FMEA: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly April ASQ Spokane Section Meeting2011-04_ASQ-FMEA.pdf
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About This Presentation
FMEA: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
April ASQ Spokane Section Meeting
Slide Content
© 2004 – 2010
FMEA: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
April ASQ Spokane Section Meeting Cheryl Tulkoff
Senior Member of the Technical Staff
[email protected]
www.dfrsolutions.com
April 28, 2011
FMEA: The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly
April ASQ Spokane Section Meeting Cheryl Tulkoff
Senior Member of the Technical Staff
[email protected]
www.dfrsolutions.com
April 28, 2011
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Instructor Biography
o
Cheryl Tulkoff has over 15 years of experience in electronics manufacturing
with an emphasis on failure analysis an d reliability. She has worked throughout
the electronics manufacturing life cycle be ginning with semiconductor fabrication
processes, into printed circuit board fabrication and assembly, through
functional and reliability testing, and culm inating in the analysis and evaluation
of field returns. She has also manage d no clean and RoHS-compliant conversion
programs and has developed and managed comprehensive reliability
programs.
o
Cheryl earned her Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from Georgia
Tech. She is a published author, experie nced public speaker and trainer and a
Senior member of both ASQ and IEEE. She holds leadership positions in the IEEE
Central Texas Chapter, IEEE WIE (Women In Engineering), and IEEE ASTR
(Accelerated Stress Testing and Reliability) sections. She chaired the annual IEEE
ASTR workshop for four years and is also an ASQ Certified Reliability
Engineer.
o
She has a strong passion for pre-college STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Math) outreach and volunteers with several organizations that
specialize in encouraging pre-college stud ents to pursue careers in these fields.
Instructor Biography
o
Cheryl Tulkoff has over 15 years of experience in electronics manufacturing
with an emphasis on failure analysis an d reliability. She has worked throughout
the electronics manufacturing life cycle be ginning with semiconductor fabrication
processes, into printed circuit board fabrication and assembly, through
functional and reliability testing, and culm inating in the analysis and evaluation
of field returns. She has also manage d no clean and RoHS-compliant conversion
programs and has developed and managed comprehensive reliability
programs.
o
Cheryl earned her Bachelor of Mechanical Engineering degree from Georgia
Tech. She is a published author, experie nced public speaker and trainer and a
Senior member of both ASQ and IEEE. She holds leadership positions in the IEEE
Central Texas Chapter, IEEE WIE (Women In Engineering), and IEEE ASTR
(Accelerated Stress Testing and Reliability) sections. She chaired the annual IEEE
ASTR workshop for four years and is also an ASQ Certified Reliability
Engineer.
o
She has a strong passion for pre-college STEM (Science, Technology,
Engineering, and Math) outreach and volunteers with several organizations that
specialize in encouraging pre-college stud ents to pursue careers in these fields.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
1) Introductions & Webinar Instructions
2) “Common Sense” Reliability Engineering
3) Introduction to FMEAs
4) FMEA Process
Roles & Responsibilities
5) Common Mistakes & Traps
6) Examples
1) Introductions & Webinar Instructions
2) “Common Sense” Reliability Engineering
3) Introduction to FMEAs
4) FMEA Process
Roles & Responsibilities
5) Common Mistakes & Traps
6) Examples
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Introduction
Introduction
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010Common Sense Reliability Engineering
o
"Unfortunately, reliability engineering has been afflicted
with more nonsense than any other branch of engineering."
- Pat O'Connor (Author Practical Reliability Engineering).
o
Reliability engineering as a discipline often fails because: o
Incorrect activities, incorrect people and incorrect timing.
o
Performing tasks just to do them but not really fulfill them.
o
Reliability activities focused excessively on maintenance or logistics issues
instead of product optimization, problem/defect prevention & risk reduction.
o
Prediction based on fundamentally flawed methods & assumptions o
Obscure or Excessive Statistical / Probabilistic Methods.
o
Playing “Number Games” to “Look Good” of “Justify Good Enough” o
To avoid extra effort, to meet schedule, to meet budget.
o
"Unfortunately, reliability engineering has been afflicted
with more nonsense than any other branch of engineering."
- Pat O'Connor (Author Practical Reliability Engineering).
o
Reliability engineering as a discipline often fails because: o
Incorrect activities, incorrect people and incorrect timing.
o
Performing tasks just to do them but not really fulfill them.
o
Reliability activities focused excessively on maintenance or logistics issues
instead of product optimization, problem/defect prevention & risk reduction.
o
Prediction based on fundamentally flawed methods & assumptions o
Obscure or Excessive Statistical / Probabilistic Methods.
o
Playing “Number Games” to “Look Good” of “Justify Good Enough” o
To avoid extra effort, to meet schedule, to meet budget.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010Common Sense Reliability Engineering
o
Common sense dictates that: o
Reliability should be defined as the absence of failures
during the intended usage life of product & services.
o
Reliability Efforts Should Focus On Ensuring The Absence Of Failure. o
Focus Product Development on FINDING & PREVENTING ALL FAILURES THAT
MIGHT AFFECT THE END CUSTOMER
o
Follow by Prevention of defects in production, assembly and fabrication
o
Up front efforts for problem prevention / doing it right the first time
o
Reduces the need / cost of correcting problems found in test or
problems reported by customers in the field.
o
Failure prevention can achieved by o
Understand why failures happen
o
Analysis to identify risks followed by risk elimination/mitigation
o
Optimizing activities designed to identify and eliminate
both design and process deficiencies.
o
Common sense dictates that: o
Reliability should be defined as the absence of failures
during the intended usage life of product & services.
o
Reliability Efforts Should Focus On Ensuring The Absence Of Failure. o
Focus Product Development on FINDING & PREVENTING ALL FAILURES THAT
MIGHT AFFECT THE END CUSTOMER
o
Follow by Prevention of defects in production, assembly and fabrication
o
Up front efforts for problem prevention / doing it right the first time
o
Reduces the need / cost of correcting problems found in test or
problems reported by customers in the field.
o
Failure prevention can achieved by o
Understand why failures happen
o
Analysis to identify risks followed by risk elimination/mitigation
o
Optimizing activities designed to identify and eliminate
both design and process deficiencies.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Introduction to FMEA:
Failure Modes & Effects
Analysis
Introduction to FMEA:
Failure Modes & Effects
Analysis
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
o
FMEA is just one of many tools in your tool box. o
It is not the only tool or best tool for every problem or every
situation.
o
It can be used across a wide range of fields and
disciplines o
Not limited to “hardware” o
Manufacturing
o
Software
o
Business Processes
o
Healthcare
o
Service Industries
o
Regulated industries – automotive, medical devices, NASA..
o
Any place where you need to reduce risk and prevent failure!
What FMEA IS NOT…
o
FMEA is just one of many tools in your tool box. o
It is not the only tool or best tool for every problem or every
situation.
o
It can be used across a wide range of fields and
disciplines o
Not limited to “hardware” o
Manufacturing
o
Software
o
Business Processes
o
Healthcare
o
Service Industries
o
Regulated industries – automotive, medical devices, NASA..
o
Any place where you need to reduce risk and prevent failure!
What FMEA IS NOT…
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
What FMEA is….
o
FMEA o
A systematic group of
activities designed to: o
Recognize and evaluate
potential failures of systems,
products, or processes
o
Identify the effects and
outcomes of the failures
o
Identify actions that could
eliminate or mitigate the
failures
o
Provide a historical written
record of the work performed
What FMEA is….
o
FMEA o
A systematic group of
activities designed to: o
Recognize and evaluate
potential failures of systems,
products, or processes
o
Identify the effects and
outcomes of the failures
o
Identify actions that could
eliminate or mitigate the
failures
o
Provide a historical written
record of the work performed
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
FMEA in the News
Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear plant
Industry watchers contend a manufacturing error was likely the culprit. "It means the assembly was wrong, it means the wrong tools were used, it means they were careless in drilling the holes, and maybe the drill was dull,"
Tear in Boeing Jet
A study has found that fatal
medication errors spiked by
10 percent in July, the month
that graduates fresh out of
medical school report to
residencies, in counties with
a high number of teaching
hospitals, but stayed the
same in areas without
teaching hospitals
Medication Errors
FMEA in the News
Japan’s Fukushima Daiichi
nuclear plant
Industry watchers contend a manufacturing error was likely the culprit. "It means the assembly was wrong, it means the wrong tools were used, it means they were careless in drilling the holes, and maybe the drill was dull,"
Tear in Boeing Jet
A study has found that fatal
medication errors spiked by
10 percent in July, the month
that graduates fresh out of
medical school report to
residencies, in counties with
a high number of teaching
hospitals, but stayed the
same in areas without
teaching hospitals
Medication Errors
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
o
Japan Quake & Tsunami points out both strengths and limitations
of FMEA o
Key issues were detailed and identified o
The plants were built to withstand an earthquake of 7.0.
o
There was a seawall around the facility in case of a tsunami.
o
In an earthquake, the plants had a SCRAM procedure, which
executed an emergency shutdown of the nuclear reactors.
o
Electrical pumps were designed to pump cool water to the container
to keep the rods submerged (the rods are hotter AFTER the shut
down than during regular operation of the plant).
o
There were back-up batteries for running the pumps in an
emergency that were designed to last about an hour or so.
