Exclusion of Judicial Review

comparative public law

1. EXCLUSION OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
CELIA SANTHOSH
SLS,CUSAT

2. WHAT ?
WHY ?
HOW ?

3. WHAT ?
Exclusionofjudicialreviewmeanscertain
circumstancesinwhichthethecourts
exercisingwritpowers(HCandSC)isexcluded
orisreluctanti.e.,willplace
restrictions/limitationsonitsownpowerto
reviewtheactionsofpublicbody(which
includestheexecutiveandthelegislature)

4. –Judiciary-watchdogoftheconstitution–guardianofthe
fundamentalrights.
YET !
“Exclusion of Judicial Review”
Why?
–Circumstanceinwhichjudiciarycannotsubstitutethe
roleoftheexecutiveorthelegislature-mustnotstep
intotheshoesoftheexecutiveorthelegislature–
Separationofpower.
WHY ?

5. –Constitution (Art 74(2))
–Ouster clauses
–Theseareclausesthatdoesnotprovideforappealorrevision
–Itmakestheorderpassedoractiontakenbyanauthority
finalandbinding
–Itmayalsostatethattheordershallnotbecalledinquestion
inanycourt.
–Mayexcludethejurisdictionofcourtaltogether.
How ?

6. More in favour of Judicial review
Than executive finality
Can exclude court control altogether
Parliament –supreme –power to make any laws
ENGLAND

7. –Thatis,evenifthestatutedeprivesthecourtofjurisdictionto
intervene,thecourtcanstill
–Reviewthefinaldeterminationofadministrativetribunal-by
exercisingsupervisoryjurisdictiononthefollowingmatters
(only)
–Whethertheauthoritymakingdecisionwastheauthority
specifiedintheact
–Whethertheauthoritywasdulyempoweredtodecidethe
issue
–Whetheritaddressedallthematterscommittedtoit
–WhethertherulesofNaturalJusticewasinanyways
violated
–Whetherthedecisionwasaresultoffraud.

8. Statute = decision
of A.T = FINAL
Court cannot attack
On the ground of
Error of law or fact
U.K

9. –However,iftheerrorwas
–Onthejurisdictionor
–Errorissuchthatitisapparentonthefaceofthe
recordor
–Iftheerrorwassuchthatitamountstomisuseor
misconceptionoftribunal’spower
–Thenthecourtcaninterfere
–Allthisispossibleevenifjudicialreviewisexcludedin
thestatute
–Asaresultofwhichthenamesakeexclusionofjudicial
reviewwasgraduallydiscontinuedinEngland.

10. –ThepresumptionwasalwaysagainsttheexclusionofJ.R,
unlessthetheparliamentinclearandexplicitlanguage
statessuchexclusion.
–Thusmakingitclearthatthereweresomestatutesin
Englandwhichcontainedprovisionswhollyexcluding
judicialreview(Ousterclauses)
–FrankscommitteeandCommitteeonMinister’sPower
stronglycriticizedsuchclauses.(tomakerecomm.onthe
constitutionandworkingofA.TinEngland)
–TheclauseswherelatermodifiedtoincludeJudicialreview.
However,therecanbe
If silent …

11. INDRIECT
EXCLUSION
OF J.R
THEY ARE SATISFIED
WHEN IT APPEARS
TO THEM
NECESSARY
by conferring powers
(on authorities) to be
exercised when
•Highly subjective
•Mainly during war
•Difficult to prove the statement of the authorities in the absence of mala fides

12. LOCAL
BODIES
Courts not ready
to interpret the
power as
absolute
A.T
IMPOSE A
STRICT
SUPERVISORY
CONTROL
MINISTER
BENEVOLENT
INTERPRETATION
OF POWER
If the statutes vest absolute discretion on …

13. –Parliament–Supreme
–Tendencyisinfavorofjudicialreviewratherthatexecutivefinality
–Evenifthestatutedeprivesthecourt,thecourtwillexerciseit
supervisoryjurisdictionwithrespecttocertainmatter(natural
principleswasfollowedetc.)
–IfthestatutesaythedecisionoftheA.Tisfinalthecourtcannot
interveneunlessitisanerrorapparentofthefaceoftherecord
etc.
–Ifthestatuteissilentthepresumptionisalwaysagainstexclusion
ofjudicialreview.
Summary

14. –InUS,absoluteexclusionofJudicialreviewisimpossible
SincelikeIndia,UShasacharterofFundamentalRights
(rightsagainstthestate).
–Howeverattimesthepowerofjudiciaryisexcludedby
statues
Fore.g.–Art38USC705itprovidesthatalldecisions
renderedbytheAdministratorofVateren’sAffair(the
departmentofveteran’saffairsprovidesvitalservicestoAmerican
vaterens)underthestatuteshallbefinalandconclusiveonall
question
United
States

15. QuestionoffactandlawandnootherofficialorcourtofUSshallhavejurisdictionto
reviewbymandamusorotherwiseanysuchdecision.
However,amerelegislativesilencecannotprecludeJudicialReview.Thusifthe
statuteissilentthenthecourtswillexercisetheinherentpowersdelegatedtothem
undertheconstitution.

16. –Absoluteexclusionimpossiblesincethereis
fundamentalrightsavailableagainstthestate
–Legislativesilencedoesnotmeanthatthereview
jurisdictionofthecourtisexcluded,thecourtwill
invokeitsinherentpowers.
Summary

17. –ThepositioninIndiarelatingtoexclusionofjudicial
reviewissomewhatsimilartothatoftheUnited
States.
–Inboththecountries,thereexistsaCharterof
fundamentalrightsguaranteedunderthewritten
constitution,andthoserightscannotbewhittleddown
(cutdown)bythetheoryofadministrativefinality.
India

18. CONSTITUTION
All three organs of the state
derive power form the
written constitutionThe organs must act within
the limits of such powers

19. –UndertheIndianconstitution
–judiciaryhasbeenmadetheinterpreterofthe
constitution
–ithasbeengiventhetasktodeterminewhatpowersare
conferredoneachbranchofgovt.
–itisalsoconferredwiththepowerofjudicialreview
(underArt.32,226)whichnotjustanintegralpartofour
constitutionbutalsothebasicstructureofour
constitution.(SPSampathKumarvUnionofIndia(1987))J
BhagwatirelyingonMinervaMills)

20. –Inspiteofthewrittenconstitution,fundamental
rightsandtheconstitutionalremedies(Articles
32,226,227and136)
–Thelegislaturestilltendtoexcludejudicialreviewin
certainfieldsviadifferentmodes–itcanbe
–Expressorimplied
–Totalorpartial
–Conditionalandqualifiedor
–Unconditionalandunqualified

21. EXECUTIVE POWER
–Article53–executivepoweroftheunionisvestedinthepresident
–A74(1)and(2)–Councilofministerstoaidand
advisethepresident–“shallnotbeinquiredintoby
thecourt”
–A77–ConductofbusinessoftheGovt.ofIndia–
“shallnotbecalledinquestion.”
–A.77and78–precludesjudicialreviewtogiveample
freedomfortheexerciseofexecutivepower.
–A.72-pardoningpowerofthepresident–cannotbe
curtailedbyanycourt.
–A161–powerofgovernortograndpardonsetc.–
cannotbecurtailedbyanycourt.
PROVISIONS
EXCLUDING
JUDICIAL
REVIEW

