Intellectual Property Policy Reform Fostering Innovation And Development Christopher Arup

Intellectual Property Policy Reform Fostering
Innovation And Development Christopher Arup
download
https://ebookbell.com/product/intellectual-property-policy-
reform-fostering-innovation-and-development-christopher-
arup-2186200
Explore and download more ebooks at ebookbell.com

Intellectual Property Policy Reform

Intellectual Property
Policy Reform
Fostering Innovation and Development
Edited by
Christopher Arup
Professor, Faculty of Business and Economics, Department of
Business Law and Taxation, Monash University, Melbourne,
Australia
and
William van Caenegem
Professor, Faculty of Law, Bond University, Queensland,
Australia
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA

© Christopher Arup and William van Caenegem 2009
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical
or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the
publisher.
Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
The Lypiatts
15 Lansdown Road
Cheltenham
Glos GL50 2JA
UK
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
William Pratt House
9 Dewey Court
Northampton
Massachusetts 01060
USA
Acatalogue record for this book
is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Control Number: 2009928607
ISBN 978 1 84844 163 7
Typeset by Cambrian Typesetters, Camberley, Surrey
Printed and bound in Great Britain by MPG Books Group, UKEEP

Contents
Acknowledgements vii
List of contributors viii
1 Themes and prospects for intellectual property law reform1
Christopher Arup and William van Caenegem
P
ART I INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY GRANTS
2 Why patents need reform, and some suggestions for it 11
William Kingston
3What
arethe costs and benefits of patent systems? 29
Hazel V.J. Moir
4 Strong patent rights, weak patent standards and innovation in
biomedicine 55
Dianne Nicol
5 The jewel in the crown: India’s patent office and patent-based
innovation 80
Peter Drahos
6 The first steps in remedying the relationship between patents and
competition 101
Charles Lawson
PART II OPEN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SYSTEMS
7 An introduction to open source biotechnology 129
Janet Hope
8 Intellectual property, innovation and openness 154
Ulf Petr
usson and Caroline Pamp
9 Wikipedia, collective authorship and the politics of knowledge
172
Matthew Rimmer
10Copyright and the new street literature 199
Megan Richardson and Jason Bosland
v

PART III INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TRANSFERS
11 Commercialization of university research and free diffusion –
what does experience show works best in and for Australia? 221
Ann L. Monotti
12 Pervasive incentives, disparate innovation and intellectual
property law 250
William van Caenegem
13 Commodifying sheer talent: perverse developments in the law’
s
enforcement of restrictive covenants 267
Joellen Riley
14 Split entitlements? Intellectual property policy for clusters and
networks 285
Christopher Arup
15 Conclusion 306
W
illiam van Caenegem and Christopher Arup
Index 311
vi Contents

Acknowledgements
This book grew from an idea we had when researching worker mobility and
knowledge transfer. We felt there was much thoughtful work being done
concerning the reform of intellectual property law generally. The collection we
proposed would draw attention to the kind of reforms that in fact are worth
considering, taking account of the changing context – that in fact are already
being tried whether the orthodoxy has accommodated them as yet or not.
The contributors willingly responded to an invitation and came to a work-
shop at Bond University on the Gold Coast, with little more than the promise
of a sunny sky outside the window of the Faculty of Law’s new resource
centre. One came via videolink from early morning Dublin. Everything went
smoothly (except for a lost wallet) because we were able to rely on Cherie
Daye’s peerless organisation of the workshop. Then, we were much obliged to
the contributors, our colleagues, for the timely and professional way they
reworked their papers and responded to the requests of the editors. At this
point, we were fortunate to obtain the assistance of Ginny O’Grady, who has
done the copy editing at Monash so thoroughly and sensitively. In completing
the volume, we should also like to thank Luke Adams, Nep Elverd and Joanne
Betteridge at Edward Elgar for the confidence they have shown in the project.
We acknowledge the crucial financial assistance that our Faculties, the Faculty
of Business and Economics at Monash and the Faculty of Law at Bond, have
given us.
We hope you find sustenance in the volume. A list of contributors is
included in this book and we are sure they would be interested to discuss their
ideas further. Please note that the law and policy are current as at the date of
submission, September 2008.
Chris Arup and William van Caenegem
September 2008
vii

viii
Contributors
Christopher Arup– Department of Business Law and Taxation, Faculty of
Business and Economics, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
Jason Bosland– Faculty of Law
, University of New South Wales, Sydney,
Australia
Peter Drahos– Centre for Governance of Knowledge and Development,
College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra,
Australia
Janet Hope– Centre for Governance of Knowledge and Development,
College of
Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra,
Australia
W
illiam Kingston– School of Business, Trinity College, Dublin, Ireland
Charles Lawson– Australian Centre for Intellectual Property in Agriculture,
School of Law, Griffith University, Brisbane, Australia
Hazel V.J. Moir– Crawford School of Economics and Government, College
of
Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra,
Australia
Ann L. Monotti – Faculty of Law, Monash University, Melbourne, Australia
Dianne Nicol – Faculty of Law, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Australia
Caroline Pamp – Centre for Intellectual Property Studies, Chalmers
University of Technology, Gotebor
g, Sweden
Ulf Petrusson – Centre for Intellectual Property Studies, Chalmers University
of Technology, Gotebor
g, Sweden
Megan Richardson – Melbourne Law School, Melbourne, Australia
Joellen Riley – Faculty of Law, University of Sydney, Australia
Matthew Rimmer – Australian Centre for Intellectual Property in
Agriculture, College of Law, Australian National University, Canberra,
Australia
William van Caenegem – Faculty of Law
, Bond University, Queensland,
Australia

1. Themes and prospects for intellectual
property law reform
Christopher Arup and William van Caenegem
When we set out to collect papers around our theme, we were encouraged by
a mood of constructive criticism concerning the roles that intellectual property
has come to play in innovation and creativity. Broadly the criticisms concern
two developments: (1) the strength of intellectual property endowments and
entitlements and (2) the proliferation and manipulation of claims to intellec-
tual property rights (see Maskus and Reichman 2005). The criticism largely
comes from academic scholars and sets that community apart from practition-
ers who are perforce involved in pursuing the possibilities within the current
laws.
The criticism is constructive. Very real questions remain about the social
value of intellectual property, at least for some sectors of the economy and
locations around the world. It is prudent to keep alternatives to intellectual
property in mind when designing new policies, for there are many other ways
that innovation and creativity can be furthered. Nonetheless, academic schol-
ars are generally thinking of ways to improve intellectual property through the
institution of reforms.
That is the flavour of our contributions. Essentially they pursue two lines.
The first is for more rigour and discernment when deciding whether to confer
intellectual property rights. This, it could be said, is merely to insist that intel-
lectual property only rewards efforts that are innovative and creative. The
second is to influence how people use intellectual property rights; specifically
how they transact in them. The aim is to encourage openness, once endow-
ments have been made, in particular to promote coordination, circulation and
sharing of intellectual property.
We are not alone in this approach, for intellectual property scholarship
seems to be in a healthy condition. Our particular contribution comes from a
workshop we convened on the Gold Coast in December of 2007. The partici-
pation was international, though we do appreciate that a majority of the
contributors are Australian based. The Australian interest in intellectual prop-
erty reform is very high.
What enables academic law scholars to identify and recommend reforms?
1

Intellectual property scholarship forms part of a general trend within legal
research to study the law ‘in context’. Intellectual property is examined and
assessed as it operates within empirically mapped social fields. The fields of
interest range over industry sectors, creative clusters, contract networks,
media sub-cultures, developing economies and public domains.
The contextualised approach is suited to reform. The contributors are able
to ask whether intellectual property, as it is constituted, administered and put
to use, is fulfilling the purposes ascribed to it. The context is changing. The
conditions on which the old policies might properly have been based are being
superseded. While the dominant model of corporate capitalism (large firm
centralisation and internalisation) still fits some sectors and locations, the
context changes with the onset of new technologies, business practices, work
methods and social mores. If intellectual property is still an important security
for investment in production, it must also facilitate dissemination and coordi-
nation of knowledge resources.
To work in context, legal researchers need to call on assistance from other
disciplines. Our contributors are well read in other disciplines, which is not to
say that they adopt the methods of those disciplines (such as economic model-
ling) or indeed that they are sufficiently expert to do so. Yet they are receptive
to the insights those disciplines offer and increasingly they also seek empiri-
cal evidence to inform their recommendations. Thus, Peter Drahos goes inside
patent offices; Dianne Nicol talks with start-up biotech companies; Janet Hope
engages with creators of open licence systems; Ulf Petrusson and Caroline
Pamp with builders of technology platforms.
While other disciplines have certain epistemological advantages over law,
our experience suggests they will not always be as open-minded as lawyers
are. For our contributors appreciate that law too forms part of social fields. In
considering how legal agents influence the course of intellectual property, they
have a rich and non-determinative sense of the possibilities of legal principles
and legal processes. So Peter Drahos takes a close interest in patent office
examiners; Charles Lawson in those commissioned to review competition
policy; Ann Monotti in university technology transfer officers, and Joellen
Riley in higher court judges.
If this research is neither traditional legal analysis, nor the method of
another discipline, how should we characterise it? The contributors see intel-
lectual property as forming part of the regulation and governance of innova-
tion (see Andersen 2006). So, they are interested in intellectual property in the
hands of a variety of actors, including scientists, writers, artists, public insti-
tutes, universities, private firms, financial investors, government administra-
tors, legal practitioners, legislators, judges and politicians. They seek to place
intellectual property within a range of strategies or instruments of policy, some
essentially outside law, but some varying within law as legislative directives,
2 Intellectual property policy reform

default principles, administrative guidelines, licence specifications, contrac-
tual terms or conditions attached to grants.
This approach is sceptical that one rule fits all. Policy making requires
evidence that intellectual property will further innovation and creativity within
a specific set of circumstances. William Kingston, Peter Drahos, Dianne
Nicol, Hazel Moir and Charles Lawson all stress this point. Often, it will not
do so directly. Instead, policy making should empower those individuals who
want to work with intellectual property in this way. Janet Hope, Ulf Petrusson
and Caroline Pamp, Ann Monotti, Matthew Rimmer, Megan Richardson and
Jason Bosland, Joellen Riley, William van Caenegem and Chris Arup all
express this preference.
So, what reforms do our contributors pursue? We said that they fall into two
broad categories. The first, for rigour and independence, is when new rights
are created. Much of the discussion is about regulating the criteria for appro-
priation, that is, the outer limits of the knowledge that should properly be the
subject-matter of a patent or copyright right, or a non-disclosure or non-
competition obligation. But our contributors also point to the need to be
demanding when laws are being interpreted and applied to make individual
grants.
It is appropriate that patents are a focus of this collection because they are
amongst the most powerful of intellectual properties in the knowledge they
encompass and the control they enable. Copyright is addressed in the context
of the new media, a little less so than patents because of its coverage else-
where. The contributions also take an interest in the appropriation of tacit
knowledge, which, in the absence of trade secrets legislation, is decided by
judges fashioning the scope of contractual and equitable obligations. This too
is a live issue. Within a service economy, technical know-how and the emerg-
ing forms of intellectual and social capital, such as customer and workplace
relations, are growing in value.
Hazel Moir takes on the whole patent system, wanting patents to be
confined to the situations where they make a difference – where they induce
innovation that otherwise would not eventuate. Similarly, William Kingston
wants to ensure that patents reward real investments in innovation, not just the
satisfaction of legal categories. Charles Lawson and William van Caenegem
again are generally sceptical of grants: they want patents available only where
they are needed to assist competition by lowering barriers to market entry and
not, it follows, when they actually work anti-competitively.
Moving down a layer into administration, Peter Drahos provides a detailed
case why patent examiners in India should make their own rigorous assess-
ments of applications from foreign companies, especially to avoid evergreen-
ing of pharmaceuticals. Dianne Nicol argues that, if patent rights are going to
be strong, standards for granting patents should really insist on novelty,
Themes and prospects 3

inventiveness and utility. William Kingston recommends a cheaper means of
dispute resolution – technical arbitration – than litigation of patent validity
through the courts. Joellen Riley counsels judges in Australia to think hard
about the consequences of surrendering to the appeals of employers for prop-
erty in information.
The uses made of intellectual property rights are our second target of
reform. In this regard, regulatory reform does not so much direct how holders
should exploit the intellectual property. It encourages and assists those who
will use rights to expand innovation and open access. As these holders are
regulating ‘privately’, the role required of the state is co-regulation or ‘meta-
regulation’ – the regulation of regulation (Hope, Nicol and Braithwaite 2008).
The basic settings of intellectual property law shape the uses made of it.
Policy making involves decisions about which use rights will be conferred on
the holders, which uses the holders may prevent others from pursuing or
controlling in other ways. Megan Richardson and Jason Bosland pursue this
regulation through the recurring contest, largely in the courts, over the scope
of the fair use provisions of copyright. Their case study is the revival of an old
medium of expression, street news, now manifested in a new electronic inter-
net form. They argue that the street news use of newspaper copy should not
have to be ‘transformative’.
Several contributions make the initial rights holders the subject of their
study. The chapters are interested in those who do not want to use their rights
to lock down intellectual property, but who wish to construct open licensing
systems. This focus is recognition that the context is changing, that much inno-
vation and creativity are network based or even the outcome of an all-comers
knowledge bazaar or a commons-based peer production. They stress the inter-
active, roundabout, cumulative nature of innovation.
As systems engineers, these holders are taking their own steps to work
around the hold-ups and break-downs associated with strong entitlements and
micro-protection of rights, as we see for example in patent thickets and a
welter of copyright take-down notices. Such reciprocating and coordinating
systems are largely self-generating; they are movements that are growing
organically. At the same time, they are quite regulatory. Their protocols and
mores are so sophisticated that some go as far as to consider them constitu-
tions (see Joerges, Sand and Teubner 2004). But this belies their fragility. They
also need a supportive public law environment in which to prosper.
At this stage, they are most pronounced in the media sectors where copy-
right is the main intellectual property governor. Matthew Rimmer explains the
dynamics of a successful system par excellence, Wikipedia, though he has his
fingers crossed that copyright litigation will not foul it up. Its integrity depends
principally on people’s discretion and restraint. If litigation is being brought,
it will call for a sympathetic reception from the courts, sitting possibly
4 Intellectual property policy reform