o
There were diesel fuel pumps that were available to take over the
pumping when the batteries ran out of juice.
o
There are vents built into the system to release steam from the
reactors if the pressure inside got too high
o
But many were considered low probability and/or excessively
expensive to consider or the risk was underestimated
FMEA in the News……
o
Japan Quake & Tsunami points out both strengths and limitations
of FMEA o
Key issues were detailed and identified o
The plants were built to withstand an earthquake of 7.0.
o
There was a seawall around the facility in case of a tsunami.
o
In an earthquake, the plants had a SCRAM procedure, which
executed an emergency shutdown of the nuclear reactors.
o
Electrical pumps were designed to pump cool water to the container
to keep the rods submerged (the rods are hotter AFTER the shut
down than during regular operation of the plant).
o
There were back-up batteries for running the pumps in an
emergency that were designed to last about an hour or so.
o
There were diesel fuel pumps that were available to take over the
pumping when the batteries ran out of juice.
o
There are vents built into the system to release steam from the
reactors if the pressure inside got too high
o
But many were considered low probability and/or excessively
expensive to consider or the risk was underestimated
FMEA in the News……
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
o
Boeing engineers underestimated the risk of cracks in
the aluminum, they assumed it would be fine for
60,000 flights (pressure cycles) but have now reduced
the expected life to 30,000 with inspections
recommended every 500 flights after reaching
30,000…. o
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038063
04576244782850491122.html
o
FMEA: The Cure for Medical Errors o
http://www.medicalhealthcarefmea.com/guides/qp0803reili ng.pdf
o
http://asq.org/sixsigma/green/pdf/preventing_medication_
errors.pdf
FMEA in the News
o
Boeing engineers underestimated the risk of cracks in
the aluminum, they assumed it would be fine for
60,000 flights (pressure cycles) but have now reduced
the expected life to 30,000 with inspections
recommended every 500 flights after reaching
30,000…. o
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240527487038063
04576244782850491122.html
o
FMEA: The Cure for Medical Errors o
http://www.medicalhealthcarefmea.com/guides/qp0803reili ng.pdf
o
http://asq.org/sixsigma/green/pdf/preventing_medication_
errors.pdf
FMEA in the News
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Why perform an FMEA?
o
Purpose of an FMEA Study is to analyze:
o
What might go wrong?
o
How bad might the effect be?
o
How might it be prevented, mitigated or detected at the earliest possible
moment?
o
With lowest cost, impact, safety risk….
o
Develop a Design FMEA process for use in future programs.
Why perform an FMEA?
o
Purpose of an FMEA Study is to analyze:
o
What might go wrong?
o
How bad might the effect be?
o
How might it be prevented, mitigated or detected at the earliest possible
moment?
o
With lowest cost, impact, safety risk….
o
Develop a Design FMEA process for use in future programs.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Typical FMEA Uses
o
FMEA are often stored and kept to prove due engineering diligence in case of a
product liability law suit or government safety investigation.
o
Worst use is when a “FMEA Specialist” generates the analysis alone or
to simply fulfill a contract requirement, and the report is not even read by the
product team.
o
FMEA are extremely powerful QRD (Quality, Reliability, Durability) analysis
techniques o
Best for total new products, new technologies and challenging design Issues.
o
But the high degree of detail and repetiti on in a FMEA can be grueling, costly
and time intensive to create especially for complex designs. o
FMEA’ing everything can lead to o
Overwork
o
Non Value Added work
o
FMEA fatigue!
o
Try to re-use FMEA “building blocks” or use as a check list on new versions
of similar products.
Typical FMEA Uses
o
FMEA are often stored and kept to prove due engineering diligence in case of a
product liability law suit or government safety investigation.
o
Worst use is when a “FMEA Specialist” generates the analysis alone or
to simply fulfill a contract requirement, and the report is not even read by the
product team.
o
FMEA are extremely powerful QRD (Quality, Reliability, Durability) analysis
techniques o
Best for total new products, new technologies and challenging design Issues.
o
But the high degree of detail and repetiti on in a FMEA can be grueling, costly
and time intensive to create especially for complex designs. o
FMEA’ing everything can lead to o
Overwork
o
Non Value Added work
o
FMEA fatigue!
o
Try to re-use FMEA “building blocks” or use as a check list on new versions
of similar products.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
o
FMEA is a widely used and powerful analysis/design review
technique. o
An extremely comprehensive element by element review of: o
What can go wrong
o
What that will happen
o
How the situation can be improved
o
For improving a design or process
o
For each component, element or process step: o
List how failures can occur (Failure Mode, what can go
wrong, how the failure manifests itself)
o
List what could happen (Failure Effect, consequences of the
mode).
o
List how processes or the system itself can detect & prevent
the problem
o
Generate Recommendations for Improvements.
FMEA Basics -Failure Mode And Effect Analysis
o
FMEA is a widely used and powerful analysis/design review
technique. o
An extremely comprehensive element by element review of: o
What can go wrong
o
What that will happen
o
How the situation can be improved
o
For improving a design or process
o
For each component, element or process step: o
List how failures can occur (Failure Mode, what can go
wrong, how the failure manifests itself)
o
List what could happen (Failure Effect, consequences of the
mode).
o
List how processes or the system itself can detect & prevent
the problem
o
Generate Recommendations for Improvements.
FMEA Basics -Failure Mode And Effect Analysis
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
o
Calculate a Risk Priority Number (RPN) for Each Line Item using
3 Criteria, o
Severity of the Failure Effect “S” (Scale of 1 (Low) - 10 (High)).
o
Frequency of Failure Occurrence “O” (Scale of 1(Infrequent) -
10 (Frequent)).
o
Detectability/Preventability/Warning “D” (Scale or 1(Very
Detectable) - 10 (Not Detectable)).
o
RPN = S x O x D, range (1 (good) to 1000 High Risk).
o
An unacceptable range is defined. o
Example: RPN’s > 150 are unacceptable and require a
corrective action redesign.
o
Often a Pareto Ranking of the RPN is performed and used
to prioritize corrective action efforts.
FMEA Basics -Failure Mode And Effect Analysis
o
Calculate a Risk Priority Number (RPN) for Each Line Item using
3 Criteria, o
Severity of the Failure Effect “S” (Scale of 1 (Low) - 10 (High)).
o
Frequency of Failure Occurrence “O” (Scale of 1(Infrequent) -
10 (Frequent)).
o
Detectability/Preventability/Warning “D” (Scale or 1(Very
Detectable) - 10 (Not Detectable)).
o
RPN = S x O x D, range (1 (good) to 1000 High Risk).
o
An unacceptable range is defined. o
Example: RPN’s > 150 are unacceptable and require a
corrective action redesign.
o
Often a Pareto Ranking of the RPN is performed and used
to prioritize corrective action efforts.
FMEA Basics -Failure Mode And Effect Analysis
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA -Failure Mode And Effect Analysis
o
Many FMEA Versions. o
Design and Process Version - DFMEA & PFMEA.
o
Can be Performed at that Component, Subsystem, System and
Software level
o
FMECA - Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis
a version that further emphasizes & highlights “Safety Critical”
issues
o
Initially, the FMECA was called FMEA (Failure modes and effects
analysis). The C in FMECA indicates that the criticality (or severity)
of the various failure effects are considered and ranked.
o
Today, FMEA is often used as a synonym for FMECA. The
distinction between the two terms has become blurred.
o
Many FMEA Versions. o
Design and Process Version - DFMEA & PFMEA.
o
Can be Performed at that Component, Subsystem, System and
Software level
o
FMECA - Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Analysis
a version that further emphasizes & highlights “Safety Critical”
issues
o
Initially, the FMECA was called FMEA (Failure modes and effects
analysis). The C in FMECA indicates that the criticality (or severity)
of the various failure effects are considered and ranked.
o
Today, FMEA is often used as a synonym for FMECA. The
distinction between the two terms has become blurred.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
o
Failure: The loss of expected or intended function under
stated conditions
o
Failure mode: The way in which a failure is observed;
generally describes the way the failure occurs.
o
Failure effect: The immediate consequences of a failure on
operation, function or functionality
o
Failure cause: Defects in design, system, process, quality, or
part application, the underlying cause of the failure or
things which initiate a process which leads to failure.
o
Severity: The consequences of a failure mode. Severity
considers the worst case outcome of a failure as determined
by the degree of injury, property damage, or harm that
could ultimately occur."
Some Key FMEA Terms
o
Failure: The loss of expected or intended function under
stated conditions
o
Failure mode: The way in which a failure is observed;
generally describes the way the failure occurs.
o
Failure effect: The immediate consequences of a failure on
operation, function or functionality
o
Failure cause: Defects in design, system, process, quality, or
part application, the underlying cause of the failure or
things which initiate a process which leads to failure.
o
Severity: The consequences of a failure mode. Severity
considers the worst case outcome of a failure as determined
by the degree of injury, property damage, or harm that
could ultimately occur."
Some Key FMEA Terms
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA –Use a Team Approach!
Core-
team
Support-
team
Core-
team
Support-
team
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010Product FMEA –Typical Team Example
Core-
team
Representatives
from:
•Development
•Production
•Supplier Quality
•Purchasing
•Validation.
•...