22. •A.80–Compositionofcouncilofstates–entirelylefttothechoiceifthepresident.
•A.103–Decisionofquestionastodisqualificationofmembers–decisionofthe
presidentshallbefinal(groundA.102)
•A.361-ProtectionofPresidentandGovernorsandRajpramukhs–areexempted
fromlegalproceedingsinthecourtoflawwithrespecttotheirofficialacts.
•Theexerciseofthepowerofthepresidentorthegovernorcannotbesubjectedto
judicialreviewonmerits.(SwaranSinghvStateofU.P1998)
•Neitherdirectionsorguidelinescanbeissuedbythecourts(MaruRamvUOI1981
(indiankanoonheadnotepara10))
•Thecourtcannotaskthepresidentorthegovernortorecordreasonsinsupportof
orderpassedbythem(StateofPunjabv.JoginderSingh1990(IndianKanoon)

23. –Wheretheexerciseofpoweris
Arbitrary
Discriminatory
Malafideor
Materialfactswerenotbroughttothenoticeofthe
presidentorthegovernor
Theactioncanbesetasideanddirectioncanbeissuedto
passfreshorderinaccordancewithlaw(SwaranSinghv
StateofU.P1998remissionofpunishmentallowedbyUP
governor)
EXCEPTIONS

24. –A.105–Power,privilegesetc.,oftheHouseofParliament
andofthemembersandcommitteesthereof.
–A.194-Power,privilegesetc.,oftheHouseoflegislatures
andofthemembersandcommitteesthereof.
–A.122(1)–Courtsnottoinquireintotheproceedingsof
Parliament
–A.212–Courtsnottoinquireintoproceedingofthe
legislature
LEGISLATIVE
POWER

25. –Sometimesexclusionmaynotbeexpresslystatedin
thestatute–whichmeanstheexclusionisimplied.
–Thatiswhenaparticularstatuteprovidefora
particularremedyinaparticularforuminaparticular
manner,theremedymustbesoughtinthatforumand
inthatmannerandallotherforumsandmodeare
impliedlyexcluded
IMPLIED
EXCLUSION

26. –6E. Bar of jurisdiction in certain cases.―Whenever any essential
commodity is seized in pursuance of an order made under section 3 in
relation thereto, or any package, covering or receptacle in which such
essential commodity is found, or any animal, vehicle, vessel or other
conveyance used in carrying such essential commodity is seized
pending confiscation under section 6A, the Collector, or, as the case
may be, the State Government concerned under section 6C shall
have (jurisdiction), and, notwithstanding anything to the contrary
contained in any other law for the time being in force, any court,
tribunal or other authority shall not have, jurisdictionto make
orders with regard to the possession, delivery, disposal, release or
distribution of such essential commodity, package, covering,
receptacle, animal, vehicle, vessel or other conveyance.
ESSENTIAL
COMMODITIES
ACT, 1955

27. –LordTenterdenstated“Whereanactcreatedan
obligationandenforcestheperformanceinaspecified
manner,wetakeittobeageneralrulethat
performancecannotbeenforcedinanyothermanner.
Doo v Bridges
(1831)

28. –Dangerous drugs Act 1930
–The poisons act, 1919
–Essential commodities act 1955
…and other statues where no court review is provided
In these statues no appeal in provided when license is
refused and administrative exercise of discretion is
generally respected.
However, in case of abuse of power writ remedy is always
available
IMPLIED
EXCLUSION
FOUND IN…

29. –InIndiaabsoluteexclusionofjudicialreviewis
impossible–fundamentalrights.
–Howeverthelegislaturetendtoexcludejudicialreview
incertainfields.
–Butiftheexerciseofpowerisarbitrary,
discriminatory,malafideorifthematerialfactisnot
broughttothenoticetheactionwillbesetaside.
Summary

30. UKUSAINDIA
However, the
practice in in favour
o f J.R, rather than
executive finality
Written constitution
Fundamental rights
Written constitution
Fundamental rights
EXCLUSION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

31. –POLITICALQUESTIONS
–POLICYMATTERS
–LACHES
–DOCTRINEOFEXHAUSTIVEALTERNATIVE
REMEDY
–RESJUDICATA
–QUESTIONOFFACT
–ACTOFSTATE
–SUBJECTIVESATISFACTION
Circumstances

32. –InspiteofverywidepoweroftheJudiciary
–Whenapurelypoliticalquestionisinvolvedina
matterthecourtwillnotinterfere.
–Andwillrefusetoexerciseitsextraordinary
jurisdiction.
POLITICAL
QUESTIONS

33. –“Suchdecisionsrequireabalancingexercisewhichthe
judgesbytheirup–bringingandexperienceareill-
qualifiedtoperform.”
-CouncilofCivilServiceUnionvMinisterforCivil
Service(1985)
WHY COZ….

34. Who decides
whether a
question is
political or not ?
Court

35. –MarkedtheU.S.SupremeCourt'sentryintothe
"politicalthicket"ofapportionmentandelectoral
politics
–JusticeFelixFrankfurter,inhisopinioninColegroev.
Green,warnedtheCourtthatitshouldavoid.
Baker
v.
Carr (1962)

36. –TheplaintiffsinBakerfiledsuitallegingtheviolationoftheir
votingrightspursuanttotheequalprotectionclauseofthe
FourteenthAmendment.
–TheallegedviolationstemmedfromTennessee'scontinued
useofa1901apportionmentstatute(whichdidnotprovide
forre-apportionment)that,becauseofpopulationshiftsin
Tennesseefrom1901to1961,renderedstatelegislative
districtsmalapportioned.
FACTS

37. 19011911

38. –Theresultofthemalapportionmentwasthedilutionthe
plaintiffs'votesinstatelegislativeelections.
–Hewentbeforethedistrictcourtdidnothavesubjectmatter
jurisdiction
–theSupremeCourtheldthatthedistrictcourtdidhave
jurisdiction,thattheplaintiffshadstandingtochallengethe
Tennesseestatute,andthatthecasewasjusticiable.

39. –Theplaintiffs,.hadstandingbecausetheirclaim
focuseddirectlyonthedilutionoftheirvoterather
thanonamoregeneralclaimThecasepresenteda
justiciableissue,ratherthananonjusticiablepolitical
question,becauseeventhoughthecaserelatedtothe
politicalissueofapportionment,itstatedastandard
equalprotection

40. 1.Atextualconstitutionalcommitmentofthematterto
anotherbranchofgovernment,suchasthepowerofthe
Presidentinforeignaffairs(relatesto)
2.Alackofjudiciallydiscoverableandmanageablestandards
forresolvingtheissue;(ifthematterissuchthatiscannotbe
resolvedbythejudiciary)
3.Aneedforaninitialpolicydeterminationbeforeaddressing
thematterthatcourtswouldnotbeabletoreach;
6 FACTORS –
POLITICAL
QUESTION

41. Asituationinwhichindependentcourtactionwouldviolate
theseparationofpowersframework;
5.Anunusualneedtostrictlyadheretoapreviouspolitical
decision; or
6.Apossibilitythatclashingstatementsonanissueby
multiplebranchesofgovernmentwouldcause
embarrassment.
Itwidenedthescopeofjudiciaryandnarroweddown
thepoliticalquestiondoctrine

42. –On 29 May 1940,(war) Robert Liversidge a pilot officer in the Royal Air
Force Volunteer Reserve, wasarrested by awarrantissued by Sir John
Anderson, Secretary of State. Liversidge was detained in Brixton prison.
–He was not charged or accusedof criminal conduct and he was givenno
reasons for his detention.
–The warrant merely recited that the Home Secretary had 'reasonable
cause to believe' that Liversidge was 'a person of hostile associations'.
–On 14 March 1941, Liversidge filed a writ, suing the Secretary of State
for unlawful detention and claiming damages for false imprisonment.
Liversidge
v.
Anderson
[1942] AC 206

