Air Power British doctrine defines airpower as "the ability to project power from the air and space to influence the behaviour of people or the course of events."
Generations of Warfare Air power theory has always been influenced by different Gen of Warfare Five Gens of Warfare
The first generation of modern warfare was intended to create a straightforward and orderly means of waging war. The concept was vast lines of soldiers meeting face to face First Gen Warfare
The increased accuracy and speed of the rifled musket and the breech-loader marks the end of first generation warfare due to the heavy casualties that could be sustained Second generation warfare still maintained lines of battle but focused more on the use of technology to allow smaller units of men to maneuver separately. These smaller units allowed for faster advances, less concentrated casualties, and the ability to use cover and concealment to advantage Second Gen Warfare
The second generation saw the rise of trench warfare, artillery support, more advanced reconnaissance techniques, extensive use of camouflage, radio communications, fireteam maneuvers and tanks Tanks invented on 15 Sept 1916 but was not optimally utilized during WW 1 Second Gen Warfare
Early Air Power Theorists had only witnessed Second Gen Warfare therefore for them a concept of a force that can reach behind enemy lines and cause destruction was too great to visualize anything else like the actual effects of aerial bombing or the effect of bombing on morale, use of air defence weapons etc However, there were people who suggested just the effects of Air Power Early Air Power Theorists
General Giulio Douhet (30 May 1869 – 15 Feb 1930) Command of the Air ; 1921 Believed in Air power Believed in bombers Argued that air power was revolutionary because it operated in the third dimension Aircraft could fly over surface forces, relegating them to secondary importance The vastness of the sky made defense almost impossible , so the essence of air power was the offensive Tall claim like Command of the air meant victory Believed in the morale effects of bombing Air power could break a people's will by destroying a country's “vital centers” Giulio Douhet
General Giulio Douhet (30 May 1869 – 15 Feb 1930) Armies became superfluous because aircraft could overfly them and attack them He believed that air commanders would prove themselves by their choice of targets. These would vary from centers of the government, military and industry with impunity, a principle later called "The bomber will always get through" Douhet also identified the five basic target types as: industry, transport infrastructure, communications, government and "the will of the people" The last category was particularly important to Douhet , who believed in the principle of total war The first step is command of the air; the next priority is destroying vital centers and civilian moral Giulio Douhet
Mashall of Air Force, Hugh Montague Trenchard , GCB, OM, GCVO, DSO (3 Feb 1873 – 10 Feb 1956) was a British officer who was instrumental in establishing the Royal Air Force. He has been described as the Father of the Royal Air Force Trenchard made three priorities First was an emphasis on support and co-ordination with ground forces He stressed on the importance of morale He had an unswerving belief in the importance of offensive action Hugh Trenchard
Victory can be achieved by bombing enemy vital centers, thus breaking the enemy’s will to fight The bomber will always get through; it does not need an escort Civilian morale is fragile. The effect of bombing on morale is more than the physical effects The offensive is the stronger form of war Night navigation, target acquisition, and bombing accuracy are manageable problems Air superiority is a prerequisite for all other military operations Both Trenchard and Douhet aimed at the collapse of civilian morale. However, Trenchard wanted to do it indirectly through the destruction of infrastructure targets, while Douhet wanted to attack the people directly Hugh Trenchard
William Lendrum Mitchell (29 Dec, 1879 – 19 Feb, 1936) was a United States Army general who is regarded as the father of the United States Air Force Airpower, organized into a separate, equal (to Army and Navy) and an autonomous air force under a unified department of defense, could serve as the most effective and economical means of defending the continental U.S. Predicted in 1906 that future conflicts would take place in the air, not on the ground The advent of aviation was revolutionary in military affairs Billy Mitchell
Command of the air is a prime requirement Airpower is inherently offensive; the bomber will always get through Anti-aircraft artillery is ineffective Airpower can defend the Continental U.S. more economically that the Navy. Naval warfare is obsolete Airmen are a special and elite breed of people, and they alone can understand the proper employment of airpower Future wars will be total; the ascendancy of the ground defensive will persist; everyone is a combatant Civilian morale is a fragile thing USA’s precision bombing theory and doctrine can also be attributed to him Billy Mitchell