anywhere in the world, and remedial action by legislatures if the judicial envi-
ronment turns hostile.
Both the Janet Hope and the Ulf Petrusson and Caroline Pamp contribu-
tions point the way for similar systems or platforms to develop in the biotech-
nology/biomedicine patents sectors. The organisational innovations they
recommend are perhaps not as wide open as the Wikipedia model. But they are
more accessible than other collective responses in the past such as industry
patent pools and relational contracting (Dreyfuss, Zimmerman and First
2001). These contributions envisage how intellectual property can be used for
increasing the openness of innovation, citing examples that are working. Open
licensing systems are crucial to avoiding lock-up of resources by upstream
owners and break-downs in exchange because there are so many rights hold-
ers.
Subject to their universities’ policies, university researchers can be
involved in these open licensing systems. Ann Monotti captures them in more
conventional intellectual property roles. They have become more like private
holders, perhaps of necessity. Yet the right policies can encourage university
decision makers to release the intellectual property they are not using and to
seek out those licensees who want to work the inventions. Regulatory studies
offer tools and Monotti identifies them at work in the proactive United States
approach, including the legislative directives of the Bayh–Dole Act, the condi-
tions the National Institutes place on money grants and the universities’ code
of ethics for research.
This perspective on the universities reminds us that intellectual property is
mainly transacted in the commercial world. Nonetheless, as Benkler (2006)
explains, the commercial interests that people show in intellectual property
can vary. They can be commercial without being proprietary. Some are more
positive for innovation. Rights can be used negatively against innovation. For
example, litigation might be threatened to increase risks and costs, to bar
others entry, to extract rents.
As Dianne Nicol finds, not everyone uses intellectual property in this way.
The first policy reflex is to be cautious about conferring rights at all, allowing
freedom to operate. But if conferring rights is a positive, then policy should be
concerned with who gets rights and what they do with them. Thus, Dianne
Nicol argues that innovation is furthered if small biotech companies have
some command of intellectual property; likewise Joellen Riley, William van
Caenegem and Chris Arup if workers do.
The final bunch of contributions to the book sees mobile individual workers
as keys to the dissemination and recombination of knowledge. Large firms need
some reward for the economies of scale and scope they bring to innovation. But
increasingly innovation benefits from circulation either within localised
networks (the high point being Silicon Valley) or inter-national movement of
Themes and prospects 5

knowledgeable and skilled people. ‘Freed up’ by organisational changes, the
hollowing out of the large firms, these workers want to take intellectual property
rights with them to other firms or to their own start-ups and collectives. Systems
prosper if these individuals have incentives to invest in intellectual and social
capital. Some of that investment returns to their first firm. However, workers
should be free to put knowledge to new uses elsewhere.
What intellectual property policy is conducive to mobility? Again, policy
begins with a caution against over-appropriation. Where ownership can be
justified, the question is who is to be free to use the rights to the knowledge?
The property in question can be the rights to use explicit or codified knowl-
edge – such as the right to work patents. In this regard, Chris Arup’s contribu-
tion considers whether it is good policy to split entitlements between
employers and workers and between principals and consultants. Just as vital to
innovation is the right to use tacit knowledge. In their contributions, Joellen
Riley and William van Caenegem seek the appropriate limits to the scope and
application of civil obligations, the non-disclosure and non-competition
restraints that the judges will uphold as a matter of contract and equity. In
these relationships, intellectual property and freedom of contract should be
moderated by a common law competition law.
In some jurisdictions, competition law becomes a legislative and adminis-
trative scheme. Competition law has the potential to allow for intellectual
property while correcting for some of its abuses. That allowance can be on a
categorical basis or a more searching case-by-case basis. On the basis of an
Australian experience, Charles Lawson wonders if competition law policy
makers have the will to regulate the uses made of intellectual property by those
with market power, such as the restrictive conditions inserted into licences
(where licences are given at all). Joellen Riley asks that judges recall the
common law’s aversion to restraints of trade, especially before giving employ-
ers the procedural advantage of an interim injunction.
While disposed to variety, our contributors do not suggest that intellectual
property should be left entirely to the market. There is attraction in the argu-
ment that innovation is much too complex and unpredictable for it to be engi-
neered socially. However, the final policy position is not one of pure freedom
of contract or absolute contract autonomy. The market is already regulated
when intellectual property is created. Our contributors do lean towards volun-
tarism when it comes to the deployment of intellectual property rights. They
are showing faith that holders will be interested in promoting innovation and
creativity. But the framework still matters and public regulation is still needed
– at the pointy end of the regulatory pyramid – if rights are abused. One danger
with contract autonomy is that the powerful will obtain more than their legal
entitlement.
But is it worth entertaining such reforms – or have the possibilities been
6 Intellectual property policy reform

foreclosed? One check on our enthusiasm is the extent of intellectual property
standardisation internationally. The World trade Organisation TRIPs agree-
ment is a high point of standardisation. Checks on reform are also to be found
in bilateral inter-governmental agreements and in memoranda of understand-
ing between functional regulators such as the patent offices. Standardisation
reduces the freedom to experiment with intellectual property regulation and to
choose divergent legal paths. That includes the opportunity to learn from the
experience in other jurisdictions, to avoid the same mistakes or simply to adapt
the form to different local conditions.
Yet we could pitch reform efforts at the international level. The interna-
tional level provides another political and legal space in which to make reform
efforts. If standardisation proceeds, the content of it is still contested, both
within, and between, international organisations. Some aspects of intellectual
property are not as standardised as others. They include trade secrets,
employee inventions, moral rights, and the regulation of the distributions and
uses of rights, including competition law – the second of the two broad
pursuits of this book. Even the more established aspects of regulation, like the
criteria for patents and copyright endowments, reveal gaps in coverage and
explicit allowances for choices to be made at the national level. So, despite
their own protestations at times, national leaders have opportunities. Their
policies can be demanding of any grant of intellectual property endowments,
geared to openness in the regulation of uses, and tailored to the conditions for
local innovation and creativity. The failure to do so is often the result of
domestic politics of interest or eagerness to please international constituen-
cies, not for the lack of imagination of alternatives.
REFERENCES
Andersen, B. (ed.) (2006), Intellectual Property Rights: Innovation, Governance and
Institutional Environment, Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward
Elgar.
Benkler, Y. (2006), The W
ealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms
Markets and Freedom, New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
Dreyfuss, R., D. Zimmerman and H. First (eds) (2001), Expanding the Boundaries of
Intellectual Property: Innovation Policy for the Knowledge Society, Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hope, J., D. Nicol and J. Braithwaite (2008), ‘Regulatory Capitalism, Business Models
and the Knowledge Economy’, in J. Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism,
Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar.
Joerges, C., I.-J. Sand and G. Teubner (eds) (2004), Transnational Governance and
Constitutionalism
, Oxford: Hart Publishing.
Maskus, K. and J. Reichman (eds) (2005), International Public Goods and Transfer of
Technology under a Globalized Intellectual Property Regime,Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Themes and pr
ospects 7

PART I
Intellectual property grants

2. Why patents need reform, and some
suggestions for it
William Kingston
There is an emerging consensus amongst users and students of the patent
system that it is not performing as it ought to, and that this performance is
getting worse. A recent comprehensive analysis of a large number of US
empirical investigations concluded that:
The performance of the United States patent system deteriorated markedly during
the 1990s as the private costs of patent litigation soared.
By the late 1990s, the risk of patent litigation for public firms outside of the
chemical and pharmaceutical industries exceeded the profits derived from patents.
This implies that patents likely provided a net disincentive for innovation for the
firms who fund the lion’s share of industrial R&D, that is, patents tax R&D. (Bessen
and Meurer 2008, p. 144)
And since most other countries, as will be seen below, have replicated the US
system, it is a reasonable assumption that this pattern is also the global one.
The simple reason why this has happened is that it is nobody’s business to
see that patents work properly. Consequently, they have been shaped by the
interests of those who could benefit from them, rather than from any vision of
the public good.
The subtitle of the book from which the above quotation is
taken is ‘How Judges, Bureaucrats and Lawyers Put Innovators at Risk’.
I. INVESTMENT IN INNOVATION
Economic innovation depends upon investment, partly under uncertainty and
partly under risk, which is uncertainty quantified. Investment under uncer-
tainty can never be rational at all, and investment under risk can only be ratio-
nal if there is the prospect of a reward that is commensurate with the risk as it
is perceived. Since innovation is the turning of information into concrete real-
ity, the risk has two dimensions: the attempt to innovate may fail; and even if
it does succeed, it may not deliver the hoped-for returns because of others free-
riding on the results. ‘Information is hard to produce, easy to reproduce, and
therefore difficult to profit by’(Nordhaus 1969, p. 144).
11

Preventing free-riding requires market power. This is not the power to
make a market, in the sense of some physical or mental arena to which there
is freedom of entry, and within which price is the arbiter between supply and
demand, as in a stock exchange. Market power, in fact, is the precise opposite,
being the power to unmake the market, by preventing entry to it by others.
Freedom of entry drives price down, thus eliminating the reward that an
investor in innovation has to have to justify his risk. Only market power, the
power to prevent freedom of entry
, can make it possible for an innovator to
hope for the above-average returns that the above-average risk of investing in
innovation demands.
II. TYPES OF MARKET POWER
Although patents are invariably thought of as the characteristic means of
making it rational to invest in innovation, in fact they rank in importance far
behind large-scale investments in capability and persuasion. Empirical studies
on how firms capture the rewards from the results of their research and devel-
opment (R&D) in the US, Europe and Japan all agree that, except for chemi-
cals, patents are ‘unambiguously the least central of the major appropriability
mechanisms’(Cohen et al. 2002, p. 1360).
The market power of capability results from investment in productive
assets, and the market power of persuasion results from similar investment in
psychological assets, that is, in reputation. In each case, the power comes from
scale. If a firm is able to produce on a larger scale than its competitors, it can
then afford to innovate because its unit costs will be lower than theirs. Even if
they can obtain access to the originator’s information, they will be at a disad-
vantage in making use of it. The same is true if a firm is able to invest more
than its competitors in building its reputation, typically through advertising.
Firms which have less established reputation, known as ‘brand equity’, are
correspondingly less able to copy with commercial success.
As long as these two types of market power are available to firms, there-
fore, we could expect that there would be economic innovation because of the
protection they give to investment to produce information of certain kinds. But
not all information can be protected in these ways, and consequently there is
need for other kinds of protection also. For example, the end-product of phar-
maceutical R&D is a chemical formula. Capability market power is a poor
protector of this information embodied in a pill because, once the formula is
known, manufacture of the pills in quantity does not require much investment
in productive assets by someone who wants to compete. Similarly
, if the pill
is an effective remedy, it will sell easily without the need for much marketing
effort, so again the market power of persuasion cannot set up much of a barrier
12 Intellectual property policy reform

to entry by competitors. Consequently, if there is to be invention and innova-
tion in cases where the information is of this kind, there is need for a third
means of preventing free-riding. This is specific market power, of which intel-
lectual property is an important component, and of course patents in turn are
part of this.
III. EVOLUTION OF PATENTS
The forces in society which shaped the patent system in its origins did so in
terms of a vision of the public good. Early patents protected innovation rather
than invention, since their subject matter was technology found abroad and
introduced to another country. The granting of a 14-year monopoly in England
for bringing ‘new manufacture within the realm’ was typical of this kind of
patent. The root of protection of invention rather than innovation is Article 1,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, and a vision of the public good was
again the shaping force. There can be little doubt that the motivation of the
Founding Fathers for this was genuine belief that it was in the interest of soci-
ety as a whole that there should be patent protection for inventors and copy-
right protection for authors.
Subsequently, until World W
ar I, intellectual property laws, like all other
legislation, were largely formulated by bureaucrats who were independent of
politicians to a large degree and equally insulated from commercial interests.
Civil servants regarded their function to be very much the definition and
defence of the public good. Such an attitude is evident, for example, on the
part of the German bureaucracy in shaping the famous 1877 Patent Actthere
(Murmann 2003). This Act played an indispensable role in changing Germany
from a poor country in the mid-19th century into a very rich one by the end of
it, as the leading world player in the new chemical and electrical technologies.
It also influenced patent legislation throughout Europe for three-quarters of a
century.
However, World
War I and the inflation which followed it destroyed the
bureaucracies which could withstand political and commercial pressures. An
early deployment of such pressures can be seen at the 1925 meeting of the
Paris Convention at The Hague. From the Convention’s establishment as the
basis of internationalisation of patents and trademarks in 1883, there was no
prohibition on any member country making local manufacture a condition of
validity of a patent. In 1925, however, on the initiative of Britain and the
United States, such a condition was outlawed from then onwards. These were
the countries with most capability market power, and the change meant that
they could now supply their foreign markets with products made at home. This
enhanced their scale of operation still further, and at the same time they could
Why patents need reform 13

enjoy patent protection in their markets. Patents should be the means of
enabling those who do not have the market powers of capability or persuasion
to protect investment in generating information; the 1925 change can be seen
as the beginning of a movement whereby they became a reinforcement of
other kinds of market power instead.
IV. UNITED STATES 1952 PATENT ACT
The evolution of patent law then went on to reflect progressive shaping by the
interests which benefited from it. A fully documented illustration of this is the
way in which the US 1952 Patent Act was drafted and passed. Its cause was
the incompatibility between the existing criterion for patentability and the new
kind of research which lay behind the antibiotic revolution.
In 1941, the Supreme Court used the expression ‘flash of creative genius’ to
encapsulate the level of ingenuity which it claimed had been necessary since the
first patent Act of 1790. Such a criterion suited inventions made by individuals,
which of course was the only kind of invention there was at the time of that Act,
and for more than half a century afterwards. However
, inventions coming from
purposive, cooperative research in company laboratories, and from the applica-
tion of science to industry, were progressively less able to meet this requirement.
Eventually, no less than two-thirds of the patents coming before Circuit Courts
of Appeal were being ruled invalid. What was described as an ‘ever-widening
gulf between the decisions of the Patent Office in granting patents and decisions
of the Courts which pass upon their validity’ was even the subject of a concerned
Message from the President of the United States in 1943.
1
This ‘gulf’ became a real crisis for the US pharmaceutical industry with the
coming of antibiotics during and after World War II. The discovery of peni-
cillin opened up an apparently limitless prospect of new drugs and profits, but
the necessary investment in R&D could only be made on the scale which was
desirable if effective patent protection were available for its results. At the
same time, nothing could have been clearer than that research for antibiotics
based on the techniques of large-scale screening which would be used, would
be quite unable to supply the ‘flash of genius’ which the Courts required for
patent validity.
Once firms in the pharmaceutical industry grasped that nothing could solve
this problem for them except a change in the law, they moved very quickly. In
1948, the New York Patent Bar Association drafted a Bill and was able to get
it introduced in Congress, and this, supplemented by other Bills and pressures,
brought about the results that the industry wanted. This Act of Congress was
given its form solely by those who would benefit by it. As a judge who, as a
patent attorney had been the main drafter of the legislation, wrote later: ‘The
14 Intellectual property policy reform