43. –The case concernedthe meaning of the phrase'reasonable
cause'. The central issue was whether the Secretary of State's
belief was subject to anobjective or a subjective test.
–By majority, Liversidgelost his claim on 3 November 1941.
Because he failed to prove that he was wrongly detained, he
received no damages for false imprisonment.
–Reason –secretary of state by reason of his position is
entitled to act to public confidence and integrity. In other
words, since it was war time the actof the secretary of the
state was justified.
Majority
judgment

44. –LordAtkinstronglydissented,heproclaimedthatamidtheclashof
arms,thelawsarenotsilent.Theymaybechangedbuttheysspeak
thesamelanguageinwarandpeace,reverberatedintheirears.
–Hence,wherefreedomisinperilandjusticeisthreatenedtocitizen,
itisthepoweranddutyofthecourttoprotectthem.
–Thoughthedissentfacedcriticismitwaslater,adoptedaroundthe
world,citedinSouthAfrica,AmericaandAustralia.
–Politicalquestion–whethertheexecutivecanonthegroundof
reasonablecausetobelievedetainaperson?Andtheverdictofthe
courtwasyes(executivecan)butjusticeAtkinstronglydissented.
Lord Atkin's
dissent

45. –Thepetitionerwasdetainedunders.3oftheMaintenanceofInternal
SecurityAct,(MISA)1971onthegroundthathebrokeopenwagonsand
lootedwheatandtea.
–Theorderofdetentionwaschallengedinteralia(7grounds)onthe
groundthatreallytherewasnoemergencyandcontinuationof
proclamationofemergencywasunconstitutional
–Refusingtoenterintothequestionanddescribingtheissueaspolitical,
thesupremecourtruledthatinsuchcases,“theappealshouldbetothe
pollsandnottothecourts.”
(detentionin this case was declared illegalon the ground of denial of opportunity to make effective representation and directed that the petitioner be set free)
Bhut Nath
v.
State of W.B
(1974)

46. –Isaleadingdecisionofthesupremecourtonthepoint.
–InthegeneralparliamentaryelectionheldinMarch1977,theJanata
PartygotelectedwiththumpingmajorityintheLokSabhadefeating
therulingCongressParty.
–InApril1977,thehomeministryaskedseveralsatesruledbythethe
congresspartyadvisingthegovernorstodissolveLegislativeAssemblies
andseekfreshmandatefromthepeople.
–ThesaidactionwaschallengedbysixStatesgovernedbycongressparty
inthesupremecourtbyinstitutingpetitionsunderArticle32ofthe
constitution.
–Thecourtheldthatthequestionwaspoliticalinnatureandthecourts
hadnopowerofjudicialreview.
State of
Rajasthan
v.
Union of
India (1977)

47. –Thecourthasneverabandoneditsconstitutionalfunctionasthe
finaljudgetodecideonthevalidityoftheacts.
–“But,itcannotassumeuntoitselfpowerstheConstitutionlodges
elsewhereorundertaketasksentrustedbytheConstitutionto
otherdepartmentsofStatewhichmaybebetterequippedto
performthem.”
–“Thescrupulously(carefully)dischargeddutiesofall'guardiansof
theConstitutionincludethedutynottotransgressthelimitations
oftheirOwnconstitutionallycircumscribedpowersbytrespassing
intowhatisproperlythedomainofotherconstitutionalorgans.”
C.J Beg

48. –Itwassubmittedthatthequestionraisedwasnot
purelypoliticalasheldbythecourt.Theissueraised
werelegalaswellasconstitutionalandhencethey
oughttohavebeenansweredanddecidedbythe
court.
–Thecourthoweverdidnotenterintothemeritsand
dismissedthepetition.

49. –ACommissionsofInquiryappointedbytheCentralGovernmentunder
theCommissionsofInquiryAct,1952havesubmittedreportswhich
indicatethatthereisreasontobelievethatvariousoffenceshavebeen
committedbypersonsholdinghighpoliticalandpublicofficesduringthe
periodofoperationoftheProclamationofEmergencydatedthe25th
June,1975,andtheperiodimmediatelyprecedingthatProclamation;
–Investigationsintosuchoffencesarebeingmadeinaccordancewithlaw
andarelikelytobecompletedsoon;
–Suggestionshavebeenmadethatthepersonsinrespectofwhomthe
investigationsrevealthataprimafaciecasehasbeenmadeoutshould
betriedspeedilyinSpecialCourtsconstitutedforthatpurpose;
Re Special
Courts Bill
v.
Unknown,
1978

50. –Aproposalhasbeenmadethatlegislationshouldbeenactedfor
thecreationofanadequatenumberofSpecialCourtsforthe
speedytrialofsuchoffencesTheSpecialCourtsBill
–InexerciseofthepowersconferreduponmebyClause(1)
ofArticle143oftheConstitution,I,NeelamSanjivaReddy,
PresidentofIndia,herebyreferthefollowingquestiontothe
SupremeCourtofIndiaforconsiderationandreportthereon,
namely:
WhethertheBilloranyoftheprovisionsthereof,ifenacted,
wouldbeconstitutionallyinvalid?

51. Oneofthecontentionsraisedonbehalfofthegovernment
wasasfollows:
–Thereferenceraisesapurelypoliticalquestionwhichwe
shouldrefrainfromanswering;and(ShriM.C.Bhandare
whoappearsforShriBansiLal)
Contentions –
Government

52. –Whetherspecialcourtsshouldbeestablishedornot,
–whetherpoliticaloffendersshouldbeprosecutedornotand
–whetherfortheirtrialaspeedyremedyshouldbeprovidedornot,
areallmatterswhichmaybesaidtobeofapoliticalnaturesince
theyconcernthewisdomandpolicyunderlyingtheBill.
–Butthe(original)questionwhethertheBilloranyofitsprovisions
areconstitutionallyinvalidisnotaquestionofpoliticalnature
whichweshouldrestrainourselvesfromanswering.Thequestion
referredbythePresidentforouropinionraisespurelylegaland
constitutionalissueswhichisourrightandfunctiontodecide.
CJ
Chandrachud

53. Political
Question
Excluded
from J.R
Decision
Question =
political or
not
Court
CONCLUSION

54. Policy Matters

55. –Apartfrom”pure”politicalquestionthejudiciarywill
notinterfereoradjudicateuponthegovt.policy
matters
Introduction

56. Questionof policy is
is essentially for the
state to decide
Dependents on
various
Circumstances
WHY COZ….

57. –And it is neither desired nor advised for a court of law
to direct the govt. to adopt a particular policy that it
thinks is fit and proper.

58. Policy= Plan of action of the Govt.

59. –Theapplicationmadebythepetitionerforopeningnew
schoolswererejectedbytheauthorities.
–Thesaidactionwaschallengedbythepetitionerbyfiling
writpetitionsinthehighCourtonvariousgrounds.
–TheHighcourtallowedpetitionanddirectedthe
authoritiestograndpermissiontothepetitionertostart
schools.
–ReservingthejudgementtheSupremeCourtobserved
thatthehighcourthasthoroughlymisunderstoodthe
natureofjurisdictionthathasbeenexercisedbyit.
State of
Maharashtra
v.
Lok Shikshan
Sanstha (1971)

60. –Solongashereis
–noviolationoffundamentalrights(reasonablerestriction
Art19(1)(c)r/w19(4)intheinterestofgeneralpublic)and
–iftheprinciplesofnaturaljusticearenotoffended,
–itwasnotforthehighcourttolaydownthepolicythat
shouldbeadoptedbytheeducationalauthoritiesinthe
mattersofgrantingpermissionforstartingschools.