The use of blitzkrieg during the German invasion of France first demonstrated the power of speed and maneuverability over static artillery positions and trench defenses. Through the use of tanks, mechanized infantry, and close air support, the Germans were able to quickly break through linear defenses and capture the rear The emphasis on maneuvering and speed to bypass enemy engagement remains a common strategy throughout the world, and collapsing an enemy's defenses by striking at deeper targets is a major strategy in third generation warfare Third Gen Warfare
The contributions of the third generation were based on the concept of overcoming technological disadvantage through the use of clever strategy. The emphasis on cavalry moved from heavy armor to greater speed, the development of the helicopter allowed insertions in hostile territory, and advanced missile technology allowed forces to bypass enemy defenses and strike at targets from great distances Third Gen Warfare
WW II saw the largest employment of Air Power thanks to Air Power theorists and enthusiasts Before 1939, all sides operated under largely theoretical models of air warfare Douhet summarized the faith that airmen during and after World War I developed in the efficacy of strategic bombing. Many said it alone could win wars, as "the bomber will always get through" The Americans were confident that the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bomber could reach targets, protected by its own weapons, and bomb, using the Norden bombsight, with "pickle barrel" accuracy Air Power Employment in WW II
The Luftwaffe lacked the bomber forces for strategic bombing, because it did not think such bombing was worthwhile, especially following the death of Walther Wever , the prime proponent of a strategic bomber force for the Luftwaffe. They did attempt some strategic bombing in the east. Their one success was destroying an airbase at Poltava Air Base, Ukraine during the Allied Operation Frantic, which housed 43 new B-17 bombers and a million tons of aviation fuel Air Power Employment in WW II Luftwaffe
The British had their own very well-developed theory of strategic bombing, thanks to Trenchard , and built the long-range bombers to implement it Bomber Command participated in two areas of attack – the strategic bombing campaign against German war production, and against the U-boats from freely operating against Allied shipping British Air Force also developed fighters and escorts RAF would carry out strategic bombing at night due to German fighters Increasingly heavy losses during the latter part of 1943 due to the reorganized Luftwaffe night fighter system, and costly attempts to destroy Berlin in the winter of 1943/44, led to serious doubts as to whether Bomber Command was being used to its fullest potential Air Power Employment in WW II Royal Air Force
USAAF developed strategic bombers like B-17 Following the legacy of Billy Mitchell, US concentrated on precision bombing but without the tools for precision Throughout European campaign, US continued challenging Royal Air Force on Strategic bombing. US continued precision bombing during daytime However, in Pacific campaign, when Japanese continued successful campaigns island after island, US decided to carry out “Strategic Bombing” of Japanese cities in 1944 Air Power Employment in WW II USAAF
After WW2, there were no major air campaigns till Vietnam war Vietnam war saw massive employment of air power The effects remained below par due to incorrect employment From WW II to Desert Storm
John Richard Boyd (January 23, 1927 – March 9, 1997) Created the Energy-Maneuverability theory, or E-M theory of aerial combat Had substantial influence on the ultimate "left hook" design of the plan in Desert Storm OODA loop Advocated a rapid series of surprise attacks at the tactical level to hurt enemy morale and psychologically incapacitate them John Boyd
When USA prepared to attack Iraq, they required an air strategy Warden came up with Five Ring Model in which he views enemy as a system Desert Storm & Warden
The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a military-theoretical hypothesis, about the future of warfare, often connected to technological and organizational recommendations for change in the militaries Broadly stated, RMA claims that in certain periods of the history of humankind, there were new military doctrines, strategies, tactics and technologies which led to an irrecoverable change in the conduct of warfare. Furthermore, those changes compel an accelerated adaptation of novel doctrines and strategies Especially tied to IT, telecommunication, and space technology, The original theorizing was done by the Soviet Armed Forces in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov , Chief of Air Staff However, United States' victory in the 1991 Gulf War renewed interest in RMA theory Air Power is the most effective tool in RMA, and most influenced as well Revolution in Military Affairs
The simplest definition includes any war in which one of the major participants is not a state but rather a violent non-state actor Fourth-generation warfare is characterized by a blurring of the lines between war and politics, combatants and civilians. In terms of generational modern warfare, the fourth generation signifies the nation states' loss of their near-monopoly on combat forces, returning to modes of conflict common in pre-modern times Fourth Gen Warfare
Evolution of Air Power is never in isolation It has always been and always will be inspired by the surrounding environment, probably more than any other power Reason is that Air Power employment is affected by prevailing environment…………. Conclusion