[1952] Patent Act was written basically by patent lawyers . . . A good 95% of
the members [of Congress] never knew that the legislation was under consid-
eration, or that it had passed, let alone what it contained.’
2
The new US criteria for patentability were then copied by other countries,
so that from the 1970s the patent systems of all the developed countries were
based upon the United States model. Parallel with this, the Secretariat of the
Paris Convention was becoming active in spreading patents through the poorer
countries of the world. This was due to the zeal of its Director, Arpad Bogsch,
which led to the recruitment to the Convention of most of the 141 countries
that joined it after World War II. He developed a ‘model law’ of intellectual
property which the poor countries could adopt, and cultivated and provided
incentives for the politicians and bureaucrats who could arrange for the adop-
tion of this law in their countries.
The model law was effectively the intellectual property law of the advanced
countries of the Western world, and its promotion worldwide was done in the
name of ‘harmonisation’, claimed to be in the general public interest. It was in
fact the last kind of law which these countries needed, as demonstrated by the
way India was able to build up a world-class pharmaceutical industry, specif-
ically by refusing to join the Paris Convention. If it had done, it would have
had to grant patents to the giant international pharmaceutical firms and its own
infant firms would have been strangled at birth.
V. TRIPS
The most egregious example of how patent law came to be made by those
whose interests are served by it is the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property (TRIPs) annex to the World Trade Organisation agreement of 1994.
The background to this was a normal ten-year updating of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), but then, as described by Jerome
Reichman (1998, p. 586),
The momentum of the multilateral negotiations during the Uruguay Round carried
the developed countries well beyond their initial goal, which was to limit the capac-
ity of firms in developing countries to make and export free-riding copies of high-
tech goods produced at great cost in the developed countries. Instead, by ... 1991,
the developed countries’ strategic goal was to impose a comprehensive set of intel-
lectual property standards on the rest of the world.
Just how this was done has been well told by Peter Drahos and John
Braithwaite in their Information Feudalism and in Susan Sell’s Private Power,
Public Law,
3
in which her expertise as a political scientist complements their
expertise.
Why patents need reform 15

A key factor was the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), initiated by the
heads of Pfizer, IBM and Du Pont to lobby for change in international intel-
lectual property arrangements. Sell points out that an important element in
achieving this objective was extraction of US commercial policy out of its
foreign policy. Once this had been done, the US Trade Representative was free
to act on behalf of American business interests overseas in a completely preda-
tory way, unconstrained by any of the factors that the President and the State
Department also need to take into account in their decisions, such as the coun-
try’s international reputation or its military alliances. Since the objective was
to impose a world-wide regime in which intellectual property would provide
reinforcement of firms’ scale and scope, the IPC had little difficulty in recruit-
ing support from similar interests in Europe and Japan. The upshot, as Sell
(2003, pp. 92 and 95) put it, was that:
The IPC, in conjunction with its counterparts in Europe and Japan, crafted a
proposal based on existing industrialized country laws and presented its proposals
to the GATTSecretariat. By 1994, the IPC had achieved its goal in the Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property … accord of the Uruguay Round … In
effect, twelve corporations made public law for the world. (My emphasis)
VI. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS
In spite of this triumph of commercial interests over any concept of the public
good in lawmaking, TRIPs did not work out quite as anticipated for US firms.
Consequently, in recent years the US Trade Representative’s policy has been
to move towards bi-lateral agreements, in which America’s greater economic
strength can be deployed to the full. As one illustration of this, Australian
experience has been the subject of a perceptive study (Weiss, Thurbon and
Mathews 2004).
What is wrong with patents can therefore be summed up as follows: The
justification for their existence is that they can enable investment in invention
and innovation to be made rationally by those who do not have great capabil-
ity or persuasive market power. Instead, patents have been allowed to become
a reinforcement of these market powers, rather than an alternative to them.
This means that smaller firms and smaller countries are greatly disadvantaged
relative to larger ones in terms of innovatory capacity.
Hope of changing this situation requires sharing Keynes’s belief that ‘in the
last analysis, it is ideas rather than vested interests, which are dangerous for good
or ill’(Keynes 1936, p. 384). It gains some support from the way in which the
educational efforts of organisations such as Oxfam and the Quaker United
Nations Office produced a coalition of poorer countries at the Doha and Cancun
TRIPs revision meetings. This has mitigated some of the worst features of
16 Intellectual property policy reform

TRIPs, notably in relation to sourcing generic drugs. And even within the restric-
tions of TRIPs, some useful general improvements appear to be possible.
VII. MAKING DISPUTE SETTLEMENT EASIER
A major deterrent to rational investment in invention and innovation is the cost
of defending patents or of otherwise being involved in litigation. Firms with
large resources for this can intimidate those that are weaker, and almost invari-
ably do so. By far the greatest practical encouragement for small-firm innova-
tion, therefore, would be an inexpensive, quick and simple means of resolving
disputes. One practical approach to this would be to introduce compulsory
technical arbitration before litigation is allowed to commence.
It is because of the use of arbitration that so few disputes in technical areas
other than patents ever reach the Courts. In fact, patents are unique in the
world of technology in not using this device to reduce the cost of dispute reso-
lution. The difference between other technical areas and patents is that in the
former the parties involved are related by a contract, which invariably includes
the arbitration condition; obviously, there is no contract between two parties
in contention over a patent. For settling patent disputes, therefore, any provi-
sion for technical arbitration can only be in the contract which does exist – the
one between the inventor and the state, that is, the patent grant.
TRIPs requires that settlement of intellectual property disputes should be
dealt with in the Courts of each country, so there would have to be a right of
appeal to the Courts from an arbitrator’s decision. It might therefore be argued
that compulsory technical arbitration of disputes would only push back the
advantage of the party with more resources for a limited time period.
Intimidation would re-emerge in the form of strong firms forcing weaker ones
to face the costs of appeals to the Courts.
This could be solved by provision of legal aid for the respondent party, that
is, the one which accepts the arbitration and does not appeal. Small firms
would never appeal, since to do so would move the dispute on to the ground
where their larger opponents have all the advantage of resources for litigation;
larger firms would be cautious about appealing because judges pay a lot of
attention to technical expertise and there would be no certainty of winning an
appeal, having lost the arbitration.
It is likely enough, therefore, that the total amount required for legal aid
payments would be low. In any event, whatever the cost to the State of legal
aid for the party that accepts an arbitration might be, it should be regarded
exactly as a counterpart to the necessary expense of conventional policing of
other kinds of property. If exclusive privileges are to be real property rights,
the State cannot escape having to spend money on their protection.
Why patents need reform 17

VIII. LARGE-SCALE WORKING MODEL
The likelihood that appeals from compulsory technical arbitration would be
few is confirmed empirically by results from the ‘Interference’ files of the
United States Patent and Trademark Office. ‘Interference’ is a procedure
necessitated by the US requirement that patents are granted to the first to
invent, not to the first to file. Consequently, when it is noted that two (or more)
applications that might possibly be for the same inventive entity are received
by the Office, all parties must provide evidence as to their respective dates of
‘conception of the invention’ and of their efforts to reduce it to practice. There
are about 200 such ‘interferences’ each year and the probability of an appli-
cant for a patent becoming involved in this procedure is about three per thou-
sand.
The Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, which decides on the
evidence submitted, acts through Administrative Judges, who are recruited
from the most experienced members of the Patent Office’s Examiner Corps.
They deal with every possible element in a patent dispute – novelty, non-obvi-
ousness, unity of invention, nullity factors – everything which in a dispute
after a patent grant could be the subject of litigation. Interference procedure,
therefore, is precisely an actual large-scale working model of compulsor y
technical arbitration by experts.
Two of these Administrative Judges made a particular study of the working
of this procedure over a nine-year period, and found that between 40 and 50
final decisions were delivered each year. Just over one-third of these were
appealed to the Courts, but only about 5 per cent of them were either wholly
or even partially reversed.
4
All in all, therefore, in terms of how few of its deci-
sions are successfully appealed to the Courts and of how many of its cases
reach voluntary settlement, the performance of compulsory expert arbitration
in the United States interference procedure is a very good augury of how well
a similar system could work for settling disputes after patent grant. Any
arrangement that works 95 per cent of the time, after all, is giving at least as
good a result as can reasonably be hoped for in human affairs.
IX. DECLINE OF PATENT QUALITY
The issue of patent quality has become a contentious one everywhere, most of
all in the United States because of the grant of patents for computer software
and business methods there. One of the reasons is growth of the practice of
‘trolling’, where firms are held up to ransom by claims that they are infring-
ing a patent. Those who make such claims generally manufacture nothing
themselves and have often bought the patent in question from a bankrupt firm.
18 Intellectual property policy reform

They make money through threats of litigation, especially by seeking injunc-
tions which could bring part of their target firm’s manufacturing to a halt and
wreck a market. Because the dangers, costs and delays of litigation are so
great, firms frequently pay up rather than fight (Reitzig, Henkel and Heath
2007).
It is an ominous sign that patent litigation costs in the US have been grow-
ing at a faster rate than firms’ investments in R&D. An important reason for
the high cost of settling patent disputes is that the information on which a
patent is based at the time of its grant is incomplete to one degree or another.
The ideal, which of course is a patent issued after a perfect search carried out
by an omniscient examiner, is impossible of achievement. If prior art searches
could be perfect, trolling could scarcely exist and litigation would be greatly
decreased. But, just as in the Diamond v . Chakrabartycase, the US Supreme
Court ruled that ‘anything under the Sun that is made by man’ is patentable, so
‘anything under the Sun’ can be prior art. It can be foreseen, therefore, that no
patent office will ever be able to offer an absolute guarantee that it has taken
all relevant information into account in deciding on a particular case.
As has been seen, the US Patent
Act of 1952 delivered a patent system
suited to the pharmaceutical industry, which had designed it. Since chemical
inventions rely almost completely on the patent system for protection, virtu-
ally every chemical invention is patented. As a result, even if a prior art search
is limited to issued patents, it works well for these inventions. For other kinds
of invention, especially in fields where patents have only been operative in the
fairly recent past, much of the prior art is outside the patent records. Examiners
have tended to miss this, with the result that many patents have been shown to
be invalid by searches carried out later by experts outside the patent Office,
often as a result of litigation.
X. ‘OPEN REVIEW’
In terms of establishing conditions conducive to innovation, it cannot be right
that a patent on the basis of which investment has been made should be inval-
idated, and the investment lost, because of the later discovery of prior art in
a foreign-language journal which had never been translated, as has often
happened. The information in question would probably only have been
discovered because of intensive search effort by a competitor of the patentee
firm after the latter’s investment had been made and even possibly when a
product was on the market. An inventor’s or a firm’s competitors are far more
likely to be aware of relevant non-patent prior art than any individual patent
examiner could possibly be, and they will also be motivated to call attention
to it.
Why patents need reform 19

This has led to a general call for means of improving the comprehensive-
ness of prior art searches, including the idea of opposition beforeexamination,
which would maximise the amount and quality of relevant information avail-
able to a patent Examiner. What is called open reviewwould force this type of
ef
fort to be exerted before the patent grant, and would thus save wasted invest-
ment errors in both human and financial terms.
It is clearly absurd to continue to issue patents on an inadequate basis of
information, when this could be provided by bringing the proved enormous
power of open source – the collective intelligence that the Net now makes
possible – to bear upon it. W
ikipedia, for example, the result of large numbers
of voluntary submissions, has been shown to be little less accurate than
Encyclopaedia Britannica, for all the costly resources which the latter
requires. Open review should prevent many patents from being wrongly
granted in the first instance. It could also significantly increase the value of the
patent grants that are made, because a community of experts will have
contributed to their prior art search.
The Community Patent Review project of New York University and the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) is a pilot study of this
approach. Several firms of the calibre of IBM, Microsoft, Intel and Hewlett-
Packard, as well as some smaller ones, have agreed to allow 250–400 of their
software-related patent applications to be published immediately for the world
to evaluate (IBM, in fact, has decided to open all
its future applications in this
way).
5
Part of USPTO’s contribution to this pilot study is to give priority to
such applications in the subsequent process of deciding their patentability.
XI. ‘AGREED PATENT DATABASE’AND
INCONTESTABILITYPERIOD
The Gowers Report (2006) recommended that the US pilot study should be
replicated in the UK, and a group of reform-minded inventors there has
proposed to the authorities that modern information technology now allows
for an open source database to be developed for use in patent examination.
Any party could add information to this, submitted presumably according to a
primary reference in the Classification. It would then be the job of the Patent
Office to do the cross-referencing which would enable all the data to be picked
up for examination of a patent application. In the event of a later dispute, only
information already in this database at the time of examination could be used
to settle questions of novelty and non-obviousness.
In the long term, the most valuable prize from success of open review and
an agreed prior art database would be the ability to take the step of making
patents incontestable for some period of their life. Just how great the gain
20 Intellectual property policy reform

could be in terms of increased incentive for innovation can be seen from the
results of the US Orphan Drug Act of 1983.
The background to this is that there are numerous disorders (‘orphan’
diseases) which affect too few people to justify the investment that large drug
firms have to make to produce a profitable product under present arrange-
ments – including the cost of patents to protect them. This Act empowered the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to fill this gap by offering to any firm
that produced a relevant drug an undertaking that it would not license a
competitor for seven years. This is effectively an incontestable grant of an
exclusive privilege, since no drug can be put on the market without FDA
approval. It is worth far more than any patent, since there can be no risk of
being involved in litigation.
The outcome of this legislation has been spectacularly successful, reflected
in a 12-foldannual increase in new ‘orphan’ drugs, with both actual and rela-
tive declines in death rates from the diseases they treat. We can be certain,
therefore, that before it, the potential for innovation of drugs of this kind was
not being exploited because the arrangements for protecting the results of the
risky investment needed for this – predominantly patents – were not consid-
ered to hold out enough prospect of profit. In contrast, the protection offered
by the Orphan Drug Act is certain, complete and eliminates all danger of liti-
gation costs. The benefits could not be clearer, nor could the lesson that can be
drawn from them: appropriate protection results in more innovation.
Aperiod of incontestability might be offered only to smaller firms at the
outset, since they could benefit most from it. The Research Fund of the
European Patent Office funded research into this. When small-firm patentees
with experience of infringement were asked, ‘what would it have been worth
to you if the defence that your patent was invalid had not been available to
your infringer?’, 75 per cent thought that it would be worth either ‘a lot’or
‘very much’. In contrast, the overwhelming view of patent agents, presumably
reflecting the conflicting interest of their large-firm clients, was against the
idea of incontestability.
If it were to be pursued, it would require smaller firms to agree to have their
patent applications published immediately, that is, they would give up their
entitlement to the 18 months’ period of grace for this under present arrange-
ments. There would then be a short period of months during which all
concerned could provide information to the Patent Office for consideration by
the Examiner. The validity of patents which were issued after consideration of
this and any other information available could then not be questioned for a
specified period.
There seems to be no reason why, if this proved successful in operation, it
might not then be possible to grant an automatic first period of incontestability
to all patents as from the date of grant, reflecting a basic level of presumption of
Why patents need reform 21