Support
team
Quality or Reliability
Facilitator
Systems Enrg
HW Design
SW Design
Production/
process-engineer
Core-
team
Representatives
from:
•Development
•Production
•Supplier Quality
•Purchasing
•Validation.
•...
Support
team
Quality or Reliability
Facilitator
Systems Enrg
HW Design
SW Design
Production/
process-engineer
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010The FMEA Process in Detail….
4) Divide the system for analysis
& Create Teams
-
7) Performing the FMEA to Identify
potential failure modes, & Their
Severity, Probability of Occurrence,
Detectability & Calculate RPNs for the
sub-system
3) Choose the type
of FMEA approach
for the study
8) Complete the Initial
Evaluation Phase Identify
Excessive Risks,
Develop Corrective
Action Proposals &
Assign Resolution Lead
2) Define the
problems of interest
for the analysis.
10) Mitigation Phase
Example Follow Up
Evaluate C.A.
Effectiveness &
Implementation Plans
Update FMEA with
Finding & Revise
RPN’s
1) Define the
system of interest
11) If new RPN are
Satisfactory,
Implement C.A.s
IF Unsatisfactory Dev &
Evaluate New C.A.s or
Escalate to Mgnt
5) Create block diagrams
that illustrate all subsystem
elements, interfaces and
interactions
- Select Ranking System
6) Create FMEA Outlines based
on the block diagrams.
Subsystem elements, interfaces
and interactions become the
FMEA subsections
9) Team
Reports To
Example
Management
4) Divide the system for analysis
& Create Teams
-
7) Performing the FMEA to Identify
potential failure modes, & Their
Severity, Probability of Occurrence,
Detectability & Calculate RPNs for the
sub-system
3) Choose the type
of FMEA approach
for the study
8) Complete the Initial
Evaluation Phase Identify
Excessive Risks,
Develop Corrective
Action Proposals &
Assign Resolution Lead
2) Define the
problems of interest
for the analysis.
10) Mitigation Phase
Example Follow Up
Evaluate C.A.
Effectiveness &
Implementation Plans
Update FMEA with
Finding & Revise
RPN’s
1) Define the
system of interest
11) If new RPN are
Satisfactory,
Implement C.A.s
IF Unsatisfactory Dev &
Evaluate New C.A.s or
Escalate to Mgnt
5) Create block diagrams
that illustrate all subsystem
elements, interfaces and
interactions
- Select Ranking System
6) Create FMEA Outlines based
on the block diagrams.
Subsystem elements, interfaces
and interactions become the
FMEA subsections
9) Team
Reports To
Example
Management
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Product Definition: Key Product Characteristics, DFMEA
Process Definition: Process Flow Diagram (PFD),
Failure Mode Analysis: PFMEA
Control Strategy: Control Plan,
Error proofing
Customer Requirements:
Manufacturing: Work Instructions & Process Monitoring
Information Flow Functions with Req’s/Tech Specs
System Technical Specs
Product and Process Characteristics
Product Definition: Key Product Characteristics, DFMEA
Process Definition: Process Flow Diagram (PFD),
Failure Mode Analysis: PFMEA
Control Strategy: Control Plan,
Error proofing
Customer Requirements:
Manufacturing: Work Instructions & Process Monitoring
Information Flow Functions with Req’s/Tech Specs
System Technical Specs
Product and Process Characteristics
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Design FMEA
Process Flow Diagram
Process FMEA
Process Control Plan
Operator Instructions
Design Specifications
Validation Plan
Process Specifications
FMEAs are “continuous steps” in the
development process (mind set)
DFMEA & PFMEA are related, but
separate tasks
Whenever changes are made for:
FTQ or other issues, ALL the
process documentation should be
reviewed & updated as required.
Key Quality Tools –General Workflow
Design FMEA
Process Flow Diagram
Process FMEA
Process Control Plan
Operator Instructions
Design Specifications
Validation Plan
Process Specifications
FMEAs are “continuous steps” in the
development process (mind set)
DFMEA & PFMEA are related, but
separate tasks
Whenever changes are made for:
FTQ or other issues, ALL the
process documentation should be
reviewed & updated as required.
Key Quality Tools –General Workflow
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA –Teamleaders & Facilitators
o
Team Leaders are often from a Product/Systems Group and
facilitators are from a Quality/Reliability Organization but no
hard and fast rules!
o
Team Leader Preparation for the FMEA session: o
Focuses on the project/product and accessing, distributing, &
displaying important product information:
o
Defines and assign tasks of the team-members:
o
Accesses support personnel when needed
o
Gathers technical solutions, subject matter expertise
o
Team Leaders are often from a Product/Systems Group and
facilitators are from a Quality/Reliability Organization but no
hard and fast rules!
o
Team Leader Preparation for the FMEA session: o
Focuses on the project/product and accessing, distributing, &
displaying important product information:
o
Defines and assign tasks of the team-members:
o
Accesses support personnel when needed
o
Gathers technical solutions, subject matter expertise
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA –Facilitator Tasks
o
Facilitator Preparation of the FMEA session
o
Works/prepares together with the team-leader
o
Helps define agenda for each meeting
o
Product-FMEA : creates block diagram
o
Process-FMEA: creates flows diagram
o
Creates the FMEA starter outline from the diagram
o
Helps select participants with team leader (4-6 persons ideal).
o
Ensures the FMEA-worksheet is completely & accurately filled-in
(actions, responsible person, date)
o
Functions are correctly written down (verb/noun)
o
All known failure modes are listed
o
Failure modes effects are correct
(no confusion between causes and effects).
o
Keeps the process moving don’t loose time with long discussions
about severity and probability.
o
In case of doubt, take the ‘worst case’ and move on.
o
Facilitator Preparation of the FMEA session
o
Works/prepares together with the team-leader
o
Helps define agenda for each meeting
o
Product-FMEA : creates block diagram
o
Process-FMEA: creates flows diagram
o
Creates the FMEA starter outline from the diagram
o
Helps select participants with team leader (4-6 persons ideal).
o
Ensures the FMEA-worksheet is completely & accurately filled-in
(actions, responsible person, date)
o
Functions are correctly written down (verb/noun)
o
All known failure modes are listed
o
Failure modes effects are correct
(no confusion between causes and effects).
o
Keeps the process moving don’t loose time with long discussions
about severity and probability.
o
In case of doubt, take the ‘worst case’ and move on.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA Worksheet Sections 1.FMEA #:
- Enter the FMEA document number, used for tracking.
2.FMEA Type & Name:
- System, Subsystem or Component,
- Item Name and Number.
3.Design Responsibility Department or Group
4.Prepared By:
-The name, phone, e-mail & company of th e person who led or prepared the
FMEA.
5.Program/Model
- List the program/project of system the item is used in and the introductory model
year of the item.
6.Key (Due) Date
- Target FMEA completion date.
7.FMEA (Revision) Date
- Revision Date of this version of the FMEA worksheet
- Enter the FMEA document number, used for tracking.
2.FMEA Type & Name:
- System, Subsystem or Component,
- Item Name and Number.
3.Design Responsibility Department or Group
4.Prepared By:
-The name, phone, e-mail & company of th e person who led or prepared the
FMEA.
5.Program/Model
- List the program/project of system the item is used in and the introductory model
year of the item.
6.Key (Due) Date
- Target FMEA completion date.
7.FMEA (Revision) Date
- Revision Date of this version of the FMEA worksheet
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA Worksheet Sections 8.Core Team:
- List the names, contact info & departments of the FMEA team members
9.Item/Function
- Concisely list the name and pertinent info of the line item/section being analyzed.
Correlate the FMEA item/function number to the number on FMEA block diagram/
engineering drawing.
10.Potential Failure Mode
- Sequentially and concisely list the manner in which the item (component,
subsystem or system) could potentially fail to perform the intended function
described in the item/function column. The potential failure mode could cause a
potential failure in a higher level item, or be the effect of lower level item.
List each potential failure mode associated with the particular item or function.
11.Potential Effect(s) of Failure
- Sequentially and concisely list the potential effects of the each failure
mode on the function, as perceived by the customer. Document if the
failure could impact safety or result in noncompliance to regulation.
- List the names, contact info & departments of the FMEA team members
9.Item/Function
- Concisely list the name and pertinent info of the line item/section being analyzed.
Correlate the FMEA item/function number to the number on FMEA block diagram/
engineering drawing.
10.Potential Failure Mode
- Sequentially and concisely list the manner in which the item (component,
subsystem or system) could potentially fail to perform the intended function
described in the item/function column. The potential failure mode could cause a
potential failure in a higher level item, or be the effect of lower level item.
List each potential failure mode associated with the particular item or function.
11.Potential Effect(s) of Failure
- Sequentially and concisely list the potential effects of the each failure
mode on the function, as perceived by the customer. Document if the
failure could impact safety or result in noncompliance to regulation.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA Worksheet Sections 12.Severity Ranking:
- List the teams assessment of the Severity rank associated with the most serious
potential effect of each identified failu re mode. Severity is a relative ranking
based on the predefined severity evaluation criteria and ranking system
Sample
Process
Severity
Ranking
Table
To be
adapted
for Design
FMEA
- List the teams assessment of the Severity rank associated with the most serious
potential effect of each identified failu re mode. Severity is a relative ranking
based on the predefined severity evaluation criteria and ranking system
Sample
Process
Severity
Ranking
Table
To be
adapted
for Design
FMEA
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA Worksheet Sections 13.Classification
- An non standardized adhoc column that ca n be used to classify special product
characteristics (i.e. critical, key, major, si gnificant). May also be used to highlight
high-priority failure modes or specific company policy issues
.
