces to temporary sea basing that
accelerates the deployment
and employment of maritime capabilities independent of

infrastructure ashore.

(5) JFCs should consider various ways and means to help
maneuver forces gain
positional advantage. Specifically, combat engineers provide
mobility of the force by
breaching obstacles, while simultaneously countering the
mobility of enemy forces by
emplacing obstacles and minimizing the effects of enemy
actions on friendly forces.

7. Protection

a. The protection function encompasses force protection, force
health protection
(FHP), and other protection activities.

(1) The function focuses on force protection, which preserves
the joint force’s
fighting potential in four primary ways. One way uses active
defensive measures that
protect the joint force, its information, its bases, necessary
infrastructure, and LOCs from
an enemy attack. Another way uses passive defensive measures
that make friendly forces,
systems, and facilities difficult to locate, strike, and destroy by
reducing the probability of,
and minimizing the effects of, damage caused by hostile action
without the intention of
taking the initiative. The application of technology and
procedures to reduce the risk of
friendly fire incidents is equally important. Finally, emergency
management and response

Chapter III

III-40 JP 3-0 CH1

reduce the loss of personnel and capabilities due to isolating
events, accidents, health
threats, and natural disasters.

(2) Force protection does not include actions to defeat the
enemy or protect
against accidents, weather, or disease. FHP complements force
protection efforts by
promoting, improving, preserving, or restoring the mental or
physical well-being of Service
members.

(3) As the JFC’s mission requires, the protection function also
extends beyond
force protection to encompass protection of US noncombatants.

b. The protection function encompasses a number of tasks,
including:

(1) Provide air, space, and missile defense.

(2) Protect US civilians and contractors authorized to
accompany the force.

(3) Conduct defensive countermeasure operations, including
MILDEC in support
of OPSEC, counterdeception, and counterpropaganda
operations.

(4) Conduct OPSEC, cyberspace defense, cyberspace security,
defensive EA, and
electronic protection activities.

(5) Conduct PR operations.

(6) Establish antiterrorism programs.

(7) Establish capabilities and measures to prevent friendly fire
incidents.

(8) Secure and protect combat and logistics forces, bases, JSAs,
and LOCs.

(9) Provide physical protection and security for forces, to
include conducting
operations to mitigate the effects of explosive hazards.

(10) Provide chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
(CBRN) defense.

(11) Minimize the effects of CBRN incidents through thorough
planning,
preparation, response, and recovery.

(12) Provide emergency management and response capabilities
and services.

(13) Protect the DODIN using cyberspace security and
cyberspace defense
measures.

(14) Identify and neutralize insider threats.

(15) Conduct identity collection activities. These include
security screening and
vetting in support of I2.

Joint Functions

III-41

c. Protection considerations affect planning in every joint
operation. Campaigns and
major operations involve large-scale combat against a capable
enemy. These operations
will typically require the full range of protection tasks, thereby
complicating both planning
and execution. Although the OA and joint force may be smaller
for a crisis response or
limited contingency operation, the mission can still be complex
and dangerous, thus
requiring a variety of protection considerations. Permissive
environments associated with
military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence still
require that
commanders and their staffs consider protection measures
commensurate with potential
risks. These risks may include a wide range of threats such as
terrorism, criminal
enterprises, environmental threats and hazards, and cyberspace
threats. Continuous
research and access to accurate, detailed information about the
OE, along with realistic
training, can enhance protection activities.

d. Force protection includes preventive measures taken to
prevent or mitigate enemy
and insider threat actions against DOD personnel (to include
family members and certain
contractors), resources, facilities, and critical information.
These actions preserve the
force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive

time and place and incorporate
integrated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures
that enable the effective
employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for
the enemy. Force
protection is achieved through the tailored selection and
application of multilayered active
and passive measures commensurate with the level of risk.
Intelligence sources provide
information regarding an enemy or adversary’s capabilities
against personnel and
resources, as well as information regarding force protection
considerations. Foreign and
domestic LEAs can contribute to force protection through the
prevention, detection,
response, and investigation of crime and by sharing information
on criminal and terrorist
organizations. I2 can identify threat networks in the OA,
enhancing the commander’s
ability to establish effective antiterrorism programs, screening
and vetting activities, and
lasting relationships with the HN and local population.

e. Key Considerations

(1) Security of forces and means enhances force protection by
identifying and
reducing friendly vulnerability to hostile acts, influence, or
surprise. Security operations
protect combat and logistics forces, bases, JSAs, and LOCs.
Physical security includes
physical measures designed to safeguard personnel; to prevent
unauthorized access to
equipment, installations, material, and documents; and to
safeguard them against
espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. The physical security

process determines
vulnerabilities to known threats; applies appropriate deterrent,
control, and denial
safeguarding techniques and measures; and responds to
changing conditions. Functions in
physical security include facility security, law enforcement,
guard and patrol operations,
special land and maritime security areas, and other physical
security operations like
military working dog operations or emergency and disaster
response support. Measures
include fencing and perimeter stand-off areas, land or maritime
force patrols, lighting and
sensors, vehicle barriers, blast protection, intrusion detection
systems and electronic
surveillance, and access control devices and systems. Physical
security measures, like any
defense, should be overlapping and deployed in depth.

Chapter III

III-42 JP 3-0 CH1

For additional guidance on physical security measures, refer to
JP 3-10, Joint Security
Operations in Theater.

(2) DCA. DCA supports protection using both active and
passive air and missile
defense measures.

(a) Active air and missile defense includes all direct defensive
actions taken
to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and

missile threats against
friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air
and missile defense weapons,
multiple sensors, EW, and other available weapons. Ideally,
integration of systems will
allow for a defense in depth, with potential for multiple
engagements that increase the
probability for success.

(b) Passive air and missile defense includes all measures, other
than active
air and missile defense, taken to minimize, mitigate, or recover
from the consequences of
attack aircraft and missiles, reducing the effectiveness of
hostile air and missile threats
against friendly forces and assets. These measures include
camouflage, concealment,
deception, dispersion, reconstitution, redundancy, detection and
warning systems, and the
use of protective construction.

(3) Global Missile Defense. Global missile defense
encompasses missile
defense operations, activities, or actions that affect more than
one GCC and require
synchronization among the affected commands to coordinate
effective allocation,
deployment, and employment of capabilities necessary to deter
and prevent attacks, destroy
enemy missiles, or nullify or reduce the effectiveness of an
attack.

For additional guidance on countering theater air and missile
threats, refer to JP 3-01,
Countering Air and Missile Threats.

(4) Other Considerations

(a) OPSEC denies the adversary the information needed to
correctly assess
friendly capabilities and intentions. It is also a tool, hampering
the adversary’s use of its
own information systems and processes. OPSEC should be
integrated into planning. The
purpose of OPSEC is to reduce the vulnerability of US and
multinational forces to
successful adversary exploitation of critical information.
Unlike security programs that
seek to protect classified information and controlled
unclassified information, OPSEC
identifies, controls, and protects critical information and
indicators that are associated
with specific military operations and activities. OPSEC applies
to all activities that
prepare, sustain, or employ forces. The OPSEC process
subsequently analyzes friendly
actions associated with military operations and other activities
to:

1. Identify those actions that may be observed by adversary
intelligence
systems.

2. Determine what specific indications could be collected,
analyzed, and
interpreted to derive critical information in time to be useful to
adversaries.

Joint Functions

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For additional guidance on OPSEC, refer to CJCSI 3213.01,
Joint Operations Security,
and JP 3-13.3, Operations Security.

(b) DCO include passive and active CO to preserve friendly
cyberspace
capabilities and protect data, networks, and net-centric
capabilities by monitoring,
analyzing, detecting, and responding to unauthorized activity
within DOD information
systems and computer networks.

(c) Cybersecurity encompasses measures that protect
computers, electronic
communications systems and services, wired communications,
and electronic
communications by ensuring their availability, integrity,
authentication, confidentiality,
and nonrepudiation. Cybersecurity incorporates protection,
detection, response,
restoration, and reaction capabilities and processes to shield and
preserve information and
information systems. Cybersecurity for the DODIN requires
integration of the capabilities
of people, operations, and technology. This capability
establishes a multilayer and
multidimensional protection to ensure survivability and mission
accomplishment.
Cybersecurity must account for the possibility that access to the
DODIN can be gained
from outside of DOD’s control.

For additional guidance on cybersecurity, refer to DODI
8500.01, Cybersecurity.

(d) Defensive Use of EW. Electronic protection is that division
of EW
involving action taken to protect personnel, facilities, and
equipment from any effects of
friendly or enemy use of the EMS that degrade, neutralize, or
destroy friendly combat
capability. Defensive EA activities use the EMS to protect
personnel, facilities,
capabilities, and equipment. Examples include self-protection
and force protection
measures such as use of expendables (e.g., chaff and active
decoys), jammers, towed
decoys, directed energy infrared countermeasure systems, and
counter radio-controlled
improvised explosive device (IED) systems.

Refer to JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare, for further guidance.

(5) PR. PR missions use military, diplomatic, and civil efforts
to recover and
reintegrate isolated personnel. There are five PR tasks (report,
locate, support, recover,
and reintegrate) necessary to achieve a complete and
coordinated recovery of US military
personnel, DOD civilians, DOD contractors, and others
designated by the President or
SecDef. JFCs should consider all individual, component, joint,
and multinational partner
capabilities available when planning and executing PR missions.

Refer to JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery, and DODD 3002.01,
Personnel Recovery in the
Department of Defense, for further guidance on PR.

(6) CBRN Defense. Preparation for potential enemy use of

CBRN weapons is
integral to joint planning. Even when an enemy does not
possess CBRN materiel or WMD,
access to materials such as radiation sources and toxic industrial
materials is a significant
planning consideration. Whether a CBRN attack achieves
traditional military objectives,
it will likely generate adverse strategic, operational,
psychological, economic, and political
effects. CBRN defense focuses on avoiding CBRN hazards
(contamination), protecting

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III-44 JP 3-0 CH1

individuals and units from CBRN hazards, and decontaminating
personnel and materiel to
restore operational capability. CBRN defense may also
contribute to the deterrence of
enemy WMD use through the enhancement of US forces’ CBRN
survivability. CBRN
defense capabilities may also respond to a noncombatant
incident or accidental causes such
as toxic industrial chemical incident.

For additional guidance on CBRN defense, refer to JP 3-11,
Operations in Chemical,
Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Environments; JP 3-40,
Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction; and JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear
Response.

(7) Antiterrorism programs support force protection by
establishing defensive
measures that reduce the vulnerability of individuals and
property to terrorist acts, to
include limited response and containment by local military and
civilian forces. These
programs also include personal security and defensive measures
to protect Service
members, high-risk personnel, civilian employees, family
members, DOD facilities,
information, and equipment. Personal security measures consist
of commonsense rules for
the on- and off-duty conduct of every Service member. They
also include employment of
dedicated guard forces and use of individual protective
equipment, hardened vehicles,
hardened facilities, and duress alarms. Security of high-risk
personnel safeguards
designated individuals who, by virtue of their rank, assignment,
symbolic value, location,
or specific threat, are at a greater risk than the general
population. Terrorist activities may
be discouraged by varying the installation force protection
posture through the use of a
random antiterrorism measures program, which may include
varying patrol routes; staffing
guard posts and towers at irregular intervals; and conducting
vehicle and vessel inspections,
personnel searches, and identification checks on a set but
unpredictable pattern. To be
effective, these measures should be highly visible to any hostile
elements conducting
surveillance.

Refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, for additional guidance on
antiterrorism.

(8) The intent of combat identification (CID) is to accurately
distinguish enemy
objects and forces in the OE from others to support engagement
decisions. CID supports
force protection and enhances operations by helping minimize
friendly fire incidents and
collateral damage. CID is not a substitute for any requirement
to conduct positive
identification of hostile forces, hostile acts, or a demonstration
of hostile intent as required
by ROE to engage targets.

(a) Depending on operational requirements, CID
characterization may be
limited to “friend,” “enemy/hostile,” “neutral,” or “unknown.”
In some situations,
additional characterizations may be required, including, but not
limited to, class, type,
nationality, and mission configuration. CID characterizations,
when applied with ROE,
enable engagement decisions concerning use or prohibition of
weapons and capabilities
that can create lethal and/or nonlethal effects.

(b) The staff should develop CID procedures early during
planning. These
procedures must be consistent with ROE and should not
interfere with the ability of a unit

Joint Functions

III-45

or individual to engage enemy forces. When developing the
JFC’s CID procedures,
important considerations include the missions, capabilities, and
limitations of all
participants.

Refer to JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, for additional guidance on
CID.

(9) Critical infrastructure protection programs support the
identification and
mitigation of vulnerabilities to defense critical infrastructure,
which includes DOD and
non-DOD domestic and foreign infrastructures essential to plan,
mobilize, deploy, execute,
and sustain US military operations on a global basis.
Coordination between DOD entities
and other USG departments and agencies; state, territorial,
tribal, and local governments;
the private sector; and equivalent foreign entities is key in
effective protection of critical
assets controlled both by DOD and private entities.
Vulnerabilities found in defense
critical infrastructure shall be remediated and/or mitigated
based on risk management
decisions made by responsible authorities. These vulnerability
mitigation decisions should
be made using all available program areas, including
antiterrorism, MILDEC, OPSEC, and
force protection.

(10) Counter-Improvised Explosive Device (C-IED)
Operations. C-IED
operations are the organization, integration, and
synchronization of capabilities and
activities to reduce casualties and mitigate damage caused by

IEDs. They include measures
to neutralize the infrastructure supporting the production and
employment of IEDs; the
development of tactics, techniques, and procedures to counter
the IED threat at the tactical
level; and the technical and forensic exploitation of the device
to obtain information to
support targeting, improve force protection, identify material
sourcing, and identify
weapon signatures.

For further guidance on C-IED, refer to JP 3-15.1, Counter-
Improvised Explosive Device
Operations.

(11) Identify and Neutralize Insider Threats. Insider threats
(sometimes
referred to as “green-on-blue” or “inside-the-wire” threats) may
include active shooters,
bombers, spies, and other threats embedded within or working
with US forces. These
threats are typically persons with authorized access, who use
that access to commit any of
a variety of illicit actions against friendly force personnel,
materiel, facilities, and
information. Countering these threats involves coordinating
and sharing information
among security, cybersecurity, CI, law enforcement, and other
personnel and staffs.
Identity activities support the identification of insider threats.
The joint force security
coordinator establishes procedures to counter insider threats
across the joint force.

For further guidance on countering insider threats, see JP 3-10,
Joint Security Operations

in Theater. For more information on identity activities, see
JDN 2-16, Identity Activities.

f. FHP complements force protection efforts and includes all
measures taken by the
JFC and the Military Health System to promote, improve, and
conserve the mental and
physical well-being of Service members. These capabilities
enable a healthy and fit force,
prevent injury and illness, and protect the force from health
hazards. FHP measures focus

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III-46 JP 3-0 CH1

on the prevention of illness and injury. The JFC is responsible
for allocating adequate
capabilities to identify health threats and implement appropriate
FHP measures. Health
threats are a composite of ongoing or potential enemy actions;
occupational,
environmental, geographical, and meteorological conditions;
endemic diseases; and the
employment of CBRN weapons or agents that can reduce the
effectiveness of military
forces. Therefore, a robust health surveillance system is
essential to FHP measures.
Health surveillance includes identifying the population at risk;
identifying and assessing
hazardous exposures; employing specific countermeasures to
eliminate or mitigate
exposures; and monitoring and reporting battle injury, disease,
and non-battle injury trends

and other health outcomes. Occupational and environmental
health surveillance enhances
the joint force’s ability to limit all categories of injuries
including combat and operational
stress, exposure to CBRN, and explosive hazards.

Refer to JP 4-02, Joint Health Services, for further guidance on
FHP.

g. Protection of Civilians. Persons who are neither part of nor
associated with an
armed force or group nor otherwise engaged in hostilities are
categorized as civilians and
have protected status under the law of war.

(1) It is US policy that members of the DOD components
comply with the law of
war during all armed conflicts, however such conflicts are
characterized, and in all other
military operations. Such compliance includes taking measures
to protect civilians. In
addition, the accountability, credibility, and legitimacy of a
joint operation; the success of
the overarching mission; and the achievement of US strategic
objectives depends on the
joint forces’ ability to minimize harm to civilians in the course
of their own operations and,
potentially, their ability to mitigate harm arising from the
operations of other parties.
Strategic objectives often involve strengthening security,
stability, and civilian well-being.

(2) Protection of civilians may be the primary purpose of a
mission or a
supporting task. The protection of civilians from deliberate
attack as a strategic or

operational imperative is distinct from the legal obligations of
US forces to minimize harm
to civilians during the conduct of operations. Effective
protection of civilians depends on
adaptive units, a command climate that emphasizes its
importance, and leaders who can
make timely and appropriate decisions based on critical
situations on the ground.
Moreover, joint forces must have in place ROE that prioritize
and account for the protection
of civilians in the planning process.

(3) Civilian casualty mitigation directly affects the success of
the overall mission.
Even tactical actions can have strategic and second-order
effects. Minimizing and
addressing civilian casualty incidents supports strategic
imperatives and are also at the
heart of the profession of arms. Failure to minimize civilian
casualties can undermine
national policy objectives and the mission of joint forces, while
assisting the enemy.
Additionally, civilian casualties can incite increased opposition
to joint forces. Focused
attention on civilian casualty mitigation can be an important
investment to maintain
legitimacy and accomplish the mission.

Joint Functions

III-47

See Department of Defense Law of War Manual regarding
obligations for protection of

civilians.

8. Sustainment

a. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel
services to maintain
operations through mission accomplishment and redeployment
of the force.
Sustainment provides the JFC the means to enable freedom of
action and endurance and to
extend operational reach. Sustainment determines the depth to
which the joint force can
conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain,
and exploit the initiative.
The sustainment function includes tasks to:

(1) Coordinate the supply of food, operational energy (fuel and
other energy
requirements), arms, munitions, and equipment.

(2) Provide for maintenance of equipment.

(3) Coordinate and provide support for forces, including field
services; personnel
services support; health services; mortuary affairs; religious
support (RS); postal support;
morale, welfare, and recreational support; financial support; and
legal services.

(4) Build and maintain contingency bases.

(5) Assess, repair, and maintain infrastructure.

(6) Acquire, manage, and distribute funds.

(7) Provide common-user logistics support to other government

agencies,
international organizations, NGOs, and other nations.

(8) Establish and coordinate movement services.

(9) Establish large-scale detention compounds and sustain
enduring detainee
operations.

b. JFCs should identify sustainment capabilities early in
planning. Sustainment
should be a priority consideration when the timed-phased force
and deployment data is
built. Sustainment provides JFCs with flexibility to develop
branches and sequels and to
refocus joint force efforts. Given mission objectives and
adversary threats, the ultimate
goal is for planners to develop a feasible, supportable, and
efficient CONOPS that takes
into account the threat and defense of logistical forces. Prior to
the development of
contingency plans, CCMDs develop a theater logistics analysis,
TLO, and distribution plan
to provide detailed mobility and distribution analysis to ensure
sufficient capacity or
planned enhanced capability is available to support the CCMD’s
CCP.

c. Logistics is planning and executing the movement and
support of forces. It
concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical
support efforts within the
theater, while scheduling the mobilization and movement of
forces and materiel to support

Chapter III

III-48 JP 3-0 CH1

the JFC’s CONOPS. The relative combat power that military
forces can generate against
an enemy is constrained by a nation’s capability to plan for,
gain access to, and deliver
forces and materiel to points of application. Logistics covers
the following core
functions: supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution,
joint health services,
logistic services, engineering, and operational contract support
(OCS). Associated
with these functions, logistics includes those aspects of military
operations that deal with:

(1) Materiel acquisition, receipt, storage, movement,
distribution, maintenance,
evacuation, and disposition.

(2) In-transit visibility and asset visibility.

(3) Common-user logistics support to other USG departments
and agencies,
international organizations, NGOs, and other nations.

(4) Logistic services (food, water, and ice; contingency basing;
and hygiene).

(5) OCS (contract support integration, contracting support, and
contract
management).

(6) Disposal operations.

(7) Engineering support.

(8) Facilities and infrastructure acquisition, construction,
maintenance,
operation, and disposition.

(9) Infrastructure assessment, repairs, and maintenance.

(10) Detention compounds (establish and sustain large-scale to
support enduring
detainee operations).

(11) Host-nation support (HNS).

(12) Personnel movement, including patient movement,
evacuation, and
hospitalization.

d. Personnel services are sustainment functions provided to
personnel rather than to
systems and equipment. Personnel services complement
logistics by planning for and
coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel during
joint operations. These
services include:

(1) Human resources support.

(2) RS.

(3) Financial management.

(4) Legal support.

Joint Functions

III-49

(5) Morale, welfare, and recreation support.

For further guidance on logistic support, refer to JP 4-0, Joint
Logistics. For further
guidance on personnel services, refer to JP 1-0, Joint Personnel
Support. For further
guidance on legal support, refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to
Military Operations. For
further guidance on religious affairs, refer to Joint Guide 1-05,
Religious Affairs in Joint
Operations. For further guidance on financial management
support, refer to JP 1-06,
Financial Management Support in Joint Operations.

e. Key Considerations

(1) Employment of Logistic Forces. For some operations,
logistic forces may
be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal
military roles and in
nonstandard tasks. Further, logistic forces may precede other
military forces or may be the
only forces deployed. Logistic forces may also continue to
support other military personnel
and civilians after the departure of combat forces. In such
cases, they must be familiar
with and adhere to applicable status-of-forces agreements and
acquisition and cross-
servicing agreements to which the US is a party. Given the
potential complexity of OEs,
logistic forces must be familiar with and adhere to legal,

regulatory, and
diplomatic/political restraints governing US involvement
because of the specialized nature
and unique authorities in operations such as disaster relief and
humanitarian assistance

(2) Protection. Logistics forces, like all other forces, must be
capable of self-
defense, particularly if they deploy alone or in advance of other
military forces. However,
the JFC should view combat and logistics forces as a unit with a
seamless mission and
objective and balance the allocation of security resources
accordingly in support of the
JFC’s mission.

(3) Facilities. JFCs should plan for the early acquisition
(leasing) of real estate
and facilities and bases when temporary occupancy is planned
or the HN provides
inadequate or no property. Early acquisition of facilities can be
critical to the flow of
forces. Use of automated planning tools can help forecast
construction labor, materiel, and
equipment requirements in support of the JFC’s contingency
basing plan.

(4) Environmental Considerations. Environmental
considerations are broader
than just protection of the environment and environmental
stewardship. They also include
continuously integrating the FHP, CMO, and other more
operationally focused
environmental considerations that affect US military forces and
objectives. Military
operations do not generally focus on environmental compliance

and environmental
protection. While complete protection of the environment will
not always be possible due
to its competition with other risks that the commander must
assess, JFCs are to protect the
environment in which US military forces operate to the greatest
extent possible consistent
with operational requirements. Specific planning guidance for
environment issues should
be IAW CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution
(APEX) Planning Formats
and Guidance. Commanders comply with the command
guidance on environmental
considerations specified in the plan or order and included in
unit SOPs. Environmental
considerations link directly to risk management and the safety
and health of Service

Chapter III

III-50 JP 3-0 CH1

members. All significant risks must be clearly and accurately
communicated to deploying
DOD personnel and the chain of command. Environmental
considerations, risk
management, and health risk communication are enabling
elements for the commander and
an essential part of military planning, training, and operations.
While complete protection
of the environment during military operations may not always
be possible, careful planning
should address environmental considerations in joint operations,
including legal aspects.

For additional guidance on environmental considerations, refer
to DODI 4715.19, Use of
Open-Air Burn Pits in Contingency Operations; DODI 4715.22,
Environmental
Management Policy for Contingency Locations; JP 3-34, Joint
Engineer Operations; and
JP 4-02, Joint Health Services.

(5) Operational Energy. The ability of the joint force to
conduct operations
depends on availability of sufficient energy, such as bulk fuel
and electricity. Proper
consideration of operational energy requirements improves the
joint force’s ability to
maintain operational access. Furthermore, efficient
management and use of operational
energy may enable greater availability of combat forces for a
variety of missions.

(6) Joint Health Services. Joint health services promote,
improve, preserve, or
restore the behavioral or physical well-being of personnel.
Joint health services include,
but are not limited to, the management of health service
resources, such as manpower,
funding, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures;
medical evacuation and
patient movement of the sick, wounded, or injured; selection of
the medically fit and
disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical
supply, equipment, and
maintenance thereof; combat and operational stress control; and
medical, dental,
veterinary, laboratory, optometric, nutrition therapy, and
medical intelligence services.

Medical logistics, included within joint health services,
includes patient movement,
evacuation, and hospitalization. CCDRs are responsible for
joint health services of forces
assigned or attached to their command and should establish
joint health services policies
and programs.

(a) Actions to obtain health threat information begin prior to
deployment
and are continually updated as forces are deployed. Disease and
injuries can quickly
diminish combat effectiveness and have a greater impact on
operations when the forces
employed are small and dispersed.

(b) The early introduction of preventive medicine personnel or
units into
theater helps protect US forces from diseases and injuries. It
also permits a thorough
assessment of the health threat to, and operational requirements
of, the mission. Preventive
medicine support includes education and training on personal
hygiene and field sanitation,
personal protective measures, epidemiological investigations,
pest management, and
inspection of water sources and supplies. For maximum
effectiveness, preventive medicine
needs to be provided to as many personnel as possible within
the OA. In addition to US
forces, preventive medicine should include multinational forces,
HN civilians, and
dislocated civilians to the greatest feasible extent. JFCs and
joint force surgeons shall
identify legal constraints unique to the OE and intended
recipient of services. Issues such

Joint Functions

III-51

as eligibility of beneficiaries, reimbursement for supplies and
manpower, and provisions
of legal agreements and other laws applicable to the theater, are
reviewed.

(c) Medical and rehabilitative care provides essential care in
the OA and
rapid evacuation to definitive care facilities without sacrificing
quality of care. It
encompasses care provided from the point of illness or injury
through rehabilitative care.

For further guidance on health services, refer to JP 4-02, Joint
Health Services. For
further guidance on procedures for deployment health activities,
refer to DODI 6490.03,
Deployment Health.

(7) HNS. JFCs interact with the HN government to establish
procedures to
request support and negotiate support terms. Logistic planners
should analyze the HN
economic capacity to supplement the logistic support to US or
multinational forces and
identify and limit adverse effects on the HN economy.
Accordingly, early mission analysis
should identify distribution requirements. This should be a
collaborative analysis with HN
government and private sector providers to build a systems

analysis for designated focus
areas when they are established. The systems analysis should
evaluate airfields, seaports,
rail and road networks, and energy infrastructure, particularly in
underdeveloped countries
where their status is questionable. Delaying this systems
analysis can diminish the flow of
strategic lift assets into the region. Additional support forces
may be required to build or
improve the supporting infrastructure to facilitate follow-on
force closure, as well as the
delivery of humanitarian cargo.

(8) OCS. Logistics support requirements are often met through
contracts with

commercial entities inside and outside the OA. Most joint
operations will require a level
of contracted support. Certain contracted items or services
could be essential to deploying,
sustaining, and redeploying joint forces effectively. OCS is the
process to plan for and
obtain supplies, services, and construction from commercial
sources in support of joint
operations. OCS is a multi-faceted joint activity executed by
the GCC and subordinate
JFCs through boards, centers, working groups, and associated
lead Service or joint theater
support contracting-related activities. It includes the ability to
plan, orchestrate, and
synchronize the provision of contract support integration,
contracting support, and
contractor management.

For further information on OCS, refer to JP 4-10, Operational

Contract Support; DODI
3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS); and CJCSM
4301.01, Planning Operational
Contract Support.

(9) Disposal Operations. Disposal is a consideration
throughout planning,
execution, and redeployment. Inadequate understanding of
disposal operations may cause
violations of public and international law, confusion over roles
and requirements, increased
costs, inefficient operations, and negative health implications.
Defense Logistics Agency
(DLA) support to the CCDR’s component commands includes
the capability to receive and
dispose of materiel in a theater. The DLA Disposition Services
element in theater
establishes theater-specific procedures for the reuse,
demilitarization, or disposal of
equipment and supplies, to include hazardous material and
waste.

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III-52 JP 3-0 CH1

(10) Legal Support. Legal support is important across all joint
functions. Many
decisions and actions have potential legal implications. The
JFC’s staff judge advocate
(SJA) provides the full spectrum of legal support during all
joint operations through direct
and reachback capability. A key member of the JFC’s personal
staff, the SJA provides

legal advice on the laws, regulations, policies, treaties, and
agreements that affect joint
operations. Legal advisors actively participate in the planning
process from mission
analysis to execution, an essential function given the
complexity of the OE. Legal
representatives advise on fiscal activities, international law, and
many other factors that
can affect operations, to include identifying legal issues that
affect operational limitations.
Further, the JFC should integrate HN legal personnel into the
command legal staff as soon
as practical to obtain guidance on unique HN legal practices and
customs.

Refer to JP 1-04, Legal Support to Military Operations, for
more detailed information and
guidance on legal support.

(11) Religious Affairs. The joint operations area requires both
the provision of
RS and advisement of the impact of religion upon operations,
morale, and ethics. The
JFC’s religious support team (RST) provides both required
capabilities directly and by
means of reachback capability. As a member of the JFC’s
personal staff, the chaplain
provides advisement on morals, ethics, and religion as they
pertain to the OE and the joint
force.

For more information on religious affairs, see Appendix B,
“Religious Affairs.”

(12) Financial Management. Financial management
encompasses resource

management and finance support. The joint force comptroller
provides the elements of
finance operations. The resource management normally consists
of costing functions and
leveraging fund sources. Finance operations provide funds to
contract and limited pay
support. The joint force comptroller’s management of these
elements provides the JFC
with many capabilities, from contracting and banking support to
cost capturing and fund
control. Financial management support for contracting,
subsistence, billeting,
transportation, communications, labor, and a myriad of other
supplies and services,
particularly in austere environments, can enable mission
accomplishment.

Refer to JP 1-06, Financial Management Support in Joint
Operations, for more detailed
information and guidance on financial management support.

IV-1

CHAPTER IV
ORGANIZING FOR JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

Organizing for joint operations involves many considerations.
Most can be associated
in three primary groups related to organizing the joint force,
organizing the joint force HQ,
and organizing OAs to help control operations. Understanding

the OE helps the JFC
understand factors that may affect decisions in each of these
areas.

2. Understanding the Operational Environment

a. General. Factors that affect joint operations extend far
beyond the boundaries of
the JFC’s assigned JOA. The JFC’s OE is the composite of the
conditions, circumstances,
and influences that affect employment of capabilities and bear
on the decisions of the
commander. It encompasses physical areas of the air, land,
maritime, and space domains;
the information environment (which includes cyberspace); the
EMS; and other factors.
Included within these are enemy, friendly, and neutral systems
that are relevant to a
specific joint operation. The nature and interaction of these
systems will affect how the
commander plans, organizes for, and conducts joint operations.

b. Physical Areas and Factors

(1) Physical Areas. The fundamental physical area in the OE is
the JFC’s
assigned OA. This term encompasses more descriptive terms
for geographic areas in which
joint forces conduct military operations. OAs include, but are
not limited to, such
descriptors as AOR, theater of war, theater of operations, JOA,
AOA, joint special
operations area (JSOA), and AO.

(2) Physical Factors. The JFC and staff must consider many
factors associated

with operations in the air, land, maritime, and space domains
and the information
environment (which includes cyberspace). These factors
include terrain (including urban
settings), population, weather, topography, hydrology, EMS,
and other environmental
conditions in the OA; distances associated with the deployment
to the OA and employment
of joint capabilities; the location of bases, ports, and other
supporting infrastructure; the
physical results of combat operations; and both friendly and
enemy forces and other
capabilities. Combinations of these factors affect operations
and sustainment.

c. Information Environment. The information environment
comprises and
aggregates numerous social, cultural, cognitive, technical, and
physical attributes that act
upon and impact knowledge, understanding, beliefs, world
views, and, ultimately, actions

“Good will can make any organization work; conversely, the
best organization
chart in the world is unsound if the men who have to make it
work don't believe
in it.”

James Forrestal, Secretary of Defense 1947-1949

Chapter IV

IV-2 JP 3-0 CH1

of an individual, group, system, community, or organization.
The information environment
also includes technical systems and their use of data. The
information environment directly
affects all OEs.

(1) Information is pervasive throughout the OE. To operate
effectively requires
understanding the interrelationship of the informational,
physical, and human aspects that
are shared by the OE and the information environment.
Informational aspects reflect the
way individuals, information systems, and groups communicate
and exchange information.
Physical aspects are the material characteristics of the
environment that create constraints
on and freedoms for the people and information systems that
operate in it. Finally, human
aspects frame why relevant actors perceive a situation in a
particular way. Understanding
the interplay between the informational, physical, and human
aspects provides a unified
view of the OE.

(2) Cyberspace is a global domain within the information
environment. It
consists of the interdependent network of information
technology infrastructures and
resident data, including the Internet, telecommunications
networks, computer systems, and
embedded processors and controllers. Most aspects of joint
operations rely in part on
cyberspace, which reaches across geographic and geopolitical
boundaries—much of it
residing outside of US control—and is integrated with the
operation of critical

infrastructures, as well as the conduct of commerce,
governance, and national security.
Commanders must consider their critical dependencies on
information and cyberspace, as
well as factors such as degradations to confidentiality,
availability, and integrity of
information and information systems, when they plan and
organize for operations.

(3) Commanders conduct CO to retain freedom of maneuver in
cyberspace,
accomplish the JFC’s objectives, deny freedom of action to
enemies and adversaries, and
enable other operational activities. CO include DODIN
operations to secure and operate
DOD cyberspace. CO rely on links and nodes that reside in the
physical domains and
perform functions in cyberspace and the physical domains.
Similarly, activities in the
physical domains can create effects in and through cyberspace
by affecting the EMS or the
physical infrastructure.

For more information on CO and the information environment,
refer to JP 3-12,
Cyberspace Operations, and JP 3-13, Information Operations.

d. EMS. The EMS is the range of all frequencies of
electromagnetic radiation.
Electromagnetic radiation consists of oscillating electric and
magnetic fields characterized
by frequency and wavelength. The EMS is usually subdivided
into frequency bands based
on certain physical characteristics and includes radio waves,
microwaves, millimeter
waves, infrared radiation, visible light, ultraviolet radiation, x-

rays, and gamma rays. The
rapid advances in EMS technologies over the past few decades
have led to an exponential
increase in commercial and military EMS-enabled/dependent
capabilities. This
proliferation, coupled with the US military’s heavy reliance on
the EMS and the low entry
costs for adversaries, poses significant military challenges to
the JFC. Integrated EMS
operations are required to achieve success and EMS
superiority—essential to all joint
operations.

Organizing for Joint Operations

IV-3

For more information on the EMS and EMS operations, see JP
3-13.1, Electronic Warfare,
and JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management
Operations.

e. A Systems Perspective

(1) A system is a functionally, physically, or behaviorally
related group of
regularly interacting or interdependent elements forming a
unified whole. One way to
think of the OE is as a set of complex and constantly interacting
political, military,
economic, social, information, and infrastructure (PMESII)
systems as depicted in Figure
IV-1. The interaction of these systems can then be viewed as a
network or networks based

on the participants. The nature and interaction of these systems
affect how the commander
plans, organizes, and conducts joint operations. The JFC’s
international partners and other
civilian participants routinely focus on systems other than
military, so the JFC and staff
should understand these systems and how military operations
affect them. Equally
important is understanding how elements in other PMESII
systems can help or hinder the
JFC’s mission. A commonly shared understanding among
stakeholders in the operation
can influence actions beyond the JFC’s directive authority and
promote a unified approach
to achieve objectives.

(2) A systems understanding of the OE typically is built
through cross-functional
participation by other joint force staff elements and
collaboration with various intelligence
organizations, USG departments and agencies, and
nongovernmental centers that possess
expertise. The JFC should consider the best way to manage or
support this cross-functional
effort. The J-2 is the staff lead for this effort as part of JIPOE.
A variety of factors,
including planning time available, will affect the fidelity of a
systems perspective.

(3) Understanding PMESII systems, their interaction with each
other, and how
system relationships will change over time will increase the
JFC’s knowledge of how
actions within a system can affect other system components.
Among other benefits, this
perspective helps intelligence analysts identify potential sources

of warning intelligence
and facilitates understanding the continuous and complex
interaction of friendly,
adversary, enemy, and neutral systems. A systems
understanding also facilitates
identification of operational design elements such as COGs,
LOOs, and decisive points.
For example, Figure IV-1 depicts notional operational and
strategic COGs (there could be
more). It shows each as a sub-system composed of related
nodes and clarifies that the two
COGs are related by a common node. This helps commanders
and their staffs visualize
and develop a broad approach to mission accomplishment early
in the planning process,
which makes detailed planning more efficient.

For further guidance on developing a systems perspective as
part of JIPOE, refer to JP 2-
01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Environment. For further guidance
on the use of a systems perspective in operational design and
joint planning, refer to JP 5-0,
Joint Planning.

Chapter IV

IV-4 JP 3-0 CH1

3. Organizing the Joint Force

a. General. How JFCs organize their assigned or attached
forces affects the
responsiveness and versatility of joint operations. The JFC’s

mission and operational
approach, as well as the principle of unity of command and a
mission command
philosophy, are guiding principles to organize the joint force for
operations. Joint
forces can be established on a geographic or functional basis.
JFCs may centralize
selected functions within the joint force but should not reduce
the versatility,
responsiveness, and initiative of subordinate forces. JFCs
should allow Service and special
operations tactical and operational forces, organizations, and
capabilities to function
generally as they were designed. All Service components
contribute distinct capabilities

Figure IV-1. A Systems Perspective of the Operational
Environment

Legend

Decisive PointCOG center of gravity COG Node Node Link

A Systems Perspective of the Operational Environment

A systems perspective facilitates operational design and joint
operation planning by providing
the joint force commander (JFC) and staff with a common frame
of reference for collaboration
with interorganizational and multinational partners to determine
and coordinate actions that are
beyond the JFC’s command authority.

Operational
COG

Strategic
COG

Military

Social

Information

Infrastructure

Political

Economic

Organizing for Joint Operations

IV-5

to joint operations that enable joint effectiveness. Joint
interdependence is the purposeful
reliance by one Service on another Service’s capabilities to
maximize the complementary
and reinforcing effects of both. The degree of interdependence
varies with specific
circumstances. When JFCs organize their forces, they should
also consider the degree of
interoperability among Service components, with multinational
forces and other potential
participants. Complex or unclear command relationships are
counterproductive to synergy
among multinational forces. Simplicity and clarity of
expression are essential. Similarly,

JFCs conducting domestic operations should consider
overlapping responsibilities and
interoperability issues among the Active Component and
Reserve Component forces.

b. Joint Force Options

(1) CCMDs. A CCMD is a unified or specified command with
a broad,
continuing mission under a single commander established and
so designated by the
President, through SecDef, and with the advice and assistance
of the CJCS. Unified
commands are established to conduct broad, continuing
missions requiring execution by
significant forces of two or more Military Departments to
achieve national objectives or
other criteria found in JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of
the United States. Specified
commands are normally composed of forces from one Military
Department but may
include units and staff representation from other Military
Departments. The UCP
establishes missions, responsibilities, and geographic AORs
assigned to GCCs. A GCC is
a CCDR assigned a geographic area that includes all associated
land, water, and airspace.
An FCC is a CCDR with transregional functional
responsibilities. GCCs and FCCs have
the authority to employ forces within their commands to carry
out assigned missions, and
they act as the supported commander for planning and executing
of these missions. They
may simultaneously be a supporting commander to other CCDRs
for planning and
executing the other CCDR’s missions. In addition, US Special

Operations Command and
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) serve
as joint force providers
for SOF and mobility forces, respectively.

(2) Subordinate Unified Commands. When authorized by
SecDef through the
CJCS, commanders of unified (not specified) commands may
establish subordinate unified
commands to conduct operations on a continuing basis IAW the
criteria set forth for unified
commands. A subordinate unified command may be established
on a geographic area or
functional basis. Commanders of subordinate unified
commands have functions and
responsibilities similar to those of the commanders of unified
commands. They exercise
OPCON of assigned commands and forces and normally of
attached forces in the assigned
operational or functional area.

(3) Joint Task Forces (JTFs). A JTF is a joint force constituted
and designated
by SecDef; a CCDR; a subordinate unified command
commander; or an existing
commander, joint task force (CJTF), to accomplish missions
with specific, limited

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Maintain operational and organizational flexibility.

Chapter IV

IV-6 JP 3-0 CH1

objectives and which do not require centralized control of
logistics. However, there may
be situations where a CJTF may require directive authority for
common support
capabilities delegated by the CCDR. JTFs may be established
on a geographical area or
functional basis. However, JTFs can also be established based
on a security challenge that
focuses on specific threats that cross AOR boundaries or
multiple noncontiguous
geographic areas. The proper authority dissolves a JTF when
the JTF achieves the
objectives for which it was created or is no longer required.

(4) There are several ways to form a JTF HQ. Normally, a
CCMD may employ
a Service component HQ or one of the Service component’s
existing subordinate HQ (e.g.,
Army corps, numbered air force, numbered fleet, or Marine
expeditionary force) as the
core of a JTF HQ and then augment that core with personnel and
capabilities from the
Services comprising the JTF. Also, the theater special
operations command (TSOC) or a
subordinate SOF HQ with the C2 capability can form the
foundation for a JTF HQ. CCDRs
verify the readiness of assigned Service HQ staffs to establish,
organize, and operate as a
JTF-capable HQ. JTF HQ basing depends on the JTF mission,
OE, and available
capabilities and support. JTF HQ can be land- or sea-based,
with transitions between both
basing options. JTFs are normally assigned a JOA. JTFs must
be able to integrate

effectively with USG departments and agencies, multinational
partners, and indigenous
and regional stakeholders. When direct participation by USG
departments and agencies
other than DOD is significant, the TF establishing authority
may designate it as a joint
interagency TF. This typically occurs when the other
interagency partners have primacy
and legal authority and the JFC provides supporting
capabilities, such as humanitarian
assistance.

(5) Forming and training the joint force HQ and task organizing
the joint force
can be challenging, particularly in crisis situations. Joint forces
must quickly adjust both
operations and organization in response to planned operational
transitions or unexpected
situational transitions. For example, achieving combat
objectives in the dominate phase of
an operation much earlier than anticipated could signal to the
JFC to shift emphasis and
organization quickly to stability actions commonly associated
with the stabilize and enable
civil authority phases. Similarly, the JFC’s mission will affect
the echelon at which joint
capabilities are best employed. Advances in areas ranging from
communications and
information sharing to munitions effectiveness make it possible
to synchronize lower
echelons of command in some situations without the risks and
inefficiencies associated
with fragmenting the assets themselves. JFCs should exploit
such opportunities.

For further guidance on the formation and employment of a JTF

HQ, refer to JP 3-33,
Joint Task Force Headquarters.

c. Component Options. CCDRs and subordinate unified
commanders conduct either
single-Service or joint operations to accomplish a mission. All
JFCs may conduct
operations through their Service component commanders,
lower-echelon Service force
commanders, and functional component commanders. Further,
functional and Service
components of the joint force conduct supported, subordinate,
and supporting
operations, not independent campaigns.

Organizing for Joint Operations

IV-7

(1) Service Components. Regardless of the organization and
command
arrangements within joint commands, Service component
commanders retain
responsibility for certain Service-specific functions and other
matters affecting their forces,
including internal administration, personnel support, training,
sustainment, and Service
intelligence operations. Conducting joint operations through
Service components has
certain advantages, which include clear and uncomplicated
command lines. This
arrangement is appropriate when stability, continuity, economy,
ease of long-range
planning, and scope of operations dictate organizational

integrity of Service components.
While sustainment remains a Service responsibility, there are
exceptions such as
arrangements described in Service support agreements, CCDR-
directed common-user
logistics lead Service, or DOD agency responsibilities.

(2) Functional Components. The JFC can establish functional
component
commands to conduct operations when forces from two or more
Services must operate in
the same physical domain or accomplish a distinct aspect of the
assigned mission. These
conditions apply when the scope of operations requires that the
similar capabilities and
functions of forces from more than one Service be directed
toward closely related
objectives and unity of command is a primary consideration.
For example, functionally
oriented components are useful when the scope of operations is
large and the JFC’s
attention must be divided between major operations or phases of
operations that are
functionally dominated. Functional component commands are
subordinate components of
a joint force. Except for the joint force special operations
component and joint special
operations TF, functional components do not constitute a joint
force with a JFC’s
authorities and responsibilities, even when composed of forces
from two or more Military
Departments.

(a) JFCs may conduct operations through functional
components or employ
them primarily to coordinate selected functions. The JFC will

normally designate the
Service component commander who has the preponderance of
forces and the ability to
exercise C2 over them as the functional component commander.
However, the JFC will
always consider the mission, nature and duration of the
operation, force capabilities, and
C2 capabilities when selecting a commander. The establishment
of a functional component
commander must not affect the command relationship between
Service component
commanders and the JFC.

(b) The functional component commander’s staff composition
should reflect
the command’s composition so the staff has the required
expertise to help the commander
effectively employ the component’s forces. Functional
component staffs require advanced
planning, appropriate training, and frequent exercises for
efficient operations. Liaison
elements from and to other components facilitate coordination
and support. Staff billets
and individuals to fill them should be identified and used when
the commander forms the

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Drive synergy to the lowest echelon at which it can be managed
effectively.

Chapter IV

IV-8 JP 3-0 CH1

functional component staff for exercises and actual operations.
The number of staff
personnel should be appropriate for the mission and nature of
the operation. The staff
structure should be flexible enough to add or delete personnel
and capabilities in changing
conditions without losing effectiveness.

(c) The JFC designates forces and/or military capabilities that
will be made
available for tasking by the functional component commander
and the appropriate
command relationship(s). JFCs may also establish a support
relationship between
components to facilitate operations. Regardless, the
establishing JFC defines the authority
and responsibilities of functional component commanders based
on the CONOPS, and the
JFC may alter their authority and responsibilities during the
course of an operation.

(3) Combination. Joint forces often are organized with a
combination of Service
and functional components. For example, joint forces organized
with Service components
normally have SOF organized under a JFSOCC, while the
conventional air forces will
normally have a JFACC designated, whose authorities and
responsibilities are defined by
the establishing JFC based on the JFC’s CONOPS.

d. SOF Employment Options

(1) Used independently with conventional force support (since
USC limits SOF

combat support and combat service support) or integrated with
conventional forces, SOF
provide strategic options for national leaders and the GCCs
through a global network that
fully integrates military, interagency, and international partners.
SOF are most effective
when special operations are fully integrated into the overall
plan and the execution of
special operations is through proper SOF C2 elements employed
intact.

(2) Commander, United States Special Operations Command
(CDRUSSOCOM),
synchronizes the planning of special operations and provides
SOF to support persistent,
networked, and distributed GCC operations to protect and
advance national interests.

(3) CDRUSSOCOM exercises COCOM of all SOF. GCCs
exercise OPCON of
their supporting TSOCs and most often exercise OPCON of SOF
deployed in their AORs.
The establishing directive will define command relationships
between the special
operations commands and JTF/TF commanders. A TSOC
commander can be the JTF
commander.

For more information on special operations, refer to JP 3-05,
Special Operations.

e. Joint HQ Augmentation Options. There are various options
available to augment
a joint HQ that is forming for joint operations.

See JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, for more

information.

4. Organizing the Joint Force Headquarters

Joint force HQ include those for unified, subordinate unified,
and specified commands
and JTFs. While each HQ organizes to accommodate the nature
of the JFC’s OA, mission,

Organizing for Joint Operations

IV-9

tasks, and preferences, all generally follow a traditional
functional staff alignment (i.e.,
personnel, intelligence, operations, logistics, plans, and
communications) depicted in
Figure IV-2. The primary staff functional areas are also
generally consistent with those at
Service component HQ, which facilitates higher, lower, and
lateral cross-command staff
coordination and collaboration. Some HQ may combine
functions under a staff principal,
while other HQ may add staff principals. Based on the mission
and other factors, some
joint HQ may have additional primary staff organizations
focused on areas such as
engineering; force structure, resource, and assessment; and
CMO.

5. Organizing Operational Areas

a. General. Except for AORs, which are assigned in the UCP,
GCCs and other JFCs

designate smaller OAs (e.g., JOA and AO) on a temporary basis.
OAs have physical
dimensions composed of some combination of air, land,
maritime, and space domains.
While domains are useful constructs for visualizing and
characterizing the physical
environment in which operations are conducted (the OA), the
use of the term “domain” is
not meant to imply or mandate exclusivity, primacy, or C2 of
any domain. Specific
authorities and responsibilities within an OA are as specified by
the appropriate JFC. JFCs
define these areas with geographical boundaries, which help
commanders and staffs

Figure IV-2. Notional Joint Force Headquarters and Cross-
Functional Staff Organization

Legend

J-1 manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff

J-4 logistics directorate of a joint staff

J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-6 communications system directorate of a joint staff

Notional Joint Force Headquarters and
Cross-Functional Staff Organization

Chief of Staff

J-3J-1 J-4J-2 J-5

Offices and
Elements

Centers and
Groups

BoardsCells

Working
Groups and

Planning
Teams

J-6

NOTE: The commander may add additional primary J-staff
directorates as required.

Chapter IV

IV-10 JP 3-0 CH1

coordinate, integrate, and deconflict joint operations among
joint force components and
supporting commands. The size of these OAs and the types of
forces employed within
them depend on the scope and nature of the mission and the
projected duration of
operations.

b. CCMD-Level Areas. GCCs conduct operations in their

assigned AORs. When
warranted, the President, SecDef, or GCCs may designate a
theater of war and/or theater
of operations for each operation (see Figure IV-3). GCCs can
elect to control operations
directly in these OAs or may establish subordinate joint forces
for that purpose, while
remaining focused on the broader AOR. Operations that span
GCC boundaries may expose
gaps in C2. DOD uses a mix of formal and informal processes
to synchronize actions
between AORs.

(1) AOR. An AOR is an area established by the UCP that
defines geographic
responsibilities for a GCC. A GCC has authority to plan for
operations within the AOR
and conduct those operations approved by the President or
SecDef. CCDRs may operate
forces wherever required to accomplish approved missions. All
cross-AOR operations
must be coordinated among the affected GCCs.

(2) Theater of War. A theater of war is a geographical area
established by the
President, SecDef, or GCC for the conduct of major operations
and campaigns involving
combat. A theater of war is established primarily when there is
a formal declaration of war
or it is necessary to encompass more than one theater of
operations (or a JOA and a separate
theater of operations) within a single boundary for the purposes
of C2, sustainment,
protection, or mutual support. A theater of war does not
normally encompass a GCC’s
entire AOR but may cross the boundaries of two or more AORs.

(3) Theater of Operations. A theater of operations is an OA
defined by the GCC
for the conduct or support of specific military operations. A
theater of operations is
established primarily when the scope of the operation in time,
space, purpose, and/or
employed forces exceeds what a JOA can normally
accommodate. More than one joint
force HQ can exist in a theater of operations. A GCC may
establish one or more theaters
of operations. Different theaters will normally be focused on
different missions. A theater
of operations typically is smaller than a theater of war but is
large enough to allow for

OPERATIONAL AREAS FOR OPERATION RESTORE HOPE

During Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, the joint forces
rear area was
centered around the separate sites of the embassy compound,
port, and
airfield in the city of Mogadishu, while its operational area was
widely
scattered around the towns and villages of the interior. The
area of interest
included the rest of the country and particularly those
population and relief
centers not under the joint force commander’s supervision.

Various Sources

Organizing for Joint Operations

IV-11

operations in depth and over extended periods of time. Theaters
of operations are normally
associated with major operations and campaigns and may cross
the boundary of two AORs.

c. For operations somewhat limited in scope and duration, or
for specialized activities,
the commander can establish the following OAs.

(1) JOA. A JOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace, defined
by a GCC or
subordinate unified commander, in which a JFC (normally a
CJTF) conducts military
operations to accomplish a specific mission. JOAs are
particularly useful when operations
are limited in scope and geographic area or when operations are
to be conducted on the
boundaries between theaters.

(2) JSOA. A JSOA is an area of land, sea, and airspace
assigned by a JFC to the
commander of SOF to conduct special operations activities. It
may be limited in size to
accommodate a discreet direct action mission or may be
extensive enough to allow a
continuing broad range of unconventional warfare (UW)
operations. A JSOA is defined
by a JFC who has geographic responsibilities. JFCs may use a
JSOA to delineate and
facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations.
The JFSOCC is the supported
commander within the JSOA.

Figure IV-3. Operational Areas within a Theater

Operational Areas within a Theater

This example depicts a combatant commander’s AOR, also
known as a theater. Within the AOR,
the combatant commander has designated a theater of war.
Within the theater of war are two
theaters of operations and a JSOA. To handle a situation
outside the theater of war, the combatant
commander has established a theater of operations and a JOA,
within which a joint task force will
operate. JOAs could also be established within the theater of
war or theaters of operations.

Theater of
Operations

JSOA

JOA

AOR Theater of
War

Legend

AOR area of responsibility
JOA joint operations area

JSOA joint special operations area

Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 3-0 CH1

For additional guidance on JSOAs, refer to JP 3-05, Special
Operations.

(3) AOA. The AOA is a geographic area within which is
located the objective(s)
to be secured by the amphibious force. This area must be of
sufficient size to accomplish
the amphibious force’s mission and must provide sufficient area
for conducting necessary
sea, air, and land operations.

For additional guidance on AOAs, refer to JP 3-02, Amphibious
Operations.

(4) AO. JFCs may define AOs for land and maritime forces.
AOs do not
typically encompass the entire OA of the JFC but should be
large enough for component
commanders to accomplish their missions (to include a
designated amount of airspace) and
protect their forces. Component commanders with AOs
typically designate subordinate
AOs within which their subordinate forces operate. These
commanders employ the full
range of joint and Service control measures and graphics as
coordinated with other
component commanders and their representatives to delineate
responsibilities, deconflict
operations, and achieve unity of effort.

d. Contiguous and Noncontiguous OAs

(1) OAs may be contiguous or noncontiguous (Figure IV-4).
When they are
contiguous, a boundary separates them. When OAs are
noncontiguous, subordinate
commands do not share a boundary. The higher HQ retains
responsibility for the
unassigned portion of its OA.

(2) In some operations, a Service or functional component
(typically the ground
component) could have such a large OA that the component’s
subordinate units operate in
a noncontiguous manner, widely distributed and beyond
mutually supporting range of each
other. In these cases, the JFC should consider options whereby
joint capabilities can be
pushed to lower levels and placed under control of units that
can use them effectively.

e. Considerations When Assuming Responsibility for an OA.
The establishing
commander should activate an assigned OA at a specified date
and time based on mission
and situation considerations addressed during COA analysis and
wargaming. Among
others, common considerations include C2, the information
environment, intelligence
requirements, communications support, protection, security,
LOCs, terrain management,
movement control, airspace control, surveillance,
reconnaissance, air and missile defense,
PR, targeting and fires, interorganizational coordination, and
environmental issues.

Refer to JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, for specific
guidance on assuming

responsibility for an OA.

Organizing for Joint Operations

IV-13

Figure IV-4. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational Areas

Adjacent, subordinate command’s operational
areas share boundaries. In this case, the higher
headquarters has assigned all of its operational
area to subordinate commands.

Contiguous Noncontiguous

Subordinate commands are assigned operational
areas that do not share boundaries. The higher
headquarters retains responsibility for the portion
of its operational area not assigned to subordinate
commands.

MARFOR
AO

ARFOR
AO

JSA

MARFOR

AO

JSA

JSOA

ARFOR
AO

Legend

AO area of operations
ARFOR Army forces
JSA joint security area

JSOA joint special operations area
MARFOR Marine Corps forces

Chapter IV

IV-14 JP 3-0 CH1

Intentionally Blank

V-1

CHAPTER V
JOINT OPERATIONS ACROSS THE CONFLICT
CONTINUUM

1. Introduction

a. Threats to US and allied interests throughout the world can
sometimes only be
countered by US forces able to respond to a wide variety of
challenges along a conflict
continuum that spans from peace to war. Our national interests
and the nature of crises
that can occur along this continuum require our nation’s Armed
Forces to be proficient in
a wide variety of activities, tasks, missions, and operations that
vary in purpose, scale, risk,
and combat intensity.

b. As the joint operations keystone publication, JP 3-0 provides
a broad framework
within which to consider how to conduct joint operations. The
framework comprises a
combination of fundamental constructs, such as operational art,
the range of military
operations, and the interconnected OE. Together, they provide
broad context to
consider the use of military capabilities in various
circumstances across the conflict
continuum. This chapter discusses some of these constructs to
clarify the relationship of
various military operations and activities to each other, and in
the context of the OE.

2. Military Operations and Related Missions, Tasks, and
Actions

a. In general, a military operation is a set of actions intended to
accomplish a task or
mission. Although the US military is organized, trained, and
equipped for sustained, large-

scale combat anywhere in the world, the capabilities to conduct
these operations also
enable a wide variety of other operations and activities. In
particular, opportunities exist
prior to large-scale combat to shape the OE to prevent, or at
least mitigate, the effects of
war. Characterizing the employment of military capabilities
(people, organizations, and
equipment) as one or another type of military operation has
several benefits. For example,
publications can be developed that describe the nature, tasks,
and tactics associated with
specific types of diverse operations, such as NEO and COIN.
These publications provide
the basis for related joint training and joint professional
military education that help joint
forces conduct military operations as effectively and efficiently
as possible even in difficult
and dangerous circumstances. Characterizations also help
military and civilian leaders
explain US military involvement in various situations to the US
and international public
and news media. Likewise, such characterizations,
supplemented by operational
experience, can clarify the need for specific capabilities that
enhance certain operations.
For example, facial recognition software associated with
biometric capabilities helps

“I am confident that our Nation has the most professional and
capable military
in the world. Our Joint Forces have proven effective and
resilient throughout
years of combat, kept the homeland safe, and advanced our
national interests
across the globe.”

General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr., 19th Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff,
Joint Force Quarterly 80

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V-2 JP 3-0 CH1

military and law enforcement personnel identify terrorists and
piece together their human
networks as part of combating terrorism.

Refer to JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism, for additional guidance on
antiterrorism and JP 3-26,
Counterterrorism, for additional guidance on counterterrorism
(CT).

b. Military operations are often categorized by their focus, as
shown in Figure V-1.
In some cases, the title covers a variety of missions, tasks, and
activities. Many activities
accomplished by single Services, such as tasks associated with
security cooperation, do not
constitute a joint operation. Nonetheless, most of these occur
under a joint “umbrella,”
because they contribute to achievement of CCDRs’ CCP
objectives. Following are brief
summaries of examples of military operations and activities.

(1) Stability Activities. Stability activities is an overarching
term encompassing
various military missions, tasks, and activities conducted
outside the US in coordination

with other instruments of national power to maintain or
reestablish a safe and secure
environment and to provide essential governmental services,
emergency infrastructure
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief. See JP 3-07, Stability,
for more information.

(2) DSCA. DSCA is provided by US federal military forces,
DOD agencies,
DOD civilians, DOD contractor personnel, DOD component
assets, and National Guard
forces when SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the
affected states, elects and
requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC, status in response
to requests for assistance
from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law
enforcement support, and other
domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special
events. See JP 3-28, Defense
Support of Civil Authorities, for more information.

(3) FHA. FHA is DOD activities, normally in support of the
United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) or DOS,
conducted outside the US and
its territories to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease,
hunger, or privation. See JP 3-
29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

Figure V-1. Examples of Military Operations and Activities

Examples of Military Operations and Activities

Foreign internal defense

Counterdrug operations

Combating terrorism

Counterinsurgency

Homeland defense

Mass atrocity response

Security cooperation

Military engagement

Stability activities

Defense support of civil authorities

Foreign humanitarian assistance

Recovery

Noncombatant evacuation

Peace operations

Countering weapons of mass destruction

Chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear response

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

V-3

(4) Recovery. Recovery is operations to search for, locate,
identify, recover, and
return isolated personnel, human remains, sensitive equipment,

or items critical to national
security. See JP 3-50, Personnel Recovery.

(5) NEO. NEO is an operation to evacuate noncombatants and
civilians from
foreign countries to safe havens or to the US when their lives
are endangered by war, civil
unrest, or natural disaster. See JP 3-68, Noncombatant
Evacuation Operations.

(6) Peace Operations (PO). PO are operations to contain
conflict, redress the
peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and
rebuilding and facilitate the
transition to legitimate governance. PO include peacekeeping
operations (PKO), peace
enforcement operations (PEO), peacemaking (PM), peace
building (PB), and conflict
prevention efforts. See JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

(7) Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD).
CWMD
encompasses efforts against actors of concern to curtail the
conceptualization,
development, possession, proliferation, use, and effects of
WMD, related expertise,
materials, technologies, and means of delivery. See JP 3-40,
Countering Weapons of Mass
Destruction.

(8) CBRN Response. CBRN response is DOD support to USG
actions that plan
for, prepare for, respond to, and recover from the effects of
domestic and foreign CBRN
incidents. See JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Response.

(9) Foreign Internal Defense (FID). FID is participation by
civilian and
military agencies of a government in any of the action programs
taken by another
government or other designated organization to free and protect
its society from
subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats
to its security. FID is an
example of USG foreign assistance. See JP 3-22, Foreign
Internal Defense.

(10) Counterdrug (CD) Operations. CD operations provide
DOD support to
LEAs to detect, monitor, and counter the production,
trafficking, and use of illegal drugs.
See JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.

(11) Combating Terrorism. Combating terrorism is actions,
including
antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability
to terrorist acts) and CT
(actions taken directly against terrorist networks) to oppose
terrorism. See JP 3-07.2,
Antiterrorism, and JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.

(12) COIN. COIN is an operation that encompasses
comprehensive civilian and
military efforts taken to defeat an insurgency and to address any
core grievances. See JP
3-24, Counterinsurgency Operations.

(13) HD. HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory,
domestic population,
and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and
aggression or other threats

as directed by the President. See JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

Chapter V

V-4 JP 3-0 CH1

(14) Mass Atrocity Response. Mass atrocity response is
military activities
conducted to prevent or halt mass atrocities. See JP 3-07.3,
Peace Operations.

3. The Range of Military Operations

a. The range of military operations is a fundamental construct
that helps relate military
activities and operations in scope and purpose. The potential
range of military activities
and operations extends from military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence in
times of relative peace up through large-scale combat
operations. The range encompasses
three primary categories: military engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence;
crisis response and limited contingency operations; and large-
scale combat
operations. Figure V-2 depicts these categories against a
backdrop of the conflict
continuum. All operations across this range share a common
fundamental purpose—to
achieve or contribute to national objectives.

b. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence
activities develop local
and regional situational awareness, build networks and

relationships with partners, shape
the OE, keep day-to-day tensions between nations or groups
below the threshold of armed
conflict, and maintain US global influence. Many missions
associated with crisis response
and limited contingencies, such as DSCA and FHA, may not
require combat. But others,
such as Operation RESTORE HOPE in Somalia, can be
dangerous and may require combat
operations to protect US forces. Large-scale combat often
occurs in the form of major
operations and campaigns that achieve national objectives or
contribute to a larger, long-
term effort (e.g., Operation ENDURING FREEDOM).

c. The complex nature of the strategic environment may require
US forces to conduct
different types of joint operations and activities simultaneously
across the conflict
continuum. Although this publication discusses specific types
of operations and activities
under the various categories in the range of military operations,
each type is not doctrinally

Figure V-2. Notional Operations Across the Conflict
Continuum

Notional Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Range of
Military
Operations

Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national

power across the conflict
continuum in a wide variety of operations and activities that are
commonly characterized in
three groups as this figure depicts.

Peace Conflict Continuum War

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

V-5

fixed and could shift within that range. For instance, security
cooperation activities may
be satisfying internal security requirements of a PN, but the
emergence of a violent internal
security threat that overwhelms PN security forces could require
the USG to commit to
FID or COIN operations in that PN, while security cooperation
activities continue.

(1) Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and
Deterrence. These
ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain, and refine
relations with other nations and
include military engagement activities with domestic civil
authorities (e.g., state governors
or local law enforcement). The general strategic objective is to
protect or further US
interests at home and abroad by enabling support from PNs,
enhancing their capacity or

capability for security and stability, and maintaining or
establishing operational access.
These activities seek to build networks and relationships to
develop situational and cultural
awareness that allows the US to develop more-informed options
to address emerging
situations and opportunities. These occur continuously in many
parts of the GCC’s AOR
even when combat operations may be occurring in other parts.
Some activities, such as
those related to deterrence, can span the entire conflict
continuum and may be integral tasks
associated with flexible deterrent options (FDOs), flexible
response options (FROs), or
large-scale combat operations. See Chapter VI, “Military
Engagement, Security
Cooperation, and Deterrence.”

(2) Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations.
These operations
can range from an independent, small-scale, noncombat
operation, such as support of civil
authorities, up to a supporting component of extended major
noncombat and/or combat
operations. The associated general strategic and operational-
level objectives are to protect
US interests and/or prevent further escalation. See Chapter VII,
“Crisis Response and
Limited Contingency Operations.”

(3) Large-Scale Combat Operations. The nature and scope of
some missions
may require joint forces to conduct large-scale combat
operations to achieve national
strategic objectives or protect national interests. Such combat
typically occurs within the

framework of a major operation or campaign. A major
operation is series of tactical actions
(battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a
single or several Services,
coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or
operational objectives in an OA. The
term can also refer to a noncombat operation of significant size
and scope. A campaign is
a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic
and operational objectives
within a given time and space. Usually associated with large-
scale combat, a campaign
can also comprise predominately limited combat and noncombat
operations of extended
duration to achieve theater and national strategic objectives.
See Chapter VIII, “Large-
Scale Combat Operations.”

4. The Combatant Command Campaign

a. Military operations, actions, and activities in a GCC’s AOR,
from security
cooperation through large-scale combat, are conducted in the
context of the GCC’s ongoing
theater campaign.

Chapter V

V-6 JP 3-0 CH1

b. The CCDR’s campaign is the overarching framework that
synchronizes all
activities and operations within the theater to achieve theater
and national strategic

objectives. A CCP operationalizes the GCC’s strategy and
approach to achieve these
objectives within two to five years by organizing and aligning
available resources. CCPs
also support the campaign objectives of other CCDRs
responsible for synchronizing
collaborative DOD planning. As Figure V-3 shows, CCPs
encompass all ongoing and
planned operations across the range of military operations,
continuously adjusted in
response to changes in the OE. The CCP’s long-term and
persistent and preventative
activities are intended to identify and deter, counter, or
otherwise mitigate an adversary’s
actions before escalation to combat. Many of these activities
are conducted with DOD in
support of the diplomatic, economic, and informational efforts
of USG partners and PNs.
The CCDR adjusts these activities as required for the occasional
execution of a contingency
plan or response to a crisis.

For more information on CCPs, see JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

c. The CCP also provides context for ongoing crisis response
and contingency
operations to facilitate execution of contingency plans as branch
plans to the CCP. These
are plans to respond to potential crises such as natural or man-
made disasters and military

Figure V-3. Notional Joint Operations in a Combatant
Command Campaign Context

Multinational

Exercises

Security Force
Assistance

Peacekeeping

Freedom of
Navigation

Counterdrug Activities

Antiterrorism

Time

Counterterrorism

Stability Actions

OPLAN/
OPORD

OPLAN/
OPORD

Ballistic
Missile Defense

Building Partner
Capacity

Key Leader
EngagementMilitary-to-Military

Contacts

Posture and Basing
Actions

Notional Joint Operations in a Combatant Command
Campaign Context

OPLAN operation plan OPORD operation order

Legend

The geographic combatant commander’s theater campaign
encompasses and provides context for all planned
and ongoing theater activities, crisis response requirements, and
combat operations. The goal is to preclude the
necessity for a combat solution to problems, while maintaining
an acceptable level of stability.

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

V-7

aggression. Also linked to the GCC’s CCP and subordinate
campaign plans are designated
DOD global campaign plans that address integrated execution of
global security priorities.

d. GCCs prepare CCPs to achieve military objectives and GEF-
directed prioritized
campaign and DOD objectives for their AORs. GCCs integrate
planning in their CCPs to
support designated missions assigned to the CCDRs responsible
for collaborative DOD
planning. Similar to GCCs, FCCs prepare global campaigns to

achieve global security
objectives as required in the GEF. FCCs also prepare CCPs to
achieve military objectives
and GEF-directed objectives for their missions. FCCs
synchronize planning for designated
missions across CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies.

e. A GCC can simultaneously conduct multiple joint operations
with different
objectives within their AOR. The GCC might initiate one or
more OPLANs while
security cooperation activities are ongoing in the same or
another part of the theater.
Further, a crisis response or contingency operation could occur
separately or as part of a
campaign or major operation (e.g., the NEO in Somalia during
Operation DESERT
SHIELD in 1991). In the extreme, a major operation or a
subordinate campaign may occur
within a theater concurrently with a separate or related
campaign. CCDRs should
synchronize and integrate the activities of assigned, attached,
and allocated forces
with subordinate and supporting JFCs so they complement
rather than compete in
achieving national or theater-strategic objectives. Due to the
transregional nature of
various enemies or adversaries (e.g., insurgents, terrorists, drug
cartels, pirates),
coordination and synchronization requirements may also extend
to adjacent GCCs.
CCDRs and subordinate JFCs must work with DOS regional and
functional bureaus,
individual country chiefs of mission, and other USG
departments and agencies to better
integrate military operations in unified action with the

diplomatic, economic, and
informational instruments of national power.

f. Some military operations may be conducted for one purpose.
For example,
FHA is focused on a humanitarian purpose (e.g., Operation
TOMODACHI, an assistance
operation to support Japan in disaster relief following the 2011
Tohoku earthquake and
tsunami). A strike may be conducted for the specific purpose of
compelling or deterring
an action (e.g., Operation EL DORADO CANYON, the 1986
operation to coerce Libya to
conform with international laws against terrorism). Often,
however, military operations
will have multiple purposes (based on strategic and operational-
level objectives) and will
be influenced by a fluid and changing situation. Branch and
sequel events may produce
additional tasks for the force, challenging the command with
multiple missions (e.g.,
Operations PROVIDE COMFORT in Iraq and RESTORE HOPE
in Somalia were PEO
that evolved from FHA efforts). Joint forces must strive to
meet such challenges with
clearly defined objectives addressing diverse purposes.