validity, and a second, longer one, once the outcome of some form of opposi-
tion procedure had strengthened this presumption. This would contribute to
solving the disincentive effect of patents on innovation by removing the fear
of litigation.
XII. PROTECTING INNOVATION DIRECTLY
The way in which the patent system evolved, especially in terms of the cost of
settling disputes, rendered it of relatively little use to smaller firms, and the
spread of ‘harmonisation’, especially in its extreme form of TRIPs, rendered
it positively disadvantageous to smaller countries. Some improvements which
could be made, even within the TRIPs strait-jacket, have been suggested
above, but by far the best potential is for quite new arrangements which would
protect innovation directly.
Invention is finding new things and innovation is getting new things done.
At present, innovation is protected only indirectly, through whatever protec-
tion its related invention is able to obtain. It therefore depends upon the
strength of the invention–innovation link. This explains why pharmaceutical
inventions are well protected by the system: in this case the link between
invention and innovation is very close, because what is discovered in the labo-
ratory, what is described in the patent specification, what is circumscribed by
the claims of the issued patent, what is made in quantity in the factory and
what is ultimately prescribed by the medical practitioner, dispensed by the
pharmacist and administered to the patient, are all absolutely identical. In
contrast, for example in the case of engineering innovations, the actual link
with the related invention is nothing like so close, as there will almost
certainly be a number of incremental changes between the start of develop-
ment work on such an invention and the time a product is finally put on the
market.
Since the investment required for innovation is on a far bigger scale than
that for invention, it has correspondingly more need for protection.
There is no
reason why it could not be protected directly, through arrangements which
would operate alongside the existing patent system and make up for several of
its shortcomings. As the English Court of Appeal judge, Lord Jacob, put it in
a recent case,
One can, of course, postulate a different policy under which a [patent] monopoly
might make sense. There are old or obvious ideas which take a lot of work, expense
and time to develop and turn into something practical and successful. Without the
incentive of a monopoly, people may not do that work or spend the time and money.
The Fosamax case, Teva v Gentili [2003] EWHC 5 (Patent), [2003] EWCA Civ
1545, is an example of an obvious invention which cost lots to bring to market. But
22 Intellectual property policy reform

patent law provided no protection for all that investment because the basic inven-
tion was obvious. The courts’ job is not, however, to uphold any claim to a monop-
oly for an idea which requires investment and risk to bring to market, only those for
ideas which are new, non-obvious and enabled.
6
XIII. INNOVATION PATENTS AND WARRANTS
Two ways of achieving what the judge postulates have in fact been advanced.
These are Herman Kronz’s Innovation Patent and the writer’s slightly differ-
ent Innovation Warrant. The EU commissioned and published a study in
which a number of world experts evaluated both approaches (see Kingston
1987). Although this was done before evidence of the success of the US
Orphan Drugs Act of 1983 was published, that evidence is strong confirmation
of the direct protection approach. The orphan drug protection is given, not for
a concept of a new drug, or even for one that has reached the stage of clinical
trials, but only for the actual drug, developed, fully tested and ready to go on
the market. The EU’
s Directive for the protection of databases is also a form
of direct protection of innovation.
Both versions evaluated in the EU study shared a number of features. The
arrangements would be administered by an independent Innovation Authority,
although a high value is set on eliminating official discretion. The subject
matter of protection would be innovation, not invention. Protection would be
offered before investment has to be made, but actual investment would be the
condition of activating it and keeping it in force. Any economic object could
be protected, not just technology. The novelty criterion would be ‘non-
availability in the ordinary course of trade’. The term of the protection would
be variable, and examination would rely heavily on Third Party involvement
– an anticipation of the open review concept. All grants would be incontestable
except in cases where they had been obtained by fraud, and there would be no
renewal fees to keep them in force. Terms of grant could differ between
regions of a country (or could apply over more than one country by agree-
ment).
XIV. MEASUREMENT BY MONEY
Afeature of these proposals which deserves special mention is that measurement
of the protection granted would be through money, not time, since this would
also be a much better way of dealing with classical intellectual property grants,
if this could be reconciled with TRIPs. Atime measure of exclusive rights can
never be anything more than a surrogate for money. If all inputs and outputs
could be measured accurately, then the logic of any grant of an exclusive right
Why patents need reform 23

would have it last until an investor in R&D had received as profit a socially
acceptable multiple of the investment made.
This multiple would take account of its subjectively assessed risk, and
would in fact be the reciprocal of that risk. With a lower multiple, the risk
would be regarded as too high and the investment would not be made, thus
possibly depriving the public of something new and useful; with a higher
multiple, the protection – and consequently the private benefit – would be
more than it needs to be, and the public benefit (in terms of lower prices and/or
improved products from competitors) would be correspondingly less. When
the practicalities of this were investigated, however, it soon emerged that it
would be very difficult to devise a tamper-proof system.
In contrast to any accounting measurement after the event, focusing on the
investment which had to be made beforehandto bring about an invention or
innovation is much more promising. It is even more so if it is combined with
compulsory licensing, so that an exclusive right would change from that of
‘making, using and selling’ to that of conditionally allowing others to ‘make,
use and sell’ (Kingston 1994). The concept of the multiple in the ideal (but
impractical) approach could then be applied instead to defining how much
should be paid for a compulsory licence.
Access to an invention by competitors is a most important point: inventions
only become useful to the public (and consequently profitable) by incremen-
tal improvements, and no originating firm can devote its resources optimally
to more than a single ‘trajectory’
of these. During whatever period the origi-
nator’s intellectual property protection of the present kind remains effective,
other firms that are capable of developing the invention along alternative
trajectories of incremental innovation may be prevented from doing so.
Boulton and
Watt’s patent postponed the development of high pressure steam
and that of the Wright Brothers slowed down aircraft design.
It is only through these alternative trajectories of relatively small technical
changes that the widest range of user and consumer wants can be satisfied; that
dynamic new firms are able to get a start in new technology; and – in the long
run – that prices of the standardised products that eventually emerge are
brought down through competition.
But if competitors are to be allowed access to the results of an originator’s
investment in R&D, the system must ensure that they pay appropriately for it.
This means making a second- or later-comer share retrospectivelyin the
investment which had brought the information they want to use into being.
The amount payable would have to be weighted by the risk the originator had
taken. That weighting should also reflect the reality that the very first money
that is put behind an idea involves uncertainty rather than risk, and is to that
extent irrational.
No matter what the advantages of compulsory licensing, it would be essen-
24 Intellectual property policy reform

tial that it did nothing to reduce the incentive to undertake the high risk of
investment in invention and innovation. A safeguard for this is that the more
important any information is seen to be by competitors, the more licences will
be requested for it, and as each licence would earn the same amount, the orig-
inator could find that his risky investment was very well rewarded. This
reward might be much greater than could have been achieved under traditional
protection, because several trajectories of incremental development would be
exploited simultaneously, which is the best possible way of expanding the total
market for the originator to exploit. At the same time, no firm would be
prevented from developing any new market as long as it was ready to share
retrospectively in both the investment and the risk which had made that market
possible.
XV. CAPITAL PAYMENTS INSTEAD OF ROYALTIES
Afurther safeguard for originators would be if payment for licences was made
through one-off capital amounts, rather than by royalties. This would reinforce
the principle of having the second- or later-comer share retrospectively in both
the amount and the risk of the investment which has been made. Any such
investment is now a sunk cost for the originator, and there is no reason why
any sharing of the result should be dependent on a licensee’s future success in
using it, as would be the case with royalty payments.
Also, a licensee who has made a capital payment for access to information
is more likely to be motivated to get the best possible value out of the infor-
mation which this licence has bought, by doing his own development work on
it. This motivation is not necessarily present to the same extent when payment
for the licence is contingent, that is, through royalties. Firms which can license
information on a royalty basis may be content simply to produce clones of the
originator’s product. The public interest is best served when the firms which
obtain compulsory licences will themselves do R&D to exploit independent
trajectories of incremental innovation. Having invested a significant capital
sum for the licence adds greatly to the incentive for this.
It should be stressed that the multiple would only set the price at which the
originator of information would have to grant a licence for its use by another.
The proposed arrangements would not prevent any type or number of licence
agreements between mutually willing buyers and sellers. Any licence which
would be granted under the present system, therefore, would equally be avail-
able under the new one.
The public interest requires that inventions should be made, then innovated,
and then diffused as quickly and as widely as possible. Wide dif
fusion implies
the possibility of several trajectories of incremental change. Unfortunately,
Why patents need reform 25

much innovation diffusion at present is the result of failure of the patent
system to deliver the protection it promises – especially in non-chemical
fields. It would clearly be much better to use the proposed new arrangements
to get the process of diffusion started in an orderly way and as early as possi-
ble.
XVI. CONCLUSION
The various proposals outlined above could be useful in enabling patents to
perform the only function which justifies their existence. This is that they
deliver the market power necessary for rational investment in innovation to
those who do not have this market power in other ways, such as through large-
scale investment in productive assets (for capability) or in advertising and
marketing (for persuasive market power).
Just as the US began to by-pass TRIPs when it discovered that it was not
working as much to its advantage as had been hoped, smaller countries, all of
which are disadvantaged by TRIPs, could work around its provisions in their
own interest by adopting some of these proposals. Specifically, direct protec-
tion of innovation could be put into effect in parallel with the existing patent
system and without being affected by TRIPs at all. It could be introduced with-
out being applicable to chemical inventions, which are already well served.
All smaller countries have suffered from ‘harmonisation’ and need to
develop some countervailing force in intellectual property to that of the ‘trilat-
eral’, the arrangement between the Patent Offices of the US and Japan and the
European Patent Office, which arranges settlement matters in the interests of
their largest users, the multinational firms, especially those in the pharmaceu-
tical industry.
The way in which the international patent system has evolved is proof posi-
tive of Mancur Olson’s theory of collective action (Olson 1965). This is that
small cohesive groups have great advantages in getting laws that suit them,
over large, diverse ones. In the patent case, the small number of large firms,
especially multinational firms, has been able to shape the patent system in
their own interest, to the disadvantage of smaller firms, which are greater in
number but which do not act in unison.
What is true of small firms is also true of smaller countries. The history of
TRIPs makes it clear that their performance when it was being formulated and
enacted was totally passive. It appears that they have never thought of taking
advantage of Article 19 of the Paris Convention to improve the capacity of
their firms to innovate. This Article is:
It is understood that the countries of the Union reserve the right to make separately
26 Intellectual property policy reform

between themselves special agreements for the protection of industrial property, in
so far as these agreements do not contravene the provisions of this Convention.
Taking advantage of this would enable any group of member countries to
agree to mutual arrangements for operating any or all of the suggestions for
repair of the patent system outlined above, and others, as long as they also
allowed any other country which was a member of the Paris Convention to
share in the benefits. Just as Doha marked the beginning of the necessary reac-
tion against TRIPs, such a group could begin a useful reaction against harmon-
isation.
NOTES
1. Transmitting the Report of the National Patent Planning Commission, 18 June 1943.
2. Judge Rich, quoted by P.J. Federico in Witherspoon (1978).
3. Drahos and Braithwaite (2002); Sell (2003).
4. Calvert and Sofocleous (1989, 1992, 1995).
5. See: http://www.peertopatent.org/.
6.Angiotech Pharm., Inc. v Conor MedSystems Inc., [2007] EWCA
Civ 5, 50 (Court of Appeal
2007 (Jacob, L.J.), aff’g, [2006] EWHC 260 (Pat) (Pumfrey, J.) (High Court 2006).
REFERENCES
Bessen, J. and M. Meurer (2008), Patent Failure, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Calvert, I.A. and M. Sofocleous (1989), ‘Interference Statistics for Fiscal Years 1986
to 1988’, Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society, 71, 399–410.
Calvert, I.A. and M. Sofocleous (1992), ‘Interference Statistics for Fiscal Years 1989
to 1991’,
Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society, 74, 822–6.
Calvert, I.A. and M. Sofocleous (1995), ‘Interference Statistics for Fiscal Years 1992
to 1994’, Journal of the Patent and Trademark Office Society, 77, 417–22.
Cohen, W., A. Goto,
A. Nagata, R. Nelson and J. Walsh (2002), ‘Research and
Development Spillovers, Patents and the Incentive to Innovate in Japan and the
United States’, Research Policy, 30, 1349–67.
Drahos, P. and J. Braithwaite (2002), Information Feudalism: Who Owns the
Knowledge Economy?, New York:
The New Press.
Gowers, Andrew (2006), Gowers Review of Intellectual Property, Norwich, UK: Her
Majesty’s Stationery Office.
Keynes, M. (1936), The General Theory of Employment, Inter
est and Money, London:
Macmillan.
Kingston, W. (ed.) (1987), Dir
ect Protection of Innovation, Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer
Academic Publishers.
Kingston, W. (1994), ‘Compulsory Licensing with Capital Payments as an Alternative
to Monopoly Grants for Intellectual Property’, Research Policy, 23, 661–72.
Murmann, J. (2003), Knowledge and Competitive Advantage , Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Why patents need reform 27

Nordhaus, W. (1969), Invention, Growth and Welfare, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Olson, M. (1965), The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of
Groups, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Reichman, J. (1998), ‘Securing Compliance with the TRIPs Agreement after US v
India’, New Y
ork University Journal of International Economic Law, 1, 586–601.
Reitzig, M., J. Henkel and C. Heath (2007), ‘On Sharks, Trolls, and their Patent Prey:
Unrealistic Damages A
wards and Firms’ Strategies of “Being Infringed”’, Research
Policy, 36, 134–54.
Sell, S. (2003), Private Power, Public Law: The Globalization of Intellectual Property,
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Weiss, L., J. Thurbon and J. Mathews (2004), How to Kill a Country:
Australia’s
Devastating Trade Deal with the United States, Sydney, New South W
ales: Allen
and Unwin.
Witherspoon, John F. (ed.) (1978), Non-obviousness – the Ultimate Condition of
Patentability,
Washington, D.C.: Bureau of International Affairs, Sections 1:10, 11.
28 Intellectual property policy reform

