Foresight and the Disasters of the Future

Context, foresight and disaster management. Complexity, cascading disasters, intersecting disasters.

1. Prof. David Alexander
FORESIGHT AND THE
DISASTERS OF THE FUTURE
Tōhoku University

2. We live in an
increasingly
precarious and
uncertain world.

3. In disaster risk reduction the past is no
longer a reliable guide to the future.

4. Report of the Midterm Review of the Implementation of the
Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030
"However, at the midpoint of the implementation of the
2015 agreements, progress has stalled and, in some
cases, reversed. This has resulted not only from the
impact of the Covid-19 pandemic, but also from
short- versus long-termism, weakened multilateralism,
disconnects between the real and the financial
economies, rising inequality, and barriers between risk
science, perception and risk-informed decision-making."
Mami Mizutori
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction
Head of the United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction

5. Objective:
to provide a [relatively]
simple means of
understanding,
classifying and
analysing the complexity
of disaster impacts
in a modern, networked
society

6. Caesar Augustus
(63 BC –AD 14)
"The more complex a
problem, the simpler the
solution should be."

7. H.L. Mencken
(1880-1956)
"For every complex
problem, there is an
answer that is clear,
simple, and wrong."

8. H.L. Mencken
(1880-1956)
"A professor must have
a theory as a dog must
have fleas."

9. If you want to understand disasters,
you have to understand their
•context
•complexity
•cascading consequences
•future trends and tendencies

10. COMPLEXITY
DISASTERS
CLIMATE CHANGE
ADAPTATION
DIGITAL
INSECURITY
CASCADING
CONSEQUENCES
INTERSECTING
EVENTS
CHANGE
CONTEXT

11. Root
causes
VulnerabilityHazard
Risk Impact
context
Threat

12. We can define 'context' as the social,
economic, cultural, psychological and
environmental milieu that surrounds disaster
risk and to some degree interacts with it. If
necessary, we can disaggregate different types
of context. However, overall, context should be
considered as the sum of elements that have
no direct causal relationship with disaster but,
paradoxically, are (or should be) essential to
any attempt to explain it.

13. The "egg hypothesis" Disaster
•vulnerabilities
•prima facie causes
•dynamic pressures
•root causes
Context
•general vulnerability
•poverty
•deprivation
•marginalisation
•discrimination

14. HAZARD or
THREAT
SPECIFIC
VULNERABILITY
HUMAN
CONSEQUENCES
The 'hazardscape' or
the 'risk landscape'
WEAKENING of the
SOCIAL FABRIC
GENERAL
VULNERABILITY
HUMAN
CONSEQUENCES
The 'wreckage
economy'
Health
Employment
Services
•reduced
•rationed
•overpriced

15. Example: If your hospitals
have no surge capacity, you
cannot deal effectively with a
sudden large influx of patients.

16. INTERSECTIONALITY
SOVEREIGNTY DEMOCRACY
MOBILITY IDENTITY
HUMAN RIGHTS LEGALITY
ENTITLEMENT
ANTI-
CORRUPTION
WELFARE
COMPLEX DISASTERS

17. Intersectionality - borrowed (with
apologies) from studies of gender,
race and culture
Intersection of:
•forms of disaster causality
•different kinds of disaster and crisis
•disaster and its context
•disaster and social circumstances

18. INTERSECTIONALITY:
An exceptionally high sensitivity to political
decisions, especially those with direct
operational consequences.

19. COMPLEXITY

20. Eyjafjallajökull eruption affected:
•the cut rose industry
•symphony orchestras
•bone-marrow transplants
•aviation company share prices
•hotel room availability
•atmospheric modelling
•overcrowding levels at railway stations
•pricing of transportation and accommodation
•modal split (use of various transportation modes)
•taxi fares
•battle training
•atmospheric CO2 and SO2 levels - and much more

21. When we make risk registers we
tend to look at risks (i.e.,
hazards, threats) singly. They
don't occur alone, they occur in
groups and assemblages.
Hence the importance
to planning of scenarios

22. RISK
Cascading risk
tightly-coupled systems
and critical infrastructure
Compound risk
multiple
extreme events
Interacting risk
environmental
drivers
Interconnected risk
interdependent
natural, human and
technological
systems
Composite risk
any and all?
COMPLEXITY

23. In the modern world, disaster risks are:-
•cascading
•cross-sectoral
•concurrent
•compound
•interconnected
•interacting
•systemic