5. A Joint Operation Model

a. Most individual joint operations share certain activities or
actions in common.
These include forming a joint HQ, deploying and redeploying
capabilities (forces, materiel,
etc.), and interacting with other interorganizational participants.
Some activities can also
characterize specific types of operations such as large-scale

combat, FHA, and COIN. For

Chapter V

V-8 JP 3-0 CH1

example, Figure V-4 shows six general groups of military
activities that may typically
occur in preparation for and during a single large-scale joint
combat operation.

b. The nature of operations and activities during a typical joint
combat operation will
change from its beginning (when the CJCS issues the execute
order) to the operation’s end
(when the joint force disbands and components return to a pre-
operation status). Shaping
activities are usually ongoing and may continue during and after
the operation. The
purpose of shaping activities is to help set the conditions for
successful execution of the
operation. Figure V-4 shows, that from deter through enable
civil authority, the operations
and activities in these groups vary in magnitude—time,
intensity, forces, etc.—as the
operation progresses (the relative magnitudes in the figure are
notional). At various points
in time, each specific group might characterize the main effort
of the joint force. For
example, dominate activities would characterize the main effort
after the joint force seizes

Figure V-4. A Notional Joint Combat Operation Model

A Notional Joint Combat Operation Model

The model depicts six general groups of military activities that
typically comprise a single joint
combat operation. The model applies to a large-scale combat
operation as well as to a combat
operation relatively limited in scope and duration. It shows that
emphasis on activity types shifts as
an operation progresses.

Operation shaping activities may begin during plan development
to help set conditions for
successful execution. They may continue after the operation
ends if the command continues to
maintain an operation plan.

Theater and global shaping activities occur continuously to
support theater and global requirements.
Specific theater and global shaping activities may support a
specific joint operation plan during its
execution.

L
e
ve

l o
f
M

ili
ta

ry
E

ff
o
rt Stabilize

Activities

Seize Initiative Activities

Deter Activities

Dominate
Activities

Enable
Activities

Theater Shaping Activities

Operation Order
Activation

Operation Order
Termination

Operation Shaping Activities

Develop
and

Maintain
Operation

Plan
XXXX

Revise,
Maintain,
or Cancel
Operation

Plan
XXXX

Global Shaping Activities

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

V-9

the initiative until the enemy no longer is able to effectively
resist. Even so, activities in
the other groups would usually occur concurrently at some level
of effort. The following
paragraphs provide more information on the nature of these
activities.

(1) Shape

(a) In general, shaping activities help set conditions for
successful theater
operations. Shaping activities include long-term persistent and
preventive military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence actions to

assure friends, build partner
capacity and capability, and promote regional stability. They
help identify, deter, counter,
and/or mitigate competitor and adversary actions that challenge
country and regional
stability. A GCC’s CCP provides these and other activities
tasked by SecDef/CJCS
strategic guidance in pursuit of national objectives. Likewise,
CCDRs may direct more
focused geographic and functional shaping activities at the
potential execution of specific
contingency plans for various types of operations. In the best
case, shaping activities may
avert or diminish conflict. At the least, shaping provides a
deeper, and common,
understanding of the OE. Preparatory intelligence activities
inform operation assessment,
planning, and execution to improve the JFC’s understanding of
the OE.

(b) Shaping activities are largely conducted through other
interorganizational participants (e.g., USG departments and
agencies, PNs), with DOD in
a supporting role. Where US and PN interests converge,
cooperation is possible. Some
partners are quite capable already; others may benefit from US
assistance. When a nation
shares our interests and has the capacity to absorb US training,
regional security can be
increased. Military engagement and security cooperation
activities are executed
continuously to enhance international legitimacy and gain
multinational cooperation.
These activities should improve perceptions and influence
adversaries’ and allies’
behavior, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for

self-defense and
multinational operations, improve information exchange and
intelligence sharing, provide
US forces with peacetime and contingency access, and
positively affect conditions that
could lead to a crisis. These activities prepare the OE in
advance to facilitate access, should
contingency operations be required. The joint community, in
concert with multinational
and interagency partners, must maintain and exercise strong
regional partnerships as
essential shaping activities in peacetime to ensure operational
access during plan execution.
For example, obtaining and maintaining rights of navigation and
overflight help ensure
global reach and rapid projection of military power.

(2) Deter. Successful deterrence prevents an adversary’s
undesirable actions,
because the adversary perceives an unacceptable risk or cost of
acting. Deterrent actions
are generally weighted toward protection and security activities
that are characterized by
preparatory actions to protect friendly forces, assets, and
partners, and indicate the intent
to execute subsequent phases of the planned operation. A
number of FDOs, FROs, and
force enhancements could be implemented to support
deterrence. The nature of these
options varies according to the nature of the adversary (e.g.,
traditional or irregular, state
or non-state), the adversary’s actions, US national objectives,
and other factors. Once a
crisis is defined, these actions may include mobilization,
tailoring of forces, and other
predeployment activities; initial deployment into a theater;

employment of intelligence

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V-10 JP 3-0 CH1

collection assets; and development of mission-tailored C2,
intelligence, force protection,
and logistic requirements to support the JFC’s CONOPS.
CCDRs continue to conduct
military engagement with multinational partners to maintain
access to areas, thereby
providing the basis for further crisis response. Many deterrent
actions build on security
cooperation activities. They can also be part of stand-alone
operations.

(3) Seize Initiative. JFCs seek to seize the initiative in all
situations through
decisive use of joint force capabilities. In combat, this involves
both defensive and
offensive operations at the earliest possible time, forcing the
enemy to culminate
offensively and setting the conditions for decisive operations.
Rapid application of joint
combat power may be required to delay, impede, or halt the
enemy’s initial aggression and
to deny the enemy its initial objectives. Operations to gain
access to theater infrastructure
and expand friendly freedom of action continue during this
phase, while the JFC seeks to
degrade enemy capabilities with the intent of resolving the
crisis at the earliest opportunity.

(4) Dominate. These actions focus on breaking the enemy’s
will to resist or, in
noncombat situations, to control the OE. Successful domination
depends on overmatching
enemy capabilities at critical times and places. Joint force
options include attacking
weaknesses at the leading edge of the enemy’s defensive
perimeter to roll enemy forces
back and striking in depth to threaten the integrity of the
enemy’s A2/AD, offensive
weapons and force projection capabilities, and defensive
systems. Operations can range
from large-scale combat to various stability actions depending
on the nature of the enemy.
Dominating activities may establish the conditions to achieve
strategic objectives early or
may set the conditions for transition to a subsequent phase of
the operation.

(5) Stabilize. These actions and activities are typically
characterized by a shift
in focus from sustained combat operations to stability activities.
These operations help
reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential
government services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian
relief. The intent is to help
restore local political, economic, and infrastructure stability.
Civilian officials may lead
operations during part or all of this period, but the JFC will
typically provide significant
supporting capabilities and activities. The joint force may be
required to perform limited
local governance (i.e., military government) and integrate the
efforts of other supporting
interagency and multinational partners until legitimate local

entities are functioning. The
JFC continuously assesses the impact of operations on the
ability to transfer authority for
remaining requirements to a legitimate civil entity.

(6) Enable Civil Authority. Joint force support to legitimate
civil governance
typically characterizes these actions and activities. The
commander provides this support
by agreement with the appropriate civil authority. In some
cases, especially for operations
within the US, the commander provides this support under
direction of the civil authority.
The purpose is to help the civil authority regain its ability to
govern and administer the
services and other needs of the population. The military end
state is typically reached
during this phase, signaling the end of the joint operation.
CCMD involvement with other
nations and other government agencies beyond the termination
of the joint operation, such
as lower-level stability activities and FHA, may be required to
achieve national objectives.

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

V-11

For more information on stability activities, refer to JP 3-07,
Stability.

c. Some joint operations below the level of large-scale combat
will have
distinguishable groups of activity. However, activities may be

compressed or absent
entirely according to the nature of the operation. For example,
deployment of forces
associated with seize the initiative activities may have a
deterrent effect sufficient to
dissuade an enemy from conducting further operations,
returning the OE to a more stable
state. Likewise, although FID and NEO may occur as
supporting operations to larger
combat operations in the OA, they will have no evident
dominating activities. Figure V-5
shows a notional successful joint strike, which did not require
follow-on operations. Figure
V-6 shows a notional FHA operation that required
predominantly stabilize and enable civil
authority activities.

Figure V-5. Notional Balance of Activities for a Joint Strike

Notional Balance of Activities for a Joint Strike

This is a notional example of the balance of military activities
in a successful operation to coerce
the enemy to stop unacceptable behavior (e.g., state-sponsored
terrorism, pursuit of nuclear
weapons). In this example, the President ordered strikes (seize
the initiative activities). The
President prepared to order follow-on operations to compel
enforcement when military-enforced
economic and other sanctions ( activities) failed.

Examples include Operations EL DORADO CANYON (Libya,
Apr 1986) and DESERT THUNDER
(Iraq, Dec 1998)

deter

L
e
ve

l o
f
M

ili
ta

ry
E

ff
o
rt

Seize
Initiative
Activities

Deter Activities

Dominate activities
(planned sequel)
not executed.

Dominate

Theater Shaping Activities

Operation Order
Activation

Operation Order
Termination

Operation
Plan

XXXX

Revise
Operation

Plan
XXXX

Global Shaping Activities

Operation Shaping Activities

Chapter V

V-12 JP 3-0 CH1

6. Phasing a Joint Operation

a. The six general groups of activity in Figure V-4 provide a
convenient basis for
thinking about a joint operation in notional phases, as Figure V-
7 depicts. A phase is a
definitive stage or period during a joint operation in which a

large portion of the forces and
capabilities are involved in similar or mutually supporting
activities for a common purpose
that often is represented by intermediate objectives. Phasing,
which can be used in any
operation regardless of size, helps the JFC organize large
operations by integrating and
synchronizing subordinate operations. Phasing helps JFCs and
staffs visualize, plan,
and execute the entire operation and define requirements in
terms of forces,
resources, time, space, and purpose. It helps them
systematically achieve military
objectives that cannot be achieved all at once by arranging
smaller, focused, related

Figure V-6. Notional Balance of Activities for a Foreign
Humanitarian Assistance
Operation

Notional Balance of Activities for a
Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operation

This is a notional example of the balance of military activities
by a joint task force (JTF) responding
to one type of crisis (foreign humanitarian assistance). There is
no pre-existing operation plan in
this example. Therefore, there are no planned pre-crisis
activities except for theater
shaping that may generally support unplanned crisis response.
activities might not occur
depending on the extent of criminal activity and lawlessness and

the host nation government’s ability
to control it. activities that support and in the
affected area may increase after the operation ends and the JTF
disbands.

An example is Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE (Haiti, Jan-Mar
2010).

shaping
Dominate

Theater shaping stabilization enable civil authorities

L
e

ve
l o

f
M

ili
ta

ry
E

ff
o

rt

Stabilize Activities
Seize

Initiative
Activities

Deter Activities

D
om

inate

Enable Activities

Theater Shaping Activities

Operation Order
Activation

Operation Order
Termination

Global Shaping Activities

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

V-13

operations in a logical sequence. Phasing also helps
commanders mitigate risk in the more
dangerous or difficult portions of an operation.

b. Figure V-7 shows one phasing alternative. Actual phases of
an operation will vary
(e.g., compressed, expanded, or omitted entirely) according to
the nature of the operation

and the JFC’s decisions. For example, UW operations normally
use a seven-phase model.
During planning, the JFC establishes conditions, objectives, and
events for transitioning
from one phase to another and plans sequels and branches for
potential contingencies.
Phases may be conducted sequentially, but some activities from
a phase may begin in a
previous phase and continue into subsequent phases. The JFC
adjusts the phases to exploit
opportunities presented by the enemy and operational situation
or to react to unforeseen
conditions.

Figure V-7. Phasing an Operation Based on Predominant
Military Activities

Phasing an Operation Based on Predominant Military Activities

The six general groups of activities provide a basis for thinking
about a joint operation in notional
phases.

Phasing can be used in any joint operation regardless of size.

Phasing helps joint force commanders and staffs visualize, plan,
and execute the entire operation
and define requirements in terms of forces, resources, time,
space, and purpose to achieve

objectives.

L
e
ve

l o
f
M

ili
ta

ry
E

ff
o
rt

Stabilize
Activities

Seize Initiative Activities

Deter Activities

Dominate
Activities

Phase III
Dominate

Phase IV
Stabilize

Phase V
Enable

Civil
Authority

Phase 0
Shape

Phase 0
Shape

Phase I
Deter

Phase II
Seize

Initiative

Enable
Activities

Theater Shaping Activities

Operation Order
Activation

Operation Order
Termination

Operation Shaping Activities

Develop
and

Maintain
Operation

Plan
XXXX

Revise,
Maintain,
or Cancel
Operation

Plan
XXXX

Global Shaping Activities

Chapter V

V-14 JP 3-0 CH1

c. A GCC’s campaign encompasses all operations and activities
for which the GCC
is responsible, from relatively benign security cooperation
activities through ongoing
large-scale combat operations. All six groups of joint operation
activities may be present
in the GCC’s AOR. However, use of the groups of activities for
the purpose of phasing
applies only to planning and executing individual operations,
whether small-scale
contingencies or large-scale campaigns that support the GCC’s
campaign. The groups of
military activities associated with phases in Figure V-7 can
serve as a frame of reference

that facilitates common understanding among interagency and
multinational partners and
supporting commanders of how a JFC intends to execute a
specific joint operation, as well
as progress during execution.

d. Transitions

(1) During execution, a transition marks a change between
phases or between the
ongoing operations and execution of a branch or sequel. This
shift in focus by the joint
force often is accompanied by changes in command or support
relationships and priorities
of effort. Transitions require planning and preparation well
before their execution. The
activities that predominate during a given phase rarely align
with neatly definable
breakpoints. The need to move into another phase normally is
identified by assessing that
a set of objectives has been achieved or that the enemy has
acted in a manner that requires
a major change for the joint force. Thus, the transition to a new
phase is usually driven by
events rather than time. An example is the shift from sustained
combat operations to
stability activities to enable civil authority. Through
continuous assessment, the staff
measures progress toward planned transitions so that the force
prepares for and executes
them.

(2) Sometimes, however, the situation facing the JFC will
change unexpectedly
and without apparent correlation to a planned transition. The
JFC may choose to shift

operations to address unanticipated critical changes. The JFC
must recognize fundamental
changes in the situation and respond quickly and smoothly.
Failure to do so can cause the
joint force to lose momentum, miss important opportunities,
experience setbacks, or even
fail to accomplish the mission. Conversely, successful
transitions enable the joint force to
seize the initiative and quickly and efficiently garner favorable
results. The JFC should
anticipate transformations, as well as plan shifts, during
operations.

Refer to JP 5-0, Joint Planning, for more information on
phasing. Refer to JP 3-05.1,
Unconventional Warfare, for additional information on phasing
UW operations. Refer to

The use of groups of activities for the purpose of phasing
applies only
to planning and executing individual joint operations, not to a
GCC’s
theater campaign or strategy development.

COMMON OPERATING PRECEPT

Plan for and manage operational transitions over time and
space.

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

V-15

JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for more information on security

cooperation’s role in
helping set conditions for successful theater operations.

7. The Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stability Activities

a. Combat missions and tasks can vary widely depending on
context of the operation
and the objective. Most combat operations will require the
commander to balance
offensive, defensive, and stability activities. This is
particularly evident in a campaign or
major operation, where combat can occur during several phases
and stability activities may
occur throughout. Figure V-8 depicts notional proportions of
offensive, defensive, and
stability activities through the phases of a joint operation.

b. Offensive and Defensive Operations. Major operations and
campaigns, whether
they involve large-scale combat, normally include both
offensive and defensive
components (e.g., interdiction, maneuver, forcible entry, fire
support, countering air and
missile threats, DCO, base defense). Although defense may be
the stronger form, offense
is normally decisive in combat. To achieve military objectives
quickly and efficiently,
JFCs normally seek the earliest opportunity to conduct decisive
offensive operations.
Nevertheless, during a sustained offensive, selected elements of
the joint force may need
to pause, defend, resupply, or reconstitute, while other forces
continue the attack.
Accordingly, certain defensive measures and protection
activities (e.g., OPSEC) are
required throughout each joint operation phase. Joint forces at

all levels should be capable
of rapid transition between offense and defense and vice versa.
The relationship between
offense and defense, then, is a complementary one. Defensive
operations enable JFCs to
conduct or prepare for decisive offensive operations.

c. Stability Activities. Commanders conduct stability activities
to maintain or
reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential
governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian
relief. To achieve objectives
and reach the desired military end state, JFCs integrate and
synchronize stability activities
with offense and defense, as necessary, during the phases of an
operation. Stability
activities support USG stabilization efforts and contribute to
USG initiatives to build
partnerships. These initiatives set the conditions to interact
with partner, competitor, or
adversary leaders, military forces, or relevant populations by
developing and presenting
information and conducting activities to affect their
perceptions, will, behavior, and
capabilities. The JFC will likely conduct stability activities in
coordination with
interorganizational participants and the private sector in support
of HN authorities.
Stability activities are conducted outside the US. DOD can
provide similar support to US
civil authorities through DSCA.

For further guidance on stability activities, refer to JP 3-07,
Stability.

For further guidance on interorganizational coordination, refer
to JP 3-08,
Interorganizational Cooperation.

d. Balance and Simultaneity

Chapter V

V-16 JP 3-0 CH1

(1) Commanders strive to apply the many dimensions of
military power
simultaneously across the depth, breadth, and height of the OA.
The challenge of balance
and simultaneity affects all operations involving combat,
particularly campaigns, due to
their scope. Consequently, JFCs often concentrate in some
areas or on specific functions
and require economy of force in others. However, plans for
major operations and
campaigns will normally exhibit a balance between offense and
defense and stability
activities in various phases. Therefore, planning for stability
activities should begin
when joint operation planning begins.

(2) Figure V-8 relates to Figure V-7 and the phasing
explanation in paragraph 6,
“Phasing a Joint Operation.” Figure V-8 illustrates the notional
balance between offensive
and defensive actions and stability activities as an operation
progresses. Since the focus of
the CCMD’s ongoing campaign is on prevention and
preparation, any stability activities in

the JFC’s proposed OA might continue, and combat (offense
and defense) may be limited

Figure V-8. Notional Balance of Offense, Defense, and
Stability Activities

Notional Balance of Offense, Defense, and
Stability Activities

NOTES:
The figure reflects a single operation.

are conducted outside the United States. Department of Defense
provides similar
support to US civil authorities for homeland defense and other
operations in the US through

operations.

Stability activities
defense

support of civil authorities

Enable Civil Authority

Defense

Offense
Stability

Dominate

Defense

Offense

Stability

Stabilize

Defense

OffenseStability

Deter

Defense

Offense
Stability

Seize Initiative

Defense

Offense

Stability

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

V-17

or absent. Defensive measures might be limited to providing an
increased level of security.
A similar balance applies to deterrence activities, whether
conducted as part of the CCP or
on initiation of an OPLAN, since the intent is to limit escalation

in the OA. A JFC might
begin to limit stability activities if an adversary’s potential
combat actions are imminent.
In combat operations, seize the initiative and dominate phases
focus on offense and
defense. Stability activities are likely restricted to parts of the
OA away from immediate
combat or might not occur at all. As the joint force achieves
objectives and combat abates,
the focus shifts to actions to stabilize and enable civil authority.
Stability activities resume
and will usually increase in proportion to the decrease in
combat.

(3) Planning for the transition from sustained combat
operations to assumption
of responsibility by civil authority should begin during plan
development and continue
during all phases of a joint operation. Planning for
redeployment should be considered
early and continue throughout the operation and is best
accomplished in the same time-
phased process in which deployment was accomplished. An
unnecessarily narrow focus
on planning offensive and defensive operations in the dominate
phase may threaten full
development of the stabilize and enable civil authority phases
and negatively affect joint
operation momentum. Even during sustained combat
operations, the joint force should
establish or restore security and control and provide
humanitarian relief as areas are
occupied, bypassed, or returned to civilian control. Planning
for humanitarian assistance
should be coordinated through the security cooperation
organization USAID (if it has

mission presence) and shared with the senior development
advisor to the CCDR to avoid
duplication of effort in the HN.

8. Linear and Nonlinear Operations

a. In linear operations, each commander directs and sustains
combat power toward
enemy forces in concert with adjacent units. Linearity refers
primarily to the conduct of
operations with identified forward lines of own troops (FLOTs).
In linear operations,
emphasis is placed on maintaining the position of friendly
forces in relation to other
friendly forces. From this relative positioning of forces,
security is enhanced and massing
of forces can be facilitated. Also inherent in linear operations
is the security of rear areas,
especially LOCs between sustaining bases and fighting forces.
Protected LOCs, in turn,
increase the endurance of joint forces and ensure freedom of
action for extended periods.
A linear OA organization may be best for some operations or
certain phases of an operation.
Conditions that favor linear operations include those where US
forces lack the information
needed to conduct nonlinear operations or are severely
outnumbered. Linear operations
are also appropriate against a deeply arrayed, echeloned enemy
force or when the threat to
LOCs reduces friendly force freedom of action. In these
circumstances, linear operations
allow commanders to concentrate and synchronize combat
power more easily. World Wars
I and II offer multiple examples of linear operations.

b. In nonlinear operations, forces orient on objectives without
geographic reference
to adjacent forces. Nonlinear operations typically focus on
creating specific effects on
multiple decisive points. Nonlinear operations emphasize
simultaneous operations
along multiple LOOs from selected bases (ashore or afloat).
Simultaneity overwhelms
opposing C2 and allows the JFC to retain the initiative. In
nonlinear operations, sustaining

Chapter V

V-18 JP 3-0 CH1

functions may depend on sustainment assets moving with forces
or aerial delivery.
Noncombatants and the fluidity of nonlinear operations require
careful judgment in
clearing fires, both direct and indirect. Situational awareness,
coupled with precision fires,
frees commanders to act against multiple objectives. Swift
maneuver against several
decisive points supported by precise, concentrated fire can
induce paralysis and shock
among enemy troops and commanders. Nonlinear operations
were applied during
Operation JUST CAUSE. The joint forces oriented more on
their assigned objectives (e.g.,
destroying an enemy force or seizing and controlling critical
terrain or population centers)
and less on their geographic relationship to other friendly
forces. To protect themselves,
individual forces relied more on situational awareness, mobility

advantages, and freedom
of action than on mass. Nonlinear operations place a premium
on the communications,
intelligence, mobility, and innovative means for sustainment.

(1) During nonlinear offensive operations, attacking forces
must focus
offensive actions against decisive points, while allocating the
minimum essential combat
power to defensive operations. Reserves must have a high
degree of mobility to respond
where needed. JFCs may be required to dedicate combat forces
to provide for LOC and
base defense. Vulnerability increases as operations extend and
attacking forces are
exposed over a larger OA. Linkup operations, particularly those
involving vertical
envelopments, require extensive planning and preparation. The
potential for friendly fire
incidents increases due to the fluid nature of the nonlinear OA
and the changing disposition
of attacking and defending forces. The presence of civilians in
the OA further complicates
operations.

(2) During nonlinear defensive operations, defenders focus on
destroying
enemy forces, even if it means losing physical contact with
other friendly units. Successful
nonlinear defenses require all friendly commanders to
understand the JFCs intent and
maintain a common operational picture (COP). Noncontiguous
defenses are generally
mobile defenses; however, some subordinate units may conduct
area defenses to hold key
terrain or canalize attackers into engagement areas. Nonlinear

defenses place a premium
on reconnaissance and surveillance to maintain contact with the
enemy, produce relevant
information, and develop and maintain a COP. The defending
force focuses almost
exclusively on defeating the enemy force rather than retaining
large areas. Although less
challenging than in offensive operations, LOC and sustainment
security will still be a test
and may require allocation of combat forces to protect LOCs
and other high-risk functions
or bases. The JFC must establish clear command relationships
to properly account for the
added challenges to base, base cluster, and LOC security.

c. AOs and Linear/Nonlinear Operations

(1) General. JFCs consider incorporating combinations of
contiguous and
noncontiguous AOs with linear and nonlinear operations as they
conduct operational
design. They choose the combination that fits the OE and the
purpose of the operation.
Association of contiguous and noncontiguous AOs with linear
and nonlinear operations
creates the four combinations in Figure V-9.

Joint Operations Across the Conflict Continuum

V-19

(2) Linear Operations in Contiguous AOs. Linear operations in
contiguous
AOs (upper left-hand pane in Figure V-9) typify sustained

offensive and defensive
operations against powerful, echeloned, and symmetrically
organized forces. The
contiguous areas and continuous FLOT focus combat power and
protect sustainment
functions.

Figure V-9. Combinations of Areas of Operations and
Linear/Nonlinear Operations

Combinations of Areas of Operations and
Linear/Nonlinear Operations

Contiguous Areas of Operation Noncontiguous Areas of
Operation

Nonlinear Operations Nonlinear Operations

Linear Operations

XXX

Linear Operations

XX

XX

XX

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

II

II

X

X

XXXXXX

XX

XX

XX

X
X

XX
X

X
X

XX

X
X

X

X
X

X

XXX

X

XX

X X

X

X X

Andrew

-

OVERLORD

Rear
Area

Rear
Area

Forward Line
of Own Troops

Forward Line
of Own Troops

Forward Edge
of the Battle

Area

Forward Edge
of the Battle

Area

X

Chapter V

V-20 JP 3-0 CH1

(3) Linear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The upper right-
hand pane of
Figure V-9 depicts a JFC’s OA with subordinate component
commanders conducting linear
operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the JFC retains
responsibility for that
portion of the OA outside the subordinate commanders’ AOs.

(4) Nonlinear Operations in Contiguous AOs. The lower left-
hand pane in
Figure V-9 illustrates the JFC’s entire assigned OA divided into
subordinate AOs.
Subordinate component commanders are conducting nonlinear
operations within their
AOs. This combination typically is applied in stability
activities and DSCA actions.

(5) Nonlinear Operations in Noncontiguous AOs. The lower
right-hand pane
of Figure V-9 depicts a JFC’s OA with subordinate component
commanders conducting
nonlinear operations in noncontiguous AOs. In this case, the
JFC retains responsibility for
that portion of the OA outside the subordinate commanders’
AOs.

VI-1

CHAPTER VI
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION,
AND

DETERRENCE

1. Introduction

a. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence
missions, tasks, and
actions encompass a wide range of actions where the military

instrument of national power
is tasked to support other instruments of national power as
represented by interagency
partners, as well as cooperate with international organizations
(e.g., UN, NATO) and other
countries to protect and enhance national security interests,
deter conflict, and set
conditions for future contingency operations. This may also
involve domestic operations
that include supporting civil authorities. These activities
generally occur continuously in
all GCCs’ AORs regardless of other ongoing joint operations.
Military engagement,
security cooperation, and deterrence activities usually involve a
combination of military
forces and capabilities separate from but integrated with the
efforts of interorganizational
participants. These activities are conducted as part of a
CCDR’s routine CCP and country
plan objectives and may support deterrence. Because DOS is
frequently the major player
in these activities, JFCs should maintain a working relationship
with the DOS regional
bureaus in coordination with the chiefs of the US diplomatic
missions and country teams
in their area. Commanders and their staffs should establish and
maintain dialogue with HN
government, multinational partners, and leaders of other
organizations pertinent to their
operation.

b. Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive
use of international
waters, international airspace, space, and cyberspace. Military
engagement, security
cooperation, and deterrence help assure operational access for

crisis response and
contingency operations despite changing US overseas defense
posture and the growth of
A2/AD capabilities around the globe. The more a GCC can
promote favorable access
conditions in advance across the AOR and in potential OAs, the
better. Relevant activities
include KLEs; security cooperation activities, such as bilateral
and multinational exercises
to improve multinational operations; missions to train, advise,
and equip foreign forces to
improve their national ability to contribute to access;
negotiations to secure basing and
transit rights, establish relationships, and formalize support
agreements; the use of grants
and contracts to improve relationships with and strengthen PNs;
and planning conferences
to develop multinational plans.

c. Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence
activities provide the
foundation of the CCDR’s theater campaign. The goal is to
prevent and deter conflict by
keeping adversary activities within a desired state of
cooperation and competition. The

“Building security globally not only assures Allies and partners
and builds their
capacity but also helps protect the homeland by deterring
conflict and
increasing stability.”

Quadrennial Defense Review, 2014

Chapter VI

VI-2 JP 3-0 CH1

joint operation model described in Chapter V, “Joint Operations
Across the Conflict
Continuum,” has limited application with respect to phasing
these activities for normal
cooperative and competitive environments. Figure VI-1 shows
a notional depiction of
activities in an environment of cooperation and competition.
DOD forces, as part of larger
whole-of-government efforts, conduct operations with partners
to prevent, deter, or turn
back escalatory activity by adversaries.

(1) Global and theater shaping increases DOD’s depth of
understanding of an
environment, a partner’s viewpoint of that environment, and
where the US and PN have
common interests. This understanding allows the US, through
the relationships that have
been developed, to shape the OE. These initiatives help
advance national security
objectives, promote stability, prevent conflicts (or limit their
severity), and reduce the risk
of employing US military forces in a conflict.

(2) In an environment that is more competitive, tensions
increase. A partner’s
resources can enhance USG understanding of an adversary’s
capabilities and intent and
expand options against the adversary. In the best case, conflict
can be averted or
diminished by coordinated USG/PN action.

Figure VI-1. The Conflict Continuum

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

Desired State/Zone of Cooperation and Competition

USG/Multinational Partner Nation Coordinated Action

Diplomatic efforts (shaded area) increase
during times of increased tension. Increasingly,
legal actions, economic sanctions, and other
deterrent options may be used to reduce
tension and return to an environment of
peaceful cooperation and beneficial
competition.

Diplomacy

DOD Focus is Cooperation/Prevention/Deterrence DOD Focus
is
OPLAN Execution

Plans, Operations
and Campaigns to
Prevent Conflict

Effort
Resources
Intensity

Risk

Large-Scale Combat Operations

Named Joint/Coalition Operation

The Goal: Prevent Conflict

Cooperation Competition Conflict/War

Return to
Diplomacy

Joint
Operation

or

Increa
sing T

ensio
n

The Conflict Continuum

Legend

DOD Department of Defense OPLAN operation plan
USG United States Government

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VI-3

(3) Despite the efforts to prevent or mitigate conflict, an armed
conflict may

occur. As conditions and objectives become more defined,
GCCs may transition to the
notional phasing construct for execution of a specific
contingency operation as Figure VI-
1 depicts. However, time spent “to the left” allows DOD to
develop a deeper understanding
of the environment to see and act ahead of conflict flashpoints,
develop options, and
maximize the efficiency of resources.

d. Military Engagement. Military engagement is the routine
contact and interaction
between individuals or elements of the Armed Forces of the
United States and those of
another nation’s armed forces, or foreign and domestic civilian
authorities or agencies, to
build trust and confidence, share information, coordinate mutual
activities, and maintain
influence. Military engagement occurs as part of security
cooperation but also extends to
interaction with domestic civilian authorities. GCCs seek out
partners and communicate
with adversaries to discover areas of common interest and
tension. This military
engagement increases the knowledge base for subsequent
decisions and resource
allocation. Such military engagements can reduce tensions and
may preclude conflict or,
if conflict is unavoidable, allow a more informed USG to enter
into it with stronger
alliances or coalitions.

e. Security Cooperation

(1) Security cooperation involves all DOD interactions with
foreign defense

establishments to build defense relationships that promote
specific US security interests,
develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense
and multinational
operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and
contingency access to the HN. The
policy on which security cooperation is based resides in
Presidential Policy Directive-23,
Security Sector Assistance. This directive refers to the policies,
programs, and activities
the US uses to work with foreign partners and help shape their
policies and actions in the
security sector; help foreign partners build and sustain the
capacity and effectiveness of
legitimate institutions to provide security, safety, and justice for
their people; and enable
foreign partners to contribute to efforts that address common
security challenges.

(2) Security cooperation is a key element of global and theater
shaping activities
and critical aspect of communication synchronization. GCCs
shape their AORs through
security cooperation and stability activities by continually
employing military forces to
complement and support other instruments of national power
that typically provide
development assistance or humanitarian assistance to PNs. The
GCC’s CCP provides a
framework within which CCMDs conduct cooperative security
cooperation activities and
development with PNs. Ideally, security cooperation activities
mitigate the causes of a
potential crisis before a situation deteriorates and requires US
military intervention.
Security assistance and security force assistance (SFA)

normally provide some of the
means for security cooperation activities.

Refer to JP 3-20, Security Cooperation, for more information on
security cooperation.

f. Deterrence

Chapter VI

VI-4 JP 3-0 CH1

(1) Deterrence prevents adversary action through the
presentation of a credible
threat of unacceptable counteraction and belief that the cost of
the action outweighs the
perceived benefits. The nature of deterrent options varies
according to the nature of the
adversary (e.g., traditional or irregular, state or non-state), the
adversary’s actions, US
national objectives, and other factors. Deterrence stems from
an adversary’s belief that the
opponent’s actions have created or can create an unacceptable
risk to the adversary’s
achievement of objectives (i.e., the contemplated action cannot
succeed or the costs are too
high). Thus, a potential aggressor chooses not to act for fear of
failure, risk, or
consequences. Ideally, deterrent forces should be able to
conduct decisive operations
immediately. However, if available forces lack the combat
power to conduct decisive
operations, they conduct defensive operations while additional
forces deploy. Effective

deterrence requires a CCP and a coordinated communication
effort that emphasize security
cooperation activities with PNs that support US interests, DOD
force posture planning, and
contingency plans that prove the willingness of the US to
employ forces in defense of its
interests. Various joint operations (e.g., show of force and
enforcement of sanctions)
support deterrence by demonstrating national resolve and
willingness to use force when
necessary. Other CCP actions that help maintain or set the
CCDR’s desired conditions
support deterrence by enhancing a climate of peaceful
cooperation and FHA, thus
promoting stability. Joint actions such as antiterrorism, DOD
support to CD operations,
show of force operations, and arms control are applied to meet
military engagement,
security cooperation, and deterrence objectives.

(2) Sustained presence contributes to deterrence and promotes a
secure
environment in which diplomatic, economic, and informational
programs designed to
reduce the causes of instability can perform as designed.
Presence can take the form of
forward basing, forward deploying, or pre-positioning assets.
Forward presence activities
demonstrate our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances,
enhance regional stability,
and provide a crisis response capability while promoting US
influence and access. Joint
force presence often keeps unstable situations from escalating
into larger conflicts. The
sustained presence of strong, capable forces is the most visible
sign of US commitment to

allies and adversaries alike. However, if sustained forward
presence fails to deter an
adversary, committed forces must be agile enough to transition
rapidly to combat
operations. In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat,
forward presence involves
periodic rotational deployments and redeployments, access and
storage agreements,
multinational exercises, port visits, foreign military training,
foreign community support,
and both military-to-military and military-to-civilian contacts.
Given their location and
knowledge of the region, forward presence forces could be the
first a CCDR commits to
respond to a crisis. At the same time, commanders must
consider adversaries’ perceptions
of forward presence and deterrent acts. While the deterrent
intent of an act may be clear
to the actor, adversaries may perceive such acts as hostile and
respond in kind. Carefully
calculated forward presence, clearly signaled to adversaries as
non-aggressive, can prevent
escalation, but poorly calculated or poorly signaled increases in
forward presence can lead
to counter-productive countermeasures and escalation. CCDRs
use their situational
understanding of the OE to advise political leaders regarding
possible reactions to any
decision about deploying forces forward as a deterrent.

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VI-5

2. Typical Operations and Activities

a. Military Engagement Activities. Numerous routine missions
(e.g., security
cooperation) and continuing operations or tasks (e.g., freedom
of navigation) occur
globally on a continuing basis under the general heading of
military engagement. These
activities build strong relationships with partners, increase
regional awareness and
knowledge of a PN’s capabilities and capacity, and can be used
to influence events in a
desirable direction. Military engagement activities can also
increase understanding of an
adversary’s capabilities, capacity, and intentions and can
provide forewarning of
undesirable events. In some cases, what begins as a military
engagement activity (e.g.,
limited support to COIN through a security assistance program)
can expand to a limited
contingency operation or even a major operation when the
President commits US forces.
Military engagement activities are generally governed by
various directives and
agreements and do not require a joint OPLAN or OPORD for
execution.

b. Emergency Preparedness. Emergency preparedness consists
of measures taken
in advance of an emergency to reduce the loss of life and
property and to protect a nation’s
institutions from all types of hazards through a comprehensive
emergency management
program of preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery.
At the strategic level,
emergency preparedness encompasses those planning activities,

such as continuity of
operations and continuity of government, undertaken to ensure
DOD processes,
procedures, and resources are in place to support the President
and SecDef in a designated
national security emergency.

(1) Continuity of operations ensures continuous conduct of
functions, tasks, or
duties necessary to accomplish a military action or mission
supporting the national strategy.
Continuity of operations includes the functions and duties of the
commander, as well as
the supporting functions and duties performed by the staff and
others under the authority
and direction of the commander. If the President directs, DOD
may be tasked with
additional missions relating to emergency preparedness.

(2) Continuity of government involves a coordinated effort
within each USG
branch (executive, legislative, and judicial) to ensure the
capability to continue minimum
essential functions and responsibilities during a catastrophic
emergency.

c. Arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament are not
synonymous. The
following are examples of US military personnel involvement in
arms control,
nonproliferation, and disarmament activities: verifying an arms
control treaty; seizing and
securing WMD; escorting authorized deliveries of weapons and
other materials (e.g.,
enriched uranium) to preclude loss or unauthorized use of these
assets; conducting and

hosting site inspections; participating in military data
exchanges; implementing armament
reductions; or dismantling, destroying, or disposing of weapons
and hazardous material.

(1) Arms control agreements refer to the written or unwritten
embodiment of the
acceptance of one or more arms control measure by two or more
nations. Arms control
refers to mutually agreed upon and verifiable restraints between
states on the research,
manufacture, or levels of, and/or locations of, deployment of
troops and weapon systems.

Chapter VI

VI-6 JP 3-0 CH1

Arms control may be used by states to restrain military
modernization of another party to
the agreement, to entitle a party to achieve at least military
parity with another party, to
free up hard currency for other priorities, to redirect military
modernization efforts so as to
take advantage of technological advances in new weapon system
areas, to facilitate sources
and methods of intelligence gathering, or to enable states to
negate first strike capabilities.

(2) Nonproliferation includes use of military capabilities in
conjunction with a
whole-of-government effort, and within a state’s legal
authorities, to deter and prevent the
acquisition of WMD by dissuading or impeding access to or

distribution of sensitive
technologies, material, and expertise by and between state and
non-state actors of concern.
Usually, sanctions are established by UN Security Council
resolutions. However, states
may view the need to unilaterally, or in concert, sanction
certain military equipment as a
necessity of their national interests. Aggressive military force
is rarely employed in
nonproliferation military operations or activities (e.g., except in
self-defense).

(3) Disarmament is the reduction of a military establishment
(e.g., the number of
weapons and troops maintained by a state) to some level set by
international agreement.
Although disarmament always involves the reduction of military
forces or weapons, arms
control does not. In fact, arms control agreements sometimes
allow for the increase of
weapons by one or more parties to a treaty. Disarmament
requires a high degree of trust
(permissive OE), and disarmament operations are unlikely
between hostile nations.

d. Combating Terrorism. Combating terrorism involves actions
to oppose terrorism
from all threats. It encompasses antiterrorism—defensive
measures taken to reduce
vulnerability to terrorist acts—and CT—offensive measures to
prevent, deter, preempt, and
respond to terrorism.

(1) Antiterrorism involves defensive measures to reduce the
vulnerability of
individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited

response and containment by
local military and civilian forces. Antiterrorism programs form
the foundation to combat
terrorism. The USG may provide antiterrorism assistance to
foreign countries under Title
22, USC (under Antiterrorism Assistance).

For further guidance on antiterrorism, refer to JP 3-07.2,
Antiterrorism.

(2) CT. CT is primarily a special operations core activity and
consists of
activities and operations taken to neutralize terrorists and their
organizations and networks
to render them incapable of using violence to instill fear and
coerce governments or
societies to achieve their goals. CT includes direct actions
against terrorist networks and
indirect actions to influence and render global and regional
environments inhospitable to
terrorist networks. Normally, CT operations require specially
trained and equipped
personnel capable of swift and effective action. CT is often
associated with IW.
However, terrorists also operate during large-scale traditional
combat, forcing commanders
to integrate CT with these operations. Enemies using irregular
methods often will use
terrorist tactics to wage prolonged operations to break the
opponent’s will and influence
relevant populations. At the same time, terrorists and
insurgents also seek to bolster their
own legitimacy and credibility with those same populations.
Therefore, CT efforts should

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VI-7

include all instruments of national power to undermine enemy
power, will, credibility, and
legitimacy, thereby diminishing its ability to influence the
relevant population.

For further details concerning CT and special operations, refer
to JP 3-26,
Counterterrorism, and JP 3-05, Special Operations. For US
policy on CT, refer to the
National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.

e. Support to CD Operations. DOD supports federal, state, and
local LEAs in their
effort to disrupt the transport and/or transfer of illegal drugs
into the US. Specific
DOD authorities that pertain to a CD are contained in Title 10,
USC, Sections 124 and 371-
382. Discussion of similar authorities is discussed in DODI
3025.21, Defense Support of
Civilian Law Enforcement Agencies.

For additional guidance on CD operations, refer to JP 3-07.4,
Counterdrug Operations.

f. Sanction enforcement is any operation that employs coercive
measures to control
the movement of designated items into or out of a nation or
specified area. Maritime
interception operations are efforts to monitor, query, and board
merchant vessels in
international waters to enforce sanctions against other nations

such as those in support of
UN Security Council resolutions and/or prevent the transport of
restricted goods. These
operations serve both strategic and military purposes. The
strategic objective is to compel
a country or group to conform to the objectives of the initiating
body, while the military
objective focuses on establishing a selective barrier that allows
only authorized goods to
enter or exit. Depending on the geography, sanction
enforcement normally involves
some combination of air and surface forces. Assigned forces
should be capable of
complementary mutual support and full communications
interoperability.

g. Enforcement of Exclusion Zones. A sanctioning body
establishes an exclusion
zone to prohibit specified activities in a specific geographic
area. Exclusion zones usually

JOINT TASK FORCE -NORTH

An example of Department of Defense support to counterdrug
operations was the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF)-6 in
1989.
Its mission originally focused exclusively along the Southwest
border of
the US. A succession of National Defense Authorization Acts
expanded
the JTF-6 charter by adding specific mission tasks for the
organization.
In 1995, the JTF-6 area of operations expanded to include the
continental
US. In June 2004, JTF-6 was officially renamed JTF-North and

its
mission was expanded to include providing support to federal
law
enforcement agencies in countering transnational threats.

Mission: JTF-North supports drug law enforcement agencies in
the
conduct of counterdrug/counter narcoterrorism operations in the
US
Northern Command area of responsibility to disrupt
transnational
criminal organizations and deter their freedom of action to
protect the
homeland.

Various Sources

Chapter VI

VI-8 JP 3-0 CH1

are imposed due to breaches of international standards of human
rights or flagrant
violations of international law regarding the conduct of states.
Situations that may warrant
such action include persecution of civil populations by a
government and efforts by a
hostile nation to acquire territory by force. Exclusion zones can
be established in the air
(no-fly zones), sea (maritime), or on land (no-drive zones). An
exclusion zone’s purpose
may be to persuade nations or groups to modify their behavior
to meet the desires of the
sanctioning body or face continued imposition of sanctions or

threat or use of force. Such
measures are usually imposed by the UN or another
international body of which the US is
a member, although they may be imposed unilaterally by the US
(e.g., Operation
SOUTHERN WATCH in Iraq, initiated in August 1992, and
Operation DENY FLIGHT
in Bosnia, from March 1993 to December 1995).

h. Freedom of Navigation and Overflight. Freedom of
navigation operations are
conducted to protect US navigation, overflight, and related
interests on, under, and over
the seas, against excessive maritime claims. Freedom of
navigation is a sovereign right
accorded by international law.

(1) International law has long recognized that a coastal state
may exercise
jurisdiction and control within its territorial sea in the same
manner it can exercise
sovereignty over its own land territory. International law
accords the right of “innocent”
passage to ships of other nations through a state’s territorial
waters. Passage is “innocent”
as long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or
security of the coastal state. The
high seas are free for reasonable use of all states.

(2) Freedom of navigation by aircraft through international
airspace is a well-
established principle of international law. Aircraft threatened
by nations or groups through
the extension of airspace control zones outside the established
international norms will
result in a measured legal response, appropriate to the situation.

The International Civil
Aviation Organization, a specialized agency of the UN, codifies
the principles and
techniques of international air navigation and fosters the
planning and development of
international air transport to ensure safe and orderly use of
international airspace.

i. Foreign assistance is civil or military assistance rendered to a
nation by the
USG within that nation’s territory based on agreements
mutually concluded between the

OVERFLIGHT AND FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION
OPERATIONS

The Berlin air corridors, established between 1948 and 1990,
which
allowed air access to West Berlin, were set up to maintain
international
airspace to an “air-locked” geographical area. When Soviet
forces
disrupted ground passage to Berlin, the US asserted its rights to
utilize
these air corridors during the Berlin airlift. The ATTAIN
DOCUMENT
series of operations against Libya in 1986 were freedom of
navigation
operations, both air and sea, in the Gulf of Sidra, a recognized
international body of water over which Libya illegally claimed
sovereignty.

Various Sources

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VI-9

US and that nation (e.g., Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY, in
1990, following Operation
JUST CAUSE in Panama). Foreign assistance supports the HN
by promoting sustainable
development and growth of responsive institutions. The goal is
to promote long-term
regional stability. Foreign assistance programs include security
assistance, development
assistance, and humanitarian and civic assistance and can
support FID and stability
activities. To be effective, foreign assistance should include
collaborative planning among
the joint force, DOS, USAID, the embassy, the country team in
the HN, HN authorities,
and any supporting international organization or NGO.
Normally, DOD foreign assistance
activities in an HN are integrated into and support objectives of
the chief of mission’s
integrated country strategy, which is consolidated in the CCP
and the country-specific
security cooperation section/country plans that are nested within
the CCP.

j. Security assistance is a group of programs by which the US
provides defense
articles, military training, and other defense-related services to
foreign nations by grant,
loan, credit, or cash sales in furtherance of national policies and
objectives. These
programs are funded and authorized by DOS to be administered
by DOD and the Defense

Security Cooperation Agency. They are an element of security
cooperation. Some
examples of US security assistance programs are the Foreign
Military Sales Program,
the Foreign Military Financing Program, the International
Military Education and Training
Program, the Economic Support Fund, and commercial sales
licensed under the Arms
Export Control Act. Security assistance surges can accelerate
release of equipment,
supplies, or services when an allied or friendly nation faces an
imminent military threat.
Security assistance surges are primarily military and provide
additional combat systems
(e.g., weapons and equipment) or supplies but may include the
full range of security
assistance, to include financial and training support.

k. SFA. SFA is DOD’s contribution to unified action by the
USG to support the
development of the capacity and capability of foreign security
forces (FSF) and their
supporting institutions, to achieve objectives shared by the
USG. SFA is conducted with
and through FSF. The US military conducts activities to
enhance the capabilities and
capacities of a PN (or regional security organization) by
providing training, equipment,
advice, and assistance to those FSF organized in national
ministry of defense (or equivalent
regional military or paramilitary forces). Other USG
departments and agencies focus
forces assigned to other ministries (or their equivalents) such as
interior, justice, or
intelligence services.

For further information about security cooperation, security
assistance, and SFA, refer to
JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

l. FID encompasses participation by civilian and military
agencies of a government
in the action programs taken by another government or other
designated organization to
free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness,
insurgency, terrorism, and other
threats to its security. USG support to FID can include
diplomatic, economic,
informational, and military development assistance to HN
security sector and collaborative
planning with multinational and HN authorities to anticipate,
preclude, and counter those
threats. US military involvement in FID has traditionally
focused on helping a nation
defeat an organized movement attempting to violently
overthrow its lawful government.

Chapter VI

VI-10 JP 3-0 CH1

US FID programs may address other threats to the stability of
an HN, such as civil disorder,
illicit weapons, drug and human trafficking, and terrorism.
While FID is a legislatively
mandated, special operations core activity, conventional forces
also contain and employ
organic capabilities to conduct SFA activities for FID.

For further guidance on FID, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal

Defense. For further
guidance on SOF involvement in FID, refer to JP 3-05, Special
Operations.

m. Humanitarian and civic assistance programs are governed by
Title 10, USC,
Section 401. This assistance may be provided in conjunction
with military operations and
exercises but must fulfill unit training requirements that
incidentally create humanitarian
benefit to the local populace. In contrast to emergency relief
conducted under FHA
operations, humanitarian and civic assistance programs
generally encompass planned
activities in the following categories:

(1) Medical, surgical, dental, and veterinary care provided in
areas of a
country that are rural or underserved by medical, surgical,
dental, and veterinary
professionals, respectively, including education, training, and
technical assistance related
to the care provided.

(2) Construction and repair of basic surface transportation
systems.

(3) Well drilling and construction of basic sanitation facilities.

(4) Rudimentary construction and repair of public facilities.

n. Protection of Shipping. When necessary, US forces provide
protection of US-
flag vessels, US citizens (whether embarked in US or foreign
vessels), and US property
against unlawful violence in and over international waters (such

as Operation
EARNEST WILL, in which Kuwaiti ships were reflagged under
the US flag in 1987). This
protection may be extended to foreign-flag vessels under
international law and with the
consent of the flag state. Actions to protect shipping include
coastal sea control, harbor
defense, port security, countermine operations, and
environmental defense, in addition
to operations on the high seas. Protection of shipping, which is
a critical element in the
fight against piracy, requires the coordinated employment of
surface, air, space, and
subsurface units, sensors, and weapons, as well as a command
structure both ashore and
afloat and a logistic base. Protection of shipping may require a
combination of operations
to be successful. These actions can include area operations,
escort duties, mine
countermeasures, and environmental defense missions.

o. Show of force operations are designed to demonstrate US
resolve. They involve
the appearance of a credible military force in an attempt to
defuse a situation that, if
allowed to continue, may be detrimental to US interests. These
operations also underscore
US commitment to our multinational partners.

(1) The US deploys forces abroad to lend credibility to its
promises and
commitments, increase its regional influence, and demonstrate
its resolve to use
military force if necessary. In addition, SecDef orders a show
of force to bolster and

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VI-11

reassure friends and allies. Show of force operations are
military in nature but often serve
both diplomatic and military purposes. These operations may
influence other governments
or political-military organizations to refrain from belligerent
acts.

(2) Diplomatic concerns dominate a show of force operation,
and as such,
military forces often are under significant legal and diplomatic
constraints and restraints.
The military force coordinates its operations with the country
teams affected. A show of
force can involve a wide range of military forces including joint
US or multinational forces.
Often, bilateral or multinational training and exercises are
scheduled to demonstrate
strength and resolve. Forces conducting a show of force
operation are also capable of
FDOs, FROs, and transitioning to crisis response or limited
contingency activities.

p. Support to Insurgency

(1) An insurgency is the organized use of subversion and
violence to seize,
nullify, or challenge political control of a region. Insurgency
can also refer to the group
itself. Insurgents use a mixture of political, economic,
informational, and combat actions

to achieve political aims. Insurgency is a protracted political-
military struggle designed to
weaken the control and legitimacy of an established
government, an interim governing
body, or a peace process, while simultaneously increasing
insurgent control and legitimacy.
Legitimacy is the central issue in an insurgency.

(2) The US may support insurgencies that oppose oppressive
regimes. The US
coordinates this support with its friends and allies. US military
support is typically through
UW, which includes activities to enable a resistance movement
or insurgency to coerce,
disrupt, or overthrow a government or occupying power by
operating with an underground,
auxiliary, and guerrilla force in a denied area. Special forces
are well-suited to conduct
UW and provide this support. Conventional forces have
functional specialties they may
contribute to the mission. US forces may provide logistic and
training support, as they did
for the Mujahidin resistance in Afghanistan during the Soviet
occupation in the 1980s. In
certain circumstances, the US can provide direct combat
support, such as support to the
French Resistance in World War II, the Afghanistan Northern
Alliance to remove the
Taliban in 2001-2002, and for NATO’s liberation of Kosovo in
1999.

For further guidance on support to insurgency, refer to JP 3-
05.1, Unconventional
Warfare.

SHOW OF FORCE IN THE PHILIPPINES

Operation Joint Task Force-PHILIPPINES was conducted by US
forces
in 1989 in support of President Aquino during a coup attempt
against the
Philippine government. During this operation, a large special
operations
force was formed, fighter aircraft patrolled above rebel air
bases, and
two aircraft carriers were positioned off the coastline of the
Philippines.

Various Sources

Chapter VI

VI-12 JP 3-0 CH1

q. COIN operations include civilian and military efforts
designed to support a
government in the military, paramilitary, political, economic,
psychological, and civic
actions it undertakes to defeat insurgency and address its root
causes. Insurgents use
irregular forms of warfare to undermine their enemies’
legitimacy and credibility.
Ultimately, insurgents seek to isolate their enemies from the
relevant populations and their
external supporters, physically as well as psychologically. At
the same time, they also seek
to bolster their own legitimacy and credibility to exercise
authority over that same

population. COIN operations often include security assistance
programs such as foreign
military sales, foreign military financing, and international
military education and training.
Such support may also include FID and SFA. In some cases, US
COIN operations can be
much more extensive and involve joint force limited
contingency or major operations.

For further guidance on support to COIN, refer to JP 3-24,
Counterinsurgency Operations,
and JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

3. Other Considerations

a. Interagency, International, and Nongovernmental
Organizations and HN
Coordination. JFCs will work with interorganizational and HN
authorities to plan and
conduct military engagement, security cooperation, and
deterrence operations and
activities. Liaison organizations such as a JIACG can promote
interaction and cooperation
among diverse agencies. Consensus building improves each
agency’s understanding of the
capabilities and limitations, as well as any constraints, of
partner agencies. Establishing
an atmosphere of trust and cooperation promotes unity of effort
to achieve USG objectives.

For further discussion on interorganizational coordination, refer
to JP 3-08,
Interorganizational Cooperation.

b. Information Sharing. NGOs and international organizations,
by the nature of

what they do, become familiar with the culture, language,
sensitivities, and status of the
populace, as well as the infrastructure in a region. This
information is valuable to
commanders and staffs who may not have physical access or the
most current information.
NGOs and international organizations may also need
information from commanders and
staffs concerning security issues. However, these organizations
hold neutrality as a
fundamental principle. Many NGOs and international
organizations will resist being used
as sources of intelligence, and they may be hesitant to associate
with the military. Discrete
coordination can sometimes alleviate these concerns. JFCs may
elect to establish
mechanisms like a CMOC, or a similar organization, to
coordinate activities and facilitate
information sharing. International organizations and NGOs are
more likely to participate
if they perceive that mutual sharing of information aids their
work and is not a threat to
their neutrality. USAID, when it has a mission presence in
country, usually has the
strongest network of contacts and information on international
organizations, NGOs, and
local partners and should be consulted. USAID missions are
required to share their
Country Development Cooperation Strategies with CCMDs, and
conversely, CCMDs are
encouraged to share their CCPs with USAID missions in their
AOR to enhance information
sharing.

Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence

VI-13

c. Cultural Awareness. Military support and operations
intended to support an HN
should be built on in-depth understanding of the HN’s cultural,
social, economic, and
political realities. The JFC may augment Service-language and
cultural awareness training
and tailor supplemental training to the JOA and mission. Also,
intelligence products and
military engagement actions continuously update cultural,
social, economic, and political
information. The beliefs, perceptions, lifestyles, and economic
underpinnings of the
society, among other considerations, influence the OE and will
affect planning and
execution. Further, it is important to monitor perceptions and
reactions of populations in
the areas of influence and area of interest, as these factors also
affect current and future
operations, activities, and planning.

(1) Security cooperation activities will likely impact countries
throughout a
region. Traditional rivalries among neighboring states and
hostility toward the US may be
factors. For example, US assistance to a nation with long-
standing rivals in the area may
be perceived by these rivals as upsetting the regional balance of
power. While such factors
do not dictate US policy, they should be carefully evaluated and
considered prior to military
operations.

(2) Multinational efforts to enhance stability, foster
development, and prevent
conflict, combined with contingency operations to contain non-
state regional actors,
require JFCs and staff to plan for sufficient permanent and
supplemental (surge) interpreter,
translator, and cultural analysis capabilities.

Chapter VI

VI-14 JP 3-0 CH1

Intentionally Blank

VII-1

CHAPTER VII
CRISIS RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY
OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

Crisis response and limited contingency operations are typically
focused in scope and
scale and conducted to achieve a very specific strategic or
operational-level objective in an

OA. They may be conducted as a stand-alone response to a
crisis (e.g., NEO) or executed
as an element of a larger, more complex operation. Joint forces
conduct crisis response
and limited contingency operations to achieve operational and,
sometimes, strategic
objectives.

2. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

a. CCDRs plan for various situations that require military
operations in response to
natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or other contingencies
and crises as directed by
appropriate authority. The level of complexity, duration, and
resources depends on the
circumstances. Limited contingency operations ensure the
safety of US citizens and US
interests while maintaining and improving the ability to operate
with multinational partners
to deter hostile ambitions of potential aggressors (e.g., JTF
SHINING HOPE in the spring
of 1999 to support refugee humanitarian relief for hundreds of
thousands of ethnic
Albanians fleeing their homes in Kosovo). Many of these
operations involve a
combination of military forces and capabilities operating in
close cooperation with
interorganizational participants. APEX integrates planning into
one unified construct to
facilitate unity of effort and transition from planning to
execution. Planning functions can
be performed in series over a period of time or they can be
compressed, performed in
parallel, or truncated as appropriate.

b. Initial Response. When crises develop and the President
directs, CCDRs respond.
If the crisis revolves around external threats to a regional
partner, CCDRs employ joint
forces to deter aggression and signal US commitment (e.g.,
deploying joint forces to train
in Kuwait). If the crisis is caused by an internal conflict that
threatens regional stability,
US forces may intervene to restore or guarantee stability (e.g.,
Operation RESTORE
DEMOCRACY, the 1994 intervention in Haiti). If the crisis is
within US territory (e.g.,
natural or man-made disaster, deliberate attack), US joint forces
will conduct DSCA and
HD operations as directed by the President and SecDef. Prompt
deployment of sufficient
forces in the initial phase of a crisis can preclude the need to
deploy larger forces later.
Effective early intervention can also deny an adversary time to
set conditions in their favor,
achieve destabilizing objectives, or mitigate the effects of a
natural or man-made disaster.
Deploying a credible force rapidly is one step in deterring or
blocking aggression.

“If we are to retain ... a choice other than nuclear holocaust or
retreat, we must
be ready to fight a limited war for a protracted period of time
anywhere in the
world.”

John F. Kennedy: Message on the Budget, Fiscal Year 1963

Chapter VII

VII-2 JP 3-0 CH1

However, deployment alone will not guarantee success.
Achieving successful deterrence
involves convincing the adversary that the deployed force is
able to conduct decisive
operations and the national leadership is willing to employ that
force and to deploy more
forces if necessary.

c. Strategic Aspects. Two important aspects about crisis
response and foreign
limited contingency operations stand out. First, understanding
the strategic objective helps
avoid actions that may have adverse diplomatic or political
effects. It is not uncommon in
some operations, such as peacekeeping, for junior leaders to
make decisions that have
significant strategic implications. Second, commanders should
remain aware of changes
not only in the operational situation but also in strategic
objectives that may warrant a
change in military operations. These changes may not always
be obvious. Therefore,
commanders must strive to detect subtle changes, which may
eventually lead to disconnects
between national objectives and military operations. Failure to
recognize changes in
national objectives early may lead to ineffective or
counterproductive military operations.

d. Economy of Force. The strategic environment requires the
US to maintain and
prepare joint forces for crisis response and limited contingency
operations simultaneously

with other operations, preferably in concert with allies and/or
PNs when appropriate. This
approach recognizes these operations will vary in duration,
frequency, intensity, and the
number of personnel required. The burden of many crisis
response and limited contingency
operations may lend themselves to using small elements like
SOF in coordination with
allied nations or PNs. Initially, SOF may take the lead of these
operations as an economy
of force measure to enable major operations and campaigns with
conventional focus to
progress more effectively.

3. Typical Operations

a. NEOs are operations directed by DOS or other appropriate
authority, in
conjunction with DOD, whereby noncombatants are evacuated
from locations within
foreign countries to safe havens designated by DOS when their
lives are endangered by
war, civil unrest, or natural disaster. Although principally
conducted to evacuate US
citizens, NEOs may also include citizens from the HN, as well
as citizens from other
countries. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of
Emergency Preparedness
Responsibilities, DOS is responsible for the protection and
evacuation of US citizens
abroad and for safeguarding their property. This order also
directs DOD to advise and
assist DOS to prepare and implement plans for the evacuation of
US citizens. The US
ambassador, or chief of the diplomatic mission, prepares the
emergency action plans that

address the military evacuation of US citizens and designated
foreign nationals from a
foreign country. The GCC conducts military operations to
assist in the implementation of
emergency action plans as directed by SecDef.

For additional guidance on NEOs, refer to JP 3-68,
Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

b. PO. PO are multiagency and multinational operations
involving all instruments of
national power—including international humanitarian and
reconstruction efforts and
military missions—to contain conflict, restore the peace, and
shape the environment to

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VII-3

support reconciliation and rebuilding and facilitate the
transition to legitimate governance.
For the Armed Forces of the United States, PO encompass PKO,
predominantly military
PEO, predominantly diplomatic PB actions, PM processes, and
conflict prevention. PO
are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic
activities and humanitarian
efforts necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the
conflict. PO are tailored to
each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic
activities before, during, or
after conflict. PO support national/multinational strategic
objectives. Military support

improves the chances for success in the peace process by
lending credibility to diplomatic
actions and demonstrating resolve to achieve viable political
settlements.

For additional guidance on PO, refer to JP 3-07.3, Peace
Operations.

c. FHA. FHA operations relieve or reduce human suffering,
disease, hunger, or
privation in countries outside the US. These operations are
different from foreign
assistance primarily because they occur on short notice as a
contingency operation to
provide aid in specific crises or similar events rather than as
more deliberate foreign
assistance programs to promote long-term stability. DOS or the
chief of mission in country
is responsible for confirming the HN’s declaration of a foreign
disaster or situation that
requires FHA. FHA provided by US forces is generally limited
in scope and duration; it is
intended to supplement or complement efforts of HN civil
authorities or agencies with the
primary responsibility for providing assistance. DOD provides
assistance when the need
for relief is gravely urgent and when the humanitarian
emergency dwarfs the ability of
normal relief agencies to effectively respond.

For further guidance on FHA operations, refer to JP 3-29,
Foreign Humanitarian
Assistance.

d. Recovery operations may be conducted to search for, locate,
identify, recover, and

return isolated personnel, sensitive equipment, items critical to
national security, or human
remains (e.g., JTF FULL ACCOUNTING, which had the
mission to achieve the fullest
possible accounting of Americans listed as missing or prisoners
of war from all past wars
and conflicts). Regardless of the recovery purpose, each type of
recovery operation is
generally a sophisticated activity requiring detailed planning to
execute. Recovery
operations may be clandestine, covert, or overt depending on
whether the OE is hostile,
uncertain, or permissive.

e. Strikes and Raids

(1) Strikes are attacks conducted to damage or destroy an
objective or a
capability. Strikes may be used to punish offending nations or
groups, uphold international
law, or prevent those nations or groups from launching their
own attacks (e.g., Operation
EL DORADO CANYON conducted against Libya in 1986, in
response to the terrorist
bombing of US Service members in Berlin). Although often
tactical in nature with respect
to the ways and means used and duration of the operation,
strikes can achieve strategic
objectives as did the strike against Libya.

Chapter VII

VII-4 JP 3-0 CH1

(2) Raids are operations to temporarily seize an area, usually
through forcible
entry, to secure information, confuse an enemy, capture
personnel or equipment, or destroy
an objective or capability (e.g., Operation RHINO, a raid led by
US SOF elements on
several Taliban targets in and around Kandahar, Afghanistan, in
October 2001). Raids end
with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned
mission.

OPERATION ATLAS RESPONSE

In the early part of February 2000, Cyclone Connie drenched
the
Southern Africa region with over 40 inches of rain causing
many rivers
in the region to overflow and flood populated areas. US
European
Command sent a humanitarian assistance survey team (HAST)
to get
“eyes on the ground.” Just as the effects of Connie were
lessening and
the HAST was preparing to head home, Cyclone Leon-Eline hit
Madagascar. The storm pushed further inland and rain fell in
Zimbabwe,
adding to reservoirs that were already full. This forced the
release of
water from reservoirs, causing even more flooding.
Mozambique was
the country with the greatest needs in the region. Consequently,
between 18 February and 1 April 2000, Joint Task Force (JTF)-
ATLAS
RESPONSE, under the command of Major General Joseph H.
Wehrle, Jr.,

US Air Force, was sent to aid the people of Mozambique, South
Africa,
Botswana, Zimbabwe, and Zambia.

The joint force commander established a small, main
headquarters in
Maputo, Mozambique, to be near the US Ambassador. The
majority of
forces and staff resided at Air Force Base Hoedspruit, South
Africa.
Eventually, a small contingent of forces would deploy to Beira,
Mozambique, to work at a supply distribution hub. The primary
predeployment tasks of the JTF: 1) Search and rescue (SAR), 2)
Coordination and synchronization of relief efforts, and 3) Relief
supply
distribution. Upon arrival, the JTF discovered SAR efforts were
essentially complete and a fourth key task became the conduct
aerial
assessment of the lines of communications. This fourth task
was
important because it was also a key indicator in the exit
strategy.

During the brief time of the operation, the JTF’s aircraft carried
a total of
714.3 short tons of intergovernmental organization
(IGO)/nongovernmental
organization (NGO) cargo, most of it for direct support of the
local
population. Helicopters and C-130s also moved 511 non-US
passengers.
The majority were medics or aid workers carried on special
operations
forces HH-60s bringing immediate relief to populations cut off
from the rest
of the world.

Operation ATLAS RESPONSE was a political and military
success. Not
only was humanitarian aid provided to the people of
Mozambique, but
good relations with South African military and many IGOs and
NGOs
were forged.

Source: Derived from Dr. Robert Sly’s “ATLAS RESPONSE
Study,”
Third Air Force History Office, 2000

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VII-5

f. HD and DSCA. Security and defense of the US homeland is
the USG’s top
responsibility and is conducted as a continuous, cooperative
effort among all federal
agencies, as well as state, tribal, and local government.
Military operations inside the US
and its territories, though limited in many respects, are
conducted to accomplish two
missions—HD and DSCA.

(1) HD. HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory,
domestic population,
and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and
aggression or other threats
as directed by the President. DOD is the federal agency with
lead responsibility,

supported by other agencies, to defend against external threats
and aggression.
However, against internal threats, DOD may be in support of
another USG department or
agency. When ordered to conduct HD operations within US
territory, DOD will
coordinate closely with other government agencies. Consistent
with laws and policy,
the Services will provide capabilities to support CCDR
requirements against a variety of
threats to national security. These include invasion, cyberspace
attack, and air and missile
attacks. Support to HD provided by the National Guard will be
IAW DODD 3160.01,
Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by the National Guard.

(2) DSCA

(a) DSCA is support provided by US federal military forces;
DOD civilians,
DOD contract personnel, DOD component assets, and DOD
agencies; and National Guard
forces (when SecDef, in coordination with the governors of the
affected states, elects and
requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC status) in response
to requests for assistance
from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law
enforcement support, and other

OPERATION EL DORADO CANYON

The strike was designed to hit directly at the heart of Libyan
leader
Muammar Gaddafi’s ability to export terrorism with the belief
that such

a preemptive strike would provide him “incentives and reasons
to alter
his criminal behavior.” The final targets were selected at the
National
Security Council level “within the circle of the President’s
advisors.”
Ultimately, five targets were selected. All except one of the
targets were
chosen because of their direct connection to terrorist activity.
The
single exception was the Benina military airfield which based
Libyan
fighter aircraft. This target was hit to preempt Libyan
interceptors from
taking off and attacking the incoming US bombers.

The actual combat commenced at 0200 (local Libyan time) and
lasted
less than 12 minutes, resulting in the dropping of 60 tons of
munitions.
Navy A-6 Intruders were assigned the two targets in the
Benghazi area,
and the Air Force F-111s hit the other three targets in the
vicinity of
Tripoli. Resistance outside the immediate area of attack was
nonexistent, and Libyan air defense aircraft never launched.
One F-111
strike aircraft was lost during the strike.

Various Sources

Chapter VII

VII-6 JP 3-0 CH1

domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special
events. For DSCA operations,
DOD supports and does not supplant civil authorities. The
majority of DSCA operations
are conducted IAW the NRF, which establishes a
comprehensive, national, all-hazards
approach to domestic incident response. Within a state, that
state’s governor is the key
decision maker and commands the state’s National Guard forces
when they are not in
federal Title 10, USC, status. When the governor mobilizes the
National Guard, it will
most often be under state active duty when supporting civil
authorities.

(b) Other DSCA operations can include CD activities, support
to national
special security events, or other support to civilian law
enforcement IAW specific DOD
policies and US law. Commanders and staffs must carefully
consider the legal and policy
limits imposed on intelligence activities in support of LEAs and
on intelligence activities
involving US citizens and entities by intelligence oversight
regulations, policies, and
executive orders.

(3) Global Perspective. Commander, US Northern Command,
and Commander,
US Pacific Command, have specific responsibilities for HD and
DSCA. These
responsibilities include conducting operations to deter, prevent,
and defeat threats and
aggression aimed at the US, its territories, and interests within

their assigned AORs, as
directed by the President or SecDef. However, DOD support to
HD is global in nature and
is often conducted by all CCDRs beginning at the source of the
threat. In the forward
regions outside US territories, the objective is to detect and
deter threats to the homeland
before they arise and to defeat these threats as early as possible
when so directed.

For more information on DSCA, see JP 3-28, Defense Support
of Civil Authorities, and
for detailed guidance on DSCA, see DODD 3025.18, Defense
Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA).