3. What arethe costs and benefits of
patent systems?
Hazel V.J. Moir
Patent systems are one of the oldest policies to promote innovation. So it is
surprising how little factual information is available about their economic costs
and benefits. The data that are available seem to be regularly ignored in patent
policy discussions (Mazzoleni and Nelson 1998). Macdonald (2004) suggests
this imperviousness to fact shows that the idea that innovation will not occur
without patents has achieved the status of myth. The objective of this chapter is
to set out the range of benefits and costs of a patent system,
1
identify those
elements most critical to sound patent policy and review the evidence available
so far, so as to set an agenda to establish an evidence basis for sound patent
policy. A sound patent system is defined as one where social benefits exceed
social costs, and the system therefore improves a nation’s economic well-being.
I.INTRODUCTION
Patent policy is based on a conundrum: designed to increase innovation, it
operates by initially suppressing the dissemination of new patented technolo-
gies. Balance is therefore central to patent policy. The benefits deriving from
any induced higher level of innovation must offset, at least at the level of soci-
ety, the costs due to the grant of monopoly privileges.
As yet, no country appears to have undertaken a cost–benefit analysis of
their patent system. The earliest, most comprehensive approach remains
Machlup’s 1958 report to the US Congress, but needed data are still missing.
The sole economist on the 1984 Australian patent review tabled a dissenting
statement saying that there was nothing economic about the supposedly
economic review (Industrial Property Advisory Committee (IPAC) 1984, pp.
79–80). Since then, a significant body of academic empirical research has
been undertaken concerning the role patents play in protecting returns to
industrial innovation (detailed below) and this research clearly shows that the
benefits of patents to innovation have been greatly over-stated. Nonetheless,
in 1994, while the Bureau of Industry Economics (BIE) did make references
29

to the earliest instances of this evidence, it was to place greater weight on
econometric estimates of high social returns to R&D (BIE 1994a). So too the
2000 Intellectual Property and Competition Review Committee (IPCRC)
review referred only briefly to the empirical evidence and it maintained a
strong faith in the absolute need for patents to encourage innovation (IPCRC
2000). Both reports relied heavily on assumptions, including the requirement
of a high standard of inventiveness for patent grants.
To the extent that costs and benefits have been measured, the major focus
has been on private benefits and private costs. Yet the most recent study shows
that if pharmaceutical companies are excluded, the net private return from
patents to publicly listed US firms is substantially negative (Bessen and
Meurer 2008).
This chapter is concerned with social costs and social benefits. Private costs
and benefits form part of this assessment too.
2
But patent systems involve
significant positive and negative externalities and these externalities need to
be added to private costs and benefits in order to estimate the net return to
society. Anticipated positive externalities are the underlying rationale for the
patent protection intervention in the economy. Patents are expected to induce
more innovation, generating increased consumer surplus, spillovers of knowl-
edge, enhanced productivity and higher economic growth. The negative exter-
nalities are the losses due to the exercise of monopoly power (lower output,
less competition and reduced consumer surplus). Because knowledge devel-
ops in a cumulative fashion, there may also be negative externalities in the
form of lower levels of subsequent innovation. Finally, any form of market
regulation gives rise to direct transaction and rent-seeking costs and indirect
costs due to misallocation of resources.
A starting point for identifying the costs and benefits of patent systems is
those areas of economic activity to which the system is directed, or through
which it works. Thus, impacts on innovation, competition and resource allo-
cation become priority categories, within which benefits and costs should be
identified. Innovation impacts need to include any benefit from improved
technology information dissemination. Naturally any regulatory system has
associated transaction costs. For example, public choice theory directs us to
pay attention to lobbying costs as an important element of the costs associated
with regulatory intervention.
Nonetheless, these headings do not form a clear framework which can be
used as a classification system. For example, if a patent system induces more
innovation, this affects resource allocation and, through the grant of the patent
monopoly, competition. Under which category should induced innovation then
be included? The ‘headings’ are useful in ensuring as complete as possible an
accounting of the full range of economic impacts but they do not provide a
good classification system.
30 Intellectual property policy reform

Implicit in any measurement of costs or benefits is the question, relative to
what? Given the substantial evidence that in most industries market mecha-
nisms provide an adequate return to innovation investment, the comparison
chosen here is compared with a situation where there is no patent system. This
could be refined to a comparison with patent system variants where, for exam-
ple, patents were restricted to technology-based inventions, where there was a
genuine inventive step of a reasonable height, where clear boundaries to claims
were a condition for grant, and/or where scope of a grant was limited to the
knowledge actually contributed. Where it is clear that such changes to patent
policy would make a difference to a particular cost or benefit, this will be noted.
Naturally any effort to measure as complex a phenomenon as innovation is
fraught with hazards. A full discussion of these measurement problems would
leave room for little else. Carter (1996) provides useful discussion of some
specific measurement difficulties.
II. INDUCED PATENTS AND USED PATENTS
From a policy perspective there are two key absolutely critical measures. First,
any policy is effective if it induces the desired change: here, more innovation.
Do patents induce innovation which would not otherwise occur? It is only
from induced innovations that the potential benefits of a patent system flow.
Where innovation would have taken place, absent patents, no benefits from
that innovation can be attributed to patent policy. This remarkably central
policy issue has received little comment since Machlup (1958). Innovations
that are patented, but not induced by the patent system, create no benefits
attributable to patent policy but they do create costs attributable to patent
policy. It is not possible to quantify the economic impact of a patent system
without first estimating the proportion of patents induced by it.
The second key policy measure is the proportion of patents used. Some
analysts assert that because of close substitutes, the monopoly losses from
patent policy are small (e.g. Gans, Williams and Briggs 2004). This seems
counter-intuitive – if a monopoly is needed to gain a return to innovation
investment, then it will not deliver a return unless it is used. Certainly the
degreeof monopoly power exercised in the use of any individual patent can
vary widely. Some authors assert that only a very small proportion of patents
are actually used, but provide no supporting evidence (Lemley 2001; Blonder
2005). The one major empirical study on patent use found that 50 per cent of
Canadian patents were worked in at least one country. Firestone also reported
on the proportion of patents worked in the UK (30 per cent) and the USA (49
per cent for lar
ge companies and 71 per cent for small companies) (Firestone
1971, pp. 148–9).
3
Costs and benefits of patent systems 31

This issue is complicated by the question of what manner of use. Use was
once simply thought of as local working, but with the massive growth in the
volume of patents and strategic uses of patents, other uses need to be consid-
ered. Each type of use may confer different types of cost on other parties,
including intermediate firms. Even patents which are renewed but not used can
increase costs of boundary search for other firms (Bessen and Meurer 2008).
Because of defensive patenting, patents may have value even where they are
used only as insurance. Patent renewal data thus reveal more about private
value than about use. Information on the proportions of patents used in differ-
ent ways is also central to measuring the economic impact of patent systems.
There are some known facts relevant to patent use. First, the proportion of
non-use is likely to be higher among domestic than foreign patentees. The
majority of patentees first patent domestically (lower patent costs and a more
familiar system).
4
For some domestic applicants, the very grant of the patent
might fulfil the innovator’s prestige or marketing objectives and the patent
may not be used or renewed (Bartow 2000). Second, certain patentees are
known to take out very large numbers of patents for strategic reasons. These
include (particularly large) firms in the industries well known for strategic
patenting – particularly the electrical and computing industries (Bessen and
Hunt 2004).
5
Asmall number of firms obtain the bulk of patents: one-third of
grants to organisations in each of the USA and Australia go to just 100 firms
(Moir 2008). Many of the patents owned by such firms may not be used in the
sense of being ‘worked’. They are however used for strategic purposes, includ-
ing misleading competitors about the key directions of research, making
significant patents harder to find, challenging other firms in cross-licensing
negotiations and preventing entry to a market.
There is now substantial evidence that the proportion of patented innova-
tions induced by the patent system is low. This possibility was first docu-
mented by Scherer et al. (1959), confirmed by Taylor and Silberston (1973)
and further documented by Mansfield (1986). The large-scale Yale survey in
the early 1980s and the 1994 Carnegie-Mellon survey (CMS) confirmed that,
in most industries, imitation time and cost were substantial, patents were
poorly regarded as a mechanism for obtaining a return to R&D investment,
and most innovations would occur, absent patents (Levin et al. 1987; Cohen,
Nelson and Walsh 2000).
6
The principal findings, particularly the low
frequency with which patents are used as a means of ensuring a return to R&D
investment, have since been replicated in national innovation surveys in many
European countries (Mairesse and Mohnen 2003; Crowley 2004; Larsson
2004; Robson and Ortmans 2006), in Canada (Hanel 2008) and in Australia
(Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007). These very large surveys include many
small R&D performing firms.
Their results confirm that there is no general failure in the market for inno-
32 Intellectual property policy reform

vation. First mover advantages, market segmentation (including product
differentiation, branding and reputation), speed of technological change,
complementary sales, service and manufacturing capabilities, knowledge
imperfections, transaction costs, learning and switching costs and network
effects, all operate to ensure that firms are both motivated to innovate and gain
good returns from their R&D investments.
There is a significant exception – the pharmaceutical and fine chemicals
industries. These are industries where patent boundaries are clear, where the
time and cost of imitation are lower than average, and where industry leaders
report that innovations would not take place absent patents.
7
It makes sense to
look separately at the economic consequences of patents for such clear and
highly codified technologies. Bessen and Meurer (2008) separate out the phar-
maceutical industries and find a large private net benefit for such firms, in
contrast to the negative outcome for firms in other industries. Even here,
however, it is not clear that patents are essential. One of the few natural exper-
iments in patent policy was the extension of patents to chemical products in
Italy in 1978. While this led to an increase in patenting, there was no conse-
quent increase in R&D expenditure, nor any increased focus on new chemical
entities (Scherer and Weisburst 1995).
There will always be individual exceptions to these general findings. Such
selective anecdotes are frequently used to illustrate the benefits or costs of
patent systems. This is not a sound basis for policy design. If there are special
circumstances in certain technologies – and there is substantial evidence that
there are – then tailored programmes should be designed if these would deliver
a net welfare gain. But the fact that a few companies may benefit from the
patent system as currently designed is not a rationale for maintaining it if the
overall impact is negative (Edwards 1949).
The empirical surveys referred to above can be used as a basis for estimat-
ing the proportion of patents induced by patent systems. Unfortunately, indus-
try and patent classifications do not cross-map well. Nor do the later surveys
provide estimates of the proportion of innovations that depended on the provi-
sion of patents. However, the CMS found that 63 per cent of process patents
and 74 per cent of product patents were acquired for defensive purposes
(Cohen, Nelson and
Walsh 2000, p. 18) and that they may well not be needed
if there were no patent protection available. So we might estimate roughly that
around 37 per cent of process and 26 per cent of product patents would cover
innovations that depended on the provision of patents in order to be induced.
8
Thus, estimating induced patents (in industries other than pharmaceuticals/
chemicals) at 25 to 50 per cent will provide an upper estimate of induced
patents.
In small nations, where the vast majority of patents are granted to foreign-
ers, one needs to consider whether there is likely to be an inducement effect
Costs and benefits of patent systems 33

specifically for overseas innovators. In Australia, for example, 88 per cent of
patents are granted to innovators from Japan, North America and Europe. It is
unlikely that the possibility of gaining an Australian patent would make a
difference to innovation investment for most innovators in these large markets,
so it is assumed that none of these innovations are induced by the Australian
patent system. For innovators from smaller markets, including New Zealand
and a range of other countries, the possibility of an Australian patent grant
might be critical to the investment.
Based on this reasoning, it can be estimated that between 1990 and 2005,
between 9171 and 13 992 innovations were induced by the Australian patent
34 Intellectual property policy reform
Table 3.1 Estimated induced patents, Australia and USA
Granted Proportion Estimated Patents
patents induced induced not
(%) patents induced
Australia, 1990–2005
Patents granted to residents of
USA, Canada, Europe and Japan 170 610 0 0
170 610
Patents to residents of Australia,
New Zealand and other countries: 23 635 (total)
Pharmaceutical and fine chemical
patents 4349 100 4349 0
All other classes 19 286 50 9643 9643
25 4822 14 465
Total granted patents 194 245
Estimated maximum induced 13 992
Estimated minimum induced 9171
USA, 2001–2005
Pharmaceutical and fine chemical
patents 109 362 100 109 362
0
All other classes 701 125 50 350 563 350 563
25 175 281 525 844
Total granted patents 810 487
Estimated maximum induced 459 925
Estimated minimum induced 284 643
Notes:
Australian data are from http://www.ipaustralia.gov.au/about/statistics.shtml (accessed 5 March
2007), T
able P31 (Mar06) Countries of Origin of Granted and Certified Patents, and Table P63
(May06) Grants of Standard Patents by Technology (‘pharmaceuticals’ and ‘fine organic chemi-
cals’).
US data are for utility patents, from http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/reports.htm (by patented tech-
nology), June 2006 version (accessed 5 March 2007). Estimates for pharmaceuticals and fine
chemicals are based on utility patents granted in the Life and Agricultural Sciences and Testing
Method and the Compositions and Synthetic Resins; Chemical Compounds classes.