24. CASCADING
DISASTERS

25. Cascading disasters:-
•topping dominoes, knock-on effects
•compound and interconnected risks
•linked physical and social
vulnerabilities
•non-linear progress
•amplification of risks
•multiple scales
•secondary risks

26. Escalation
Vulnerability
scenarios
Risk
scenario
Primary
impact
Secondary
impacts
Cascade
path
Cascade
path
Hazard
event(s)
After Nones & Pescaroli 2016, Pescaroli & Nones 2016
Interaction
between
vulnerabilities
Legislation
Management
Time-space
transitions

27. Primary
cause of
disaster
Impact on
critical
infrastructure
Impact on
housing
Impact on
productive
capacity
Direct
impacts
Indirect
impacts
Impact on
activities
Secondary
impacts
Impact on
livelihoods
Impact on
revenue
Secondary
cause of
disaster
Impact on
well-being
Impact on
safety
Impact on
recovery

28. Critical infrastructure
complex, multi-dimensional networks:
chain effects with escalation points

29. Critical infrastructure is the main
vehicle by which disasters
produce cascading impacts. To a greater
or lesser extent, all modern disasters are
cascading events.
If you want to understand the
risks to critical infrastructure, you
need to understand all four of its
dimensions: physical, technological,
cyber and social.

30. CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE
Technological
component
Social
component
Cyber
space
Physical
space

31. Direct causes:
practical problems
contributing to disaster
Long-term causes
(dynamic pressures):
predisposition
to create disaster
Root causes:
motivating and
underlying factors
Local
cascading
effects
National
cascading
effects
International
cascading
effects
Escalation
factors
Context

32. FORESIGHT:
present trends,
future tendencies

33. We need to exercise foresight:-
•greater magnitude and frequency of
meteorological events (climate change)
•proliferating technological failure
•unplanned mass migration
•exceptionally large geophysical events
•intersection of conflict (or other
agents) and disasters
•emerging hazards and threats

34. There are at least 35 possible foresight methodologies, e.g.:-
•Wild cards / Weak signals (WiWe)
•Scenario formulation
•Counterfactual analysis
•Expert panels
•Interviews
•Literature reviews
•Relevance trees / Logic charts
•Scanning
•Surveys
•Strengths - Weaknesses - Opportunities - Threats (SWOT)
•"Red teaming" (destructive criticism)

35. Perceived
reality
Objective
reality
"Manufactured"
reality*
perceptions, leading to
opinions and actions
*the collective result of the public's choices

36. It's reality, not because it's true,
but because people believe it.

37. Cyber crime
(illegal activity)
deception
theft
Digital terrorism
(sabotage)
computer viruses
ransomware
Digital influence
(subversion)
spreading
false
information
Digital extremism
(on-line intervention)
conspiracy theories
character assassination
incitement to violence
MISUSE OF
THE INTERNET
AND SOCIAL
MEDIA

38. SCENARIO
DEVELOPMENT
Worst case
Envelope of outcomes
Best case
'upward'
counter-factual
analysis
'downward'
counter-factual
analysis
EMERGENCY
PLAN
incorporation
of scenario
into plan
stress test
of plan
systems
methodology
data and basic
information
emergency
simulation
- desktop
- command post
- field exercise
consider
practicalities
FORESIGHT
FORESIGHT

39. RESILIENCE

40. RESILIENCE:the ability
to overcomethe impacts
of large, negative events
[by a combinationof
resistanceand adaptation].
Not the onlydefinition, notexclusive, not
comprehensive, and notincontestable.

41. Resilience:-
•is it an objective, a process or
a strategy?
•does it mean 'bounce-back' or
'bounce-forward’?
•on whatscale shoulditfocus –
thatof the community?

42. Is resilience an illusion?
It relies on the concept of homeostasis,
the innate tendency of a system to seek
equilibrium, whatever the shocks
applied to it.
In disaster risk reduction, we have no
equilibrium.

43. CONCLUSIONS

44. The future will not be the same as
the past, but the lessons of the past
will still be perfectly valid.
Safeguarding citizens will require
massive investments and a much
more serious approach.

45. Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky 1988.
Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy
of the Mass Media. Pantheon Books, New York.
Central question:-
What is the value and impact of good,
‘hard’ scientific information in a
[digital] age of relativism, extremism
and a lack of clear morality?

46. Summary:-
•understand how context conditions
preparedness for disasters
•understand changes in context
•foresee possible future challenges
•use rigorous methods to plan for them
•ensure plans are realistic ways of
optimising the use of available
resources

47. Thank you
for
listening!
[email protected]
Driving
the agenda
forward
in disaster risk
reduction.