For more information on National Guard support, see DODD
3025.18, Defense Support
of Civil Authorities (DSCA), and DODI 3025.22, The Use of
the National Guard for
Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

For detailed guidance on HD, see JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

4. Other Considerations

a. Duration and End State. Crisis response and limited
contingency operations may
be relatively short in duration (e.g., NEO, strike, raid) or last
for an extended period to
achieve the national objective (such as US participation with ten
other nations in the
independent [non-UN] peacekeeping operation, Multinational
Force and Observers, in the
Sinai Peninsula since 1982). Short-duration operations are not
always possible, particularly

in situations where destabilizing conditions have existed for
years or where conditions are
such that a long-term commitment is required to achieve
national strategic objectives.
Nevertheless, it is imperative to have clear national objectives
for all types of contingencies.

b. Intelligence. As soon as practical, JFCs and their staffs
determine intelligence
requirements to support the anticipated operation. Intelligence
planners also consider the
capability for a unit to receive external intelligence support, the
capability to store

Crisis Response and Limited Contingency Operations

VII-7

intelligence data, the timeliness of intelligence products, the
availability of intelligence
publications, and the possibility of using other agencies and
organizations as intelligence
sources. In some contingencies (e.g., PKO), the term
information collection is used rather
than the term intelligence because of the operation’s sensitivity.

(1) HUMINT may often provide the most useful source of
information and is
essential to understanding an enemy or adversary. If a
HUMINT infrastructure is not in
place when US forces arrive, it needs to be established as
quickly as possible. HUMINT
also complements other intelligence sources with information
not available through

technical means. For example, while overhead imagery may
graphically depict the number
of people gathered in a town square, it cannot gauge the
motivations or enthusiasm of the
crowd. Additionally, in underdeveloped areas, belligerent
forces may not rely heavily on
radio communications, thereby denying US forces intelligence
derived through signal
intercept.

(2) Where there is little USG or US military presence, open-
source intelligence
(OSINT) may be the best immediately available information to
prepare US forces to
operate in a foreign country. OSINT from broadcasts, print
media, and social networks
may be the best, immediately available information to provide
tip-offs for HUMINT and
other intelligence and information collection methods.

(3) Tailored products based on continuous JIPOE can promote
timely and
comprehensive understanding of all aspects of the OE needed
for crisis response and
limited contingency operations.

(4) GEOINT consists of the exploitation and analysis of
imagery and geospatial
information to describe, assess, and visually depict physical
features and geographically
referenced activities. GEOINT consists of imagery, imagery
intelligence, and geospatial
information.

For further guidance on GEOINT, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial
Intelligence in Joint

Operations.

(5) Intelligence organizations (principally at the JTF HQ level)
should include
foreign area officers. Due to extensive training and experience
working in foreign
countries as defense attachés and in defense support to US
embassy operations, foreign
area officers add valuable cultural awareness and insights to
intelligence products.

For further guidance on JIPOE, refer to JP 2-01.3, Joint
Intelligence Preparation of the
Operational Environment.

c. Operational Limitations. A JFC tasked with conducting or
supporting a crisis
response or limited contingency operation may face numerous
constraints, restraints, and
ROE based on the specific circumstances. For example,
international acceptance of each
operation may be extremely important, not only because
military forces may be used to
support international sanctions but also because of the
probability of involvement by
international organizations. As a consequence, legal and fiscal
constraints unique to the
operation should be addressed in detail by the CCDR’s staff.
Also, operational limitations

Chapter VII

VII-8 JP 3-0 CH1

imposed on any agency or organization involved in the
operation should be clarified for
other agencies and organizations to facilitate coordination.

d. Force Protection. Limited contingency operations may
involve a requirement to
protect nonmilitary personnel, such as contractors authorized to
accompany the force. In
the absence of the rule of law, the JFC must address when, how,
and to what extent he will
extend force protection to civilians and what that protection
means.

e. Training. Participation in certain types of smaller-scale
contingencies may
preclude normal mission-related training. For example, infantry
units or fighter squadrons
conducting certain protracted PO may not have the time,
facilities, or environment in which
to maintain individual or unit proficiency for traditional
missions. In these situations,
commanders should develop programs that enable their forces to
maintain proficiency in
their core competencies/mission-essential tasks to the greatest
extent possible.

VIII-1

CHAPTER VIII
LARGE-SCALE COMBAT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

a. Traditionally, campaigns are the most extensive joint
operations, in terms of the
amount of forces and other capabilities committed and duration
of operations. In the
context of large-scale combat, a campaign is a series of related
major operations aimed at
achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given
time and space. A major
operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles,
engagements, and strikes, and is the
primary building block of a campaign. Major operations and
campaigns typically include
multiple phases (e.g., the 1990-1991 Operations DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM
and 2003 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM). Campaign planning is
appropriate when the
contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single
major operation.

b. Campaigns can occur across the conflict continuum. In
campaigns characterized
by combat, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as
quickly as possible; conclude
hostilities; and establish conditions favorable to the HN, the
US, and its multinational
partners. Establishing these conditions may require joint forces
to conduct stability
activities to restore security, provide essential services and
humanitarian relief, and conduct
emergency reconstruction. Some crisis response or contingency
operations may not
involve large-scale combat but could meet the definition of a
major operation or
campaign based on their scale and duration (e.g., the Tsunami
relief efforts in Indonesia
or Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in the US, both in 2005).

c. Campaigns are joint in nature—functional and Service
components of the
joint force conduct supporting operations, not independent
campaigns. Within a
campaign, forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in
time and space, conduct
operations to achieve strategic or operational objectives in one
or more OAs. Forces
operate simultaneously or sequentially IAW a common plan and
are controlled by a single
Service commander or the JFC.

“Your task will not be an easy one. Your enemy is well trained,
well equipped
and battle hardened. He will fight savagely.

But this is the year 1944! Much has happened since the Nazi
triumphs of
1940-41. The United Nations have inflicted upon the Germans
great defeats,
in open battle, man-to-man. Our air offensive has seriously
reduced their
strength in the air and their capacity to wage war on the ground.
Our Home
Fronts have given us an overwhelming superiority in weapons
and munitions
of war, and placed at our disposal great reserves of trained
fighting men. The
tide has turned! The free men of the world are marching
together to Victory!

I have full confidence in your courage and devotion to duty and
skill in battle.
We will accept nothing less than full Victory!”

General Dwight D. Eisenhower D-Day Message
Order of the Day: 6 June 1944

Chapter VIII

VIII-2 JP 3-0 CH1

2. Combatant Command Planning

a. The CCMD strategy links national strategic guidance to
development of CCMD
campaign and contingency plans. A CCMD strategy is a broad
statement of the GCC’s
long-term vision for the AOR and the FCC’s long-term vision
for the global employment
of functional capabilities. CCDRs prepare these strategies in
the context of SecDef’s
priorities outlined in the GEF and the CJCS’s objectives
articulated in the NMS. However,
the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of operations
typically magnify the planning
challenges. There are three categories of campaigns, which
differ generally in scope and
focus.

b. CCDRs document the full scope of their campaigns in the set
of plans that includes
the CCP or FCP and all of its GEF- and JSCP-directed plans,
subordinate and supporting
plans, posture or master plans, country plans (for the geographic
CCMDs), OPLANs of
operations currently in execution, and contingency plans.

(1) GCCs, as directed in the UCP, GEF, and JSCP, prepare

CCPs in APEX
OPLAN format for their UCP-assigned AOR and integrate the
planning of designated
missions assigned to specified CCDRs into their CCPs.

(2) FCCs, as directed in the UCP, GEF, and JSCP, prepare
CCPs in APEX
OPLAN format for their UCP-assigned missions and
responsibilities and synchronize
planning across CCMDs, Services, and DOD agencies for
designated missions.

(3) The scale and projected duration of a subordinate JFC’s
crisis response or
contingency mission may require the GCC or JFC to develop a
campaign plan subordinate
to the GCC’s theater campaign.

For detailed guidance on joint planning and campaign plans, see
JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

THE GULF WAR, 1990 -1991

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded and occupied Kuwait. Much of
the rest
of the world, including most other Arab nations, united in
condemnation
of that action. On 7 August, the operation known as DESERT
SHIELD
began. Its principal objectives were to deter further aggression
and to
force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The United Nations (UN)
Security
Council passed a series of resolutions calling for Iraq to leave
Kuwait,

finally authorizing “all necessary means,” including the use of
force, to
force Iraq to comply with UN resolutions.

The US led in establishing a political and military coalition to
force Iraq
from Kuwait and restore stability to the region. The military
campaign
to accomplish these ends took the form of a series of major
operations.
These operations employed the entire capability of the
international
military coalition and included operations in war and operations
other
than war throughout the campaign—which included Operations

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-3

DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and the subse quent
period of
post-conflict operations. These operations can be viewed in the
following major phases.

• DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP (to include crisis
planning,
mobilization, deployment, and deterrence)

• DEFENSE (with deployment and force buildup continuing)

• OFFENSE

• POSTWAR OPERATIONS (to include redeployment)

DEPLOYMENT AND FORCE BUILDUP. While diplomats
attempted to
resolve the crisis without combat, the coalition’s military forces
conducted rapid planning, mobilization, and the largest strategic
deployment since World War II. One of the earliest military
actions was
a maritime interdiction of the shipping of items of military
potential to
Iraq.

The initial entry of air and land forces into the theater was
unopposed.
The Commander, United States Central Command
(CDRUSCENTCOM),
balanced the arrival of these forces to provide an early, viable
deterrent
capability and the logistic capability needed to receive, further
deploy,
and sustain the rapidly growing force. Planning, mobilization,
and
deployment continued throughout this phase.

DEFENSE. While even the earliest arriving forces were in a
defensive
posture, a viable defense was possible only after the buildup of
sufficient coalition air, land, and maritime combat capability.
Mobilization and deployment of forces continued. Operations
security
(OPSEC) measures, operational military deception, and
operational
psychological operations were used to influence Iraqi
dispositions,
expectations, and combat effectiveness and thus degrade their
abilities

to resist CDRUSCENTCOM’s selected course of action before
engaging
enemy forces. This phase ended on 17 January 1991, when
Operation
DESERT STORM began.

OFFENSE. Operation DESERT STORM began with a major
airpower
effort—from both land and sea—against strategic targets; Iraqi
air, land,
and naval forces; logistic infrastructure; and command and
control (C2).
Land and special operations forces supported this air effort by
attacking
or designating for attack forward-based Iraqi air defense and
radar
capability. The objectives of this phase were to gain air
supremacy,
significantly degrade Iraqi C2, deny information to enemy
commanders,
destroy enemy forces and infrastructure, and deny freedom of
movement. This successful air operation would establish the
conditions
for the attack by coalition land forces.

Chapter VIII

VIII-4 JP 3-0 CH1

3. Setting Conditions for Theater Operations

a. General. CCDRs and JFCs execute their campaigns and
operations in pursuit of

US national objectives and to shape the OE. In pursuit of
national objectives, these
campaigns and operations also seek to prevent, prepare for, or
mitigate the impact of a
crisis or contingency. In many cases, these actions enhance
bonds between potential
multinational partners, increase understanding of the region,
help ensure access when
required, and strengthen the capability for future multinational
operations, all of which help
prevent crises from developing.

b. Organizing and Training Forces. Organizing and, where
possible, training forces
to conduct operations throughout the OA can be a deterrent.
JTFs and components that are
likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised
regularly during peacetime.

While airpower attacked Iraqi forces throughout their depth,
land forces
repositioned from deceptive locations to attack positions using
extensive OPSEC measures and simulations to deny knowledge
of
movements to the enemy. Coalition land forces moved a great
distance
in an extremely short time to positions from which they could
attack the
more vulnerable western flanks of Iraqi forces. US amphibious
forces
threatened to attack from eastern seaward approaches, drawing
Iraqi
attention and defensive effort in that direction.

On 24 February, land forces attacked Iraq and rapidly closed on
Iraqi

flanks. Under a massive and continuous air operation, coalition
land
forces closed with the Republican Guard. Iraqis surrendered in
large
numbers. To the extent that it could, the Iraqi military
retreated. Within
100 hours of the start of the land force attack, the coalition
achieved its
strategic objectives and a cease-fire was ordered.

POSTWAR OPERATIONS. Coalition forces consolidated their
gains and
enforced conditions of the cease-fire. The coalition sought to
prevent
the Iraqi military from taking retribution against its own
dissident
populace. Task Force Freedom began operations to rebuild
Kuwait City.

The end of combat operations did not bring an end to conflict.
The
coalition conducted peace enforcement operations, humanitarian
relief,
security operations, extensive weapons and ordnance disposal,
and
humanitarian assistance. On 5 April, for example, President
Bush
announced the beginning of a relief operation in the area of
northern
Iraq. By 7 April, US aircraft from Europe were dropping relief
supplies
over the Iraqi border. Several thousand Service personnel who
had
participated in Operation DESERT STORM eventually
redeployed to
Turkey and northern Iraq in this joint and multinational relief

operation.

This postwar phase also included the major operations
associated with
the redeployment and demobilization of forces.

Various Sources

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-5

Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and
controlling joint and multinational
operations. The composition of joint force staffs should reflect
the composition of the joint
force to ensure those employing joint forces have thorough
knowledge of their capabilities
and limitations. When possible, JFCs and their staffs should
invite non-DOD agencies to
participate in training to facilitate a common understanding and
to build a working
relationship prior to actual execution. Commanders must
continue to refine interactions
with interagency partners they will work with most often and
develop common procedures
to improve interoperability. When it is not possible to train
forces in the theater of
employment, as with US-based forces with multiple tasks,
commanders should make
maximum use of regularly scheduled and ad hoc exercise
opportunities. The training focus
for all forces and the basis for exercise objectives should be the

CCDR’s joint mission-
essential tasks.

c. Rehearsals. Rehearsal provides an opportunity to learn,
understand, and practice
a plan in the time available before actual execution. Rehearsing
key combat and
sustainment actions allows participants to become familiar with
the operation, visualize the
plan, and identify possible friction points. This process orients
joint and multinational
forces to surroundings and to other units during execution.
Rehearsals also provide a forum
for subordinate leaders to analyze the plan, but they must
exercise caution in adjusting the
plan. Changes must be coordinated throughout the chain of
command to prevent errors in
integration and synchronization. HQ at the tactical level often
conduct rehearsals involving
participation of maneuver forces positioned on terrain that
mirrors the OE. HQ at the
operational level rehearse key aspects of a plan using command
post exercises, typically
supported by computer-aided simulations. While the joint force
may not be able to rehearse
an entire operation, the JFC should identify essential elements
for rehearsal.

d. Maintaining Operational Access. JFCs must overcome the
enemy’s A2/AD
capabilities to establish and maintain access to OAs where they
are likely to operate,
ensuring forward presence, basing (to include availability of
airfields and seaports and
adequate sustainment), resiliency of combat power after enemy
action, freedom of

navigation, and cooperation with allied and/or coalition nations
to enhance operational
reach. In part, this effort is national or multinational, involving
maintenance of intertheater
(between theaters) air, land, sea, space, EMS, and cyberspace
LOCs. Supporting CCDRs
can greatly enhance this effort.

e. Space Considerations. Space operations support all joint
operations. Prior to and
during conflict, commanders need to ensure US, allied, and/or
multinational forces gain
and maintain space superiority. Commanders must anticipate
and mitigate hostile actions
that may affect friendly space operations. Commanders should
also anticipate the
proliferation and increasing sophistication of commercial space
capabilities and products
available that the commander can leverage but which may also
be available to enemies and
adversaries. USSTRATCOM plans and conducts space
operations. The GCC, in
coordination with other USG departments and agencies,
conducts certain aspects of
theater space operations, to include planning for, supporting,
and conducting the
recovery of astronauts, space vehicles, space payloads, and
objects as directed. They
may also request the CDRUSSTRATCOM’s assistance in
integrating space forces,
capabilities, and considerations into each phase of campaign
and major OPLANs. Global

Chapter VIII

VIII-6 JP 3-0 CH1

and theater space operations require robust planning and skilled
employment to
synchronize and integrate space operations with the joint
operation. It is therefore
incumbent upon the GCCs to coordinate as required to minimize
conflicts. Space
capabilities help shape the OE in a variety of ways, including
providing intelligence and
communications necessary to keep commanders and leaders
informed worldwide. JFCs
and their components should request space support early in the
planning process to ensure
effective and efficient use of space assets.

For further guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14,
Space Operations, and Air
Force Doctrine Annex 3-14, Space Operations.

f. EMS Considerations. The joint force is critically dependent
on the EMS for
operations across all joint functions and throughout the OE. For
example, modern C2
requires operation of EMS-dependent sensing and
communication systems, while
advanced weapons rely on PNT information transmitted through
the EMS. Therefore, the
joint force should strive for local EMS superiority prior to
executing joint operations. EMS
superiority is that degree of dominance in the EMS that permits
the conduct of operations
at a given time and place without prohibitive interference, while
affecting an adversary’s
ability to do the same. Achieving EMS superiority is

complicated by increasing joint EMS-
use requirements, EME congestion, and proliferation of EMS
threats. Joint forces execute
JEMSO, facilitated by electromagnetic battle management
(EMBM), to achieve the
necessary unity of effort for EMS superiority.

For further information on EMS/JEMSO, see the National
Military Strategic Plan for
Electronic Warfare; JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Management Operations; JP
3-13.1, Electronic Warfare; and the DOD EMS Strategy.

g. Stability Activities. Activities prior to combat operations
may focus on continued
planning and preparation for anticipated stability activities in
the subsequent phases. These
activities should include conducting collaborative interagency
planning to synchronize the
civil-military effort; confirming the feasibility of pertinent
military objectives and the
military end state; and providing for adequate intelligence, an
appropriate force mix, and
other capabilities. US military support to stabilization efforts
in this phase may be required
as part of the USG’s security sector assistance, purposed to
quickly restore security and
infrastructure or provide humanitarian relief in select portions
of the OA to dissuade further
adversary actions or to help gain and maintain access and future
success.

4. Considerations for Deterrence

a. General. Deterrence is characterized by preparatory actions
that indicate resolve

to commit resources and respond to the situation. These actions
begin when a CCDR or
JFC identifies that routine operations may not achieve desired
objectives due to an
adversary’s actions. This requires the commander to have
identified CCIRs and assessed
whether additional resources, outside those currently allocated
and assigned for ongoing
operations, are required to defuse the crisis, reassure partners,
demonstrate the intent to
deny the adversary’s goals and execute subsequent phases of the
operation. Deterrence
should be based on capability (having the means to influence
behavior), credibility

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-7

(maintaining a level of believability that the proposed actions
may actually be employed),
and communication (transmitting the intended message to the
desired audience) to ensure
greater effectiveness (effectiveness of deterrence must be
viewed from the perspective of
the agent/actor that is to be deterred). Before hostilities begin,
the JFC and staff analyze
and assess the adversary’s goals and decision-making process to
determine how, where,
and when these can be affected and what friendly actions
(military and others) can
influence events and act as a deterrent. For example, traditional
US military force may be
less of a deterrent to irregular and non-state threats, and the

assessment should therefore
consider alternative or complementary approaches. Emphasis
should be placed on setting
the conditions for successful joint combat operations should
deterrence fail.

b. Preparing the OA

(1) Special Operations. SOF play a major role in preparing and
shaping the OA
and OE by setting conditions which mitigate risk and facilitate
successful follow-on
operations. The regional focus, cross-cultural/ethnic insights,
language capabilities, and
relationships of SOF provide access to and influence in nations
where the presence of
conventional US forces is unacceptable or inappropriate. SOF
contributions can provide
operational leverage by gathering critical information;
undermining an adversary’s will or
capacity to wage war; and enhancing the capabilities of
conventional US, multinational, or
indigenous/surrogate forces. CDRUSSOCOM synchronizes
planning for global
operations against terrorist networks in coordination with other
CCMDs, the Services, and,
as directed, appropriate USG departments and agencies. In
coordination with GCCs and
the supported JFC, CDRUSSOCOM plans and executes or
synchronizes the execution of
activities related to preparing the OE and OA or provides SOF
to other CCMDs.

For further guidance on special operations, refer to JP 3-05,
Special Operations.

(2) Stability Activities. Joint force planning and operations
conducted prior to
commencement of hostilities should establish a sound
foundation to conduct stabilization
and enable civil authority. JFCs should anticipate and address
how to fill the power
vacuum created when sustained combat operations wind down.
Accomplishing this task
should ease the transition to stability activities and shorten the
path to national objectives
and transition to another authority. Considerations include
actions to:

(a) Limit the damage to key infrastructure (water, energy,
medical) and
services.

(b) Assist with the restoration and development of power
generation
facilities.

(c) Establish the intended disposition of captured leadership
and
demobilized military and paramilitary forces.

(d) Provide for the availability of cash or other means of
financial exchange.

(e) Determine the proper force mix (e.g., combat, military
police, CA,
engineer, medical, multinational).

Chapter VIII

VIII-8 JP 3-0 CH1

(f) Assess availability of HN law enforcement and health and
medical
resources.

(g) Secure key infrastructure nodes and facilitate HN law
enforcement and
first responder services.

(h) Develop and disseminate information necessary to suppress
potential
new enemies and promote new governmental authority.

(3) CA have a variety of specialty skills that may support the
joint operation
being planned. CA conduct military engagement and
humanitarian and civic assistance to
influence HN and foreign nation populations. CA assess
impacts of the population and
culture on military operations, assess impact of military
operations on the population and
culture, and facilitate interorganizational coordination.
Establishing and maintaining civil-
military relations may include interaction among US, allied,
multinational, and HN forces,
as well as other government agencies, international
organizations, and NGOs. CA can
provide expertise on factors that directly affect military
operations, to include culture,
social structure, economic systems, language, and HNS
capabilities. CA may be able to
perform functions for limited durations that normally are the
responsibility of local or
indigenous governments. Employment of CA should be based
upon a clear concept of CA

mission requirements for the type of operation being planned.

For further guidance on CA, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military
Operations.

(4) Sustainment. Thorough planning for logistic and personnel
support is
critical. Planning must include active participation by all
deploying and in-theater US and
multinational forces, as well as interagency personnel. This
planning is done through
theater distribution plans (TDPs) in support of the GCCs’ CCPs.
Setting the conditions
enables the JFCs to address global, end-to-end distribution
requirements and identify
critical capabilities, infrastructure, and relationships required to
be resourced and emplaced
in a timely manner to sustain and enable global distribution
operations. USTRANSCOM
synchronizes efforts between global TDPs in support of the
Campaign Plan for Global
Distribution. The GCC conducts theater distribution operations,
and the GCC may request
USTRANSCOM’s assistance in integrating distribution
enablers, capabilities, and
considerations into each phase of the campaign and contingency
plans. Global and theater
distribution operations require robust planning and skilled
employment to synchronize and
integrate distribution operations with the joint operation.

For further guidance on sustainment and distribution operations,
refer to JP 4-0, Joint
Logistics, and JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

c. Isolating the Enemy

(1) With Presidential and SecDef approval, guidance, and
national support, JFCs
strive to isolate enemies by denying them allies and sanctuary.
The intent is to strip
away as much enemy support or freedom of action as possible
while limiting the enemy’s
potential for horizontal or vertical escalation. JFCs may also be
tasked by the President
and SecDef to support diplomatic, economic, and informational
actions.

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-9

(2) The JFC also seeks to isolate the main enemy force from
both its strategic
leadership and its supporting infrastructure. Such isolation can
be achieved through
the use of information-related activities and the physical
interdiction of LOCs or resources
affecting the enemy’s ability to conduct or sustain military
operations. This step serves to
deny the enemy both physical and psychological support and
may separate the enemy
leadership and military from their public support.

d. FDOs and FROs. FDOs and FROs are executed on order and
provide scalable
options to respond to a crisis. Both provide the ability to scale
up (escalate) or de-escalate
based on continuous assessment of an adversary’s actions and
reaction. While FDOs are

primarily intended to prevent the crisis from worsening and
allow for de-escalation, FROs
are generally punitive in nature.

(1) FDOs. FDOs are preplanned, deterrence-oriented actions
carefully tailored
to bring an issue to early resolution without armed conflict.
Both military and nonmilitary
FDOs can be used to dissuade actions before a crisis arises or to
deter further aggression
during a crisis. FDOs are developed for each instrument of
national power, but they are
most effective when used in combination.

(a) Military FDOs can be initiated before or after unambiguous
warning of
enemy action. Deployment timelines, combined with the
requirement for a rapid, early
response, generally require economy of force; however, military
FDOs should not increase
risk to the force that exceeds the potential benefit of the desired
effect. Military FDOs
must be carefully tailored regarding timing, efficiency, and
effectiveness. They can rapidly
improve the military balance of power in the OA, especially in
terms of early warning,
intelligence gathering, logistic infrastructure, air and maritime
forces, MISO, and
protection without precipitating armed response from the
adversary. Care should be taken
to avoid undesired effects such as eliciting an armed response
should adversary leadership
perceive that friendly military FDOs are being used as
preparation for a preemptive attack.

(b) Nonmilitary FDOs are preplanned, preemptive actions taken

by other
government agencies to dissuade an adversary from initiating
hostilities. Nonmilitary
FDOs need to be coordinated, integrated, and synchronized with
military FDOs to focus
all instruments of national power.

(2) FROs. FROs, usually used in response to terrorism, can
also be employed in
response to aggression by a competitor or adversary. Like
FDOs, the discussion should
include indicators of their effectiveness and probability of
consequences, desired and
undesired. The basic purpose of FROs is to preempt and/or
respond to attacks against the
US and/or US interests. FROs are intended to facilitate early
decision making by
developing a wide range of prospective actions carefully
tailored to produce desired effects,
congruent with national security policy objectives. An FRO is
the venue in which various
military capabilities are made available to the President and
SecDef, with actions
appropriate and adaptable to existing circumstances, in reaction
to any threat or attack.

For further guidance on planning FDOs and FROs, refer to JP 5-
0, Joint Planning.

Chapter VIII

VIII-10 JP 3-0 CH1

e. Protection. JFCs must protect their forces and their freedom

of action to
accomplish their mission. This dictates that JFCs not only
provide force protection but be
aware of and participate as appropriate in the protection of
interagency and regional
multinational capabilities and activities. JFCs may spend as
much time on protection to
assure partners to preserve coalition resolve and maintain
access as on direct preparation
of their forces for combat.

f. Space Operations. JFCs depend upon and exploit the
advantages of space
capabilities. During the deter phase, space forces are limited to
already fielded and
immediately deployable assets and established priorities for
service. As the situation
develops, priorities for space force enhancement may change to
aid the JFC in assessing
the changing OE. Most importantly, the JFC and component
commanders need to
anticipate “surge” space capabilities needed for future phases
due to the long lead times to
reprioritize or acquire additional capabilities.

For further guidance on space operations, refer to JP 3-14,
Space Operations, and Air
Force Doctrine Annex 3-14, Space Operations.

g. GEOINT Support to Operations. Geospatial products or
services—including
maps, charts, imagery products, web services, and support
data—must be fully coordinated
with JFC components, as well as with the Joint Staff, Office of
the Secretary of Defense,
and NGA through the JFC’s GEOINT cell. Requests for or

updates to GEOINT products,
including maps or annotated imagery products, should be
submitted as early as possible
through the JFC’s GEOINT cell to the NGA support team at the
JFC’s HQ. US products
should be used whenever possible, since the accuracy, scale,
and reliability of foreign maps
and charts may vary widely from US products. In any joint or
multinational operation, the
World Geodetic System 1984 should be the common system. If
US products are to be used
in a coalition environment or within a multinational HQ, the
release of US mapping
materials or imagery products requires foreign
disclosure/release adjudication.

For further guidance on GEOINT, refer to JP 2-03, Geospatial
Intelligence in Joint
Operations.

h. Physical Environment

(1) Weather, terrain, and sea conditions can significantly affect
operations and
sustainment support of the joint force and should be carefully
assessed before and during
sustained combat operations. Mobility of the force, integration
and synchronization of
operations, and ability to employ precision munitions can be
affected by degraded
conditions. Climatological and hydrographic planning tools,
studies, and forecast products
help the JFC determine the most advantageous time and location
to conduct operations.

For additional guidance, refer to JP 3-59, Meteorological and

Oceanographic Operations.

(2) Urban areas possess all of the characteristics of the natural
landscape,
coupled with man-made construction and the associated
infrastructure, resulting in a
complicated and dynamic environment that influences the
conduct of military operations
in many ways. The most distinguishing characteristic of
operations in urban areas,

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-11

however, is not the infrastructure but the density of civilians.
Joint urban operations
(JUOs) are conducted in large, densely populated areas with
problems unique to clearing
enemy forces while possibly restoring services and managing
major concentrations of
people. For example, industrial areas and port facilities often
are collocated with highly
populated areas, creating the opportunity for accidental or
deliberate release of toxic
industrial materials which could impact JUOs. During JUOs,
joint forces may not focus
only on destruction of enemy forces but may also be required to
take steps necessary to
protect and support civilians and their infrastructure from which
they receive services
necessary for survival. As such, ROE during JUOs may be
more restrictive than for other
types of operations. When planning JUOs, the JFC and staff

should consider the impact of
military operations on civilians to include their culture, values,
and infrastructure, thereby
viewing the urban area as a dynamic and complex system—not
solely as terrain. This
implies the joint force should be capable of understanding the
specific urban environment;
sensing, locating, and isolating the enemy among civilians; and
applying combat power
precisely and discriminately.

For additional guidance on JUOs, refer to JP 3-06, Joint Urban
Operations.

(3) Littoral Areas. The littoral area contains two parts. First is
the seaward area
from the open ocean to the shore, which must be controlled to
support operations ashore.
Second is the landward area inland from the shore that can be
supported and defended
directly from the sea. Control of the littoral area often is
essential to maritime superiority.
Maritime operations conducted in the littoral area can project
power, fires, and forces to
achieve the JFC’s objectives. These operations facilitate the
entry and movement of other
elements of the joint force through the seizure of an enemy’s
port, naval base, or air base.
Access to, and freedom of maneuver within, the littorals depend
on the enemy’s A2/AD
actions and capabilities, such as the use of surface-to-surface
missiles and use of mines.
The ability to avoid detection and maneuver to evade can be
reduced in the littorals due to
the proximity to enemy sensors and the lack of maneuver space,
thus increasing risk.

Depending on the situation, mine warfare may be critical to
control of the littoral areas.

(4) The EMS, which has become increasingly complex,
contested, and congested
as technology has advanced, can significantly affect joint force
operations. Operational
experiences demonstrate not only how successful control of the
EMS can influence the
outcome of the conflict but also highlight US vulnerabilities and
dependence on the EMS
to successfully operate. When planning operations, the JFC
should consider both the
impact of military operations on the current EME, as well as its
effect on military
operations. Key to this is the JFC’s execution of JEMSO,
facilitated by EMBM, to achieve
integration. This will ensure EMS-dependent systems are
mission ready and compatible
within the intended EME.

5. Considerations for Seizing the Initiative

a. General. As operations commence, the JFC needs to exploit
friendly advantages
and capabilities to shock, demoralize, and disrupt the enemy
immediately. The JFC seeks
decisive advantage through the use of all available elements of
combat power to seize and
maintain the initiative, deny the enemy the opportunity to
achieve its objectives, and

Chapter VIII

VIII-12 JP 3-0 CH1

generate in the enemy a sense of inevitable failure and defeat.
Additionally, the JFC
coordinates with other USG departments and agencies to
facilitate coherent use of all
instruments of national power in achieving national strategic
objectives.

b. Force Projection

(1) Projecting US military force invariably requires extensive
use of the
international waters, international airspace, space, cyberspace,
and the EMS to gain
operational access. Our ability to freely maneuver to position
and sustain our forces is vital
to our national interests and those of our PNs. US forces may
gain operational access to
areas through invitation by an HN to establish an operating base
in or near the conflict or
by the use of forcible entry operations. Treaties, agreements,
and activities that occur
during the shape and deter phases may aid in the invitation to
establish a base or support
facility. However, gaining and maintaining operational access
requires the ability to defeat
the enemy’s A2/AD actions and capabilities.

(2) The President and SecDef may direct a CCDR to resolve a
crisis quickly,
employing immediately available forces and appropriate FDOs
as discussed above to
preclude escalation. When these forces and actions are not
sufficient, follow-on strikes
and/or the deployment of forces from CONUS or another theater

and/or the use of
multinational forces may be necessary. Consequently, the
CCDR must sequence, enable,
and protect the deployment of forces to create early decisive
advantage. The CCDR should
not overlook enemy A2/AD capabilities that may affect the
deployment of combat and
logistic forces from bases to ports of embarkation. The CCDR
may have to adjust the time-
phased force and deployment data to meet a changing OE. The
deployment of forces may
be either opposed or unopposed by an enemy.

(a) Opposed. Initial operations may be designed to suppress
enemy A2/AD
capabilities. For example, the ability to generate sufficient
combat power through long-
range air operations or from the sea can provide for effective
force projection in the absence
of timely or unencumbered access. Other opposed situations
may require a forcible entry
capability. In other cases, force projection can be accomplished
rapidly by forcible entry
operations coordinated with strategic air mobility, sealift, and
pre-positioned forces. For
example, the seizure and defense of lodgment areas by
amphibious forces would then serve
as initial entry points for the continuous and uninterrupted flow
of forces and materiel into
the theater. Both efforts demand a versatile mix of forces that
are organized, trained,
equipped, and poised to respond quickly.

(b) Unopposed deployment operations provide the JFC and
subordinate
components a more flexible OE to efficiently and effectively

build combat power, train,
rehearse, acclimate, and otherwise establish the conditions for
successful combat
operations. In unopposed entry, JFCs arrange the flow of
forces, to include significant
theater opening logistics forces, that best facilitates the
CONOPS. In these situations,
logistics forces may be a higher priority for early deployment
than combat forces, as
determined by the in-theater protection requirements.

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-13

(3) Commanders should brief deploying forces on the threat
and force protection
requirements prior to deployment and upon arrival in the OA.
Also, JFCs and their
subordinate commanders evaluate the timing, location, and
other factors of force
deployment in each COA for the impact of sabotage, criminal
activity, and terrorist acts
and their impact on joint reception, staging, onward movement,
and integration (JRSOI)
and the follow-on CONOPS. The threat could involve those not
directly supporting or
sympathetic to the enemy but those seeking to take advantage of
the situation. When the
situation involves a failed or failing WMD-possessor state,
commanders should consider
that opportunists could employ lost or stolen WMD.

(4) During force projection, US forces and ports of debarkation

must be
protected. JFCs should introduce forces in a manner that
provides security for rapid force
buildup. Therefore, early entry forces should deploy with
sufficient organic and supporting
capabilities to preserve their freedom of action and protect
personnel and equipment from
potential or likely threats. Early entry forces should also
include a deployable joint C2
capability to rapidly assess the situation, make decisions, and
conduct initial operations.

(5) JRSOI occurs in the OA and comprises the essential
processes required to
transition arriving personnel, equipment, and materiel into
forces capable of meeting
operational requirements. Forces are vulnerable during JRSOI,
so planning must include
force protection requirements.

For further information on JRSOI, refer to JP 3-35, Deployment
and Redeployment
Operations.

c. Unit Integrity During Deployment

(1) US military forces normally train as units and are best able
to accomplish a
mission when deployed intact. By deploying as an existing
unit, forces are able to continue
to operate under established procedures, adapting them to the
mission and situation, as
required. When personnel and elements are drawn from various
commands, effectiveness
may be decreased. By deploying without established operating
procedures, an ad hoc force

takes more time to form and adjust to requirements of the
mission. This not only
complicates mission accomplishment but may also have an
impact on force protection.

(2) Even if diplomatic/political restraints on an operation
dictate that a large force
cannot be deployed intact, commanders should select elements
for deployment that have
established internal procedures and structures, have trained and
operated together, and
possess appropriate joint force combat capabilities. To provide
a JFC with needed
versatility, it may not be possible to preserve complete unit
integrity. In such cases, units
must be prepared to send elements that are able to operate
independently of parent units.
Attachment to a related unit is the usual mode. In this instance,
units not accustomed to
having attachments may be required to provide administrative
and logistic support to
normally unrelated units.

(3) The CCDR, in coordination with Commander,
USTRANSCOM; subordinate
JFCs; and the Service component commanders, needs to
carefully balance the desire to

Chapter VIII

VIII-14 JP 3-0 CH1

retain unit integrity through the deployment process with the
effective use of strategic lift

platforms. While maximizing unit integrity may reduce JRSOI
requirements and allow
combat units to be employed more quickly, doing so will often
have a direct negative
impact on the efficient use of the limited strategic lift. In some
cases, this negative impact
on strategic lift may have a negative effect on DOD deployment
and sustainment
requirements beyond the GCC’s AOR. A general rule of thumb
is that unit integrity is
much more important for early deploying units than for follow-
on forces.

d. While access operations focus on enabling access to the OA,
entry operations
focus on actions within the OA. Joint forces conduct entry
operations for various
purposes, including to defeat threats to the access and use of
portions of the OE; to control,
defeat, disable, and/or dispose of specific WMD threats; to
assist populations and groups;
to establish a lodgment; and to conduct other limited duration
missions.

e. Entry operations may be unopposed or opposed. Unopposed
entry operations
often, but not always, follow unopposed access. These
circumstances generally allow
orderly deployment into the OA in preparation for follow-on
operations. Forcible entry
is a joint military operation conducted either as a major
operation or a part of a larger
campaign to seize and hold a military lodgment in the face of
armed opposition for the
continuous landing of forces. Forcible entry operations can
strike directly at the enemy

COGs and can open new avenues for other military operations.

(1) Forcible entry operations may include amphibious,
airborne, and air assault
operations or any combination thereof. Forcible entry
operations can create multiple
dilemmas by creating threats that exceed the enemy’s capability
to respond. Commanders
will employ distributed, yet coherent, operations to attack the
objective area or areas. The
net result will be a coordinated attack that overwhelms the
enemy before they have time to
react. A well-positioned and networked force enables the defeat
of any enemy reaction
and facilitates follow-on operations, if required.

(2) Forcible entry is normally complex and risky and should,
therefore, be kept
as simple as possible in concept. These operations require
extensive intelligence, detailed
coordination, innovation, and flexibility. Schemes of maneuver
and coordination between
forces need to be clearly understood by all participants. Forces
are tailored for the mission
and echeloned to permit simultaneous deployment and
employment. When airborne,
amphibious, and air assault operations are combined, unity of
command is vital.
Rehearsals are a critical part of preparation for forcible entry.
Participating forces need to
be prepared to fight immediately upon arrival and require robust
communications and
intelligence capabilities to move with forward elements.

(3) The forcible entry force must be prepared to immediately
transition to

follow-on operations and should plan accordingly. Joint
forcible entry actions occur in
both singular and multiple operations. These actions include
establishing forward
presence, preparing the OA, opening entry points, establishing
and sustaining access,
receiving follow-on forces, conducting follow-on operations,
sustaining the operations, and
conducting decisive operations.

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-15

(4) Successful OPSEC and MILDEC may confuse the enemy
and ease
forcible entry operations. OPSEC helps foster a credible
MILDEC. Additionally, the
actions, themes, and messages portrayed by all friendly forces
must be consistent if
MILDEC is to be believable.

(5) SOF may precede forcible entry forces to identify, clarify,
establish, or
modify conditions in the lodgment. SOF may conduct the
assaults to seize small, initial
lodgments such as airfields or seaports. They may provide or
assist in employing fire
support and conduct other operations in support of the forcible
entry, such as seizing
airfields or conducting reconnaissance of landing zones or
amphibious landing sites. They
may conduct special reconnaissance and direct action well
beyond the lodgment to identify,

interdict, and destroy forces that threaten the conventional entry
force.

(6) The sustainment requirements and challenges for forcible
entry operations
can be formidable but must not be allowed to become such an
overriding concern that the
forcible entry operation itself is jeopardized. JFCs must
carefully balance the introduction
of sustainment forces needed to support initial combat with
combat forces required to
establish, maintain, and protect the lodgment, as well as forces
required to transition to
follow-on operations.

For additional and detailed guidance on forcible entry
operations, refer to JP 3-18, Joint
Forcible Entry Operations.

f. Attack of Enemy COGs. As part of creating decisive
advantages early, joint force
operations may be directed immediately against enemy COGs
using conventional forces
and SOF if COGs are vulnerable and sufficient friendly force
capabilities are available.
These attacks may be decisive or may begin offensive
operations throughout the enemy’s
depth that can create dilemmas causing paralysis and destroying
cohesion.

g. Full-Spectrum Superiority. Mission success in large-scale
combat requires full-
spectrum superiority; the cumulative effect of achieving
superiority in the air, land,
maritime, and space domains; the information environment; and
the EMS. Such

superiority permits the conduct of joint operations without
effective opposition or
prohibitive interference. JFCs seek superiority throughout the
OE to accomplish the
mission as rapidly as possible. The JFC may have to initially
focus all available joint forces
on seizing the initiative. A delay at the outset of combat may
damage US credibility, lessen
coalition support, and provide incentives for other adversaries
to begin conflicts elsewhere.

(1) JFCs normally strive to achieve air and maritime
superiority early. Air
and maritime superiority allows joint forces to conduct
operations without prohibitive
interference from opposing air and maritime forces. Control of
the air is a critical enabler
because it allows joint forces both freedom from attack and
freedom to attack. Using both
defensive and offensive operations, JFCs employ
complementary weapon systems and
sensors to achieve air and maritime superiority.

(2) Land forces can be moved quickly into an area to deter the
enemy from
inserting forces, thereby precluding the enemy from gaining an
operational advantage. The

Chapter VIII

VIII-16 JP 3-0 CH1

rapid deployment and employment of land forces (with support
of other components)

enable sustained operations, more quickly contribute to the
enemy’s defeat, and help
restore stability in the OA.

(3) Space superiority must be achieved early to support
freedom of action.
Space superiority allows the JFC access to communications,
environmental monitoring,
PNT, strategic and theater missile warning, and intelligence
collection assets without
prohibitive interference by the opposing force. Space control
operations are conducted by
joint and allied and/or coalition forces to gain and maintain
space superiority.

OPERATION JUST CAUSE

In the early morning hours of 20 December 1989, the
Commander, US
Southern Command, Joint Task Force (JTF) Panama, conducted
multiple, simultaneous forcible entry operations to begin
Operation
JUST CAUSE. By parachute assault, forces seized key
lodgments at
Torrijos-Tocumen Military Airfield and International Airport
and at the
Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF) base at Rio Hato. The JTF
used these
lodgments for force buildup and to launch immediate assaults
against
the PDF.

The JTF commander synchronized the forcible entry operations
with
numerous other operations involving virtually all capabilities of

the joint
force. The parachute assault forces strategically deployed at
staggered
times from bases in the continental US, some in C-141
Starlifters, others
in slower C-130 transport planes. One large formation
experienced
delays from a sudden ice storm at the departure airfield—its
operations
and timing were revised in the air. H-hour was even adjusted
for assault
operations because of intelligence that indicated a possible
compromise. Special operations forces (SOF) reconnaissance
and
direct action teams provided last-minute information on widely
dispersed targets.

At H-hour the parachute assault forces, forward-deployed
forces, SOF,
and air elements of the joint force simultaneously attacked 27
targets—
most of them in the vicinity of the Panama Canal. Illustrating
that joint
force commanders organize and apply force in a manner that fits
the
situation, the JTF commander employed land and SOF to attack
strategic
targets and stealth aircraft to attack tactical and operational-
level
targets.

The forcible entry operations, combined with simultaneous and
follow-
on attack against enemy command and control facilities and key
units,
seized the initiative and paralyzed enemy decision making.

Most
fighting was concluded within 24 hours. Casualties were
minimized. It
was a classic coup de main.

Various Sources

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-17

(4) Early superiority in the information environment (which
includes
cyberspace) is vital in joint operations. It degrades the enemy’s
C2 while allowing the
JFC to maximize friendly C2 capabilities. Information
superiority also allows the JFC
to better understand the enemy’s intentions, capabilities, and
actions, as well as influence
foreign attitudes and perceptions of the operation.

(5) Control of the EME must be achieved early to support
freedom of action.
This control is important for superiority across the physical
domains and information
environment.

h. C2 in Littoral Areas

(1) Controlled littoral areas often offer the best positions from
which to
begin, sustain, and support joint operations, especially in OAs
with limited or poor

infrastructure for supporting US joint operations ashore. JFCs
can gain and maintain the
initiative through the ability to project fires and employ forces
from sea-based assets in
combination with C2, intelligence collection, and information-
related activities. Maritime
forces operating in littoral areas can dominate coastal areas and
rapidly generate high-
intensity offensive power at times and in locations required by
JFCs. Maritime forces’
relative freedom of action enables JFCs to position these
capabilities where they can readily
strike opponents. Maritime forces’ very presence, if made
known, can pose a threat that
the enemy cannot ignore.

(2) JFCs can operate from a HQ platform at sea. Depending on
the nature of
the joint operation, a maritime commander can serve as the JFC
or function as a JFACC
while the operation is primarily maritime and shift that
command ashore if the operation
shifts landward IAW the JFC’s CONOPS. A sea base provides
JFCs with the ability to C2
forces and conduct select functions and tasks at sea without
dependence on infrastructure
ashore. In other cases, a maritime HQ may serve as the base of
the joint force HQ, or
subordinate JFCs or other component commanders may use the
C2 and intelligence
facilities aboard ship.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND CONVENTIONAL
FORCES
INTEGRATION DURING OPERATION ENDURING
FREEDOM

Special operations forces (SOF) and conventional forces
integration
demonstrated powerful air-ground synergies in Operation
ENDURING
FREEDOM. While performing the classic core activity of
unconventional
warfare, Army special forces organized and coordinated
operations of
the Northern Alliance against the Taliban and al Qaeda.
Supported by
other joint SOF, they frequently directed massive and effective
close air
support from Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps assets. The
effects of
the continuous SOF-directed air strikes so weakened the Taliban
and al
Qaeda that the Northern Alliance was able to quickly capture
the major
cities of Afghanistan early in the campaign.

Various Sources

Chapter VIII

VIII-18 JP 3-0 CH1

(3) Transferring C2 from sea to shore requires detailed
planning, active liaison,
and coordination throughout the joint force. Such a transition
may involve a simple
movement of flags and supporting personnel, or it may require a

complete change of joint
force HQ. The new joint force HQ may use personnel and
equipment, especially
communications equipment, from the old HQ, or it may require
augmentation from
different sources. One technique is to transfer C2 in several
stages. Another technique is
for the JFC to satellite off the capabilities of one of the
components ashore until the new
HQ is fully prepared. Whichever way the transition is done,
staffs should develop detailed
checklists to address all of the C2 requirements and the timing
of transfer of each. The
value of joint training and rehearsals in this transition is
evident.

i. SOF-Conventional Force Integration. The JFC, using SOF
independently or
integrated with conventional forces, gains an additional and
specialized capability to
achieve objectives that might not otherwise be possible.
Integration enables the JFC to
take fullest advantage of conventional and SOF core
competencies. SOF are most effective
when special operations are fully integrated into the overall
plan and the execution of
special operations is through proper SOF C2 elements in a
supporting or supported
relationship with conventional forces. Joint SOF C2 elements
are provided to conduct a
specific special operation or prosecute special operations in
support of a joint campaign or
operation. Special operations commanders also provide liaison
to component commands
to integrate, coordinate, and deconflict SOF and conventional
force operations. Exchange

of SOF and conventional force LNOs is essential to enhance
situational awareness and
reduce risk of friendly fire incidents.

j. Stability Activities. Combat in this phase provides an
opportunity to begin various
stability activities that will help achieve military strategic and
operational-level objectives
and create the conditions for the later phases. Activities to
neutralize or eliminate potential
stabilize phase enemies may be initiated. National and local
HN authorities may be
contacted and offered support. Key infrastructure may be
seized or otherwise protected.
CA should be tasked to increase civil information management
in support of overall
intelligence collection on the status of enemy infrastructure,
government organizations, and
humanitarian needs. MISO used to influence the behavior of
approved foreign target
audiences in support of military strategic and operational
objectives can ease the situation
encountered when sustained combat is concluded. In
coordination with interorganizational
participants, the JFC must arrange for necessary financial
support of these operations well
in advance. Additionally, OCS can be leveraged by letting
contracts to help build the local
economy, promote goodwill with the local populace, and
contribute to long-term HN
economic growth and stability.

k. Protection. JFCs must strive to conserve the fighting
potential of the
joint/multinational force at the onset of combat operations.
Further, HN infrastructure and

logistic support key to force projection and sustainment of the
force must be protected.
JFCs counter the enemy’s fires and maneuver by making
personnel, systems, and units
difficult to locate, strike, and destroy. They protect their force
from enemy maneuver and
fires by using various physical and informational measures.
OPSEC and MILDEC are key
elements of this effort. Activities to gain air, space, maritime,
and EMS superiority; PR;

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-19

and protection of airports and seaports, LOCs, and friendly
force lodgment also contribute
significantly to force protection at the onset of combat
operations.

l. Prevention of Friendly Fire Incidents. JFCs must make every
effort to reduce the
potential for the killing or wounding of friendly personnel by
friendly fire. The destructive
power and range of modern weapons, coupled with the high
intensity and rapid tempo of
modern combat, increase the potential for friendly fire
incidents. Commanders must be
aware of those situations that increase the risk of friendly fire
incidents and institute
appropriate preventive measures. The primary mechanisms for
reducing friendly fire
incidents are command emphasis, disciplined operations, close
coordination among

component commands and multinational partners, SOPs,
training and exercises,
technology solutions (e.g., identify friend or foe, blue force
tracking), rehearsals, effective
CID, and enhanced awareness of the OE. Commanders should
seek to minimize friendly
fire incidents while not limiting boldness and initiative.
CCMDs should consult with
USAID when it has a mission presence to determine locations of
friendly international
organizations, NGOs, and local partners operating in the
targeted area to avoid friendly fire
incidents.

6. Considerations for Dominance

a. General. JFCs conduct sustained combat operations when a
swift victory is not
possible. During sustained combat operations, JFCs
simultaneously employ conventional
forces and SOF throughout the OA. The JFC may designate one
component or LOO to be
the main effort, with other components providing support and
other LOOs as supporting
efforts. When conditions or plans change, the main effort might
shift. Some missions
continue throughout to deny the enemy sanctuary, freedom of
action, or informational
advantage. These missions, when executed concurrently with
other missions, degrade
enemy morale and physical cohesion and bring the enemy closer
to culmination. When
prevented from concentrating, opponents can be attacked,
isolated at tactical and
operational levels, and defeated in detail. At other times, JFCs
may cause their opponents

to concentrate their forces, facilitating their attack by friendly
forces. In some
circumstances (e.g., regime change, ensuring stability prior to
transition to civil authority),
the JFC may be required to maintain a temporary military
occupation of enemy territory
while continuing offensive actions. If the occupation is
extended and a country’s
government is not functioning, the JFC may be required to
establish a military government
through the designation of a transitional military authority.

b. Operating in the Littoral Areas. Even when joint forces are
firmly established
ashore, littoral operations provide JFCs with excellent
opportunities to gain leverage over
the enemy by operational maneuver from the sea. Such
operations can introduce
significant size forces over relatively great distances in short
periods of time into the rear
or flanks of the enemy. The mobility and fire support capability
of maritime forces at sea,
coupled with the ability to rapidly land operationally significant
forces, can be key to
achieving military operational objectives. These capabilities
are further enhanced by
operational flexibility and the ability to identify and take
advantage of fleeting
opportunities.

Chapter VIII

VIII-20 JP 3-0 CH1

c. Attack on Enemy COGs. Attacks on enemy COGs typically
continue during
sustained operations. JFCs should time their actions to coincide
with actions of other
operations of the joint force and vice versa to achieve military
strategic and operational-
level objectives. As with all joint force operations, direct and
indirect attacks of enemy
COGs should be planned to achieve the required military
strategic and operational-level
objectives per the CONOPS, while limiting potential undesired
effects on operations in
follow-on phases.

d. Synchronizing and/or Integrating Maneuver and Interdiction

(1) Synchronizing and integrating air, land, maritime, and
cyberspace
interdiction and maneuver, enabled by JEMSO and space-based
capabilities, provides one
of the most dynamic concepts available to the joint force.
Interdiction and maneuver are
not usually considered separate operations against a common
enemy but rather are
complementary operations planned to achieve the military
strategic and operational-level
objectives. Moreover, maneuver by air, land, or maritime
forces can be conducted to
interdict enemy military potential. Potential responses to
integrated and synchronized
maneuver and interdiction can create a dilemma for the enemy.
If the enemy attempts to
counter the maneuver, enemy forces may be exposed to
unacceptable losses from
interdiction. If the enemy employs measures to reduce such
interdiction losses, enemy

forces may not be able to counter the maneuver. The synergy
achieved by integrating and
synchronizing interdiction and maneuver throughout the OA
assists commanders in
optimizing leverage at the operational level.

(2) As a guiding principle, JFCs should exploit the flexibility
inherent in joint
force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and
other techniques to resolve
the issues that can arise from the relationship between
interdiction and maneuver. When
interdiction and maneuver are employed, JFCs need to carefully
balance the needs of
surface maneuver forces, area-wide requirements for
interdiction, and the undesirability of
fragmenting joint force capabilities. The JFC’s objectives,
intent, and priorities, reflected
in mission assignments and coordinating arrangements, enable
subordinates to fully exploit
the military potential of their forces while minimizing the
friction generated by competing
requirements. Effective targeting procedures in the joint force
also alleviate such friction.
As an example, interdiction requirements will often exceed
interdiction means, requiring
JFCs to prioritize requirements. Land and maritime force
commanders responsible for
integrating and synchronizing maneuver and interdiction within
their AOs should be
knowledgeable of JFC priorities and the responsibilities and
authority assigned and
delegated to commanders designated by the JFC to execute
theater- and/or JOA-wide
functions. JFCs alleviate this friction through the CONOPS and
clear statements of intent

for interdiction conducted relatively independent of surface
maneuver operations. In doing
this, JFCs rely on their vision as to how the major elements of
the joint force contribute to
achieving theater-strategic objectives. JFCs then employ a
flexible range of techniques to
assist in identifying requirements and applying capabilities to
meet them. JFCs must define
appropriate command relationships, establish effective joint
targeting procedures, and
make apportionment decisions.

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-21

(3) All commanders should consider how their operations can
complement
interdiction. These operations may include actions such as
MILDEC, withdrawals, lateral
repositioning, and flanking movements that are likely to cause
the enemy to reposition
surface forces, making them better targets for interdiction.
Likewise, interdiction
operations need to conform to and enhance the JFC’s scheme of
maneuver. This
complementary use of maneuver and interdiction places the
enemy in the operational
dilemma of either defending from disadvantageous positions or
exposing forces to
interdiction strikes during attempted repositioning.

(4) Within the JOA, all joint force component operations must
contribute to

achievement of the JFC’s objectives. To facilitate these
operations, JFCs may establish
AOs within their OA. Synchronization and/or integration of
maneuver and
interdiction within land or maritime AOs is of particular
importance, especially when
JFCs task component commanders to execute theater- and/or
JOA-wide functions.

(a) Air, land, and maritime commanders are directly concerned
with those
enemy forces and capabilities that can affect their current and
future operations.
Accordingly, that part of interdiction with a near-term effect on
air, land, and maritime
maneuver normally supports that maneuver. In fact, successful
operations may depend on
successful interdiction operations; for instance, to isolate the
battle or weaken the enemy
force before battle is fully joined.

(b) JFCs establish land and maritime AOs to decentralize
execution of land
and maritime component operations, allow rapid maneuver, and
provide the ability to fight
at extended ranges. The size, shape, and positioning of land or
maritime AOs will be based
on the JFC’s CONOPS and the land or maritime commanders’
requirements to accomplish
their missions and protect their forces. Within these AOs, land
and maritime
commanders are designated the supported commander for the
integration and
synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction.
Accordingly, land and maritime
commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of

interdiction operations
within their AOs. Further, in coordination with the land or
maritime commander, a
component commander designated as the supported commander
for theater/JOA-wide
interdiction has the latitude to plan and execute JFC prioritized
missions within a land or
maritime AO. If theater or JOA-wide interdiction operations
would have adverse effects
within a land or maritime AO, then the commander conducting
those operations must
readjust the plan, resolve the issue with the appropriate
component commander, or consult
with the JFC for resolution.

(c) The land or maritime commander should clearly articulate
the vision of
maneuver operations to other commanders that may employ
interdiction forces within the
land or maritime AO. The land or maritime commander’s intent
and CONOPS should
clearly state how interdiction will enable or enhance land or
maritime force maneuver in
the AO and what is to be accomplished with interdiction (as
well as those actions to be
avoided, such as the destruction of key transportation nodes or
the use of certain munitions
in a specific area). Once this is understood, other interdiction-
capable commanders can
normally plan and execute operations with only that
coordination required with the land or
maritime commander. However, the land or maritime
commander should provide other

Chapter VIII

VIII-22 JP 3-0 CH1

interdiction-capable commanders as much latitude as possible in
the planning and
execution of interdiction operations within the AO.

(d) Joint force operations in maritime or littoral OAs often
require additional
coordination among the maritime commander and other
interdiction-capable commanders
because of the highly specialized nature of some maritime
operations, such as
antisubmarine and mine warfare. This type of coordination
requires that the interdiction-
capable commanders maintain communication with the maritime
commander. As in all
operations, lack of close coordination among commanders in
maritime OAs can result in
friendly fire incidents and failed missions. The same principle
applies concerning joint
force air component mining operations in land or maritime OAs.

(5) JFCs need to pay particular attention and give priority to
activities impinging
on and supporting the maneuver and interdiction needs of all
forces. In addition to normal
target nomination procedures, JFCs establish procedures
through which land or maritime
force commanders can specifically identify those interdiction
targets they are unable to
engage with organic assets within their OAs that could affect
planned or ongoing
maneuver. These targets may be identified individually or by
category, specified

geographically, or tied to a desired effect or time period.
Interdiction target priorities
within the land or maritime OAs are considered along with
theater and JOA-wide
interdiction priorities by JFCs and reflected in the air
apportionment decision. The JFACC
uses these priorities to plan, coordinate, and execute the
theater- and/or JOA-wide air
interdiction effort. The purpose of these procedures is to afford
added visibility to, and
allow JFCs to give priority to, targets directly affecting planned
maneuver by air, land, or
maritime forces.

e. Operations When WMD Are Employed or Located

(1) Locating WMD and WMD Materials. Since an enemy’s use
of WMD can
quickly change the character of an operation or campaign, joint
forces may be required to
track, seize, and secure any WMD and materials used to develop
WMD discovered or
located in an OA. Once located, resources may be required to
secure and inventory items
for subsequent exploitation. If WMD sites are located, but joint
forces are unable to seize
and secure them, the JFC should plan to strike the sites if
required to prevent WMD from
being used or falling into enemy control. The desired effects of
strikes are to minimize
collateral effects and deny access to WMD. If sites are not
under enemy control or in
imminent jeopardy of falling to the enemy, monitor them
persistently until sites can be
seized and secured. During combat operations, exploitation,
secure transport of WMD,

and safe transport of technical personnel for disposition may
depend upon a permissive
OE.

(2) Enemy Employment. The use or the threatened use of
WMD can cause
large-scale shifts in strategic and operational-level objectives,
phases, and COAs.
Multinational operations become more complicated with the
threatened employment of
these weapons. An enemy may use WMD against friendly force
multinational partners,
especially those with little or no defense against these weapons,
to disintegrate the alliance
or coalition. The enemy may also use CBRN weapons as part of
an A2/AD plan.

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-23

(a) Intelligence and other joint staff members advise JFCs of an
enemy’s
capability to employ WMD and under what conditions that
enemy is most likely to do so.
This advice includes an assessment of the enemy’s willingness
and intent to employ these
weapons. The JFC should avoid large force or materiel
concentrations, as they may
provide lucrative targets for enemy WMD.

(b) Known threat of WMD use and associated preparedness
against such use
are imperative in this environment. The joint force can survive

use of WMD by
anticipating their employment and taking appropriate offensive
and defensive measures.
Commanders can protect their forces in a variety of ways,
including training; MISO;
OPSEC; dispersion of forces and materiel; use of individual
protective equipment,
collective protection equipment, and medical countermeasures;
and proper use of terrain
and structures for shielding against blast and radiation effects.
Enhancement of CBRN
defense capabilities may reduce incentives for a first strike by
an enemy with WMD.

(c) The combination of active and passive defense can reduce
the
effectiveness or success of an enemy’s use of WMD. The JFC
may have to conduct
offensive operations to control, defeat, disable, and/or dispose
of enemy WMD capabilities
before they can be brought to bear. Offensive measures include
raids, strikes, and
operations to locate and neutralize the threat of such weapons.
When conducting offensive
operations, the JFC must fully understand the collateral effects
created by striking or
neutralizing enemy WMD capabilities.

(d) JFCs should immediately inform HN authorities, the US
ambassador or
chief of mission, other USG departments and agencies,
international organizations, and
NGOs in the OA of enemy intentions to use WMD. These
organizations do not have the
same intelligence or protection, mitigation, and response
capabilities as military units and

need the maximum amount of time available to protect their
personnel. In the event WMD
are used against nonmilitary targets, JFCs must plan for and
prepare to manage the
consequences of CBRN incidents to minimize the effects.

For additional guidance on defensive CBRN measures and
countermeasures, refer to JP
3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and
Nuclear Environments; JP 3-
40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction; JP 3-41,
Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Response; and the Department of
Defense Strategy for
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

(3) Friendly Employment. When directed by the President and
SecDef, CCDRs
will plan for the employment of nuclear weapons by US forces
in a manner consistent with
national policy and strategic guidance. The employment of such
weapons signifies an
escalation of the war and is a presidential decision.
USSTRATCOM’s capabilities to lead
in the collaborative planning of all nuclear missions are
available to support nuclear
weapon employment. If directed to plan for the use of nuclear
weapons, JFCs typically
have two escalating objectives.

(a) The first objective is deterring or preventing the enemy
from using
WMD. Effective WMD deterrence rests on a credible
deterrence policy that declares an

Chapter VIII

VIII-24 JP 3-0 CH1

adversary, expresses the will to pursue that adversary, and is
backed by the capability to
defend against the use and protect against the effects of WMD.
A demonstrated, collective
military capability may contribute to the success of all three
criteria for WMD deterrence.
JFC deterrence efforts should involve security cooperation plans
that emphasize the
willingness of the US and its partners to employ forces for
collective interests. Various
bilateral and multilateral exercises and operations support
deterrence by demonstrating
collective willingness and capability to use force when
necessary. Overall USG deterrence
goals are supported by a credible capability to intercept WMD
in transit; destroy critical
nodes, links, and sources; defend against WMD attack; attribute
WMD attacks; and
dismantle WMD programs.

(b) If deterrence is not an effective option or fails, JFCs will
respond
appropriately, consistent with national policy and strategic
guidance, to enemy aggression
while seeking to control the intensity and scope of conflict and
destruction. That response
may include the employment of conventional, special
operations, or nuclear forces.

(4) CWMD. JFCs should be prepared to conduct activities to
curtail the

conceptualization, development, possession, proliferation, use,
and effects of WMD.
When planning or executing operations and activities to counter
WMD, JFCs coordinate
and cooperate with not only other USG departments and
agencies but also local, tribal, and
state organizations, in addition to multinational partners. With
numerous stakeholders in
the CWMD mission area, it is critical JFCs understand and
consider the capabilities and
responsibilities of various interorganizational partners when
defining command
relationships and coordinating interorganizational activities.
Operations to counter WMD
may require formation of a functional JTF for that purpose.

For further guidance on CWMD, refer to JP 3-40, Countering
Weapons of Mass
Destruction.

f. Stability Activities. Stability tasks and activities that began
in previous phases may
continue. These activities may focus on stability tasks that will
help achieve strategic and
operational-level objectives and create the conditions for the
later stabilization and enable
civil authority phases. Minimum essential stability activities
should focus on protecting
and facilitating the personal security and well-being of the
civilian population. Stability
activities provide minimum levels of security, food, water,
shelter, and medical treatment.
If no civilian or HN agency is present, capable, and willing,
then JFCs and their staffs must
resource these minimum essential stability tasks. When demand
for resources exceeds the

JFC’s capability, higher-level joint commanders should provide
additional resources.
These resources may be given to the requesting JFC or the
mission may be given to follow-
on forces to expeditiously conduct the tasks. JFCs at all levels
assess resources available
against the mission to determine how best to conduct these
minimum essential stability
tasks and what risk they can accept to accomplishment of
combat tasks.

7. Considerations for Stabilization

a. General. Operations to stabilize typically begin with
significant military
involvement, to include some combat and the potential for
longer-term occupation.

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-25

Operations then move increasingly toward transitioning to an
interim civilian authority and
enabling civil authority as the threat wanes and civil
infrastructures are reestablished. The
JFC’s mission accomplishment requires fully integrating US
military operations with the
efforts of interorganizational participants in a comprehensive
approach to accomplish
assigned and implied tasks. As progress is made, military
forces will increase their focus
on supporting the efforts of HN authorities, other USG
departments and agencies,

international organizations, and/or NGOs. The Secretary of
State coordinates with SecDef
to ensure harmonization with planned and ongoing operations.
Military support to
stabilization efforts within the JOA are the responsibility of the
JFC.

For more information on stability activities, see JP 3-07,
Stability.

b. Several LOOs may be initiated immediately (e.g., providing
FHA, establishing
security). In some cases, the scope of the problem set may
dictate using other nonmilitary
entities which are uniquely suited to address the problems. The
goal of these military and
civil efforts should be to eliminate root causes or deficiencies
that create the problems (e.g.,
strengthen legitimate civil authority, rebuild government
institutions, foster a sense of
confidence and well-being, and support the conditions for
economic reconstruction). With
this in mind, the JFC may need to address how to coordinate
CMO with the efforts of
participating other government agencies, international
organizations, NGOs, and HN
assets.

For further guidance on CMO, refer to JP 3-57, Civil-Military
Operations.

c. Forces and Capabilities Mix. The JFC may need to realign
forces and capabilities
or adjust force structure to begin stability activities in some
portions of the OA even while
sustained combat operations still are ongoing in other areas.

For example, CA and
HUMINT capabilities are critical to supporting stabilize phase
operations and often involve
a mix of forces and capabilities far different than those that
supported the previous phases.
Planning and continuous assessment will reveal the nature and
scope of forces and
capabilities required. These forces and capabilities may be
available within the joint force
or may be required from another theater or from the Reserve
Component. The JFC should
anticipate and request these forces and capabilities in a timely
manner to facilitate their
opportune employment.

d. Stability Activities

(1) As sustained combat operations conclude, military forces
will shift their focus
to stability activities as the military instrument’s contribution to
the more comprehensive
stabilization efforts by all instruments of national power. Force
protection will continue
to be important, and combat operations might continue,
although with less frequency and
intensity than in the dominate phase. Of particular importance
will be CMO, initially
conducted to secure and safeguard the populace, reestablish
civil law and order, protect or
rebuild key infrastructure, and restore public services. US
military forces should be
prepared to lead the activities necessary to accomplish these
tasks, especially if conducting
a military occupation, and restore rule of law when indigenous
civil, USG, multinational,
or international capacity does not exist or is incapable of

assuming responsibility. Once

Chapter VIII

VIII-26 JP 3-0 CH1

legitimate civil authority is prepared to conduct such tasks, US
military forces may support
such activities as required/necessary. SFA plays an important
part during stability
activities by supporting and augmenting the development of the
capacity and capability of
FSFs and their supporting institutions. Likewise, the JFC’s
communication
synchronization will play an important role in providing public
information to foreign
populations during this period.

For further guidance on SFA, refer to JP 3-22, Foreign Internal
Defense.

(2) The military’s predominant presence and its ability to C2
forces and logistics
under extreme conditions may give it the de facto lead in
stabilization efforts normally
governed by other agencies that lack such capacities. However,
most stability activities
will likely be in support of, or transition to support of, US
diplomatic, UN, or HN efforts.
Integrated civilian and military efforts are key to success and
military forces need to work
competently in this environment while properly supporting the
agency in charge. To be
effective, planning and conducting stabilization efforts require a

variety of perspectives
and expertise and the cooperation and assistance of other USG
departments and agencies,
other Services, and alliance or multinational partners. Military
forces should be prepared
to work in integrated civilian-military teams that could include
representatives from other
US departments and agencies, foreign governments and security
forces, international
organizations, NGOs, and members of the private sector with
relevant skills and expertise.
Typical military support includes emergency infrastructure
reconstruction, engineering,
logistics, law enforcement, health services, and other activities
to restore essential services.

For further guidance on stability activities and USG
stabilization efforts, refer to JP 3-07,
Stability, and DODI 3000.05, Stability Operations.

(a) CA are organized and trained to perform CA operations that
support
CMO conducted in conjunction with stability activities. MISO
forces will develop,
produce, and disseminate products to gain and reinforce popular
support for the JFC’s
objectives. Complementing conventional forces’ IW efforts,
SOF will conduct FID to
assess, train, advise, assist, and equip foreign military and
paramilitary forces as they
develop the capacity to secure their own lands and populations.

For further guidance on SOF, refer to JP 3-05, Special
Operations.

(b) CI activities safeguard critical information. This is

particularly pertinent
in countering adversary HUMINT efforts. HN authorities,
international organizations, and
NGOs working closely with US forces may pass information
(knowingly or unknowingly)
to adversary elements that enables them to interfere with
stability activities. Members of
the local populace, who might actually be belligerents, often
gain access to US military
personnel and their bases by providing services such as laundry
and cooking. They can
then pass on information gleaned from that interaction to seek
favor with a belligerent
element or to avoid retaliation from belligerents. Identity
activities, coupled with all-
source intelligence analysis of the collected data, such as
biometrics, forensics, signals
intelligence, OSINT, and document and media exploitation, can
support verification and
deconfliction of HUMINT source identities and assist the JFC to
take appropriate actions

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-27

to counter potential compromise. CI personnel develop an
estimate of the threat and
recommend appropriate actions.

For more information on identity activities, see JDN 2-16,
Identity Activities.