61. –Reversingthequestionofpolicyisessentialforthestate
andsuchpolicywilldependuponanoverallassessment
andsummaryoftherequirementsoftheresidentsofa
particularlocalityandothercategoriesofpeopleforwhom
itisessentialtoprovidefacilitiestoeducation.
–Thisoverallassessmentisarrivedatafteraproper
classificationonreasonablebasisanditisnotforthecourts
tointerferewiththepolicyleadinguptosuchassessment.

62. –Thequestionraisedbeforethesupremecourtwas
regardingtheconstitutionalvalidityandlegalityofthe
importpolicyofnewsprint(Importcontrolorder1955)
adoptedbythegovernment.
–Thecourtmustrefusetoadjudicateuponthepolicy
mattersunlessitisarbitrary,capricious(irregular)or
malafide.
Bennett Coleman
& Co
v.
Union of India
(1972)

63. –Inhisdissentingjudgmentheobservedthat:
“theargumentofthepetitionerthatthegovernment
shouldhaveaccordedgreaterprioritytotheimportof
newsprinttosupplytheneedofallnewspaperproprietor
tothemaximumextentisamatterrelatingtothepolicy
ofimportandthiscourtcannotbepropelled(pushed)
intotheunchartered(unplanned)oceanofgovernment
policy”
Mathew J

64. –ConstitutionalvalidityofSpecialBearerbonds
(ImmunitiesandExemptions)Act,1981was
challengedbeingarbitraryandhavingnoreasonable
nexuswiththeobjectsoughttobeachieved
R.K Garg
v.
Union of
India (1981)

65. –Holdingtheactintraviresandconstitutional,and
describingitaspolicylegislation,themajoritystated:
–Thecourtmustalwaysrememberthat"legislationis
directedtopracticalproblems,thattheeconomic
mechanismishighlysensitiveandcomplex,thatmany
problemsaresingularandcontingent,thatlawsarenot
abstractpropositionsanddonotrelatetoabstractunits
andarenottobemeasuredbyabstractsymmetry"that
exactwisdomandniceadoptionofremedyarenot
alwayspossibleandthat

66. –"judgmentislargelyaprophecy(prediction)basedon
meagre(small)andun-interpretedexperience".Every
legislationparticularlyineconomicmattersisessentially
empiricanditisbasedonexperimentationorwhatone
maycalltrialanderrormethodandthereforeitcannot
provideforallpossiblesituationsoranticipateallpossible
abuses.There,maybecruditiesandinequitiesin
complicatedexperimentaleconomiclegislationbutonthat
accountaloneitcannotbestruckdownasinvalid.

67. –Thevalidityofregulation104(3)oftheMaharashtra
secondaryandhighersecondaryeducationboard
regulations,1977waschallenged.
–Theregulationprovidedthat,“nocandidateshallclaim
orbeentitledtorevaluationofhisanswersor
disclosureorinspectionofanswerbooksorother
documentsasthesearetreatedbytheDivisionalBoard
asmostconfidential.”
Maharashtra State
Board of Secondary
and Higher Secondary
Education
v.
Paritosh
BhupeshkumarSheth
(1984)

68. –Treating it to be a policy decision and upholding the value
there of the supreme court held observed:
–The Court cannot sit in judgment over the wisdom of the
policy evolved by the legislature
–It may be a wise policy which will fully effectuate (put into
force) the purposeof the enactment or it may be lacking in
effectiveness and hence calling for revision and
improvement.

69. –But any drawbacksin the policy incorporated in a rule
or regulation will not render it ultra viresand the Court
cannot strike it down on the ground that, in its
opinion, it is not a wise or prudent policy, but is even a
foolish one, and that it will not really serve to
effectuate the purposes of the Act.

70. –Thelegislatureanditsdelegatearethesolerepositories
ofthepowertodecidewhatpolicyshouldbepursuedin
relationtomatterscoveredbytheActandthereisno
scopeforinterferencebytheCourt
–unlesstheparticularprovisionimpugnedbeforeitcanbe
saidtosufferfromanylegalinfirmity,inthesenseofits
beingwhollybeyondthescopeoftheregulation-making
poweroritsbeinginconsistentwithanyoftheprovisions
oftheparentenactmentorinviolationofanyofthe
limitationsimposedbytheConstitution.

71. –Dealing with import export policy followed by government,
the supreme court observed :
–Theimportpolicyofanycountry,particularlya
developingcountry,hasnecessarilytobetunedtoits
generaleconomicpolicyfoundeduponitsconstitutional
goals,therequirementsofitsinternalandinternational
trade,itsagriculturalandindustrialdevelopmentplans,
itsmonetaryandfinancialstrategiesandlastbutnotthe
leasttheinternationalpoliticalanddiplomaticovertones
dependingon`friendship,neutralityorhostilitywith
othercountries'(GlassChotansImportersandUsers'
Associationv.UnionofIndia.
Liberty Oil Mills
v.
Union of India
(1984)

72. –Theremustalsobeaconsiderablenumberofotherfactors
whichgointothemakingofanimportpolicy.
-Expertisein
–publicandpolitical,
–nationalandinternationaleconomy
isnecessarybeforeonemayengageinthemakingorinthe
criticismofanimportpolicy.
–Obviouslycourtsdonotpossesstheexpertiseandare
consequentlyincompetenttopassjudgmentonthe
appropriatenessortheadequacyofaparticularimport
policy.

73. –TheA.Pgovt.issuednotificationundertheprovisoto
Article309oftheconstitutionreducingtheageof
superannuationofallgovt.servantsfrom58to55.the
actionwasquestionedinsupremecourtbyfiling
petitionunderart32oftheconstitution
K.Nagaraj
v.
State of A.P
(1985)

74. –Holdingittobepolicymatteranddismissingthepetition
thecourtobservedthat:
–Theseclaimsinvolveconsiderationsofvaryingvigour
(strength)andapplicability.
–Often,theCourthasnosatisfactoryandeffectivemeans
todecidewhichalternative,outofthemanycompeting
ones,isthebestinthecircumstancesofagivencase.
–Wedonotsuggestthateveryquestionofpolicyisoutside
thescopeOfjudicialreview.

75. –Iftheageofretirementisfixedatanunreasonablylowlevel
soastomakeitarbitraryandirrational,theCourt's
interferencewouldbecalledfor,thoughnotforfixingthe
ageofretirementbutformandatingacloserconsideration
ofthematter.
–"Whereanactisarbitrary,itisimplicitinitthatitisunequal
bothaccordingtopoliticallogicandconstitutionallawand
isthereforeviolativeofArticle14.”

76. –But, while resolving the validity of policy issues like the
age of retirement, it is not proper to put the conflicting
claims in a sensitive judicial scale and decide the issue
by finding out which way the balance tilts. That is an
exercise which the administrator and the legislature
have to undertake.

77. Aclassificationoftheatersforlicensefees,andgradedaccordingto,
pricesofadmissionwasnotheldtobearbitraryandunreasonable.
–Thecourtobservedthat:
–Wemustnotforgotthatincomplexeconomicmattersevery
decisionisnecessarilyempiricanditisbasedon
experimentationorwhatonemaycall‘trailanderrormethod’
andthereforeitsvaliditycannotbetestedonanyrigidapriori
(knowledgewhichproceedsfromtheoryratherthan
observationandexperience)considerationsoronapplicationof
anystraitjacketformula.
Metropolis
Theatre Co.
v.
Chicago
(1912)

78. –Thecourtmustwhileadjudgingtheconstitutional
validityofanexecutivedecisionrelatingtoeconomic
mattergrantacertainmeasureoffreedomtothe
executive.
–Mereerrorsofgovtarenotsubjecttojudicialreview
–Itisonlyarbitraryexerciseswhichcanbedeclared
void

79. –The court cannot strike down a policy decision taken by
the government merely because it feels that another
policy decision would have been fairer or wiser or more
scientific or logical.
–The court can interfere only if the policy decision is
arbitrary, discriminatory or malafide.

