Why does Theory of mind develop? Language ability predicts preschoolers’ false-belief understanding (Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). Children who are trained to use, mental-state words in conversation are better at false-belief tasks (Hale & Tager- Flusberg , 2003; San Juan & Astington, 2012). - think / know / remember / guess (Milligan et al., 2007) Quechua people of the Peruvian highlands (language lacks mental-state terms ), children have difficulty with false-belief tasks longer than other children ( Vinden , 1996). Astington and Pelletier (2005) - predicts early reading comprehension – ToM involved in understanding the beliefs and intentions and therefore plots of different characters. Executive function — inhibition, cognitive flexibility (flexible shifting of attention ), and planning— predict false belief task success - enhance children’s ability to reflect on experiences and mental states of others – these skills have a developmental trajectory as well (Benson et al., 2013; Drayton, TurleyAmes , & Guajardo, 2011; Müller et al., 2012). Inhibition is related to false-belief understanding, i.e. tasks require suppression of an irrelevant response— the child's own point of view (Carlson , Moses, & Claxton, 2004 ). Social experiences - maternal “mind-mindedness” experienced by securely attached babies (frequent commentary on their mental states) is positively associated with later performance on false-belief and other theory-of-mind tasks (Laranjo et al., 2010; Meins et al., 2003 ; Ruffman et al., 2006). Securely attached children experience more parent– child narratives, including discussions of mental states (Ontai & Thompson, 2008).