(c) PA activities support stability activities by providing public

information
about progress to internal and external audiences.

e. In the stabilize phase, commanders must consider protection
from virtually any
person, element, or group hostile to US interests. These could
include activists, a group
opposed to the operation, looters, and terrorists. Forces will
have to be even more alert to
force protection and security matters after a CBRN incident.
JFCs should also be
constantly ready to counter activity that could bring significant
harm to units or jeopardize
mission accomplishment. Protection may involve the security
of HN authorities, other
USG department and agency personnel, and international
organization and NGO
members if authorized by higher authority. For contractors, the
GCC must evaluate the
need for force protection support following the guidelines of
DODI 3020.41, Operational
Contract Support (OCS).

f. Personnel should stay alert even in an operation with little or
no perceived risk.
JFCs must take measures to prevent complacency and be ready
to counter activity
that could bring harm to units or jeopardize the operation.
However, security
requirements should be balanced with the military operation’s
nature and objectives.
During some stability activities, the use of certain security
measures, such as carrying arms,
wearing helmets and protective vests, or using secure
communications may cause military
forces to appear more threatening than intended, which may

degrade the force’s legitimacy
and hurt relations with the local population.

g. Restraint. Military capability must be applied even more
prudently since the
support of the local population is essential for success. The
actions of military personnel
and units are framed by the disciplined application of force,
including specific ROE.
These ROE will often be more restrictive and detailed when
compared to those for
sustained combat operations due to national policy concerns.
Moreover, these rules may
change frequently during operations. Restraints on weaponry,
tactics, and levels of
violence characterize the environment. The use of excessive
force could adversely affect
efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the
achievement of both short- and long-
term objectives. The use of capabilities that can create
nonlethal effects should be
considered to fill the gap between verbal warnings and deadly
force when dealing with
unarmed hostile elements and to avoid raising the level of
conflict unnecessarily. The JFC
must determine early in the planning stage what nonlethal
technology is available, how
well the force is trained to use it, and how the established ROE
authorize its employment.
The principle of restraint does not preclude the application of
overwhelming force, when
appropriate and authorized, to display US resolve and
commitment. The reasons for the
restraint often need to be understood by the individual Service
member, because a single
act could cause adverse diplomatic/political consequences.

Chapter VIII

VIII-28 JP 3-0 CH1

h. Perseverance. Some operations may move quickly through
stability activities and
transition smoothly to the enable civil authority. Other
situations may require years of
stabilization activities before this transition occurs. Therefore,
the patient, resolute, and
persistent pursuit for as long as necessary of the conditions
desired to reach national
objectives is often the requirement for success.

i. Legitimacy. Military activities must sustain the legitimacy
of the operation and of
the emerging or host government. During operations where a
government does not exist,
extreme caution should be used when dealing with individuals
and organizations to avoid
inadvertently legitimizing them. Implementation of strategic
guidance through
communication can enhance perceptions of the legitimacy of
stabilization efforts.

j. OPSEC. Although there may be no clearly defined threat, US
military operations
should be safeguarded. The uncertain nature of the situation,
coupled with the potential
for rapid change, requires that OPSEC be an integral part of all
military operations. They
can then pass on information gleaned from that interaction or
provide other support to a

belligerent element to seek favor or to avoid retaliation. The
JFC must consider these and
similar possibilities and take appropriate actions to counter
potential compromise. OPSEC
planners must consider the effect of media coverage and the
possibility coverage may
compromise essential security or disclose critical information.

8. Considerations for Enabling Civil Authority

a. General. To enable civil authorities, the joint operation is
assessed and objectives
are established for transitioning from large-scale combat
operations to FID and security
cooperation. The catalyst for transition is that a legitimate civil
authority has been
established to manage the situation without further outside
military intervention. The new
government obtains legitimacy, and authority is transitioned
from an interim civilian
authority or transitional military authority to the new
indigenous government. This
situation may require a change in the joint operation as a result
of an extension of the
required stability activities in support of US diplomatic, HN,
international organization,
and/or NGO stabilization efforts.

b. PB. The transition from military operations to full civilian
control may involve
ongoing operations that have a significant combat component,
including COIN operations,
antiterrorism, and CT. Even while combat operations are
ongoing, the operation will
include a large stability component that is essentially a PB
mission. PB, transitioning to a

DOS-led effort, provides the reconstruction and societal
rehabilitation that offers hope to
the HN populace. Stability measures establish the conditions
that enable PB to succeed.
PB promotes reconciliation, strengthens and rebuilds civil
infrastructures and institutions,
builds confidence, and supports economic reconstruction to
prevent a return to conflict.
The ultimate measure of success in PB is political, not military.
Therefore, JFCs seek a
clear understanding of the national/PN objectives and how
military operations support that
end state.

c. Transfer to Civil Authority. In many cases, the US will
transfer responsibility
for the political and military affairs of the HN to another
authority (e.g., UN observers,

Large-Scale Combat Operations

VIII-29

multinational peacekeeping force, or NATO) consistent with
established termination
criteria. This will probably occur after an extended period of
conducting joint or
multinational stability activities and PB missions as described
above. Overall, transfer will
likely occur in stages (e.g., HN sovereignty, PO under UN
mandate, termination of all US
military participation). Joint force support to this effort may
include the following:

(1) Support to Truce Negotiations. This support may include
providing
intelligence, security, transportation and other logistic support,
and linguists for all
participants.

(2) Transition to Civil Authority. This transfer could be to a
local or HN
government or to an international authority facilitated by the
UN. For example, an interim
government (Northern Alliance) assumed governance during
Operation ENDURING
FREEDOM and then transferred governance to a legitimate
(newly elected) national
government in Afghanistan. However, the coalition forces
provided for the security of the
nation, which was transferred later to the International Security
Assistance Force as the
authority for security that enabled the Afghan government. The
transition for security is
ongoing with the overall objective of transferring security
concerns to the Afghan National
Army, police, and other security forces.

d. Redeployment

(1) Conduct. Redeployment is the transfer of forces and
materiel to support
another JFC’s operational requirements or to return personnel,
equipment, and materiel to
home/demobilization stations for reintegration and out-
processing. Redeployment is
normally conducted in stages—the entire joint force will likely
not redeploy in one
relatively short period. It may include waste disposal, port
operations, closing of contracts

and other financial obligations, disposition of contracting
records and files, clearing and
marking of minefields and other explosive ordnance disposal
activities, and ensuring
appropriate units remain in place until their missions are
complete. Redeployment must
be planned and executed in a manner that facilitates the use of
redeploying forces and
supplies to meet new missions or crises.

(a) Redeployment planning is the responsibility of the losing
supported
commander, when personnel, equipment, and materiel are
redeployed to home or
demobilization stations. The gaining supported commander is
responsible for this planning
when the redeployment is to a new OA.

(b) Upon redeployment, units or individuals may require
refresher training
prior to reassuming more traditional roles and missions.
Service members and leaders may
also require follow-on schooling to ensure normal career
progression. Due to this,
redeployment planning must be a collaborative and
synchronized effort between supported
and supporting commanders.

(2) Redeployment to Other Contingencies. Due to competing
demands for
limited forces, the joint force coordinator (for conventional
forces) or joint force provider
(for SOF and mobility forces) may source recommendations for
allocating a force from

Chapter VIII

VIII-30 JP 3-0 CH1

one CCDR to another higher-priority mission if the risks
warrant. If SecDef approves the
sourcing recommendation, the allocation will be ordered in a
deployment order.
Commanders and their staffs should consider how they would
extricate forces and ensure
they are prepared for the new contingency. This might include
such things as a prioritized
redeployment schedule, identification of aerial ports for linking
intratheater and
intertheater airlift, the most recent intelligence assessments and
supporting GEOINT
products for the new contingency, and some consideration to
achieving the national
objectives of the original contingency through other means.

(3) Redeployment in Support of Rotational Requirements. Due
to Service or
other rotational requirements, forces may be relieved in place
and redeployed to home
station for reconstitution or regeneration. Commanders and
their staffs must consider
security and protective measures during the relief in place
between incoming and outgoing
forces.

For further information on redeployment, refer to JP 3-35,
Deployment and Redeployment
Operations, and CJCSM 3130.06, Global Force Management
Allocation Policies and
Procedures. For further guidance on considerations for

termination of operations, refer to
JP 5-0, Joint Planning, and JP 3-33, Joint Task Force
Headquarters.

A-1

APPENDIX A
PRINCIPLES OF JOINT OPERATIONS

1. Introduction

The principles of joint operations are formed around the
traditional principles of
war. Three additional principles—restraint, perseverance, and
legitimacy—are relevant to
how the Armed Forces of the United States use combat power
across the range of military
operations. These three, added to the original nine, comprise 12
principles of joint
operations. The principles do not apply equally in all joint
operations. Most principles, if
not all, are relevant in combat. Some principles, such as
offensive, maneuver, and surprise,
may not apply in some crisis response operations like FHA.
However, principles such as
unity of command, objective, and legitimacy are important in all
operations.

2. Principles of Joint Operations

a. Objective

(1) The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every
military operation
toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal.

(2) The purpose of military operations is to achieve specific
objectives that
support achievement of the overall strategic objectives
identified to resolve the conflict.
This frequently involves the destruction of the enemies’
capabilities and their will to fight.
The objective of joint operations not involving this destruction
might be more difficult to
define; nonetheless, it too must be clear from the beginning.
Objectives must directly,
quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the
operation. Each operation must
contribute to achieving strategic objectives. JFCs should avoid
actions that do not
contribute directly to achieving the objective(s).

(3) Additionally, changes to the military objectives may occur
because national
and military leaders gain a better understanding of the situation
or they may occur because
the situation itself changes. The JFC should anticipate these
shifts in national
objectives necessitating changes in the military objectives. The
changes may be very
subtle, but if not made, achievement of the military objectives
may no longer support the
national objectives, legitimacy may be undermined, and force
security may be
compromised.

b. Offensive

(1) The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and
exploit the initiative.

(2) Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to
achieve a clearly
defined objective. Offensive operations are the means by which
a military force seizes and
holds the initiative while maintaining freedom of action and
achieving decisive results.
The importance of offensive action is fundamentally true across
all levels of warfare.

Appendix A

A-2 JP 3-0 CH1

(3) Commanders adopt the defensive only as a temporary
expedient and must
seek every opportunity to seize or regain the initiative. An
offensive spirit must be inherent
in the conduct of all defensive operations.

c. Mass

(1) The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat
power at the most
advantageous place and time to produce decisive results.

(2) To achieve mass, appropriate joint force capabilities are
integrated and
synchronized where they will have a decisive effect in a short
period of time. Mass must
often be sustained to have the desired effect. Massing effects of

combat power, rather than
concentrating forces, can enable even numerically inferior
forces to produce decisive
results and minimize human losses and waste of resources.

d. Maneuver

(1) The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position
of disadvantage
through the flexible application of combat power.

(2) Maneuver is the movement of forces in relation to the
enemy to secure or
retain positional advantage, usually to deliver—or threaten
delivery of—the direct and
indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver
keeps the enemy off balance
and thus also protects the friendly force. It contributes
materially in exploiting successes,
preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by
continually posing new
problems for the enemy.

e. Economy of Force

(1) The purpose of economy of force is to expend minimum
essential combat
power on secondary efforts to allocate the maximum possible
combat power on primary
efforts.

(2) Economy of force is the judicious employment and
distribution of forces. It
is the measured allocation of available combat power to such
tasks as limited attacks,
defense, delays, deception, or even retrograde operations to

achieve mass elsewhere at the
decisive point and time.

f. Unity of Command

(1) The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of
effort under one
responsible commander for every objective.

(2) Unity of command means all forces operate under a single
commander with
the requisite authority to direct all forces employed in pursuit of
a common purpose. Unity
of command may not be possible during coordination and
operations with multinational
and interagency partners, but the requirement for unity of effort
is paramount. Unity of
effort—the coordination and cooperation toward common
objectives, even if the

Principles of Joint Operations

A-3

participants are not necessarily part of the same command or
organization—is the product
of successful unified action.

g. Security

(1) The purpose of security is to prevent the enemy from
acquiring unexpected
advantage.

(2) Security enhances freedom of action by reducing friendly
vulnerability to
hostile acts, influence, or surprise. Security results from the
measures taken by
commanders to protect their forces, the population, or other
critical priorities. Staff
planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and
doctrine enhance security.
Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this
principle includes prudent risk
management, not undue caution.

h. Surprise

(1) The purpose of surprise is to strike at a time or place or in a
manner for which
the enemy is unprepared.

(2) Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of
combat power and thus
achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended.
Factors contributing to
surprise include speed in decision making, information sharing,
and force movement;
effective intelligence; deception; application of unexpected
combat power; OPSEC; and
variations in tactics and methods of operation.

i. Simplicity

(1) The purpose of simplicity is to increase the probability that
plans and
operations will be executed as intended by preparing clear,
uncomplicated plans and
concise orders.

(2) Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple
plans and clear, concise
orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other
factors are equal, the simplest
plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better
understanding and execution planning at
all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly
facilitate mission execution in the
stress, fatigue, fog of war, and complexities of modern combat
and are especially critical to
success in multinational operations.

j. Restraint

(1) The purpose of restraint is to prevent the unnecessary use
of force.

(2) A single act could cause significant military and political
consequences;
therefore, judicious use of force is necessary. Restraint
requires the careful and disciplined
balancing of the need for security, the conduct of military
operations, and national
objectives. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved,
thereby damaging the
legitimacy of the organization that uses it while potentially
enhancing the legitimacy of the

Appendix A

A-4 JP 3-0 CH1

opposing party. Sufficiently detailed ROE the commander
tailors to the specific

circumstances of the operation can facilitate appropriate
restraint.

k. Perseverance

(1) The purpose of perseverance is to ensure the commitment
necessary to
achieve national objectives.

(2) Perseverance involves preparation for measured, protracted
military
operations in pursuit of national objectives. Some joint
operations may require years to
reach the termination criteria. The underlying causes of the
crisis may be elusive, making
it difficult to achieve decisive resolution. The patient, resolute,
and persistent pursuit of
national goals and objectives often is essential to success. This
will frequently involve
diplomatic, economic, and informational measures to
supplement military efforts.

l. Legitimacy

(1) The purpose of legitimacy is to maintain legal and moral
authority in the
conduct of operations.

(2) Legitimacy, which can be a decisive factor in operations, is
based on the
actual and perceived legality, morality, and rightness of the
actions from the various
perspectives of interested audiences. These audiences will
include our national leadership
and domestic population, governments, and civilian populations
in the OA, and nations and

organizations around the world.

(3) Committed forces must sustain the legitimacy of the
operation and of the host
government, where applicable. Security actions must be
balanced with legitimacy
concerns. All actions must be considered in the light of
potentially competing strategic-
and tactical-level requirements and must exhibit fairness in
dealing with competing
factions where appropriate. Legitimacy may depend on
adherence to objectives agreed to
by the international community, ensuring the action is
appropriate to the situation and to
perceptions of fairness in dealing with various factions.
Restricting the use of force,
restructuring the type of forces employed, protecting civilians,
and ensuring the disciplined
conduct of the forces involved may reinforce legitimacy.

(4) Another aspect of this principle is the legitimacy bestowed
upon a local
government through the perception of the populace that it
governs. Humanitarian and civil
military operations help develop a sense of legitimacy for the
supported government.
Because the populace perceives the government has genuine
authority to govern and uses
proper agencies for valid purposes, they consider that
government as legitimate, especially
when coupled with successful efforts to build the capability and
capacity of the supported
government to complete such operations on its own. During
operations in an area where a
legitimate government does not exist, extreme caution should be
used when dealing with

individuals and organizations to avoid inadvertently
legitimizing them.

B-1

APPENDIX B
RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS

1. General

a. Basis for Religious Affairs. Religious affairs is the
combination of RS and
religious advisement. The Services maintain chaplaincies to
accommodate religious needs;
provide religious and pastoral care; and advise commanders on
religion, ethics, morals, and
morale with regard to personnel and the assigned mission. As
military members, chaplains
are uniquely positioned to assist Service members and their
families, and other authorized
personnel, with the challenges of military Service as advocates
of religious, moral, ethical,
and spiritual well-being and resiliency.

b. Authorities. The US Constitution, law, and policy support
free exercise of
religion. Military commanders are responsible for providing the
free exercise of religion
for those under their authority. RS is the chaplain-facilitated
free exercise of religion.

c. The RST. The RST is a team comprising at least one
chaplain and one enlisted
religious affairs person. The RST plans, executes, and assesses
the commander’s religious
program and training. The geographic combatant command
chaplain is the senior chaplain
assigned to the staff of, or designated by, the GCC to provide
advice on religion, ethical
and moral issues, and morale of assigned personnel and to
coordinate RS within the GCC’s
AOR. The command chaplain is the senior chaplain assigned to
or designated by a
commander of a staff, command, or unit. The joint force
chaplain (JFCH) is the military
chaplain designated by the JFC to serve as the senior chaplain
for the joint force. Each
echelon is responsible for training and supervision of
subordinate RSTs.

d. The Noncombatant Status of the Chaplain. As
noncombatants, advisement is
limited to the ethical, moral, and religious dimensions of the
targeting process. Chaplains
will not engage in combatant duties, will not conduct activities
that compromise their
noncombatant status, will not function as intelligence collectors
or propose combat target
selection, and will not advise on including or excluding specific
structures on the no-strike
list or target list.

e. The Combatant Status of Enlisted RS Personnel. Service
doctrine describes
enlisted religious affairs personnel as combatants. Therefore,
enlisted religious affairs
personnel are trained and authorized, IAW approved ROE, to

use lethal force. This
includes providing force protection and security measures for
the RST. Enlisted religious
affairs personnel therefore bear arms. Chaplains supervise
enlisted RS personnel to ensure
their employment does not jeopardize the chaplain’s protected
status.

2. Fundamentals of Religious Affairs

a. Religious affairs is the commander’s responsibility.
Throughout planning and
execution, commanders and staffs consider the possible impact
of religion throughout the
OA and area of influence. Religious beliefs and practices
influence the adversary and may
influence civilians and populations within the OA, impacting
the ideology or functioning

Appendix B

B-2 JP 3-0 CH1

of the government. Chaplains and enlisted RS personnel enable
and support free
expression of faith and/or religious practice for all assigned,
attached, or authorized
personnel. They also guard against religious discrimination
within the command.
Commanders are responsible for the religious accommodation of
joint force personnel.

b. Religious advisement is the practice of informing the
commander on the impact

of religion on operations, to include, but not be limited to,
worship, rituals, customs, and
practices of unified action partners and the indigenous
population, as well as the impact of
military operations on the religious and humanitarian dynamics
in the OA.

c. RS consists of provision and facilitation of religious
worship, rites, pastoral
counseling, and DOD support to accommodate free exercise of
religion for all assigned,
attached, or authorized personnel; pastoral care and counseling
for individuals; and
visitation of work areas, living areas, medical treatment
facilities, and confinement
facilities.

d. Functions. Joint RS requirements are determined and
validated IAW existing joint
processes. RSTs need to be integrated into their staffs and must
use command reporting
and tasking procedures. Chaplains must understand the limits
of their tasking authority.
Official tasking comes from appropriate command authority.
Command chaplains do not
task subordinate unit RS personnel directly. Tasking occurs
through normal command
tasking processes.

e. Religious Affairs in Interorganizational Cooperation. When
directed by the
commander, the JFCH establishes relationships with non-DOD
organizations to increase
capacity, enhance capabilities, promote interoperability, and
advise the commander in
support of mission requirements. Issues of legality,

permissions, collaborative tools,
information sharing, and partnering with other governmental
agencies or PNs to meet
religious needs should be considered.

3. The Role of Religious Affairs in Joint Operations

a. RSTs and the Conflict Continuum. Religious affairs in joint
military operations
will require a variety of actions supporting different types and
phases of operations across
the conflict continuum. The JFCH and RST support the joint
force during military
engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence; crisis
response and limited contingency
operations; and major operations and campaigns. Close
coordination should be maintained
among the RSTs of the CCMDs, Service components, JTFs, and
other subordinate units
involved in joint military operations.

b. Chaplain Liaison in Support of Military Engagement. In
many situations, and
only when approved by the command, clergy-to-clergy
communication is preferred by
indigenous religious leaders. Military chaplains with the
requisite knowledge, experience,
and training/education have religious legitimacy that may
directly contribute positively to
the JFC’s mission.

For more doctrinal information, see Joint Guide 1-05, Religious
Affairs in Joint
Operations.

C-1

APPENDIX C
REFERENCES

The development of JP 3-0 is based upon the following primary
references:

1. General

a. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense
Reorganization Act of 1986 (Title
10, USC, Section 161).

b. The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America.

c. National Defense Strategy of the United States of America.

d. National Defense Authorization Act of 1991.

e. National Military Strategy.

f. Department of Defense Strategy for Countering Weapons of
Mass Destruction.

g. The Department of Defense Cyber Strategy.

h. National Strategy for Homeland Security.

i. National Response Framework.

j. The Quadrennial Defense Review 2014.

k. Unified Command Plan.

l. Guidance for Employment of the Force.

m. Defense Planning Guidance.

n. Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency
Preparedness Responsibilities.

o. National Security Presidential Memorandum-4, Organization
of the National
Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and
Subcommittees.

p. UN Charter.

q. Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence
Activities.

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. DODD 3000.03E, DOD Executive Agent for Non-Lethal
Weapons (NLW), and
NLW Policy.

b. DODD 3002.01, Personnel Recovery in the Department of
Defense.

Appendix C

C-2 JP 3-0 CH1

c. DODD 3025.18, Defense Support of Civil Authorities
(DSCA).

d. DODD 3160.01, Homeland Defense Activities Conducted by
the National Guard.

e. DODD 5240.01, DOD Intelligence Activities.

f. DODI 3020.41, Operational Contract Support (OCS).

g. DODI 3025.21, Defense Support of Civilian Law
Enforcement Agencies.

h. DODI, 3025.22, The Use of the National Guard for Defense
Support of Civil
Authorities.

i. DODI 4715.19, Use of Open-Air Burn Pits in Contingency
Operations.

j. DODI 4715.22, Environmental Management Policy for
Contingency Locations.

k. DODI 5000.74, Defense Acquisition of Services.

l. DODI 6490.03, Deployment Health.

m. DODI 8500.01, Cybersecurity.

n. DOD Manual 5240-01, Procedures Governing the Conduct of
DOD Intelligence
Activities.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3110.01J, (U) 2015 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
(JSCP).

b. CJCSI 3121.01B, (U) Standing Rules of
Engagement/Standing Rules for the Use of
Force for US Forces.

c. CJCSI 3126.01A, Language, Regional Expertise, and Culture
(LREC) Capability
Identification, Planning, and Sourcing.

d. CJCSI 3141.01E, Management and Review of Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan
(JSCP)-Tasked Plans.

e. CJCSI 3150.25F, Joint Lessons Learned Program.

f. CJCSI 3320.01D, (U) Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum
Operations (JEMSO).

g. CJCSI 3500.01H, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces
of the United States.

h. CJCSI 5715.01C, Joint Staff Participation in Interagency
Affairs.

i. CJCSI 5810.01D, Implementation of the DOD Law of War
Program.

References

C-3

j. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES)
Volume I (Planning Policies and Procedures).

k. CJCSM 3122.05, Operating Procedures for Joint Operation
Planning and
Execution System (JOPES)-Information Systems (IS)
Governance.

l. CJCSM 3130.01A, Campaign Planning Procedures and
Responsibilities.

m. CJCSM 3130.03, Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)
Planning Formats
and Guidance.

n. CJCSM 3150.03D, Joint Reporting Structure Event and
Incident Reports.

o. CJCSM 4301.01, Planning Operational Contract Support.

p. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

q. JP 1-0, Joint Personnel Support.

r. JP 2-0, Joint Intelligence.

s. JP 2-01, Joint and National Intelligence Support to Military
Operations.

t. JP 2-01.2, Counterintelligence and Human Intelligence in
Joint Operations.

u. JP 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational
Environment.

v. JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats.

w. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

x. JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction.

y. JP 3-05, Special Operations.

z. JP 3-05.1, Unconventional Warfare.

aa. JP 3-07, Stability.

bb. JP 3-07.3, Peace Operations.

cc. JP 3-07.4, Counterdrug Operations.

dd. JP 3-08, Interorganizational Cooperation.

ee. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support.

ff. JP 3-09.3, Close Air Support.

Appendix C

C-4 JP 3-0 CH1

gg. JP 3-10, Joint Security Operations in Theater.

hh. JP 3-11, Operations in Chemical, Biological, Radiological,
and Nuclear
Environments.

ii. JP 3-12, Cyberspace Operations.

jj. JP 3-13, Information Operations.

kk. JP 3-13.1, Electronic Warfare.

ll. JP 3-13.2, Military Information Support Operations.

mm. JP 3-13.4, Military Deception.

nn. JP 3-14, Space Operations.

oo. JP 3-15.1, Counter-Improvised Explosive Device
Operations.

pp. JP 3-16, Multinational Operations.

qq. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations.

rr. JP 3-18, Joint Forcible Entry Operations.

ss. JP 3-20, Security Cooperation.

tt. JP 3-22, Foreign Internal Defense.

uu. JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency.

vv. JP 3-26, Counterterrorism.

ww. JP 3-27, Homeland Defense.

xx. JP 3-28, Defense Support of Civil Authorities.

yy. JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance.

zz. JP 3-30, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations.

aaa. JP 3-31, Command and Control for Joint Land Operations.

bbb. JP 3-32, Command and Control for Joint Maritime
Operations.

ccc. JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters.

ddd. JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations.

eee. JP 3-40, Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.

References

C-5

fff. JP 3-41, Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear
Response.

ggg. JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations.

hhh. JP 3-59, Meteorological and Oceanographic Operations.

iii. JP 3-60, Joint Targeting.

jjj. JP 3-61, Public Affairs.

kkk. JP 3-68, Noncombatant Evacuation Operations.

lll. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

mmm. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

nnn. JP 4-10, Operational Contract Support.

ooo. JP 5-0, Joint Planning.

ppp. JP 6-0, Joint Communications System.

qqq. JP 6-01, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Management

Operations.

rrr. JDN 3-16, Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations.

4. Allied Joint Publications

a. AJP-01(D), Allied Joint Doctrine.

b. AJP-3(B), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of
Operations.

Appendix C

C-6 JP 3-0 CH1

Intentionally Blank

D-1

APPENDIX D
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on
this publication using

the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it
to:
[email protected] These comments should address content
(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and organization), writing,
and appearance.

2. Authorship

a. The lead agent and Joint Staff doctrine sponsor for this
publication is the Joint Staff
Director for Joint Force Development (J-7).

b. The following staff, in conjunction with the joint doctrine
development community,
made a valuable contribution to the revision of this joint
publication: lead agent, Joint Staff
doctrine sponsor, and Joint Doctrine Analysis Division action
officer, Mr. Ricky Rowlett,
Joint Staff J-7 and Joint Doctrine Division action officer, Mr.
Lloyd Brown, Joint Staff J-
7.

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 3-0, Joint Operations, 11 August
2011.

4. Change Recommendations

a. To provide recommendations for urgent and/or routine
changes to this publication
please complete the Joint Doctrine Feedback Form located at:
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jp_feedback_form.pdf and e-mail it
to:
[email protected]

b. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the
CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that
directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its
proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when
changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Lessons Learned

The Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP) primary objective is
to enhance joint force
readiness and effectiveness by contributing to improvements in
doctrine, organization,
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel,
facilities, and policy. The Joint
Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is the DOD
system of record for lessons
learned and facilitates the collection, tracking, management,
sharing, collaborative
resolution, and dissemination of lessons learned to improve the
development and readiness
of the joint force. The JLLP integrates with joint doctrine
through the joint doctrine

Appendix D

D-2 JP 3-0 CH1

development process by providing lessons and lessons learned
derived from operations,
events, and exercises. As these inputs are incorporated into

joint doctrine, they become
institutionalized for future use, a major goal of the JLLP.
Lessons and lessons learned are
routinely sought and incorporated into draft JPs throughout
formal staffing of the
development process. The JLLIS Website can be found at
https://www.jllis.mil
(NIPRNET) or http://www.jllis.smil.mil (SIPRNET).

6. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified
publications is
unrestricted. However, access to and reproduction authorization
for classified JPs must be
IAW DOD Manual 5200.01, Volume 1, DOD Information
Security Program: Overview,
Classification, and Declassification, and DOD Manual 5200.01,
Volume 3, DOD
Information Security Program: Protection of Classified
Information.

7. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution.
Electronic versions are
available on JDEIS Joint Electronic Library Plus (JEL+) at
https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/index.jsp (NIPRNET) and
http://jdeis.js.smil.mil/jdeis/index.jsp
(SIPRNET), and on the JEL at http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/
(NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs are releasable outside the combatant
commands, Services, and
Joint Staff. Defense attachés may request classified JPs by
sending written requests to

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd.,
Joint Base Anacostia-
Bolling, Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development
community member,
the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with
current JPs. This JEL CD-
ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when
received can be locally
reproduced for use within the combatant commands, Services,
and combat support
agencies.

GL-1

GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND
INITIALISMS

A2 antiaccess
AADC area air defense commander
ACA airspace control authority
ACO airspace control order
ACP airspace control plan
ACS airspace control system
AD area denial
AJP Allied joint publication
AO area of operations
AOA amphibious objective area
AOR area of responsibility
APEX Adaptive Planning and Execution

C2 command and control
CA civil affairs
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
CCIR commander’s critical information requirement
CCMD combatant command
CCP combatant command campaign plan
CCS commander’s communication synchronization
CD counterdrug
CDRUSCYBERCOM Commander, United States Cyber
Command
CDRUSSOCOM Commander, United States Special Operations
Command
CDRUSSTRATCOM Commander, United States Strategic
Command
CI counterintelligence
CID combat identification
C-IED counter-improvised explosive device
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CJTF commander, joint task force
CMO civil-military operations
CMOC civil-military operations center
CO cyberspace operations
COA course of action
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
COG center of gravity
COIN counterinsurgency
CO-IPE cyberspace operations-integrated planning element
COMCAM combat camera
CONOPS concept of operations
CONUS continental United States

Glossary

GL-2 JP 3-0 CH1

COP common operational picture
CT counterterrorism
CTF counter threat finance
CWMD countering weapons of mass destruction

DAFL directive authority for logistics
DCA defensive counterair
DCO defensive cyberspace operations
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DODI Department of Defense instruction
DODIN Department of Defense information network
DOS Department of State
DSCA defense support of civil authorities
DSR defense strategy review

EA electronic attack
EMBM electromagnetic battle management
EME electromagnetic environment
EMS electromagnetic spectrum
EW electronic warfare
EWCA electronic warfare control authority

FCC functional combatant commander
FDO flexible deterrent option
FFIR friendly force information requirement
FHA foreign humanitarian assistance
FHP force health protection
FID foreign internal defense
FLOT forward line of own troops

FRO flexible response option
FSF foreign security forces

GCC geographic combatant commander
GEF Guidance for Employment of the Force
GEOINT geospatial intelligence

HD homeland defense
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
HQ headquarters
HUMINT human intelligence

Glossary

GL-3

I2 identity intelligence
IAW in accordance with
IED improvised explosive device
IM information management
ISR intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
IW irregular warfare

J-2 intelligence directorate of a joint staff
J-3 operations directorate of a joint staff
J-5 plans directorate of a joint staff
J-7 training directorate of a joint staff
JDN joint doctrine note
JEMSO joint electromagnetic spectrum operations
JFACC joint force air component commander
JFC joint force commander

JFCH joint force chaplain
JFLCC joint force land component commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JFSOCC joint force special operations component commander
JIACG joint interagency coordination group
JIPOE joint intelligence preparation of the operational
environment
JOA joint operations area
JP joint publication
JPP joint planning process
JRSOI joint reception, staging, onward movement, and
integration
JSA joint security area
JSOA joint special operations area
JTCB joint targeting coordination board
JTF joint task force
JUO joint urban operation

KLE key leader engagement
KS knowledge sharing

LEA law enforcement agency
LNO liaison officer
LOC line of communications
LOE line of effort
LOO line of operation

MILDEC military deception
MIPOE medical intelligence preparation of the operational
environment
MISO military information support operations
MOE measure of effectiveness
MOP measure of performance

Glossary

GL-4 JP 3-0 CH1

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEO noncombatant evacuation operation
NGA National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO nongovernmental organization
NMS national military strategy
NRF National Response Framework
NSC National Security Council
NSS national security strategy

OA operational area
OCA offensive counterair
OCO offensive cyberspace operations
OCS operational contract support
OE operational environment
OPCON operational control
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OSINT open-source intelligence

PA public affairs
PB peace building
PEO peace enforcement operations
PIR priority intelligence requirement
PKO peacekeeping operations
PM peacemaking
PMESII political, military, economic, social, information, and
infrastructure
PN partner nation
PNT positioning, navigation, and timing
PO peace operations

PR personnel recovery

ROE rules of engagement
RS religious support
RST religious support team

SCA space coordinating authority
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SFA security force assistance
SJA staff judge advocate
SOF special operations forces
SOP standard operating procedure
STO special technical operations

Glossary

GL-5

TACON tactical control
TDP theater distribution plan
TF task force
TLO theater logistics overview
TMM transregional, multi-domain, and multifunctional
TSOC theater special operations command

UCP Unified Command Plan
UN United Nations
USAID United States Agency for International Development
USC United States Code
USCYBERCOM United States Cyber Command
USG United States Government
USSTRATCOM United States Strategic Command
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

UW unconventional warfare

WMD weapons of mass destruction

GL-6 JP 3-0 CH1

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

activity. 1. A unit, organization, or installation performing a
function or mission. 2. A
function, mission, action, or collection of actions. (DOD
Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

adversary. A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a
friendly party and against

which the use of force may be envisaged. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

air apportionment. The determination and assignment of the
total expected effort by

percentage and/or by priority that should be devoted to the
various air operations for a
given period of time. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

alliance. The relationship that results from a formal agreement
between two or more

nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common

interests of the
members. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

antiaccess. Action, activity, or capability, usually long-range,
designed to prevent an

advancing enemy force from entering an operational area. Also
called A2. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

area denial. Action, activity, or capability, usually short-range,
designed to limit an enemy

force’s freedom of action within an operational area. Also
called AD. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

area of influence. A geographical area wherein a commander is
directly capable of

influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems
normally under the
commander’s command or control. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

area of interest. That area of concern to the commander,
including the area of influence,

areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. Also
called AOI. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

area of operations. An operational area defined by a
commander for land and maritime

forces that should be large enough to accomplish their missions
and protect their
forces. Also called AO. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

assessment. 1. A continuous process that measures the overall
effectiveness of employing

capabilities during military operations. 2. Determination of the
progress toward
accomplishing a task, creating a condition, or achieving an
objective. 3. Analysis of
the security, effectiveness, and potential of an existing or
planned intelligence activity.
4. Judgment of the motives, qualifications, and characteristics
of present or prospective
employees or “agents.” (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

assign. 1. To place units or personnel in an organization where
such placement is relatively

permanent, and/or where such organization controls and
administers the units or
personnel for the primary function, or greater portion of the
functions, of the unit or

Glossary

GL-7

personnel. 2. To detail individuals to specific duties or
functions where such duties or
functions are primary and/or relatively permanent. (DOD
Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

attach. 1. The placement of units or personnel in an
organization where such placement

is relatively temporary. 2. The detailing of individuals to
specific functions where
such functions are secondary or relatively temporary. (DOD
Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

battle damage assessment. The estimate of damage composed of
physical and functional

damage assessment, as well as target system assessment,
resulting from the application
of lethal or nonlethal military force. Also called BDA. (DOD
Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

boundary. A line that delineates surface areas for the purpose
of facilitating coordination

and deconfliction of operations between adjacent units,
formations, or areas. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

close air support. Air action by manned or unmanned fixed-
wing and rotary-wing aircraft

against hostile targets that are in close proximity to friendly
forces and that require
detailed integration of each air mission with the fire and
movement of those forces.
Also called CAS. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

combatant command chaplain. The senior chaplain assigned to
the staff of, or designated

by, the combatant commander to provide advice on religion,
ethical, and moral issues
and morale of assigned personnel and to coordinate religious
ministries within the
combatant commander’s area of responsibility. (Approved for
inclusion in the DOD
Dictionary.)

combatant commander. A commander of one of the unified or
specified combatant

commands established by the President. Also called CCDR.
(DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

combat power. The total means of destructive and/or disruptive
force that a military

unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time.
(DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

command chaplain. The senior chaplain assigned to or
designated by a commander of a

staff, command, or unit. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD
Dictionary.)

commander’s critical information requirement. An information
requirement identified

by the commander as being critical to facilitating timely
decision making. Also called
CCIR. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

commander’s intent. A clear and concise expression of the
purpose of the operation and

the desired military end state that supports mission command,
provides focus to the

Glossary

GL-8 JP 3-0 CH1

staff, and helps subordinate and supporting commanders act to
achieve the
commander’s desired results without further orders, even when
the operation does not
unfold as planned. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

common operational picture. A single identical display of

relevant information shared

by more than one command that facilitates collaborative
planning and assists all
echelons to achieve situational awareness. Also called COP.
(DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

condition. 1. Those variables of an operational environment or
situation in which a unit,

system, or individual is expected to operate and may affect
performance. 2. A physical
or behavioral state of a system that is required for the
achievement of an objective.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

continuity of operations. The degree or state of being
continuous in the conduct of

functions, tasks, or duties necessary to accomplish a military
action or mission in
carrying out the national military strategy. Also called COOP.
(DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

control. 1. Authority that may be less than full command
exercised by a commander over

part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. (JP
1) 2. In mapping,
charting, and photogrammetry, a collective term for a system of
marks or objects on

the Earth or on a map or a photograph, whose positions or
elevations (or both) have
been or will be determined. (JP 2-03) 3. Physical or
psychological pressures exerted
with the intent to assure that an agent or group will respond as
directed. (JP 3-0) 4.
In intelligence usage, an indicator governing the distribution
and use of documents,
information, or material. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 2-01)

crisis. An incident or situation involving a threat to the United
States, its citizens, military

forces, or vital interests that develops rapidly and creates a
condition of such
diplomatic, economic, or military importance that commitment
of military forces and
resources is contemplated to achieve national objectives. (DOD
Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

cyberspace operations. The employment of cyberspace
capabilities where the primary

purpose is to achieve objectives in or through cyberspace. Also
called CO. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

deterrence. The prevention of action by the existence of a
credible threat of unacceptable

counteraction and/or belief that the cost of action outweighs the
perceived benefits.

(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

economy of force. The judicious employment and distribution
of forces so as to expend

the minimum essential combat power on secondary efforts to
allocate the maximum
possible combat power on primary efforts. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

Glossary

GL-9

effect. 1. The physical or behavioral state of a system that
results from an action, a set of

actions, or another effect. 2. The result, outcome, or
consequence of an action. 3. A
change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP
3-0)

end state. The set of required conditions that defines
achievement of the commander’s

objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

engagement. 1. An attack against an air or missile threat. (JP
3-01) 2. A tactical conflict,

usually between opposing lower echelons maneuver forces.
(DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

essential element of friendly information. None. (Approved for
removal from the DOD

Dictionary.)

exclusion zone. A zone established by a sanctioning body to
prohibit specific activities in

a specific geographic area to persuade nations or groups to
modify their behavior to
meet the desires of the sanctioning body or face continued
imposition of sanctions, or
the use or threat of force. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)

exercise. A military maneuver or simulated wartime operation
involving planning,

preparation, and execution that is carried out for the purpose of
training and evaluation.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

expeditionary force. An armed force organized to achieve a
specific objective in a foreign

country. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

fire support coordination measure. A measure employed by

commanders to facilitate

the rapid engagement of targets and simultaneously provide
safeguards for friendly
forces. Also called FSCM. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

force projection. The ability to project the military instrument
of national power from the

United States or another theater, in response to requirements for
military operations.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

force protection. Preventive measures taken to mitigate hostile
actions against

Department of Defense personnel (to include family members),
resources, facilities,
and critical information. Also called FP. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

foreign assistance. Assistance to foreign nations ranging from
the sale of military

equipment and support for foreign internal defense to donations
of food and medical
supplies to aid survivors of natural and man-made disasters that
may be provided
through development assistance, humanitarian assistance, and
security assistance.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

Glossary

GL-10 JP 3-0 CH1

freedom of navigation operations. Operations conducted to
protect United States
navigation, overflight, and related interests on, under, and over
the seas. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

friendly force information requirement. Information the
commander and staff need to

understand the status of friendly force and supporting
capabilities. Also called FFIR.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

full-spectrum superiority. The cumulative effect of dominance
in the air, land, maritime,

and space domains; electromagnetic spectrum; and information
environment (which
includes cyberspace) that permits the conduct of joint
operations without effective
opposition or prohibitive interference. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

hostile environment. Operational environment in which host
government forces, whether

opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to
conduct, do not have control
of the territory and population in the intended operational area.
(DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

information management. The function of managing an
organization’s information

resources for the handling of data and information acquired by
one or many different
systems, individuals, and organizations in a way that optimizes
access by all who have
a share in that data or a right to that information. Also called
IM. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

interagency coordination. Within the context of Department of
Defense involvement, the

coordination that occurs between elements of Department of
Defense and participating
United States Government departments and agencies for the
purpose of achieving an
objective. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

interoperability. 1. The ability to act together coherently,
effectively, and efficiently to

achieve tactical, operational, and strategic objectives. (JP 3-0)
2. The condition

achieved among communications-electronics systems or items
of communications-
electronics equipment when information or services can be
exchanged directly and
satisfactorily between them and/or their users. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 6-0)

joint fires. Fires delivered during the employment of forces
from two or more components

in coordinated action to produce desired effects in support of a
common objective.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint fire support. Joint fires that assist air, land, maritime, and
special operations forces

to move, maneuver, and control territory, populations, airspace,
and key waters. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

Glossary

GL-11

joint force. A force composed of elements, assigned or
attached, of two or more Military
Departments operating under a single joint force commander.
(DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

joint force air component commander. The commander within a
unified command,

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to
the establishing
commander for recommending the proper employment of
assigned, attached, and/or
made available for tasking air forces; planning and coordinating
air operations; or
accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
Also called JFACC.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint force chaplain. The military chaplain designated by the
joint force commander to

serve as the senior chaplain for the joint force. Also called the
JFCH. (Approved for
inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

joint force land component commander. The commander within
a unified command,

subordinate unified command, or joint task force responsible to
the establishing
commander for recommending the proper employment of
assigned, attached, and/or
made available for tasking land forces; planning and
coordinating land operations; or
accomplishing such operational missions as may be assigned.
Also called JFLCC.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint force maritime component commander. The commander
within a unified

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force
responsible to the
establishing commander for recommending the proper
employment of assigned,
attached, and/or made available for tasking maritime forces and
assets; planning and
coordinating maritime operations; or accomplishing such
operational missions as may
be assigned. Also called JFMCC. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

joint force special operations component commander. The
commander within a unified

command, subordinate unified command, or joint task force
responsible to the
establishing commander for recommending the proper
employment of assigned,
attached, and/or made available for tasking special operations
forces and assets;
planning and coordinating special operations; or accomplishing
such operational
missions as may be assigned. Also called JFSOCC. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP
3-0)

joint functions. Related capabilities and activities placed into
seven basic groups of

command and control, information, intelligence, fires,
movement and maneuver,
protection, and sustainment to help joint force commanders
synchronize, integrate, and
direct joint operations. (Approved for incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)

joint operations. Military actions conducted by joint forces and
those Service forces

employed in specified command relationships with each other,
which of themselves,
do not establish joint forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-
0)

Glossary

GL-12 JP 3-0 CH1

joint operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace,
defined by a geographic
combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in
which a joint force
commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts
military operations to
accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

joint special operations area. An area of land, sea, and airspace
assigned by a joint force

commander to the commander of a joint special operations force
to conduct special
operations activities. Also called JSOA. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

link. 1. A behavioral, physical, or functional relationship
between nodes. 2. In

communications, a general term used to indicate the existence
of communications
facilities between two points. 3. A maritime route, other than a
coastal or transit route,
that connects any two or more routes together. (Approved for
incorporation into the
DOD Dictionary.)

major operation. 1. A series of tactical actions (battles,
engagements, strikes) conducted

by combat forces, coordinated in time and place, to achieve
strategic or operational
objectives in an operational area. 2. For noncombat operations,
a reference to the
relative size and scope of a military operation. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

maneuver. 1. A movement to place ships, aircraft, or land
forces in a position of advantage

over the enemy. 2. A tactical exercise carried out at sea, in the
air, on the ground, or
on a map in imitation of war. 3. The operation of a ship,

aircraft, or vehicle to cause
it to perform desired movements. 4. Employment of forces in
the operational area,
through movement in combination with fires and information, to
achieve a position of
advantage in respect to the enemy. (Approved for incorporation
into the DOD
Dictionary.)

military engagement. Routine contact and interaction between
individuals or elements of

the Armed Forces of the United States and those of another
nation’s armed forces, or
foreign and domestic civilian authorities or agencies to build
trust and confidence,
share information, coordinate mutual activities, and maintain
influence. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

military intervention. The deliberate act of a nation or a group
of nations to introduce its

military forces into the course of an existing controversy.
(DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

military occupation. A condition in which territory is under the
effective control of a

foreign armed force. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

mission. 1. The task, together with the purpose, that clearly

indicates the action to be taken

and the reason therefore. (JP 3-0) 2. In common usage,
especially when applied to
lower military units, a duty assigned to an individual or unit; a
task. (JP 3-0) 3. The
dispatching of one or more aircraft to accomplish one particular
task. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-30)

Glossary

GL-13

neutral. In combat and combat support operations, an identity
applied to a track whose

characteristics, behavior, origin, or nationality indicate that it is
neither supporting nor
opposing friendly forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

neutrality. In international law, the attitude of impartiality
during periods of war adopted

by third states toward a belligerent and subsequently recognized
by the belligerent,
which creates rights and duties between the impartial states and
the belligerent. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

neutralize. 1. As pertains to military operations, to render

ineffective or unusable. 2. To

render enemy personnel or materiel incapable of interfering
with a particular
operation. 3. To render safe mines, bombs, missiles, and booby
traps. 4. To make
harmless anything contaminated with a chemical agent. (DOD
Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

node. 1. A location in a mobility system where a movement
requirement is originated,

processed for onward movement, or terminated. (JP 3-17) 2. In
communications and
computer systems, the physical location that provides
terminating, switching, and
gateway access services to support information exchange. (JP
6-0) 3. An element of a
system that represents a person, place, or physical thing. (DOD
Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

operation. 1. A sequence of tactical actions with a common
purpose or unifying theme.

(JP 1) 2. A military action or the carrying out of a strategic,
operational, tactical,
service, training, or administrative military mission. (DOD
Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

operational access. The ability to project military force into an

operational area with

sufficient freedom of action to accomplish the mission. (DOD
Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

operational area. An overarching term encompassing more
descriptive terms (such as

area of responsibility and joint operations area) for geographic
areas in which military
operations are conducted. Also called OA. (DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

operational art. The cognitive approach by commanders and
staffs—supported by their

skill, knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgment—to
develop strategies,
campaigns, and operations to organize and employ military
forces by integrating ends,
ways, and means. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

operational environment. A composite of the conditions,
circumstances, and influences

that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the
decisions of the commander.
Also called OE. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

Glossary

GL-14 JP 3-0 CH1

operational level of warfare. The level of warfare at which
campaigns and major
operations are planned, conducted, and sustained to achieve
strategic objectives within
theaters or other operational areas. (DOD Dictionary. Source:
JP 3-0)

operational reach. The distance and duration across which a
force can successfully

employ military capabilities. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-
0)

permissive environment. Operational environment in which
host nation military and law

enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and
capability to assist
operations that a unit intends to conduct. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

physical security. 1. That part of security concerned with
physical measures designed to

safeguard personnel; to prevent unauthorized access to
equipment, installations,
material, and documents; and to safeguard them against
espionage, sabotage, damage,

and theft. (JP 3-0) 2. In communications security, the
component that results from all
physical measures necessary to safeguard classified equipment,
material, and
documents from access thereto or observation thereof by
unauthorized persons. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 6-0)

protection. Preservation of the effectiveness and survivability
of mission-related military

and nonmilitary personnel, equipment, facilities, information,
and infrastructure
deployed or located within or outside the boundaries of a given
operational area.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

protection of shipping. The use of proportionate force, when
necessary for the protection

of United States flag vessels and aircraft, United States citizens
(whether embarked in
United States or foreign vessels), and their property against
unlawful violence. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

raid. An operation to temporarily seize an area to secure
information, confuse an enemy,

capture personnel or equipment, or to destroy a capability
culminating with a planned
withdrawal. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD
Dictionary.)

religious advisement. The practice of informing the commander
on the impact of religion

on operations, to include, but not limited to, worship, rituals,
customs, and practices of
United States military personnel, international forces, and the
indigenous population, as
well as the impact of military operations on the religious and
humanitarian dynamics in
the operational area. (Approved for inclusion in the DOD
Dictionary.)

religious affairs. The combination of religious support and
religious advisement.

(Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

religious discrimination. The unlawful limits on religious
expression; punishment for

religious beliefs or lack of belief; or the compulsion to express
opinions or beliefs

Glossary

GL-15

contrary to religious beliefs of established religions. (Approved
for inclusion in the
DOD Dictionary.)

religious support. Chaplain-facilitated free exercise of religion
through worship, religious

and pastoral counseling services, ceremonial honors for the
fallen, crisis intervention,
and advice to the commander on ethical and moral issues and
morale. Also called RS.
(Approved for inclusion in the DOD Dictionary.)

religious support team. A team comprising at least one chaplain
and one enlisted

religious affairs person. Also called RST. (Approved for
inclusion in the DOD
Dictionary.)

risk management. The process to identify, assess, and control
risks and make decisions

that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Also called RM.
(DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

sanction enforcement. Operations that employ coercive
measures to control the

movement of certain types of designated items into or out of a
nation or specified area.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

show of force. An operation planned to demonstrate United

States resolve that involves

increased visibility of United States deployed forces in an
attempt to defuse a specific
situation that, if allowed to continue, may be detrimental to
United States interests or
national objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

stability activities. Various military missions, tasks, and
activities conducted outside the

United States in coordination with other instruments of national
power to maintain or
reestablish a safe and secure environment and provide essential
governmental services,
emergency infrastructure reconstruction, and humanitarian
relief. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

strategic level of warfare. The level of warfare at which a
nation, often as a member of a

group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance
or coalition) strategic
security objectives and guidance, then develops and uses
national resources to achieve
those objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

strategy. A prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the
instruments of national power

in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater,
national, and/or

multinational objectives. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

strike. An attack to damage or destroy an objective or a
capability. (DOD Dictionary.

Source: JP 3-0)

supported commander. 1. The commander having primary
responsibility for all aspects of

a task assigned by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Instruction 3110.01J, (U) 2015
Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), or other joint planning
authority. 2. In the

Glossary

GL-16 JP 3-0 CH1

context of joint planning, the commander who prepares
operation plans or operation
orders in response to requirements of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. 3. In
the context of a support command relationship, the commander
who receives
assistance from another commander’s force or capabilities, and
who is responsible for
ensuring that the supporting commander understands the
assistance required.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

supporting commander. 1. A commander who provides

augmentation forces or other

support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting
plan. 2. In the
context of a support command relationship, the commander who
aids, protects,
complements, or sustains another commander’s force and who is
responsible for
providing the assistance required by the supported commander.
(Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

surveillance. The systematic observation of aerospace,
cyberspace, surface, or subsurface

areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic,
photographic, or other
means. (Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

sustainment. The provision of logistics and personnel services
required to maintain and

prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment.
(DOD Dictionary.
Source: JP 3-0)

system. A functionally, physically, and/or behaviorally related
group of regularly

interacting or interdependent elements; that group of elements
forming a unified
whole. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

tactical level of warfare. The level of warfare at which battles
and engagements are

planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to
tactical units or task
forces. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

targeting. The process of selecting and prioritizing targets and
matching the appropriate

response to them, considering operational requirements and
capabilities. (DOD
Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

termination criteria. The specified standards approved by the
President and/or the

Secretary of Defense that must be met before a military
operation can be concluded.
(Approved for incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

theater of operations. An operational area defined by the
geographic combatant

commander for the conduct or support of specific military
operations. Also called TO.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

theater of war. Defined by the President, Secretary of Defense,
or the geographic

combatant commander as the area of air, land, and water that is,
or may become,
directly involved in the conduct of major operations and
campaigns involving combat.
(DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

Glossary

GL-17

theater strategy. An overarching construct outlining a
combatant commander’s vision for

integrating and synchronizing military activities and operations
with the other
instruments of national power to achieve national strategic
objectives. (Approved for
incorporation into the DOD Dictionary.)

uncertain environment. Operational environment in which host
government forces,

whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends
to conduct, do not
have totally effective control of the territory and population in
the intended operational
area. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

unity of command. The operation of all forces under a single
responsible commander

who has the requisite authority to direct and employ those
forces in pursuit of a
common purpose. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-0)

weapon system. A combination of one or more weapons with
all related equipment,

materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and
deployment (if applicable)
required for self-sufficiency. (DOD Dictionary. Source: JP 3-
0)

Glossary

GL-18 JP 3-0 CH1

Intentionally Blank

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT

DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED

JOINT

WARFIGHTING

CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

� JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

� JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

� JSDS prepares JS staffing package

� JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature

� LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the
first
draft (FD)

� PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

� FD comment matrix adjudication

� JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

� Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrix

� FC joint working group

STEP #4 - Maintenance

� JP published and continuously
assessed by users

� Formal assessment begins
24-27 months following
publication

� Revision begins 3.5 years
after publication

� Each JP revision is completed
no later than 5 years after
signature

STEP #1 - Initiation

� Joint doctrine development
community (JDDC) submission to fill
extant operational void

� Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-
end analysis

� Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
validation

� Program directive (PD) development
and staffing/joint working group

� PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship

� JS J-7 approves and releases PD to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
command, JS directorate)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIONS HIERARCHY

JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS
COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEMPLANSPERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

OPERATIONS

JP 3-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive
hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 3-0 Operationsis in the series of joint doctrine
publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:

PREFACESUMMARY OF CHANGESTABLE OF
CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARYCHAPTER I
FUNDAMENTALS OF JOINT OPERATIONS1. Introduction2.
Strategic Environment and National Security Challenges3.
Instruments of National Power and the Conflict Continuum4.
Strategic Direction5. Unified Action6. Levels of Warfare7.

Characterizing Military Operations and ActivitiesCHAPTER II
THE ART OF JOINT COMMAND1. Introduction2. Commander -
Centric Leadership3. Operational Art4. Operational Design5.
Joint Planning6. AssessmentCHAPTER III JOINT
FUNCTIONS1. Introduction2. Command and Control3.
Information4. Intelligence5. Fires6. Movement and Maneuver7.
Protection8. SustainmentCHAPTER IV ORGANIZING FOR
JOINT OPERATIONS1. Introduction2. Understanding the
Operational Environment3. Organizing the Joint Force4.
Organizing the Joint Force Headquarters5. Organizing
Operational AreasCHAPTER V JOINT OPERATIONS ACROSS
THE CONFLICT CONTINUUM1. Introduction2. Military
Operations and Related Missions, Tasks, and Actions3. The
Range of Military Operations4. The Combatant Command
Campaign5. A Joint Operation Model6. Phasing a Joint
Operation7. The Balance of Offense, Defense, and Stability
Activities8. Linear and Nonlinear OperationsCHAPTER VI
MILITARY ENGAGEMENT, SECURITY COOPERATION,
ANDDETERRENCE1. Introduction2. Typical Oper ations and
Activities3. Other ConsiderationsCHAPTER VII CRISIS
RESPONSE AND LIMITED CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS1.
Introduction2. Crisis Response and Limited Contingency
Operations3. Typical Operations4. Other
ConsiderationsCHAPTER VIII LARGE -SCALE COMBAT
OPERATIONS1. Introduction2. Combatant Command
Planning3. Setting Conditions for Theater Operations4.
Considerations for Deterrence5. Considerations for Seizing the
Initiative6. Considerations for Dominance7. Considerations for
Stabilization8. Considerations for Enabling Civil
AuthorityAPPENDIXAPPENDIX A PRINCIPLES OF JOINT
OPERATIONSAPPENDIX B RELIGIOUS AFFAIRSAPPENDIX
C REFERENCESAPPENDIX D ADMINISTRATIVE
INSTRUCTIONSGLOSSARYPART I —ABBREVIATIONS,
ACRONYMS, AND INITIALISMSPART II —TERMS AND
DEFINITIONSFIGUREFigure I-1. Principles of Joint
OperationsFigure I-2. Common Operating PreceptsFigure I-3.

Unified ActionFigure I-4. Relationship Between Strategy and
Operational ArtFigure II-1. Joint Planning ProcessFigure II-2.
Assessment InteractionFigure III-1. Command Relationships
SynopsisFigure III-2. Building Shared UnderstandingFigure III-
3. Risk Management ProcessFigure IV-1. A Systems Perspective
of the Operational EnvironmentFigure IV-2. Notional Joint
Force Headquarters and Cross-Functional Staff
OrganizationFigure IV-3. Operational Areas within a
TheaterFigure IV-4. Contiguous and Noncontiguous Operational
AreasFigure V-1. Examples of Military Operations and
ActivitiesFigure V-2. Notional Operations Across the Conflict
ContinuumFigure V-3. Notional Joint Operations in a
Combatant Command Campaign ContextFigure V-4. A Notional
Joint Combat Operation ModelFigure V-5. Notional Balance of
Activities for a Joint StrikeFigure V-6. Notional Balance of
Activities for a Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
OperationFigure V-7. Phasing an Operation Based on
Predominant Military ActivitiesFigure V-8. Notional Balance of
Offense, Defense, and Stability ActivitiesFigure V-9.
Combinations of Areas of Operations and Linear/Nonlinear
OperationsFigure VI-1. The Conflict Continuum

22 June 2012

Sealift Support to Joint Operations

Joint Publication 4-01.2

i

PREFACE

1. Scope

This publication provides doctrine for sealift in support of joint
operations.

2. Purpose

This publication has been prepared under the direction of the
Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. It sets forth joint doctrine to govern the
activities and performance of the
Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and
provides the doctrinal basis for US
military coordination with other US Government departments
and agencies during operations
and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It
provides military guidance
for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and
other joint force commanders
(JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education,
and training. It provides
military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing
their appropriate plans. It is not
the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC
from organizing the force and
executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most
appropriate to ensure unity of effort
in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

3. Application

a. Joint doctrine established in this publication applies to the
Joint Staff, commanders of
combatant commands, subunified commands, joint task forces,
subordinate components of

these commands, and the Services.

b. The guidance in this publication is authoritative; as such,
this doctrine will be
followed except when, in the judgment of the commander,
exceptional circumstances dictate
otherwise. If conflicts arise between the contents of this
publication and the contents of
Service publications, this publication will take precedence
unless the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, normally in coordination with the other
members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
has provided more current and specific guidance. Commanders
of forces operating as part of
a multinational (alliance or coalition) military command should
follow multinational doctrine
and procedures ratified by the United States. For doctrine and
procedures not ratified by the
United States, commanders should evaluate and follow the
multinational command’s
doctrine and procedures, where applicable and consistent with
US law, regulations, and
doctrine.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM E. GORTNEY
VADM, USN
Director, Joint Staff

Preface

ii JP 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

iii

SUMMARY OF CHANGES
REVISION OF JOINT PUBLICATION 4 -01.2

DATED 31 AUGUST 2005

operations center
and joint movement center.

responsibilities of United
States Transportation Command.

operations security.

including the joint
high speed vessel and offshore petroleum discharge system.

-port opening and joint
logistics over-the-
shore.

peration and
guidance for
shipping.

Summary of Changes

iv JP 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

v

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
...............................................................................................
ix

CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

...............................................................................................
......................... I-1
...................................................................................... I-1
...............................................................................................
....... I-3

CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

...............................................................................................
........................II-1
Authority................................................................................
..................II-1
-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation
...............................................II-2
............................................................................II-2
........................................................................II-11

CHAPTER III
SEALIFT CAPABILITIES

...............................................................................................
...................... III-1
...............................................................................................
................ III-1
..............................................................................................
III-9

................................................................................ III-16
-the-Shore
....................................................................................... III-
16

CHAPTER IV
PLANNING

...............................................................................................
...................... IV-1
...............................................................................................
... IV-2
..............................................................................................
IV-3
............................................................................... IV-3
......................................................................... IV-5
................................................................................. IV-9
...................................................................................... IV-9
..................................... IV-10
.............................................................................................
IV-12

CHAPTER V
EMPLOYMENT OF SEALIFT FORCES

...............................................................................................
....................... V-1
...............................................................................................
................... V-1
............................................................................. V-3

Table of Contents

vi JP 4-01.2

...............................................................................................
......... V-5
..............................................................................................
V-5
ons
.................................................................... V-6
Cooperation

Activities, and Humanitarian Assistance
.................................................................. V-8

CHAPTER VI
VESSEL ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION PROGRAMS

...............................................................................................
...................... VI-1
-Owned/Controlled (Organic) Assets
.................................................. VI-2

................................................................................ VI-4

CHAPTER VII
NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

...............................................................................................
..................... VII-1
...............................................................................................
............. VII-1
ies
.........................................................................................
VII-2
Measures for

Commercial Shipping
.............................................................................................
VII-3

APPENDIX

A References
...............................................................................................
.. A-1
B Administrative Instructions
........................................................................B-1

GLOSSARY

Part I Abbreviations and Acronyms
.................................................................. GL-1
Part II Terms and Definitions
............................................................................. GL-5

FIGURE

I-1 Strategic Mobility Triad
.............................................................................. I-1
I-2 Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the

Strategic Mobility Triad
.............................................................................. I-2
I-3 Phases of Strategic Mobility
....................................................................... I-3
I-4 The Sealift Trident
...................................................................................... I-4
II-1 Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation
Sealift Assets.........II-3
II-2 Responsibilities of the Commander, US Transportation
Command ..........II-6
III-1 Types of Dry Cargo Ships
........................................................................ III-2
III-2 Types of Liquid Cargo Carriers
............................................................... III-6
III-3 Sealift Ship Programs
............................................................................... III-9
IV-1 Supporting Strategic Transportation Requirements
................................. IV-1
IV-2 Measures of Ship Capacity
....................................................................... IV-4
IV-3 Cargo Planning Factors
............................................................................ IV-5
IV-4 Sealift Planning Factors
........................................................................... IV-6

Table of Contents

vii

IV-5 Sealift Asset Availability Times
............................................................ IV-11
V-1 Seabasing
...............................................................................................
.... V-9
VI-1 Sealift Acquisition and Activation Plan
................................................... VI-2
VI-2 Ready Reserve Force Activation Process for Contingency
Deployments
of Common-User Ships
............................................................................ VI-5
VI-3 National Defense Reserve Fleet Activation/Ship
Requisition Process .... VI-6
VI-4 Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Activation
Process .................. VI-8

Table of Contents

viii JP 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

ix

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

COMMANDER’S OVERVIEW

• Provides an Overview Sealift Support to Joint Operations

• Explains Organization and Responsibilities for Sealift Support

• Covers Sealift Capabilities and Sealift Enhancement Features

• Explains Execution Planning, Basic Cargo Planning Concepts,
Protection

and Operations Security, and Automatic Planning Tools

• Describes the Employment of Sealift Forces, Including
Communications

Support, Logistic Support, and Support to Seabasing

• Gives Descriptions of Vessel Acquisition and Activation
Programs

• Explains the Mission and Command Structure of the Naval
Cooperation

and Guidance for Ships Organization

Sealift Support to Joint Operations Overview

The Strategic Mobility Triad

Successful response to regional
contingencies crisis response,
limited contingency operations,

and major operations and
campaigns depends on sufficient
strategic mobility assets in order
to deploy and sustain forces in an
operational area as long as
necessary to meet US military
objectives.

The strategic mobility triad is made up of air
mobility, sealift, and pre-positioning (PREPO).
Each element of the triad has its own unique
advantages and disadvantages. In general, air
mobility transports light, high priority forces and
supplies, including personnel and equipment
required to rapidly integrate units with PREPO
elements’ equipment and supplies. As an operation
progresses, sealift delivers the heavy units and their
support equipment as well as the vital sustainment
for deployed forces. In most cases, sealift accounts
for the majority of the total cargo delivered to an
operational area.

The Sealift Trident During large deployment operations, sealift
support
is typically conducted in three phases comprising
the sealift trident: prepositioning, surge, and
sustainment. All three portions of the sealift trident
are distinct entities, and removing any segment of
the trident denies joint force commanders the full
range of sealift support options.

Executive Summary

x JP 4-01.2

Organization and Responsibilities

Forces and Authority Department of Defense Directive (DODD)
5158.04,

United States Transportation Command, designates
Commander, United States Transportation
Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) as the
Department of Defense (DOD) single manager for
transportation, other than Service-organic or
theater-assigned transportation assets. In order to
carry out its Unified Command
Plan-assigned transportation responsibilities,
CDRUSTRANSCOM exercises combatant
command (command authority) over its Service
transportation component commands.

Service-Organic or Theater-
Assigned Transportation

As used in DODD 5158.04, United States
Transportation Command, Service-organic or
theater-assigned transportation includes sealift
assets. Various Service-organic or theater-assigned
transportation sealift assets are assigned to the
Department of the Army, the Department of the
Navy, the Department of the Air Force, and the
combatant command (command authority) of a
unified command (including the US

Special Operations Command) other than
CDRUSTRANSCOM.

Organizations and
Responsibilities

The Secretary of Defense (SecDef) is responsible
for transportation planning and operations with
DOD.

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(CJCS) reviews and evaluates movement
requirements and resources, apportions capability,
and allocates capability when required.

The Military Departments retain the responsibility
for organizing, training, equipping, and providing
the logistic support (including Service-organic
transportation) of their respective forces.

CDRUSTRANSCOM provides transportation and
common-user port management and terminal
services for DOD as well as non-DOD agencies
upon request.

Executive Summary

xi

Military Surface Deployment and Distribution
Command (SDDC) is a major subordinate
command of the United States Army Materiel

Command. As the Army component of United
States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM),
SDDC is the continental United States
transportation manager and provides worldwide
common-use ocean terminal services and traffic
management services to deploy, employ, sustain,
and redeploy US forces on a global basis.

Military Sealift Command (MSC) is a major
subordinate command of the United States Navy
Fleet Forces Command. As the Navy component of
USTRANSCOM, MSC provides common -user and
exclusive use sealift transportation services to
deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy US forces on
a global basis.

The Maritime Administration is the agency within
the Department of Transportation responsible for
assuring that US Merchant Marine shipping is
sufficient to meet the needs of national defense in
times of war or national emergency, and can also
support the domestic and foreign commerce of the
US.

The United States Coast Guard (USCG), an
agency of the Department of Homeland Security, is
a branch of the Armed Forces of the United States.
National defense, maritime safety, maritime law
enforcement, and maritime environmental
protection are the four major roles of the USCG.
During joint force deployment and redeployment
operations, the USCG can assist the naval coastal
warfare commander in providing protection of
military shipping at US seaports of embarkation
(SPOEs) and overseas ports of debarkation (PODs)
by conducting port security and harbor defense

operations.

Command and Control
Architecture

Command and control (C2) of sealift assets is
normally exercised in a variety of ways and is
largely dependent upon the sealift asset and the
program to which it belongs (PREPO, surge, or
sustainment). The exercise of C2 of sealift assets

Executive Summary

xii JP 4-01.2

generally applies to government-owned or
government leased vessels. However, where C2
does not apply, as in the case of commercial ships
(both US and foreign-flagged in liner service),
protocols are in place to ensure the safe passage of
vessels in high threat or contested waters.

Commander, Military Sealift Command exercises
operational control (OPCON) of MSC forces
through five geographically organized subordinate
commands. These commands include the
following: MSC, Atlantic; MSC, Pacific; MSC,
Europe and Africa; MSC, Far East; and MSC,
Central.

Sealift Capabilities

Sealift Forces Sealift forces are those militarily useful
merchant-
type ships available to DOD to execute the sealift
requirements of the Defense Transportation System
(DTS) across the range of military operations.
Called “common-user shipping,” these ships are
used in the transportation of cargoes for one or
more Services from one seaport to another or to a
location at sea in the operational area pending a
decision to move the cargo embarked ashore.

Ship Types Sealift shipping falls into three broad categories:
dry cargo ships or freighters, liquid cargo carriers or
tankers, and passenger ships. During joint
operations, dry cargo ships transport the equipment
and supplies and tankers carry the refined
petroleum, oils, and lubricants required to conduct
and sustain the operation. Passenger ships provide
troop carrying, noncombatant, or sealift medical
evacuation capability in support of the joint
operation.

Sealift Ship Programs The conventional sealift assets discussed
above
cannot meet all strategic sealift and sealift-related
requirements alone. To meet these requirements,
various sealift ship programs have been established.
Sealift ship programs are large medium-speed roll-
on/roll-off (RO/RO) ships, auxiliary crane ships,
fast sealift ships, aviation logistics support ships,

Executive Summary

xiii

hospital ships, Ready Reserve Force roll-on/roll-off
ships, and afloat pre-positioning force.

Sealift Enhancement Features Sealift enhancement features
(SEFs) consist of
special equipment and modifications that adapt
merchant-type dry cargo ships and tankers to
specific military missions. They are typically
installed on ships of the Ready Reserve Force or on
ships under MSC control. The SEFs fall into three
categories: productivity, operational, and
survivability enhancements.

Logistics Over-the-Shore

The Army and the Navy maintain
an organic capability to perform
logistics over-the-shore missions
in support of their respective
Service missions.

Strategic sealift also includes the requirement to
achieve an over-the-shore cargo discharge
capability that matches cargo deliveries in an
amphibious objective area or other operational area.
This is known as logistics over-the-shore (LOTS).
LOTS operations are conducted over unimproved
shorelines or in ports that are inaccessible to deep
draft shipping or that are damaged or otherwise

inadequate.

Planning

Operational considerations lead
to a great many combinations of
ships that may be considered for
prompt delivery of unit equipment
and other cargo to their
destinations.

The actual or contemplated use of sealift assets
leading up to and during a crisis or conflict involves
significant operational considerations, each of
which must be the subject of detailed planning. The
amount of time available significantly influences
the planning process. Supporting strategic
transportation requirements is a four-step
process. The four steps are:

stainment movement

requirement;

measure;

and,

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xiv JP 4-01.2

Execution Planning The execution planning period may be
weeks, days,
or even hours in length depending on the political
situation and scenario. During this period,
USTRANSCOM and its Navy and Army
component commands, MSC and SDDC, identify
the sealift forces required for execution of the
operation order (OPORD) and tentatively schedule
the sealift to move the earliest deploying units. In
general, USTRANSCOM and its component
commands are responsible for ensuring that
adequate transportation is available to support the
OPORD when executed, developing feasible
transportation schedules, establishing initial and
follow-on requirements for sealift capability,
resolving transportation shortfalls, adjudicating
transportation allocation conflicts with the Joint
Transportation Board, and publishing transportation
coordinating instructions.

Sealift Asset Planning Shipping is divided into two broad
categories:
common-user and withhold. Common-user assets
are available for joint support of all Services’
movement requirements. Withhold vessels are
reserved for specific purposes and not generally
available to transport joint movement requirements.

Planning for ships designated as maritime PREPO
force and Navy Combat Logistics Force, as well as
other sealift planning factors, is covered in the Joint
Strategic Capabilities Plan Mobility Supplement.