14.Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure
- Sequentially and concisely list all potential causes and/or failure mechanisms
that might trigger or result in each failure mode. So that preventative or mitigation
efforts can be identified.
- An non standardized adhoc column that ca n be used to classify special product
characteristics (i.e. critical, key, major, si gnificant). May also be used to highlight
high-priority failure modes or specific company policy issues
.
14.Potential Cause(s) / Mechanism(s) of Failure
- Sequentially and concisely list all potential causes and/or failure mechanisms
that might trigger or result in each failure mode. So that preventative or mitigation
efforts can be identified.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA Worksheet Sections 15.Probability or Potential Frequency of Occurrence.
- Rank the likelihood that a specific failu re cause/mechanism will occur during the
intent design life or usage situation. The likelihood of occurrence ranking number
is a relative meaning rather than an abs olute value. Preventing or controlling
the causes/mechanisms of the failure mode through a design or process change
(i.e. design checklist, design review, desi gn guide) is the only way a reduction in
the occurrence ranking can be effected. Estima te the likelihood of occurrence of
potential failure cause/mechanisms on a 1 to 10 scale.
Sample Process Occurrence Ranking Scale
To be
adapted
for Design
FMEA
- Rank the likelihood that a specific failu re cause/mechanism will occur during the
intent design life or usage situation. The likelihood of occurrence ranking number
is a relative meaning rather than an abs olute value. Preventing or controlling
the causes/mechanisms of the failure mode through a design or process change
(i.e. design checklist, design review, desi gn guide) is the only way a reduction in
the occurrence ranking can be effected. Estima te the likelihood of occurrence of
potential failure cause/mechanisms on a 1 to 10 scale.
Sample Process Occurrence Ranking Scale
To be
adapted
for Design
FMEA
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA Worksheet Sections
16.Current Design Controls
- List the prevention, design validation/verifi cation, quality controls, self diagnostics,
fail safe features or other activities that have incorporated into the product or
process to assure the design adequacy for the failure mode and/or cause/
mechanism being considered. The team should always be focused on improving
or optimizing design controls; for example , creating better tests or creating new
system algorithms. There are two type s of design controls to consider:
- Prevention: Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode from
occurring, or reduce their rate of occurrence.
- Detection: Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode, either by
analytical or physical methods, before th e item is released to production of by
self diagnostics with fail safe features in the field. The FMEA form has separate
columns for Prevention Controls and Detectio n Controls) to assist in distinguishing
between the two types of design cont rols. This allows for a quick visual
determination that both types of design controls are being used.
16.Current Design Controls
- List the prevention, design validation/verifi cation, quality controls, self diagnostics,
fail safe features or other activities that have incorporated into the product or
process to assure the design adequacy for the failure mode and/or cause/
mechanism being considered. The team should always be focused on improving
or optimizing design controls; for example , creating better tests or creating new
system algorithms. There are two type s of design controls to consider:
- Prevention: Prevent the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode from
occurring, or reduce their rate of occurrence.
- Detection: Detect the cause/mechanism of failure or the failure mode, either by
analytical or physical methods, before th e item is released to production of by
self diagnostics with fail safe features in the field. The FMEA form has separate
columns for Prevention Controls and Detectio n Controls) to assist in distinguishing
between the two types of design cont rols. This allows for a quick visual
determination that both types of design controls are being used.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA Worksheet Sections
17.Detection i
s a relative ranking of the intended design controls.
Sample Process Detection Scale
To be adapted
for the Design
FMEA
17.Detection i
s a relative ranking of the intended design controls.
Sample Process Detection Scale
To be adapted
for the Design
FMEA
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA Worksheet Sections
18.RPN - Risk Priority Number
- The RPN is the product of the severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D)
rankings: (S) x (O) x (D) =RPN. The RPN is used to prioritize the risk related to
each failure mode and mechanism.
19.Recommended
Corrective Action.
- Engineering efforts for preventive/corrective action should be first directed at high
severity, high RPN, items identified by the team. The objective is to
recommended action that reduce severity, occurrence and detection risks rankings.
9 or 10 severity issues require special atte ntion to ensure that the risk is addressed
through design controls or preventive/c orrective action(s) regardless of the RPN
value. After special attention has been give n to severity rankings of 9 or 10, other
failure modes can then be addressed
The primary objective of recommended actions is to reduce risks AND increase
customer satisfaction by improving the design.
20.Responsibility & Target Completion Date
- Enter the name of the organization and the individual responsible for evaluating
and implementing each recommended corrective action and the target completion
date.
18.RPN - Risk Priority Number
- The RPN is the product of the severity (S), occurrence (O), and detection (D)
rankings: (S) x (O) x (D) =RPN. The RPN is used to prioritize the risk related to
each failure mode and mechanism.
19.Recommended
Corrective Action.
- Engineering efforts for preventive/corrective action should be first directed at high
severity, high RPN, items identified by the team. The objective is to
recommended action that reduce severity, occurrence and detection risks rankings.
9 or 10 severity issues require special atte ntion to ensure that the risk is addressed
through design controls or preventive/c orrective action(s) regardless of the RPN
value. After special attention has been give n to severity rankings of 9 or 10, other
failure modes can then be addressed
The primary objective of recommended actions is to reduce risks AND increase
customer satisfaction by improving the design.
20.Responsibility & Target Completion Date
- Enter the name of the organization and the individual responsible for evaluating
and implementing each recommended corrective action and the target completion
date.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010FMEA Worksheet Sections
21.Action Taken
- After the recommended corrective action has been evaluated and implemented briefly
description the final outcome and effective date.
22.Corrective Action Results.
- After the preventive/corrective action has been identified, estimate and record the
revised resulting severity, occurrence, and detection rankings. Calculate and
record the resulting RPN. If no actions are taken, leave these columns blank.
All revised ratings should be reviewed. lf further action is considered necessary,
repeat the analysis. The focus should always be on continuous improvement.
The design-responsible engineer is respon sible for ensuring that all recommended
actions have been adequately addressed an d implemented. The FMEA is a living
document throughout the product development process and should always reflect
the latest design level and latest relevant .
21.Action Taken
- After the recommended corrective action has been evaluated and implemented briefly
description the final outcome and effective date.
22.Corrective Action Results.
- After the preventive/corrective action has been identified, estimate and record the
revised resulting severity, occurrence, and detection rankings. Calculate and
record the resulting RPN. If no actions are taken, leave these columns blank.
All revised ratings should be reviewed. lf further action is considered necessary,
repeat the analysis. The focus should always be on continuous improvement.
The design-responsible engineer is respon sible for ensuring that all recommended
actions have been adequately addressed an d implemented. The FMEA is a living
document throughout the product development process and should always reflect
the latest design level and latest relevant .
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
o
“Fill in the blanks” only.
o
Don’t understand the scope and objective of FMEA
o
Day dreaming
o
Didn’t go through the self-challenge process of design control
o
Couldn’t separate Failure Mode, Cause, Effect
o
Mixed everything together. Argument for the sake of
argument.
Common Mistakes and Traps
o
“Fill in the blanks” only.
o
Don’t understand the scope and objective of FMEA
o
Day dreaming
o
Didn’t go through the self-challenge process of design control
o
Couldn’t separate Failure Mode, Cause, Effect
o
Mixed everything together. Argument for the sake of
argument.
Common Mistakes and Traps
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
o
Repeated itself
o
Dog chases its own tail.
o
Mitigation is not truly challenged
o
Ranking criteria too loose
o
Only identifying the problems but not the solutions. Or, couldn’t
control it, even if there is a solution. Control plan not in place.
o
Do once, then keep in file
o
Leaving Document rather than Living Document
o
Lack of consistency
Common Mistakes and Traps
o
Repeated itself
o
Dog chases its own tail.
o
Mitigation is not truly challenged
o
Ranking criteria too loose
o
Only identifying the problems but not the solutions. Or, couldn’t
control it, even if there is a solution. Control plan not in place.
o
Do once, then keep in file
o
Leaving Document rather than Living Document
o
Lack of consistency
Common Mistakes and Traps
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
1.
Develop a sub-system or component by component system block diagram, mechanization or schematic of the device/system to be
analyzed.
2.
For each subsystem or component, identify and list the:
Potential Failure Modes(i.e. how failures might be observed or experienced)
and the Potential Effect(s) of the Failure
- Then rate their severityon a predetermine scale (typically 1-5 or 1-10)
where a low value indicates a low severity
3.
Identify Potential Cause(s) or Mechanisms of Failure for each Failure mode
- Then rate their potential probability or frequency of occurrenceon another
predetermine 1-5 or 1-10 scale.
4.
Identify the Design Controls, prognostics or Fail Safe features incorporated into design to detect, prevent and/or mitigate the failure
so that safety and/or hazardous conditions are adverted.
- Then rate the expected effectiveness of the design controlson another 1-5 or 1-10 scale.
5.
Calculate the risk factorfor each item by multiply the value of the Severity Scale by the Probability Scale & the Effectiveness
Scale values.