80. –Priceofsugarfixedbythegovernmentbygrouping
sugarfactoriesonthebasisofgeographicallocation.
Thesaidactionwaschallengedbycertainsugar
companiesasarbitrary,unreasonableandultra-vires.
–Dismissingthepetitionandholdingittobeapolicy
decisionofthecentralgovernmentthecourtobserved
thatitisamatterof
Shri Sitaram
Sugar Co. ltd
v.
Union of
India(1990)

81. –Whatisbestforthesugarindustry
–Andinwhatmannerthepolicyshouldbeformulatedand
implementedbearinginmindthefundamentalobjectof
thestatute
–Supplyandequitabledistributionofessential
commoditiesatfairpricesinthebestinterestofthe
generalpublic.
–Isamatterfordecisionexclusivelywithintheprovinceof
thecentralgovt.
–Suchmattersdonotordinarilyattractthepowerofjudicial
review.

82. –Thevalidityofestablishmentoflargedamwasquestioned.
–Describingittobeapolicydecisionthemajoritysaid:
–Itisnowwell-settledthatthecourts,intheexerciseoftheirjurisdiction,
willnottransgressintothefieldofpolicydecision.
–Whethertohaveaninfrastructuralprojectornotandwhatisthetypeof
projecttobeundertakenandhowithastobeexecuted,arepartof
policymakingprocessandtheCourtsareillequippedtoadjudicateona
policydecisionsoundertaken.
–TheCourt,nodoubt,hasadutytoseethatintheundertakingofa
decision,nolawisviolatedandpeoplesfundamentalrightsarenot
transgresseduponexcepttotheextentpermissibleunderthe
Constitution.
Narmada
Bachao Andolan
v.
Union of India
(2000)

83. –Supremecourtheldthattherecanbejudicialreviewofapolicy
decisiononthefollowinggrounds:
1.ifitisunconstitutional
2.Ifitisdehors(goesoutsidethescope)oftheactandthe
regulation
3.Ifthedelegateehasactedbeyondthepowerofdelegation;
and
4.iftheexecutivepolicyiscontrarytothestatutoryoralarger
policy.
DDA
V
Joint Action
Committee (2008)

84. –Thegovtalsohasthepowertochangethepolicy
–Theexecutivepowerisnotlimitedtoframeaparticularpolicy,theyalso
havethepowertochange,re-change,adjustandre-adjustthepolicy
takingintoaccounttherelevantconsiderations.
–Itisentirelyinthediscretionofthegovt.howapolicyshouldbeshaped.
–Itshouldnothoweverbe
-Arbitrary
-capriciousor
-unreasonable
Change in policy

85. –AspertheoldpolicyofpromotionthepetitionerwhowasservingasAir
ViceMarshalwasconsideredeligibletobepromotedasairmarshal.
–However,thepolicywaschangedbythegovt.asperthechangedpolicy,
thepetitionerwasnotconsideredeligibleforthepromotionalpost.
–Hechallengedthesaiddecisionbyfilingapetitionunderart226ofthe
constitutionandthehighcourtalloweditholdingthat“thenew
promotionpolicywasnotframedafterin-depthstudy”anddirectedthe
govt.toconsiderthecaseofthepetitioneronthebasedontheold
policy.
–Thegovt.approachedtheSC
Union of India
v.
S.L Dutta (1991)

86. –SCobserved:
–AconsiderationofpolicyfollowedinIndianAirForceregarding
promotionalchancesofofficersinthenavigationstreamoftheflying
branchintheairforceandtheotherbrancheswouldnecessarilyinvolve
-scrutinyofdesirabilityofsuchachangewhichwouldrequire
considerableknowledgeofmodernaircraft,scientificandtechnical
equipmentavailableinsuchaircrafttoguideinnavigatingthesame,
tacticstobefollowedbytheIndianairforceandsoon.Theseare
mattersregardingwhichthejudgeorlawyersofcourtcanhardlybe
expectedtohavemuchknowledgebyreasonsoftheirtrainingand
experience.

87. –Principlesofnaturaljusticedonotapplytopolicydecisions
bythegovt.ortheauthorities.
–Thus,itcannotbecontendedthatthepersonwhowould
beaffectedwhileformulatingpolicyoreffectingchangein
theprevailingpolicymustbeheard.
Policy Decisions
and Natural
Justice

88. –Normally,thecourtwhileexercisingthepowerofjudicial
reviewwillnotinterferewiththepolicyofthegovt.
–Thequestionsastowhetherapolicyisgoodorbad,wiseor
foolishshouldnotbetheconcernofthecourt.
–Itisnotforthecourttoadvisethegovt.toadoptanother
policybecauseintheopinionofthecourtitisfairer,wiser
andmorescientific.
–Itisriskyforthecourttotakeandunknownpaththusitis
bettertoleavesuchexercisetotheexperts.
Conclusion

89. –Atthesametime,thecourtcanadjudge(determine)
constitutionalvalidityofanexecutiveaction.Ifthepolicy
adoptedbythegovernmentis
–Arbitrary
–Discriminatory(TheSecretary,MinistryofDefencev.Babita
Puniya&Ors2020)
–Malafide
–Unreasonable
–Ultravires
–Unconstitutional (Majority judgement in Bennett Coleman & Co
v.Unionof India (1972))
–Thecourthasthepoweranddutytointerferewiththe
decision.

90. Res Judicata

91. Introduction
–Sec11CPCembodiesthedoctrineofResJudicataorthe
ruleofconclusivenessofjudgement.
–Itstatesthatonceamatterhasbedecidedbya
competentcourtnopartycanbepermittedtore-openit
inasubsequentlitigation.
–Intheabsenceofsuchruletherewillbenoendto
litigationthepartieswouldbeputtoconstanttrouble,
harassmentandexpenses.

92. Doctrineof Res Judicata = Baron Re-Litigation

93. Satyabhama
Ghosal
v.
Derain Debi
(1960)
–J.Gupta–explainedthedoctrineinthesimplestpossiblemanner
–Theprincipleofresjudicataisbasedontheneedofgivingafinalityto
judicialdecisions.
–Whatit(doctrine)saysisthatonceares(particularthing)isjudicata
(finallydecided),itshallnotbeadjudgedagain.
–Primarilyitappliesasbetweenpastlitigationandfuturelitigation.
–Whenamatter-whetheronaquestionoffactoronaquestionoflaw-
hasbeendecidedbetweentwopartiesinonesuitorproceedingandthe
decisionisfinal,

94. either because -
–no appeal was takento a higher court or
–because the appeal was dismissed,
–or no appeal lies,
–neither party will be allowed in a future suit or
proceeding between the same parties to canvass the
same matter again.