Costs and benefits of patent systems 35
Table 3.2 Patent system costs and benefits: importance and empirical
evidence
Type of effect Importance Existing empirical
evidence?
Impacts on innovation
Induced innovation critical substantial; can use
appropriability studies
to estimate
Earlier timing marginal non-existent
Inventive resources unknown/moderate anecdotal
shifted to patent work
Negative impacts on
other innovators:
no copying
inventing around moderate? almost none
complete blocking
moderate? almost none
fences and thickets low risk/large impact some historical
evidence
Technology market unknown anecdotal except for
19th century
Licensing costs and unknown scattered
benefits
Information limited evidence suggests zero
dissemination value, with possible
exception of large firms
Secrecy minor single study
Competition and
resource allocation
Used patents critical almost none
Dynamic efficiency some indirect estimates
gains from induced of knowledge spillovers;
innovations: important little on productivity-
knowledge spillovers enhancing
productivity share of induced
improvements innovation
Increased foreign directmar
ginal evidence suggests
investment insignificant
Static efficiency losses important almost none
Slower diffusion of unknown almost none
patented innovations possibly important
Impact on entry of firms important several studies with
varying findings
Patent races small? scattered
Defensive patenting frequent could estimate from
but modest appropriability studies
Waste of non-invention unknown almost none
resources

system (see Table 3.1). Thus, we can say that between 180 000 and 185 000
(92.3 to 95.3 per cent) of granted patents were for innovations that would have
occurred in the absence of the Australian patent system. In the much larger US
market, a larger share of patents is induced. The assumptions lead to an esti-
mate of between 284 643 and 459 925 induced innovations, or 35 to 57 per
cent of granted patents. This generous estimate of induced innovation still
leaves a minimum of 43 per cent of patents granted to innovations which
would have occurred in the absence of a patent system.
The remainder of this chapter reviews, very briefly, the evidence regarding
the range of costs and benefits associated with patent systems. The discussion
is summarised in Table 3.2.
III.IMPACTS ON INNOVATION
The extent of induced innovations is critical to estimating the major social
benefit from patents. If the embodied new knowledge spills over to other firms
and industries, it may create positive social benefits. These knowledge flows
translate into productivity improvements and subsequent innovation in the
recipient firms. There is remarkably little direct evidence on such social bene-
fits.
9
Mansfield’s seminal work (Mansfield et al. 1977) measured gross
consumer surpluses generated by 17 innovations. One had negative social
returns. Of the remainder, social returns exceeded private returns for 12, but
half of these had private returns of over 25 per cent, so would have proceeded
anyway. The BIE’s in-depth study of social returns to 16 Australian industrial
innovations attempted to trace the likelihood and magnitude of both consumer
36 Intellectual property policy reform
Table 3.2 continued
Type of effect Importance Existing empirical
evidence?
Transaction costs
Applying for and renewing moderate a few studies
patents
Establishing patent possibly very significant cost impact on search not
boundaries/noise documented
Monitoring and important some useful litigation
enforcing patents studies; one on total cost
impact
Lobbying small but central very scattered
Abuses of the system unknown

surplus benefits and knowledge spillovers. Fourteen of the 16 innovations
were intermediate products. Knowledge spillovers were found to be low or
very low for 13 of the innovations, and consumer surplus increases were low
for six and moderate for another three. General community spillovers
(improved quality of life or environmental impacts) were low or non-existent
for 14 of the innovations (BIE 1994b).
While such positive externalities form the most important likely benefit of
patent systems, they are clearly difficult to measure and may be more tenuous
than often supposed. They can be counted as a benefit of patent systems only
if they flow from induced innovations. The higher the inventive step require-
ment, the more likely that patent innovations contain new knowledge and thus
generate spillover benefits.
It is well known that most of the private and social value of patents lies in
a very small proportion of them (Griliches 1990; Sena 2004). But for innova-
tions generally, there is no direct or systematic correlation between private and
social returns.
10
The small literature on patent renewal rates focuses largely on
estimating the private value of patents. Provided renewal costs are more than
symbolic,
11
it could be assumed that firms will only renew patents that remain
of real value to their business.
12
In the mid-1990s Mischlewski and Dormer
estimated that in Australia only about 10 per cent of patents ran the then full
life of 16 years (Mischlewski and Dormer 1995). Others have used the idea
that those patents which are renewed to the statutory limit are the most valu-
able and found that a very small proportion of patents contribute a large share
of the value (see, for example, Harhoff, Scherer and Vopel 1998).
Do private returns necessarily tally with positive social externalities? Some
innovations are productivity-enhancing. While theoretical treatments of such
innovations are frequent, there appear to be no empirical estimates of the
proportion of innovations which have this effect. Such innovations – particu-
larly where they are general purpose technologies like electric power or
computers – can have major positive impacts on economic growth. But major
positive benefits do not occur until the innovation has been widely adopted
(David 1990). There are no estimates of the proportion of induced patents
which have major or minor impacts in improving productivity.
It is to be expected that new patented technologies will diffuse slowly, due
to the exercise of the granted monopoly power to raise price and restrict
output. National innovation surveys show that the bulk of innovative activity
in high income countries is innovation that is new to the industry or the firm
rather than new to the country or the world. For example, the 2004–05
Australian Innovation Survey found that 82 per cent of product or process
innovations fell into these categories (Australian Bureau of Statistics 2007, p.
12). It is this spread of technology through the economy that provides the
major boost to national productivity levels.
Costs and benefits of patent systems 37

Another suggested benefit from patent systems is bringing innovations
forward in time. There seems to be no documented evidence of this, even
anecdotal, so this benefit, if it exists at all, seems likely to be small.
Innovation resources may be shifted from unpatentable to patentable
areas of research as a consequence of patent systems. Evidence from 19th
century World Fairs suggests that patent systems do not affect the level of
innovation but do affect the structure of the industries and the technologies
in which it occurs (Moser 2005). Cole (2001) considers this a cost. He refers
to research that finds, in some fields, the patentability of alternative options
has a major impact in determining research directions (Rivette and Kline
2000). There is little disagreement that such an effect is a logical conse-
quence of patent incentives, but there appears to be no systematic evidence
on its magnitude.
Unlike copyright, patents do not simply prevent copying. They prevent the
commercial use of independently made identical inventions.
13
To a large
extent losses due to the prevention of copying are implicit in losses due to
slower dissemination of new technology. But the loss due to reduced ability of
competitors to innovate independently is important (Nelson 2006, p. 1108).
Bessen and Meurer (2008) argue that most litigation involves cases of inad-
vertent infringement, and that the costs of determining the boundaries of
patented technology are substantial.
All these effects need to be assessed against the understanding that
knowledge cumulates and that every innovation draws on previous knowl-
edge, including knowledge in patented artefacts. There is no point at which
an ‘initial innovator’ can be clearly identified. Acquisition of knowledge is
costly, and imitation involves substantial knowledge inputs. It can also
lead to improvements, and sometimes sequential incremental innovation
leads to radical breakthroughs (Mandeville 1996). Given the objective of
encouraging innovation, the very substantial cost to innovators of estab-
lishing the boundaries to property already granted through the patent
system needs to be recognised (Bessen and Meurer 2008). This transaction
cost relates directly to determining the technological space within which
innovators may freely operate. If a technological space becomes crowded
with large numbers of patents, the costs to other innovators can rise
substantially. The higher the inventive step threshold, the less likely this
crowding is to occur.
Companies devote considerable resources to ‘inventing around’ patents.
Plant suggested this was an important aspect of the maldistribution of
resources caused by the patent system (Plant 1934, p. 46). In a remarkable
piece of ‘spin’ (or ‘framing’ to use a more academic term), the costsof invent-
ing around are now often claimed as a benefitof patent systems. Machlup took
short shrift with this:
38 Intellectual property policy reform

from merely defending the need of ‘inventing around a patent’ as a minor item of
waste, the discussion has recently proceeded to eulogize it as one of the advantages
of the system, indeed as one of its justifications … The production of the knowl-
edge of how to do in a somewhat different way what we have already learned to do
in a satisfactory way would hardly be given highest priority in a rational allocation
of resources. (Machlup 1958, p. 51)
At its extreme, the prevention of independent invention can hold up major
technology developments. Perhaps the most famous example is James Watt,
whose refusal to license his patents is generally considered to have held up the
Industrial Revolution by several decades (Ashton 1948; Boldrin and Levine
2008). Other famous examples are the Wright brothers’ stabilisation and steer-
ing systems for aircraft and Edison’s incandescent lamp (Cohen 2005).
Examples of technological hold-ups do not need to be pervasive to have a
large social cost: if ‘the technology in question is sufficiently important, only
one or a few instances … may impose considerable social cost’ (Cohen 2005,
p. 63). In some industries there is a very high degree of concentration in patent
ownership. For example, 75 per cent of agricultural patents are held by just six
companies (Phillips et al. 2004).
14
Another consequence of a patent system for innovation can be efforts by an
inventor to tie up all possible applications of a new idea. The use of resources
to discover and claim ownership to all possible means of doing something is
inefficient. The CMS shows a large majority of firms report taking out patents
either to block rivals, or to improve their position in negotiating licences with
other firms (Cohen, Nelson and Walsh 2000). The associated resources,
including resources to develop alternative variants, are resources that would
not be needed if a patent system did not exist.
The net effect of such an array of techniques [patent pools and cartels, bottleneck
patents, patent blitzkrieg, umbrella patents and accordion patents] is that competi-
tors would not be able to differentiate valid and invalid patents and the cost of liti-
gation or, alternatively, of inventing around becomes so high that they would refrain
from indulging in any activity that is protected by the network of patents.
(Endeshaw 1996, p. 92)
Afurther cost is consequent on the prevention of independent invention –
so-called ‘defensive patenting’. Cohen, Nelson and Walsh (2000) found that a
large majority of patents were taken out for defensive reasons (63 to 74 per
cent). The greater the volume of patenting, the more is the pressure to patent
defensively (Macdonald 2002, p. 144). This cost would disappear if indepen-
dent invention were allowed as a defence in infringement cases (Scotchmer
1998).
Arecently popular argument in support of patent systems is that they
encourage development of technology markets. There are two aspects to this:
Costs and benefits of patent systems 39

outright sale and licensing. Patents appear to have been more often traded in
the late 19th century (Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 1997; 1999) than they are now.
A study of patent renewal rates notes that patent rights are seldom marketed
(Pakes and Simpson 1989, p. 356). The sole empirical estimate of recent trad-
ing of patents indicates that 18 per cent of US patents held by small innova-
tors are traded at least once in their lifetime (Serrano 2006). Given the
boundary problems associated with most patents (Bessen and Meurer 2008), it
is surprising that so many are traded.
Licensing of patents usually involves arrangements for the purchase of
associated know-how as well as the patented technology (Boehm 1967). Firms
are notoriously loath to disclose information about the terms and conditions of
such licences.
15
Between 23 and 28 per cent of firms in the CMS indicated that
a reason for obtaining patents was to earn licensing revenue (Cohen, Nelson
and Walsh 2000). A large minority of patents are used in some way in a tech-
nology market.
IV. DISSEMINATION OF TECHNOLOGY INFORMATION
Anumber of authors consider information dissemination to be the principal
rationale for a patent system, while others consider it an important secondary
benefit. Even in countries where the principal rationale is the innovation
incentive, patent statutes often require clear disclosure, sometimes as an
explicit condition of grant. Machlup (1958) dismissed as entirely fallacious the
idea that technology disclosure is a benefit of patent systems.
16
But what
empirical evidence is there on the use of patents for information on new tech-
nologies?
In an early 1980s survey of Australian engineers, only 14 per cent reported
using patent information to track new technologies. This was partly due to
legalistic language: one respondent commented, ‘I could hardly recognize my
own inventions in legalese’ (Mandeville, Lamberton and Bishop 1982, p. 209).
Acompanion survey indicated that the major use of patent data was for using
the patent system. The 1984 IPAC review noted that ‘much of the technical
information in patent documents is not, or is only some years later, disclosed
elsewhere. Indeed, one study found that less than 10 per cent of the informa-
tion contained in patents appears in other technical media’ (IPAC 1984, p.
53).
17
The IPAC committee considered this might be due to poor technical
content, lack of awareness by potential users and difficulties in interpreting the
information.
Other reasons can be added. The important ways in which information
flows along supply chains and the role of customers and suppliers in the inno-
vation process have been increasingly understood as key drivers of competi-
40 Intellectual property policy reform

tive advantage (Porter 1990). In a 1996 study of small UK manufacturing
firms, Macdonald (2003) found they looked principally to customers, suppli-
ers and competitors for ideas. He found the two major reasons for patent
searches were checking on infringements and preparing patent applications.
Another frequent use was to check on competitors – but on their patenting
activity not their technology. Oppenheim (2000), also looking at small UK
manufacturing firms, found the major reason for non-use of patent data to be
irrelevance to company needs (54 per cent), with a further 17 per cent saying
such information was available from other sources.
18
Patent offices regularly write about the high value of patent information,
often despite survey work they have commissioned. A very large survey of
European R&D performing manufacturing firms, conducted in 1994 for the
European Patent Office (EPO), found that patent data were ‘rated lowest as
sources of information on technical developments’(EPO 1995a, p. 105).
19
The one empirical study finding that firms do use patent data is a small
survey, undertaken through the auspices of a business association, reporting
that 90 per cent of large firms find patent data useful for their own R&D, and
that 44 per cent had found usefulness increased over the past ten years
(Sheehan, Martinez and Guellec 2003). Whether the value for their own R&D
derives from purposes related to the patent system (avoiding infringement,
inventing around etc.), or for purposes to do with following the latest devel-
opments in technology, is not reported.
Besides the complexity of patent language, non-use of patent data as a
source of technology information may be due to the very low level of inven-
tiveness apparent in many patents. Further, built-in delays in publication can
eliminate any value in fast-moving areas.
Patent classes are not well designed for identifying and tracking develop-
ments in specific technologies. They often contain widely differing inventions
(Desrochers 1998).
20
At the same time, searching for a single type of innova-
tion can require searching dozens of sub-classes.
21
Word search is not always
a good alternative as there is evidence that patentees deliberately hide critical
information. Where keywords are missing, finding relevant patents can be
impossible. Stallman provides a very telling example of this problem: a US
patent on natural order recalculation in spreadsheets.
22
He notes that the key
terms ‘spreadsheet’, ‘natural order recalculation’ and ‘topological sorting’ did
not appear in the specifications (Stallman 2001). The obscurity of patent titles
has been highlighted (Murphy 2002) and Labich commented two decades ago:
‘Acompany’s patent lawyers can protect the company’s proprietary position
without giving away too much in the application process’ (Labich 1988, p. 30).
The empirical evidence thus suggests that the possible benefit of disclosure
of detailed information about new technologies may be minimal.
23
This value
may have fallen recently if preliminary work indicating increased secrecy
Costs and benefits of patent systems 41