The risk factor value often called the Risk Priority Number (RPN)is then used to quantify, rank and access the risk of each
element and feature of the design as well as the overall design, where small RPN values indicate low risk and large values indi cate
higher risk.
- Different industry and companies have developed standards that def ined various evaluation scales and acceptable RPN values
related
to the criticality of their products.
6.
DFMEA PART 2:Once all the RPN values are determined for each aspect of the design. The FMEA team evaluates the over all
and individual risks of the design to determine if the design risks are acceptable or if failure risks are excessive and the de sign need
to be revised to reduce the failure risks. This leads to the second phase of the FMEA where Recommended Corrective
Action(s), Implementation Responsibility, & Target Co mpletion Date and define and tracked.
7.
DFMEA PART 3: As corrective actions are implemented the FMEA team reviews the corrective action revision and re-evaluates
the severity, probability and effectiveness of each revised design element and recalculates a new RPN base on the
improvements. If the risk is still not determined to be acceptable furthe r corrective action design revisions may be required.
- In this way the FMEA is used as a risk evaluation and control process throughout the design-development phase of a program and
used to evaluate if quality, reliability and safety was designed in to the product. The FMEA also serves to document that due
diligence
was applied for quality, reliability, safety and ri sk management during the design-development program.
8.
Another use for FMEA is that many companies will require a new project team to review older FMEA for similar products, at the st art
of a new project, so that the lessons learn in the past are iden tified and reused at the beginning of the design. In this way a new
project team should get started at a higher point on the l earning curve and not need to relearn past lessons on their own.
Basic Steps of a Modern, Traditional Hardware DFMEAs
1.
Develop a sub-system or component by component system block diagram, mechanization or schematic of the device/system to be
analyzed.
2.
For each subsystem or component, identify and list the:
Potential Failure Modes(i.e. how failures might be observed or experienced)
and the Potential Effect(s) of the Failure
- Then rate their severityon a predetermine scale (typically 1-5 or 1-10)
where a low value indicates a low severity
3.
Identify Potential Cause(s) or Mechanisms of Failure for each Failure mode
- Then rate their potential probability or frequency of occurrenceon another
predetermine 1-5 or 1-10 scale.
4.
Identify the Design Controls, prognostics or Fail Safe features incorporated into design to detect, prevent and/or mitigate the failure
so that safety and/or hazardous conditions are adverted.
- Then rate the expected effectiveness of the design controlson another 1-5 or 1-10 scale.
5.
Calculate the risk factorfor each item by multiply the value of the Severity Scale by the Probability Scale & the Effectiveness
Scale values.
The risk factor value often called the Risk Priority Number (RPN)is then used to quantify, rank and access the risk of each
element and feature of the design as well as the overall design, where small RPN values indicate low risk and large values indi cate
higher risk.
- Different industry and companies have developed standards that def ined various evaluation scales and acceptable RPN values
related
to the criticality of their products.
6.
DFMEA PART 2:Once all the RPN values are determined for each aspect of the design. The FMEA team evaluates the over all
and individual risks of the design to determine if the design risks are acceptable or if failure risks are excessive and the de sign need
to be revised to reduce the failure risks. This leads to the second phase of the FMEA where Recommended Corrective
Action(s), Implementation Responsibility, & Target Co mpletion Date and define and tracked.
7.
DFMEA PART 3: As corrective actions are implemented the FMEA team reviews the corrective action revision and re-evaluates
the severity, probability and effectiveness of each revised design element and recalculates a new RPN base on the
improvements. If the risk is still not determined to be acceptable furthe r corrective action design revisions may be required.
- In this way the FMEA is used as a risk evaluation and control process throughout the design-development phase of a program and
used to evaluate if quality, reliability and safety was designed in to the product. The FMEA also serves to document that due
diligence
was applied for quality, reliability, safety and ri sk management during the design-development program.
8.
Another use for FMEA is that many companies will require a new project team to review older FMEA for similar products, at the st art
of a new project, so that the lessons learn in the past are iden tified and reused at the beginning of the design. In this way a new
project team should get started at a higher point on the l earning curve and not need to relearn past lessons on their own.
Basic Steps of a Modern, Traditional Hardware DFMEAs
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
AUTOMOTIVE EXAMPLE SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA
Hazardous-
with
warning
Very High
High
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
warning
Low
Very Low
Minor
Very Minor
None
Very high severity ranking when a potentia l failure mode affects safe vehicle
operation and/or involves noncompliance w ith government regulation with warning
Vehicle/item inoperable (lo ss of primary function).
Vehicle/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very
dissatisfied.
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer
dissatisfied.
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced
level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied.
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most
customers (greater than 75%).
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of
customers.
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by
discriminating customers (less than 25%).
No discernable effect.
10
8
7
6
3
2
1
Hazardous-
without
warning
Moderate
4
5
EFFECT CRITERIA: Severity of Effect RNK .
SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA
9
AUTOMOTIVE EXAMPLE SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA
Hazardous-
with
warning
Very High
High
Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode affects safe vehicle
operation and/or involves noncompliance with government regulation without
warning
Low
Very Low
Minor
Very Minor
None
Very high severity ranking when a potentia l failure mode affects safe vehicle
operation and/or involves noncompliance w ith government regulation with warning
Vehicle/item inoperable (lo ss of primary function).
Vehicle/item operable but at a reduced level of performance. Customer very
dissatisfied.
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) inoperable. Customer
dissatisfied.
Vehicle/item operable but Comfort/Convenience item(s) operable at a reduced
level of performance. Customer somewhat dissatisfied.
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by most
customers (greater than 75%).
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by 50% of
customers.
Fit & Finish/Squeak & Rattle item does not conform. Defect noticed by
discriminating customers (less than 25%).
No discernable effect.
10
8
7
6
3
2
1
Hazardous-
without
warning
Moderate
4
5
EFFECT CRITERIA: Severity of Effect RNK .
SEVERITY EVALUATION CRITERIA
9
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010Occurrence Evaluation Criteria
*Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, O ccurrence or Detection are not allowed
Probability of Likely Fa ilure Rates Over Design Life Ra nking
Failure
SUGGESTED OCCURRENCE EVALUATION CRITERIA
Very High: Persistent failures
High: Frequent failures
Moderate: Occasional failures
Low: Relatively few failures
Remote: Failure is unlikely
100 per thousand vehicles/items
50 per thousand vehicles/items
20 per thousand vehicles/items
10 per thousand vehicles/items
5 per thousand vehicles/items
2 per thousand vehicles/items
1 per thousand vehicles/items
0.5 per thousand vehicles/items
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items
0.01 per thousand vehicles/items
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
*Note: Zero (0) rankings for Severity, O ccurrence or Detection are not allowed
Probability of Likely Fa ilure Rates Over Design Life Ra nking
Failure
SUGGESTED OCCURRENCE EVALUATION CRITERIA
Very High: Persistent failures
High: Frequent failures
Moderate: Occasional failures
Low: Relatively few failures
Remote: Failure is unlikely
100 per thousand vehicles/items
50 per thousand vehicles/items
20 per thousand vehicles/items
10 per thousand vehicles/items
5 per thousand vehicles/items
2 per thousand vehicles/items
1 per thousand vehicles/items
0.5 per thousand vehicles/items
0.1 per thousand vehicles/items
0.01 per thousand vehicles/items
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010Detection Rating
Absolute
Uncertainty
Very Remote
Remote
Very Low
Low
Moderate
Moderately
High
High
Very High
Almost
Certain
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Design Control will not and/or cannot de tect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode; or there is no
Design Control.
Very Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Very Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Moderately High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode.
Very High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Design Controls will almost certainly detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
DETECTION
SUGGESTED DETECTION EVALATION CRITERIA
CRITERIA R
NK
.
Absolute
Uncertainty
Very Remote
Remote
Very Low
Low
Moderate
Moderately
High
High
Very High
Almost
Certain
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Design Control will not and/or cannot de tect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode; or there is no
Design Control.
Very Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Remote chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Very Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Low chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Moderate chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Moderately High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/mechanism
and subsequent failure mode.
Very High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
High chance the Design Control will detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
Design Controls will almost certainly detect a potential cause/ mechanism and
subsequent failure mode.
DETECTION
SUGGESTED DETECTION EVALATION CRITERIA
CRITERIA R
NK
.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Questions & Discussion
Please feel free to contact me anytime for
questions!
[email protected]
www.dfrsolutions.com
Questions & Discussion
Please feel free to contact me anytime for
questions!
[email protected]
www.dfrsolutions.com
© 2004 – 2010
Your Partner Throughout
the Product Life Cycle DfR lends a guiding hand on quality, reliability and durability (QRD) issues
through our expertise in the emerging sc ience of Reliability Physics, providing
crucial insights and solutions early in product design, development and test
throughout manufacturing, and even into the field.
Your Partner Throughout
the Product Life Cycle DfR lends a guiding hand on quality, reliability and durability (QRD) issues
through our expertise in the emerging sc ience of Reliability Physics, providing
crucial insights and solutions early in product design, development and test
throughout manufacturing, and even into the field.
