Embedded device-care Point of View - security

MaazPatni1 20 views 10 slides Jul 19, 2024
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About This Presentation

Embedded device-care POV- security


Slide Content

EMBEDDED DEVICE-CARE
POV- SECURITY
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www.siliconsignals.io
Securing embedded devices is crucial to protect sensitive data and
ensure their reliable performance, which is highly important in our
interconnected world.
High-level look at the security features to cure your Embedded products
such as

IOT
Consumer Avionics
Wearable
Automotive
Medical

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These are potential areas worth exploring for embedded device security
Linux Kernel
Hardware extensions
File system
SOC features
Core features
CVEs, Updates (Signed OTA), Patching

Linux kernel
A lot can be written but one “drop” from the sea is discussed
ASLR - Address Space Layout Randomization - buffer overflow attack
Disabling /dev/mem access to physical memory (DEVMEM=n)
SELinux, AppArmor, Kernel Hardening, cgroup, SecComp
Kernel module signing - CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_* config
Kernel Self Protection Project
Linux Audit framework
Userspace process isolation
CONFIG_HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR
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Linux kernel (continue ...)
Skipping the talk, see it your self in kernel config
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Hardware extensions
Adding TPM (Secure element) to the design - pkcs11
one can find the our patch of enabling of TPM on imx8 processor here
- https://github.com/Rutvij-dev/Security-TPM2.0-SPI-
imx8/blob/main/0001-Security-TPM2.0-Hardware-Support-
enable.patch
Disable JTAG interface or secure debug (NXP imx8)
Tamper detection
Encrypted data exchange on the physical bus (No probing)
Hardware based Crypto engines
Security key storage element
Resource Partitioning using sandbox - NXP imx8

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File system
Filesystem Mount Options
secure mount options, such as "noexec" to prevent execution of
binaries on mounted file systems and "nosuid" to disable setuid and
setgid permissions, reducing the risk of privilege escalation.
DM_VERITY, DM_CRYPT, and DM_INTEGRITY
Encrypted Swap Space
Access controlled file system (cgroup, persmissions, namespace)
File system mounting with key comparison on the device(key matching)
fscrypt - Kernel space and user space
containerize i.e Docker

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SOC & Core features
Secure Boot
High Assurance/Advance assurance boot - NXP imx8
FUSE blowing
Cryptographic Acceleration
Secure debug
Hardware Root of Trust
Cryptographic Accelerator and Assurance Module (CAAM) - NXP imx8
SECO - Security Controller - NXP -imx8
Encrypted “execute in place” (XIP) capability from QSPI
TrustZone and OP-TEE - (Trusted Execution Environment (TEE))
Verified Boot & Measured boot

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References
https://www.timesys.com/webinars/Secure-by-Design-NXP-Webinar-
Series-Kernel-Hardening-and-Security.pdf
https://community.nxp.com/t5/Technology-Days-Training/i-MX-8-
Security-Overview-SECO-HAB-BOOT-Flow-ATF-xRDC-CST/ta-p/1117940?
attachment-id=88625
https://www.linux.com/training-tutorials/overview-linux-kernel-security-
features/

www.siliconsignals.io
At Silicon Signals, our team has decade of experience designing secure
embedded system and has experience working on HSM, TPM, Secure boot,
hardware crypto Linux driver writing and many more...
Want to design a Secure Embedded product secure from all levels, connect
us for the expert solution.
www.siliconsignals.io [email protected]
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