Basic Cargo Planning Concepts Before proceeding with sealift
planning, the joint
planner must understand several basic concepts of
cargo handling and stowage. These are: different
measures of ship capacity, broken stowage, stowage
factor or cargo density, and units of cargo
measurement.

Protection and Operations
Security

MSC ships have virtually no self-protection
capability, particularly against chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards. The
presence of CBRN contamination may preclude
transit by ships. Further, unprotected ships are
faced with the risk of loss of ship, cargo, and
personnel while operating in any area where a
credible military, terrorist, or piracy threat exists.
Therefore, military forces are assigned either to

Executive Summary

xv

eliminate the threat so ships can transit unopposed
at any time, or to provide direct protection, to

include ship augmentation, during transits of threat
environments.

Environmental Considerations Sealift support operations should
be planned and
conducted with appropriate consideration of their
effect on the environment in accordance with
applicable US and host nation agreements,
environmental laws, policies, and regulations.

Automated Planning Tools Transportation Coordinator’s
Automated
Information for Movement System is an
automated information system that supports day-to-
day operations for unit movement officers,
movement controllers, staffs from battalion/separate
company to theater level, mode managers, and
installation transportation offices.

Joint Flow and Analysis System for
Transportation is a transportation feasibility
evaluation tool capable of scheduling transportation
assets against a time-phased force and deployment
data. This allows planners to download specific
movement requirements from Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and
identify specific problem areas in meeting latest
arrival dates at the PODs.

Integrated Computerized Deployment System is
an automated information system designed to
support cargo management, ship load planning, and
stowage at common-user ocean terminals.

Port Simulation Model (PORTSIM) is a time-
stepped, discrete simulation of SPOE and seaport of
debarkation events during a force deployment.
PORTSIM can determine a port’s reception,
staging, clearance, and throughput capabilities.

Global Air Transportation Execution System is a
single automated system serving management of
both aerial port and surface port operations for
DOD transportation, worldwide.

Executive Summary

xvi JP 4-01.2

Cargo Movement Operations System is a joint
system that integrates computer hardware, software,
and communications to effectively plan, document,
and manage outbound and inbound cargo and
passengers, and to plan, schedule, and monitor the
execution of transportation activities in support of
deployment and reception of forces.

Transition from Peace to Conflict
to Stability Operations

The transition from peace to conflict represents a
critical period for sealift. The transition period
involves high risk due to misperceptions about the
speed with which the DTS in general, and sealift in
particular, can transition from a relatively small

peacetime force into a major military force. The
first and most obvious change in sealift during
transition is that the number of ships under
USTRANSCOM and MSC control will rapidly and
substantially increase. The transition from conflict
to stability operations can be critical to the overall
success of an operation. As operations shift from
sustained combat operations to stability operations,
civil-military operations will facilitate humanitarian
relief, civil order, and restoration of public services.

Employment of Sealift Forces

Employment Planning for the employment of sealift begins in
the
planning phase of the joint deployment process and
is in JOPES. Employment continues until the
operation is terminated by proper authority or is
completed, including redeployment of forces and
materiel and retrograde of equipment.

Execution The execution phase starts with the President and
SecDef decision to exercise the military option for
resolution of the crisis. Acting on the authority and
direction of the SecDef, the CJCS issues an execute
order that directs the supported combatant
commander (CCDR) to carry out the OPORD.
Throughout the execution of an OPORD,
USTRANSCOM is responsible for coordinating
with the supported CCDR for validating
transportation requirements and developing,
monitoring, and adjusting transportation
schedules.

Executive Summary

xvii

Communications System Support The inherent worldwide
dispersal of sealift forces
mandates that sealift C2 systems be fully
interoperable with the Global Command and
Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) family of
systems. GCCS-J is built such that interoperability
with existing systems can be attained. GCCS-J
provides the means for disseminating and sharing
the information necessary in order to effectively
plan, deploy, sustain, redeploy, and employ sealift
forces. The sealift communications system, in its
simplest form, must enable the sealift operational
commander to monitor the situation, conduct
assessments, develop estimates, plans, and
schedules, issue orders and directives, and report
status to higher authority.

Logistic Support In general, merchant ships will be logistically
supported by their owner and/or operators
within the terms of their charters or other
agreements when the ships are using commercial
seaports for loading and discharge of military cargo.
The exception to this is that merchant ships under
MSC OPCON are generally supplied with fuel
from military sources. This may take the form of
direct payment for fuel from commercial sources or
actual transfer of military fuels to merchant ships.

Intermodal Operations Intermodal operations provide flexibility
by
incorporating various combinations of sealift, airlift,
rail, and trucking operations to facilitate rapid,
efficient cargo movement. In the context of
commercial shipping, “intermodal” operations or
systems refer primarily to the efficient interchange
of standardized shipping containers between ocean
and land carriers, sophisticated systems of container
handling and storage in marine terminals, or
container freight stations and computerized tracking
of shipments.

Amphibious/Expeditionary
Operations

Navy elements in an amphibious task force include
various types and classes of ships to include
combatant and strategic sealift and support units
from various warfare specialties.

Support to Seabasing, Military
Engagement and Security

Seabasing is the deployment, assembly, command,
projection, reconstitution, and reemployment of

Executive Summary

xviii JP 4-01.2

Cooperation Activities, and
Humanitarian Assistance

joint power from the sea without reliance on land
bases within the operational area. Currently, sealift
support to the sea base is normally accomplished
indirectly by delivery of supplies to an intermediate
staging base. Sealift plays an essential role in
developing capabilities, interoperability, and
cooperation among US allies and coalition partners.
In many cases, the value of sealift support extends
well beyond strictly military considerations. In
providing humanitarian and civic assistance, these
ships are often able to operate where combatants or
support vessels would not be permitted for political
reasons. Frequently, sealift support to humanitarian
assistance plays an important, if not the primary
role in preserving life in the immediate aftermath of
a natural or man-made disaster.

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

In maritime terminology, leasing
agreements are known as
charters.

The vast majority of vessels required to support
military operations are not under DOD control
during peacetime (i.e., nonorganic). To acquire
these ships, some type of lease agreements or
operating agreements must be executed between
DOD and the owning and controlling
organizations (either commercial firms or US and

allied government agencies). Although their terms
and conditions differ widely, charters are of three
basic types: bareboat, voyage, and time.

Government-Owned/Controlled
Assets

Government-owned shipping (primarily RO/RO) is
the most readily available source for quickly
deploying large quantities of unit equipment.
However, the number of ships in this category is
limited, and they would primarily support the very
early stages of a major military deployment.

Commercial Controlled Assets Commercial ships will likely be
required to fill
sealift requirements in major crisis situations
requiring large amounts of logistics support. DOD
can obtain commercial shipping from the following
sources: US flag commercial charters and liner
service; foreign owned charters and liner service
ships, used in accordance with existing laws and
policies; ships/capacity committed to Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement/voluntary tanker

Executive Summary

xix

agreement; US-owned ships, registered under
certain flags, known as the effective US controlled
fleet; and militarily useful US flag ships which are

subject to requisitioning.

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Ships

Naval cooperation and guidance
for shipping provides the
operational interface between the
Navy and commercial shipping.

In periods of crisis, conflict, national emergency, or
war, naval authorities may direct the movement of
merchant ships (including routing and diversion) so
that they may be better protected from hostilities
and not interfere with possible active naval, joint, or
combined military operations. The naval
cooperation and guidance for shipping (NCAGS)
organization is the principal US resource to carry
out this function. The purpose of NCAGS is to
ensure the efficient management and safe passage
of merchant ships that are not performing strategic
sealift functions.

Organization Commander, US Fleet Forces, is responsible for
overall program management and control of assets
NCAGS. There are currently four units assigned to
the NCAGS organization. Each unit is composed of
48 personnel possessing a variety of operational
warfare skills as well as specialized skills relating to
the civil maritime industry. Each unit provides the
capabilities to: liaise with the civil maritime
industry and the operational commander; deploy
shipping coordination teams (SCTs) ashore or
afloat; and establish or augment shipping

coordination centers (SCCs) with skilled personnel.

Mission and Capabilities The NCAGS mission is to assist the
geographic
combatant commander/operational commander in
managing risk by providing situational awareness
and near real-time clarity of the merchant shipping
picture to help ensure the safe passage of merchant
shipping and the safety of naval vessels or the
nation in a crisis contingency, which may include
combat operations, piracy, or foreign humanitarian
assistance. The NCAGS organization provides the
operational commander with the following
capabilities: liaison officers, SCTs, and SCCs.

Executive Summary

xx JP 4-01.2

Implementing Naval Cooperation
and Guidance for Shipping
Measures for Commercial
Shipping

While many NCAGS techniques and procedures are
employed to support the military commander, the
decision to implement NCAGS measures having a
direct impact on commercial shipping requires the
approval of SecDef. The Chief of Naval
Operations, as the NCAGS organization program
sponsor, with the support of US Fleet Forces

Command maintains liaison with the national
shipping authority and other civilian authorities to
coordinate the exchange of information concerning
implementation of NCAGS measures.

CONCLUSION

This publication provides doctrine for sealift in
support of joint operations.

I-1

CHAPTER I
OVERVIEW

1. General

This joint publication (JP) identifies, describes, and defines the
sealift forces;
organization for command and control (C2) of sealift forces;
procedures and responsibilities
for the generation of sealift force assets and requirements; and
doctrine for sealift planning,
employment, and transition across the range of military
operations. Successful response to
regional contingencies crisis response, limited contingency
operations, and major
operations and campaigns depends on sufficient strategic
mobility assets in order to

deploy and sustain forces in an operational area as long as
necessary to meet US military
objectives.

2. The Strategic Mobility Triad

a. The strategic mobility triad of air mobility, sealift, and pre-
positioning (PREPO) is
shown in Figure I-1. Each element of the triad has its own
unique advantages and

“Strategic sealift is the maritime bridge to ensure that heavy
ground forces are
delivered and that all land-based forces are supported and
resupplied in a conflict.”

Secretary of the Navy John Dalton 1994

Figure I-1. Strategic Mobility Triad

Strategic Mobility Triad

Force
Protection

SealiftAir Mobility

Pre-Positioning
(Afloat and Ashore)

Chapter I

I-2 JP 4-01.2

disadvantages, as shown in Figure I-2. In general, air mobility
transports light, high priority
forces and supplies, including personnel and equipment required
to rapidly integrate units

Figure I-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of the
Strategic Mobility Triad

Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements
of the Strategic Mobility Triad

Air Mobility

Pre-Positioning (Ashore)

Pre-Positioning (Afloat)

Sealift

Advantages Disadvantages

Rapid deployment of combat and
supporting units
Flexibility of employment
Direct delivery capability to the
warfighter, i.e., "factory to foxhole"
without transload requirements

Rapid deployment of heavy combat and
supporting units
Reduces movements required for
deployment and redeployment
Reduces deployment timeline

Rapid deployment of heavy combat and
supporting units
Reduces movements required for
deployment and redeployment
Flexibility of employment
Reduces deployment timeline

Sustained delivery of heavy combat and
supporting units and their sustainment
Flexibility of employment

Limited delivery capacity
Air lane dependent
May require overflight rights
Dependent on availability and
suitability of airfields
Requires cooperation of foreign
governments

Lacks flexibility
Airlift dependent
Fixed sites may be easily targeted for
attack
Requires cooperation of foreign
governments
Finite capability

Dependent upon suitability of port
facilities and debarkation locations
Dependent upon open sea lines of
communications
Airlift dependent
Anchorages subject to attack

Seaport dependent (may be mitigated

via Service/joint logistics over-the-
shore operations)
Speed
Dependent upon open sea lines of
communications

Overview

I-3

with PREPO elements’ equipment and supplies. As an
operation progresses, sealift delivers
the heavy units and their support equipment as well as the vital
sustainment for deployed
forces.

b. In most cases, sealift accounts for the majority of the total
cargo delivered to an
operational area. To meet these requirements, sealift forces are
employed in the three phases
of strategic mobility, which are: PREPO, deployment (or surge),
and sustainment. Similarly,
sealift generally accounts for the majority of the cargo moved
during redeployment to the
home and/or demobilization stations. The relationship of each
phase to the others in terms of
time and quantities of material delivered is shown in Figure I-3.

3. The Sealift Trident

During large deployment operations, sealift support is typically
conducted in three
phases comprising the sealift trident as depicted in Figure I-4.

All three portions of the
sealift trident are distinct entities, and removing any segment of
the trident denies joint force
commanders (JFCs) the full range of sealift support options.
Organic and nonorganic are the
two primary categories of sealift shipping available to support
these three phases. Organic
vessels are owned by the United States Government (USG) or
under long-term charter
(lease) to a government entity. Nonorganic shipping includes
all commercial vessels not

Figure I-3. Phases of Strategic Mobility

C-Day unnamed day on which a
deployment operation
begins

PREPO pre-positioned equipment

Legend

Phases of Strategic Mobility

D
ai

ly
T

on
na

ge

R
eq

ui
re

d

PRE-
DEPLOYMENT
(PREPO)

DEPLOYMENT
(SURGE)

SUSTAINMENT REDEPLOYMENT

PREPO/deployment unit equipment

sustainment unit equipment and supplies
redeployment unit equipment and supplies

C-DAY

Chapter I

I-4 JP 4-01.2

owned or leased by the USG, to include US-flagged, US owned
but foreign-flagged
(effective US control), and foreign-owned and -flagged.

a. PREPO afloat is made up of ships from the afloat pre-

positioning force (APF) of
the Military Sealift Command (MSC). APF ships are discussed
in greater detail in
Chapter III, “Sealift Capabilities.” The flexibility inherent in
the APF provides the
combatant commanders (CCDRs) various force options to use
when developing courses of
action (COAs) to accomplish assigned tasks. While pre-
positioned equipment and supplies
aboard APF shipping are tailored to support the joint forces’
combat operations, these same
assets can be used to support other types of joint military
operations. On a limited basis,
selected capabilities—such as production, storage, and
distribution of potable water; rations;
shelter; bulk fuel operations; engineer support; and
transportation services—may be provided
to host nation (HN), other government departments and
agencies, or international
organizations to support foreign humanitarian assistance or
disaster relief operations. This
occurred during the Indonesian tsunami relief efforts in 2004-
2005, the Russia-Georgia
conflict in 2008, and the earthquake relief efforts in Haiti in
2010. When providing support

Figure I-4. The Sealift Trident

The Sealift Trident

Sealift Support Options

Pre-Positioning
APS/MPS/

NDAF

Surge
MSC-CSS/

MARAD RRF

Sustainment
US Merchant Fleet

APS afloat pre-positioning ship
MARAD RRF Maritime Administration Ready

Reserve Force
MPS maritime pre-positioning ship

MSC-CSS Military Sealift Command-
Controlled Surge Sealift

NDAF Navy, Defense Logistics Agency,
Air Force

Legend

Crisis
Area

Overview

I-5

to foreign nations, it is important to comply with applicable
laws, regulations, and reporting
procedures. Elements of the APF may be temporarily moved to

take up position close to a
potential employment area, either to signal national resolve
during an evolving crisis or
enhance the timely delivery of supplies and equipment upon the
decision to deploy a decisive
force.

b. “Surge” includes all organic ships not assigned to PREPO,
but may also
include nonorganic ships if readily available. Subcategories of
surge sealift include the
MSC-controlled fleet as well as the Maritime Administration
Ready Reserve Force
(MARAD RRF). The Commander, United States Transportation
Command
(CDRUSTRANSCOM) exercises combatant command (command
authority) (COCOM) of
the surge sealift fleet. The MSC-controlled fleet are organic
(US owned and long-term
leased) ships, primarily large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off
(LMSR) types, which operate
under MSC administrative control (ADCON) and operational
control (OPCON). MSC-
controlled ships which are government-owned are typically
identified by distinctive blue and
gold funnel bands. Maritime Administration (MARAD)
exercises ADCON of ships in the
MARAD RRF, which are a mix of roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO)
vessels, fast sealift ships (FSSs),
and special mission ships. When MARAD RRF shipping is
activated, Commander, Military
Sealift Command (COMSC), exercises OPCON. MARAD RRF
vessels are typically
identified by distinctive red, white, and blue funnel bands.
Surge shipping types are
discussed in detail in Chapter VI, “Vessel Acquisition and

Activation Programs.” A robust
and responsive surge fleet is a critical element of US national
security strategy. The ability
to move forces and military equipment enables the US to defend
and promote vital interests
anywhere in the world. For surge sealift, MSC first looks to the
US market and then the
foreign market to charter ships as mandated by law. If no
suitable ships are available,
government-owned ships may be activated. Surge shipping
delivers the heavy combat power
and accompanying supplies in order to facilitate the worldwide
deployment of predominantly
continental United States (CONUS)-based forces.

c. Sustainment refers to nonorganic shipping provided by the
US merchant fleet, mostly
containerships, to deliver large quantities of resupply and
ammunition to forward-deployed
forces augmented as necessary by the government controlled
assets. Sustainment shipping
considerations are discussed in greater detail in Chapter V,
“Employment of Sealift Forces.”

d. Finally, although not one of the sealift options specifically,
JFCs need to carefully
consider and plan for the eventual transition from conflict to
stability/post-conflict. Sealift
will play an important role in supporting
redeployment/retrograde of materials back to the
US for reconstitution or to another theater for subsequent
operations. The majority of
equipment moved during redeployment will be via the US
merchant fleet.

Chapter I

I-6 JP 4-01.2

While most troops flew to the war [Operation IRAQI
FREEDOM], 91 percent
of deployment cargo traveled by sea. This figure compares
favorably with
the first Gulf War, when sealift accounted for 88 percent of
total dry cargo.
Between 1 January and 1 May 2003, 118 ships completed 141
downloads,
delivering 811,169 short tons/16,342,573 square feet of unit
cargo.

Of the 118 ships used, 36 belonged to the Military Sealift
Command (MSC),
31 to the Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force
(MARAD RRF), 12
were US flag commercial ships, and 39 were foreign flag
commercial
vessels. The majority of vessels (99) were roll-on/roll-off
(RO/RO) ships, the
best for carrying most kinds of equipment because of their large
size, ease
of loading and unloading, and good speed. Thirty-five of these
came from
MSC, 30 from the MARAD RRF, and 34 from the commercial
sector (7 US flag
and 27 foreign flag). Thanks to adequate volunteerism by
commercial US
flag carriers, USTRANSCOM [United States Transportation
Command] did
not activate any ships under the Voluntary Intermodal Sealift

Agreement
[VISA]. MSC chartered 11 VISA ships, and SDDC [Military
Surface
Deployment and Distribution Command] used 37 in liner
service.

Various Sources

II-1

CHAPTER II
ORGANIZATION AND RESPONSIBILITIES

1. General

The national security strategy depends heavily on our ability to
transport personnel,
equipment, and supplies worldwide. To assist Department of
Defense’s (DOD’s) ability to
carry out its transportation missions, CDRUSTRANSCOM
provides common-user air,
land (CONUS only), and sea transportation and common-user
port management and
terminal services to the DOD.

2. Forces and Authority

a. Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5158.04, United
States Transportation
Command, designates CDRUSTRANSCOM as t he DOD single
manager for
transportation, other than Service-organic or theater-assigned
transportation assets. In

order to carry out its Unified Command Plan-assigned
transportation responsibilities,
CDRUSTRANSCOM exercises COCOM over its Service
transportation component
commands (TCCs). The authority and duty to organize, train,
and equip forces for
assignment to CDRUSTRANSCOM and the associated
programming and budgeting
function remain with the Secretaries of the Military
Departments.

For additional information, see DODD 5158.04, United States
Transportation Command.

b. United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)
has the following
responsibilities and authorities:

(1) DOD single manager for transportation (other than Service-
organic, Service-
controlled, or theater assigned assets) responsible for providing
common-user and
commercial air, land, and sea transportation, terminal
management, and aerial refueling to
support the global deployment, employment, sustainment, and
redeployment of US forces.

(2) DOD single manager for patient movement, providing DOD
global patient
movement, through the Defense Transportation System (DTS),
in coordination with the
geographic combatant commanders (GCCs).

(3) Mobility joint force provider responsible for identifying
and recommending
global joint sourcing solutions to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff (CJCS).

(4) Distribution process owner (DPO) responsible for:

“We have at this moment to distinguish carefully between
running an industry or a
profession, and winning the war.”

Winston Churchill
Memorandum for First Sea Lord, 1939

Chapter II

II-2 JP 4-01.2

(a) Coordinating and overseeing the DOD distribution system
to provide
interoperability, synchronization, and alignment of DOD-wide,
end-to-end distribution.

(b) Developing and implementing process improvements that
enhance the
Defense Logistics and Global Supply Chain Management
System.

For additional information on the roles and responsibilities of
the DPO, see DOD
Instruction 5158.06, Distribution Process Owner.

(5) Responsible for synchronizing planning for global
distribution operations in
coordination with other combatant commands (CCMDs), the
Services, and as directed,
appropriate agencies.

(6) With respect to sealift, CDRUSTRANSCOM is delegated
authority to procure
commercial transportation services and, with the approval of the
Secretary of Defense
(SecDef), to activate the MARAD RRF and the Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement
(VISA). Additionally, CDRUSTRANSCOM shall control the
transportation accounts of the
Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF).

3. Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation

As used in DODD 5158.04, United States Transportation
Command, Service-organic or
theater-assigned transportation includes sealift assets that are
shown in Figure II-1.

4. Organizations and Responsibilities

a. Traffic management and transportation single manager
responsibilities must be
aligned to achieve optimum responsiveness, effectiveness, and
economy. Specific sealift
responsibilities follow.

b. Secretary of Defense. SecDef is responsible for
transportation planning and
operations with DOD. Transportation-specific responsibilities
include establishing and
overseeing implementation of overall policy for effective and
efficient use of DOD and
commercial transportation resources, and establishing overall
policy guidance governing the
transportation account of the TWCF.

c. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The CJCS reviews
and evaluates movement
requirements and resources, apportions capability, and allocates
capability when required.
CJCS:

(1) Establishes procedures, in coordination with the Assistant
Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense (Transportation Policy), the Secretaries of
the Military Departments,
and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), for the submission of
movement requirements by
DOD user components to USTRANSCOM and for the
submission of evaluated requirements
and capabilities by USTRANSCOM and its component
commands.

(2) Prescribes a movement priority system in agreement with
uniform materiel
movement and issue priority system to meet the requirements of
the supported CCDRs.

Organization and Responsibilities

II-3

(3) Monitors the capabilities of USTRANSCOM common-user
transportation
resources to provide air mobility, sealift, CONUS land
transportation, common-user ocean
terminal service, and aerial port service based upon the
requirements of DOD components.

(4) Assigns movement priorities in support of DOD

components based upon
capabilities reported by USTRANSCOM.

(5) The current Global Force Management Implementation
Guidance (GFMIG)
apportions forces for planning.

(6) Adjudicates competing lift requirements as requested by
USTRANSCOM or
the CJCS Joint Transportation Board (JTB).

Figure II-1. Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned
Transportation Sealift Assets

Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned
Transportation Sealift Assets

Assigned to the Department of the Army:

Army afloat pre-positioning (PREPO) ships (prior to the initial
discharge
of cargo);

Army watercraft to include, but not limited to, self-sustaining
and self-
deployable logistic support vessels, Landing Craft Utility 2000,
and
oceangoing 128 foot large tug.

Assigned to the Department of the Navy as:

The special mission support force of missile range
instrumentation ships,
ocean survey ships, cable ships, oceanographic research ships,
acoustic

research ships, and naval test support ships;

The naval fleet auxiliary force of fleet ammunition ships,
submarine
surveillance ships, dry cargo, fast combat stores ships, fleet
ocean tugs,
ballistic missile submarine support ships, and fleet oilers;

Hospital ships;

Marine Corps intermediate maintenance activity ships; or

Maritime PREPO ships (prior to initial cargo offload and if
released by the
combatant commander to common user status).

Assigned to the Department of the Air Force as Air Force afloat
PREPO ships
(prior to the initial discharge of cargo); or

Assigned to the combatant command (command authority) of a
unified command
(including the US Special Operations Command) other than
Commander, US
Transportation Command.

Chapter II

II-4 JP 4-01.2

(7) Acts on the recommendations of the CJCS JTB with respect
to the
establishment of priorities and allocations for the use of air
mobility, sealift, and surface

transportation capability.

d. The Military Departments retain the responsibility for
organizing, training,
equipping, and providing the logistic support (including
Service-organic transportation) of
their respective forces. In this role, the United States Army
(USA), United States Navy
(USN), United States Air Force (USAF), United States Marine
Corps (USMC), United States
Coast Guard (USCG), DLA, and other DOD agencies are all
generically referred to as
“shipper services.” Each Service is responsible for establishing
transportation policy for the
movement of equipment and supplies funded by the applicable
shipper service and for
administrative support and performance of transportation
operations assigned by CCDRs at
either their local shipping installations or throughout the
theater. Each Service is also
responsible for maintaining trained personnel who can
participate in joint planning and
provide Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
(JOPES) inputs. Specifically, with
respect to sealift, the Secretaries of the Military Departments
are responsible as follows:

(1) The Secretary of the Army establishes, organizes, trains,
and equips Military
Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC) as a
jointly staffed major
command of the USN for assignment to CDRUSTRANSCOM
and establishes and controls
installation and port activities as necessary for the operation
and administration of SDDC.
Other tasks include:

(a) Providing acquisition authority to SDDC by designating
Commander,
SDDC as Head of Contracting Activity for the Army to support
CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(b) Providing litigation and legal support for actions arising
from contracts
issued or administered by SDDC in support of
CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(c) Organizes, trains, and equips forces for theater opening,
port opening, and
terminal operations missions.

(d) Assignment of Service-unique missions, to include logistics
over the shore,
movement and maneuver, intratheater distribution, port denial
mitigation, and C2 to Army
organizations.

(e) Supports CCDR requirements through theater assignment of
organizations
and equipment.

(2) The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV) establishes,
organizes, trains, and
equips MSC as a jointly staffed major command of the USN for
assignment to
CDRUSTRANSCOM. SECNAV obtains CDRUSTRANSCOM
approval on organizational
changes within MSC that may impact the ability of
CDRUSTRANSCOM to carry out
assigned responsibilities. In addition, SECNAV coordinates
with CDRUSTRANSCOM on
the assignment of new missions to MSC to ensure MSC is able

to meet its assigned
USTRANSCOM functions without degradation. Other tasks
include:

Organization and Responsibilities

II-5

(a) Coordinating Navy requirements for shipping support to be
drawn from the
MARAD RRF with CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(b) Providing acquisition authority to MSC by designating
COMSC as Head of
Contracting Activity for the Navy to support
CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(c) Providing litigation and legal support for actions arising
from contracts
issued by MSC in support of CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(d) Assigning to MSC Service-unique missions or assets.

e. Commander, US Transportation Command. Specific
CDRUSTRANSCOM
responsibilities with respect to sealift are shown in Figure II-2.
As the focal point for
transportation for DOD, the CDRUSTRANSCOM:

(1) Provides transportation and common-user port management
and terminal
services for DOD as well as non-DOD agencies upon request.

(2) Exercises COCOM of all assigned forces (including

Reserve Component forces
if mobilized or ordered to active duty for other than training) as
authorized by the Forces for
Unified Commands memorandum. (Air Mobility Command and
SDDC reservists, when
activated fall under CDRUSTRANSCOM’s COCOM.)

(3) Exercises responsibility for global air, land, and sea
transportation planning.

(a) Providing CCDRs with the coordinated transportation
planning expertise
required during the deliberate planning process. This includes
reviewing the Joint Strategic
Capabilities Plan (JSCP) tasking, analyzing supported CCDR
requirements registered in
JOPES (force and non-unit cargo and/or personnel) for
transportation feasibility, and
advising the supported CCDR of changes required to produce a
force and sustainable
deployment concept. Upon approval of the supported CCDR’s
operation plan (OPLAN),
support the plan review and analysis as required.

(b) Providing deployment estimates and total lift assets
availability to the
President, SecDef, and supported CCDRs for development of
alternative COAs and optimal
flow of forces during crisis action planning.
CDRUSTRANSCOM will also advise the
supported CCDRs and the CJCS concerning use of, or changes
to, lift capabilities.

(c) Synchronizing planning for global distribution operations in
coordination
with other CCMDs, the Services, and as directed appropriate

USG departments and agencies.

(4) Acts as DOD focal point for items in the transportation
system.

(5) Exercises responsibility for intertheater (non-theater
assigned) aeromedical
evacuation.

(6) Oversees the responsibilities listed below:

Chapter II

II-6 JP 4-01.2

Figure II-2. Responsibilities of the Commander, United States
Transportation Command

Responsibilities of the Commander,
United States Transportation Command

Exercise combatant command (command authority) of sealift
forces, to include
organizing and employing forces to carry out missions in
support of other unified
commands.

Coordinate and implement Transportation Working Capital Fund
operational
procedures in association with comptrollers of Military
Departments and Office of
the Secretary of Defense; provide guidance for standardization

of rates,
regulations, operational policies, and procedures.

Apply assigned/allocated strategic sealift resources as directed
by the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensuring effective use.

Procure commercial transportation services (including lease of
transportation
assets) in accordance with applicable laws as necessary to
conduct the US
Transportation Command mission.

Establish and maintain relationship between the Department of
Defense and the
commercial transportation industry to develop concepts,
requirements, and
procedures for the Sealift Readiness Program.

With the approval of the Secretary of Defense, activate strategic
sealift
reserve/mobilization programs including the Maritime
Administration Ready
Reserve Force, Sealift Readiness Program, Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift
Agreement, and the Volunteer Tanker Agreement.

Coordinate and provide oversight for the joint logistics-over-
the-shore program.

Coordinate with the Maritime Administration and provide
guidance on
requirements issues as necessary.

In coordination with other agencies, provide direction and
oversight for all matters

dealing with the transportation of hazardous material.

Have the authority to provide management support for Service-
organic or theater-
assigned transportation assets as requested by the Secretaries of
the Military
Departments and the commanders of unified commands at the
direction of the
Secretary of Defense or when the Commander, US
Transportation Command
(CDRUSTRANSCOM) and the Service Secretary or commander
concerned so
agree.

Make recommendations to the Service Chiefs via the Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff concerning the capability, characteristics, design, and
other requirements
for mobility assets needed for CDRUSTRANSCOM's mission.

Designate continental United States (CONUS) seaports of
embarkation and
debarkation for deploying/redeploying forces and sustainment
during planning
and execution; make recommendations to the geographic
combatant
commanders for designation of seaports outside CONUS that
might be used in
military operations.

Organization and Responsibilities

II-7

(a) During deployment, assisting the supported CCDRs in route
validated
movement requirements and scheduling for maximum support.
During sustainment and
redeployment, the CDRUSTRANSCOM will also consider
efficient use of intertheater lift
resources. The CDRUSTRANSCOM assists the CJCS by
recommending reallocation of
intertheater assets to optimize their use and support plan
execution during deployment,
employment, reconstitution, redeployment, and sustainment.
The CDRUSTRANSCOM
refers problems with recommended COAs to the CJCS JTB for
resolution or adjudication if a
balance of transportation requirements and capabilities cannot
be maintained.

(b) As Executive Agent for DOD Customs and Border
Clearance Program,
interface with the US Customs and Border Protection Service,
US Department of Homeland
Security, US Department of Agriculture, Animal and Plant
Health Inspection Service, and
state customs and agriculture officials for customs and
agriculture inspections of DOD
personnel, material, and equipment returning to the US.

(c) Developing policies and procedural guidance through the
CCDRs, in
collaboration with the DOD components, USG border clearance
activities, and foreign
governments, to effectively and uniformly implement the DOD
Military Customs and Border
Clearance Program.

(d) Developing and maintaining integrated in-transit visibility

(ITV) capability
for DOD. The Integrated Data Environment/Global
Transportation Network Convergence
(IGC) provides that capability and is the designated ITV system
for DOD. IGC also
provides C2 functionality for USTRANSCOM and is integrated
into the Global Command
and Control System-Joint (GCCS-J) family of systems and the
Global Combat and Support
System-Joint.

For additional information on GCCS-J, refer to JP 6-0, Joint
Communications System.

f. Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command.
SDDC is a major
subordinate command of the USA Materiel Command. As the
Army component of
USTRANSCOM, SDDC is the CONUS transportation manager
and provides worldwide
common-use ocean terminal services and traffic management
services to deploy, employ,
sustain, and redeploy US forces on a global basis. These
services also include the use of
common-user sealift through the VISA program. SDDC also
conducts transportation
engineering to ensure deployability and feasibility of present
and future deployment assets.
Additionally, SDDC, acting on behalf of USTRANSCOM, is the
single port manager for all
common-user seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) and seaports of
debarkation (SPODs). When
designated, SDDC serves as the port operator (e.g., using
stevedoring services contracts of
host-nation support [HNS]). In addition to these
responsibilities, SDDC serves as DOD’s

proponent for container management and USTRANSCOM’s
Army force provider for joint
task force-port opening (JTF-PO). Surface Deployment and
Distribution Command
Transportation Engineering Agency (SDDCTEA) provides
policy guidance, deployment
engineering, research, and analytical expertise to improve the
deployability of the Armed
Forces of the United States. SDDCTEA executes surface
transportation engineering policy
matters assigned by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on
behalf of USTRANSCOM and
SDDC Headquarters (HQ). SDDCTEA also provides a focal
point for developing DTS-

Chapter II

II-8 JP 4-01.2

related modeling and simulation tools. Sealift-related
responsibilities, subject to the
direction and control of USTRANSCOM, are as follows:

(1) Providing deliberate and crisis action planning support to
CDRUSTRANSCOM
to ensure effective use of CONUS common-user ocean terminals
and other CONUS
transportation assets.

(2) Providing traffic management, CONUS surface
transportation, and CONUS
common-user ocean terminal support to supported CCDRs.

(3) Negotiating ocean and intermodal rates and procuring cargo

space on ships and
related services to meet DOD ocean and intermodal
transportation requirements.

(4) Recommending diversions of cargo and passengers within
DTS.

(5) Evaluating cargo throughput capability of CONUS
common-user ocean
terminals to be used for unit deployment.

(6) Providing those functions necessary to control the strategic
flow of cargo and
information between SPOE and hand-off to the GCC. Assigning
workloads to the port
operator based on the CCDR’s priorities. Contracting for port
services and documentation.

(7) Providing freight traffic management services and obtaining
freight
transportation rates and services from commercial for hire
transportation companies,
including inland waterway and coastal carriers. Providing
routing, rates, and performance
quality control.

(8) Providing ocean cargo booking and contract administrative
services for sealift
cargo for DOD components.

(9) Providing through SDDCTEA, deployment engineering,
research, and
analytical expertise to improve the deployability of the Armed
Forces of the United States.
SDDCTEA executes surface transportation engineering policy
matters assigned by the Office

of the Secretary of Defense on behalf of USTRANSCOM and
SDDC HQ. They also provide
a focal point for developing DTS related modeling and
simulation tools.

(10) Supporting the USTRANSCOM Fusion Center to synergize
surface
requirement planning and execution.

(11) Providing trained and ready forces in support of JTF-PO.

g. Military Sealift Command. MSC is a major subordinate
command of the USN
Fleet Forces Command. As the Navy component of
USTRANSCOM, MSC provides
common-user and exclusive use sealift transportation services to
deploy, employ, sustain,
and redeploy US forces on a global basis. MSC consists of the
HQ, area commands, field
offices, operational commands, and liaison offices. MSC
functions include operating and
maintaining MSC forces as directed and serving as the Navy
administrative

Organization and Responsibilities

II-9

commander for MSC forces. MSC-specific sealift tasks, subject
to the direction and
control of USTRANSCOM, are as follows:

(1) Providing deliberate and crisis action planning support to
USTRANSCOM

ensuring effective use and control of common-user sealift.

(2) Providing organic and leased ocean transportation and
support services to DOD
components as required by CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(3) Ensuring effective use and control of government- and
commercial-owned
ocean transportation services for DOD.

(4) Informing CDRUSTRANSCOM and SDDC as to the
availability of
commercial and MSC-controlled lift capability.

(5) Recommending to CDRUSTRANSCOM activation of the
MARAD RRF ships
and activation of VISA.

(6) On behalf of CDRUSTRANSCOM, administering and
executing the VISA,
exercising operational oversight of the MARAD RRF in concert
with MARAD and over
ships requisitioned, and exercising mission control of those
forces when transferred to
CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(7) Preparing forecasts of ocean and maritime common-user
transportation services
based on DOD component requirements.

(8) Acting as CDRUSTRANSCOM scheduling authority for
sealift support of
DOD requirements.

(9) Coordinating MSC operations with appropriate port
authorities.

(10) Providing sealift for passengers on government-owned
and/or -controlled or
commercial ships as required.

(11) In coordination with USTRANSCOM, developing program
and budget
submissions for strategic sealift system requirements.

(12) Performing missions and tasks as directed by
CDRUSTRANSCOM. Keeping
CDRUSTRANSCOM informed of Service assigned missions and
employment use of
strategic sealift assets.

h. Maritime Administration. MARAD is the agency within the
Department of
Transportation (DOT) responsible for assuring that US
Merchant Marine shipping is
sufficient to meet the needs of national defense in times of war
or national emergency, and
can also support the domestic and foreign commerce of the US.
MARAD administers
programs to meet sealift requirements determined by DOD and
conducts related national
security activities. MARAD functions include maintenance of
ships in MARAD custody;
administration of subsidy programs and other financial aids to
shipping; maritime research

Chapter II

II-10 JP 4-01.2

and development; and training of US merchant marine officers.
MARAD also functions as
the national shipping authority (NSA) of the US, the emergency
shipping operations agency
tasked to acquire and manage merchant shipping for government
service in time of war or in
defense-related emergencies. MARAD also conducts national
security planning, training,
and operations in areas such as emergency communications,
naval cooperation and guidance
for shipping (NCAGS), war risk insurance, and port emergency
operations. In peacetime,
MARAD provides ship inventory and characteristics
information as well as estimates of ship
forecasts for use in DOD planning. In turn, DOD provides
MARAD with information on
defense shipping requirements. In a contingency, DOD advises
MARAD of time-phased
requirements for ships by type. MARAD provides DOD with
the required ships by
activation of reserve vessels and through various government
programs, including VISA,
voluntary tanker agreement (VTA), and requisitioning. In a
North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) crisis, MARAD would be responsible for
obtaining the NATO ships
committed under the NATO Reinforcement Shipping
Agreement.

i. Coast Guard. The USCG, an agency of the Department of
Homeland Security, is a
branch of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is
specifically authorized to assist DOD
in the performance of any activity for which the USCG is
especially qualified. National
defense, maritime safety, maritime law enforcement, and

maritime environmental
protection are the four major roles of the USCG. During joint
force deployment and
redeployment operations, the USCG can assist the naval coastal
warfare commander in
providing protection of military shipping at US SPOEs and
overseas ports of
debarkation (PODs) by conducting port security and harbor
defense operations. Major
cutters are deployed to participate in enforcement of sanctions,
maritime intercept operations,
and peace operations. The major cutters of the USCG, like
Navy combatants, are self-
sustaining during deployments in support of joint force
operations. However, deploying port
security units and supplies for sustainment must be time-phased
to support Navy component
operations and entered on the joint force time-phased force and
deployment data (TPFDD)
by supported CCMDs planners for scheduling of common-user
lift. The Coast Guard/naval
expeditionary “harbor defense package” is an ad hoc capability
that has been used to provide
an integrated layered defense for shipping in the SPODs. The
deployable harbor defense
package includes a port security unit; a harbor defense
command unit; a mobile inshore
underwater warfare unit; an explosive ordnance disposal team;
two visit, board, search and
seizure teams; two patrol boats; and a high endurance cutter
with its embarked helicopter.
Also, the USCG is unique among the US military forces in that
it has statutory law
enforcement authority. In the US, the USCG is responsible for
assuring the safety and
security of US ports and waterways and enforcing vessel cargo

and waterfront facility
regulations; inspecting vessels (including those of the MARAD
RRF); licensing mariners;
enforcing customs laws; establishing and servicing aids to
navigation; regulating and
administering bridges over navigable waterways; port
emergency response; search and
rescue; operation of vessel traffic services in selected ports; and
establishing safety and
security zones.

j. Joint Transportation Board. The CJCS JTB may be convened
by the CJCS during
wartime or contingencies for ensuring President and SecDef
requirements for all common-
user transportation resources assigned or available to DOD are
apportioned and scheduled to
optimize accomplishment of DOD objectives. When convened,
the CJCS JTB acts for the

Organization and Responsibilities

II-11

CJCS to communicate President and SecDef priorities and
adjudicate competing
requirements for intertheater mobility lift assets and/or resolve
other issues that negatively
impact the DTS and which USTRANSCOM and the supported
CCDRs are unable to resolve.
USTRANSCOM allocates transportation assets to supported
CCDRs’ validated requirements
in accordance with the CJCS apportionment guidance and
priority assigned to each operation

and/or requirement. USTRANSCOM advises the Joint Staff
operations directorate and
logistics directorate when movement requirements exceed
capabilities. The
CDRUSTRANSCOM will refer problems with recommended
COAs to the CJCS for
resolution or adjudication if a balance to transportation
requirements and capabilities cannot
be maintained. Should additional support be required to resolve
lift shortfalls, the CJCS JTB
may be convened to analyze proposed solutions and develop
recommended COAs for CJCS
approval. CCDRs could establish a theater JTB (T-JTB) to
resolve similar issues.

For further information concerning the organization,
responsibilities, management, and
procedures of a JTB see JP 3-35, Deployment and
Redeployment Operations, and JP 4-01,
The Defense Transportation System.

5. Command and Control Architecture

a. General. C2 of sealift assets is normally exercised in a
variety of ways and is largely
dependent upon the sealift asset and the program to which it
belongs (PREPO, surge, or
sustainment). The exercise of C2 of sealift assets generally
applies to government-owned or
government leased vessels. However, where C2 does not apply,
as in the case of commercial
ships (both US and foreign-flagged in liner service), protocols
are in place to ensure the safe
passage of vessels in high threat or contested waters. See
Chapter V “Employment of Sealift
Forces,” for more on C2 systems.

(1) PREPO ships. MSC currently operates PREPO ships
supporting the Army,
Air Force, Marine Corps, and DLA. Most of the PREPO ships
are strategically placed
around the globe and contain combat gear, supplies, and
ammunition for use by deployed
forces. Once off-loaded in theater and when released by the
GCC, the ships become part of
the common user fleet and under the OPCON of
CDRUSTRANSCOM.

(2) Surge ships. The surge fleet consists of the MSC-
controlled fleet as well as
common-user elements of the MARAD RRF once they have
been activated. When activated
and ordered into service, they are placed under OPCON of
COMSC in support of US
wartime or humanitarian and disaster relief or civil contingency
operations to offset
shortages of commercial US flagged ships. Surge sealift may
also be used for routine
operations such as sustainment when commercial assets are not
available or suitable. FSSs
are normally maintained in a four or five day reduced operating
status (ROS). Other
MARAD RRF ships which come under USTRANSCOM control
when activated may
include crane ships, RO/RO ships, and others. As with the
PREPO ships, MSC operates the
surge shipping for USTRANSCOM and the GCCs. MSC also
contracts surge shipping on
the commercial market to augment existing controlled capacity.
See Chapter VI, “Vessel
Acquisition and Activation Programs,” for more on vessel
acquisition and activation

programs.

Chapter II

II-12 JP 4-01.2

(3) Sustainment. Sustainment shipping is almost exclusively
obtained from the
commercial market. Sustainment shipping includes vessel
charters executed by MSC (with
the exception of long-term leases, which are considered organic
and typically fall under the
pre-positioned or surge fleets) and regularly scheduled and
dedicated liner service contracts
executed by the SDDC. Vessels chartered by MSC operate
under the OPCON of COMSC in
the same way as US Government-owned assets. COMSC
normally then delegates OPCON
to one of the MSC area commanders in whose area the vessel is
operating. Liner service,
which includes containerized and breakbulk cargo, may also
include contracted intermodal
service from the inland origin or the SPOE to the SPOD or
inland destination, depending on
the customer requirement. It is important to note that
commercial ocean carriers operate in
accordance with their contractual requirements and their vessels
do not come under military
OPCON. However, in some circumstances, when operating in a
potentially high threat area,
merchant shipping may voluntarily participate in NCAGS
protocols to ensure safe passage.
See Chapter VII, “Naval Cooperation and Guidance for
Shipping,” for details on the

NCAGS program.

b. Military Sealift Command. COMSC exercises OPCON of
MSC forces through
five geographically organized subordinate commands. These
commands include the
following: MSC, Atlantic, encompassing Central and South
America as well as the eastern
coastlines of the US and Canada; MSC, Pacific, encompassing
the west coast of North
America as well as much of the Eastern Pacific west of South
and Central America; MSC,
Europe and Africa, encompassing the Eastern Atlantic north and
west of Europe, the
Atlantic west and south of Africa, as well as the Adriatic,
Baltic, Barents, Black, Caspian,
Mediterranean, and North Seas; MSC, Far East, covering the
mid-Pacific to the Indian
Oceans and from the Bering Sea south to Antarctica; and MSC,
Central, which covers the
Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and parts of the Indian
Ocean east of Africa to the
coast of Pakistan. In certain cases when, in the opinion of the
MSC commander, the threat to
shipping under MSC OPCON presents an unacceptable risk to
ships and cargo, the ships will
be placed under the tactical control (TACON) of the Navy
component commander of the
responsible GCC. Upon the departure of the ships from the
danger area, control over the
ships will revert to MSC.

III-1

CHAPTER III
SEALIFT CAPABILITIES

1. General

a. Sealift forces are those militarily useful merchant-type ships
available to DOD to
execute the sealift requirements of the DTS across the range of
military operations. Called
“common-user shipping,” these ships are used in the
transportation of cargoes for one or
more Services from one seaport to another or to a location at
sea in the operational area
pending a decision to move the cargo embarked ashore. The
sealift force is composed of
shipping from some or all of the following sources:

(1) Active government-owned or controlled shipping.

(2) Government-owned reserve or inactive shipping.

(3) US privately owned and operated commercial shipping.

(4) US privately owned, foreign flag commercial shipping.

(5) Foreign owned and operated commercial shipping.

b. The precise nature of each type of shipping and how it is
acquired for DOD use is
discussed in Chapter VI, “Vessel Acquisition and Activation
Programs.” This chapter will
describe those ships and ship characteristics that are most
useful for DOD missions, discuss

the advantages and disadvantages of common merchant ship
types for military operations,
and provide a general overview of DOD sealift ship and sealift
support programs.

2. Ship Types

a. Sealift shipping falls into three broad categories: dry cargo
ships or freighters, liquid
cargo carriers or tankers, and passenger ships. During joint
operations, dry cargo ships
transport the equipment and supplies and tankers carry the
refined petroleum, oils, and
lubricants (POL) required to conduct and sustain the operation.
Passenger ships provide
troop carrying, noncombatant, or sealift medical evacuation
capability in support of the joint
operation.

b. Dry Cargo Ships. In general, a dry cargo ship is considered
to be usable for military
purposes if it has a minimum carrying capability of 2,000 long
tons (LTs) of cargo and the
ability to carry, without significant modification, unit
equipment, ammunition, or sustaining
supplies. The major types of dry cargo ships are listed in
Figure III-1.

“It’s all about chartering the direct course to deliver military
power in the quickest,
most efficient, most businesslike manner wherever and
whenever the nation calls
on us to serve. The vast majority of how we get things done is
through sealift.”

General Norton A. Schwartz, Commander,

United States Transportation Command, March 2007

Chapter III

III-2 JP 4-01.2

(1) Breakbulk. The term “breakbulk ships” refers to ships
characterized by large
open hatches and fitted with boom-and-winch gear or deck
cranes. They are primarily used
at ports which, either because of low cargo volumes or local
economic factors, lack the
modern facilities and inland rail/highway connections required
to support efficient
containership operations. In competition with containerships,
breakbulk ships are no
longer commercially viable. Fewer of these ships are being
built each year, and none have
been built for US flag owners in recent years. The military
advantages of general cargo or
breakbulk ships include flexibility in the load composition
afforded by open decks and
multiple cargo holds and the ability to discharge cargo without
the use of developed port
facilities. Their military disadvantages include time-consuming
cargo operations, the need
for dunnage to block and brace pallets, and the requirement for
large numbers of trained
personnel to load and unload.

(2) Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships. A RO/RO ship is specifically
designed to carry
vehicle cargo (i.e., wheeled and tracked vehicles) as all or most
of its cargo. Vehicles are

driven or towed on and off the ship by means of either the
ship’s own ramps or shore-based
ramps. Because it is designed to accommodate cargoes which
cannot be stacked but which
vary in height, below-deck space and volume utilization is
generally less efficient than on a
containership. RO/RO ships are thus commercially viable only
in certain specialized trades.
However, the RO/RO is the preferred ship type for deployment
of military unit
equipment. The military advantages of RO/RO ships include
the capability for rapid
loading and discharge of military vehicles and non-self-
deployable aircraft, and open deck
areas well suited to the carriage of outsized military cargo.
Their military disadvantages
include their relative unsuitability for carriage of sustaining
supplies and ammunition (in
comparison with general cargo and containerships). One type of
RO/RO ship is the pure car
and truck carrier (PCTC). PCTC ships are designed to transport
automobiles and light trucks
across the ocean. They are most commonly used by the
automobile/vehicle manufacturing
industry. PCTC decks and ramps are designed to facilitate ease
of loading and unloading
light vehicles; however, their deck strength and height between
decks are often insufficient
to support military vehicles. Overall, the availability of
militarily-useful commercial RO/RO

Figure III-1. Types of Dry Cargo Ships

Types of Dry Cargo Ships

Breakbulk
Roll-on/Roll-off
Ships
High-Speed
Vessel

Container Ships
Barge Ships:
Lighter aboard ship
SEABARGE
Ocean-going barge

Container Ships
Barge Ships:
Lighter aboard ship
SEABARGE
Ocean-going barge

Float-on/Float-off
Ships
Heavy Lift Ships
Dry Bulk Carriers

Float-on/Float-off
Ships
Heavy Lift Ships
Dry Bulk Carriers

Sealift Capabilities

III-3

ships is decreasing and as PCTCs have superseded general-
purpose RO/ROs as the preferred

means of shipping light vehicles.

(3) High-Speed Vessel (HSV). HSVs are high-speed twin hull
catamaran vessels
designed to rapidly deliver vehicles, combat equipment,
supplies, and personnel to
contingency sites or within theater. Two commercially owned
HSVs are under contract to
MSC. HSVs and joint HSVs have limited cargo carrying
capability and limited range at
speed. These vessels are best suited for intratheater
transportation and are not considered
intertheater assets.

(4) Containerships. Containerships are specifically designed to
carry all of their
cargo in standard ocean shipping containers, which are loaded
into vertical “cells” below
deck and stacked and lashed on deck. Most rely on shore-based
cranes for cargo loading and
discharge. Some container ships are self-sustaining and can
self-load/offload. Standard
ocean shipping containers are weatherproof, made of steel or
similar material, constructed to
withstand the high forces and elements to which they may be
subjected in heavy seas, and
usually designed and sized to permit their efficient interchange
for connecting with
intermodal systems for inland rail or highway movement.
Shipping containers are
available in a variety of configurations that include end
opening, side opening, half
heights, open top, flatrack, refrigerated, liquid bulk (tank), and
modular (quadcon/tricon).
Except in highly specialized trades, cargo containers generally
conform to US and

international standards. The size standards for outer dimensions
of shipping containers are
20 feet (ft) or 40 ft length, 8 ft width, and 8 ft or 8 ft 6 inches
in height. 40 ft containers are
the standard; however, there are sealift enhancement features
(SEFs) such as coupling
devices that can make two 20 ft containers fit into one 40 ft
container slot. 20 ft containers
are particularly useful in transporting high-density cargo such
as ammunition. Fortunately,

Roll-on/roll-off ships such as the Military Sealift Command
large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off Ship
BENAVIDEZ (T-AKR 306) are the preferred ship for military
deployments. The BENAVIDEZ is
heading out of Souda Bay harbor carrying more than 230,000
square feet of United States Army
combat equipment and supplies for the 1st Cavalry Division,
deploying for service in Iraq.

Chapter III

III-4 JP 4-01.2

most containerships can carry containers of mixed heights
without significant difficulty.
Depending on cargo density, a standard 20 ft container can
carry up to 15-20 short tons or 29
measurement tons (MTONs) of cargo. Containership capacity is
normally expressed in
twenty-foot equivalent units, which is defined as the number of
20 ft by 8 ft by 8 ft 6 inches
containers it can carry; or, similarly, in forty-foot equivalent

units. There is a high likelihood
of their availability due to the large number of containerships in
the world. The military
advantages of containerships include their large cargo capacity,
excellent suitability for
carriage of sustaining supplies and ammunition, and rapid and
efficient cargo operations.
Movements by containers also provide a greater degree of cargo
security, reduce pilferage
and damage to cargo, reduce cargo-handling costs, and result in
faster, more efficient
deliveries. Their military disadvantages include near total
dependence on specialized
shoreside equipment for cargo loading and discharge, and
general unsuitability for carriage
of large vehicles and oversized cargo unless modified to utilize
heavy-duty flatracks.

(5) Barge Ships. Barge ships are designed to carry specially
designed barges
(lighters) or a combination of such barges and containers.
Thus, they are necessarily
large ships with a large heavy lift capability. Their design was
intended to combine the
flexibility and self-sustained cargo handling capability of the
general cargo ship with the
rapid port turnaround time of the RO/RO and containership. In
general, these ships are
becoming less common as an ever-increasing share of the cargo
trade passes to
containerships.

Joint High Speed Vessel-2, Swift, conducting high speed trials.
The Joint High Speed Vessels provide
for fast intratheater transportation of troops, military vessel and

equipment. They are capable of
transporting 700 short tons 1,200 nautical miles at an average
speed of 35 knots, and can operate in
shallow-draft ports and waterways.

Sealift Capabilities

III-5

(a) Sea Barge (SEABEE). The two MARAD RRF SEABEE
heavy lift
vessels have three decks on which the cargo barges or container
flats are stowed. Cargo
can be brought to each deck level by a stern elevator and are
moved internally within the ship
by the transporter (conveyor) system. The elevator capacity is
2,000 LTs. The SEABEE
ships are the preferred means of transporting amphibious
lighterage, certain types of non-self
deploying watercraft, and floating causeways. As such, they are
a critical enabler of joint
logistics over-the-shore (JLOTS) operations.

(b) Ocean-Going Barges. Ocean-going barges are specifically
designed to
carry a variety of cargo types over the open seas. These barges
are either towed by a large
ocean-going tug with a hawser or towing cable, or have an
interlocking connection for a
push-tug (articulated/integrated tug/barge). Some have open
holds and can carry containers,
rolling stock, or bulk cargo such as grains or ores. Other barge
types have a solid deck with
the internal compartments designated for the carriage of liquid

cargoes and petroleum
products, or covered holds or deckhouses for cargo protection.
In most cases, ocean-going
barges do not have the speed and capacity of ships. However,
they are very versatile and
capable of deploying into shallow draft ports and up rivers and
estuaries that the larger ships
are unable to navigate.

(6) Float-On/Float-Off Ships. These specialized vessels, or
semisubmersible
ships, provide the capability to load, transport, and off-load
outsized military cargo
independent of port equipment traditionally used for handling
large or extremely heavy
cargo, such as tug boats, barges, landing craft, floating cranes,
and single anchor leg mooring
systems. Lifts range from approximately 50 to as much as
45,000 tons. These ships are
designed to take on ballast water in floodable tanks that
partially submerge the vessel. Cargo
is then floated over the submerged portion of the vessel, which
then deballasts and surfaces
under the cargo. After the vessel is fully afloat, the cargo is
secured for transport.

(7) US Flag Heavylift Ships. Heavy lift ships are designed to
carry exceptionally
heavy loads such as boats, barges, cranes, trucks, passenger
ferries, or other heavy cargoes.

The SS Cape May is a heavy lift ship capable of transporting
oversized military cargo.

Chapter III

III-6 JP 4-01.2

Cargo can be stowed aboard the ships by a lift-on/lift-off
(LO/LO) method using shoreside
cranes or the ship’s own cranes, or float-in, float-out where the
ship partially submerges
during loading and unloading. These ships are extremely useful
for large, heavy, over-sized,
and bulky military equipment and cargo.

(8) Dry Bulk Carriers. Dry bulk carriers are designed to carry
grain or similar
cargoes in bulk (i.e., material that can be dumped, sucked,
pumped, or blown). Loading and
discharge are normally performed at specialized terminals using
cargo-handling systems that
are designed for specific commodities. Gravity is often used for
loading; the various
discharge methods include the use of pneumatic systems,
conveyors, and excavation-type
machinery. Most dry bulk carriers are not considered to be
militarily useful. However, some
are fitted with deck cranes so that, in some cases, their
characteristics are similar to those of a
general cargo ship without tween decks.

c. Liquid Cargo Carriers. MSC operates ships providing
worldwide point-to-point
movement of DOD bulk petroleum products. Liquid cargo
ships, or tankers, are specifically
designed to transport liquid cargoes in bulk. Although tankers
differ greatly in size, their
cargo handling equipment is similar. Specific features of the

cargo handling equipment
differ; however, based on the intended cargo. These differences
may limit the capability of
the ship to carry cargo other than that for which it was
designed. Tanker capacities are stated
in terms of cargo deadweight tonnage (DWT) or barrels (bbl).
DWT is measured in LT of
2,240 pounds and 1 bbl equals 42 US gallons. The parameters
that define a militarily useful
tanker are the capability of carrying POL, a capacity within the
range of 2,000 to 100,000
DWT, and a sustained speed in excess of 12 knots. Tankers are
classed by size and type of
cargo. The major types of liquid cargo carriers are listed in
Figure III-2. In general, smaller
tankers carry “clean” cargoes (refined products, such as
gasoline, diesel fuel, or jet fuel), and
are sometimes referred to as “product tankers.” Large tankers
generally carry “dirty”
(unrefined oil or crude oil) cargoes, and are often referred to as
“crude carriers.”

(1) Handy Size Tankers. The handy size tanker (6,000 to
35,000 cargo DWT, or
approximately 48,000 to 280,000 bbl) is the most militarily
useful. These generally carry
clean or refined products, although some may carry unrefined
oil, chemicals and,
occasionally, bulk grain. The term “handy size tanker
equivalent,” refers to a tanker of

Figure III-2. Types of Liquid Cargo Carriers

Types of Liquid Cargo Ships

Handy Size Tankers

Medium Size Tankers

Large Crude Carriers

Sealift Capabilities

III-7

200,000 bbl or approximately 25,000 DWT. The military
advantages of handy size tankers
include their ability to enter most of the world’s tanker ports,
the relatively short time
required for tank cleaning when required, and their overall
flexibility with regard to the
numbers of different cargoes they can carry.

(2) Medium Size Tankers. The medium size tanker ranges in
capacity from
35,000 to 100,000 DWT (or approximately 280,000 to 800,000
bbl). As a general rule, those
under 60,000 DWT can carry “clean” cargoes while those over
80,000 DWT will, almost
exclusively, carry crude oil or other “dirty” cargoes. Their
military disadvantage is that it is
extremely difficult and time-consuming (months) to clean the
tanks and piping of tankers
that have been transporting either crude oil or other “dirty”
cargoes, so they can be used to
transport refined POL products.

(3) Large Crude Carriers. Large crude carriers are the largest
tanker class and

are solely dedicated to the transportation of crude oil. Very
large crude carriers range in
capacity from 100,000. None of these ships are considered
militarily useful.

(4) Offshore Petroleum Discharge System (OPDS). OPDS
provides a
semipermanent, all-weather facility for bulk transfer of refined
bulk petroleum (e.g., jet
propulsion fuel, type 5 [JP5] and jet propulsion fuel, type 8
[JP8]) directly from an offshore
tanker to a beach termination unit (BTU) located immediately
inland from the high
watermark. POL then is either transported inland or stored in
the beach support area. There
are two types of OPDS: a legacy system based on a converted
tanker, offshore petroleum
discharge system-legacy (OPDS-Legacy), and a follow-on
system based upon commercial
off-the-shelf technology, offshore petroleum discharge system-
future (OPDS-Future).

(a) OPDS-Legacy. Major OPDS-Legacy components are: the
OPDS tanker
with booster pumps and spread mooring winches, a recoverable
single-anchor leg mooring
(SALM) to accommodate four follow-on tankers up to 70,000
DWT, ship-to-SALM hose
lines, up to four miles of six-inch (internal) diameter conduit
for pumping to the beach, and
two BTUs to interface with the shoreside systems. OPDS-
Legacy can support a two-line
system for multiproduct discharge, but ship standoff distance is
reduced from four to two
miles. Amphibious construction battalions install the OPDS
with underwater construction

The Motor Tanker Evergreen State is part of the Military Sealift
Command’s tanker fleet which
transports refined petroleum products for the Department of
Defense, primarily between commercial
refineries and Department of Defense storage and distribution
facilities worldwide.

Chapter III

III-8 JP 4-01.2

team assistance. The only remaining OPDS-Legacy ship is the
MARAD-controlled SS
PETERSBURG, in 10-day status on the West Coast.

(b) OPDS-Future (currently in service). OPDS-Future is a
current capability
employed onboard the MV VADM K.R. Wheeler that does not
incorporate afloat storage of
fuel, but utilizes tankers of opportunity. The system is capable
of providing 1.7 million
gallons per day of JP5 or JP8 from up to eight miles offshore in
significantly higher sea
states than OPDS-Legacy. The OPDS-Future system consists of
Wheeler, a 165 foot tender
vessel, two embarked lighters amphibious resupply cargo
vessels which help deploy the
OPDS conduit, and a beach terminal unit that receives fuel and
transfers it to the holding
tanks or bladders ashore. Once the conduit is deployed,
Wheeler uses its dynamic
positioning system to hold itself in place.

For additional guidance on OPDS, refer to JP 4-01.6, Joint
Logistics Over-the-Shore.

d. Troop/Passenger Ships. Although government-owned
national defense reserve
troop ships are specifically designed to transport troops for
combat missions, the mission has
changed significantly. Troops are generally airlifted to safe
landing areas near the combat
zone. Troop ships are used for movement of military troops to
and from combat and safe
areas where troops embark or debark military and commercial
aircraft. Passenger ships
may also serve for rest and recreation for troops during long
periods of combat; these
ships are generally foreign flag privately owned passenger
vessels equipped with amenities
not available in traditional troop ships. National defense
reserve troop ships are generally
converted state maritime academy training vessels that have
been enhanced to enable the
transport of troops for combat missions. These ships have
limited cargo space, and they
carry between 480 to 800 troops. When the number of troops
increases, the use of folding
canvas cots, and berthing on deck and in designated holds is
required. Commercial privately
owned US and foreign flag passenger ships are traditional cruise
or converted ferry vessels

The motor vesell VADM K. R. Wheeler (T-AG 5001) is part of
Military Sealift Command’s pre-
positioning fleet and is capable of distributing 1.7 million
gallons per day of jet fuel ashore from

distances up to eight miles offshore.

Sealift Capabilities

III-9

equipped with the necessary comforts for the duration of the
transit; vessel capacity varies
with the capability for messing and berthing.

3. Sealift Ship Programs

a. The conventional sealift assets discussed above cannot meet
all strategic sealift
and sealift-related requirements alone. These requirements
include the rapid deployment
of heavy Army combat units and Marine Corps forces,
containership discharge where port
facilities are damaged or nonexistent, expeditionary aviation
maintenance support, state-of-
the-art medical care for expeditionary forces, and PREPO of
combat and support equipment
and supplies. To meet these requirements, various sealift ship
programs have been
established as shown in Figure III-3.

The SS Empire State is one of the troop/passenger ships
currently in the National Defense

Reserve Fleet.

Figure III-3. Sealift Ship Programs

Sealift Ship Programs

Large Medium-Speed Roll-on/
Roll-off Ships
Auxiliary Crane Ships
Fast Sealift Ships
Aviation Logistics Support Ships
Hospital Ships
Ready Reserve Force Roll-on/
Roll-off Ships

Afloat Pre-positioning
(PREPO) Force
Maritime PREPO Ships
Afloat PREPO Stocks
Navy, Defense Logistics

Agency, Air Force Ships

Chapter III

III-10 JP 4-01.2

b. LMSR Ships. An LMSR is similar to any other RO/RO
ship in that it is specifically
designed to carry wheeled and tracked vehicles as all or most of
its cargo. An LMSR
differs from most other RO/RO ships in that it is faster, larger,
and has cranes and
hatches to support LO/LO as well as RO/RO operations. By
design, an LMSR is capable
of sustaining a transit speed of at least 24 knots. LMSRs are
Panamax ships (the largest

ships that can transit the Panama Canal) (950 ft length, 106 ft
beam, 34 ft draft), with two to
three times the stowage capacity of the average RO/RO. The
gross cargo space for the
LMSRs range between approximately 300,000 square feet for
the conversion ships and
approximately 380,000 square feet for the new construction
ships. Usable cargo-carrying
capacity is between 225,000 square feet and 285,000 square feet
respectively with 25 percent
broken stowage applied. The LMSR ship type was built or
converted specifically for
military use. There are currently no commercial equivalents.

“One of the clearest lessons learned from the recent US-Iraq
war is the need
for greater speed in moving combat equipment and supplies
across
oceans,” said Navy Vice Admiral David L. Brewer III, head of
the Military
Sealift Command (MSC). The MSC has sped up its act since
the first Persian
Gulf War, but more needs to be done. “We may be fast, but we
need to be
faster,” he said. “During Desert Storm, the average speed of
our ships was
about 13 knots,” “Today, our large, medium-speed, roll-on/roll-
off (LMSRs)
ships can go up to 24 knots. Their average speed, during the
war, was about
18 knots. When you’re going 9,000 miles, that’s a significant
difference.”
LMSRs are the ships of choice for cargo-carrying missions.
They are 950
feet long and have more than 380,000 square feet of cargo
space, making

them only slightly smaller in size than the Navy’s aircraft
carriers. An
LMSR’s six-deck interior is larger than eight football fields.
Each ship can
carry an entire Army armored task force, including 58 Abrams
tanks and 48
other tracked vehicles, plus more than 900 trucks and other
wheeled
vehicles. The ship’s decks have ample open space for lashing
down
helicopters, tanks, trucks and other large vehicles. A moveable
stern and
side ramps make it easy to drive vehicles on and off the ship.
An LMSR can
be loaded or off-loaded within 96 hours. Two 110-ton, single-
pedestal, twin
cranes make it possible to load and unload cargo even in
locations without
port facilities. In total, during the Gulf War, the MSC moved
more than 12
million tons of tanks, helicopters, ammunition, fuel and other
supplies into
the theater. It took about seven months, however, for the
United States to
build up enough strength in 1991 to drive Iraq out of Kuwait.
More than a
decade later, investments in LMSRs and pre-positioning enabled
the MSC to
move US forces into place for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM
“about 50 percent
faster,” Brewer said.

SOURCE: July 2003 interview with then-Commander,
Military Sealift Command

Sealift Capabilities

III-11

c. Fast Sealift Ship. The FSSs are former containerships,
purchased by the Navy and
converted to a RO/RO configuration with on-board cranes and
self-contained ramps that
enable the ships to off-load onto lighterage while anchored at
sea or in ports where shore
facilities for unloading equipment are unavailable. The vessels
are specially suited to
transport heavy or bulky unit equipment such as tanks, large
wheeled vehicles and
helicopters. The FSSs are the fastest cargo ships in the world.
They are capable of a
sustained speed in excess of 27 knots. The FSSs are part of the
MARAD RRF and berthed at
CONUS East, West, and Gulf Coast ports in a 5-day ROS, each
maintained by a crew of 10.
When the FSSs are at full operational status they operate with a
crew of 42.

d. Auxiliary Crane Ships. Crane ships are converted
containerships on which two or
three twin-boom revolving heavy-lift cranes have been mounted.
These cranes are able to
off-load containerships and provide a heavy lift capability in
locations where port facilities
are nonexistent, inadequate, or damaged. Crane ships are
capable of handling lifts up to 110
LTs, containers of all sizes, and wheeled and tracked vehicles.
In addition to this unique off-
load capability, each crane ship is able to carry between 200
and 700 containers, and/or

flatracks (depending on configuration), and its main deck is also
outfitted to carry
amphibious lighterage and causeways. This capability makes
these ships extremely useful in
supporting in-stream offload and JLOTS operations. Crane
ships are part of the MARAD
RRF and are berthed on the East and West Coasts.

The fleet of fast sealift ships, now part of the Maritime
Administration Ready Reserve Force, is
capable of lifting four brigade combat teams.

Chapter III

III-12 JP 4-01.2

Large medium-speed roll-on/roll-off ships, such as the United
States Naval Ship WATSON, are

the preferred ship type for military deployments.

The auxiliary crane ship SS Cornhusker State, part of Maritime
Administration Ready Reserve
Force, deployed with her sister ship SS Gopher State, providing
relief to Haiti during Operation

UNIFIED RESPONSE in 2010.

Sealift Capabilities

III-13

e. Aviation Logistics Support Ships (T-AVBs). T-AVBs in the
MARAD RRF
provide dedicated sealift for critical movement of the Marine
Corps aviation sustainment
forces of the Marine air-ground task force (MAGTF) aviation
combat element (ACE), upon
activation. These ships transport the mobile aviation
maintenance facility container, which is
configured and modified to operate intermediate aviation
maintenance afloat. The T-AVBs
are operationally controlled by MSC and maintained in ROS-5
status. Currently, there
are T-AVBs berthed in Baltimore, Maryland, and San Diego,
California. Aviation
sustainment personnel deploy and work in standard 8 ft by 8 ft
by 20 ft International
Organization for Standardization containers called mobile
facilities (MFs). The MFs provide
the necessary work space for personnel, support equipment,
technical publications, special
tools, and spare parts. The T-AVB can be deployed in three
modes of operation:
operational, transport, and combination. In the operational
mode, approximately 300
MFs and 325 USMC personnel can be embarked to provide sea
based support for the
MAGTF ACE while loaded aboard ships. In the transport mode,
approximately 684 MFs
and minimum USMC personnel can be embarked to provide
maximum land based support
for the MAGTF ACE when off-loaded ashore. In the
combination mode, a tailored mix of
MFs and USMC personnel can be loaded aboard the T-AVB for
a mix of sea based and land

based support for the MAGTF ACE.

f. Hospital Ships (T-AHs). T-AHs are converted tankers
equipped with 12 operating
rooms and 1,000 patient beds. The primary mission of these
ships is to provide
expeditionary medical facilities in a major contingency or
conflict however, they provide
JFCs with a significant theater engagement and humanitarian
assistance capability, often
with embarked support from nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs). The two T-AHs in the

Hospital ships enable medical facilities to be positioned in or
near the joint force operational

area.