95. RESJUDICATAADJUDGEDAGAIN
PATICULAR THING
FINALLY DECIDED

96. 3 Maxims
–The doctrine is based on 3 maxims
–nemodebit bis vexer pro una et Eidem causa
NobodyVexedCause
No man shall be vexed (troubled) twice for the same
cause

97. –Interest republicanUt sit fineslithium
Interest state finish/ end litigation
It is in the interest of the state that there
should be an end to a litigation

98. –Res Judicata pro vitiate occipitur
A judicial decision must be accepted as correct

99. CIVIL
CRIMINAL
WRIT

100. Res Judicata
and Writ
Petitions
–MSM Sharma v. Shree Krishan Sinha (1960)
–ForthefirsttimeSCheldthatthegeneralprincipleofresjudicata
applyeventowritpetitionfiledunderArt32oftheconstitutionof
India
–ThusonceapetitionfiledunderArt32oftheconstitutionis
dismissedbycourt,subsequentpetitionisbarred.
–Similarly,ifwritpetitionfiledbyapartyunderArt226is
consideredonmeritsasacontestedmatterandisdismissed,the
decisionpronouncedwouldcontinuetobindonpartiesunless

101. –Unless the petition is ,
–modified or reversed in appeal
–Or in other appropriate proceedings permissible
under the constitution.
–It would not be open to a party to ignore the said
judgement and move to the high court or the
supreme court on the same facts and for obtaining
the sameor similar orders or writs.

102. Grihkalyan
Kendra Workers’
Union
v.
Union of India
(1991)
–Theemployeesofkendrawherepaidonlyhonorarium
(paymentatthediscretionofthepayer)andnotregular
payandotherbenefitsaspaidtogovernmentservants.
–TheemployeesthereforefiledapetitionunderArt32,
equalpayforequalwork.
–TheSCrequestedtheformerCJI(ShriY.VChandrachud)to
makerecommendationsinthematter.

103. –Accordingtohim,employmentinkendrawasunique
incharacterasthereisnorestrictionregardingage,
educationqualification,retirementetc.
–Hewastheopinionthattheemployeesofthekendra
wouldnotbesaidtobegovt.orsemi-govt.
employees.Thusthekendrahasnotviolatedthe
doctrineofequalpayforequalwork
–Theacceptedthisreportanddismissedthepetition.

104. –Therespondentimplementedtherecommendations
i.esteppingupofhonorariumonadhocbasis
–Butonceagainthesamequestionwasraisedbythe
employeesbyfilingafreshpetitionunderart32of
theconstitution
–Thecourtheldthatitisnotopenforthepartiesto
challengeandreopenthethefindingsbyfilinga
freshpetitionandthepetitionwasdismissed

105. Ashok Kumar
v
Union of India
(1991)
–Theconstitutionalvalidityofsec433AofCrPCwas
challengedbythepetitionerbyfilingapetitionunder
Art32oftheconstitution.
–Theviresofsec433Awasdecidedbytheconstitution
benchinMaruRamv.UnionofIndia(1981),andthe
saidprovisionwasupheld.
–Itwashoweverarguedthatthecasewasnotexamined
ofahistoricalperspectiveandcertainarguments
wherenotadvancedbeforethecourtinMaruRam.

106. –Thesupremecourtheldthatitisnotopentothe
petitionertoreopenthecaseandchallengeon
“speciousplea”(falsestatement)thataparticular
argumentwasnotputforwardbeforethecourt.

107. AvinashNagra
v.
Navodaya
Vidyalaya
Samiti
(1997)
–A petition was filed by the petitioner under Art 226 of the
constitution againstan order terminating his service.
–The petition was permitted to be withdrawn by the High
Court withoutgrant of libertyto file a second petition.
–Thereafter again a fresh petition was filed which was
dismissed by the high court as not maintainable.
–Upholding the order passed by the high court, the supreme
court observed that the second petition was barredby
constructive res judicata.

108. DOCTRINEOF
RES JUDICATA
HABEAS CORPUS
PETITION

109. Summary
dismissal of
writ petition
–Q.Apetitionmaybedismissedbycourtinlimine
withoutadmittingitforfinalhearing.Willsuch
dismissalofpetitionoperateasresjudicata?
(dismissedinliminemeansthateveninprima
facie(firstimpression),theappealisdevoidofany
merit(worthless)towarrantitsadmission)

110. –Answer–nohardandfastrulecanbelaiddowndependson
–Thefactsandcircumstanceofeachcaseand
–Uponthenatureoftheorder
Foreg-
–Iforderisonmeritbar
–Iftheordershowsthatthedismissal(petitionerhasalternate
remedies)wasforareasonthennobar.
–Ifthepetitionisdismissedinlimineevenwithoutpassinga
speakingorder(reasonedorder)thennobari.e.noresjudicata
–Ifthepetitionisdismissedaswithdrawn,itcannotbeabarto
subsequentpetitionunderArt32–becauseinsuchcasethereis
nodecisiononmeritbythecourt.
Amounts
to

111. Summary
–ResJudicatameansbaronre-litigation
–Why?–toputanendtolitigation
–Basedon3maxims
–Thedoctrineisapplicableonwritpetitionaslaiddownin
MSMSharmavShreeKrishnaSinha(1960)
–NotapplicableonHabeasCorpusPetition
–Isthedoctrineapplicableonpetitionsdismissedbycourt
inliminewithoutadmittingitforfinalhearing?
-dependsonthefactsandcircumstancesofeachcase

112. Question of fact

113. QUESTIONS
OF FACTOF LAWMIXED

114. Question of
fact
–Ifthequestionispurelyoffact,decidedinanearlier
proceedingbyacompetentcourt,thenina
subsequentproceedingbetweenthesamepartiesit
mustberegardedasfinallydecidedandcannotbe
re-opened.

115. Examples
IfAisaccusedkillingB
–Questionoffact
-Whofiredtheshot?
-Atwhom?
-Wherewasthetarget?
-Istheaccusedacontinuingthreattothesociety?
(US–Jurytodecide)

116. –Question of law
-Is the accused guilty of culpable homicide or
murder?
(US –Judge or judiciary to decide)

117. Mixed
Question of
Fact and Law
–When the existenceof certain facts and the legal effects
thereof are to be found before the question is decided
one way or the other it can be said to be a mixed question
of law and fact.
–Existence of certain fact + legal effects = Mixed Question
–A mixed question of law and fact determinedin the
earlierproceeding between the same parties will operate
as res judicata and cannot be questioned in a subsequent
proceeding

118. Example
–Whetheratenancyisorisnotofapermanentnature?
–Whetherornotadecreeiscapableofexecution?
-istheexecutioneffectedbylimitation–questionoflaw
-isthesubjectmatterstillthere(flood)–questionoffact
–Whetheraparticularcustomisorisnotopposedtopublic
policy?
thedecisionsthereofareasmuchresjudicataasoneon
aquestionoffact.
What is the custom-factIPC-law

119. Summary
–Question of law
–Question of fact
–Mixed question
Res
Judicata
The courts will not
exercise its review
jurisdiction
NoRes
JudicataProvided there is an appeal

120. Doctrine of Laches

121. Laches –Unreasonable delay in ascertaining a claim, which
may result in its dismissal.

122. You were late Claimis dismissedAs a result of
which your

123. –The doctrine of laches is built on the concept
Vigilantibusnon dormientiusaequitassubventil
–means law protects even the indolent (slow and lazy
person), the vigilant(alert) but notthe ones who sleepover
their rights.
–The court shall, in compliance with this act or doctrine,
preserve the rights of people who are aware of their rights,
notof those who have fallen asleepon their rights.
vigilant

124. –Thedoctrineisusedbythecourttodealwith
inordinatedelay,whichhappenswhenfilinga
petitionoracomplaint.
–Thatisifyouhavealegalclaimyouhaveto
approachthecourtinatimelymanner.
–Ifthereisunreasonabledelayinapproachingthe
courthecourtwilllookintotheissuethroughthe
prismofdoctrineoflaches.

125. –The court will particularly look into 3 elements
–knowledge of delay –whether you were aware of
the delay
–Whether the delay is reasonable or unreasonable?
–Have you neglectedthis claim before, and are you
raising it now to purposefully harm the defendant.