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Your
Needs…
o
…faster time to market
o
…find, incorporate new technologies
o
…extend warranty period
o
…reduce warranty costs
o
…technically manage suppliers
o
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o
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Your
Needs…
o
…faster time to market
o
…find, incorporate new technologies
o
…extend warranty period
o
…reduce warranty costs
o
…technically manage suppliers
o
…improve employee skills
o
…out perform your competition
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
…Our
Capabilities
o
DfR uses Physics-of-Failure (PoF) and Best
Practices expertise to provide knowledge-
based strategic quality and reliability solutions
to the electronics industry o
Technology Insertion
o
Design
o
Manufacturing and Supplier Selection
o
Product Validation and Accelerated Testing
o
Root-Cause Failure Analysis & Forensics Engineering
o
Unique combination of expert consultants and
state-of-the-art laboratory facilities o
Capabilities at package, board, product, and system-
level
…Our
Capabilities
o
DfR uses Physics-of-Failure (PoF) and Best
Practices expertise to provide knowledge-
based strategic quality and reliability solutions
to the electronics industry o
Technology Insertion
o
Design
o
Manufacturing and Supplier Selection
o
Product Validation and Accelerated Testing
o
Root-Cause Failure Analysis & Forensics Engineering
o
Unique combination of expert consultants and
state-of-the-art laboratory facilities o
Capabilities at package, board, product, and system-
level
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
How Do
Companies
Use DfR?
o
Work overflow o
Maximize the efficiency of your current staff
o
Independent party on critical design reviews
o
Supplier benchmarking (commodity / custom)
o
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o
Reliability predictions
o
Root-Cause Analysis
o
Continuing education
How Do
Companies
Use DfR?
o
Work overflow o
Maximize the efficiency of your current staff
o
Independent party on critical design reviews
o
Supplier benchmarking (commodity / custom)
o
Test plan development and execution
o
Reliability predictions
o
Root-Cause Analysis
o
Continuing education
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Who Uses
DfR?
Military / Avionics / Space Enterprise / Telecom / ATE Consumer / Appliance Industrial / Power
Lockheed Martin Cisco Systems Dell Computers General Electric
Northrop Grumman Huawei Hewlett Packard Siemens
Boeing Sun Microsystems Apple Emerson Electric
General Dynamics Motorola Fujitsu Schlumberger
BAE Systems Alcatel-Lucent Samsung Ingersoll Rand
Honeywell Juniper Networks LG Electronics Danaher Motion
Hamilton Sundstrand KLA-Tencor Microsoft Olympus
Rockwell Collins Xerox Tyco Electronics
Auto / Transportation
GovernmentGeneral MotorsPortablesMedical
NAVAIR Caterpillar LG ElectronicsPhilips Medical
NASA Panasonic Automotive Kyocera Medtronic
Air Force TRW Boston Scientific
MagnaComponents Cardinal Health
Contract Manufacturers Takata Samsung Beckman Coulter
Flextronics Fairchild Semiconductor Biotronik
Benchmark ElectronicsMaterials International Rectifier Cameron Health
Jabil Graftech Nvidia Cardiac Science
Gold Circuit Electronics Nihon Superior Amphenol Zoll Medical
Viasystems NIC
Who Uses
DfR?
Military / Avionics / Space Enterprise / Telecom / ATE Consumer / Appliance Industrial / Power
Lockheed Martin Cisco Systems Dell Computers General Electric
Northrop Grumman Huawei Hewlett Packard Siemens
Boeing Sun Microsystems Apple Emerson Electric
General Dynamics Motorola Fujitsu Schlumberger
BAE Systems Alcatel-Lucent Samsung Ingersoll Rand
Honeywell Juniper Networks LG Electronics Danaher Motion
Hamilton Sundstrand KLA-Tencor Microsoft Olympus
Rockwell Collins Xerox Tyco Electronics
Auto / Transportation
GovernmentGeneral MotorsPortablesMedical
NAVAIR Caterpillar LG ElectronicsPhilips Medical
NASA Panasonic Automotive Kyocera Medtronic
Air Force TRW Boston Scientific
MagnaComponents Cardinal Health
Contract Manufacturers Takata Samsung Beckman Coulter
Flextronics Fairchild Semiconductor Biotronik
Benchmark ElectronicsMaterials International Rectifier Cameron Health
Jabil Graftech Nvidia Cardiac Science
Gold Circuit Electronics Nihon Superior Amphenol Zoll Medical
Viasystems NIC
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
DfR
Solutions –
Senior
Experts
o
Dr. Craig Hillman, CEO and Managing Partner
o
Expertise: Design for Reliability (DfR), Pb-free
Transition, Supplier Benchmarking, Passive
Components, Printed Circuit Board
o
PhD, Material Science (UCSB)
o
Dr. Nathan Blattau, Vice President
o
Expertise: Power Devices, DfR, Nonlinear Finite
Element Analysis (FEA), Solder Joint Reliability, Fracture, Fatigue Mechanics.
o
PhD, Mechanical Eng. (University of Maryland)
o
Cheryl Tulkoff, CRE
o
Expertise: Pb-Free Transition, PCB and PCBA Fabrication, IC Fabrication, RCA (8D and Red X)
o
B.S., Mechanical Engineering (Georgia Tech)
o
Dr. Ron Wunderlich
o
Expertise: Design for EMI/EMC, Power Supply Design, Analog Circuit Design, Spice Model Development, Monte Carlo Circuit Simulation
o
PhD, Electrical Engineering (SUNY – Binghamton)
o
Greg Caswell
o
Expertise: Nanotechnology CMOS, CMOS/SOS, Input Protection Networks / ESD, SMT, Pb-free
o
B.S., Electrical Engineering (Rutgers)
o
Dr. Randy Schueller
o
Expertise: IC Fabrication, IC Packaging, Pb-Free Transition Activities, Supplier Benchmarking,
Corrosion Mechanisms
o
PhD, Material Science (University of Virginia)
o
Dr. Gregg Kittlesen
o
Expertise: Semiconductor Lasers, Microprocessors,
Memory Components, Photonic and RF Technologies, Supply Chain Management
o
PhD, Inorganic Chemistry (MIT)
o
James McLeish, CRE
o
Expertise: FMEA, Root-Cause Analysis, Warranty Analysis, Automotive Electronics, Physics of Failure, Battery Technology
o
M.S., Electrical Eng. (Wayne State University)
o
Norm Anderson
o
Expertise: Avionics, Product Qualification, Safety Criticality Assessment, FTA, FMEA, Component Uprating, Obsolescence
o
B.S., Electrical Engineering (Iowa State University)
o
Anne Marie Neufelder
o
Expertise: Software Reliability Prediction, Best Practices in Software Risk Management
o
B.S., Systems Engineering (Georgia Tech)
o
Walt Tomczykowski, Vice President, CRE
o
Expertise: Systems Eng., Life Cycle Management (including obsolescence), Spares Analysis, Counterfeit Mitigation, Failure Analysis
o
M.S., Reliability Eng. (University of Maryland)
DfR
Solutions –
Senior
Experts
o
Dr. Craig Hillman, CEO and Managing Partner
o
Expertise: Design for Reliability (DfR), Pb-free
Transition, Supplier Benchmarking, Passive
Components, Printed Circuit Board
o
PhD, Material Science (UCSB)
o
Dr. Nathan Blattau, Vice President
o
Expertise: Power Devices, DfR, Nonlinear Finite
Element Analysis (FEA), Solder Joint Reliability, Fracture, Fatigue Mechanics.
o
PhD, Mechanical Eng. (University of Maryland)
o
Cheryl Tulkoff, CRE
o
Expertise: Pb-Free Transition, PCB and PCBA Fabrication, IC Fabrication, RCA (8D and Red X)
o
B.S., Mechanical Engineering (Georgia Tech)
o
Dr. Ron Wunderlich
o
Expertise: Design for EMI/EMC, Power Supply Design, Analog Circuit Design, Spice Model Development, Monte Carlo Circuit Simulation
o
PhD, Electrical Engineering (SUNY – Binghamton)
o
Greg Caswell
o
Expertise: Nanotechnology CMOS, CMOS/SOS, Input Protection Networks / ESD, SMT, Pb-free
o
B.S., Electrical Engineering (Rutgers)
o
Dr. Randy Schueller
o
Expertise: IC Fabrication, IC Packaging, Pb-Free Transition Activities, Supplier Benchmarking,
Corrosion Mechanisms
o
PhD, Material Science (University of Virginia)
o
Dr. Gregg Kittlesen
o
Expertise: Semiconductor Lasers, Microprocessors,
Memory Components, Photonic and RF Technologies, Supply Chain Management
o
PhD, Inorganic Chemistry (MIT)
o
James McLeish, CRE
o
Expertise: FMEA, Root-Cause Analysis, Warranty Analysis, Automotive Electronics, Physics of Failure, Battery Technology
o
M.S., Electrical Eng. (Wayne State University)
o
Norm Anderson
o
Expertise: Avionics, Product Qualification, Safety Criticality Assessment, FTA, FMEA, Component Uprating, Obsolescence
o
B.S., Electrical Engineering (Iowa State University)
o
Anne Marie Neufelder
o
Expertise: Software Reliability Prediction, Best Practices in Software Risk Management
o
B.S., Systems Engineering (Georgia Tech)
o
Walt Tomczykowski, Vice President, CRE
o
Expertise: Systems Eng., Life Cycle Management (including obsolescence), Spares Analysis, Counterfeit Mitigation, Failure Analysis
o
M.S., Reliability Eng. (University of Maryland)
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
DfR
Locations
(North
America)
Austin, TX
512-913-8624
Rochester Hills, MI
248-726-7600
Binghamton, NY
607-754-0347
Minneapolis, MN
320-433-4075
Corporate Headquarters
College Park, MD
301-474-0607
DfR
Locations
(North
America)
Austin, TX
512-913-8624
Rochester Hills, MI
248-726-7600
Binghamton, NY
607-754-0347
Minneapolis, MN
320-433-4075
Corporate Headquarters
College Park, MD
301-474-0607
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
DfR
Resources
and
Equipment
Electrical o
Oscilloscopes (Digital and Analog)
o
Curve Tracers (Digital and Analog)
o
Capacitance Meters
o
Low/High Resistance Meters
o
High Voltage Power Supplies (Hi-Pot)
o
Network Analyzer (up to 3 GHz)
Testing
o
HALT / HASS
o
Temperature Cycling
o
Thermal Shock
o
Temperature/Humidity
o
Vibration
o
Mechanical Shock / Drop Tower
o
Mixed Flowing Gas
o
Salt Spray
o
Capacitor Testing (Ripple Current,
Step Stress, Partial Discharge)
o
Bend Testing (Cyclic and Overstress)
o
Mechanical Testing
Material Analysis
o
X-ray
o
Acoustic Microscopy
o
Infrared Camera
o
Metallographic Preparation
o
Stereoscope
o
Optical Microscope
o
Scanning Electron Microscope
o
Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy
o
Ion Chromatography
o
FTIR (Solid / Film / Liquid)
o
Thermomechanical Analyzer
o
Mechanical Testing (Tension,
Compression, Shear, etc.)