Chapter III

III-14 JP 4-01.2

Navy inventory are berthed on the East and West Coasts and
maintained in a 5-day ROS by a
crew of 10 civilian personnel. The ships are operated by MSC.
The US Navy Chief of the
Bureau of Medicine and Surgery provides manning for the
hospital facilities.

g. Afloat PREPO Force. This program, which involves the
forward deploying of
equipment and supplies aboard ships, improves sealift response
time in a crisis. These

ships are chartered commercial and government-owned vessels.
Some of these ships have
militarily useful features including aviation facilities, lighterage
and floating hoseline
systems. The APF consists of the Maritime pre-position force,
Army pre-positioned stocks-3
(APS-3) ships, DLA, and Air Force ships.

(1) Maritime PREPO Force Ships. Maritime PREPO is a
strategic deployment
option that quickly combines the substantial PREPO equipment
and supplies loaded aboard
the ships of a maritime pre-positioning ships squadron
(MPSRON) with a MAGTF to
establish a formidable combined arms force capable of sustained
operations. The MAGTF
and Navy support element (NSE) personnel, selected equipment,
and combat aircraft are
flown into the objective area where the maritime pre-
positioning ship (MPS) operations
occur. The MPSs are comprised of specifically constructed or
modified RO/RO ships,
augmented by LMSRs and special capability ships that are
forward-deployed in two self-
contained squadrons. Each squadron (except for the maritime
PREPO force enhanced ships,
LMSRs, which have no bulk liquid capabilities) carries the unit
equipment and up to 30 days
of supplies for one Marine expeditionary brigade. Each ship
carries a spread load of unit
equipment, supplies, POL, and potable water. Additionally,
each ship is outfitted with
NSE equipment consisting of the camp support and lighterage
needed to discharge cargo

The United States Naval Ship Seay, part of the maritime pre-
positioning ships force, off-loads

tracked vehicles using joint logistics over-the-shore.

Sealift Capabilities

III-15

over unimproved ports or over the beach. Currently, one swing
bulk fuel tanker provides
strategic stocks for any theater of operation in direct support of
the MAGTF. The NSE and
lighterage embarked in Maritime Security Program (MSP)
squadrons constitutes the Navy’s
logistics over-the-shore (LOTS) capability and is often the
nucleus around which JLOTS
operations are formed. MPSRON 2 is positioned in the Indian
Ocean (Diego Garcia) and
MPSRON 3 is positioned in the Western Pacific. MPS cargo
may be discharged pierside or
“in stream” by NSE personnel composed of naval beach group
and cargo handling battalion
personnel, as well as Marine Corps personnel airlifted to the
objective area.

(2) Army Pre-Positioned Stocks-3 Ships. The APS-3 consists
of government-
owned and commercially chartered ships on which pre-
positioned military equipment and
munitions and/or supplies are stored to meet rapid deployment
requirements of the USA.
These ships are normally forward-deployed with heavy combat
equipment, combat support

(CS) equipment, and sustainment to support a USA brigade
combat team for 15 days, plus a
sustainment brigade to support the first 30 days of an operation.
All ships are capable of
limited self-discharge in the objective area, but are typically
intended to be offloaded at a
fixed SPOD. The APS-3 currently includes both container ships
and LMSRs. These ships
are under the ADCON of COMSC Washington and TACON of
the MPSRON commanders.

(3) DLA and Air Force Ships. DLA and the Air Force currently
operate three
vessels around the world for the DLA and the USAF.

(a) COMSC has OPCON of one pre-positioned vessel for DLA.
It is an
OPDS vessel, MV Wheeler, that can distribute fuel from eight
miles off shore. This ship
reports to one of the two MPSRON depending upon its
geographic location.

(b) The Air Force pre-positioned fleet consists of two
ammunition carriers:

The Motor Vessel Capt. Steven L. Bennett Fisher is a container
under charter to Military Sealift

Command as part of the Prepositioning Program carrying Air
Force munitions.

Chapter III

III-16 JP 4-01.2

one under the OPCON of MPSRON Two in Diego Garcia and
one under the OPCON of
MPSRON Three in the Guam/Saipan area.

4. Sealift Enhancement Features

a. SEFs consist of special equipment and modifications that
adapt merchant-type
dry cargo ships and tankers to specific military missions. They
are typically installed on
ships of the MARAD RRF or on ships under MSC control. The
SEFs fall into three
categories: productivity, operational, and survivability
enhancements.

b. Productivity Enhancements. A number of productivity
enhancements expand the
capabilities of merchant ships to carry military cargoes.
Examples include militarily
useful (reinforced) RO/RO ramps for commercial RO/RO
vessels, the installation of 20 ft
container hardpoints in 40 ft container cells, and installation of
vehicle tie-downs (D-rings
and cloverleafs) on deck. Other productivity enhancements
provide the necessary interfaces
with ship-to-shore cargo handling systems. Examples include
main deck fittings and rails for
the transport of amphibious lighterage and alongside lighter
mooring systems.

c. Operational Enhancements. Operational enhancements are
equipment and systems
that enable merchant ships to operate with, and provide logistic
support to, Navy warships

and support units. These features include communications
equipment operated by
embarked military personnel, which provides the capability for
classified message traffic.

d. Survivability Enhancements. Survivability enhancements
include internal
communications and nuclear, biological, and chemical
washdown systems.

5. Logistics Over-the-Shore

Strategic sealift also includes the requirement to achieve an
over-the-shore cargo
discharge capability that matches cargo deliveries in an
amphibious objective area or other
operational area. This is known as LOTS. LOTS operations are
conducted over unimproved
shorelines or in ports that are inaccessible to deep draft
shipping or that are damaged or
otherwise inadequate. Both the Army and the Navy maintain an
organic capability to
perform LOTS missions in support of their respective Service
missions and when directed, to
support the CCDR’s requirement for a capability to perform
JLOTS. USTRANSCOM has
developed the JTF-PO (SPOD) capability that can be used to
complement JLOTS. JTF-PO
(SPOD) provides for the efficient and transparent movement of
cargo from the highwater
mark to a forward distribution node. JTF-PO facilitates and
enables follow-on theater
distribution.

Additional information on JLOTS is available in JP 4-01.6,
Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore,

and on JTF-PO in JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

IV-1

CHAPTER IV

PLANNING

1. General

a. The actual or contemplated use of sealift assets leading up to
and during a crisis or
conflict involves significant operational considerations, each of
which must be the subject of
detailed planning. Operational considerations lead to a great
many combinations of ships
that may be considered for prompt delivery of unit equipment
and other cargo to their
destinations. The amount of time available significantly
influences the planning process.
Supporting strategic transportation requirements is a four-step
process, as shown in
Figure IV-1. The four steps are:

(1) Determine the cargo and sustainment movement
requirement.

(2) State the requirement in the appropriate units of measure.

(3) Simulate the deployment using available forces.

(4) Confirm that the plan is transportation feasible.

“A shipload of war material delivered safely overseas [is]
wasted if half the cargo
consists of filler items not needed immediately.”

Richard Leighton and Robert Coakley (on efficiency in
transportation
versus effective supply) Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-
1943

Figure IV-1. Supporting Strategic Transportation Requirements

Supporting Strategic Transportation Requirements

Identify the Total
Movement
Requirements

Describe Them in
Logistics Terms

Simulate the
Strategic
Deployment

Short Tons

Square Feet

Cubic Feet/
Metric Tons

Using Common-

User Lift

Confirm Operation
Plan Is
Transportation
Feasible

Operat
ion

Plan

Time-
Phased

Force a
nd

Deploy
ment

Data
(TPFDD

)

Chapter IV

IV-2 JP 4-01.2

b. The planning process for deliberate and crisis action
planning is described in the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3122

Series, Joint Operation
Planning and Execution System (JOPES), and JP 5-0, Joint
Operation Planning.

2. Execution Planning

a. This execution planning period may be weeks, days, or even
hours in length
depending on the political situation and scenario. During this
period, USTRANSCOM and
its Navy and Army component commands, MSC and SDDC,
identify the sealift forces
required for execution of the operation order (OPORD) and
tentatively schedule the sealift
to move the earliest deploying units. In general,
USTRANSCOM and its component
commands are responsible for ensuring that adequate
transportation is available to support
the OPORD when executed, developing feasible transportation
schedules, establishing initial
and follow-on requirements for sealift capability, resolving
transportation shortfalls,
adjudicating transportation allocation conflicts with the JTB,
and publishing transportation
coordinating instructions.

b. Sealift Application. In a crisis, strategic sealift divides into
three broad categories:
PREPO; surge shipping during initial mobilization; and
resupply and sustainment shipping.
PREPO ships reduce closure times of combat and support forces
needed in the early stages
of a crisis. Surge shipping should be capable of handling
outsized and heavy items of
equipment. These include large numbers of wheeled and
tracked vehicles and helicopters,

for which RO/RO ships are most suitable. Containerships
should not be overlooked in surge
operations as they may have the capability to transport light
combat, CS, and combat service
support (CSS) equipment. Resupply and sustainment shipping
moves the equipment,
parts, and supplies necessary to sustain the force. It transports
mainly containerized cargo
and bulk POL products.

c. Service Requirements. The methods by which forces are
introduced into an
operational area vary from Service to Service. Sealift assets
must be assigned based on the
supported CCDR’s force closure and sustainment cargo
requirements. Strategic sealift of
accompanying supplies for Army and/or Air Force units is
normally point-to-point unless
otherwise specified by the CCDR potentially based on point of
need distribution or available
port facilities. However, this is not always true for Marine
Corps forces. The expeditionary
Marine forces, as an integral component of a larger naval force,
can influence events within
the world’s littorals using the sea as maneuver space and as a
secure operating base.
Seabasing enables forces to move directly from ship to inland
objectives. It also permits
Marine forces to commence sustainable operations to enable the
flow of follow-on forces
into theater. During Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Marine
forces operated over 400
miles inland while being supported from the sea. Whenever
expeditionary units of a
significant sized MAGTF are employed, assault follow-on
echelon (AFOE) sealift provides

for long-term operations; short-term or voyage charters are not
sufficient. The AFOE is
more fully explained in Chapter V, “Employment of Sealift
Forces.”

d. Resource Capability. When arranging the duration of
supporting sealift assets, it is
very important to match sealift asset capabilities with Service
orientation. For example, all
of MSC’s RO/RO and some MARAD RRF ships are self-
sustaining offshore, meaning that

Planning

IV-3

they can discharge to lighterage offshore. It follows that these
ships are highly suitable for
amphibious operations. Furthermore, because they are
government-owned, their assured
availability makes it feasible to plan and train with them in
preparation for a contingency.
The MSC surge LMSRs and the MARAD RRF FSSs are vessels
of choice for immediate
assignment to surge shipping. For example, historically surge
loading of vessels results in an
average of 35 percent broken stowage while PREPO vessels can
achieve a broken stowage of
25 percent or less.

e. Mobility and Transportation Planning. The Logistics
Supplement to the JSCP
provides planning guidance to CCDRs regarding strategic
sealift. Specific questions

regarding asset availability and responsibilities for planning
certain facets of sealift (Marine
Corps AFOE, for example) can be answered by consulting the
Logistics Supplement to the
JSCP and the GFMIG.

3. Sealift Asset Planning

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction (CJCSI)
3110.11F, Mobility
Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan for FY 2008,
presents information and
guidance on sealift assets and is further detailed in Guidance for
the Development of the
Force 2008. Shipping is divided into two broad categories:
common-user and withhold.
Common-user assets are available for joint support of all
Services’ movement requirements.
Withhold vessels are reserved for specific purposes and not
generally available to transport
joint movement requirements. Planning for ships designated as
maritime PREPO force and
Navy Combat Logistics Force, as well as other sealift planning
factors, is covered in the
JSCP Mobility Supplement.

4. Basic Cargo Planning Concepts

a. Before proceeding with sealift planning, the joint planner
must understand several
basic concepts of cargo handling and stowage. These are:
different measures of ship
capacity, broken stowage, stowage factor or cargo density, and
units of cargo measurement.

b. Measures of Ship Capacity. The cargo carrying ability of a

vessel may be
expressed in one or more units of measure (see Figure IV-2).

c. Broken Stowage. Broken stowage is cargo space left
unoccupied after the ship is
considered “fully” loaded. This occurs because cargo sizes and
shapes do not conform to
those of the ship’s cargo compartments and because of the space
required for cargo bracing
and tie-down to prevent shifting and damage during the voyage.
It is expressed as a
percentage of the total volume available for cargo stowage (bale
cubic). For RO/RO
ships, the broken stowage is normally estimated to be 25-35
percent, indicating that the cargo
actually occupies 65-75 percent of the total available load
space, even though individual
cargo spaces/holds are full. The amount of broken stowage is
specific to each ship type, the
cargo characteristics, the load plan, and the available load time.
For example, historically
surge loading of vessels results in an average of 35 percent
broken stowage, while PREPO
vessels can achieve a broken stowage of 25 percent or less.

Chapter IV

IV-4 JP 4-01.2

d. Stowage Factor. Stowage factor is the number of cubic feet
occupied by one LT
(2,240 pounds) of any given cargo, without allowance for
broken stowage. The stowage
factor, in combination with the estimated percentage of broken

stowage, can be used to
estimate either the space required for loading a given cargo, or
the amount of cargo that can
be loaded aboard a given ship. It also can be used to maximize
the cargo space (bale cubic
capacity) and weight capacity (cargo deadweight) of available
shipping. General cargo
ships are typically designed to be full and down when loaded
with cargoes having an
average stowage factor of 40 cubic feet per LT (or one MTON
per LT). Cargoes with
relatively high stowage factors (i.e., low densities) will fill the
ship by volume before its
weight capacity is reached. Conversely, cargoes with relatively
low stowage factors (high
densities) will bring the ship down to its deepest allowable draft
before it is full.

e. Units of Cargo Measurement. In determining sealift
transportation requirements,
the appropriate units of measurement will vary with cargo type
and stowage factor (see
Figure IV-3). For vehicles and other nonstackable cargo, area
square feet is the relevant
measurement. For stackable cargoes, stowage factors will
determine whether weight (LT) or
volume (MTON) is the more appropriate measurement.

Figure IV-2. Measures of Ship Capacity

Measures of Ship Capacity

Bale Cubic

Cargo Deadweight

Square Footage

Liquid Volume

Bale cubic is the internal volume of the below-deck cargo
compartments
available for general or “package” cargo. It is expressed either
in cubic feet
(ft ) or in measurement tons of 40 ft per ton.3 3

Cargo deadweight is the weight of cargo that the ship can carry
when fully
crewed, fueled, and provisioned (when loaded, in salt water, to
the summer
freeboard marks). It is measured in long tons of 2,240 pounds.

Square footage is the total of those deck areas that are
considered usable for
the stowage of cargo, expressed in square feet.

Liquid volume is the total internal volume of the ship’s liquid
cargo tanks,
expressed in standard barrels of 42 US gallons.

Planning

IV-5

f. Sealift Planning Factors. For planning purposes, ships of
various types may be
assumed to have, on the average, the notional cargo capacities
shown in Figure IV-4. Cargo
characteristics will determine whether area, weight, or volume

is the appropriate
consideration in loading general purpose vessels (breakbulk
ships and barge carriers). A
single criterion applies to each of the more specialized designs:
area, in the case of the
RO/RO, and volume, for the containership.

5. Protection and Operations Security

a. MSC ships have virtually no self-protection capability,
particularly against chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards. The
presence of CBRN
contamination may preclude transit by ships. Further,
unprotected ships are faced with the
risk of loss of ship, cargo, and personnel while operating in any
area where a credible
military, terrorist, or piracy threat exists. Therefore, military
forces are assigned either to
eliminate the threat so ships can transit unopposed at any time,
or to provide direct
protection, to include ship augmentation, during transits of
threat environments. As directed
by their GCCs, Navy component commanders are tasked with
establishing and implementing
plans to provide embarked security teams (ESTs), and surface
and air escort for the
protection of all MSC shipping. While merchant ships are
under escort of military forces,
TACON is delegated by the MSC area commander to the
appropriate Navy component
commander, who may then retain or further delegate TACON
over the merchant shipping
(refer to Chapter VII, “Naval Cooperation and Guidance for
Shipping”). However,
throughout the escort mission, OPCON of the shipping normally

remains with the MSC area

Figure IV-3. Cargo Planning Factors

Cargo Planning Factors

AREA: Vehicles and nonvehicular cargo that cannot be stacked.
For example:

Tanks
Trucks
Generators

WEIGHT: Nonvehicular, stackable cargo with a stowage factor
less than 40.
For example:

Dumb bombs
Artillery ammunition

VOLUME: Nonvehicular, stackable cargo with a stowage factor
greater than or
equal to 40. For example:

Food
Spare parts

Chapter IV

IV-6 JP 4-01.2

commander. Protection of shipping may be loosely divided into
two distinct areas; en route
operations and port security.

b. En Route Protection of Shipping. The traditional, and still
very effective, means of
directly protecting shipping transit is escort by naval
combatants and Coast Guard assets.
However, protection of shipping does not consist simply of
those actions required to
assemble and protect groups of merchant ships. Other offensive
actions that reduce threats
to sealift shipping also may eliminate the need for naval escort
and be a more efficient use of
resources. These actions may involve other use of air, land, or
naval power, as appropriate.
Internal protection of ships while en route is an MSC
responsibility. Consequently, MSC
provides threat awareness, ensures that vessels/owners are
contractually obligated to accept
ESTs and crew vetting, and provides small arms training.
Whatever the means, the desired
end state remains the safe, uninterrupted passage of shipping
and the delivery of the cargoes

to their destinations.

c. Port Security. Threats to shipping in seaports are different
from those found en
route. While the en route threat is primarily from conventional
air, surface, and subsurface
units and mines, the port threat is generally from
unconventional or special operations
forces, as well as terrorist organizations. The USCG is
responsible for the security of
ports in the US, and its port security units can be employed
overseas. Maritime
expeditionary security group units are also conducting the port
security mission overseas.
Port security functions involve the safeguarding of vessels and
waterfront facilities
(including key assets) within the port from internal and external
subversive acts, accidents,
thefts, or other incidents. There may be circumstances where
dispersion of vessels will be
required to minimize the risk of damage from attack. This is
done by reberthing vessels in
the periphery of the port area or in the vicinity of the port for
protection. Refer to Navy
Warfare Publication (NWP) 3-10, Maritime Expeditionary
Security Operations, for

Figure IV-4. Sealift Planning Factors

DWT deadweight tonnage
ft square feet
ft cubic feet

2

3

Legend

MT measurement ton
TEU twenty-foot equivalent unit

Sealift Planning Factors

Breakbulk:

10,000 DWT
15,000 MT

600,000 ft 3

Barge Carrier:

30,000 DWT
30,000 MT

1,200,000 ft 3

Roll-on/Roll-off Ship:

150,000 ft 2
Containership:

2,400 TEU

Planning

IV-7

information regarding the responsibilities and capabilities of
maritime expeditionary security
forces (MESFs). Principal port security activities include:

(1) Monitoring port operations.

(2) Conducting harbor patrols to detect suspicious activity, and
determining if the
level of security measures taken by vessel and facility owners
and operators are sufficient to
meet the threat level.

(3) Surveying waterfront facilities to ascertain capabilities that
would be useful in
emergency response.

(4) Establishing and enforcing security zones to safeguard
vessels and port areas.

(5) Developing measures to be taken to prevent acts of
maritime terrorism.

(6) Developing and maintaining maritime counterterrorism
plans, and responding
to maritime emergencies involving terrorism.

(7) Carrying out the Special Interest Vessel Program to
safeguard US ports from
external threats of sabotage and espionage.

(8) Preparing for mobilization and national defense, including
providing waterside
security and limited landside security if required.

(9) The Navy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, SDDC, United
States Northern

Command (USNORTHCOM), United States Army Forces
Command (FORSCOM), Federal
Emergency Management Agency, and other agencies, as well as
commands acting with and
through port readiness committees, play roles in port security
and harbor defense depending
on the particular crisis, situation, or geographic location.
USNORTHCOM closely
coordinates with DOT, the Department of Homeland Security,
and the Transportation
Security Agency in an effort to protect DOD assets at
commercial ports where DOD’s
jurisdiction is limited. Protection of shipping in port also
requires close coordination and
cooperation among intelligence agencies and commands.

d. Considerations for Civilian-Crewed Ships Operated by or for
MSC. MSC ships
are civilian-manned and have legal restrictions with regards to
force protection and the use of
force. In accordance with their civilian status, civilian mariners
may not be protected by
status-of-forces agreements and are not governed by military
rules of engagement. The
small crew size of MSC ships and the legal status of civilian
mariners generally preclude
tasking crewmembers with full-time security duties. They can
perform any force protection
duties, armed or unarmed, while remaining on the ship. They
cannot perform security/force
protection duties off the ship, such as armed or unarmed pier
sentry duty, armed or unarmed
picket boat operations, or escort duty.

e. Defense of MSC Ships. MSC ships are unarmed with the
exception of a modest

complement of small arms. The civilian mariners (whether
government or contractor
employees) are not members of the Armed Forces. Accordingly,
MSC civilian and contract

Chapter IV

IV-8 JP 4-01.2

mariners use force in accordance with the standing rules for use
of force, not the standing
rules of engagement applicable to the military. In some cases
this will directly or indirectly
provide protection for ship and/or cargo. In all cases, force
protection activities would be
limited to actions “within the lifelines” of the ship, however, in
self-defense, they may
engage from the vessel at persons or contacts beyond the
lifelines of the ship. For example,
civilian mariners cannot be employed to serve as a pier sentry
or picket boat operator.
Accordingly, operational commanders must be prepared to
augment MSC ships when, in
their judgment, an armed security force is required. To this
end, the JFC has an array of
enabling capabilities to provide protection to MSC ships under
Operation VIGILANT
MARINER (OVM) . OVM commenced in June 2004 to meet
SecDef requirement that the
Navy act as the DOD Executive Agent for force protection of
military sealift assets.
Available capabilities under the umbrella of OVM include the
analysis and dissemination of
collected intelligence; C2; HNS; maritime aircraft patrols; dark-

ship transits; operational risk
management; and the utilization of more heavily armed ESTs at
selected chokepoints,
transits, and ports. ESTs are comprised of teams that provide
security augmentation to MSC
assets to detect, deter, and defend against waterborne and land-
based terrorist attacks. ESTs
are assigned to and employed by Navy Expeditionary Combat
Command under Commander,
US Fleet Forces Command. Tools to accomplish the mission
include small arms, crew
served weapons, body armor, night vision devices, and secure
radios and telephones.

f. Operations Security (OPSEC). Sealift has several significant
OPSEC aspects. The
first, and possibly most obvious problem, is the presence of a
large number of fully loaded
merchant ships at anchor in a major port. Such a gathering over
several days is an obvious
indication that a convoy or major operation is being planned,
and is almost impossible to
keep secure. Somewhat more subtle, but still obvious, is the
gathering of large numbers of
sealift ships at a forward base, particularly those ships which
can be identified with an
AFOE. The key point here is that, while a large mass of
merchant shipping can be regarded
as a target in and of itself, the presence of certain types of
merchant ships can indicate a
major military operation even when the “military” end of the
operation has scrupulously
observed OPSEC measures. Although not an exhaustive list of
OPSEC measures for sealift,
the following should be considered as guidelines:

(1) Avoid massing of shipping if possible. If that cannot be
avoided, minimize the
assembly time involved and limit the numbers of ships in any
one location.

(2) Be aware of the inferences that can be drawn from the
presence of certain
combinations of cargoes and specific ship types.

(3) Use deceptive routing and other techniques where possible,
avoiding patterns in
vessel operations, and routing shipping away from the “normal”
sea lanes to avoid detection
by neutral or other shipping.

(4) Establish and practice an active OPSEC program by
planning and exercising
OPSEC procedures.

(5) Consult with the MESF commander for all OPSEC
considerations.

Planning

IV-9

6. Environmental Considerations

a. Sealift support operations should be planned and conducted
with appropriate
consideration of their effect on the environment in accordance
with applicable US and HN
agreements, environmental laws, policies, and regulations. A
separate annex or appendix

for ensuring that proper attention is given to environmental
considerations should be
included in each OPORD and OPLAN. The annex or appendix
should address the
transport of oil and hazardous substances; fuel transfers;
shipboard waste disposal including
hazardous waste, hazardous materials transport, and medical
and infectious waste disposal;
and natural and cultural resources protection including marine
mammals, oil and hazardous
substance spills prevention and controls, and water pollution
prevention. In addition to
coordination with other staff elements (e.g., medical and legal),
coordination with other
DOD agencies (e.g., DLA) and other USG departments (e.g.,
Department of Energy) also
may be necessary.

b. Requirements related to environmental considerations may
be found in numerous
sources, which may include but are not limited to the following:

(1) Provisions of US environmental law applicable overseas.

(2) Execute orders (EXORDs).

(3) DOD directives, regulations, and policies.

(4) HN laws.

(5) Status-of-forces agreements.

(6) International treaties, protocols, and conventions.

Refer to JP 3-34, Joint Engineer Operations, for additional
information on environmental

considerations.

7. Automated Planning Tools

a. Transportation Coordinator’s Automated Information for
Movement System
(TC-AIMS II). TC-AIMS II is an automated information system
that supports day-to-day
operations for unit movement officers, movement controllers,
staffs from battalion/separate
company to theater level, mode managers, and installation
transportation offices. It
interfaces with joint and Service systems that provide intransit
and total asset visibility to all
Services and is the basic building block of source data. The
IGC force-tracking software will
translate the raw data into ITV and force tracking information.

b. Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation (JFAST).
JFAST is a
transportation feasibility evaluation tool capable of scheduling
transportation assets
against a TPFDD. This allows planners to download specific
movement requirements from
JOPES and identify specific problem areas in meeting latest
arrival dates at the PODs.
JFAST employs the Notional Requirements Generator, which
draws from a standardized

Chapter IV

IV-10 JP 4-01.2

database, and creates notional movement requirement data for

transportation analysis in a no-
plan crisis situation.

c. Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES).
ICODES is an
automated information system designed to support cargo
management, ship load planning,
and stowage at common-user ocean terminals. It also supports
the requirements of GCCs for
oversight and management of ocean terminals. The
responsibility for this function is shared
within the Army between SDDC and FORSCOM, and is
performed by the USN at select
locations. The ICODES ship load planning function includes
the development and
implementation of ship’s prestow plans, hazardous cargo
reports, and final ship load plans of
military cargo and unit equipment. It requires strict
accountability of cargo. The
information developed through these processes at ocean
terminals directly supports ITV of
the cargo. This contributes to the DOD objective of total asset
visibility from origin to
destination and provides information required by supported and
supporting CCDRs to
accomplish their missions.

d. Port Simulation Model (PORTSIM). PORTSIM is a time-
stepped, discrete
simulation of SPOE and SPOD events during a force
deployment. PORTSIM can determine
a port’s reception, staging, clearance, and throughput
capabilities. The model identifies
systems or infrastructure constraints and provides port-specific,
time-phased force clearance
profiles. PORTSIM simulates simultaneous deployment and

retrograde seaport operations
and assesses the impact of JLOTS.

e. Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES).
GATES is a single
automated system serving management of both aerial port and
surface port operations for
DOD transportation, worldwide. Serving peacetime and
contingency operations, GATES
support includes processing and tracking cargo and passenger
information while maintaining
ITV. GATES also aids DOD’s capability to bill for cargo and
passenger movement.
GATES surface port functions include capability formerly
provided by the SDDC
Worldwide Port System.

f. Cargo Movement Operations System (CMOS). CMOS is a
joint system that
integrates computer hardware, software, and communications to
effectively plan, document,
and manage outbound and inbound cargo and passengers, and to
plan, schedule, and monitor
the execution of transportation activities in support of
deployment and reception of forces.
CMOS provides joint forces with an end-to-end distribution
capability and real time ITV
during all passenger and cargo movements.

8. Transition from Peace to Conflict to Stability Operations

a. General. The transition from peace to conflict represents a
critical period for
sealift. Management of this transition will have a significant
effect on the success of
deployment and sustainment missions assigned to sealift. The

transition period involves
high risk due to misperceptions about the speed with which the
DTS in general, and sealift in
particular, can transition from a relatively small peacetime force
into a major military force.
Transition from a peacetime transportation role to a military
deployment role requires
significant changes that affect every portion of the sealift
forces. The transition from

Planning

IV-11

conflict to stability operations, while not subject to the same
time and capacity constraints as
the transition from peace to conflict, still requires careful
planning in order to ensure that
gains made during the conflict are not lost during the post-
conflict reconstruction and
stabilization.

b. Sealift Force Structure. The first and most obvious change
in sealift during
transition is that the number of ships under USTRANSCOM and
MSC control will
rapidly and substantially increase. It should be noted that the
number of ships under MSC
OPCON might not be an accurate measure of ships performing
the sealift function.
Depending on the mode of acquisition, ships may be delayed for
significant time periods
before they can be considered as active sealift assets. For
planning purposes, the notional

time periods shown in Figure IV-5 will be required to obtain
shipping from each source or
method of acquisition. The elapsed times represent the period
between the first request for
that type of shipping and the arrival of ships at berth, ready for
loadout. These include the
time required to take all of the actions discussed in Chapter VI,
“Vessel Acquisition and
Activation Programs”: activation time (if in ROS, RRF, or
National Defense Reserve Fleet
[NDRF]), or the time necessary to make the ship ready for
military cargo (if a charter, VISA,
and/or VTA or requisition), and transit to the desired SPOE. In
the expansion of the sealift
force, several factors may further complicate the rapid
accumulation of sufficient
shipping, particularly the acquisition of ships from the MARAD
RRF and NDRF. These
are:

Figure IV-5. Sealift Asset Availability Times

MARAD RFF Maritime Administration Ready
Reserve Force

MSC Military Sealift Command
NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet

Legend

ROS reduced operating status
VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift

Agreement
VTA voluntary tanker agreement

Sealift Asset Availability Times

MSC ROS Shipping:

4-30 days (depending on location)

Charter:

4-30 days (depending on location)

MARAD RRF:

5 or 10 days (depending on
readiness and/or location)

VISA and/or VTA:

7-45 days (depending on location)

Requisitioning:

14-45 days (depending on
location)

NDRF:

45-135 days

Chapter IV

IV-12 JP 4-01.2

(1) Frequency of reserve ship test activations and exercises.

(2) Maintenance effort expended on reserve shipping.

(3) Shipyard capacity to activate large numbers of ships.

(4) Availability of trained crews, spare parts, and logistic
support.

(5) Availability of militarily useful shipping on the world
charter market.

(6) Restrictions on the activities of foreign-flag ships by their
respective national
governments or by the USG.

c. Stability Operations. The transition from conflict to stability
operations can be
critical to the overall success of an operation. Sealift support
requirements for this phase of
an operation should be considered carefully. Ideally, planning
for stability operations,
and the sealift requirements to support stability operations,
should begin when joint
operation planning is initiated. As operations shift from
sustained combat operations to
stability operations, civil-military operations will facilitate
humanitarian relief, civil order,
and restoration of public services. Initially, the military’s
predominant presence and its
ability to C2 forces and logistics under extreme conditions may
give it the de facto lead in
stability operations normally governed by other agencies that
lack such capacities. Some of
the same sealift support concerns that affect the transition from
peace to conflict also affect
the transition to stability operations. However, as the focus

changes from projecting combat
power and force sustainment ashore to providing relief to
civilians and preparing for
transition to legitimate civil or international authority, the
materiel requirements for the
operation markedly change. Additionally, preparations for the
expeditious transition from
primarily military and contracted sealift support to sustainable
commercial sealift support
must be considered, especially since redeployment of forces
may compete for available
sealift capacity during this phase of operations.

For additional guidance concerning stability operations, refer to
JP 3-0, Joint Operations,
JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, and JP 3-57, Civil-
Military Operations.

9. Other Considerations

As mentioned in Chapter II, “Organization and
Responsibilities,” MSC and SDDC
interface in the area of water terminal operations.
USTRANSCOM, with input from MSC
and SDDC, selects the strategic terminals in coordination with
the supported CCDRs.
Selection will be based on various factors, of which the speed
of the arrival, marshalling, and
movement of deploying forces will be primary. Other factors
include Service requirements
and transportation infrastructure in proximity to the ports.

For additional guidance concerning water terminal operations,
refer to JP 4-01.5, Joint
Terminal Operations.

V-1

CHAPTER V
EMPLOYMENT OF SEALIFT FORCES

1. General

Planning for the employment of sealift begins in the planning
phase of the joint
deployment process and is in JOPES. Employment continues
until the operation is
terminated by proper authority or is completed, including
redeployment of forces and
materiel and retrograde of equipment. Errors of judgment in
acquiring, scheduling, and
determining C2 of sealift assets may result in late delivery of
units and supplies essential to
the successful conduct of the operation. A complete
understanding of the organizational
responsibilities for sealift employment is, therefore, essential.

2. Execution

a. This phase starts with the President and SecDef decision to
exercise the military
option for resolution of the crisis. Acting on the authority and
direction of the SecDef, the
CJCS issues an EXORD that directs the supported CCDR to
carry out the OPORD. The
supported CCDR then issues EXORDs to subordinate and
supporting commanders directing

them to execute their supporting OPORDs. During this phase,
changes to the OPORD may
be necessary for some or all of the following reasons: strategic,
operational, tactical, or
intelligence considerations; force and nonunit cargo
availability; availability of shipping;
CONUS transportation system throughput capabilities; and
SPOE and/or SPOD throughput
capabilities.

b. Execution Requirements. Because the OPORD will probably
require adjustment as
it is executed, ongoing refinement and adjustment of
deployment activities are required.
At the time of execution, the OPORD TPFDD should include, at
a minimum, properly
identified combat, CS, and CSS units. The area of movement
control in joint operations is
covered in JP 4-09, Distribution Operations, and JP 3-35,
Deployment and Redeployment
Operations.

(1) USTRANSCOM Responsibilities. Throughout the
execution of an OPORD,
USTRANSCOM is responsible for coordinating with the
supported CCDR for validating
transportation requirements and developing, monitoring, and
adjusting transportation
schedules. USTRANSCOM reports the progress of the
deployment to the supported CCDR
and CJCS and identifies lift shortfalls or other transportation-
related problems accordingly.

(2) Supported CCDR Responsibilities. The supported GCC
should ensure that
USTRANSCOM and its TCCs clearly understand theater

transport requirements. While
developing requirements and priorities, the supported GCC
coordinates with

“Sealift is absolutely essential to deploy and sustain large
military forces in hostile
operations over global distances…There is no substitute for
sealift in our national
strategy of forward defense.”

Everett Pyatt, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Shipbuilding and
Logistics), 1989

Chapter V

V-2 JP 4-01.2

USTRANSCOM to ensure that the movement control system
will be ready to manage
strategic movement. The supported GCC has a wide range of
movement control options
available to allow a seamless intertheater-intratheater leg
interface. A T-JTB may be
established or subordinate JFCs or Service components may be
directed to carry out their
own movement control. However, to facilitate a fully
coordinated and responsive
transportation system, the GCC may assign responsibility for
theater transportation
movement control to the joint deployment and distribution
operations center (JDDOC).
JDDOCs are established for each GCC. The premise behind the
JDDOC capability is that
theater expertise is combined with national-level, strategic

knowledge and reachback
authority within the GCC’s command structure. The JDDOC
accomplishes theater joint
movement responsibilities for any potential logistic
organizational structure as directed by
the GCC. The GCC also establishes POD support activities.
These include the
arrival/departure airfield control group (A/DACG), port support
activity (PSA), and any
subordinate movement control organization.

For additional information on the JDDOC and movement
control, see JP 4-09, Distribution
Operations.

(3) Supporting CCDR Responsibilities. Certain situations may
require that one
CCDR support another CCDR. This support may range from the
deployment of forces to the
provision of sustainment. Regardless of the mission, the
supporting commander should
establish a movement control system similar to
USTRANSCOM’s system. A JDDOC,
with supporting component movement cells, manages all moves
and assures compliance with
the supported CCDR’s priorities. For deployments to another
theater, the supporting
CCDR establishes port of embarkation (POE) activities. These
include the A/DACG,
PSA, and movement control organization.

c. Resolution of Resource Allocation Conflicts. If several
CCDR OPORDs are
executed simultaneously, or nearly simultaneously, resource
allocation conflicts may occur.
CJCS policy is to allocate support forces such as sealift in

proportion to the allocation
of combat forces. Through this mechanism, each CCDR is
provided a share of the available
resources consistent with national priorities. If the strategic
situation requires the assignment
of a greater percentage of assets to one supported CCDR than
another, the CCDR desiring
additional support may request that the CJCS reallocate
resources from other CCDRs.
If an agreement between the CCDRs directly involved cannot be
reached, the matter will be
referred to the CJCS JTB for final resolution. The CJCS JTB’s
final resolution is subject to
the approval of the CJCS and SecDef.

d. Command and Control. Common-user shipping is under the
COCOM of
CDRUSTRANSCOM with OPCON executed by COMSC. When
required, protection,
escort, and security are provided to USTRANSCOM from the
naval component or the joint
force maritime component commander (JFMCC) in the
respective area of responsibility
(AOR) in which the vessel is operating. To carry out this
responsibility, COMSC or MSC
area commanders give TACON to the respective JFMCCs. This
concept requires close
coordination between MSC and the JFMCCs to enable adequate
protection of common-user
sealift and merchant shipping while transiting areas of hostile
activity (refer to Chapter VII,
“Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping”).

Employment of Sealift Forces

V-3

3. Communications System Support

a. The inherent worldwide dispersal of sealift forces mandates
that sealift C2 systems
be fully interoperable with the GCCS-J family of systems.
GCCS-J is built such that
interoperability with existing systems can be attained. GCCS-J
provides the means for
disseminating and sharing the information necessary in order to
effectively plan, deploy,
sustain, redeploy, and employ sealift forces. The sealift
communications system, in its
simplest form, must enable the sealift operational commander to
monitor the situation,
conduct assessments, develop estimates, plans, and schedules,
issue orders and directives,
and report status to higher authority.

b. GCCS-J is the DOD joint C2 system of record. It is a suite
of mission applications
that provides critical, joint warfighting C2 capabilities. GCCS-
J is the principal foundation
for dominant battlespace awareness, providing an integrated,
near-real-time picture of the
battle necessary to conduct joint and multinational operations.
GCCS-J provides a robust
and seamless C2 capability to the President, SecDef, National
Military Command Center,
CCDRs, JFCs, and Military Departments. In GCCS-J,
components update JOPES via the
SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNET). Of the
many elements of GCCS-J,
the JOPES is of primary interest to the sealift operator.

(1) Sealift Transportation Movement. The unit move begins
with an EXORD
sent out by CJCS. Once notified, the installation transportation
officer works with SDDC to
coordinate the movement requirements for deploying units.
SDDC inputs or updates
movement requirements in JOPES and adds the actual departure
data. SDDC uses its
automated database programs to configure these requirements
into shiploads along with
other requirements going to the same port and having the same
available to load dates.
These updated and coordinated requirements and shipload
information are passed through
JOPES to the command in need of this information. MSC
identifies a ship type based on the
specific requirements for the unit. If MSC has insufficient
chartered or government-owned
sealift to satisfy the requirement, USTRANSCOM activates
VISA Stage I. If VISA Stage I
is insufficient, USSTRANSCOM coordinates with MARAD for
further VISA activation or
requisition of US flag and effective United States controlled
(EUSC) ships.

(2) The request is received by MARAD via secure fax or
Defense Message System
message (not by JOPES). In the event of a NATO contingency,
if no acceptable US or
EUSC ship is available, then MARAD as the NSA intercedes
with the Civil Sealift Group for
the request of a NATO flag ship. Once the ship is found,
MARAD nominates the ship to
MSC HQ. After MARAD activates the vessel, MSC accepts it
and assumes OPCON and the

ship information is passed to the MSC area command, complete
with berth availability. This
happens before the unit reaches the load port, and if timed
correctly, the unit moves into the
seaport by road or rail and proceeds to the piers where the ship
is prepared to receive unit
cargo and/or personnel. As noted above, the time-phased
requirements listing is updated as
directed by CJCS. This enables the supported CCDR to
reprioritize the forces based on the
threat, and allows USTRANSCOM to adjust these requirements
based on strategic lift
available. The systems currently under development include
those listed below.

Chapter V

V-4 JP 4-01.2

c. Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation Network
Convergence.
IGC is a cooperative effort between DLA and USTRANSCOM
that establishes common
integrated data services for the CCMDs, Services, DOD, and
other USG departments and
agencies in order to manage supply, distribution, and logistics
information with a global
perspective. IGC replaced the legacy Global Transportation
Network system and provides
integration of information from a variety of DTS automated
information systems to provide
consolidated ITV and C2 data support. IGC extends backward
compatibility to customer
systems, feeds shipment status to Service and DOD agency

systems, and provides joint force
movement tracking and closure. IGC integrates automated data
processing and information
systems, electronic commerce, and electronic data interchange
to track the identity, status,
and location of DOD unit and non-unit cargo, passengers,
patients, forces, and military and
commercial air mobility, sealift, and surface assets from origin
to destination.

d. Sealift Communications. Communications systems are
critical to the flow of orders
and directives from the sealift commander to subordinates, and
to their status reports to the
commander. However, the procedures for communicating with
the sealift force are
unique to military operations because of the heavy reliance on
commercial maritime
systems. Hence, commercial sealift communications are
extremely vulnerable to
exploitation by information operations. Communications among
the military organizations
involved in C2 of sealift take place through the normal military
communication channels.

(1) Merchant Ship Communications Capabilities. Long-range
communications
capabilities in strategic sealift ships range from advanced
military communications and on-
line cryptographic systems on some military-owned sealift ships
to the satellite aided Global
Maritime Distress and Safety System, and conventional high
frequency (HF) and single side
band voice capabilities. The vast majority of US-owned
merchant ships that would
make up the sealift force are equipped with commercial satellite

systems that provide
both voice and data communications capability 24 hours a day.
Those ships not equipped
with commercial satellite systems communicate with other ships
and organizations ashore
through commercial coastal radio stations, using conventional
HF voice communications.
Merchant ships may be provided limited capability for handling
classified information
through use of MSC-provided secure telephone unit systems that
can be interfaced with
satellite communications systems.

(2) Interface Between Commercial and Military
Communications Systems.
For naval commands to communicate rapidly and effectively
with merchant ships, interfaces
between commercial and military satellite communications
systems have been established.
However, in most circumstances requiring direct communication
between military
authorities and merchant ships, unclassified messages will be
transmitted via commercial
channels. This requires understanding of the communications
capabilities of each ship and
establishes procedures for voice communications and delivery
of message traffic to the ship.

(3) Naval Embarked Advisory Team (NEAT). A NEAT may be
temporarily
assigned aboard civilian-manned ships to provide the ship’s
master with advice on naval
matters, particularly on tactical maneuvering and
communications. NEATs have their own
transceivers and associated gear, visual communications gear,
and ancillary equipment and

communications publications, all of which would be carried
aboard their assigned vessels.

Employment of Sealift Forces

V-5

In essence, a NEAT serves as the operations department aboard
a merchant ship, but with no
C2 authority.

For additional discussion of sealift communications see
Commander, Military Sealift
Command Instruction (COMSCINST) 2000.2, Communications
Policy and Procedures
Manual, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
Publication 117, Radio
Navigational Aids.

e. OPORDs and Reports. To ensure that assigned sealift
missions are accomplished
efficiently and with the desired results, operational C2 is
implemented through a system
that relies on standard orders and reports. These orders and
reports are designed to
provide a complete, accurate, and timely flow of essential
information in both directions in
the chain of command. COMSCINST 3121.9, MSC Standard
Operating Manual, specifies
reporting requirements and procedures.

4. Logistic Support

In general, merchant ships will be logistically supported by

their owner and/or
operators within the terms of their charters or other agreements
when the ships are using
commercial seaports for loading and discharge of military
cargo. Merchant ships are
normally provisioned at the beginning of every voyage with 60
to 90 days of consumable
items. This will usually be sufficient for a ship to make the
round-trip between POE and
POD, including the required cargo discharge time at the POD.
The exception to this is that
merchant ships under MSC OPCON are generally supplied with
fuel from military
sources. This may take the form of direct payment for fuel from
commercial sources or
actual transfer of military fuels to merchant ships. The latter is
most likely to occur in the
supported GCC’s AOR as the ships deliver their cargoes after a
long voyage. On shorter
voyages the ships may be able to return without refueling.
Other in-theater logistic support
to merchant shipping will usually be limited to assistance in
treatment and repatriation of
sick or injured crew members, expediting the arrival of crew
replacements and high priority
spare parts, mail delivery, and arranging or providing tugs,
pilots, and nautical charts and
publications when required. Should vessel repairs be required
in-theater, commercial
facilities, when available, should be used due to their
familiarity with merchant ships’
requirements and to keep naval repair facilities available to
naval combatants.

5. Intermodal Operations

a. Intermodal operations provide flexibility by incorporating
various combinations of
sealift, airlift, rail, and trucking operations to facilitate rapid,
efficient cargo movement. In
the context of commercial shipping, “intermodal” operations or
systems refer primarily to
the efficient interchange of standardized shipping containers
between ocean and land
carriers, sophisticated systems of container handling and
storage in marine terminals, or
container freight stations and computerized tracking of
shipments. These are perhaps
epitomized by the US “land bridge” operations in which
containerized cargoes moving
between Far Eastern and European seaports cross this country
on dedicated “unit trains”
rather than utilizing the all-water route via the Panama Canal.
The advantages include
savings in transit time and delivered cost, and the arrival of
perishables in better condition

Chapter V

V-6 JP 4-01.2

because of reduced transit times. The existence of this
commercial infrastructure has
promising implications for military use, particularly in moving
large numbers of containers.

b. Container Requirements. Current commercial sealift trends
favor a heavy
emphasis on the use of containers. The supported GCC’s ability
to manage containerized

cargo from SPODs and aerial ports of debarkation (APODs) to
the troops in the field
depends on the sophistication of the host country’s
infrastructure and the expeditionary
capability the deployed force has brought with it.

c. Theater Support Planning. During execution planning, it is
particularly important
to consider the theater’s existing transportation infrastructure
and capabilities, so as to
make maximum use of its potential for intermodal operations.
Selecting SPODs and/or
APODs close to major highway systems, rail networks and
civilian logistic support is
important even where modern, sophisticated intermodal
infrastructures do not exist.

d. Sustaining the Force. Sustaining the force is as important as
deploying it. For this
reason, intermodal operations must be planned in depth to allow
for transportation
infrastructure damage from adversary action and/or sabotage.
Planning also must take into
account the need for additional manpower, vehicles, and other
logistic support over time,
especially during redeployment. Initial HNS may eventually be
withdrawn as that nation
attempts to reestablish normal commercial transportation
operations in support of its own
economy.

For additional information on intermodal containerization, refer
to JP 4-09, Distribution
Operations.

6. Amphibious/Expeditionary Operations

a. An amphibious force consists of an amphibious task force
(ATF) and landing force
(LF), together with other forces that are trained, organized, and
equipped for amphibious
operations. An ATF is a Navy task organization formed to
conduct amphibious operations.
An LF is a Marine Corps or Army task organization formed to
conduct amphibious
operations. Navy elements in an ATF include various types and
classes of ships to include
combatant and strategic sealift and support units from various
warfare specialties. The LF is
normally comprised of a command element, aviation combat
element, ground combat
element, and a logistic combat element. The LF is divided into
two echelons, assault
echelons (AEs) and the AFOE. The AE is the element of the LF
that is scheduled for initial
deployment and employment in the objective area. The AE is
those troops, vehicles, aircraft,
equipment, and supplies required to commence operations. The
AE is normally embarked in
amphibious shipping. The AFOE is comprised of that echelon
of troops, vehicles, aircraft,
equipment, and supplies which, though not needed to initiate
operations, are required to
support and sustain the operations. In order to accomplish its
purpose, it is normally
required in the objective area no later than five days after
deployment of the AE into the
objective area. Portions of the AFOE may be required ashore
sooner because of the tactical
situation. As part of the LF, the AFOE also should ideally be
embarked in amphibious
assault shipping. Due to limitations in the number of

amphibious ships, however, the AFOE
is normally embarked in strategic sealift shipping. An integral
part of the ATF is the NSE.

Employment of Sealift Forces

V-7

The NSE consists of cargo handling, beach, and lighterage
groups, equipped and trained to
discharge ships in stream and at pierside.

Doctrine regarding the employment of sealift in amphibious
operations is contained in JP 3-
02, Amphibious Operations, and NWP 3-02.21, MSC Support of
Amphibious Operations.

b. Employment of AFOE Shipping. The AFOE is not to be
confused with Marine
Corps units deployed by MPS, which will be addressed below.
When an ATF is being
formed by the supported CCDR, USTRANSCOM allocates
shipping for the AFOE mission
to the supported CCDR. These ships are then integrated into
the Navy component
commander’s operations and incorporated with the forces of the
commander, amphibious
task force (CATF). AFOE sealift assets are positioned and
loaded at port facilities, generally
where ATF support cargo and personnel can be most
expeditiously and efficiently loaded to
meet AFOE mission requirements. Loadout of AFOE shipping
are nearly simultaneous with
the loadout of AE shipping. The AFOE deploys in accordance

with the CATF’s amphibious
OPLAN. The AFOE needs to be discharged swiftly, safely, and
in sufficient time to support
the LF. When a ship of the AFOE has discharged its cargo, it
may be returned by the
supported CCDR to the USTRANSCOM common -user shipping
pool.

c. Transfer of APF to Common-User Status. Strategic sealift in
the APF will
normally be transferred to common-user status when released by
the supported CCDR.
However, it may be necessary for the supported CCDR to retain
afloat PREPO or, more
probably, MPS ships as theater support assets to meet specific
operational requirements.
This is called “withhold shipping.” A prime example arose
during Operations DESERT
SHIELD and DESERT STORM when suitable AFOE ships could
not be acquired for a
Marine expeditionary brigade. Upon arrival in-theater, MPS
ships were retained by the GCC
for use as AFOE shipping. When the APF ships are transferred
to the common-user pool,
their support is coordinated through USTRANSCOM and MSC
in the same manner as for all
other common-user ships.

d. Logistics Over-the-Shore

(1) This section provides only general, nontechnical
descriptions of various LOTS
systems. Consult JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, for
a more detailed discussion
of LOTS/JLOTS systems, capabilities, limitations, and
requirements.

(2) The major naval systems for in-stream cargo offload and
discharge is the cargo
offload and discharge system (COLDS). COLDS has two major
subsystems; for dry
cargo, the cargo off-loading and transfer system, and for liquid
cargo the off-shore bulks
fuel system. Navy COLDS equipment and facilities include
lighterage, causeway ferries,
floating piers, the RO/RO discharge facilities, and the elevated
causeway system. Liquid
cargo off-load is supported by the amphibious bulk liquid
transfer system and OPDS.

(3) Army LOTS equipment includes self-deploying watercraft,
lighterage, modular
causeway systems, logistics support vessels, Landing Craft
Utility 2000, Landing Craft
Medium-8, causeway ferries, floating piers, Trident piers,
RO/RO discharge facilities, small
tugs, barge derricks, terminal service unit handling equipment,
shore-based water storage

Chapter V

V-8 JP 4-01.2

systems, and the inland petroleum distribution system, that
includes a tactical petroleum
terminal. LOTS operations can be conducted over unimproved
shorelines, through fixed
ports not accessible to deep draft vessels, and through fixed
ports that are inadequate without
the use of LOTS capabilities.

e. Joint Task Force-Port Opening. Although all Services have
the organic capability
to fully support theater opening functions, traditional Service
port opening/operating forces
may not be sufficient in situations that require rapid response or
joint integration. JTF-PO
gives the supported GCC rapid port opening capability to
facilitate crisis response in austere
environments and is designed to be in place in advance of a
deployment of forces,
sustainment, or humanitarian relief supplies. JTF-PO (SPOD) is
a joint expeditionary
capability that enables USTRANSCOM to rapidly establish and
initially operate an SPOD
and a distribution node, facilitating port throughput in support
of a contingency response.
SPOD forces are ready to deploy within 36 hours and are
designed to operate for 45-60 days
and then redeploy or be relieved by follow-on forces.

For additional information on JTF-PO, see JP 4-09, Distribution
Operations.

7. Support to Seabasing, Military Engagement and Security
Cooperation Activities,
and Humanitarian Assistance

a. Seabasing. Seabasing is the deployment, assembly,
command, projection,
reconstitution, and reemployment of joint power from the sea
without reliance on land bases
within the operational area (see Figure V-1).

(1) Principles. The basic principles of joint seabasing are: use
the sea as maneuver

space; leverage forward presence and joint interdependence;
protect joint force operations;
provide scalable, responsive joint power projection; sustain
joint force operations from the
sea; expand access options and reduce dependence on land
bases; and create uncertainty for
our adversaries.

(2) Considerations. The smooth flow of supplies and personnel
to the sea base
and into the operational area will be one of the determining
factors in a successful seabasing
operation. This flow has many variables, including the type and
size of the operation being
supported from the sea base, the amount of air and sealift
available, the distance from the
advanced base/advance logistic support site/forward logistic site
to the sea base and
operational area, the infrastructure available (airfields, port
facilities, material handling
equipment, etc.) in or out of the operational area, C2 of air and
sealift, coordination and
prioritization of supply, equipment and personnel movement,
and the personnel required to
execute this transportation and distribution function.

(3) Operations. Currently, sealift support to the sea base is
normally accomplished
indirectly by delivery of supplies to an intermediate staging
base (ISB). From the ISB, Navy
Combat Logistics Force vessels operated by MSC transload
materiel to the sea base.

Employment of Sealift Forces

V-9

Refer to NWP 3-62M/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
(MCWP) 3-31.7, Seabasing, for
additional information.

b. Military Engagement and Security Cooperation. Sealift can
provide support to
the GCC’s military engagement and theater security cooperation
efforts in a variety of ways.

SEALIFT SUPPORT OF SE CURITY COOPERATION
EFFORTS

In 2008 and again in 2010, the USNS [United States Naval
Ship] Mercy visited
countries from the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia and
served as an
enabling platform for military and nongovernmental
organizations to
coordinate and carry out relationship-building work in the
Republic of the
Philippines, Vietnam, the Federated States of Micronesia,
Timor-Leste and
Papua New Guinea. During this deployment, Mercy medical
teams treated
more than 90,000 patients. This type of engagement builds trust
between the
US and partner and potential partner nations around the world.

Various Sources

Figure V-1. Seabasing

ALSS advanced logistics support site
FLS forward logistics site

Legend

OA operational area
OBJ objective

Seabasing

FLS

Logistics and Sustainment

Sea Base

OA

Sea Shield

Follow-
On F

orce
s

ALSS

OBJ

Sea Strike

OA

Chapter V

V-10 JP 4-01.2

Sealift plays an essential role in developing capabilities,
interoperability, and cooperation
among US allies and coalition partners during a host of
multinational exercises such as
COBRA GOLD in Thailand, TALISMAN SABRE in Australia,
and AFRICAN LION in
Morocco, to name a few. In many cases, the value of sealift
support extends well beyond
strictly military considerations. Besides delivering significant
medical capabilities in
response to natural and man-made disasters, MSC’s T-AHs
routinely complete humanitarian,
civic assistance, and theater security cooperation mission
deployments. In providing
humanitarian and civic assistance, these ships are often able to
operate where combatants or
support vessels would not be permitted for political reasons.

c. Humanitarian Assistance. Frequently, sealift support to
humanitarian assistance
plays an important, if not the primary role in preserving life in
the immediate aftermath of a
natural or man-made disaster. Generally, this relief is of
limited duration or scope and is
designed to support and supplement HN or civil authority
efforts, in coordination with a US
lead federal agency, until a transition of relief efforts to HN,
international, or NGOs can be
completed. Sealift support in these situations may be tailored
to the particular situation,
depending on the unique relief requirements.

Refer to JP 3-29, Foreign Humanitarian Assistance, for
additional information on
humanitarian assistance. Refer to JP 3-28, Defense Support of
Civil Authorities, for
additional information on military support of domestic
emergencies and disasters and JP 4-
01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore, for additional information
on JLOTS operations.

The United States Naval Ship Mercy Sealift (T-AH 19) transfers
cargo to the Royal Australian

Navy heavy landing craft HMAS Labuan (L128) while anchored
near Dili, Timor-Leste.

Employment of Sealift Forces

V-11

US Sailors unload humanitarian aid supplies from the crane ship
SS Cornhusker State (T-ACS 6)
in Killick, Haiti, Feb. 13, 2010, via joint logistics over-the-
shore in support of Operation UNIFIED
RESPONSE. The SS Cornhusker State is part of the Maritime
Administration Ready Reserve
Force and comes under the operational control of the Military
Sealift Command when activated.

Chapter V

V-12 JP 4-01.2

SEALIFT SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE

Operation UNIFIED ASSISTANCE in late 2004 and early 2005,
provided relief
to the governments of Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and other
affected
nations to mitigate the effects of an earthquake and subsequent
tsunamis.
Although initial relief efforts came in the form of fixed wing
airlift through
intermediate staging bases and through organic Navy ships and
Navy and
Marine Corps helicopters, pre-positioned ships forward
deployed in Guam
also responded to the disaster and provided their water
producing capability
to alleviate potable water shortages caused by the tsunamis. In
January
2010, during Operation UNIFIED RESPONSE, in addition to
US Navy vessels,
the maritime pre-positioning ship the United States Naval Ship
1st
Lieutenant Jack Lummus, was diverted during a scheduled
continental
United States offload to on-load and provide relief material to
Haiti. In this
instance, the joint task force commander was able to marry the
cargo
carrying capacity of the pre-positioning vessel with the offload
capability of
joint logistics over-the-shore to mitigate the effects of the
earthquake-

damaged Haitian seaport. In addition to the use of the maritime
pre-
positioning ship Lummus, four of Maritime Administration’s
Ready Reserve
Force ships were activated to rapidly deliver sealift support to
the affected
area. Sealift’s ability to rapidly deliver substantial quantities of
relief
supplies to many population centers around the world, together
with the
ability to remain on station for extended periods until
conditions and
infrastructure on the ground permit shifting to ground-based
relief efforts,
make sealift support to humanitarian assistance an invaluable
tool to the
joint force commander.

Various Sources

VI-1

CHAPTER VI
VESSEL ACQUISITION AND ACTIVATION PROGRAMS

1. General

The vast majority of vessels required to support military
operations are not under DOD
control during peacetime (i.e., nonorganic). To acquire these
ships, some type of lease
agreements or operating agreements must be executed between
DOD and the owning

and controlling organizations (either commercial firms or US
and allied government
agencies). In maritime terminology, leasing agreements are
known as charters. Although
their terms and conditions differ widely, charters are of three
basic types: bareboat,
voyage, and time. A bareboat charter is a contract whereby the
charterer gets the rights
and obligations of “ownership.” The fixed duration of this type
of charter is generally for a
number of years. The charterer pays in advance for the entire
ship on a monthly or
semiannual basis even if the vessel is laid up or carries less than
its full capacity. Under a
bareboat charter, the charterer assumes total responsibility for
operating the ship, including
manning, provisioning, maintenance, navigation, and logistic
support. Under a voyage
charter, the charterer specifies type of vessel required, cargo to
be loaded, and where the
vessel is to load and discharge. The charterer pays for either
part or all of the carrying
capacity of the vessel, usually in one payment. The shipowner
provides vessel, crew, fuel,
stores, and commits the vessel to being capable of making a
given speed. A time charter is
a contract for the service of the vessel (i.e., its cargo carrying
ability), for an agreed period of
time. As with a bareboat charter, the charterer pays for the
entire carrying capacity of the
vessel on a per-day rate, even if the vessel is laid up or carries
less than its full capacity.
Additionally, the charterer determines where the ship goes and
what it carries while paying
for port charges and the vessel’s fuel. Time and voyage
charters are most commonly used

to acquire sealift shipping to meet short-term military
requirements. A significant amount of
military cargo moves in the US flagged commercial fleet
through liner agreements.
SDDC moves the majority of peacetime military cargo using
commercial liner service.
Military cargo is offered to carriers in less than full shipload
lots for a dollar per ton rate, and
moves along established trade routes. This includes overseas
movement of household goods
and vehicles of USG employees. The sealift acquisition and
activation decision flow is
detailed in Figure VI-1.

“It is clear…that future force deployments will be extremely
demanding and that
there is clearly a requirement for additional sealift…Our
experience in the Persian
Gulf has clearly validated the importance of a balanced
maritime program and the
contribution of our maritime industry to national defense.”

Robert Moore, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Production and Logistics) 1991

Chapter VI

VI-2 JP 4-01.2

2. Government-Owned/Controlled Assets

a. Government-owned shipping (primarily RO/RO) is the most
readily available source
for quickly deploying large quantities of unit equipment.

However, the number of ships in
this category is limited, and they would primarily support the
very early stages of a major
military deployment.

b. Active Assets. The active government-owned (organic) and
controlled sealift forces
are MSC common-user point-to-point shipping and the APF.
Common-user ships are
government-owned or under long-term time charter to MSC and
are employed in providing
sealift to all DOD agencies on a nondedicated basis. In a crisis,
these ships may be
immediately diverted to a SPOE to load deploying military
cargo. However, MSC
common-user shipping involved in peacetime sealift missions
may be distant from CONUS
SPOEs and thus may not be immediately available. The ships of
the APF will execute their

Figure VI-1. Sealift Acquisition and Activation Plan

Sealift Acquisition and Activation Plan

Legend
* operational plan specific
MARAD RFF Maritime Administration Ready

Reserve Force

VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
VTA voluntary tanker agreement

Option 1 Option 2
Request VISA

and/or
VTA Activation

Request
Requisitioning

Authority

Request
Allied

Shipping

Charter
Additional

Ships

Request
MARAD

RRF
Activation

Compare Sealift
Assets on Hand to

Requirements

How Can the
Requirements

be Met?
Requirements

Met

First Step Third StepSecond Step Fourth Step*

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

VI-3

missions at the time and place required by the CCDR/JFC under
whose command the
specific ships have been placed.

c. Inactive Assets. Inactive or reserve sealift assets consist of
organic ships (typically
Navy-owned) maintained by MSC in ROS and organic ships
(typically DOT-owned)
maintained by MARAD for use in a contingency. The latter are
known as the MARAD
RRF and its larger set, the NDRF. With very few exceptions,
title to MARAD RRF and
other NDRF ships are vested in MARAD’s parent organization,
the DOT. The exceptions
are NDRF vessels owned by the Services that have been placed
in MARAD custody at
NDRF sites, but which the owning Service can unilaterally
activate whenever required. The
MARAD RRF is a quick-response subset of the NDRF but,
because MARAD RRF
activation procedures differ from those for the NDRF, they are
addressed separately. To
ensure the readiness of both the MSC inactive (ROS) fleet as
well as the MARAD RRF,
USTRANSCOM conducts periodic no-notice vessel activations
under their sealift exercise

programs.

(1) Reduced Operating Status. Because ROS ships are
maintained by cadre
crews in CONUS ports, they are the first sealift shipping
available in a crisis and are
expected to be ready to execute their mission within 96 to 120
hours of the activation order.
These ships’ readiness, while measured in terms of hours, is
expressed in terms of days. For
example, a ROS-4 ship is expected to be under way within 96
hours. DOD is not required
to coordinate with any other agency to order activation of DOD
ROS ships. The Navy-
owned and maintained ROS ships include the LMSRs and T-
AHs. Many MARAD RRF
ships are also maintained in a ROS status, but since the
activation procedures are different,
they will be discussed below under MARAD RRF.

(2) Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force. The
MARAD RRF is a
significant source of government-owned early deployment
shipping in terms of both the
number of ships and overall cargo-carrying capability. MARAD
RRF ships are in various
specified states of readiness. Many MARAD RRF ships,
particularly RO/RO types, are
maintained in ROS with nucleus crews in a manner similar to
their MSC counterparts,
although typically in 5-day versus 4-day readiness. The
remainder of the MARAD RRF
fleet is in ready reserve status (10-day increments). MARAD
RRF vessels in ready reserve
readiness status, although decrewed, are subject to regular
surveys and maintenance periods

to prevent deterioration. All of the MARAD RRF fleet is
berthed on the three CONUS
seacoasts. These ships are activated pursuant to presidential
action or as otherwise
authorized under law. The specific procedures are discussed
below.

(a) Status. The number of ships in the MARAD RRF and their
composition
change frequently. The reader is advised to refer to the MSC
and MARAD Web sites for the
most current information about the MARAD RRF at MSC
(http://www.msc.navy.mil/inventory/inventory.asp?var=RRF)
and at MARAD
(http://www.marad.dot.gov/ships_shipping_landing_page/nation
al_security/ship_operations/
ready_reserve_force/ready_reserve_force.htm).

(b) Ship Maintenance and Upgrade. MARAD RRF ships are
maintained
and upgraded by MARAD using funds appropriated from Navy
for that purpose.

Chapter VI

VI-4 JP 4-01.2

(c) Activation Process. CDRUSTRANSCOM requests the
activation of
MARAD RRF for contingency deployments. Upon activation,
the ships are committed to
CDRUSTRANSCOM and are normally under the OPCON of
COMSC. The SECNAV
requests Service-organic or theater-assigned ships. The ships

are manned, provisioned,
operated, and maintained by commercial shipping companies
under agreements with
MARAD. The activation process is shown in Figure VI-2.
Those vessels in the highest state
of readiness, ROS-5, are maintained by a civilian crew of 10
mariners, while vessels in 10-
day status are unmanned and require shipyard assistance to
activate. When activated to
support US Armed Forces, operating authority is transferred to
the MSC PM52 Sealift Dry
Cargo project office. In order to ensure readiness,
USTRANSCOM regularly exercises no
notice activation trials to test the vessels under operating
conditions. The MARAD RRF is
funded from the Navy-controlled National Defense Sealift Fund.

(3) National Defense Reserve Fleet. The NDRF (excluding its
quick-response
subset, the MARAD RRF) contains older dry cargo ships,
tankers, troop transports, and
other types of vessels (tugs and other such types) that are
maintained in MARAD custody
under minimal preservation. Current planning considers NDRF
vessels strategic sealift
resources suitable for use as replacements for combat losses, for
sustainment, and for
economic support. Because of their relatively low level of
readiness, NDRF ships would
require a minimum of 30 to 120 days to activate. They are
berthed at MARAD reserve fleet
sites in the James River (Ft. Eustis), Virginia; Beaumont,
Texas; and Suisun Bay, California.

(a) As of 30 June 2010, the NDRF consisted of 165 ships (49 in
the MARAD

RRF). Of the non-MARAD RRF ships, 31 ships are maintained
in “retention” status
(preserved in the same condition that they entered the NDRF).
Of the remaining ships not in
retention status 75 percent are ready for scrapping and the
remainder are being prepared for
scrapping. The NDRF is expected to decline further as the
disposal of older ships continues.
As the number and type of ships in the MARAD RRF and NDRF
can change, refer to the
MARAD Web site: http://www.marad.dot.gov for the most up-
to-date numbers.

(b) Activation Process. NDRF ships are made available to
DOD whenever
the President proclaims that the security of the nation makes it
advisable or during any
national emergency declared by proclamation of the President.
A flow diagram of the
activation process is shown in Figure VI-3.

3. Commercial Controlled Assets

a. Commercial ships will likely be required to fill sealift
requirements in major crisis
situations requiring large amounts of logistics support. DOD
can obtain commercial
shipping from the following sources: US flag commercial
charters and liner service; foreign
owned charters and liner service ships, used in accordance with
existing laws and policies;
ships/capacity committed to VISA/VTA; US-owned ships,
registered under certain flags,
known as the EUSC fleet; and militarily useful US flag ships
which are subject to
requisitioning. Registry procedures between certain nations

allow EUSC ships under the
registries to be available to the USG in a national emergency.
Additionally, shipping may be
obtained through allied agreements.

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

VI-5

b. US Flag Ships. The US flag fleet is generally considered to
be the commercial
shipping sector most responsive to DOD requirements.
However, the number of militarily
useful US flag ships is steadily declining.

Figure VI-2. Ready Reserve Force Activation Process for
Contingency Deployments of

Common-User Ships

MARAD RRF

MSC

Maritime Administration Ready
Reserve Force
Military Sealift Command

USTRANSCOM United States
Transportation Command

Legend

Ready Reserve Force Activation Process for Contingency
Deployments of Common-User Ships

Yes

No

Yes

No

Forward Request
to MARAD RRF

MSC Requests
MARAD RRF Activation

Forwards Request for
USTRANSCOM

Evaluation

USTRANSCOM
Reviews

and Approves
Request?

MARAD RRF Ships Assigned
to USTRANSCOM

and/or MSC

MARAD RRF Activates
MARAD RRF Ships

Charter Enough
Ships in Time?

No Action
Necessary

Sealift
Requirement

Chapter VI

VI-6 JP 4-01.2

(1) The MSP was enacted in 1996 to help slow the downward
trend in militarily
useful US flag shipping and to ensure that militarily useful
ships are available to DOD
during war or national emergency. On November 24, 2003, the
President signed the

Figure VI-3. National Defense Reserve Fleet Activation/Ship
Requisition Process

National Defense Reserve Fleet Activation/
Ship Requisition Process

Sealift
Requirement

Forwards to SecDef
via CJCS

SecDef Reviews/

Approves?

Requests SECTRANS
Concurrence

SECTRANS
Concurs ?

SecDef/SECTRANS
Forward to President

Ships Assigned
to

USTRANSCOM/
MSC

Enough
Ships?

No Action
Required

USTRANSCOM
Reviews/

Approves?

MSC Requests
Requisitioning and/or

NDRF Activation

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

Yes

No

No President
Reviews/Approves

Request?

MARAD Instructed to
Requisition and/or

Activate NDRF Ships

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff

MARAD Maritime Administration
MSC Military Sealift Command
NDRF National Defense Reserve

Fleet
SecDef Secretary of Defense

SECTRANS Secretary of Transportation
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation

Command

Legend

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

VI-7

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for fiscal year
(FY) 2004, which contained the
Maritime Security Act (MSA) of 2003. The most current NDAA
has authorized the MSP
through FY 2025. The MSA 2003 requires that the Secretary of
Transportation
(SECTRANS), in consultation with SecDef, establish a fleet of
active, commercially viable,
militarily useful, privately-owned vessels to meet national
defense and other security
requirements. Participating operators are required to make their
ships and commercial
transportation resources available upon request by SecDef
during times of war or national
emergency. The MSP provides military access to vessels and
vessel capacity, as well as a
total global, intermodal transportation network. This network
includes not only vessels, but
logistics management services, infrastructure, terminals
facilities, and US citizen merchant
mariners to crew the government owned/controlled and
commercial fleets.