126. WHY?
–Highchanceofmemorylossorbeingfadeaway.
–Withdelaythereisalwaysachanceofvitalevidenceloss
–Toputanendtoanticipation
–Lawdoesnotsupportpersonswhosleepovertheir
right
–Onewhoclaimsequitymustdoequity.

127. How?–LIMITATION ACT

128. Art 32 and
laches
–Now, when it comes to writ petition the time limit
for filing the same is not mentioned any where in the
limitation act.
–Thus the same is entirely based on the discretion of
the court.

129. Trilok Chand
Motichand
v.
H.B. Munshi
(1970)
–The main question before the Court was whether there is any
period of limitationprescribed within which the remedy under
Article 32 is to be invoked.
–The petition, in this case, was filed after a delay of 10 years;
the plea was dismissed for delay.
–The judgeswho comprised the bench in this case however
differed with respect to the time period after which laches
should apply.

130. –Sikri, J., opined that three years will be the proper
yardstick for measuring a reasonable time for
preferring a writ petition.
–Bachawat, J., put it as one year.

131. –Ontheotherhand,JusticeHegdesuggestedthatthelawon
limitationhasnoapplicationontheproceedingsthattakeplace
underArticle32andassuchtheCourtcannotrefuseapetition
basedondelay.
–Inthisregard,however,ChiefJusticeHidayatullahfeltthatno
hardandfastruleshouldbeadopted.Hestatedthattheissue
shouldbedealtwithbytheCourtonacasetocasebasis.
–Thewholeissueisdependenton
–whatthebreachofafundamentalrightis,
–whattheremedyisand
–whydidthedelayinquestionariseinthefirstplace.

132. V. Bhasker Rao
v.
State of
Andhra
Pradesh
(1993)
–Here,thepetitionersandrespondentsareDistrict
andSessionsJudgesintheStateofAndhraPradesh.
–Thesenioritylistwaspublishedtwelvetimesduring
eightyearsshowingthepetitionerbelowthe
respondents(thoughthewasappointedearlierto
service)butthepetitionerneverchallenged.
–Onfilingapetitionitwasheldthathewasnot
entitledtochallengeitunderArticle32ofthe
ConstitutionofIndia

133. Ravindra
Kumar Jain
v.
Union of India
(2015)
–In this case the petitioner claimed compensation
under the 2013 Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Re-settlement Act
–However, the landwas acquired under the 1894 act.
–Thus since the claim was delayedthe petition was
rejected by court citing the doctrine of laches.
–Till date no SC decision was over-ruled this decision.

134. Summary
–Laches= unreasonable delay
–Based on the maxim = Vigilantibusnon dormientius
aequitassubventil(law protects even the indolent
and the vigilant but not the one who sleeps over
their rights)
–Why ? Memory loss, put an end to anticipation, one
who seek equity must do equity
–Art 32 and laches–yes (Ravindra kumarJain v.
Union of India (2015))

135. Exhaustion of
Alternative Remedy

136. CGIT -ID
DRT -DRAT
LOWER COURTS +
TRIBUNAL
HIGH COURTS
SUPREME COURTS

137. –Thusthedoctrinedirectsthatalitigantmust
approachtheforumthatisnearesttohim/herinthe
chainofthejudicialstructure,sothatprecious
judicialresources,bothatthehigherlevel,andat
thelower(whichisperhapsthespecializedlevel)is
notwastedinthewakeofaforumshopping
exercise.

138. WHY?
–Despite, Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution which is specifically
provided for the enforcement of fundamental rights.
–And moreover Art 32 itself being a Fundamental right.
–And in spite of cases like
–M/s BaburamPrakash Chandra Maheshwari v. AntarimZila Parishad
(1969)
held that, once the violation of the fundamental right is
established, it is not only the right and power but the duty and
obligation of the Supreme Court to see that the petitioner's
fundamental rightis protected and safe-guarded.
–

139. YET, THE DOCTRINE !
-The rule has been born out of convenience
-It was never a rule in strict sense
-Used by the judiciary for disallowing a case
-As per the doctrine discretion of court is paramount

140. Reasons
1.Widespread growth of tribunalization.
There are tribunals for several areas perceived as
within the province of specialized laws, including
income tax, elections, industrial disputes, etc. in
certain cases tribunals are more apt to decide
matters than the courts.
2. Due to severe constrain of time as Judicial time is
the most precious asset.

141. SUMMARY
TYPES OF MATTERS IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
Pending Matters –67,279 *
[As on 04.04.2021]
Admission Matters Regular Hearing Matters
(48,415) (18,864)
(Miscellaneous)
Complete
(Miscellaneous)
(35,615)
[In which all
Preliminaries are
Complete and ready
For hearing]
Incomplete
(Miscellaneous)
(12,800)
[Preliminaries not
complete like process
fee not paid/notice yet
not served/ Pleadings
not completed, etc.]
Ready
(Regular Hearing)
(18,793)
[All preliminaries
completed after
admission]
Not Ready
(Regular Hearing)
(71)
[Preliminaries not
completed like
notice of lodgement
of appeal Not
served/statement of
case not filed, etc.]
* 19.13 % matters are Incomplete / Not Ready required preliminaries to be completed.
* Number of Constitution Bench matters : 444 (48 main matters + 396 connected matters)
TotalMain Connected
Five Judges Bench Matters 294 36 258
Seven Judges Bench Matters 15 7 8
Nine Judges Bench Matters 135 5 130
Total 444 48 396
* Out of 67,279 pending matters, 12,871 matters (12,800 incomplete Miscellaneous matters and
71 Not Ready Regular Hearing matters) are such matters which cannot be listed for ‘hearing’
before Hon’ble Court.
67,279 Supreme Court
46,00,000 High Courts
3.19 Crore Lower courts
PENDING CASES
As of Feb 16,2020

142. –The common criticism about the wave of judicial
activismis that the courts seem to have interfered in
the functionsof the legislature and the executive.
Now here the judiciaryis actually conceding from
exercising its jurisdiction. Thus it should be seen as a
positive attitude from the judiciary that is borne out
of necessity.
–The doctrine also ensures decentralisation of judicial
powers

143. Exceptions
Writ petition
filed for
enforcement
of F.R
violation of
the principles
of natural
justice
The authority
has no
jurisdiction
Viresof the
statute under
which the
authority acts
is challenged
Exceptions to the rule of Exhaustion
These exceptions to the rule of exhaustion under Article 226 have been laid
down by the Supreme Court, in a Division Bench ruling, in Whirlpool
Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, Mumbai 1998

144. Executive
Engineer, Bihar
State Housing
Board
v.
Ramesh
Kumar Singh
(1996)
–ThepetitionerhadapproachedtheHighCourtunder
Article226evenbeforereplyingtoanoticeasking
himtoshowcauseastowhyhehadbeenresidingon
propertybelongingtotheBoard.
–Therehadbeennoviolationofanyfundamental
right,norwasitthecasethattheauthority,which
hadcommencedproceedingsagainsthim,hadnot
therequiredjurisdiction.
–

145. –Therefore,thenoticewasnotanullity.Moreover,
thebasicfactsweredisputed.TheSupremeCourt,
speakingthroughaDivisionBench,declaredthatthe
HighCourthaderredintakingupthecaseand
lookingintothefacts.
–Thealternativeremedythathadbeenprovidedfor,
i.e.,theproceedingsbeforetheBoardandthe
consequentappealthereon,shouldhavebeen
resortedto.