Exploring the Variety of Random
Documents with Different Content

Effectivement, tout le milieu du torrent, sur une largeur de plus
de cent pieds, roulait avec rapidité ses flots verdâtres où se
culbutaient de larges glaçons. Au premier coup d'œil il était visible
que la navigation serait dangereuse, pour ne pas dire impossible.
—Ça va mal! grommela Veghte, après quelques minutes de
contemplation muette, si nous voulons arriver au Fort Presqu'île, il
faut absolument franchir ce scélérat de ruisseau: mais comment
faire…?
—Holà! est-ce que vous songeriez à traverser ce cours d'eau?
—Il n'y a pas d'autre parti à prendre. J'aimerais mieux en faire le
tour; mais vous conviendrez avec moi que ce serait un peu long.
—Il faudra construire un radeau, alors?
Veghte, sans rien répondre, regarda çà et là autour de lui d'un air
inquiet, comme s'il eût été en quête de quelque chose.
—Que cherchez-vous? demanda Johnson.
—Il y a généralement beaucoup de Peaux-Rouges dans ces
parages, si je pouvais mettre la main sur un de leurs canots, ce
serait parfait: leurs embarcations sont construites pour des cas
semblables; elles sont à la fois des traîneaux et des barques.
—Vous dites là une chose fort juste; mais la difficulté est de
découvrir quelque chose, sous l'épaisseur de neige qui couvre tout: il
y en a au moins quatre pieds.
—Ils ont l'habitude de les mettre sens dessus dessous, le long du
rivage; reprit Veghte continuant ses investigations. Je pense que
l'élévation de la carène apparaîtra comme une éminence sur la neige
et nous en facilitera la trouvaille. Inspectez les environs, d'un œil
perçant, Master Johnson; si vous découvrez quelque chose vous
ferez une bonne action pour nous deux, car, je vous le jure, je suis
fort embarrassé; et vous le savez, nous n'avons pas une minute à
perdre.
Chacun d'eux se mit en quête avec une patience et une
opiniâtreté de chat. Après des marches et contre-marches, Johnson
signala un renflement de neige qui semblait annoncer l'objet tant

désiré: mais c'était malheureusement sur l'autre rive; autant aurait
valu ne rien voir.
—Non! non! répliqua Basil à une observation que fit Horace dans
ce sens; non! ce que vous montrez là ne sera pas tout à fait inutile;
ça me confirme dans l'idée que ces parages sont fréquentés par les
Indiens.
A ces mots il se remit à fureter avec une nouvelle ardeur.
—Je vous le dis, Master Johnson! poursuivit-il, c'est plein
d'Indiens par ici; il y aura des barques, n'en doutez pas. Le souvenir
m'en revient maintenant; l'été dernier j'ai beaucoup voyagé dans ce
territoire, à tous les pas je rencontrais des canots, et je m'en servais
sans façon pour traverser la rivière. Si nous sommes de bons
chasseurs nous dénicherons ce gibier là.
Tout à coup les yeux de Veghte brillèrent, il s'élança vers un
bosquet de jeunes arbres, et, après un court examen, il poussa un
cri de triomphe.
Johnson releva la tête, l'aperçut qui trépignait dans la neige
comme un énergumène; il courut à lui et le trouva occupé à soulever
le canot qu'ils placèrent aussitôt sur leurs têtes pour le porter à la
rivière.
—Hein, que dites-vous de ça, Horace Johnson? s'écria Veghte au
comble de la jubilation.
—Vous êtes un habile homme, camarade Basil!
—Heu! heu! ça m'arrive quelquefois. Ah! voici l'aviron.—Holà!
holà! les Indiens, par le ciel! à l'eau! vite! vite!
Les détonations se firent entendre au milieu du silence de la
forêt, et nos deux héros purent voir cinq Peaux-Rouges leur courant
sus avec une vitesse effrayante.
Il y avait lieu de se hâter: Veghte, quoique empêché par le canot
dont Johnson lui avait abandonné toute la charge, arriva le premier à
la partie courante de la rivière.
—Allons donc! sautez! tombez là dedans! ils arrivent comme une
avalanche de démons. Baissez la tête, voilà un de ces vagabonds qui

vous vise.
Johnson, l'homme au fier sourire, était démoralisé; sa frayeur
était telle qu'il baissa, non seulement la tête, mais tout le corps, et
alla choir éperdument au fond du canot les cheveux hérissés, la
poitrine haletante.
Veghte avait saisi le long et flexible aviron; il le plongea
vigoureusement dans l'eau et le manœuvra avec une telle ardeur
que bientôt le léger esquif vola sur les flots clapotants.
Il était temps, les Indiens étaient sur le bord; et leurs balles
sifflaient brutalement aux oreilles des fugitifs.
—Ah! il faut que ça finisse! s'écria Basil en déposant l'aviron pour
prendre son fusil; en voici une qui m'a touché! et si l'affaire continue
de cette façon, nous n'irons pas loin. Johnson, où est mon fusil?
donnez-le moi.
Johnson fit son possible pour obéir, mais il tremblait si fort que le
mousquet lui échappa; malgré les efforts désespérés de Veghte,
l'arme chavira par-dessus le bord et disparut en un clin d'œil dans le
gouffre liquide.
Il serait inutile et impossible de reproduire les interjections avec
lesquelles le Forestier accueillit ce fâcheux contre-temps.
—Enfin! ajouta-t-il, montrez-vous donc bon à quelque chose:
prenez votre fusil et faites-en usage.
Au moment où Johnson épaula son mousquet, les Sauvages se
laissèrent tomber dans la neige, comme si le coup fût parti et les eût
tous renversés.
—Ne faites pas feu! s'écria Basil, ce serait une balle perdue.
Attendez qu'ils se relèvent.
Les Indiens, au lieu de rester immobiles dans la neige, avaient
rampé agilement dans son épaisseur, et s'étaient considérablement
rapprochés du rivage. Quand ils reparurent à la surface, Veghte
poussa une exclamation de dépit, et força de rames: cependant le
courant l'avait aidé dans ses efforts; si les Indiens avaient couru, le

canot avait glissé sur l'eau, et s'était dirigé obliquement vers la rive
opposée.
La bande sauvage se mit à le suivre, courant sur le bord, et
poussant des hurlements atroces; en même temps les Peaux-Rouges
ne cessaient pas de fusiller la frêle embarcation.
La situation n'était pas gaie. Stimulé par les observations de Basil,
Johnson essaya de faire feu: mais ce fut inutilement, son fusil
vacillait entre ses mains, soit parce que ses mains tremblaient de
terreur, soit parce que l'agitation de la barque sur les flots se
communiquait à tout ce qu'elle contenait. La balle alla soulever la
neige fort loin du but. Cette maladresse fut accueillie par de
nouvelles clameurs à la fois menaçantes et dérisoires.
Veghte perdit patience; il arracha le fusil à Johnson, lui jeta
dédaigneusement l'aviron:
—Essayez si vous serez moins maladroit à ramer, lui dit-il; je vois
bien que vous n'entendez rien au maniement du fusil.
Horace saisit la rame d'un air contrit et s'en servit avec une telle
ardeur qu'au premier coup il faillit la rompre; au second la barque
fut sur le point de sombrer.
Veghte lança un regard qui ne présageait rien de bon:
—Encore une maladresse de ce genre, lui dit-il, je vous casse la
tête comme à un chien, et je vous jette aux poissons.
Horace se modéra et fit marcher le canot convenablement; mais il
était écrit que cette néfaste traversée serait entravée jusqu'à la fin:
au moment où l'esquif allait toucher le bord opposé, la fusillade des
sauvages envoya sur lui un ouragan de plomb.
Johnson se mit à crier qu'il était blessé aux deux bras, lâcha
l'aviron et se laissa choir au milieu du bateau.
—Il n'y a plus moyen! oui Basil! murmura-t-il: je ne serai plus bon
à rien. Je n'ai pas de chance aujourd'hui.
—Ouf! je ne perds pas grand chose, grommela Veghte en le
poussant du pied pour dégager l'aviron sur lequel il était couché. Je

me tirerai bien d'affaire tout seul, s'ils me laissent une minute ou
deux de répit.
A ce moment, chose singulière, les Indiens cessèrent leur feu.
Peut-être s'étaient-ils lassés de brûler leur poudre inutilement, ou
croyaient-ils les fugitifs hors de portée.
Cependant, lorsque Veghte reprit l'aviron en main, trois coups de
fusil retentirent, et les balles firent jaillir quelques éclats du canot.
Johnson se mit à crier lamentablement qu'il venait d'être blessé
encore. Il n'y avait pas une seconde à perdre; Basil se cramponna à
l'aviron avec une vraie furie et fut assez heureux pour joindre enfin
le rivage. Le canot aborda avec une telle force que la proue vint
s'engager de plus de trois pieds dans la glace.
Le Forestier bondit à terre:
—Allons! venez vite! dit-il à son compagnon, en retenant la
barque de la main gauche, pendant qu'il lui tendait la droite pour
faciliter son débarquement.
Johnson secoua mélancoliquement la tête:
—Impossible, camarade! ça ne se peut pas.
—Comment! y pensez-vous? Allons donc, Johnson; ces canailles
vont nous fondre dessus, si nous ne décampons au plus vite. Et si
vous tombez entre leurs mains, vous savez ce qui arrivera.
Basil compléta sa pensée par un geste expressif qui consista à
faire tourner son doigt autour de sa chevelure.
—Ce sera malheureux, répondit Horace, mais je suis trop blessé
pour pouvoir me remuer; prenez mon fusil et allez-vous en; sauvez-
vous puisque vous le pouvez; laissez-moi.
Veghte le regarda pendant quelques instants d'un air indécis. Il
ne pouvait se résoudre à l'abandonner.
Mais il fallait bien prendre une résolution: deux balles vinrent
siffler à ses oreilles; les Indiens cherchaient sous la neige un canot,
et semblaient sur le point de le trouver; le danger devenait pressant.

Johnson lui-même, sans s'effrayer de rester seul, lui renouvela
l'invitation de partir et lui tendit de nouveau son fusil.
A la fin Veghte accepta; il prit l'arme et s'éloigna en disant:
—Adieu, vieux garçon! ayez bon courage; peut-être nous croiront-
ils évadés tous deux, et ne vous inquiéteront-ils pas davantage.
Avant de quitter le canot, il avait eu soin de le tirer fort avant sur
la glace, afin de le mettre le plus possible à l'abri des Indiens: sa
conscience était donc tranquille à l'égard de l'homme qu'il
abandonnait, et qui, après tout, loin d'être son ami, n'avait cessé de
lui être suspect dès le premier moment.
Une fois engagé dans la forêt, et relativement en sécurité, Basil
se rappelant qu'il avait été blessé, fit un examen rapide et superficiel
de sa personne, jugea qu'il n'y avait rien de grave, et s'orienta pour
continuer sérieusement sa route.
Au milieu de ses préoccupations, il remarqua que la fusillade des
Indiens avait cessé: cette circonstance fut notée dans son esprit,
quoiqu'il n'y attachât, sur le moment, aucune importance.
Et pourtant, s'il avait été à même de voir ce qui se passa derrière
lui aussitôt après son départ, il aurait éprouvé une surprise sans
égale.
Master Horace Johnson, après avoir attendu quelques moments
pour être sûr que son compagnon était assez éloigné, se releva
allègrement du fond du canot, et fit, de la main, un signal aux
sauvages.
Cette pantomime télégraphique voulait dire sans doute: «cessez
le feu,» et les Indiens avaient de bonnes raisons pour lui obéir
docilement, car il ne fut plus tiré un seul coup de fusil.
Une chose bien plus curieuse! Johnson, le blessé! qui ne pouvait
plus manier ni le fusil, ni la rame, lorsque Basil était auprès de lui;
Johnson, le trembleur maladroit! dégagea son canot de la glace,
avec une dextérité et une force herculéennes, prit l'aviron, s'en servit
si adroitement et si vigoureusement que la barque bondit sur les
flots, soulevée par ses bras d'acier. Enfin, chose inouïe! Master

Horace Johnson revint en droite ligne vers la rive où se trouvaient
les sauvages!
En vérité, il fut heureux pour le repos mental de Basil Veghte qu'il
n'eût pas vu ce spectacle étonnant et gros de mystère. L'honnête
Forestier aurait été obligé de laisser ce problème non résolu, et de
convenir que, comme les femmes, les hommes étaient des «choses
bizarres.»
Ce qui prouva l'innocence de son âme et la bonté de son cœur, ce
fut un remords de conscience auquel il s'empressa d'obtempérer.
Veghte n'avait pas fait un quart de mille qu'il se prit à songer qu'il
était un vrai lâche, un vrai Judas! d'avoir ainsi abandonné son
camarade: que si, d'un côté, le soin de sa préservation personnelle
avait pu le solliciter dans le sens du départ; d'un autre côté,
l'honneur, la loyauté, lui commandaient impérieusement de revenir
auprès de Johnson pour l'arracher aux mains de ses ravisseurs
impitoyables.
Basil ne tergiversa pas, il retourna en arrière. Accoutumé à être
prudent, il s'approcha de la rivière avec les plus grandes précautions
et gagna sans bruit les abords du lieu de son débarquement.
Là il eut beau écouter, épier du regard les rives du cours d'eau; le
silence seul et la solitude répondirent à ses investigations: il n'y avait
plus ni Johnson, ni canot, ni sauvages; plus rien que l'immensité
neigeuse, muette, glacée, et le torrent bleuâtre dont les vagues
folâtraient lugubrement entre elles.
—Ma foi! murmura-t-il en inclinant la tête avec mélancolie, voilà
ce pauvre Horace enfoncé. Je ne l'ai jamais beaucoup aimé, cet
homme, cependant je ne lui aurais souhaité aucun mal. Enfin! c'est
pour tous la même loi; nous devons tous y aller tôt ou tard.
Sur ce propos philosophique, Basil tourna les talons et reprit
diligemment la roule du Fort Presqu'île, où il arriva fort tard dans la
soirée.

CHAPITRE VI
ÉCLAIRCISSEMENT.—SINISTRES
NOUVELLES
Le Fort Presqu'île était situé sur l'extrémité méridionale du Lac
Érié, près de l'emplacement actuel de la ville Érié.
Sur l'un de ses bastions avancés était une grosse citadelle en
troncs d'arbres, une Block-House, comme on disait alors, spécimen
favori des fortifications américaines à cette époque primitive de la
civilisation. Elle avait deux étages de hauteur; celui de dessus
excédant l'autre en diamètre, de telle façon que la garnison pouvait,
au besoin, faire feu sur les assaillants, jusque sous les murs de la
citadelle.
La toiture, formée de plaques d'argile cuites au feu, était à l'abri
de l'incendie; et, par surcroît de précaution, au faîte de l'édifice se
trouvait un vaste réservoir en bois, toujours rempli d'eau, en cas de
besoin.
La position de ce fort n'était pas heureuse. On l'avait bâti sur une
langue de terre avancée, entre les eaux du Lac et un petit ruisseau
qui venait s'y jeter à angle droit. Mais, à environ cent cinquante
pieds de la Block-House, s'élevait un monticule qui la dominait
presque entièrement; c'était un point d'attaque formidable contre le
Fort: de l'autre côté, le Lac fournissait toutes les facilités possibles
pour une attaque par eau.
Les événements dont nous retraçons l'histoire, se passaient à
l'époque éminemment critique pour les émigrants Européens, où le
fameux Pontiac, le célèbre chef des Ottawas, faisait de gigantesques

[
1]
efforts pour exterminer les Faces-Pâles dont l'irruption envahissante
depuis la défaite du Roi Philippe
1
absorbait de jour en jour les
territoires Indiens, et refoulait les Peaux-Rouges dans le désert.
Voir le 6
e
volume de la 2
me
série—Le Scalpeur des Ottawas—qui reproduit
les phases émouvantes de la guerre du roi Philippe.
Ce chef habile, avec un corps composé de mille hommes d'élite,
avait établi son quartier général au Détroit, dont il faisait le siége;
pour coopérer à son œuvre de destruction, toutes les peuplades, à
cent lieues à la ronde, avaient envoyé leurs contingents dans chaque
territoire occupé par les Européens, et leur faisaient une guerre
héroïque.
Devant eux tombèrent successivement les forts nombreux établis
sur une immense ligne de frontières: ces établissements militaires
protégés par de minimes garnisons, furent saccagés au moment où
leurs défenseurs y songeaient le moins. Les officiers supérieurs,
isolés dans la solitude du désert, séparés les uns des autres par
plusieurs centaines de milles, passaient souvent plusieurs mois sans
recevoir aucune nouvelle de leurs plus proches voisins; leur désastre
n'éveillait aucun écho; ils disparaissaient ignorés, comme avaient
disparu leurs concitoyens, sans secours, sans consolations, sans
aucune chance de salut.
Le fort Sandusky tomba ainsi au milieu de mai 1764. Le fort St-
Joseph, à l'embouchure de la rivière Sainte-Marie sur le Lac
Michigan, subit le même sort quelques jours après. Ensuite le
Michilimackinac; l'Onataton sur l'Wabash; le Miami sur le Maumee.
Nous verrons bientôt périr aussi le fort Presqu'île aux dernières
péripéties duquel sont consacrés les récits qui composent cette
histoire.
Cette esquisse générale terminée nous rentrons dans notre sujet.
Plusieurs mois s'étaient écoulés: par une belle soirée de juin,
l'Enseigne Christie, commandant du Fort Presqu'île, debout devant la
Block-House, sur le bord du lac, était en grande conversation avec
notre ami Basil Veghte.