(2) Status. Active, privately owned, oceangoing US flag ships
numbered less than
200 as of August 2011, of which only a portion were considered
militarily useful. Because
the number and type of ships in the US flag fleet can change
frequently, refer to the MARAD
Web site, http://www.marad.gov, for the most up-to-date ship
numbers.

(3) DOD Acquisition Procedures. DOD can acquire US flag
shipping by five
methods: commercial or open market charters, liner agreements
for scheduled containerized
service, VTA, VISA, and requisitioning.

(a) Commercial Charter. MSC frequently charters US and
foreign flag ships
during peacetime to provide additional sealift capacity.
Chartering is a routine
commercial transaction that can be accomplished in as little as
two days. However, all
chartered ships may not be immediately available in time of
crisis. Depending on ship
location, the time required to arrive at the designated loading
port may be as much as 30
days.

(b) The Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. VISA is the
primary
sealift mobilization program. It is an intermodal capacity-
oriented program vice a ship-by-
ship oriented program. All major US flag carriers are enrolled
in VISA. This constitutes
more than 90 percent of the US flag dry cargo fleet. The
worldwide intermodal system
provided by these carriers provides extensive and flexible

capabilities to DOD. The types of
ships enrolled in the VISA program includes containerships,
RO/RO ships, combination
RO/RO and containerships, heavy lift ships, breakbulk ships,
and tugs and barges. In
addition, all vessels enrolled in the MSP program are enrolled
in VISA. VISA is activated
upon approval of SecDef. Stage I may be activated by
CDRUSTRANSCOM, with the
approval of SecDef when voluntary capacity commitments are
insufficient to meet DOD
requirements. When Stage I assets are exhausted Stage II may
be activated.
CDRUSTRANSCOM may recommend the activation of Stage III
to SecDef when capacity
requirements from Stage I and II are insufficient and other
shipping services are not
available. At Stage III SecDef requests SECTRANS to allocate
capacity based on DOD
requirements. A Joint Planning Advisory Group (JPAG) is
central to the successful
implementation of VISA and is comprised of representatives
from USTRANSCOM, SDDC,
MSC, DLA, MARAD, and intermodal industrial transportation
representatives. The JPAG
provides USTRANSCOM and its components with
recommendations as to how best to

Chapter VI

VI-8 JP 4-01.2

resolve critical transportation issues during periods of heavy
demand or crisis. The decision

flow for activation of VISA is shown in Figure VI-4.

Figure VI-4. Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
Activation Process

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
Activation Process

Movement
Requirement

Adequate?

Adequate?

Adequate?

Adequate?

Adequate?

Adequate?

Adequate?

Request for
Volunteers

Program
Participants

Volunteers –
US Flag,

Foreign Flag

Volunteers –
US Flag,

Foreign Flag

Nonprogram
Participants

Nonparticipant
US Flag

Foreign
Flag

Requirement Satisfied

Activate
Stage III

Activate
Stage II

Activate
Stage I

Charter
Service

Liner
Service

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No

No

No

No

No

No

No

Vessel Acquisition and Activation Programs

VI-9

(c) Liner Agreements. A significant amount of military cargo
moves in US
flag liner ships. Liner operators are common carriers operating
ships on scheduled
sailings over established trade routes. They provide service to
all on a first-come, first-

served basis. Military cargo offered by SDDC to liner carriers
usually is offered in less-than-
full shipload lots. This method helps share space with cargo
shipped by private sector
business. Since the advent of intermodal transportation, the
most common practice is for
shipments from a variety of DOD sources to be consolidated in
containers under military
auspices for delivery to commercial terminals. There, the
containers are loaded onto
container ships and carried under terms and conditions set forth
in an SDDC container
agreement or contract. SDDC agreements or contracts contain
uniform terms and
conditions for transporting military cargo between the US and
foreign countries.
Agreements or contracts are competitively solicited. Rates are
proposed in response to
requests for proposals and are finalized by negotiation between
SDDC and the interested
carriers.

(d) Voluntary Tanker Agreement. The VTA, established by
MARAD,
provides for tanker owners to voluntarily make their vessels
available to satisfy DOD needs.

1. The VTA is activated, at the request of SecDef, if the
MARAD finds:

a. That a tanker capacity emergency affects the national
defense.

b. That defense requirements cannot be met by chartering.

c. That defense requirements can be met more efficiently by

activating the VTA than by requisitioning ships.

2. Tanker capacity provided under the VTA is for point-to-
point transport
of military POL. The agreement is designed to meet
contingency or war requirements, not to
deal with shortages of capacity in connection with peacetime
resupply operations. The
decision flow for activating the VTA is the same as that shown
in Figure VI-4.

(e) Requisitioning Shipping. SECTRANS is authorized to
requisition any
vessel which is majority owned by US citizens, whether
registered under the US or foreign
flag, whenever the President proclaims that the security of the
nation makes it advisable, or
during any national emergency declared by proclamation of the
President (and/or concurrent
resolution of the Congress). The requisitioning process is
essentially the same as that for
activating the NDRF, shown in Figure VI-3.

c. Effective US-Controlled Shipping. EUSC ships are majority
owned by US citizens
or corporations, but are registered and operated under the flags
of the Marshall Islands,
Liberia, Panama, Honduras, the Bahamas, or other governments
that will permit their ships
to be made available (by chartering or, if necessary, by
requisitioning) to the USG in time
of emergency. If requisitioned, these vessels could either be
time chartered or bareboat
chartered and require crewing.

(1) Status. The EUSC fleet numbers over 60 ships; but these

are primarily tankers
and dry bulk carriers and are almost entirely crewed by foreign
nationals.

Chapter VI

VI-10 JP 4-01.2

(2) DOD Acquisition Procedures. EUSC ships may either be
chartered
commercially or requisitioned. The chartering and
requisitioning process is the same as
that for US flag ships. The same requisitioning authority
applies to all US-owned ships
registered under other flags.

d. Foreign Flag Ships

(1) As a general rule, foreign-owned and operated commercial
shipping may be
chartered through commercial charter during a contingency
when organic and US flag
or EUSC nonorganic assets are unavailable or insufficient.
National Security Directive-
28, National Security Directive on Sealift, prohibits deliberate
planning for the chartering of
foreign flag vessels; however, there are some standing shipping
agreements with US allies.
Country-to-country shipping agreements can be arranged on
short notice dependent on the
crisis at hand. The US benefited from other country-provided
shipping during Operation
DESERT STORM.

(2) DOD Acquisition Procedures. After it has been determined
that there is not
sufficient voluntary US flag sealift capacity to meet
requirements, the foreign flag ships may
be chartered. The procedure is the same as for US flag ships.
Country relationships and
politics need to be considered when chartering foreign flag
ships.

VII-1

CHAPTER VII
NAVAL COOPERATION AND GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING

1. General

a. NCAGS has emerged from its predecessor’s missions known
as naval coordination
and protection of shipping (NCAPS), and naval control of
shipping (NCOS). Both NCAPS
and NCOS were established to meet national requirements to
protect merchant shipping
against a global open ocean threat through the means of military
escorts, large convoys, and
administrative procedures. Advancements in both the
information technology, and maritime
transportation and industries, coupled with changing world
threats, shifted the primary
concepts from “protection of merchant shipping” to
“deconfliction of merchant and military
vessels.”

b. In periods of crisis, conflict, national emergency, or war,
naval authorities may direct
the movement of merchant ships (including routing and
diversion) so that they may be better
protected from hostilities and not interfere with possible active
naval, joint, or combined
military operations. The NCAGS organization is the principal
US resource to carry out this
function. The purpose of NCAGS is to ensure the efficient
management and safe passage of
merchant ships that are not performing strategic sealift
functions. NCAGS provides the
operational interface between the Navy and commercial
shipping.

c. The mission and command structure of the NCAGS
organization are described
below, as well as the procedures to implement NCAGS for
commercial shipping. Additional
guidance may be found in Navy Tactics, Techniques, and
Procedures (NTTP) 3-07.12, Naval
Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping, Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations Instruction
3450.18, US Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping, and
Allied Tactical Publication
(ATP)-2 (B) Volume II, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for
Shipping Manual.

2. Organization

a. Commander, US Fleet Forces, is responsible for overall
program management and
control of assets NCAGS.

b. There are currently four units assigned to the NCAGS

organization. Each unit is
composed of 48 personnel possessing a variety of operational
warfare skills as well as
specialized skills relating to the civil maritime industry. Each
unit provides the capabilities
to: liaise with the civil maritime industry and the operational
commander; deploy shipping

“Our Nation’s maritime interests are best served by working
together across the
globe with many nations to foster security and cooperation.
NCAGS [naval
cooperation and guidance for shipping] is a key resource in
building to that
endstate; building maritime domain awareness through
collaboration and common
technologies.”

Rear Admiral Lee Metcalf, Director, National Office, Global
Maritime Situational
Awareness/Director, Maritime Domain Awareness, 19 May 2008

Chapter VII

VII-2 JP 4-01.2

coordination teams (SCTs) ashore or afloat; and establish or
augment shipping coordination
centers (SCCs) with skilled personnel. The network of NCAGS
units and SCCs allows
centrally coordinated and managed groups to provide dynamic
and flexible response when
and where needed. NCAGS units provide leadership and
primary response for their aligned

fleet for contingency or crisis, supported as required by other
units and available select
individuals across the community in a federated model. When
assigned, NCAGS
components are operationally employed by either the JFMCC,
or at the tactical level, by the
surface warfare commander as part of a Navy carrier strike
group.

c. NCAGS facilitates cooperation between the military and
civil maritime industry: to
minimize the economic impact as a result of commercial
shipping operating in the vicinity of
naval vessels engaged in military operations and to ensure the
safe passage of commercial
shipping, safety of naval vessels, and minimize confusion in the
maritime operational
environment. This is accomplished through communication,
development of the common
operational picture (COP), and deconflicting, and protective
guidance for merchant shipping.
NCAGS policy approval and coordination with other
government agencies concerned with
merchant shipping functions requires consideration of political
and legal consequences.
These functions are the responsibility of the GCC. When
utilized, the NCAGS functional
element should be an integral part of the operational
commander’s organization.
Responsibility for managing merchant shipping in accordance
with approved NCAGS policy
is incumbent upon the GCC/operational commander and may be
delegated.

3. Mission and Capabilities

a. The NCAGS mission is to assist the GCC/operational
commander in managing risk
by providing situational awareness and near real-time clarity of
the merchant shipping
picture to help ensure the safe passage of merchant shipping and
the safety of naval vessels
or the nation in a crisis contingency, which may include combat
operations, piracy, or
foreign humanitarian assistance. This mission primarily
involves employing a framework
and capabilities for communicating directions, advisories,
concerns, and/or information
among NCAGS organizational elements (e.g., SCCs, operational
forces, merchant shipping,
and maritime organizations); the deconfliction of merchant
vessel sailings/operations, for
safety or operational reasons, to preclude interference with
naval or merchant ship activities;
and making recommendations to the GCC/operational
commander on the extent and type of
protection that may be provided to merchant shipping.

b. The NCAGS organization provides the operational
commander with the following
capabilities: liaison officers (LNOs), SCTs, and SCCs.

c. LNOs are the senior military subject matter experts
responsible for advising the
military commander on all matters relating to the civil maritime
industry. They are
responsible for evaluating how NCAGS should be employed and
recommending COAs to
the operational commander, and interacting with business
leaders in the civil maritime
industry (for the purpose of cooperation). The LNO or SCT
may operate as an NCAGS cell

for the Navy component commander or JFMCC maritime
operations center.

Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping

VII-3

d. The SCT provides an expeditionary capability to the
operational commander. SCTs
can both be located ashore or afloat, and provide the manpower
to support a 24 hour watch
section at sea or ashore. SCTs provide the capability to manage
regional commercial
shipping information and disseminate that information through
the common operating
environment. Depending on commercial traffic density and/or
complexity of operations,
additional SCTs can be added to meet requirements.

e. The SCCs is the foundation of the NCAGS organization.
SCCs are located in Dam
Neck, VA, Key West, FL, and Alameda, CA. SCCs are
comprised of watch officers,
maritime analysts, plotters, as well as their supporting command
infrastructure. SCCs are
regionally focused to support the GCC through its JFMCC in
improving maritime domain
awareness as it relates to merchant shipping (other than
strategic sealift). SCCs are
responsible for maintaining and refining commercial shipping
information within the COP
with a primary focus on maritime homeland defense, but also
capable of providing AOR
specific information to forward fleet commanders.

4. Implementing Naval Cooperation and Guidance for Shipping
Measures for
Commercial Shipping

While many NCAGS techniques and procedures are employed to
support the military
commander, the decision to implement NCAGS measures having
a direct impact on
commercial shipping requires the approval of SecDef. Because
of the potential economic
impact (delivery times, insurance rates, etc.), the NSA should
be consulted when considering
to implement NCAGS measures outlined in NTTP 3-07.12,
Naval Cooperation and
Guidance for Shipping, and ATP-2 (B), Naval Cooperation and
Guidance for Shipping
(NCAGS) Manual Guide to Owners, Operators, Masters and
Officers, Volume II. Foreign
flag commercial shipping may participate in protocols and
measures set forth by the NCAGS
organization on a voluntary basis, under the request of the
vessel’s owner or the flag state.
The Chief of Naval Operations, as the NCAGS organization
program sponsor, with the
support of US Fleet Forces Command maintains liaison with the
NSA and other civilian
authorities to coordinate the exchange of information
concerning implementation of NCAGS
measures.

Chapter VII

VII-4 JP 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

A-1

APPENDIX A
REFERENCES

The development of JP 4-01.2 is based upon the following
primary references:

1. General

a. Title 10, United States Code.

b. Title 50, United States Code.

2. Department of Defense Publications

a. Defense Transportation Regulation, Part II, Cargo
Movement.

b. Defense Transportation Regulation, Part III, Mobility.

c. DODD 5158.04, United States Transportation Command.

d. National Disclosure Policy 4, Naval Logistics.

3. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Publications

a. CJCSI 3110.01G, Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)

for FY 2008.

b. Logistics Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan.

c. CJCSM 3122.01A, Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES) Volume I,
Planning Policies and Procedures.

d. CJCSM 3122.02D, Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES) Volume
III, Time-Phased Force and Deployment Data Development and
Deployment Execution.

e. CJCSM 3122.03C, Joint Operation Planning and Execution
System (JOPES) Volume II,
Planning Formats.

f. JP 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States.

g. JP 3-02, Amphibious Operations.

h. JP 3-02.1, Amphibious Embarkation and Debarkation.

i. JP 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations.

j. JP 4-0, Joint Logistics.

k. JP 4-01, The Defense Transportation System.

l. JP 4-01.5, Joint Terminal Operations.

Appendix A

A-2 JP 4-02.1

m. JP 4-01.6, Joint Logistics Over-the-Shore.

n. JP 4-09, Distribution Operations.

4. Service Publications

a. NTTP 3-07.12, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for
Shipping.

b. NWP 3-02.3M, Maritime Prepositioning Force Operations.

c. NWP 3-02.21, MSC Support of Amphibious Operations.

d. NWP 3-62M/MCWP 3-31.7, Seabasing.

e. Marine Corps Warfare Publication 3-32, Maritime
Prepositioning Force Operations.

f. Field Manual (FM) 55-50, Army Water Transport Operations.

g. FM 55-65, Strategic Deployment.

h. COMSCINST 2000.2, Communications Policy and
Procedures Manual.

i. COMSCINST 3121.9A CH-2, Standard Operating Manual.

5. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Publication

ATP-2 (B), Volume II, Naval Cooperation and Guidance for
Shipping Manual.

B-1

APPENDIX B
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTRUCTIONS

1. User Comments

Users in the field are highly encouraged to submit comments on
this publication to: Joint
Staff J-7, Deputy Director, Joint and Coalition Warfighting,
Joint and Coalition Warfighting
Center, ATTN: Joint Doctrine Support Division, 116 Lake View
Parkway, Suffolk, VA
23435-2697. These comments should address content
(accuracy, usefulness, consistency, and
organization), writing, and appearance.

2. Authorship

The lead agent for this publication is the USTRANSCOM. The
Joint Staff doctrine
sponsor for this publication is the Director for Logistics (J-4).

3. Supersession

This publication supersedes JP 4-01.2, 31 August 2005, Sealift
Support to Joint
Operations.

4. Change Recommendations

a. Recommendations for urgent changes to this publication
should be submitted:

TO: CDRUSTRANSCOM SCOTT AFB IL//TCJ5/4 -PD//
INFO: JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC//J4/J7 -JEDD//

b. Routine changes should be submitted electronically to the
Deputy Director, Joint and
Coalition Warfighting, Joint and Coalition Warfighting Center,
Joint Doctrine Support
Division and info the lead agent and the Director for Joint Force
Development, J-7/Joint
Education and Doctrine Division.

c. When a Joint Staff directorate submits a proposal to the
CJCS that would change
source document information reflected in this publication, that
directorate will include a
proposed change to this publication as an enclosure to its
proposal. The Services and other
organizations are requested to notify the Joint Staff J-7 when
changes to source documents
reflected in this publication are initiated.

5. Distribution of Publications

Local reproduction is authorized, and access to unclassified
publications is unrestricted.
However, access to and reproduction authorization for classified
JPs must be in accordance
with DOD Manual 5200.01, DOD Information Security
Program: Overview, Classification,
and Declassification.

Appendix B

B-2 JP 4-02.1

6. Distribution of Electronic Publications

a. Joint Staff J-7 will not print copies of JPs for distribution.
Electronic versions are
available on Joint Doctrine, Education, and Training Electronic
Information System at
https://jdeis.js.mil (Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
[NIPRNET]) and
http://jdeis.js.smil.mil (SIPRNET), and on the Joint Electronic
Library (JEL) at
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine (NIPRNET).

b. Only approved JPs and joint test publications are releasable
outside the CCMDs,
Services, and Joint Staff. Release of any classified JP to
foreign governments or foreign
nationals must be requested through the local embassy (Defense
Attaché Office) to DIA,
Defense Foreign Liaison/IE-3, 200 MacDill Blvd., Joint Base
Anacostia-Bolling,
Washington, DC 20340-5100.

c. JEL CD-ROM. Upon request of a joint doctrine development
community member,
the Joint Staff J-7 will produce and deliver one CD-ROM with
current JPs. This JEL CD-
ROM will be updated not less than semi-annually and when
received can be locally
reproduced for use within the CCMDs and Services.

GL-1

GLOSSARY
PART I—ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ACE aviation combat element (USMC)
A/DACG arrival/departure airfield control group
ADCON administrative control
AE assault echelon
AFOE assault follow-on echelon
AOR area of responsibility
APF afloat pre-positioning force
APOD aerial port of debarkation
APS-3 Army pre-positioned stocks-3
ATF amphibious task force
ATP allied tactical publication

bbl barrel (42 US gallons)
BTU beach termination unit

C2 command and control
CATF commander, amphibious task force
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CCDR combatant commander
CCMD combatant command
CDRUSTRANSCOM Commander, United States Transportation
Command
CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction
CJCSM Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual
CMOS cargo movement operations system
COA course of action
COCOM combatant command (command authority)
COLDS cargo offload and discharge system
COMSC Commander, Military Sealift Command

COMSCINST Commander, Military Sealift Command
instruction
CONUS continental United States
COP common operational picture
CS combat support
CSS combat service support

DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DOD Department of Defense
DODD Department of Defense directive
DOT Department of Transportation
DPO distribution process owner
DTS Defense Transportation System
DWT deadweight tonnage

Glossary

GL-2 JP 4-01.2

EST embarked security team
EUSC effective United States controlled
EXORD execute order

FM field manual (Army)
FORSCOM United States Army Forces Command
FSS fast sealift ship
ft feet
FY fiscal year

GATES Global Air Transportation Execution System
GCC geographic combatant commander
GCCS-J Global Command and Control System-Joint
GFMIG Global Force Management Implementation Guidance

HF high frequency
HN host nation
HNS host-nation support
HQ headquarters
HSV high-speed vessel

ICODES integrated computerized deployment system
IGC Integrated Data Environment/Global Transportation
Network Convergence
ISB intermediate staging base
ITV in-transit visibility

JDDOC joint deployment and distribution operations center
JFAST Joint Flow and Analysis System for Transportation
JFC joint force commander
JFMCC joint force maritime component commander
JLOTS joint logistics over-the-shore
JOPES Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JP joint publication
JP5 jet propulsion fuel, type 5
JP8 jet propulsion fuel, type 8
JPAG Joint Planning Advisory Group
JSCP Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan
JTB Joint Transportation Board
JTF-PO joint task force-port opening

LF landing force
LMSR large, medium-speed roll-on/roll-off
LNO liaison officer
LO/LO lift-on/lift-off
LOTS logistics over-the-shore

Glossary

GL-3

LT long ton

MAGTF Marine air-ground task force
MARAD Maritime Administration
MARAD RRF Maritime Administration Ready Reserve Force
MCWP Marine Corps warfighting publication
MESF maritime expeditionary security force
MF mobile facility
MPS maritime pre-positioning ship
MPSRON maritime pre-positioning ships squadron
MSA Maritime Security Act
MSC Military Sealift Command
MSP Maritime Security Program
MTON measurement ton

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCAGS naval cooperation and guidance for shipping
NCAPS naval coordination and protection of shipping
NCOS naval control of shipping
NDAA National Defense Authorization Act
NDRF National Defense Reserve Fleet
NEAT naval embarked advisory team
NGO nongovernmental organization
NIPRNET Nonsecure Internet Protocol Router Network
NSA national shipping authority
NSE Navy support element
NTTP Navy tactics, techniques, and procedures
NWP Navy warfare publication

OPCON operational control
OPDS offshore petroleum discharge system (Navy)
OPDS-Future offshore petroleum discharge system-future
(Navy)

OPDS-Legacy offshore petroleum discharge system-legacy
(Navy)
OPLAN operation plan
OPORD operation order
OPSEC operations security
OVM Operation VIGILANT MARINER

PCTC pure car and truck carrier
POD port of debarkation
POE port of embarkation
POL petroleum, oils, and lubricants
PORTSIM port simulation model
PREPO pre-positioning
PSA port support activity

Glossary

GL-4 JP 4-01.2

RO/RO roll-on/roll-off
ROS reduced operating status

SALM single-anchor leg mooring
SCC shipping coordination center
SCT shipping coordination team
SDDC Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SDDCTEA Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
Transportation Engineering Agency
SEABEE sea barge
SecDef Secretary of Defense
SECNAV Secretary of the Navy
SECTRANS Secretary of Transportation
SEF sealift enhancement feature

SIPRNET SECRET Internet Protocol Router Network
SPOD seaport of debarkation
SPOE seaport of embarkation

TACON tactical control
T-AH hospital ship
T-AVB aviation logistics support ship
TC-AIMS II Transportation Coordinator’s Automated
Information for
Movement System II
TCC transportation component command
T-JTB theater-joint transportation board
TPFDD time-phased force and deployment data
TWCF Transportation Working Capital Fund

USA United States Army
USAF United States Air Force
USCG United States Coast Guard
USG United States Government
USMC United States Marine Corps
USN United States Navy
USNORTHCOM United States Northern Command
USTRANSCOM United States Transportation Command

VISA Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement
VTA voluntary tanker agreement

GL-5

PART II—TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

active sealift forces. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-

02.)

administrative landing. None. (Approved for removal from JP
1-02.)

afloat pre-positioning force. Shipping maintained in full
operational status to afloat pre-
position military equipment and supplies in support of
combatant commanders’
operation plans, consisting of the three maritime pre-positioning
ships squadrons, the
Army’s afloat pre-positioning stocks-3 ships, and the Defense
Logistics Agency, and the
Air Force ships. Also called APF. (Approved for incorporation
into JP 1-02.)

afloat pre-positioning ships. None. (Approved for removal
from JP 1-02.)

afloat support. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

bale cubic capacity. The space available for cargo measured in
cubic feet to the inside of
the cargo battens, on the frames, and to the underside of the
beams. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)

capacity load (Navy). None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-
02.)

common operating environment. Automation services that
support the development of the
common reusable software modules that enable interoperability
across multiple combat
support applications. Also called COE. (Approved for
incorporation into

JP 1-02.)

common-user ocean terminals. A military installation, part of a
military installation, or a
commercial facility operated under contract or arrangement by
the Surface Deployment
and Distribution Command which regularly provides for two or
more Services terminal
functions of receipt, transit storage or staging, processing, and
loading and unloading of
passengers or cargo aboard ships. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-
01.2)

common-user transportation. Transportation and transportation
services provided on a
common basis for two or more Department of Defense agencies
and, as authorized, non-
Department of Defense agencies. (Approved for incorporation
into JP 1-02.)

convoy schedule. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

dispersion. 1. A scattered pattern of hits around the mean point
of impact of bombs and
projectiles dropped or fired under identical conditions. (JP 3-
60) 2. The spreading or
separating of troops, materiel, establishments, or activities,
which are usually
concentrated in limited areas to reduce vulnerability. (JP 5-0)
3. In chemical and
biological operations, the dissemination of agents in liquid or
aerosol form.
(JP 3-41) 4. In airdrop operations, the scatter of personnel
and/or cargo on the drop
zone. (JP 3-17) 5. In naval control of shipping, the reberthing
of a ship in the periphery

of the port area or in the vicinity of the port for its own
protection in order to minimize
the risk of damage from attack. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

Glossary

GL-6 JP 4-01.2

effective United States controlled ships. United States-owned
foreign flag ships that can
be tasked by the Maritime Administration to support
Department of Defense
requirements when necessary. Also called EUSCS. (Approved
for replacement of
“effective US controlled ships” and its definition in JP 1-02.)

fly-in echelon. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

government-owned, contract-operated ships. None. (Approved
for removal from JP 1-
02.)

government-owned, Military Sealift Command-operated ships.
None. (Approved for
removal from JP 1-02.)

heavy-lift ship. A ship specially designed and capable of
loading and unloading heavy and
bulky items and has booms of sufficient capacity to
accommodate a single lift of 100
tons. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

intermediate maintenance (field). None. (Approved for
removal from JP 1-02.)

intracoastal sealift. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-
02.)

in-transit visibility. The ability to track the identity, status, and
location of Department of
Defense units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum,
oils, and lubricants) and
passengers; patients; and personal property from origin to
consignee or destination
across the range of military operations. Also called ITV. (JP 1-
02. SOURCE: JP 4-
01.2)

Joint Transportation Board. Responsible to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the
Joint Transportation Board assures that common-user
transportation resources assigned
or available to the Department of Defense are allocated as to
achieve maximum benefit
in meeting Department of Defense objectives. Also called JTB.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE:
JP 4-01.2)

Maritime Administration. The Maritime Administration is the
agency within the United
States Department of Transportation dealing with waterborne
transportation. Also
called MARAD. (Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

Maritime Security Program. A program authorized in the
Maritime Security Act of 2003
requiring the Secretary of Transportation, in consultation with
the Secretary of Defense,
to establish a fleet of active, commercially viable, militarily
useful, privately-owned

vessels to meet national defense and other security
requirements. Also called MSP.
(Approved for inclusion in JP 1-02.)

merchant ship communications system. None. (Approved for
removal from JP 1-02.)

merchant ship reporting and control message system. None.
(Approved for removal
from JP 1-02.)

Glossary

GL-7

mercomms system. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-
02.)

Military Sealift Command. A major command of the United
States Navy reporting to
Commander Fleet Forces Command, and the United States
Transportation Command’s
component command responsible for designated common-user
sealift transportation
services to deploy, employ, sustain, and redeploy United States
forces on a global basis.
Also called MSC. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Military Sealift Command force. Common-user sealift
consisting of three subsets: the
Naval Fleet Auxiliary Force, common-user ocean transportation,
and the special mission
support force. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

National Defense Reserve Fleet. 1. Including the Maritime
Administration Ready Reserve
Force, a fleet composed of ships acquired and maintained by the
Maritime
Administration for use in mobilization or emergency. 2. Less
the Maritime
Administration Ready Reserve Force, a fleet composed of the
older dry cargo ships,
tankers, troop transports, and other assets in Maritime
Administration’s custody that are
maintained at a relatively low level of readiness. Also called
NDRF. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)

national shipping authority. The organization within each
Allied government responsible
in time of war for the direction of its own merchant shipping.
Also called NSA. (JP 1-
02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

naval coordination and protection of shipping. None.
(Approved for removal from JP 1-
02.)

naval coordination and protection of shipping officer. None.
(Approved for removal
from JP 1-02.)

naval coordination and protection of shipping organization.
None. (Approved for
removal from JP 1-02.)

naval tactical data system. None. (Approved for removal from
JP 1-02.)

Ocean Cargo Clearance Authority. None. (Approved for

removal from JP 1-02.)

origin. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

passenger mile. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

point-to-point sealift. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-
02.)

port of embarkation. The geographic point in a routing scheme
from which cargo or
personnel depart. Also called POE. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)

Glossary

GL-8 JP 4-01.2

reduced operating status. Military Sealift Command ships
withdrawn from full operating
status because of decreased operational requirements. Also
called ROS. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-02.)

replenishment at sea. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-
02.)

safe anchorage. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

sea barge. A type of barge-ship that can carry up to 38 loaded
barges and also carry tugs,
stacked causeway sections, various watercraft, or heavy lift
equipment to better support
joint logistics over-the-shore operations. Also called SEABEE.

(Approved for inclusion in
JP 1-02.)

sealift enhancement features. Special equipment and
modifications that adapt merchant-
type dry cargo ships and tankers to specific military missions.
Also called SEFs.
(Approved for inclusion into JP 1-02.)

Sealift Readiness Program. None. (Approved for removal from
JP 1-02.)

seaport. A land facility designated for reception of personnel or
materiel moved by sea, and
that serves as an authorized port of entrance into or departure
from the country in which
located. (JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

shipping control. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

staging base. 1. An advanced naval base for the anchoring,
fueling, and refitting of
transports and cargo ships as well as replenishment of mobile
service squadrons. 2. A
landing and takeoff area with minimum servicing, supply, and
shelter provided for the
temporary occupancy of military aircraft during the course of
movement from one
location to another. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02
with JP 4-01.2 as the
source JP.)

stowage factor. The number that expresses the space, in cubic
feet, occupied by a long ton
of any commodity as prepared for shipment, including all
crating or packaging.

(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02 with JP 4-01.2 as the
source JP.)

strategic sealift shipping. Common-user ships of the Military
Sealift Command force,
including pre-positioned ships after their pre-positioning
mission has been completed
and they have been returned to the operational control of the
Military Sealift Command.
(JP 1-02. SOURCE: JP 4-01.2)

traffic density. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

underway replenishment. None. (Approved for removal from
JP 1-02.)

underway replenishment force. None. (Approved for removal
from JP 1-02.)

underway replenishment group. None. (Approved for removal
from JP 1-02.)

Glossary

GL-9

United States controlled shipping. That shipping under United
States flag and selected
ships under foreign flag considered to be under effective United
States control.
(Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

United States naval ship. A public vessel of the United States
that is in the custody of the

Navy and is: a. Operated by the Military Sealift Command and
manned by a civil
service crew; or b. Operated by a commercial company under
contract to the Military
Sealift Command and manned by a merchant marine crew. Also
called USNS.
(Approved for replacement of “United States Naval Ship” in JP
1-02.)

US commercial assets. None. (Approved for removal from JP
1-02.)

US Transportation Command coordinating instructions. None.
(Approved for removal
from JP 1-02.

vehicle cargo. Wheeled or tracked equipment, including
weapons, that require certain deck
space, head room, and other definite clearance. (Approved for
incorporation into JP 1-
02 with JP 4-01.2 as the source JP.)

Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement. An agreement that
provides the Department of
Defense with assured access to United States flag assets, both
vessel capacity and
intermodal systems, to meet Department of Defense contingency
requirements. Also
called VISA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

voluntary tanker agreement. An agreement established by the
Maritime Administration to
provide for United States commercial tanker owners and
operators to voluntarily make
their vessels available to satisfy the Department of Defense to
meet contingency or war

requirements for point-to-point petroleum, oils, and lubricants
movements. Also called
VTA. (Approved for incorporation into JP 1-02.)

wartime load. None. (Approved for removal from JP 1-02.)

Glossary

GL-10 JP 4-01.2

Intentionally Blank

Maintenance

Approval Development

Initiation

JOINT
DOCTRINE

PUBLICATION

ENHANCED
JOINT

WARFIGHTING
CAPABILITY

STEP #3 - Approval STEP #2 - Development

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JSDS delivers adjudicated matrix to JS J-7

JS J-7 prepares publication for signature

JSDS prepares JS staffing package

JSDS staffs the publication via JSAP for
signature

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LA selects primary review authority (PRA) to develop the first
draft (FD)

PRA develops FD for staffing with JDDC

FD comment matrix adjudication

JS J-7 produces the final coordination (FC) draft, staffs to
JDDC and JS via Joint Staff Action Processing (JSAP) system

Joint Staff doctrine sponsor (JSDS) adjudicates FC comment
matrix

FC joint working group

STEP #4 - Maintenance

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JP published and continuously
assessed by users

Formal assessment begins
24-27 months following
publication

Revision begins 3.5 years
after publication

Each JP revision is completed
no later than 5 years after
signature

STEP #1 - Initiation

l

l

l

l

l

l

Joint doctrine development
community (JDDC) submission to fill
extant operational void

Joint Staff (JS) J-7 conducts front-
end analysis

Joint Doctrine Planning Conference
validation

Program directive (PD) development
and staffing/joint working group

PD includes scope, references,
outline, milestones, and draft
authorship

JS J-7 approves and releases PD to
lead agent (LA) (Service, combatant
command, JS directorate)

JOINT DOCTRINE PUBLICATIO NS HIERARCHY

JOINT
DOCTRINE

JP 1

LOGISTICS
COMMUNICATIONS

SYSTEMPLANSOPERATIONSPERSONNEL INTELLIGENCE

JP 1-0 JP 2-0 JP 3-0 JP 4-0 JP 5-0 JP 6-0

LOGISTICS

JP 4-0

All joint publications are organized into a comprehensive
hierarchy as shown in the chart above. Joint
Publication (JP) 4-01.2 is in the Logistics series of joint
doctrine publications. The diagram below
illustrates an overview of the development process:

PREFACESUMMARY OF CHANGESTABLE OF
CONTENTSEXECUTIVE SUMMARYCHAPTER I
OVERVIEW1. General2. The Strategic Mobility Triad3. The
Sealift TridentCHAPTER II ORGANIZATION AND
RESPONSIBILITIES1. General2. Forces and Authority3.
Service-Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation4.
Organizations and Responsibilities5. Command and Control
ArchitectureCHAPTER III SEALIFT CAPABILITIES1.
General2. Ship Types3. Sealift Ship Programs4. Sealift
Enhancement Features5. Logistics Over-the-ShoreCHAPTER IV
PLANNING1. General2. Execution Planning3. Sealift Asset
Planning4. Basic Cargo Planning Concepts5. Protection and
Operations Security6. Environmental Considerations7.

Automated Planning Tools8. Transition from Peace to Conflict
to Stability Operations9. Other ConsiderationsCHAPTER V
EMPLOYMENT OF SEALIFT FORCES1. General2.
Execution3. Communications System Support4. Logistic
Support5. Intermodal Operations6. Amphibious/Expeditionary
Operations7. Support to Seabasing, Military Engagement and
Security Cooperation Activities,and Humanitarian
AssistanceCHAPTER VI VESSEL ACQUISITION AND
ACTIVATION PROGRAMS1. Genera l2.Government-
Owned/Controlled Assets3. Commercial Controlled
AssetsCHAPTER VII NAVAL COOPERATION AND
GUIDANCE FOR SHIPPING1. General2. Organization3.
Mission and Capabilities4. Implementing Naval Cooperation
and Guidance for Shipping Measures forCommercial
ShippingAPPENDICESAPPENDIX A
REFERENCESAPPENDIX B ADMINISTRATIVE
INSTRUCTIONSGLOSSARYPART I —ABBREVIATIONS AND
ACRONYMSPART II —TERMS AND
DEFINITIONSFIGURESFigure I -1. Strategic Mobility
TriadFigure I-2. Advantages and Disadvantages of Elements of
the Strategic Mobility TriadFigure I-3. Phases of Strategic
MobilityFigure I-4. The Sealift TridentFigure II-1. Service-
Organic or Theater-Assigned Transportation Sealift
AssetsFigure II-2. Responsibilities of the Commander, United
States Transportation CommandFigure III-1. Types of Dry
Cargo ShipsFigure III-2. Types of Liquid Cargo CarriersFigure
III-3. Sealift Ship ProgramsFigure IV-1. Supporting Strategic
Transportation RequirementsFigure IV-2. Measures of Ship
CapacityFigure IV-3. Cargo Planning FactorsFigure IV-4.
Sealift Planning FactorsFigure IV-5. Sealift Asset Availability
TimesFigure V-1. SeabasingFigure VI-1. Sealift Acquisition and
Activation PlanFigure VI-2. Ready Reserve Force Activation
Process for Contingency Deployments ofCommon-User
ShipsFigure VI-3. National Defense Reserve Fleet
Activation/Ship Requisition ProcessFigure VI-4. Voluntary
Intermodal Sealift Agreement Activation Process

Tactics, Techniques, and ProceduresTactics, Techniques, and
Procedures

09-48
Sep 09

Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

Foreword

This handbook is designed to aid the requiring activity in
developing a performance
work statement (PWS). Army reliance on contracts for
equipment, supplies, and
services has significantly increased in recent years. Identifying
the requiring
activity’s requirements and clearly articulating them, in a PWS
is critical; nothing is
more fundamental to the success of a contract than the PWS.

Key lessons:

• A PWS defines a unit’s contractor support requirement for
supplies,
services, or construction.

• A PWS does not dictate the ways and means of contractor
support.

• The benefit of a well-written PWS is that the government pays
for results,
not activity.

• The handbook’s eight-step process for writing a PWS greatly
increases
the probability of maximizing contractor performance.

The PWS is a detailed set of verifiable performance or quality
standards for
everything the contractor is required to perform or produce. A
PWS must be
specific because contracting officers and contractors are not
mind readers. A
properly-developed PWS is concise in defining the performance
parameters and
quality of product. Ultimately, an effective PWS is the basis for
viable contracts
that meet or exceed the user’s requirements.

Developing a Performance Work Statement

Table of Contents

Introduction 1

Chapter 1. Introduction to Performance Work Statements and
Statements of Work

3

Chapter 2. Contracting 101 7

Chapter 3. English 101: Guidelines for Writing a Performance
Work
Statement

11

Chapter 4. Eight Steps to Developing a Performance Work
Statement 15

Chapter 5. Government-Provided Support Considerations 31

Appendix A. Blank Performance Work Statement Template 35

Appendix B. Example of a Performance Work Statement for
Grounds
and Roads Maintenance

43

Appendix C. Example of a Performance Work Statement for
Shower
and Hand-Washing Station Requirements

51

Appendix D. Terms and Definitions 55

Center for Army Lessons Learned

Director Colonel Robert W. Forrester

Division Chief Dave Bialas

CALL Analysts John Goodloe

Jack Crafton

Contributing Author Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stone

Production Coordinator/Editor Kristine Bell

Graphic Artist Julie Gunter

Distribution Manager Candice Miller

i

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

The Secretary of the Army has determined that the publication
of this periodical is
necessary in the transaction of the public business as required
by law of the
Department.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine
gender is used, both
are intended.

Note: Any publications (other than CALL publications)
referenced in this product,
such as ARs, FMs, and TMs, must be obtained through your
pinpoint distribution
system.

ii

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Introduction

This first edition (version 1.0) of the performance work
statement (PWS) handbook
contains a summary of how to develop a PWS. Contingency
contracting officers
(KOs) frequently perform this task in a deployed environment.
Information from
numerous sources within the defense acquisition community,
hard lessons from
countless requiring activities (units), and contingency KOs in
deployed
environments contributed to this handbook.

The authors designed this handbook for users operating in a
deployed environment
based on realities they do not routinely find in continental U.S.
operations. The
design of the handbook allows you to pick it up and begin
reading at any point,
much like a reference book, so you may want to start with a
topic that interests you.
Use the table of contents to identify general areas of interest,
find what you need,
place the handbook in your Army combat uniform cargo pocket,
and tackle a
statement of work or PWS-related task with confidence.

This handbook is a guide and is not a substitute for official
training. Your
supporting contracting office will normally provide training, or
you can attend
courses offered at the Army Logistics Management College
(ALMC).

Recommended Resident Training Courses

Performance Work Statements Course

Purpose: To train military and civilians in the Department of
Defense (DOD) and
employees of DOD contractors. Successfully completing the
Performance Work
Statement (PWS) Course will prepare officers,
noncommissioned officers, and
civilians to prepare a PWS.

Scope: This three-day course is designed to provide an overview
of writing a PWS.

Prerequisites: None. This course is targeted to individuals who
will prepare or edit
statements of work and PWSs.

Teaching locations: The PWS Course is primarily taught in
residence at Fort Lee,
VA, and various on-site locations.

For further details and enrollment, go online to:
<http://www.almc.army.mil/hsv/hsv.htm>.

Operational Contract Support Course

Purpose: The Operational Contract Support Course prepares
graduates to perform
contract planning and management duties (to include developing
a PWS) in tactical
unit staffs (brigade through theater Army) for deployed
operations.

Scope: This two-week course is designed for commissioned,
noncommissioned, and
warrant officers and civilians assigned to tactical unit staffs
(brigade through
theater Army) who will be responsible to plan for and assist in
the integration of
contracted support during deployed operations. This is not a
career development
course but a “how to” course for the preparation of acquisition-
ready requirements
packages and the management of a unit’s overall contract
officer’s representative
responsibilities for basic service and supply contracts.
Graduates will learn through

1

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

practical exercise the proper preparation of PWSs, independent
government cost
estimates, purchase requests, and contract performance
oversight techniques
necessary to assure mission success.

Prerequisites: This course is branch immaterial and not an
acquisition workforce
course. There are no restrictions as to grade, rank, position, or
duty status as long as
the student is assigned to or being assigned to units responsible
for performing
contract planning and management duties. An additional skill
identifier is being
planned and will be awarded to course graduates.

Teaching locations: The Operational Contract Support Course is
taught in residence
at Fort Lee, VA.

For further details and enrollment, go online to:
<http://www.almc.army.mil/hsv/hsv.htm>.

The proponent for this manual is the U.S. Army Combined Arms
Support
Command (CASCOM). The approving authority is the CASCOM
commanding
general. The preparing agent is the Assistant Secretary of the
Army (Acquisition,
Logistics, and Technology) Integration Office (ALT-IO)
collocated with
headquarters (HQ) CASCOM. The technical review authority is
the HQ U.S. Army
Materiel Command and deputy assistant secretary–
acquisition/materiel. The
publisher is the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Center for
Army Lessons
Learned. Send comments and recommendations on Department
of the Army Form
2028 (Recommended Changes to Publications and Blank Forms)
to Commander,
U.S. Army Combined Arms Support Command, ATTN: ATCL -
ALT-IO, 2221
Adams Avenue, SCOE Building, Fort Lee, VA, 23801-1899.

2

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Chapter 1

Introduction to Performance Work Statements and
Statements of Work

Getting statements of work (SOW) or performance work
statements (PWS) correct
is no easy task in a combat environment; however, nothing is
more fundamental to
the success of a contract. If the PWS is too vague, too broad, or
too generic, it can
leave room for wild and varied interpretations in a less than
ideal business
environment. These various interpretations can lead to mission
failure.

Often the requiring activity (typically your unit) gives little
thought to developing
the PWS. Frequently the project along with a poorly written
PWS with vague
requirements makes its way to a contracting officer who knows
little or nothing of
the history and importance of the requirement. Remember, any
contract starts with
a PWS, and PWS development is the requiring activity’s
responsibility. Who else
knows best what they want?

There are two major categories of acquisitions: supplies and
services. A service
contract directly engages the time and effort of a contractor
whose primary purpose
is to perform an identifiable task rather than to furnish an end
item of supply. In
order to communicate what tasks the contractor is to perform,
the requiring activity

(your unit) must develop the PWS or SOW.

For the purposes of this handbook, the term SOW is used to
refer to the document
completely describing the contractual work requirement. Unless
otherwise noted,
SOW also encompasses the term PWS.

Performance-based PWS means that the government describes
its requirements and
lets the contractor determine how it will meet them. The
contract is based on
performance rather than methodology as in a SOW.

SOW for baking one dozen chocolate chip cookies

Ingredients:

1 cup (c.) butter (or ¾ c. butter and ¼ c. butter-flavored Crisco)

2 ¼ c. all-purpose flour

1 c. dark brown sugar

½ c. granulated sugar

2 large eggs, beaten

2 teaspoons (tsp) real bourbon vanilla extract

12 ounces semi-sweet chocolate chips

1 c. shelled walnuts

3

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Ingredients (continued):

1 tsp milk

½ tsp water

1 tsp baking soda

½ tsp salt

Directions:

Preheat your oven to 325° Fahrenheit.

Use an electric mixer to mix sugars and butter in a large bowl.
Add the
other wet ingredients, mixing well. Then mix in flour, baking
soda, and salt.
Finally, mix in chocolate and nuts.

Place tablespoon-sized balls of cookie dough on an ungreased
baking sheet
and bake for about 11 minutes (cooking times may vary). The
cookies will be
extremely soft when removed from the oven. Carefully lift the
cookies with a
spatula and place them on a rack to cool. Ensure there is
protection from
flies and rodents.

Packaging should provide adequate moisture protection so that
the cookies

remain fresh and no more than five percent of the delivered
cookies
experience breakage.

Delivery must be made not later than 7 days after contract
award at
Forward Operating Base (FOB) Diamondback, Building 171, in
the 5th floor
lobby. Acceptance will be made by the COR after tasting a
random sample.

PWS for baking one dozen chocolate chip cookies

What? Bake one dozen delicious chocolate chip cookies.

When? One week from today.

Where? FOB Diamondback, Building 171, 5th floor lobby.

How many? 1 dozen (12 cookies).

How well? Must taste good and not be broken.

4

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

In developing the PWS, the development team should keep in
mind a shared vision
of the project and consensus on the end state. The team must be
willing to
compromise without losing sight of the answers to three key
questions:

1. What do I need?

2. When do I need it?

3. How do I know it is good when I receive it?

Using the PWS approach encourages efficiency and innovation
on the part of the
contractor. At the same time, developing a PWS requires
substantially less research
and work for the team developing the requirement.

Benefits of a PWS

The PWS:

• Provides better value. The government pays for results, not
activity.

• Maximizes performance. The contractor and the government
focus on
results, not procedure. The contractor delivers the required
service or
goods but follows its own best practices. Provided that the
delivered
service (outcome) remains in accordance with the contract,
contractors
can adjust their processes, as appropriate, throughout the life of
the
contract without the burden of contract modifications. The use
of
incentives further motivates contractor performance.

• Detailed processes are not required, which allows the
contractor
flexibility in proposing the best solution and the option to

follow standard
industry procedures. In addition, the government is relieved of
the burden
to provide detailed processes. However, detailed specifications
may be
required in some cases.

• Promotes the use of commercial services. The ability to use
commercial
services allows the government to take advantage of existing
industry
practices and reduces the use of government-unique contract
clauses and
requirements.

• Maximizes competition. Competition is maximized not just in
the areas of
cost and price, but also when it comes to ideas and innovation.
The PWS
approach allows for greater innovation and has the potential to
attract a
broader industry base to a project. Encouraging innovation from
the
supplier base by using performance requirements maximizes
opportunities for competitive alternatives in place of
government-directed
solutions.

Other potential benefits include an increased likelihood of
meeting mission needs;
increased focus on intended results, not processes; and
contractor buy-in and shared
interests. Additionally, shared incentives permit innovation and
cost effectiveness;
surveillance is less frequent, but more meaningful; and the
government can choose

from a variety of solutions.

5

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Chapter 2

Contracting 101

As a member of the acquisition team, you will be developing
Section C of the
contract, and you should have a basic understanding of the
“cradle to grave”
concept of contracting (see Figure 1-1 for generic contracting
flow). If you are
writing the performance work statement (PWS), you will most
likely be
participating in many other aspects of the contracting process.

Figure 1-1. Contracting flow

Essential Elements of the Contract

Contracts generally follow the uniform contract format. This
format divides each
contract into parts I, II, III, and IV.

(Tip: Pay particular attention to Section C below)

Part I: The schedule

Section A (contract form): This section contains basic
information such as the
issuing office, addresses, and contract number.

7

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Requiring
activity
(unit)

Finance
office

Contractor
(commercial

entity)

Develop an
acquisition-ready package

PWS
development

COR: Performance
modeling

Acquisition review board
(if required)

Funding

Payment

Request for proposal:

Invoice
Close

out

Performance/deliverables

As part of the acquisition-ready package COR: contracting
officer’s representative

Contracting �
�

�

Justification and authority
Source selection
Contract award

Section B (supplies or services and prices/costs): This section
contains a brief
description of the supplies or services and quantity.

Section C (description/specifications/statement of work
[SOW]/PWS): This section
contains a detailed description of the requirement and may
contain references to
other sections of the contract.

PWS format within Section C:

• Section C-1: General

• Section C-2: Definitions

• Section C-3: Government-furnished property and services

• Section C-4: Contractor-furnished items

• Section C-5: Requirements

• Section C-6: Publications and forms

• Technical exhibits

Section D (packaging and marking): This section provides
packaging, packing,
preservation, and marking requirements.

Section E (inspection and acceptance): This section contains
inspection,
acceptance, quality assurance, and reliability requirements.
(Inspect all deliverable
items, services, or materials to determine satisfactory
compliance with the contract.
Remember if you sign the receiving report it is too late to reject
the service or
deliverables.)

Section F (delivery or performance): This section specifies the
time, place, and
method of delivery or performance.

Section G (contract administration data): This section contains
any required
accounting, appropriation data, required contract administration
information, or
instructions other than those on the solicitation form.

Section H (special contract requirements): This section contains
a clear statement of
any special contract requirements that are not included in
Section I, Part II, contract
clauses, or in any other sections of the contract.

Part II: Contract clauses

Section I, commonly known as the “boilerplate”: This section
includes standard
clauses of considerable power that define the rights and
responsibilities of
contracting parties. It also contains clauses mandated by
regulations or laws. Local
clauses are also added depending on the particular location.

8

CENTER FOR ARMY L ESSONS LEARNED

Part III: List of documents, exhibits, and other attachments

Key highlights: Contains Section J, which is the list of attached
documents,
exhibits, and other items. Any cross-references to material in
other sections of the
contract may be included.

Part IV: Representations and instructions

Section K, representations, certifications, and other statements:
This section
includes solicitation provisions that require representations,

certifications, or the
submission of other information by offerors or respondents.

Section L, instructions, conditions and notices to offerors or
quoters: This section
contains basic information such as the issuing office, address,
and contract number.

Section M, evaluation factors for award: This section includes
solicitation
provisions and other information or instructions not provided
elsewhere to guide
offerors or respondents in preparing proposals or responses to
requests for
information. This section may also instruct prospective offerors
or respondents to
submit proposals or information in a specific format or
severable parts to facilitate
evaluation. The instructions may specify further organization of
proposal or
response parts, such as:

• Administrative

• Management

• Technical

• Past performance

• Cost or pricing data or information other than cost or pricing
data

Developing the Acquisition Team Contact List

The acquisition team consists of all participants in the

acquisition process such as
the requiring activity; finance officer; resource manager (RM);
contracting officer
(KO); contracting officer’s representative (COR); and others, as
applicable.
Successful teams typically assign specific duties to each
member, develop
performance measures and milestones, and hold each member of
the group and the
group as a whole accountable. Normally, leadership of the team
comes from the
KO, however the COR plays a critical role in determining the
success of the
contract after its award.

Basic acquisition team

KO: The KO is the only individual expressly authorized to enter
into, administer, or
terminate contracts. KOs are responsible for ensuring all
contract actions comply
with appropriate laws, executive orders, regulations, and other
applicable
procedures and approvals.

Requiring activity: The requiring activity is usually the Army
unit that has a
requirement for goods or services and initiates the requirement.
CORs routinely

9

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

interface between the requiring activity (which is most often the
COR’s own unit),
the contractor, and the supported customer (which may be the
requiring activity).

General counsel: The general counsel provides legal advice to
the acquisition team
and reviews acquisition documents for legal sufficiency. Your
KO will have the
legal point of contact.

COR: The COR is an individual or several individuals
(depending on the contract)
the KO appoints in writing. The COR monitors the technical or
performance
aspects of a contract and performs other duties specified in the
appointment letter or
orders. Ideally upon contract award, each individual who serves
as a COR
participates in developing the requirement and other pre-award
activities so he/she
is familiar with all aspects of the contract.

RM: The RM provides advice and guidance to the commander
and is responsible
for developing command resource requirements, identifying
sources of funding,
determining cost, acquiring funds, distributing and controlling
funds, and tracking
costs and obligations.

Miscellaneous others: Other personnel may also be used based
on areas of expertise
that could affect the requirement and overall acquisition action.
An example
includes an individual appointed to develop the PWS or SOW.

(Tip: Write down the acquisition team members’ names, units,
phone numbers, and
email addresses.)

10

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Chapter 3

English 101: Guidelines for Writing a Performance
Work Statement

When writing a performance work statement (PWS), focus on
the intended
audience. Both the author and the reader must understand the
PWS. A variety of
personnel from diverse disciplines and backgrounds, such as
those from foreign
countries, will read and interpret each PWS. Moreover, offerors
(usually local
nationals or third country nationals in a deployed environment)
will interpret words
within the PWS to identify potential costs and to determine
anticipated profit as
well as the ability to compete with other offerors. Therefore,
write the PWS with
terms that are clear, simple, concise, and legally enforceable.

Writing Guidelines

Style

Style is how you express ideas in phrases, sentences, and
paragraphs. Strive to
present information in a concise, accurate, thorough, and logical
sequence. Avoid
complex words. The purpose of writing is to express, not
impress.

Sentences

Good writing of any type depends on natural order. Eliminate
long, complicated
sentences by creating two or three short, simple sentences
limited to a single
thought or idea. Avoid legal phrases, technical jargon, and other
elaborate phrases.
Strive to omit extraneous words or phrases; eliminate
unnecessary words from
sentences and omit unnecessary sentences from paragraphs.

Paragraphs

A paragraph may consist of one or more sentences to state and
discuss a single idea
or similar ideas. State the main idea in a topic sentence at the
beginning of the
paragraph. The topic sentence provides a base for subsequent
sentences that
develop and support the main idea. While paragraph length will
vary, avoid long
paragraphs that may crowd ideas and confuse the reader. Shorter
paragraphs are
more visually appealing and easier to read and understand.
Number paragraphs for
easy reference.

Usage

Use the active voice. In the active voice, the subject performs
rather than receives
the action. The active voice is clearer and uses fewer words
without reducing
clarity. The active voice makes the subject (the contractor)
responsible and
accountable for the action or performance required.

11

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Active versus passive voice for routine services:

Active Passive

Clean up all debris at the end of each
workday.

The debris shall be picked up at the
end of each workday.

Empty trash containers twice a
week.

Trash containers shall be emptied
twice a week.

Install new air filters in accordance
with manufacturer’s
recommendations.

New air filters are required in

accordance with the manufacturer’s
recommendations.

Ambiguity

Ambiguity is the use of vague, indefinite, or uncertain terms
and words. Examples
of some ambiguous phrases include securely mounted, properly
assembled, and
carefully performed. The PWS must be free of ambiguous words
or phrases such as
etc., as required, as directed, good workmanship, assist, best
commercial practice,
including but not limited to, and as necessary. These terms are
ambiguous because
one cannot quantify, precisely measure, or state objectively
what they mean.

Punctuation

Use minimal punctuation. Since the goal is to write simple,
short, concise
sentences, a well-written document should require minimum
punctuation. When
complicated punctuation is required, consider rewriting the
sentence. Construct
sentences so that inadvertent misplacement or elimination of a
punctuation mark
will not alter the intended meaning. For maximum clarity,
follow the formal rules
of punctuation.

Abbreviations and acronyms

Abbreviations and acronyms are a form of shorthand used to
make complex terms

short and precise. However, they can cause misunderstandings
when the reader is
from outside the U.S. or if the abbreviations and acronyms have
multiple meanings;
for example, CO can mean commanding officer, commissioned
officer, or change
order. Upon first use, use the complete term followed by the
abbreviation or
acronym in parentheses. When there are many abbreviations or
acronyms, develop
a glossary.

Symbols

Use the full word associated with the symbol unless the
meaning is universally
clear

Numbers

Spell out numbers under 10 except when they represent
dimensions. Use the
numeral form for figures 10 and above. Represent dimensions,
degrees of
temperature, percentages, and dollars and cents as numerals.
One or zero should

12

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

always be spelled out when used alone. When two numbers are
used together to
define both size and quantity, use a written word for one of the

numbers (for
example, six 55-gallon metal drums).

Redundancy and repetition

Avoid redundancy and unnecessary repetition. They reduce
clarity and increase the
likelihood of ambiguity, inconsistency, and internal
contradiction.

Misused words and phrases

The following is a list of commonly misused and abused words,
phrases, and
terminology that when improperly applied will confuse the
reader and obscure
rather than clarify the requirements:

• Shall and will. Use “shall” to specify that a provision is
binding and to
describe the contractor’s work requirements. Use “will” to
express a
statement of acts and actions that will occur.

• Shall and should. Use “shall” to specify that a provision is
binding; it
ordinarily is used to describe the work required to be done by
the
contractor. Use “should” to indicate an expected course of
action or
policy that is to be followed unless inappropriate for a
particular
circumstance.

• Any and either. These words imply a contractual choice.
Unless the intent

is to give the contractor a choice, specify the true intent. For
instance, the
word “any” means a limited number selected at the discretion of
the
reader (contractor). The statement “mow any areas over” can
mean any of
the areas selected by the contractor, while “mow areas over”
means every
area spelled out in the requirements. The word “either” implies
a choice
between two options. For instance, clean glass on either side is
incorrect
if the intent is to require the contractor to clean both sides of
the glass.

• And, or, and/or, and etc. Use “and” if both conditions are true
and “or” if
only one of the conditions is true. Avoid using “and/or” because
using
those two words together creates ambiguity (are both conditions
true or is
only one true). Also, avoid the use of “etc.” because the reader
may not
be aware of what constitutes the subset of etc.

Remember, a well-written PWS:

• Meets the SMART (specific, measurable, attainable, relevant,
and timely)
test.

• Provides a complete definition of the work requirements.

• Withstands changes in staffing—both contractor and requiring
activity.

• Minimizes interpretation errors.

• Details obligations, expectations, and deliverables.

13

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

• Identifies acceptance criteria to ensure desired outcomes are
achieved.

• Ties deliverables to contractor payments.

Figure 3-1. The consequences of a poorly-written PWS for a
gravel parking area.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Chapter 4

Eight Steps to Developing a Performance Work Statement

Step 1: Plan

Overview

Step 1 discusses the four primary components in developing a
performance work
statement (PWS) and a quality assurance surveillance plan
(QASP):

• Market research

• Forming the writing team and finding the right resources

• Developing a project plan with milestones

• Developing a decision plan (proactive approach to resolving
issues)

Careful planning makes better use of resources, minimizes
interruptions in activity
performance, saves time, and obtains the service required to
support the Soldiers
and mission.

Market research

The acquisition team must conduct market research to
understand the standard
performance parameters in the local marketplace, and then work
to draft a PWS that
incorporates the appropriate local practices.

Forming your team

Gather the best people for the PWS writing team and obtain
leadership support
from the beginning. The development of a quality PWS is the
result of a team
effort. The members of the team are usually from the requiring
activity, other units
with subject matter expertise, and the local supporting
contracting office. The team
is typically composed of the following individuals:

• The PWS team leader (most likely you) has the authority and
responsibility for developing the PWS and QASP.

• Subject matter experts provide functional knowledge to
describe the
service and recommend how to measure and accept the service.
It is likely
these individuals will be contracting officer’s representatives
(CORs) for
this contract.

• The supporting contracting office provides the necessary
authority and
technical experience in contracting to approve the final product
and
initiate the contract.

• Other stake holders such as the supply officer or supported
customer
provide the necessary guidance and information.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

(Tip: There are no absolutes in selecting PWS team members.
Required skills are
situational, and you should consider them within the context of
the entire team.)

Most requiring activities (units) can find individuals to fill
these roles, but these
individuals often have other duties in a deployed environment.
The leadership must

make the hard decision to allocate the proper time, resources,
and individuals
required to develop a proper PWS.

Work space

Do not overlook the need for office space for the PWS team
members. The PWS
team must have secure facilities where it can store its materials
and work with
limited interruptions. Many times your supporting contracting
office will have
limited office space to offer.

Security concerns

Do not leave sensitive information on your desk or computer
screen and do not
discuss this information in common areas. Factors affecting
security are the degree
of sensitivity of the information; nature of the threat to the
information;
vulnerability of the information; options that are available for
protecting the
information; and organizational facilities and capabilities for
secure handling,
storage, and transmission. Much of your information, such as
troop numbers, grid
coordinates, and other related information, will be classified.
Remember, the
acquisition process begins at the point the unit’s needs are
established. All
personnel should understand the adverse impact of inappropriate
disclosure of
sensitive information regarding future procurements. Early in
the acquisition

planning process and throughout the development of the
government’s
requirements in writing the PWS, the contracting officer (KO)
will advise the
acquisition team of the negative consequences and prejudicial
impact of improperly
releasing information to potential future offerors.

Initial team meeting

The PWS team leader should receive guidance and training from
the supporting
contracting office.

During the initial meeting, team members should:

• Introduce roles and responsibilities.

• Begin to identify issues.

• Review all documents to date (initial requirements document,
purchase
request, and other supporting documents).

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Go over this checklist for the team’s key players

Key Player Tasks

Requiring activity Meet with PWS team lead frequently
to monitor progress, give guidance,

and provide liaison to customers.

Review the PWS at 50 percent and
75 percent completion and provide
comments.

Review PWS at 100 percent
completion and provide final
comments before the PWS is
finalized for solicitation.

Meet with the PWS team as needed
to provide guidance and support for
its efforts.

PWS team leader Oversee the PWS team and stay on
schedule for completion of the PWS
and QASP.

Develop the QASP.

Assign tasks to team members,
including writing sections of the
PWS and formatting the technical
exhibits.

Monitor team members to assure
they complete the work as scheduled.

Arrange for review by customers,
stakeholders, management, and
requiring activity when 75 percent
complete and incorporate
recommended changes.

Arrange for review by requiring

activity and incorporate
recommended changes.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Key Player Tasks

PWS team leader (continued) Conduct team meetings as needed
to
review work completed, assign new
tasks, and respond to questions from
the team.

Develop evaluation criteria.

Contracting office Assist the requiring activity and
PWS team in the development of the
PWS.

Arrange for review of the PWS.

Ensure the PWS is adequate and
appropriate to serve as a basis for
the contract award.

Others Assist the requiring activity in the
development of the PWS.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

What is the milestone schedule?

Perhaps the most overlooked planning step (besides writing the
PWS) is developing
the milestone schedule. The milestone schedule provides
overall, critical
completion times for each major requirement and appropriate
review and
coordination (when required). Keep in mind that milestones may
be changed for
larger, more complex contracts (consult your supporting KO for
further details).

Milestone schedule example:

Requirements documents completed 0X/0X/20XX

Statements of work and PWS approval 0X/0X/20XX

Acquisition review board 0X/0X/20XX

Funding for purchase request 0X/0X/20XX

Request for quotations 0X/0X/20XX

Receipt of quotations 0X/0X/20XX

Evaluation of quotations 0X/0X/20XX

Discussion 0X/0X/20XX

Award of contract and notice to proceed 0X/0X/20XX

(Tip: Early planning including the user and all acquisition team

members to the
maximum extent practicable is essential in determining overall
success. Ultimately,
the KO will decide upon the precise milestone dates; just make
sure it works with
the requiring activity objective.)

Step 2: Define the Requirement

Planning should start by focusing on the big picture of the
acquisition. What
requirement needs to be satisfied, and how will this acquisition
meet the needs of
the requiring activity? The requirement should also address the
criticality of need.
In certain contingency operations, criticality of need may
supersede certain
acquisition processes. See your contracting support element for
clarification.

Step 3: Identify Desired Results

Results are what the acquisition is intended to accomplish. The
desired results are
the ideal outcomes of contract performance. Examples of
desired results include a
clean building, broader dissemination of information, and
increased levels of
maintenance. The PWS team must ask what it wants out of this
acquisition and
define what the tasking intends to achieve in terms of outcomes
and deliverables.
The answer will be specific to each acquisition, and the team
should develop the
answer during its work sessions. This analysis will provide the
basis to develop a

work breakdown structure (WBS) for formulating the PWS.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Begin by listing what the PWS should accomplish in order to
satisfy the overall
requirement. For example:

• What outcome is needed?

• When is the outcome needed?

• Where is the outcome needed?

• Who needs the outcome?

• Why is the outcome needed?

• What will be done with the outcome?

• What will occur as a result of the outcome?

• Is the outcome worth the effort and cost?

• Would a different outcome be preferable?

After the team clearly identifies the desired results, it must
identify what outcome
will constitute success. For example, the customer desires a
clean building. A clean
building is the result. Defining success means defining how the
customer knows if

the building is clean—the floors are mopped, the surfaces are
dusted, and the
carpets are vacuumed.

Keep in mind the link between level of service and cost; it is
important to define the
level of service required so as not to unnecessarily exceed
requirements and cost.
Polishing the brass doorknobs may improve the Feng Shui
feeling for the
commander but at what cost?

Step 4: Create a Work Breakdown Structure

Use the WBS to facilitate a logical arrangement of all elements
of the work targeted
in a performance-based contract. Simultaneously use the
checklist provided below
for the performance-based acquisition team to trace all the
necessary elements of
the project. Generally your WBS will only serve as an internal
planning document.
Do not use the WBS in your actual PWS.

Creating a WBS checklist:

• Identify the overall service or output required from the
contractor.

• Divide the job into all its parts and subparts.

• Clarify the relationships among all the parts.

• Write one requirement sentence describing the desired result
of each
subtask.

• Conduct a review and finalize the WBS.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Finalizing the WBS checklist:

• Check the scope statement for completeness and accuracy.

• Check that each activity is broken down into all tasks
necessary for that
activity to be completed.

• Check that all tasks are identified and defined in “do what”
terms not “how to” terms.

• Check that completion criteria are defined for each task.

• Check that the data requirements (reports, software, or other
deliverables)
have been identified and associated with tasks.

• Check that all required government-furnished property has
been
identified.

Figure 4-1. Example of a WBS for cleaning an office building

At each level of breakdown, the parts must be mutually
exclusive and collectively
exhaustive of the next higher level. Furthermore, there must be
no overlap among

the parts at a particular level, and nothing must be left out.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Office
Building

Floors Furniture Fixtures Appliances Walls

Hardwood

Linoleum

Carpet

Metal

Wood
systems

Leather

Sinks

Shower

Toilets

Wall-to-wall

Refrigerator

Dishwasher

Stove

Interior

ExteriorOriental

Tile

Cabinets

Windows

Blinds

Curtians

Glass

Paintings

Posters

Surfaces

Develop a performance standard for each item on the WBS

Performance standard = (Attribute of the service object that you
want the
contractor to change) + (a specific attribute description or
measurement)

Example:

Object: Floors

Floors must be free of all visible dirt and refuse

Object: Toilets

Each toilet must be supplied with a full roll of toilet paper,
sanitized, and free of
all visible fecal matter, urine, and refuse

Ensure you develop a performance standard for each element at
the lowest level of
work breakdown. What you see, smell, hear, taste, or feel is the
determinant of
acceptability.

Once you have identified your set of performance standards,
apply the SMART test
by asking, are these performance measures:

• Specific?

• Measurable?

• Attainable?

• Relevant?

• Timely?

Step 5: Collect and Analyze Goals or Outcomes

Most of the data should be collected during preliminary
planning and available to
the PWS team already. However, your data may be marginal at
best. For example,
the purchase request may only say “contract to clean office

headquarters building
number 123 on forward operating base ABC.”

If your data is marginal conduct interviews to gather further
details:

• Customer view: Ask the supported customer what he expects
from the
contractor. This question should be asked and answered in
writing.

• Requiring activity view: Obtain higher-level guidance and
expected
outcomes. Many times the customer’s view and his
headquarters’ view
will differ and you must hash out the must do from the nice to
have.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• KO view: You can compare your requirement to the same type
of activity
provided by a preexisting or old contract on file with your
supporting
contracting office. Often using a similar, preexisting PWS will
assist you
in developing your own. Do not reinvent the wheel unless you
have to but
do not simply copy another PWS; no two are alike.

Manage expectations from the beginning and ensure the
requiring activity approves

the initial concept before you start writing the PWS.

(Tip: The PWS is your roadmap for the contractor engagement.
Ensure it accurately
reflects the specific tasks and obligations during the course of
performance. Most
contractual problems are directly attributable to the lack of a
properly written
PWS.)

Step 6: Write the PWS

Once you have completed the tree diagramming, data collection,
and performance
standards, write the PWS.

(Tip: Begin writing the PWS at the same time you begin
collecting and analyzing
data. Most PWS sections are boilerplate (see your KO for this
information). PWS
teams save time by beginning to write sections that are ready
while they finish data
collection and analysis on other sections.)

To ensure you write a good PWS, coordinate comments from the
requiring activity
before you give the final PWS to the supporting contracting
office for execution. In
some situations your draft PWS will be submitted with the
requirements document
to the acquisition review board for review and approval prior to
submitting it to
your supporting contracting office. In any case, ensure your
supporting contracting
office is part of your PWS team.

Delegating Checklist on Developing Sections of a Performance
Work
Statement

As discussed in Chapter 2, the PWS becomes Section C of the
solicitation. You
must develop the following sub-sections:

Point of Contact Responsible Action

Name____________________

Section C-1: General information to include
scope of work, general operating conditions,
personnel matters, and other relevant
information.

Name____________________
Section C-2: Definitions of all special terms,
phrases, and acronyms used in the PWS.

Name____________________

Section C-3: Government-furnished
property (GFP) and services provided to the
contractor for use in executing the PWS
activities.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Point of Contact Responsible Action

Name____________________

Section C-4: Contractor-furnished items;
details the items that the contractor is
required to provide in executing the PWS
activities.

Name____________________

Section C-5: Specific tasks that the
contractor is required to perform to include
outputs, outcomes, and quality control
requirements.

