According to Forbes (2013), the 1998 Asian financial crisis exposed longstanding weaknesses in
South Korea's development model including high debt/equity ratios and massive short-term
foreign borrowing. GDP plunged by 6.9 percent in 1998, and then recovered by 9 percent in 1999-
2000. Korea adopted numerous economic reforms following the crisis, including greater openness
to foreign investment and imports. Growth moderated to about 4 percent annually between 2003
and 2007. Korea's export focused economy was hit hard by the 2008 global economic downturn,
but quickly rebounded in subsequent years, reaching 6.3 percent growth in 2010. The US-South
Korea Free Trade Agreement was ratified by both governments in 2011 and went into effect in
March 2012. Throughout 2012 the economy experienced sluggish growth because of market
slowdowns in the United States, China, and the Eurozone.
The nation’s successful industrial growth began in the early 1960s, when the government
instituted sweeping economic reforms emphasizing exports and labour-intensive light industries.
The government also carried out currency reform, strengthen financial institutions, and introduced
flexible economic planning. South Korea’s rapid and sustained development can be ascribed to
a combination of social and economic factors: the high level of industriousness and literacy among
the people, the introduction in the early 1960s of economic reforms aimed at expending exports
and labour-intensive industries, the gradual removal of import barriers, the extreme flexibility of
economic management, the close cooperation between government and private industry, and
the autonomy of the banking system and the development of an efficient financial market. But the
close cooperation between government and export industries during the period of rapid catch-up
with the West is perhaps the most important key to understanding success of its outward-looking
industrialization strategy.
According to Smith (2003), the case of South Korea suggests that it is a combination of industrial
policies addressed to specific market failures, and consistent with underlying market forces (as
well as the local political economy) that promotes industrial development. Without proper attention
to incentives (for both market and rent-seeking activities), these same industrial policies can prove
counterproductive. Countries that cannot find the political will to use protection as a highly
selective and strictly temporary instrument of industrial policy in cases where large, identified
market failures can be shown to exist, are probably better off abandoning this instrument
altogether; the case of Bolivia is probably a good example of this. Even prior to the financial crisis,
Korea's now democratic government is making a series of adjustments designed to make its
market economy function in a more mature way. In the past, the government encouraged giant
conglomerates, or Chaebol, to expand and enter new markets as a way of achieving economies
of scale and scope, to facilitate exporting, and to facilitate its control over the economy by keeping
the number of companies it had to stay in close contact with small. Now that the Korean economy
is established, the Chaebol are seen as liabilities to further growth. They are also seen as political
liabilities, or as companies that unfairly received government advantages in the past from which
other companies did not benefit. Antitrust regulations are now being enacted and enforced; this
will probably make the Korean economy much more competitive in the future. As the Korean
economy approaches maturity, government's role in the productive sector continues to recede.
But the lesson for developing countries that would like to emulate South Korea's success is that
until the world technology frontier is approached, government does have an important role, even
in the productive sector, until domestically-based private industry can establish itself.
By: Justine C. Banta
Course: Econ 312 Development Economics
Topics: Industrialization & Trade