10
CHAPTER
Market design
✩
Nikhil Agarwal
a,b
and Eric Budish
c,b,∗
a
MIT Department of Economics, Cambridge, MA, United States
b
NBER, Cambridge, MA, United States
c
University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Chicago, IL, United States
∗
Corresponding author: e-mail address:
[email protected]
CONTENTS
1Introduction........................................................................................2
2Theoretical framework...........................................................................6
2.1Taxonomy of market design problems............................................ 8
2.1.1Matching or allocation?...........................................................8
2.1.2Transferable utility or non-transferable utility?...............................9
2.1.3Single-unit vs. multi-unit demand?.............................................9
2.1.4Endowments?.......................................................................10
2.1.5Clarification: are schools in school-choice agents or objects?............10
2.2Canonical market design problems............................................... 10
2.3Canonical market-design mechanisms........................................... 14
2.3.1Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance............................................14
2.3.2Immediate acceptance (“Boston mechanism”).............................18
2.3.3Random serial dictatorship......................................................20
2.3.4Top trading cycles.................................................................21
2.3.5Hylland and Zeckhauser pseudomarket......................................22
2.3.6Draft approaches to multi-unit assignment...................................23
2.3.7Competitive equilibrium approaches to multi-unit assignment...........24
3Empirical frameworks and applications......................................................25
3.1Non-transferable utility models.................................................... 26
3.1.1Random utility model.............................................................27
3.1.2Analysis with data from assignment mechanisms..........................28
3.1.3Analysis with data on final outcomes..........................................36
Continuum many-to-one matching.....................................................36
One-to-one or few-to-one matching....................................................41
3.2Transferable utility models......................................................... 46
✩
We thank Eduardo Azevedo, Jacob Leshno, Jeremy Fox, Parag Pathak, Al Roth, Dan Waldinger, Alex
Wolitzky, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments. Agarwal is grateful to Paulo Somaini for
collaboration on surveys of related topics that this article draws on. With permission of the respective
publishers and authors, this chapter reuses portions from Agarwal and Somaini (2020;2021b) and adapts
certain figures from Agarwal and Somaini (2018).
Handbook of Industrial Organization, Volume 5, ISSN 1573-448X.https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hesind.2021.11.010
Copyright © 2021 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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