Name____________________

Section C-6: Applicable documents,
specifications, manuals, and regulations
governing the requirements included in the
PWS.

Name____________________
Release draft PWS for comment and
approval.

Name____________________ Finalize the PWS.

Name____________________ Respond to questions and
comments.

The PWS Format

Write the PWS in service contract format. First, develop an
outline to provide
structure for the document. The following is a sample outline.
The PWS falls in

Section C of the RFP. The standard numbering scheme for
service contracts is legal
numeric (for example: 1, 1.1, 1.2, . . .). See PWS examples in
Appendices A, B, and
C for the legal-numeric formatting.

Section 1: General

This section includes a broad overview of the PWS and a
description of the scope
of work.

Section 2: Definitions

This section includes terms and phrases readers need to know to
understand the
PWS.

Section 3: Government-furnished property and services

This section references applicable exhibits and specific terms
and conditions not
covered in the Federal Acquisition Regulation clauses.

Section 4: Contractor-furnished items

This section holds the contractor accountable for all items he
must provide to
perform the services. This section may include specific
standards for items.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Section 5: Requirements

This section is the heart of the PWS. Most of the analysis of
activities will be in this
section.

Section 6: Publications and forms

This section references exhibits that list the documents and
forms the contractor
needs to perform the work.

Technical exhibits

Some items are too bulky to include in the main body of the
PWS (for example,
spreadsheets with workload data). Also, you may want to
include information
helpful to the potential contractor. Use technical exhibits for
this purpose.

After you have developed the outline, focus writing the most
important
section—C-5: Requirements—first.

Step 7: Write the QASP

The QASP defines the process the government uses to evaluate
the contractor’s
execution of the PWS.

The QASP explains the following:

• What will be monitored.

• How monitoring will take place.

• Who will conduct the monitoring.

• How monitoring efforts and results will be documented.

This QASP does not detail how the contractor accomplishes the
work. Instead, the
QASP is created on the premise the contractor is responsible for
management and
quality control actions to meet the terms of the contract. It is
the government’s
responsibility to be objective, fair, and consistent in evaluating
performance. In
addition, the QASP should recognize that unforeseen and
uncontrollable situations,
such as acts of God (bad weather or earthquakes) or situations
resulting from a
combat environment, may occur.

The QASP is a living document, and the KO may review and
revise it on a regular
basis. However, the KO shall coordinate changes with the
contractor. Updates must
ensure the QASP remains a valid, useful, and enforceable
document. The contractor
and the CORs implementing the surveillance activities must
receive copies of the
original QASP and any subsequent revisions.

Methods of surveillance

After contract award, the COR should review the performance
standards in the
contract to determine if the selected monitoring methods are
appropriate to monitor

each performance standard. Within a QASP, multiple
surveillance methods may be
used.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Various methods exist to monitor performance. The COR will
use one or more of
the surveillance methods listed below. However, regardless of
the surveillance
method, the COR must always contact the KO when a defect is
identified and
inform him of the specifics of the problem.

Contractor performance must be monitored in some fashion to
determine the rate of
success. As much as possible, human biases should be
eliminated from the
surveillance process. The objective is to assess the contractor’s
performance against
established performance standards. The following procedures
are the most common
methods of surveillance:

• Random sampling. Receipt of acceptable performance is based
on a
percentage of successful assessments. Random sampling is the
most
appropriate method for frequently recurring tasks.

• Periodic sampling. Evaluations are scheduled for specific
intervals or

dates. This sampling may be appropriate for tasks that occur
infrequently.

• One hundred percent inspection. Only appropriate for the most
stringent
requirements where health or safety is on the line.

• Trend analysis. This technique is used to assess the
contractor’s ongoing
performance. A database can be built with the data to
continually evaluate
performance.

• Customer feedback. Allows end users to evaluate and provide
feedback
on the service received. This form of surveillance is useful for
areas that
do not lend themselves to observation. Because of this,
evaluators can
focus time in other areas. With this approach, it is important the
end-users
providing feedback understand the contract performance
standards.

Surveillance results may be used as the basis for actions (to
include payment
deductions) against the contractor. In such cases, the inspection
of services clause
in the contract becomes the basis for the KO’s actions.

When unacceptable performance occurs, the COR must inform
the contractor in
writing unless circumstances necessitate verbal communication.
In any case, the
COR must document the discussion and place it in the COR’s
file.

When the COR determines formal written communication is
required, the COR
prepares a contract discrepancy report (CDR) and presents it to
the contractor. A
CDR template should be part of the QASP.

The contractor must acknowledge receipt of the CDR in writing.
The CDR will
specify if the contractor is required to prepare a corrective
action plan to document
how the contractor shall correct the unacceptable performance
and avoid a
recurrence. The CDR also will state how long after receipt the
contractor has to
present this corrective action plan to the COR. The KO shall
review the contractor’s
corrective action plan to determine acceptability.

Any CDR may become a part of the supporting documentation
for contract payment
deductions, fixed fee deductions, award fee nonpayment, or
other actions deemed
necessary by the KO.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

During contract and order performance, the COR shall take the
periodic
measurements that the QASP specifies. It may help if the
government prepares a
work sheet with a schedule for executing the surveillance

measures listed in the
QASP. This work sheet shall be for government use and shall
not be shared with
the contractor.

Step 8: Finalize the Performance Work Statement

(Tip: To encourage stakeholder review and comment, the PWS
team should e-mail
the PWS to all stakeholders.)

Performance Work Statement Checklist

Actions for final review:

• Does the PWS contain all required elements and is it ready for
detailed
review?

º Section C-1: General information

º Section C-2: Definitions

º Section C-3: GFP and government-furnished services

º Section C-4: Contractor-furnished items and services

º Section C-5: Specific tasks for the contractor

º Section C-6: Applicable documents governing the
requirements in
the PWS

º Technical exhibits

º Maps and work area layouts

º QASP written with performance measures and standards

• Does Section C-1 (general information) provide a satisfactory
overview
of the PWS?

• Are the roles of a project or contract manager and any special
personnel
requirements (quality control, safety, environmental, security
requirements, or specialized training) discussed? Are full-time
requirements, on-site requirements, and 24 hours per day and 7
days per
week requirements clear?

• Are the following requirements addressed?

º Quality control by the contractor

º Government quality assurance methods

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

º Hours of operation, including normal duty hours and a list of
local
holidays

º Requirements to support emergencies and contingencies
outside
normal duty hours

º Safety, fire prevention, physical security, traffic control,

energy
conservation, environmental, and other appropriate
requirements

• Are the definitions in Section C-2 adequate?

º Special terms in the PWS (including technical exhibits)
defined
and readily understandable

º All acronyms, abbreviations, and special terms clearly defined

º Terms used in Section C-5 (specific functions) clearly defined
in
Section C-2

• Are the provisions in Section C-3 for GFP adequate?

º Responsibilities for accountability (initial, periodic, and
closing
inventory) and stewardship adequately stated for
government-furnished material and government-furnished
equipment

º Conditions and standards adequately stated for contractor
return
of government property and facilities

º Conditions and responsibilities adequately stated for leased
property provided by the government

• Does Section C-4 (contractor-furnished items and services)
provide
sufficient guidance?

º Categories of items that the contractor will supply (such as

materials, tools, and equipment) adequately described

º Standards provided for all materials or supplies that must meet
minimum government standards

• Does Section C-5 (specific tasks) clearly identify work
requirements?

º Function and major tasks and subtasks broken down
sufficiently
so that the scope of work is reasonably clear

º Specific performance tasks and the desired outcome for each
job
activity clearly described

º Special duty hours (including night shifts, overtime, or
weekends)
specified for any tasks required outside normal duty hours

º Reference sources cited accurate and current (such as in the
instructions, manuals, and technical orders)

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• Does Section C-6 (applicable publications and forms)
reference all
applicable directives or forms?

• Does Section C-6 clearly specify whether the contractor or the
government will be responsible for obtaining future directive
editions,

supplements, amendments, or changes?

• Is the technical exhibits section in agreement with the PWS?

• Are all technical exhibits correctly cross-referenced to the
proper sections
of the PWS?

• Have all conclusions, comments, or recommendations
resulting from
negative responses to review steps been provided?

• Do any conclusions, comments, or recommendations constitute
a
significant error or omission requiring nonoccurrence,
correction, and
subsequent review?

• Does the PWS provide the basis for fair competition (a level
playing
field)? Is there anything either stated or omitted by the PWS
that would
shift the competition in favor of any bidder?

• Verify the PWS reviewed is the same as contained in the
contract
solicitation.

You can now forward the PWS to your supporting KO for final
review.

Other Sections

Sections B, L, and M

Although the KO is responsible for Sections B, L, and M of the

solicitation, the
PWS team should provide input.

Section B (cost/price schedule)

The PWS team may help develop contract line item numbers or
recommend
variance ranges.

Section L (instructions to offerors)

Because the PWS team writes the content for technical
evaluation, its members
understand how proposals will be evaluated. Their input into
how offerors should
organize proposals is very important.

Section M (evaluation criteria)

The criteria, subfactors, and ranking all naturally flow from the
PWS and
development of instructions to offerors. The PWS team’s input
on this section is
also very important.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Final Thoughts

Watch out for scope creep. It occurs when the requiring activity
changes its mind
midway through PWS development. Unfortunately, it is common

when there is a
failure in managing expectations from everyone’s input at the
beginning of PWS
development. When you ensure you clearly understand and
manage expectations
early, you should not have this problem.

If scope creep happens, you can manage it with changes to
clauses. In fixed-price
supply contracts, the changes clause provides that the CO may
at any time, by
written order, make changes, within the general scope of the
contract. The key
words are “within the general scope of the contract.” When a
contractor receives a
change order, the contractor typically has 30 days to submit a
proposal for
adjustment. The term “equitable adjustment” is the name for the
process by which
contractors recover the reasonable value for the work under
which no agreement
was reached on the fixed-price contract. The bottom line—stay
away from scope
creep, if possible.

A cardinal change is a unique subset of changes to the initial
contract, a
modification beyond the original scope of the contract, which
requires the
contractor to perform duties materially different from those
originally bargained.
Cardinal change is a breach of contract entitling the contractor
to damages.
Cardinal changes are considered potential attempts at
unauthorized procurement. In
other words, someone is overstepping the contract’s legal

bounds by attempting to
derive extra benefits from the contractor.

Finally, a constructive change is an oral or written act or
omission by the KO or
other authorized government official that is construed as having
the same effect as a
written change order. A constructive change consists of two
elements: (1) a change
element that calls for examination of the actual performance to
determine whether it
went beyond the minimum standards demanded by the contract,
and (2) an order
element in which the government’s representative (by word or
deed) requires the
contractor to perform work that is not a necessary part of the
contract.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Chapter 5

Government-Provided Support Considerations

Contractors provide their own logistic support except when
providing that support
is impractical, cost-prohibitive, or otherwise not in the best
interest of the
government. Since most military operations are conducted in
austere or
non-permissive environments, contractors authorized to
accompany the force

(CAAF) often receive military-provided support or the military
arranges for another
contractor to provide support. In these situations the contractor
will detail what
support the government will provide in the terms and conditions
of the solicitation.
Subsequently, after determining the support requirements and
assessing the
availability of support from theater-adjudication authorities, the
contract will
specify what support will be provided. Without understanding
the overall support
requirement to include specific government-furnished support
requirements for
CAAF, the supporting unit will not be able to accurately plan
for and direct support
responsibilities in the operational area.

Base Operating and Facility Support

In permissive and non-austere operations, contractors should
arrange for their own
lodging, subsistence, and facilities; however, this may not be
possible in hostile and
austere environments. The military will provide support in
circumstances where the
contractor has no commercial infrastructure from which to
draw, or when it is cost
prohibitive for a contractor to furnish the support. If contractor-
arranged
base-operating support would impede the government’s force
protection efforts,
generate competition with the military, or adversely influence
prices, the military
must consider providing the support, or at least directly
coordinating this support

within U.S. bases. The operational commander has the authority
to direct where
CAAF reside under the terms and conditions of the contract.
CAAF must generally
be provided the same standard that is applied to Department of
Defense (DOD)
civilian personnel of similar pay grade and responsibility level.

In some operations or phases of operations, selected CAAF may
be required to
temporarily live under field conditions. Field conditions are
quite different from
normal civilian life; these conditions are characterized by
austere and communal
living with a collective responsibility for the living area. The
contracting officer
(KO) must ensure that appropriate clauses are included in the
contract for all CAAF
who may be expected to perform their duties under field
conditions.

Subsistence may be provided to contractors, either in
conjunction with
government-provided lodging or separately, when CAAF are
unable to obtain
subsistence during their daily work shift or for other operational
reasons. For
CAAF living in field conditions, the food provided might be
pre-packaged rations
with very little opportunity for choice; consequently, special
diets may not be
accommodated. Because of dietary needs, in some sustained
operations it may be
desirable to have separate contracts run dining facilities that
provide ethnic-based
subsistence that may be both less expensive and more appealing

to third country
national (TCN) employees.

Although it is natural to expect reimbursement from contractors
for the cost of
lodging and subsistence, the cost for such support is normally
be included in the
overall cost of the contract. Therefore, when possible,
subsistence support should
be provided on a non-reimbursable basis to eliminate the
unnecessary,

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

administrative burden of reimbursement. However, joint force
command planners
must include the cost of supporting contractors in the overall
cost of the operation
so adequate funding is provided.

Similar to base operating support, facility support to contractor
personnel is
situationally dependent. Facility support must be planned for as
early as possible,
especially in austere and non-permissive environments where
contract companies
cannot coordinate their own facility support. In these situations,
external support
and system contractor managers must provide their requirements
during contract
negotiations. The KO or designated administrative KO must
then coordinate these

requirements with the appropriate command engineer.

Personnel Recovery

The DOD personnel recovery (PR) program is the aggregate of
military, civil, and
political efforts to recover captured, detained, evading, isolated,
or missing
personnel from uncertain or hostile environments and denied
areas. PR may occur
through military action, action by non-governmental
organizations, other U.S.
government-approved action and diplomatic initiatives, or
through any combination
of these options. According to DOD policy, CAAF must be
included in the PR
program.

Note: DOD Instruction (DODI) 3020.41, Contractor Personnel
Authorized to
Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces; DOD Directive (DODD)
2310.2, Personnel
Recovery; and Joint Publication (JP) 3-50, Personnel Recovery,
provide additional
details on the PR program.

Medical

During contingency operations in austere or non-permissive
environments, CAAF
will most likely be unable to access medical support from local
sources. Therefore,
DOD policy and doctrine directs the Army forces command, at a
minimum, to be
prepared to have U.S. level III medical treatment facilities
(MTFs) provide

emergency medical care to all CAAF and non-CAAF contract
employees who are
injured in the immediate vicinity of U.S. forces or on a U.S.
base. This medical
support includes emergency and resuscitative care, stabilization,
hospitalization at a
level III MTF, and assistance with patient movement in
emergencies where loss of
life, limb, or eyesight could occur. Nonetheless, all CAAF must
be afforded routine,
western medical care either at a deployed MTF or by accessing
a modern medical
facility outside their area of operations.

Note: Further detailed guidance on medical support to deployed
contractor
personnel can be found in Appendix E of DODI 3020.41,
Contractor Personnel
Authorized to Accompany the U.S. Armed Forces; DODI
6490.03, Deployment
Health; and JP 4-02, Health Service Support.

Major Equipment Items

Major equipment items include government-furnished
equipment (GFE) and
contractor-acquired, government-owned equipment. GFE
includes Class VII items
that are either deployed into the operational area with the
contractor, or
theater-provided equipment that is issued to the contractor in
the operational area.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

GFE issuance, maintenance, and return is the responsibility of
the appropriate
requiring activity.

Postal Service

The nationality of the contractor employee usually determines
postal support. U.S.
citizen-contractor employees who deploy in support of U.S.
armed forces may be
authorized to use the military postal service (MPS) if there is no
U.S. postal service
available and if MPS use is not precluded by the terms of any
international or
host-nation agreement. In some operations, TCN personnel may
be authorized
limited access to MPS for the purpose of mailing paychecks to
their home country.

Note: Additional information on postal operations can be found
in DOD 4525.6-M,
DOD Postal Manual.

Mortuary Affairs

The joint mortuary affairs program is a broadly-based military
program that
provides for the necessary care and disposition of deceased
personnel, including
personal effects, across the spectrum of conflict. Support to
contractor personnel is
normally done on a reimbursable basis. The specific nature and
extent of the

support is determined during the planning process and
communicated to military
forces and contractors through governing operation plans/orders
and contractual
documents.

Note: Additional information on mortuary affairs can be found
in DODD 1300.22,
Mortuary Affairs Policy, and JP 4-06, Mortuary Affairs in Joint
Operations.

Post/Base Exchange Privileges

When deployed, CAAF are generally eligible to use the Army
and Air Force
Exchange Service, Navy Exchange, or Marine Corps Exchange
facilities for health
and comfort items in operations where CAAF do not have
access to commercial
sources for these items. This privilege is dependent on the
overall operational
situation, status of forces agreement, and individual terms and
conditions in the
contract.

Note: Additional information on exchange privileges for
deployed contractors can
be found in DODI 1330.21, Armed Services Exchange
Regulations.

Morale, Welfare, and Recreation

Deployed contractors have a responsibility to provide morale,
welfare, and
recreation (MWR) services and other quality of life support to
their own employees

as much as practical. The availability of MWR programs in the
operational area
vary with the deployment location. MWR activities available
may include
self-directed recreation (such as the issue of sports equipment),
entertainment in
coordination with the United Service Organizations and the
Armed Forces
Professional Entertainment Overseas, military clubs, unit
lounges, and some types
of rest centers.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Appendix A

Blank Performance Work Statement Template

This template is a guide. Do not copy it verbatim.

Performance Work Statement for (Add Title of Service)

Part 1: General information

The performance work statement (PWS) defines the
government’s requirements in
terms of the objective and measurable outputs. It should provide
the vendor with
answers to five basic questions: what, when, where, how many,
and how well. It is

important to accurately answer these questions to allow the
vendor the opportunity
to accurately assess resources required and risks involved.

1.1 Description of services and introduction: The contractor
shall provide all
personnel, equipment, tools, materials, supervision, other items,
and non-personnel
services necessary to perform
________________________________________ as
defined in this PWS except as specified in Section C-3 as
government-furnished
property and services at _________________________. The
contractor shall
perform to the standards in this contract.

1.2 Background: (Complete as appropriate.)

1.3 Objectives: (Add a few bullets stating the basic services
objective.)

1.4 Scope: (Usually a paragraph. This work involves or the
contractor shall provide
services for [insert the type of services the contractor will
provide]. Services
include [insert what is included in the services]. The contractor
shall accomplish
[complete if applicable].)

1.5 Period of performance: (State period of performance and
number of option
years. For example: The period of performance shall be for 1
base year of 12
months and two 12-month option years.) The period of
performance reads as
follows:

• Base year

• Option year one

• Option year two

The government reserves the right to extend the term of this
contract at the prices
set forth in Section B in accordance with the terms and
conditions contained in
clause 52.217-9 entitled, “Option to Extend the Term of the
Contact.”

1.6 General Information

1.6.1 Quality control (QC): (Include if necessary.) The
contractor shall develop and
maintain an effective QC program to ensure services are
performed in accordance
with this PWS. The contractor shall develop and implement
procedures to identify,
prevent, and ensure non-recurrence of defective services. The
contractor’s QC
program is the means by which he assures himself his work
complies with the

35

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

requirement of the contract. As a minimum, the contractor shall
develop QC
procedures addressing the areas identified in Technical exhibit

1, “Performance
Requirements Summary.” After acceptance of the QC plan, the
contractor shall
receive the contracting officer’s (KO’s) acceptance in writing of
any proposed
change to his QC system.

1.6.2 Quality assurance: The government shall evaluate the
contractor’s
performance under this contract in accordance with the quality
assurance
surveillance plan. This plan is primarily focused on what the
government must do
to ensure the contractor has performed in accordance with the
performance
standards. It defines how the performance standards will be
applied, the frequency
of surveillance, and the minimum acceptable defect rates.

1.6.3 Government remedies: The KO shall follow Federal
Acquisition Requirement
(FAR) 52.212-4, “Contract Terms and Conditions-Commercial
Items” or 52.246-4,
“Inspection of Services-Fixed Price” for a contractor’s failure
to perform
satisfactory services or failure to correct non-conforming
services.

1.6.4 Recognized holidays: (State if the contractor is or is not
required to perform
services on these holidays.)

• Hours for prayer or holy days

• Iraq Memorial Day

• Iraq Independence Day

1.6.5 Hours of operation or place of performance: The
contractor is responsible for
conducting ____________________between the hours of (insert
appropriate hours
for your organization here) Monday through Friday except
federal holidays or when
the government facility is closed due to local or national
emergencies,
administrative closings, or similar government-directed facility
closings. The
contractor must at all times maintain an adequate work force for
the uninterrupted
performance of all tasks defined within this statement of work
(SOW) when the
government facility is not closed for the above reasons. When
hiring personnel, the
contractor shall keep in mind that the stability and continuity of
the work force are
essential.

1.6.6 Security requirements: (Indicate the level of security
required, if necessary. If
a Department of Defense Form 254 [Contract Security
Classification Specification]
is required, the unit security monitor should initiate a DD 254
that will become an
attachment to this PWS.)

1.6.6.1 Physical security. The contractor shall be responsible
for safeguarding all
government property provided for contractor use. At the close
of each work period,
government facilities, equipment, and materials shall be
secured.

1.6.6.2 Key control. (Include if necessary.) The contractor shall
establish and
implement methods of making sure all keys/key cards issued to
the contractor by
the government are not lost or misplaced and are not used by
unauthorized persons.
(Note: All references to keys include key cards.) No keys issued
to the contractor
by the government shall be duplicated. The contractor shall
develop procedures
covering key control that shall be included in the QC plan. Such
procedures shall

36

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

include turn-in of any issued keys by personnel who no longer
require access to
locked areas. The contractor shall immediately report any
occurrences of lost or
duplicate keys to the KO.

1.6.6.2.1. In the event keys other than master keys are lost or
duplicated, the
contractor shall, upon direction of the KO, re-key or replace the
affected lock or
locks; however, the government, at its option, may replace the
affected lock or
locks or perform re-keying. When the replacement of locks or
re-keying is
performed by the government, the total cost of re-keying or the
replacement of the

lock or locks shall be deducted from the monthly payment due
the contractor. In the
event a master key is lost or duplicated, all locks and keys for
that system shall be
replaced by the government and the total cost deducted from the
monthly payment
due the contractor.

1.6.6.2.2. The contractor shall prohibit the use of government-
issued keys by any
persons other than the contractor’s employees. The contractor
shall prohibit the
opening of locked areas by contractor employees to permit
entrance of persons
other than contractor employees engaged in the performance of
assigned work in
those areas or personnel authorized entrance by the KO.

1.6.6.3 Lock combinations. (Include if necessary.) The
contractor shall establish
and implement methods of ensuring all lock combinations are
not revealed to
unauthorized persons. The contractor shall ensure lock
combinations are changed
when personnel with access to the combinations no longer have
a need to know
such combinations. These procedures shall be included in the
contractor’s QC plan.

1.6.6.4 Conservation of utilities. The contractor shall instruct
employees in utilities
conservation practices. The contractor shall be responsible for
operating under
conditions that preclude the waste of utilities which includes
turning off the water
faucets or valves after using the required amount to accomplish

cleaning vehicles
and equipment.

1.6.7 Special qualifications: (Insert any special certification
requirements for
employees if deemed appropriate. For example: The contractor
is responsible for
ensuring all employees possess all required licenses for
operating ____________
used in the execution of this contract.)

1.6.8 Post-award conference or periodic progress meetings: The
contractor agrees
to attend any post-award conference convened by the
contracting activity or
contract administration office in accordance with FAR Subpart
42.5. The KO,
contracting officer’s representative (COR), and other
government personnel, as
appropriate, may meet periodically with the contractor to review
the contractor’s
performance. At these meetings, the KO will apprise the
contractor of how the
government views the contractor’s performance, and the
contractor will apprise the
government of problems, if any, being experienced. Appropriate
action shall be
taken to resolve outstanding issues. These meetings shall be at
no additional cost to
the government.

1.6.9 COR: (Insert the name, address, phone number, fax, and e-
mail address of the
COR.) The COR monitors all technical aspects of the contract
and assists in
contract administration. The COR is authorized to perform the

following functions:
assure the contractor performs the technical requirements of the
contract; perform
inspections necessary in connection with contract performance;
maintain written

37

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

and oral communications with the contractor concerning
technical aspects of the
contract; issue written interpretations of technical requirements,
including
government drawings, designs, and specifications; monitor
contractor’s
performance and notify both the KO and contractor of any
deficiencies; coordinate
availability of government-furnished property; and provide site-
entry of contractor
personnel. A letter of designation issued to the COR, a copy of
which is sent to the
contractor, states the responsibilities and limitations of the
COR, especially with
regard to changes in cost or price, estimates, or changes in
delivery dates. The COR
is not authorized to change any of the terms and conditions of
the resulting order.

1.6.10 Contract manager: The contractor shall provide a
contract manager who
shall be responsible for the performance of the work. The name
of this person and
an alternate who shall act for the contractor when the manager

is absent shall be
designated in writing to the KO. The contract manager or
alternate shall have full
authority to act for the contractor on all contract matters
relating to daily operation
of this contract.

1.6.11 Identification of contractor employees: All contract
personnel attending
meetings, answering government telephones, and working in
other situations where
their contractor status is not obvious to third parties are
required to identify
themselves as such to avoid creating an impression in the minds
of members of the
public that they are government officials. They must also ensure
all documents or
reports produced by contractors are suitably marked as
contractor products or that
contractor participation is appropriately disclosed. (Indicate if
contractor personnel
will be required to obtain and wear badges in the performance
of this service.)

Part 2: Definitions and acronyms

This section includes all special terms and phrases used in the
PWS. Each definition
provided should be carefully considered; that definition
becomes binding for all
requirements in the contract. This section should also contain a
complete listing of
all acronyms used; giving both the acronym and the term the
acronym represents.

PWS: Performance work statement

Contracting officer’s representative (COR): A representative
from the requiring
activity appointed in writing by the KO to perform surveillance
and to act as liaison
to the contractor.

Defective service: A service output that does not meet the
standard of performance
associated with it in the PWS.

Quality assurance surveillance plan (QASP): A written
document specifying the
surveillance method used for surveillance of contractor
performance.

Quality control (QC): Actions taken by a contractor to control
the performance of
contracted services to meet PWS requirements.

Quality assurance: Actions taken by the government to assure
contracted services
meet PWS requirements.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Part 3: Government-furnished items and services

If the government is to provide any property, services, or
information to the
contractor, this section is used to describe what will be
provided. If the list or lists

are fairly extensive, they should be made into a technical
exhibit or attachment.
(Complete as appropriate.)

3.1 General: The government shall provide the facilities,
equipment, materials,
and/or services listed below.

3.2 Equipment: The government will provide: (List equipment
and indicate when,
where, and for how long.)

3.3 Services:

3.3.1 Utilities: All utilities in the facility will be available for
the contractor’s use in
performance of duties outlined in this PWS. The contractor
shall instruct employees
in utilities conservation practices. The contractor shall be
responsible for operating
under conditions that preclude the waste of utilities.

3.4 Facilities: The government will furnish the necessary
workspace for the
contractor staff to provide the support outlined in this PWS to
include desk space,
telephones, computers, and other items necessary to maintain an
office
environment. (Indicate when, where and for how long.)

Part 4: Contractor-furnished items and services

In this section, describe property or services that the contractor
shall provide.
(Complete as appropriate.)

4.1 General: Except for those items specifically stated to be
government-furnished
in Part 3, the contractor shall furnish everything required to
perform this PWS.

4.2 Secret facility clearance: (If applicable, state if the
contractor needs any kind of
facility clearance.) The contractor shall possess or be eligible to
receive and
maintain a Secret facility clearance from the Defense Security
Service. The
contractor’s employees performing work in support of this
contract shall have been
granted a Secret security clearance from the Defense Industrial
Security Clearance
Office.

Part 5: Specific tasks

Specific tasks are the heart of the SOW. This section defines
how the contracting
effort fits within the existing or intended customer environment,
both technically
and organizationally. Examples of items to include here are a
detailed description
of the services required and other pertinent information.

5.1 Basic services: The contractor shall provide services for
(insert the services to
be provided by the contractor).

Part 6: Applicable publications

6.1 Publications applicable to this PWS are listed below. The
publications must be
coded as mandatory or advisory, contain the date of the

publication, and specify

39

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

what chapters or pages are applicable to the requirement. All
publications listed are
available via the Internet at the specified e-mail address.

Technical exhibit 1: performance requirements summary

The contractor service requirements are summarized into
performance objectives
that relate directly to mission-essential items. The performance
threshold briefly
describes the minimum acceptable levels of service required for
each requirement.
These thresholds are critical to mission success.

Performance
Objective

(The service
required; usually
a shall statement)

Standard Performance
Threshold

(This is the
maximum error
rate. For example:
Zero deviation

from standard.)

Method of
Surveillance

(Also indicate who
performs. For
example: One
hundred percent
inspection by the
COR.)

Performance
requirements
summary (PRS)
#1
(Insert PWS
paragraph.)

PRS # 2
(Insert PWS
paragraph
number.)

PRS # 3
(Insert PWS
paragraph
number.)

PRS # 4
(Insert PWS
paragraph
number.)

Types of surveillance:

• Random sampling: Appropriate for frequently recurring tasks.
Evaluate
randomly selected samples of the lot to determine the
acceptability of the
entire lot (random inspection guide, method of surveillance, lot
size,
sample size, performance requirement, sampling procedure, and
inspection procedure).

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

• One hundred percent inspection: Appropriate for tasks that
occur
infrequently. Inspect and evaluate performance each time task is
performed.

• Periodic surveillance: Evaluation of samples selected on other
than a 100
percent or statistically random basis (such as monthly,
quarterly, or
semi-annually).

• Validated customer complaint: Complaints must be validated.

(Note: You may also use any surveillance method used in the
commercial market to
evaluate delivery of the required service. [This method will be
determined after
market research is conducted.])

Technical Exhibit 2: Deliverables Schedule

A deliverable is anything that can be physically delivered but
may include
non-physical things such as meetings.

Deliverable Frequency
Number of

Copies
Medium/Format Submit To

(Indicate
PWS
paragraph
number.)

(For
example:
By the fifth
of every
month or
within 30
days of
contract
award.)

(For example:
Paper or
CD-Rom in
Microsoft Word
format.)

Technical Exhibit 3: Estimated Workload Data

Sample for the PWS Part 5:

Item Name Estimated Quantity

1 ________

2 ________

3 ________

4 ________

5 ________

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Appendix B

Example of a Performance Work Statement for Grounds and
Roads Maintenance

1.0 Performance Work Statement (PWS). The contractor shall
provide grounds and
roads maintenance procedures that shall be preventive rather
than remedial in
nature, including gravel emplacement. The contractor shall
ensure maintenance
procedures for gravel control are in place for the Mihail
Kogalniceanu (MK)
Airbase and Babadag Training Area (BTA) Logistics Support
Area (LSA) no later
than 15 June 2007, and that the service continues through 31
December 2007. The

contractor shall be familiar with and comply with all applicable
local and national
environmental laws and regulations for maintaining a clean and
safe work
environment and disposing of all waste.

Grounds and road maintenance will include maintenance and
minor repairs to
roadways and landscaping.

1.A. Contract specifics.

Street cleaning (MK Airbase only): The contractor shall use
mechanical means to
clean dirt, mud, leaves, or other debris from paved roadways
and parking surfaces
daily at a time directed by the contracting officer’s
representative (COR).
Contractor shall dispose of all materials from cleaning the MK
Airbase in
accordance with Romanian law, policies, and regulations.

Grass cutting: The contractor shall cut the grass and rake and
remove the grass
indicated on MK Airbase and BTA LSA biweekly. The
contractor shall
immediately dispose of cut grass from the MK Airbase and the
BTA LSA in
accordance with Romanian law, policies, and regulations. See
attached map for
required area. The anticipated grass-cutting season will end on
approximately 31
October 2007.

Sidewalk cleaning (MK Airbase only): The contractor shall
sweep and clean

interlocking paving stone, wood decking, and panel sidewalks
of dirt, mud, leaves,
or other debris weekly. Contractor shall dispose of all materials
from cleaning of
MK Airbase in accordance with Romanian law, policies and
regulations. See
attached map for required area.

Grade gravel roads and pavements (MK Airbase and BTA LSA):
Contractor shall
grade gravel pads and roads to a four percent crown. All roads
and gravel pads will
be graded two times per month at a time and date coordinated
with the COR.

Place and compact gravel: Contractor shall procure, deliver,
install, and compact
gravel to maintain existing roads and pads or new requirements.
Contractor shall
emplace approximately 250 cubic meters (m) of gravel at MK
Airbase and 20 cubic
meters at BTA once during the months of August, September,
October, and
November. Time and date of this service will be coordinated
with the COR. Any
additional requirements will be coordinated with the COR and
the contracting
office on a case-by-case basis.

Clean storm sewer inlets: (MK Airbase only) The contractor
shall open and clean
140 storm sewer inlets of leaves and debris at a date and time
directed by the COR.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Dust control: The contractor shall implement strict dust control
measures to
minimize the creation and dispersion of dust. Dust control will
include application
of water to control dust from roadways and other activities.
Contractor shall apply
clean water to gravel and un-surfaced roads.

Grass cutting in vicinity of airfield: Contractor will be required
to maintain the
grass in the vicinity of the airfield (see Attachment 1).
Approximately 2,300,000
square meters must be maintained to a height between 7 and 14
inches (0.17m to
0.35m) to ensure an effective bird aircraft strike hazard
program. At no time must
the grass exceed the 14 inches (0.35m) in height. The contractor
must ensure that
grass heights stay within listed specifications. Mowing
operations must be
coordinated with the COR.

1.A. In addition to the roads indicated in the attached map, the
contractor shall
apply dust control measures to approximately 6.5 kilometers of
dirt road linking
BTA with the road between Ceamurlia de Jos and Lunca. The
contractor shall
provide clean water (free from salt), oil, and other deleterious
material for onsite
dust control. These control measures will generally consist of
water applications as

required to prevent dust emissions. Dust control will be
accomplished as directed
by the COR and consist of not less than 10 applications.

1.B. During the service period, unless otherwise specified
herein, the contractor
shall provide all supplies, personnel, equipment, tools,
materials, supervision, and
other items or services necessary for grounds and roads
maintenance and related
systems and equipment. No government-furnished equipment or
government-furnished material will be provided.

1.C. Points of contact. The contractor shall provide an English-
speaking point of
contact (POC) within the company to interface with designated
U.S. government
personnel on issues concerning grounds and road maintenance.
This contractor
POC shall have an English language proficiency of Level II or
higher. Names,
business addresses, phone numbers, and hours of operation are
the minimum
information requirements. Arrangements for contacting the
contractor’s POC after
normal business hours shall also be made. The POC must be
available on a 24-hour
basis including Saturdays, Sundays, and local and American
holidays.

2.0 Definitions. Technical definitions that are specific to a
PWS.

2.A. Acceptance inspection. Contractor POC will perform an
inspection on grounds
and road maintenance such as gravel, leveling, and grass cutting

before accepting
the work. This inspection shows the overall condition of the
grounds and their
capability to support military vehicles or equipment, mainly 17-
ton Stryker vehicles
(wheeled). Discrepancies will be fixed before occupation if use
of the site would
aggravate a problem or if the discrepancy creates a safety
hazard.

2.B. Criminal act. This results from violating a civil law.

2.C. Damaged area. An area damaged or worn-out causing the
inability to drive a
vehicle.

2.D. Fair wear and tear. The deterioration of items attributed to
normal use.

2.E. Scheduled maintenance. Periodic prescribed inspections or
servicing of areas
in the temporary forward operating site.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

2.F. Unscheduled maintenance. Maintenance that is not
scheduled but is required to
correct deficiencies.

2.G. English language proficiency, Level II:

• Speaking: Able to satisfy most work requirements with

language usage
that is acceptable and effective. Speak the language with
sufficient
structural accuracy and vocabulary for effective participation in
most
formal and informal conversations on practical, social, and
professional
topics.

• Reading: Able to read various materials on unfamiliar subjects
within a
normal range of speed and with almost complete
comprehension; rarely
misinterprets text. Comprehend a variety of styles and forms
pertinent to
professional needs.

3.0 Contractor Services.

3.A. Services. Contractor shall ensure personnel are properly
trained in
maintenance procedures and are prepared for the safe and
efficient operation of
grounds and roads maintenance equipment.

3.A.1. Insurance. The contractor shall comply with the Federal
Acquisition
Regulation clause that addresses this issue. See terms and
conditions of this
solicitation for applicable clauses and guidance.

3.A.2. Records. The contractor should maintain records of
transactions with the
U.S. government, and, upon request make such records available
to properly
designated CORs within a reasonable period of time.

3.A.3. Condition. Ensure equipment is properly operated and
maintained.

3.A.4. Safety items. The equipment used for grounds
maintenance must meet all of
the safety requirements and laws required of the U.S. and the
host nation
government.

3. B. Services. The contractor shall provide the following
services:

3.B.1. Joint inspection. The contractor shall perform a joint
inspection with the U.S.
government COR at the time of goods/services acceptance upon
contract
completion and at the appropriate sites.

3.B.1.A. Acceptance inspection. The contractor shall provide an
inspection sheet
written in English and in duplicate. The inspection sheet must
be signed and dated
by both the contractor and the COR as acknowledgment of the
conditions of the
grounds before the exercise. The contractor and the COR will
retain a copy of the
inspection sheet for use during joint inspections conducted at
the end of the contract
period.

3.B.1.B. Random inspections. The COR will inspect areas
designated in this PWS
periodically by conducting a random sample to ensure
compliance with this PWS
and all environmental and safety requirements. The COR will

use the results of
these inspections and customer feedback to determine contractor
performance and
take any necessary corrective action.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

3.B.2. Maintenance. The contractor shall perform both
scheduled and unscheduled
maintenance. The contractor shall provide all parts, labor,
supplies, materials,
equipment, and expertise necessary to complete required
maintenance tasks.

3.B.3. Hours of service. Grounds and roads maintenance service
must be available
from 0700-1900, seven days a week, including U.S. and local
holidays. Exceptions
shall be coordinated by the COR and negotiated and agreed to
by the contracting
officer (KO).

4.0 Quality Control Program.

4. A. The contractor shall institute and maintain a complete
quality control (QC)
program to ensure the requirements of this contract are provided
as specified. The
overall goal of the program should be to identify and correct
any problems that may
exist before they are identified by or reported to the COR. At a
minimum, the

program shall include:

4.A.1. An inspection system covering all the services required
with a
comprehensive checklist to be used to inspect contract
performance during
scheduled and unscheduled inspections and the names of the
individuals who will
be performing the inspections. Provide a list of the QC
inspectors to the COR.

4.A.2. A system for identifying and correcting deficiencies
and/or a pattern of
deficiencies in the quality or quantity of services provided
before the level of
performance becomes unacceptable and/or government
inspectors point out the
deficiencies.

4.A.3. A file for inspections conducted by the contractor and
related corrective
actions. This file should include follow-up documentation of
inspections to ensure
corrective action was appropriate, complete, and timely. This
documentation shall
be organized in a logical manner, kept current, and made
available to the COR and
the KO during the term of the contract.

5.0 Quality Assurance Program.

5.A. The government shall evaluate the contractor’s
performance under this
contract. All surveillance observations shall be recorded by the
government. When
an observation indicates deficient or defective performance, the

COR shall request
the contractor’s representative initial the observation.

5.B. Government verification inspections of services shall not
constitute acceptance
nor replace the contractor inspection or in any way relieve the
contractor of any
responsibility to take all actions necessary to assure highest
quality of service
rendered.

5.C. The contractor may be required to meet at least weekly
with the COR during
the first month of the contract. Meetings shall be as often as
necessary thereafter as
determined by the COR.

5.D. The contractor shall maintain a current list of employees.
The list shall include
the employee’s name, government identification number,
contact information, and
residence information. The list shall be validated and signed by
the contractor and
provided to the COR. Updated lists shall be provided when an
employee’s status or
information changes.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

6.0 COR Duties and Responsibilities.

The contractor is required to attempt to resolve all questions or

problems with the
COR prior to contacting the KO. The COR cannot change the
performance
requirements of the contract; only the KO may alter the terms of
this contract, make
applicable agreements, or obligate U.S. government funds.

6.A. The COR shall be responsible for continuous observations
of the contractor’s
performance under this contract. All observations of incomplete
or defective
performance or safety and health standards violations shall be
recorded.

6.B. The COR shall issue written notices to the contractor and
shall require the
contractor to reply in writing to the COR within five workdays
after receipt
explaining reasons for the existing conditions and the corrective
actions and
procedures taken to prevent recurrence.

6.C. The COR will inspect and accept the goods/services
performed by the
contractor. Do not sign for any goods or services not received
or not to standard.

6.D. Verify quantities and/or services on the vendor’s invoice.

6.E. Escort vendors on MK Airbase and BTA LSA as required.

6.F. Inform the KO of any performance problems.

6.G. The U.S. Army Contracting Command Europe will appoint
the COR for this
contract.

7.0 Access Procedures.

7.A. Before access is permitted to any Romanian military site or
installation, a
30-day access request notification is required for all civilian
contractors. The list for
base access shall be provided to the COR within five working
days of notification
of award.

7.B. The access request notification requires the last name and
first name; passport
or ID card number; date of birth and place of birth information;
and vehicle type
and license plate number, if any. The access list shall be
delivered on paper and
electronically in Microsoft Excel in the format determined by
the COR.

7.C. All base access requests shall be made through the COR.

7.D. Failure to comply with these procedures will result in base
access for
contractor personnel being denied.

7.E. Failure to comply with additional access requirements or to
meet the
requirements is grounds for access denial of the contractor’s
personnel and, if
necessary, termination of the contract for cause. Contractor
personnel shall travel
within MK Airbase and BTA only to locations necessary to
perform contracted
duties. No authority to use airbase or training area facilities or
make purchases is

included in this agreement. Contractors may be searched upon
entry. Cell phones
with a camera function and cameras are prohibited.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

7.F. No contractor access requests made directly with the MK
Airbase authorities
will be honored.

8.0 Safety and Accident Prevention.

8.A. The contractor shall formulate and submit within 30 days
after the conditional
contract award date a written safety and health plan for
acceptance by the
government. The written plan shall include the details of the
contractor’s safety
organization, responsibilities, method of program
implementation, and how hazards
and deficiencies shall be identified and corrected. It shall detail
employees’
responsibilities for protecting government property and the
safety of others as well
as reporting all accidents and reporting or correcting unsafe
conditions, hazards, or
practices. The plan shall also contain accident notification and
reporting
procedures. The contractor shall have a central English-
speaking POC for safety
and health related issues. The POC shall be identified in writing
to the COR.

8.B. The contractor shall ensure employees have all required
Romanian safety
training when engaged in activities involving government
facilities, personnel, or
equipment. The proof of training (certificates) must be provided
upon request.

8.C. The contractor shall immediately notify the COR and
designated U.S.
government safety officer of all accidents or incidents involving
employee use of or
damage or injury to facilities, equipment, or personnel.
Contractor shall be notified
upon award of safety officer POC and contact procedures.

8.D. The contractor shall require their personnel to wear safety
shoes or boots
according to Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) standard
1926, Subpart E, Personal Protective and Lifesaving Equipment.

8.E. Some classifications of work may require special protective
clothing and the
contractor shall be responsible for and provide all required
personal protection
equipment (respirators, hearing protection, eye protection,
gloves, steel-toed safety
shoes or boots, aprons, masks, face shields, coveralls, reflective
vests, and hard
hats) according to OSHA standard 1926, Subpart E, Personal
Protective and
Lifesaving Equipment.

9.0. Environmental Requirements.

9.A. The contractor shall comply with all local host national
and U.S. federal
environmental laws and regulations to include but not limited to
the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act, Safe Water Drinking Act, the
Clean Air Act, and
Federal Facilities Compliance Act.

9.B. The contractor shall define proper procedures for the
storage of hazardous
materials conforming with good housekeeping practices. The
use, handling, storage,
and disposal of all toxic, hazardous, special, or radiological
wastes or materials
shall be according to all U.S. and local host national
environmental regulations and
procedures. Personnel shall be trained according to Romanian
regulations on proper
procedures to include spill response and clean up.

9.C. The contractor shall provide a complete environmental plan
to assure
compliance with all environmental statutes and regulations. A
copy of the plan shall
be provided to the COR at the pre-performance conference and
as changes occur.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

10. Authorization to Perform.

The contractor, in entering this agreement, affirms that all

necessary licenses,
permits, and qualifications necessary to perform this contract
were or will be met
before performance begins. All taxes and fees associated with
conducting business
in Romania are the responsibility of the contractor. The
contractor must conform to
all Romanian labor laws, safety, environmental compliance,
practices, and
requirements unless otherwise informed in writing by the KO.

11.0 Contractor Liability.

11.A. The contractor shall be liable for and shall indemnify and
hold harmless the
government against all actions or claims for loss of or damage
to property or the
injury or death of persons, resulting from the fault, negligence,
or wrongful act or
omission of the contractor, its agents, or employees. If
applicable, host nation or
local government laws limit the obligation to indemnify and
hold the U.S.
government harmless in any manner; the obligation to
indemnify and hold the U.S.
government harmless shall apply to the fullest extent possible.

11.B. Fault, negligence, or wrongful act or omission of the
contractor, its agents, or
employees includes but is not limited to any tortious act or
omission; willful
misconduct; failure to comply with host nation, U.S. federal, or
local governmental
requirements; libel, slander, or other defamatory or disparaging
statement in any
written deliverable required under the contract; or any false or

negligent statement
or omission made by contractor in its proposal to the U.S.
government.

11.C. When loss or damage is caused by the negligence of the
contractor, the
liability is for the full cost of satisfactory repair or for the
current replacement value
of the article.

11.D. The contractor shall give prompt notice to the U.S.
government upon learning
of the assertion of any claim or the commencement of any
action or proceeding in
respect of which a claim under this paragraph may be sought
and must specify the
facts pertaining thereto and an estimate of the amount of the
liability arising there
from.

11.E. Liability of the contractor shall survive the termination,
expiration, or
completion of performance under this contract.

11.F. The government shall in no event be liable or responsible
for damage or
injury to any person or property occasioned through the use,
maintenance, or
operation of any vehicle or other equipment by or the action of
the contractor or the
contractor’s employees and agents in performing under this
contract. The
government shall be indemnified and held harmless against
claims for damage or
injury in such cases.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Appendix C

Example of a Performance Work Statement for Shower and
Hand-Washing Station Requirements

General Information

1. Scope of work. The contractor shall provide portable shower
facilities or
structures. The contractor will provide service or maintenance
and supervision of
shower placement and/or replacement or removal. It will be
necessary for the
contractor and employed personnel to set up, install, maintain,
take down, and
transport all shower material and peripherals to and from the
training sites upon
completion. The contractor shall provide shower structures,
shaving areas (sinks),
and hand-washing stations. These facilities must accommodate
up to 1,000
personnel composed of both genders. The contractor must
provide hand-washing
stations at the designated locations to include areas adjacent to
portable toilets and
the dining facilities (DFACs). The contractor is also responsible
to deliver and fill
each shower facility with potable water. The contractor must

also supervise and
conduct the removal of gray water or waste water from the
hand-washing stations
and showers. The contractor is also required to stay to the end
of the contract for
disassembly, closing out contracts, and removal of equipment.

2. Personnel. The contractor shall furnish all personnel to
accomplish work required
by this contract. The contracting supervisor shall oversee
personnel who are
qualified in their respective areas of responsibility.

2.1. Certifications and qualifications. All contractor personnel
will have a working
knowledge of tent assembly. Only certified electricians will be
employed by the
contractor to manage power generation and power distribution.

2.2. Conflict of interest. The contractor shall not employ any
person who is an
employee of the U.S. government or a Department of Defense
military or civilian if
the employment of that person would create or appear to be a
conflict of interest.

2.3. Background check. All contractor personnel are subject to
and must approve a
police record check be accomplished before working at Fort
Chaffee Maneuver
Training Center (FCMTC).

2.4. Use of alcoholic beverages/drugs. The use of alcoholic
beverages or illegal
drugs by contractor personnel while on duty and on FCMTC is
strictly forbidden

for the duration of the contract. The contractor shall
immediately remove and
replace employees who are under the influence of alcohol or
drugs.

2.5. Theft. If a contractor employee is observed and verified
stealing any
government property, the proper authorities will be contacted
and the contractor
shall immediately remove the employee.

2.6. Removal of contractor employees. All personnel employed
by the contractor in
the performance of this contract or any representative of the
contractor entering the
government installation shall abide by all security regulations
of the installation and
shall be subject to such checks as may be deemed necessary.
The government
reserves the right to direct the removal of an employee for
misconduct, security
reasons, or any overt evidence of communicable disease.
Removal of contractor

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

employees for reasons stated above does not relieve the
contractor from
responsibility for total performance of this contract.

2.7. Vehicle operators. Contractor personnel operating
privately-owned vehicles on

the installation shall have a valid state license to operate a
motor vehicle as well as
the commensurate insurance required for the state in which their
vehicle is
registered and shall comply with the current FCMTC standing
operating
procedures. (Contractor is responsible to ensure all employees
have current vehicle
insurance.) All vehicle operators should be aware of bridge
weight limitations
(maximum of 22 tons on post, with some bridges having a 5-ton
weight limit), road
network conditions, and traffic ability. The forward operating
bases (FOBs) are
only accessible by gravel or dirt roads.

3. Shower facilities. The contractor shall be responsible for
completion and
assembly of the showers to meet the following specifications for
their respective
locations:

3.1. Shower capacity. Each shower facility at each FOB shall
accommodate at least
1,000 personnel on a continuous 24-hour basis. The capacity of
the showers shall
allow the ratio of 1 shower head per 15 personnel. (Note:
Contractor shall also
place one shower trailer with a minimum of 12 shower stations
and hand-washing
stations at the cantonment area FOB.)

3.2. Shower lighting. Each shower facility shall have lighting to
allow personnel to
see adequately while showering, washing, and shaving during
limited natural light

hours. There shall be external lighting on the shower facility to
allow for safe
movement into and from the shower facility.

3.3. Shaving stations. Each shower facility shall shaving
stations assembled.
Whether internal or external, shaving stations must allow
personnel to have hot
water, a basin, and mirror.

3.4. Power generation. Each shower facility shall have a power
generation source
(generator). Each shower facility shall have hot and cold
running water and proper
lighting. Power generation is essential. The contractor must
provide maintenance to
the power generation as well as the shower facility internal
operation and controls.

3.5. Power distribution. Each specified shower facility shall
have electrical outlets.
It shall be the responsibility of the contractor to provide
adequate electrical outlets.

3.6. Maintenance. The contractor shall be responsible for the
24-hour maintenance
of the shower facility’s plumbing, lighting, and power
generation units.

3.7. Fuel: The government will provide standard, diesel fuel for
the generators at
each location at no cost to the contractor.

4. Hand-washing stations. The contractor shall provide all hand-
washing stations
for personnel. By direction, the hand-washing stations will be

placed outside of all
shower facilities and dining facilities. The placement of hand-
washing stations must
accommodate 1,000 personnel at each FOB.

4.1. Water. The contractor will deliver and refill the water in
the hand-washing
stations.

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4.2. Maintenance. The contractor must provide 24-hour service
and support to all
power generation units. Only personnel authorized and certified
by the contractor
may perform maintenance on the equipment owned by the
contractor.

4.3. DFAC. The contractor will place a minimum of ten hand-
washing stations
outside each DFAC located in the FOBs in addition to those
placed near the shower
facility and porta-potty areas.

4.4. Porta-potties. The contractor will place a minimum of one
hand-washing
station with two sinks for every six porta-potties located in the
FOBs and one at
each range, in addition to those placed with the shower facility
and DFAC. (Note:
Except for cantonment, each FOB will have approximately 36
porta-potties.)

5. Quality control. The contractor shall follow the quality
standards as established
by the government.

6. Government-furnished property (GFP) and services.

6.1. Replacement of GFP or equipment. There will be no GFP or
equipment other
than potable water, the equipment to dispose of grey water, and
diesel fuel for use
in contractor-owned generators.

6.2. Loss of or damage to GFP. Upon discovery of any loss or
damage to GFP,
equipment, or material, the contractor shall immediately notify
the contracting
officer’s representative (COR) or contracting officer (KO) by
verbal means. A
written notification shall follow within two days. The contractor
shall investigate
and report in writing to the COR all cases of loss, damage, or
destruction of GFP in
its possession as soon as the facts become known, but not later
than 15 days after
discovery.

6.3. Liability. See Federal Acquisition Regulations clause
52.245-8, Liability for
Facilities.

6.4. Completion of contract. Upon contract completion or
termination of the
contract, the government and the contractor at the written
direction of the KO shall
conduct a joint inventory. The contractor designated funds

manager, COR, and
quality assurance evaluator will be present at these inventories.

7. Services. The government will furnish: None.

8. Miscellaneous. Water buffalo refills. Contractor will be
required to fill
approximately ten 400-gallon, government-owned water
buffaloes at the FOBs with
potable water on an as needed basis daily. It is anticipated that
this requirement will
be twice per day

9. Contractor-furnished items and services. The contractor shall
be responsible for
the accountability and maintenance of all equipment necessary
for the completion
of the contract.

10. Contract administration data. The KO is the contract
administrator. In no event
shall any understanding or agreement, contract modification,
change order, or other
matter that deviates from the terms of this contract between the
contractor and a
person other than the KO be recognized as an effective
contractual document.

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11. Submission of invoices/special contract requirements.

11.1. Wages. Wages shall be paid in accordance with U.S.
Department of Labor
wage determination current at the time of the contract award.

11.2. Compliance with applicable federal, state, and local
requirements. In
performing work under this contract, the contractor shall
comply with all relevant
federal, state, and local statutes; ordinances; laws; and
regulations.

11.3. Liability. The government shall not be held responsible
for damages to
property or for injuries or death to persons that might occur
without fault on the
part of the government as a result of or incident to performance
of the contract.

11.4. Permits and responsibilities for work. The contractor shall
without additional
expense to the government obtain all licenses and permits
required for the
execution of the work. He shall be responsible for all damages
to persons or
property that occur as a result of his fault or negligence in
connection with the
execution of the work.

11.5. Rights of the government to perform functions with its
own personnel. The
government reserves the right to perform or supplement
performance of contract
functions with government personnel during periods of disaster,
war, emergencies,
police actions, or acts of God.

11.6. Supervision. The government shall not exercise any
supervision or control
over the contractor’s employees performing services under this
contract. Such
employees shall be accountable not to the government, but
solely to the contractor
who is responsible to the government.

11.7. Utilities. For the purposes of this contract, utilities, water,
and electricity will
be furnished at no cost to the contractor. The contractor will be
required to
participate in all energy conservation programs

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Appendix D

Terms and Definitions

Acquisition: The process of acquiring supplies, services, and
construction in
support of the joint force.

Administrative contracting officer (ACO): Contracting officers
whose duties are
limited to contract administration. See also contracting officer
and procuring
contracting officer.

Administrative lead time: The interval between initiation of a
procurement action

and the letting of a contract or placing of an order. See also
procurement lead time.

Civil augmentation program (CAP): Standing, long-term
external support contacts
designed to augment service logistic capabilities with contract
support in both
preplanned and short-notice contingencies. Examples include
the U.S. Army
Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, the Air Force Contract
Augmentation
Program, and the U.S. Navy Global Contingency Capabilities
Contracts. See also
contingency contract and external support contracts.

Constructive change to a contract: A constructive change occurs
when the
contractor performs work beyond what is required by the
contract and without a
formal change order; it is perceived that the work originated
from a government
informal order, or is due to government fault.

Contingency contractor employees: Employees of a commercial
entity providing
goods and/or services to the joint force within the operational
area during a
contingency operation. See also contractors authorized to
accompany the force,
contractors who deploy with the force, and contractors who
accompany the
force/non-contractors who deploy with the force.

Contingency contracting: The process of obtaining goods and
services from
commercial sources via contracting means in support of

contingency operations.
See also contingency, contingency contracts, and contingency
contractor employee.

Contingency contractors authorized to accompany the force
(CAAF): Contingency
contractor employees who are specifically authorized through
their contract to
accompany the force and have protected status in accordance
with international
conventions. Also known as CAAF. See also contractors who
deploy with the force
and contractors who accompany the force, but who do not
deploy with the force.

Contingency contractors authorized to accompany the force, but
who do not deploy
with the force: A subset of CAAF who are specifically
authorized through the
contract to accompany the force, but who do not deploy through
a formal
deployment process, and who generally receive a lower level of
government
support as compared to those contractor personnel designated as
CAAF. Also
known as non-CAAF. See also CAAF and contractor personnel
who deploy with
the force.

Contingency contracts: Contracts for goods and services
obtained from commercial
sources in support of contingency operations. See also external
support contracts,
theater support contracts, and systems support contracts.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Contract administration: A subset of contracting that includes
efforts to ensure that
supplies and services are delivered in accordance with the
conditions and standards
expressed in the contract.

Contractor management: The process of managing and
integrating contracted
support, including all associated contractor personnel, into
military operations.

Contract termination: The cessation or cancellation, in whole or
in part, of work
under a prime contract, or a subcontractor for the convenience
of, or at the option
of, the government, or due to failure of the contractor to
perform in accordance with
the terms of the contract (default).

Contracting officer (KO): The servicemember or Department of
Defense (DOD)
civilian with the legal authority to enter into, administer, and/or
terminate contracts.

Contracting officer representative (COR): A servicemember or
DOD civilian
appointed in writing by a contracting officer responsible for
monitoring contract
performance, and performs other duties specified by his
appointment letter. See also
contracting officer technical representative.

Contracting officer technical representative (COTR): A
servicemember or DOD
civilian appointed in writing by a contracting officer to provide
specific technical
expertise in the contract management process. See also
contracting officer
representative.

Cost-plus award fee contract: A type of contract that provides
for a payment
consisting of a base amount fixed at inception of the contract
along with an award
amount that is based upon a judgmental evaluation by the
government.

Delivery order: A contract for supplies that does not procure or
specify firm
quantities (other than maximum/minimum quantity) and
provides for the issuance
of orders for delivery of supplies during the contract period.

Direct vendor delivery: A materiel acquisition and distribution
method that requires
a vendor deliver directly to the customer.

External support contracts: Prearranged contracts, or contracts
awarded during the
contingency, from contracting organizations whose contracting
authority does not
derive directly from the contingency operation or system
support contracting
authority. See also theater support and system support contracts.

Field ordering officer (FOO): A servicemember or DOD civilian
who is appointed

in writing and trained by a contracting officer who is authorized
to spend
government money in support of forces and/or designated civil-
military operations.

Head of the contracting activity: The official who has overall
legal responsibility
for managing the contracting activity.

Indefinite delivery/indefinite quantity (ID/IQ) type of contract:
A type of contract
used for procurements where the exact time of delivery or
quantity of the item is
not known at the time of the letting the contract.

Independent government estimate (IGE): An independent
government estimate is
an estimate of the cost/price for goods and/or services to be
procured by contract.

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CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Initiation of procurement action: The point in time when the
approved document
requesting procurement and citing funds is forwarded to the
procuring activity. See
also procurement lead time.

Letter of authorization: A document issued by the procuring
contracting officer or
designee that authorizes contractor personnel to accompany the
force and to travel

to, from, and within the operational area. It also outlines
government-furnished
support authorizations within the operational area.

Non-contingency contractor authorized to accompany the force
contractor
employees: Include local national and third country national
expatriates who are
permanent residents in the operational area who perform their
support function
away from direct vicinity of, and do not reside with, U.S.
forces. See also
contingency contractor employees and contractors authorized to
accompany the
force.

Performance work statement (PWS): A performance-based
description of the user’s
technical, functional, and performance requirements.

Prime contract: A contract or contractual action entered into by
the U.S.
government for the purpose of obtaining supplies, materials,
equipment, or services
of any kind.

Prime vendor (PV): A contracting process that provides
commercial products to
regionally-grouped military and federal customers from
commercial distributors
using electronic commerce. Customers typically receive
materiel delivery through
the vendor’s commercial distribution system. See also direct
vendor delivery and
distribution system.

Privity of contract: The legal relationship that exists between
two contracting
parties, for example, between the prime and sub-contractor.

Procurement lead time: The interval in months of time between
the initiation of the
procurement action and receipt into the supply system of the
production model
(excludes prototypes) purchased as the result of such actions. It
is composed of two
elements, production lead time and administrative lead time.
See also
administrative lead time.

Procuring contracting officer (PCO): A contracting officer who
initiates and signs
the contract. Also see contracting officer and administrative
contracting officer.

Ratification: The process of approving an unauthorized
commitment by an official
who has the authority to do so. See also constructive change to
a contract and
unauthorized commitment.

Requiring activity: A military or other designated, supported
organization that
identifies and receives contracted support during military
operations. See also
supported unit.

Senior contracting official (SCO): The lead service or joint-
command-designated
contracting official who has direct managerial responsibility
over theater support
contracting.

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DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Subcontract: A contract or contractual action entered into by a
prime contractor and
subcontractor, or a subcontractor to another subcontractor, for
the purpose of
obtaining supplies, materials, equipment, or services of any
kind under a prime
contract. See also contingency contract, prime contract, and
privity of contract.

Supported unit: As related to contracted support, the
organization that is the
recipient, but not necessarily the requester, of contractor-
provided support. See also
requiring activity.

System support contracts: A pre-arranged contingency contract
awarded by the
service acquisition program management offices that provides
technical support,
maintenance support and, in some cases, Class IX support for
selected military
weapon and support systems. System support contracts are
routinely put in place to
provide support to newly-fielded weapon systems including
aircraft, land combat
vehicles, and automated command and control systems. System
support contracting
authority, contract management, and program management
authority resides with

the service system materiel acquisition program offices. System
support contractors
are comprised of mostly U.S. citizens who provide support in
garrison and often
deploy with the force in both training and contingency
operations. The joint forces
commander generally has less ability to influence the execution
of system support
contracts than other types of contracted support.

Task order: Order for services placed against an established
contract. See also civil
augmentation program, cost-plus award fee contract, and
indefinite delivery/
indefinite quantity type of contract.

Theater support contracts: A type of contingency contract that is
awarded by
contracting officers deployed to the operational area serving
under the direct
contracting authority of the service component, special
operations force command,
or designated joint head of contracting authority for the
designated contingency
operation. These contracts are normally executed under
expedited contracting
authority and provide goods, services, and minor construction
from commercial
sources (normally within the operational area). Theater support
contracts are
typically associated with term contingency contracting. Local
nationals comprise
the bulk of the theater contract support employees.

Unauthorized commitment: A non-binding agreement between a
contractor and a

U.S. government official who lacks proper contracting authority
to enter into a
contract or to change a contract. See also constructive change to
a contract and
ratification.

58

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

PROVIDE US YOUR INPUT

To help you access information quickly and efficiently, Center
for Army Lessons Learned

(CALL) posts all publications, along with numerous other
useful products, on the CALL

Web site. The CALL Web site is restricted to U.S. government
and allied personnel.

PROVIDE FEEDBACK OR REQUEST INFORMATION

<http://call.army.mil>

If you have any comments, suggestions, or requests for
information (RFIs), use the
following links on the CALL home page: “Request for
Information or a CALL Product” or
“Give Us Your Feedback.”

PROVIDE TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
(TTP) OR
SUBMIT AN AFTER -ACTION REVIEW (AAR)

If your unit has identified lessons learned or TTP or would like
to submit an AAR, please
contact CALL using the following information:

Telephone: DSN 552-9569/9533; Commercial 913-684-
9569/9533

Fax: DSN 552-4387; Commercial 913-684-4387

NIPR Email address: [email protected]
Mailing Address: Center for Army Lessons Learned, ATTN:
OCC, 10 Meade Ave.,
Bldg 50, Fort Leavenworth, KS66027-1350.

TO REQUEST COPIES OF THIS PUBLICATION

If you would like copies of this publication, please submit your
request at:
<http://call.army.mil>. Use the “Request for Information or a
CALL Product” link. Please
fill in all the information, including your unit name and official
military address. Please
include building number and street for military posts.

59

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

PRODUCTS AVAILABLE "ONLINE"

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED (C ALL)

Access and download information from CALL's Web site. CALL

also offers Web-based
access to the CALL Archives. The CALL home page address is:

<http://call.army.mil>

CALL produces the following publications on a variety of
subjects:

• Combat Training Center Bulletins, Newsletters, and Trends

• Special Editions

• News From the Front

• Training Techniques

• Handbooks

• Initial Impressions Reports

You may request these publications by using the “Request for
Information or a CALL
Product” link on the CALL home page.

COMBINED ARMS CENTER (CAC)

Additional Publications and Resources

The CAC home page address is:

<http://www.leavenworth.army.mil>

Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS)

BCKS supports the online generation, application, management,
and exploitation of Army

knowledge to foster collaboration among Soldiers and units in
order to share expertise and
experience, facilitate leader development and intuitive decision
making, and support the
development of organizations and teams. Find BCKS at
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/bcks/index.asp>.

Center for Army Leadership (CAL)

CAL plans and programs leadership instruction, doctrine, and
research. CAL integrates and
synchronizes the Professional Military Education Systems and
Civilian Education System.
Find CAL products at
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/CAL/index.asp>.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI)

CSI is a military history “think tank” that produces timely and
relevant military history and
contemporary operational history. Find CSI products at
<http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/csi/RandP/CSIpubs.asp>.

60

CENTER FOR ARMY LESSONS LEARNED

Combined Arms Center-Training: The Road to Deployment

This site provides brigade combat teams, divisions, and support
brigades the latest road to
deployment information. This site also includes U.S. Forces
Command’s latest training
guidance and most current Battle Command Training Program

Counterinsurgency
Seminars.

Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate (CADD)

CADD develops, writes, and updates Army doctrine at the corps
and division level. Find
the doctrinal publications at either the Army Publishing
Directorate (APD)
<http://www.usapa.army.mil> or the Reimer Digital Library
<http://www.adtdl.army.mil>.

Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO)

FMSO is a research and analysis center on Fort Leavenworth
under the TRADOC G-2.
FMSO manages and conducts analytical programs focused on
emerging and asymmetric
threats, regional military and security developments, and other
issues that define evolving
operational environments around the world. Find FMSO
products at
<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/recent.htm> or
<http://fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products.htm>.

Military Review (MR)

MR is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original
thought and debate on the art
and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest
to the U.S. Army and the
Department of Defense. Find MR at
<http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview>.

TRADOC Intelligence Support Activity (TRISA)

TRISA is a field agency of the TRADOC G2 and a tenant
organization on Fort Leavenworth.
TRISA is responsible for the development of intelligence
products to support the
policy-making, training, combat development, models, and
simulations arenas. Find TRISA
Threats at <https://dcsint-
threats.leavenworth.army.mil/default.aspx>
(requires AKO password and ID).

United States Army Information Operations Proponent
(USAIOP)

USAIOP is responsible for developing and documenting all IO
requirements for doctrine,
organization, training, materiel, leadership and education,
personnel, and facilities;
managing the eight personnel lifecycles for officers in the IO
functional area; and
coordinating and teaching the qualification course for
information operations officers. Find
USAIOP at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC/usaiop.asp>.

U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center

The U.S. Army and Marine Corps COIN Center acts as an
advocate and integrator for
COIN programs throughout the combined, joint, and interagency
arena. Find the U.S.
Army/U.S. Marine Corps COIN Center at:
<http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/coin/index.asp>.

Support CAC in the exchange of information by telling us about
your
successes so they may be shared and become Army successes.

61

DEVELOPING A PWS HANDBOOK

Approved for Public Release
Distribution Unlimited

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
http://call.army.mil

Combined Arms Center (CAC) Ft. Leavenworth, KS�

Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)
http://call.army.mil

Combined Arms Center (CAC) Ft. Leavenworth, KS�

US Army

Combined

Arms Center

US Army

Combined

Arms Center

“Intellectual Center of the Army”“Intellectual Center of the
Army”

www.leavenworth.army.mil
Table of ContentsForewordIntroductionChapter 1: Introduction

to Performance Work Statements and Statements of
WorkChapter 2: Contracting 101Chapter 3: English 101:
Guidelines for Writing a PerformanceWork StatementChapter 4:
Eight Steps to Developing a Performance Work
StatementChapter 5: Government-Provided Support
ConsiderationsAppendix A: Blank Performance Work Statement
TemplateAppendix B: Example of a Performance Work
Statement for Grounds and Roads MaintenanceAppendix C:
Example of a Performance Work Statement for Shower and
Hand-Washing Station RequirementAppendix D: Terms and
Definitions

Assignment: Force Generation Briefing

This brief target ELOs 400-SMC-1011.3.2 (F301: Range of
Military Operations (ROMO)), 400-SMC-1011.3.5 (F304: Unit
Status Reporting), 400-SMC-1011.3.6 (F305: Global Mobility),
and 400-SMC-1011.3.7 (F306: Train and Deploy the Brigade)

Assignment Instructions: This is a military information briefing,
not a reading. The presentation will be 15 minutes (+/- 2).
Presentation will consist of 6 to 10 slides in PowerPoint
(including Title Slide, Agenda, Conclusion, & References).
Students may use up to two other visual aids such as maps and
diagrams if desired.

(F301) Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and
Deterrence. These ongoing activities establish, shape, maintain,
and refine relations with other nations and domestic civil
authorities. The general strategic and operational objective is to
protect US interests at home and abroad.

Briefing must answer/address these questions/statements:

(F305) As a Sergeant major it is important to have a grasp of

how integrating the capabilities of both inter-theater and intra-
theater common-user mobility assets. This is only gained by
having analyzed the air, land, and sea transportation planning in
support of the Range of Military Operations.

(F304) A key element of meeting global requirements to support
the ROM is having analyzed the air, land, and sea transportation
planning. This coupled with accurate USR reporting to develop
a viable RSOI plan to support a wide contingency of operations.

Explain the personnel and medical readiness deployability
standards and understood how to apply organizational training
to support the deployment process and RSOI operations (F306).
Assignment: Analyze the concepts and theories you read about
in F301, F304, F305, and F306; utilizing key language and
terms from these concepts and theories,

Present an oral presentation that highlights and explains the
Range of Military Operations (ROMO) (F301). In your briefing
ensure you link ROMO to global mobility (F305) and the
implication /importance of Unit Status Reporting (USR) (F304)
to help finalize the RSOI process to train and deploy the brigade
(F306).

Department of Defense COR HANDBOOK March 22,

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