o
SQUID Microscopy
Other
o
Circuit Simulation
o
Finite Element Analysis (FEA)
o
Computational Fluid Dynamics
o
Reliability Prediction (Physics of
Failure)
DfR
Resources
and
Equipment
Electrical o
Oscilloscopes (Digital and Analog)
o
Curve Tracers (Digital and Analog)
o
Capacitance Meters
o
Low/High Resistance Meters
o
High Voltage Power Supplies (Hi-Pot)
o
Network Analyzer (up to 3 GHz)
Testing
o
HALT / HASS
o
Temperature Cycling
o
Thermal Shock
o
Temperature/Humidity
o
Vibration
o
Mechanical Shock / Drop Tower
o
Mixed Flowing Gas
o
Salt Spray
o
Capacitor Testing (Ripple Current,
Step Stress, Partial Discharge)
o
Bend Testing (Cyclic and Overstress)
o
Mechanical Testing
Material Analysis
o
X-ray
o
Acoustic Microscopy
o
Infrared Camera
o
Metallographic Preparation
o
Stereoscope
o
Optical Microscope
o
Scanning Electron Microscope
o
Energy Dispersive Spectroscopy
o
Ion Chromatography
o
FTIR (Solid / Film / Liquid)
o
Thermomechanical Analyzer
o
Mechanical Testing (Tension,
Compression, Shear, etc.)
o
SQUID Microscopy
Other
o
Circuit Simulation
o
Finite Element Analysis (FEA)
o
Computational Fluid Dynamics
o
Reliability Prediction (Physics of
Failure)
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
DfR –
Software
Solutions
o
DfR has developed a revolutionary tool
that allows for an early-stage
assessment of hardware design o
Easy-to-use + Comprehensive
o
Identification of high risk design elements
o
Tradeoff analysis
o
Faster time-to-market through guarantee of
test success
o
Physics-based reliability prediction
o
Warranty reduction
DfR –
Software
Solutions
o
DfR has developed a revolutionary tool
that allows for an early-stage
assessment of hardware design o
Easy-to-use + Comprehensive
o
Identification of high risk design elements
o
Tradeoff analysis
o
Faster time-to-market through guarantee of
test success
o
Physics-based reliability prediction
o
Warranty reduction
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
DfX –A
Software
Solution
DfX –A
Software
Solution
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Tech
Insertion:
Integrated
Circuit
Wearout
o
Working with companies across the electronic
supply chain to develop an online solution
”The notion that a transistor ages is a new concept for circuit designers,” …
aging has traditionally been the bailiwick of engineers who guarantee the
transistor will operate for 10 years or so …But as transistors are scaled down
further and operated with thinner volt age margins, it’s becoming harder to
make those guarantees… transistor aging is emerging as a circuit designer’s
problem.
IEEE Spectrum, June 2009
1995 20052015
0.1
1.0
10
100
1000
Service life, yrs.
Computer, cell phone requirements
Hi-Rel requirements
500 250 130 65 35
Semiconductor lifetimes Semiconductor Feature Size, nm
Tech
Insertion:
Integrated
Circuit
Wearout
o
Working with companies across the electronic
supply chain to develop an online solution
”The notion that a transistor ages is a new concept for circuit designers,” …
aging has traditionally been the bailiwick of engineers who guarantee the
transistor will operate for 10 years or so …But as transistors are scaled down
further and operated with thinner volt age margins, it’s becoming harder to
make those guarantees… transistor aging is emerging as a circuit designer’s
problem.
IEEE Spectrum, June 2009
1995 20052015
0.1
1.0
10
100
1000
Service life, yrs.
Computer, cell phone requirements
Hi-Rel requirements
500 250 130 65 35
Semiconductor lifetimes Semiconductor Feature Size, nm
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
IC Wearout
–Value
Proposition
o
Tradeoff studies
o
Reliability
predictions
o
System
prognostics and
self-healing
o
Supplier
engagement
IC Wearout
–Value
Proposition
o
Tradeoff studies
o
Reliability
predictions
o
System
prognostics and
self-healing
o
Supplier
engagement
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
DfR Design
Assessment
Tool
o
Meets current market needs, including o
Accelerates time-to-market through earlier
and more robust analysis
o
Mitigates risk in move to environmentally
friendly materials
o
Effectively manages the original design
manufacturer (ODM) supply chain
o
Meets new requirements from end-users and
regulators for knowledge based assessment
DfR Design
Assessment
Tool
o
Meets current market needs, including o
Accelerates time-to-market through earlier
and more robust analysis
o
Mitigates risk in move to environmentally
friendly materials
o
Effectively manages the original design
manufacturer (ODM) supply chain
o
Meets new requirements from end-users and
regulators for knowledge based assessment
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Tech
Insertion: 2
nd
Gen Solder
Testing
o
Major solder manufacturer needed to demonstrate reliability
of 2
nd
generation Pb-free alloy
o
DfR provided a turn-key solution o
Test plan development
o
Test coupon design
o
Test execution
o
Failure analysis
o
Solder reliability model
o
Results o
Developed new test technology
to meet schedule and cost
constraints
o
Online calculators now
available for customers
world-wide
Tech
Insertion: 2
nd
Gen Solder
Testing
o
Major solder manufacturer needed to demonstrate reliability
of 2
nd
generation Pb-free alloy
o
DfR provided a turn-key solution o
Test plan development
o
Test coupon design
o
Test execution
o
Failure analysis
o
Solder reliability model
o
Results o
Developed new test technology
to meet schedule and cost
constraints
o
Online calculators now
available for customers
world-wide
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Design:
Component
Packaging
o
DfR has assisted numerous component manufacturers and
OEMs in ensuring robustness of existing and future
packaging solutions
o
Expertise o
1
st
Level Interconnects
(Solder Bumps / Wire Bonds)
o
Underfill Selection and Validation
o
Substrate / RDL
o
Design for Manufacturability
(Package Level)
o
Physics of Failure (PoF) Reliability Prediction
o
Finite Element Analysis (FEA)
o
Focus o
Flip Chip / Ball Grid Array
o
Bottom Terminated Components
o
Stacked Die / System in Package (SiP)
Design:
Component
Packaging
o
DfR has assisted numerous component manufacturers and
OEMs in ensuring robustness of existing and future
packaging solutions
o
Expertise o
1
st
Level Interconnects
(Solder Bumps / Wire Bonds)
o
Underfill Selection and Validation
o
Substrate / RDL
o
Design for Manufacturability
(Package Level)
o
Physics of Failure (PoF) Reliability Prediction
o
Finite Element Analysis (FEA)
o
Focus o
Flip Chip / Ball Grid Array
o
Bottom Terminated Components
o
Stacked Die / System in Package (SiP)
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Design:
Circuit Board
Level
o
DfR uses industry-leading design for excellence (DfX)
practices to optimize design and ensure success early in new
product development (NPD)
o
Expertise o
Circuit Analysis
o
Power Supply Design
o
Design for Reliability
o
Design for Manufacturability
o
Design for Testability
o
Design for Environment
o
Physics of Failure (PoF) Reliability Prediction
o
Finite Element Analysis (FEA)
o
Focus o
Semiconductor Packaging
o
Printed Circuit Board
o
Circuit Card Assemblies
o
Product and System-Level
Design:
Circuit Board
Level
o
DfR uses industry-leading design for excellence (DfX)
practices to optimize design and ensure success early in new
product development (NPD)
o
Expertise o
Circuit Analysis
o
Power Supply Design
o
Design for Reliability
o
Design for Manufacturability
o
Design for Testability
o
Design for Environment
o
Physics of Failure (PoF) Reliability Prediction
o
Finite Element Analysis (FEA)
o
Focus o
Semiconductor Packaging
o
Printed Circuit Board
o
Circuit Card Assemblies
o
Product and System-Level
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Supplier
Assessment
(Approach)
o
DfR offers multiple solution paths for ensuring
a quality supply chain. o
Each solution is specifically tailored to each
company’s production volume, design complexity,
and cost requirements
o
Approaches include o
Component-Level Testing
o
Development of Supplier Qualification Documents
o
Supplier Evaluations (Component, Board, Assembly)
o
Construction Analysis
o
Statistical Process Control Evaluations
Supplier
Assessment
(Approach)
o
DfR offers multiple solution paths for ensuring
a quality supply chain. o
Each solution is specifically tailored to each
company’s production volume, design complexity,
and cost requirements
o
Approaches include o
Component-Level Testing
o
Development of Supplier Qualification Documents
o
Supplier Evaluations (Component, Board, Assembly)
o
Construction Analysis
o
Statistical Process Control Evaluations
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Supply
Chain:
Component
Qualification
o
Working with major electronic OEMs on
benchmarking suppliers of critical components
o
Actions include o
Developing test
plans
o
Characterizing time
to failure behavior
o
Developing
qualification
criteria based on test results
Supply
Chain:
Component
Qualification
o
Working with major electronic OEMs on
benchmarking suppliers of critical components
o
Actions include o
Developing test
plans
o
Characterizing time
to failure behavior
o
Developing
qualification
criteria based on test results
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Testing: Test
Plan
Development
o
Product test plans are critical to th e success of a new product or technology o
Stressful enough to identify defects
o
Show correlation to a realistic environment
o
DfR Solutions approach o
Industry Standards + Physics of Failure
o
Results in an optimized test plan that is acceptable
to management and customers
o
Experience in product test plans include o
Industrial controls
o
Process monitoring
o
Consumer appliances
o
Telecom (Class I, II, and III environments)
o
Personal computers
o
Mobile phones and other mobile products
o
Avionics (engine controls, fuselage)
o
Automotive (under-hood, passenger
compartment, chassis, and trunk)
o
Down-hole oil-drilling
Month
Cycles/Year
Ramp
Dwell
Max
Temp
(ºC)
Min
Temp
(ºC)
T
Cycles per Day
AF
Jan+Feb+Dec 90 6 hrs 6 hrs 30 5 25 1 12.654
Mar+Nov 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 35 10 25 1 11.799
Apr+Oct 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 40 15 25 1 10.944 May+Sep 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 45 20 25 1 10.26
Jun+Jul+Aug 90 6 hrs 6 hrs 50 25 25 1 9.576
Operational 16.6 5 min 3 hrs 25 -40 65 1 2.223
ALT Plan Approval
Start
Manufacture
Qualification and
RGT Units
Pass Qual?