146. Radha Krishna
Industries
v.
State of
Himachal
Pradesh
(2021)
–In the present case, the High Court had dismissed
the writ petitioninstituted under Article 226 of the
Constitution challengingorders of provisional
attachment on the ground that an alternate remedy
is available. The appellant challenged the orders
issued on 28 October 2020 by the Joint Commissioner
of State Taxes and Excise, Parwanooprovisionally
attaching the appellant’s receivables from its
customers.

147. –The provisional attachment was ordered while
invoking Section 83 of the Himachal Pradesh Goods
and Service Tax Act,2017 and Rule 159 of Himachal
Pradesh Goods and Service Tax Rules, 20173 . While
dismissing the writ petition challenging orders of
provisional attachment the High Court noted that
although it can entertain a petition under Article 226
of the Constitution, it must not do so when the
aggrieved person has an effective alternate remedy
available in law.

148. U.K
–The doctrine of exhaustion finds wide mention in English
jurisprudence.
–However, the practice does not meet with the same
amount of enthusiasm.
–According to Justice Wade,
There ought to be no categorical rule requiringthe
exhaustion of administrative remedies before judicial
review can be granted.
The no. of times this particular rulehas been applied
should not transform it into a rule .

149. R.
v.
Birmingham
(1991)
–Reviewwas denied because the statutory remedy
under the Consumer Protection Act, 1987, had not
been exhausted.
Additionally, the doctrine was applied because of the
"paramount need toprotect the consumer “.
Nevertheless, the application of the doctrine
remains restricted in England.

150. Wade’s
Argument
“Itdoesnotseemrightistoinsistthatthereis
somethingexceptionalaboutjudicialreview,that
remediesgivenfordifferentpurposesmustbe
exhaustedfirst,andthatthechoiceofremedies
dependsuponconvenience,speed,expertiseand
otherfactorswhichareinprincipleirrelevantand
which,beingimponderable,produceprocedural
dilemmasandpotentialtrapsforlitigant.”

151. USA
–The doctrine is well developed in USA.
–It is imagined as an expression of executive and
administrative autonomy–SOP.

152. United States
v.
Sing Tuck
(1904)
–In this case for the first time the doctrinewas firmly
appliedby the US Supreme Court
–The petitioners sought judicial review of a decisionby an
immigration inspector who denied them entry into the
country, instead of appealing to the Secretary of
Commerce and Labour, as provided by statute.
–Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously stated that "the
preliminary sifting (to sieve) process must be gone through
before the courts may be called upon."

153. Reiter
v.
Cooper
(1993)
–Therulewasre-instated
–"Wherereliefisavailablefromanadministrative
agency,theplaintiffisordinarilyrequiredtopursue
thatavenueofredressbeforeproceedingtothe
courts,anduntilthatrecourseisexhausted,suitis
prematureandmustbedismissed."

154. McKart
v.
United States
(1969)
–It was laid down
–"that no one isentitled to judicial relief for a
supposed or threatened injury untilthe prescribed
administrative remedy has been exhausted.”

155. Federal
Administrative
Procedure Act,
1946
–ThedoctrineisreflectedinSec10(c)ofthefederal
AdministrativeProcedureAct
—Everyagencyactionmadereviewablebystatuteandevery
finalagencyactionforwhichthereisnootheradequate
remedyinanycourtshallbesubjecttojudicialreview.
–Thusthecourtscannotreviewtheagencyaction,
unlessspecifiedotherwisebystatute,tillthefinal
decisioninreviewofthatactionistakenbythehighest
appellateauthority,
–Becauseofthesimplereasonthatthedecisionisnot
finaluntilthattime.

156. Schlesinger
Secretary of
Defense
v.
Councilman
(1975)
–Afairlystraightforwardapplicationofthedoctrineis
foundinthecase
–Hereaservicemanwaschargedwiththecrimeof
possessionofmarijuanabymilitaryauthorities.The
servicemancouldshownoharmotherthanthat
"attendanttoresolutionofhiscaseinthemilitarycourt
system."Therefore,theCourtheldthatintheabsenceof
anyextenuating(mitigating)circumstance,thefederal
districtcourtsmustrefrainfromintervention,bywayof
injunctionorotherwise.Theremedybywayofthemilitary
tribunalmustbeexhaustedbeforeapproachingthe
courts.

157. Summary
–Thedoctrineofexhaustionofalternativeremediesis
thusborneoutofnecessity.
–Thejudiciary,withitsmountingpilesofarrears,has
reallynootheroptionbuttoexerciseitsdiscretion
andapplytherule.
–Althoughthereisnorealconstitutionalbasisfor
sucharejectionofawritpetition,itisinfactinthe
interestsofjusticethatthecourtsareforcedtotake
suchastep.

158. –Oncomparisonitisevidentthatthedoctrinehas
beenappliedintheUnitedStatesovertheyears.The
Englishsystem,althoughawareofthedoctrine,
seemswaryandreluctanttoapplyit.

159. Act of State

160. –Sovereign actof state cannotbe questionedin a court
of law
–An act of state is excluded under the doctrine of Judicial
Review

161. What is act of
state ?
–UnderEnglishlawactofstateisanactofexecutivedoneinthecourseof
itsrelationshipwithanotherstateorwiththesubjectsofthatstate.
–Itisanactofsovereignagainstanothersovereigninthecontestof
foreignrelationsoractdonebyorwiththeauthorityofcrown.
–Thusadeclarationwhetherastateofwarexist,
–Whetheraparticularcountryishostile
–Whetheraparticulargovt.shouldberecognizedasindependent
stateorsovereigncountryareallactofstate.
–Likewise,decisionrelatingtowar,treaty,dissolutionofparliament,
mobilizingarmedforce,etc.cannotbesubjectmatterofJudicial
review.

162. Subjective Satisfaction

163. –Conferralofpowerontheadministrativeauthoritycompletely
onthebasisoftheirsatisfactionisanotherinstanceof
exclusionofJudicialReview
–IsfoundinPreventiveDetentionLawssuchas
–PreventiveDetentionAct,1950
–MaintenanceofInternalSecurityAct,1971
–NationalSecurityact,1980
–ConservationofForeignExchangeandPreventionof
SmugglingAct,1974and
–PreventionofBlackMarketingandMaintenanceofSupplies
ofEssentialcommoditiesact,1980tonameafew

164. Sec 3 of PDA
act
–PowertoMakeOrdersDetainingCertainPersons.-(1)TheCentral
GovernmentortheStateGovernmentmay-
(a)ifsatisfiedwithrespecttoanypersonthatwithaviewtopreventing
himfromactinginanymannerprejudicialto-
(i)thedefenceofIndia,therelationsofIndiawithforeignpersons,or
thesecurityofIndia,or
(ii)thesecurityoftheStateorthemaintenanceofpublicorder,or
(iii)themaintenanceofsuppliesandservicesessentialtothe
community;or
(b)ifsatisfiedwithrespecttoanypersonwhoisaforeignerwithinthe
meaningoftheForeignersAct,1946-(31of1946),thatwithaviewto
regulatinghiscontinuedpresenceinIndiaorwithaviewtomaking
arrangementsforhisexpulsionfromIndiaitisnecessarysotodo,make
anorderdirectingthatsuchpersonbedetained.

165. –No judicial review was envisaged
–However, resort to Art 32 and 226 for a writ of
habeas corpus was permitted

166. Emergency
–Satisfactionofpresidentsoastodeclareemergency
isnotopentoJudicialReview.
–Thesatisfactionissubjectiveinnatureandnormally
itcannotbeinterferedwith.
–Butiftisshownthatthereis,
–nomaterialwhatsoeverforthesatisfactionofthe
presidentor
–noreasonablemancouldhavecometosucha
conclusion
–Oriftheactionwasmalafidethenthecourtwill
interfere.