N
Y
Finish
Perform Qual
Failure Analysis /
Repairs
Order SRT Units
Perform RGT
Perform SRT
Perform Updates
on SRT Units
Submit Final
Report
Update SRT
Units?
N
Y
Update RGT
units? Perform Updates
on RGT Units
Y
N
Limited Re-
qualification?
N
Order Limited Re-
qual units and
Perform Limited
Re-qualification
Pass Limited
Re-qual?
Failure Analysis /
Repairs
ALT Objective
Met?
Y
N
Y
Y
Request Guidance
from GD
N
Testing: Test
Plan
Development
o
Product test plans are critical to th e success of a new product or technology o
Stressful enough to identify defects
o
Show correlation to a realistic environment
o
DfR Solutions approach o
Industry Standards + Physics of Failure
o
Results in an optimized test plan that is acceptable
to management and customers
o
Experience in product test plans include o
Industrial controls
o
Process monitoring
o
Consumer appliances
o
Telecom (Class I, II, and III environments)
o
Personal computers
o
Mobile phones and other mobile products
o
Avionics (engine controls, fuselage)
o
Automotive (under-hood, passenger
compartment, chassis, and trunk)
o
Down-hole oil-drilling
Month
Cycles/Year
Ramp
Dwell
Max
Temp
(ºC)
Min
Temp
(ºC)
T
Cycles per Day
AF
Jan+Feb+Dec 90 6 hrs 6 hrs 30 5 25 1 12.654
Mar+Nov 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 35 10 25 1 11.799
Apr+Oct 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 40 15 25 1 10.944 May+Sep 60 6 hrs 6 hrs 45 20 25 1 10.26
Jun+Jul+Aug 90 6 hrs 6 hrs 50 25 25 1 9.576
Operational 16.6 5 min 3 hrs 25 -40 65 1 2.223
ALT Plan Approval
Start
Manufacture
Qualification and
RGT Units
Pass Qual?
N
Y
Finish
Perform Qual
Failure Analysis /
Repairs
Order SRT Units
Perform RGT
Perform SRT
Perform Updates
on SRT Units
Submit Final
Report
Update SRT
Units?
N
Y
Update RGT
units? Perform Updates
on RGT Units
Y
N
Limited Re-
qualification?
N
Order Limited Re-
qual units and
Perform Limited
Re-qualification
Pass Limited
Re-qual?
Failure Analysis /
Repairs
ALT Objective
Met?
Y
N
Y
Y
Request Guidance
from GD
N
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Root Cause
Analysis
(RCA) --
Personnel
o
The number one requirement in failure
analysis
o
DfR has all the necessary elements o
Electrical engineers, mechanical engineers,
materials scientists, inorganic chemists, etc.
o
Extensive in-house expertise o
PhD, MS, BS + industry experience
o
The right background o
Over 800 failure analyses combined
Root Cause
Analysis
(RCA) --
Personnel
o
The number one requirement in failure
analysis
o
DfR has all the necessary elements o
Electrical engineers, mechanical engineers,
materials scientists, inorganic chemists, etc.
o
Extensive in-house expertise o
PhD, MS, BS + industry experience
o
The right background o
Over 800 failure analyses combined
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Failure
Analysis:
Desktop
Computer
o
Failures during HALT o
Exposure to vibration
o
Electrical testing indicated
electrical open o
Under BGA socket
o
Validity of failure mechanism? o
Shearing of electrolytic
capacitor leads
o
Dependent upon orientation
of capacitors o
Only those along the board length
o
Vibration test may not have
applied random loads o
Potential issues with vibration table or fixturing
Failure
Analysis:
Desktop
Computer
o
Failures during HALT o
Exposure to vibration
o
Electrical testing indicated
electrical open o
Under BGA socket
o
Validity of failure mechanism? o
Shearing of electrolytic
capacitor leads
o
Dependent upon orientation
of capacitors o
Only those along the board length
o
Vibration test may not have
applied random loads o
Potential issues with vibration table or fixturing
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
On-Die
RCA
o
Wireless and telecom component manufacturer o
Issues with new silicon nitride technology in MIMCAP structure
o
Halted multi-million dollar product launch
o
Identified potential root
causes based on o
Knowledge of semiconductor
process technology
o
Fundamental behavior of
the material
o
Recommended experimental
design and analytical
techniques to confirm failure
mechanism o
Guided modification in process
parameters for fundamentally
more robust technology
Metal 2 Bridge
Nitride 2
Nitride 1
Standard dual nitride layer MIMCAP
On-Die
RCA
o
Wireless and telecom component manufacturer o
Issues with new silicon nitride technology in MIMCAP structure
o
Halted multi-million dollar product launch
o
Identified potential root
causes based on o
Knowledge of semiconductor
process technology
o
Fundamental behavior of
the material
o
Recommended experimental
design and analytical
techniques to confirm failure
mechanism o
Guided modification in process
parameters for fundamentally
more robust technology
Metal 2 Bridge
Nitride 2
Nitride 1
Standard dual nitride layer MIMCAP
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Knowledge
and
Education
(Website)
o
Let your staff learn
all day / every day
E-LEARNING
o
Scholarly articles
o
Technical white
papers
o
Case studies
o
Reliability
calculators
o
Online
presentations
Knowledge
and
Education
(Website)
o
Let your staff learn
all day / every day
E-LEARNING
o
Scholarly articles
o
Technical white
papers
o
Case studies
o
Reliability
calculators
o
Online
presentations
© 2004 - 2007 © 2004 - 2010
Interested?
o
Could your next product benefit from DfR’s
extensive expertise and PoF knowledge base? o
Bring us in as an independent party during critical design
reviews
o
Are your concerned with new technologies? o
DfR’s scientists and engineers can provide comprehensive
analysis to ensure risk-minimization during these difficult
transitions
o
Take advantage of our unique Open-Doorpolicy!
o
See how much we already know about your current issues
o
Chances are we have already solved your problem at least once before
o
We work around the clock and around the world
o
Contact us by phone (301-474-0607) or email ([email protected])
Interested?
o
Could your next product benefit from DfR’s
extensive expertise and PoF knowledge base? o
Bring us in as an independent party during critical design
reviews
o
Are your concerned with new technologies? o
DfR’s scientists and engineers can provide comprehensive
analysis to ensure risk-minimization during these difficult
transitions
o
Take advantage of our unique Open-Doorpolicy!
o
See how much we already know about your current issues
o
Chances are we have already solved your problem at least once before
o
We work around the clock and around the world
o
Contact us by phone (301-474-0607) or email ([email protected])
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