Christie était un homme robuste, musculeux, coulé en bronze,
dont le visage calme et sévère avait un puissant cachet de
détermination et d'intelligence; sa voix était vibrante et
sympathique, sa conversation agréable; mais il avait, en parlant, une
singulière contenance: il avait toujours les bras croisés, la tête
basse; il ne remuait que ses pieds, fort occupés à lancer au loin des
cailloux.
Veghte, suivant son invariable habitude fumait démesurément,
armé d'une énorme pipe en racine de bruyère: lorsqu'il voulait
gesticuler, il retirait invariablement sa pipe de sa bouche et la faisait
participer à la pantomime qu'exécutait sa main.
Christie ne relevait guère les yeux; seulement, lorsqu'il était
parvenu à hisser sur le bout de son pied un caillou convenable, il le
suivait du regard après l'avoir lancé le plus loin possible.
Au contraire les yeux du Forestier étaient dans un mouvement
perpétuel; sur le lac, sur les collines, sur les bois, devant, derrière,
sur les côtés, ils étaient partout. Cette mobilité cauteleuse du regard,
devenue une seconde nature, est le type caractéristique du
Frontiersman; sa vie aventureuse l'a accoutumé à une vigilance
forcée, permanente, infatigable.
—Oui… dit Christie, répondant après un long silence à une
observation que lui avait faite son compagnon, je ne tire pas bon
augure de cette tranquillité affectée des Indiens. Ils se sont éloignés
du fort ostensiblement, pendant la journée, et pourtant, ce soir, je
crois flairer des embuscades tout autour de nous. Oui, ce départ
n'est pas naturel, je m'en méfie beaucoup.
—Je suis parfaitement de votre avis, ils ne sont pas loin, vous
pouvez vous mettre ça dans l'esprit. Il y en a partout de ses
vermines-là: en bon compte, c'est trop de moitié.
—Je voudrais avoir des nouvelles du Détroit, ajouta Christie après
une nouvelle pose, il s'est présenté un Indien, la semaine dernière,
alors que vous étiez en chasse, cet homme avait quelque chose à
nous dire. Tout ce qu'on a pu saisir dans son baragouin a été ceci:
«Pontiac… Détroit…» Sur le moment, je n'ai pas fait grande attention

à ses paroles; mais depuis, j'ai réfléchi, il doit y avoir quelque
mauvaise affaire dans l'air; je suis sûr que ce Sauvage avait des
détails intéressants à nous donner.
—Vous pensez que le vieux chef aurait pris la place?
—Je le crains.
—Eh bien! pas moi. Lorsque je l'habitais, ce Fort me faisait l'effet
d'être la plus forte citadelle qu'on pût désirer en cas de guerre
Indienne.
—Cela pourrait être si ces sauvages combattaient comme les
hommes blancs. Mais, Basil, vous savez aussi bien que moi leurs
façons extraordinaires d'attaquer. Ce serait un jeu pour le Major
Gladwyn de repousser un assaut livré ouvertement, en plein jour;
mais je tremble toujours qu'ils ne le surprennent à l'improviste hors
de garde.
—Je n'en disconviens pas: mais n'a-t-il pas fréquenté les bois
autant que vous? Or, vous ne seriez pas homme à vous laisser
surprendre.
—Ah! bien des circonstances sont venues m'instruire: j'ai peut-
être plus d'expérience que lui. Peut-être m'y laisserais-je prendre, si
je n'avais pas reçu vos leçons.
—Oh! je ne suis pas un savant, moi: seulement, je serais un triste
imbécile si je n'avais pas un peu appris à connaître les Indiens,
depuis le temps que je les fréquente.
—Vous rappelez-vous votre aventure avec Johnson, l'hiver
dernier? cette nuit où vous sauvâtes une fille Indienne à demi-gelée?
—Je le crois bien! je ne suis pas près de l'oublier.
—Depuis, avez-vous eu des nouvelles de ce Johnson?
—Non. Le pauvre diable était bien bas quand je l'ai laissé; il était
gravement blessé, les Indiens étaient sur ses talons, je ne sais trop
comment il aura fait pour leur échapper; sa seule ressource aura été
de sauter hors du canot et de se noyer pour ne pas tomber entre
leurs mains.

—C'est bien lui qui était venu au fort plusieurs fois, dans le
courant de l'été dernier?
—Oui, il est venu à diverses reprises.
—Eh bien! mon pauvre Basil, je l'ai revu l'autre jour, cet homme-
là.
Le Forestier releva la tête avec une expression de surprise facile à
comprendre. Christie lui adressa un paisible sourire.
—Oui! je l'ai vu, reprit-il, comme je vous vois en ce moment. Il
n'était pas à cent pas de distance.
—Et où donc?
—Sur ce ruisseau même. J'étais allé à la chasse, vous vous en
souvenez, mercredi dernier: j'avais remonté le cours d'eau sur un
espace d'environ un demi-mille: tout à coup j'entends le bruit d'un
canot courant sur l'eau; je me retourne à temps pour le voir passer,
et pour distinguer parfaitement Master Johnson assis au gouvernail,
avec le calme et la majesté d'un commodore.
—Ah! voilà qui est merveilleux! Je suis bien aise de cette
nouvelle; car j'avais sur le cœur l'idée que cet homme avait péri
malheureusement. Les Sauvages en auront eu pitié, l'auront soigné;
il se sera ensuite arrangé de manière à leur glisser entre les mains.
—C'est possible; mais dans ce cas, il y en a un ou deux qui n'ont
pu se décider à être séparés de lui. Il était en compagnie d'un
superbe couple d'Indiens, peints magnifiquement en guerre.
Veghte regarda le commandant dans les yeux, pour se convaincre
que ses paroles étaient sérieuses.
—J'ai reconnu même un de ces sauvages, poursuivit l'officier;
quant à l'autre, il ne me semble pas l'avoir jamais vu. Mais vous
aussi, avez eu affaire avec l'un de ces guerriers du désert.
—Comment le nommez-vous?
—Balkblalk, ce gros vaurien d'Ottawa. Il est venu rôder souvent
par ici, sous prétexte de chasse: j'en ai toujours eu méchante
opinion.

—Johnson est en mauvaise compagnie, répliqua le Forestier; cet
Ottawa est un drôle capable de faire tout, grand traître ami du mal
fait dans l'ombre. Je suis sûr qu'il m'a tenu un jour au bout de son
fusil et ne s'est pas gêné pour tirer; si j'ai échappé, c'est par un
miracle de la bonté de Dieu. Je serais bien aise de le rencontrer sur
mon chemin.
—Non; ce n'est pas le moment. Évitons tout conflit avec les
Indiens, tout prétexte d'hostilité. Ils nous sont assez ennemis, il n'y
a pas besoin de les exciter davantage.—Ce fut une étrange aventure,
n'est-ce pas, Basil? poursuivit Christie après un instant de silence,
que cette rencontre d'une fille Indienne au beau milieu d'une
tempête, en plein désert, par une nuit noire de décembre?
—Oui! ç'a été le plus grand étonnement de ma vie. Ah! si j'avais
été un malin, j'aurais approfondi la question: aujourd'hui je me
repens de ne pas l'avoir fait.
—Qu'y auriez-vous gagné? Des coups de fusil probablement: on a
toujours du désagrément à se mêler d'affaires de femmes.
—Les femmes sont de drôles de choses! répéta Veghte avec une
mélancolie comique; je n'en saurais parler convenablement.
Pendant environ deux minutes, l'Enseigne Christie fut
complètement absorbé par le lancement difficile de plusieurs petits
cailloux suspendus en équilibre sur le bout de son pied. Il se
contenta de sourire, sans parler, ni relever la tête, au naïf axiome de
son compagnon.
Ce dernier, toujours les yeux au guet, inspectait le Lac et ses rives
comme s'il ne les avait jamais vus.
Tout à coup il poussa une exclamation.
—Commandant! jetez un regard sur ce rivage, là-bas, au
couchant, et dites-moi si ce n'est pas un bateau qui s'avance. Oui,
c'est un bateau, j'en suis sûr maintenant.
Christie regarda dans la direction indiquée, et répondit aussitôt:
—Oui, c'est un bateau, rempli de monde, et qui vient dans cette
direction.

—Il y a deux embarcations, reprit vivement Basil: voyez-vous, une
d'elles s'avance au large dans le lac; l'autre la suit. Ah! cette seconde
passe devant, maintenant.
—Elles ne sont pas à plus d'un mille de distance, répondit
Christie; à la manière dont les rameurs manient les avirons il est
facile de voir qu'ils sont rudement fatigués, regardez comme les
rames se lèvent et s'abaissent avec lenteur.
—Oui, probablement ils ont fait une longue journée.
—Qui croyez-vous que ce puisse être, Basil?
—Vraiment je ne saurais le dire. Ce sont peut-être des gens qui
ont entendu parler d'un danger menaçant Presqu'île, et qui viennent
pour nous donner un coup de main.
—Pire que cela, Basil; pire que cela! Je parierais qu'il y a
quelqu'un de nos forts saccagé, et que les survivants viennent nous
demander asile.
—Quelle place? le fort Sandusky, peut-être.
—Justement, j'y pensais. C'est une triste affaire, vous pouvez en
être sûr.
Pendant ce temps, quelques hommes de la citadelle avaient
signalé l'approche des bateaux, et s'étaient portés à leur rencontre
jusqu'à l'extrémité de la langue de terre. Peu après les barques
abordèrent et les navigateurs firent leur débarquement.
Ils étaient environ une quarantaine; tous dans un état de
délabrement pénible à voir; visages bandés, bras en écharpe, figures
hâves et amaigries, vêtements en lambeaux: tel était leur aspect
lamentable.
Leur chef, le lieutenant Cuyler, s'avança rapidement vers
l'enseigne Christie, et lui dit d'un ton abattu:
—J'ai de mauvaises nouvelles à vous annoncer.
—Je le pressentais, répondit l'autre avec tristesse, voyons de quoi
il s'agit.

Pendant que les deux chefs conversaient ensemble, on prit soin
des hommes, et on leur offrit avec cordialité les rafraîchissements
dont ils avaient grand besoin.
—Voilà tout ce qui me reste de mes quatre-vingt seize hommes,
dit le lieutenant, nous avons quitté le fort Niagara le trente mai, et
nous nous sommes traînés comme nous avons pu, tout le long des
rivages nord du Lac Érié, nous dirigeant vers le fort Détroit.
—Pourquoi preniez-vous cette direction?
—N'avez-vous pas appris que Pontiac a commencé le mois dernier
à assiéger cette place?
—Non, en vérité; mais je soupçonnais que tout n'était pas au
mieux pour le major Gladwyn.
—Oh! sa position est presque désespérée. Il est serré de près par
des forces énormément supérieures: je le crois perdu avec sa
garnison.
—Vous croyez?
—Mon Dieu, oui. Un courrier est venu nous apporter un pressant
message pour nous demander des renforts en hommes et en
munitions: Nous sommes partis aussi vite que possible. Mais nous ne
pouvons plus essayer de rejoindre le major Gladwyn, car, après le
désastre que nous venons d'éprouver, ce serait marcher à une
destruction certaine.
—Je suis bien désireux d'entendre votre récit lieutenant; mais ne
voudriez-vous pas accepter quelques rafraîchissements, vous
semblez épuisé?
—Je vous remercie, tout-à-l'heure.—Après plusieurs jours de
marche, nous sommes arrivés à la Pointe au Pelé, près de
l'embouchure de la rivière Détroit, où nous pensions trouver un lieu
favorable de débarquement. Une fois sur les lieux, nous les avons
soigneusement explorés en tout sens pour nous assurer des indices
qui auraient pu révéler la présence des Indiens. Nous ne pûmes rien
découvrir: il n'apparaissait pas l'ombre d'un danger.

—Signe certain qu'il y avait quelque désastre dans le vent;
grommela Basil.
—Nous avions pris toutes nos mesures pour nous mettre sur la
défensive ou même nous échapper, en cas d'alarme. Nos huit
bateaux étaient rangés sur le bord, tout prêts à appareiller. Un de
nos hommes et un mousse étaient entrés dans le bois pour y
ramasser des broussailles destinées à allumer le feu.—Tout à coup
un sauvage surgit, fend la tête au mousse d'un coup de tomahawk,
en fait autant à l'homme qui vient mourir dans le camp, en donnant
l'alarme.
«Je forme sur le champ mes hommes en demi cercle devant les
bateaux, et je leur recommande de se tenir fermes et inébranlables,
le moindre mouvement inopportun pouvant nous devenir fatal.
«Cependant les choses s'annonçaient mal; plusieurs pauvres
diables tombèrent foudroyés, sans qu'il fut possible de voir même
d'où arrivaient les coups de feu. Je vis bien qu'une attaque sérieuse
nous serait funeste.
«J'avais à peine donné mes premiers ordres, que les démons
rouges ouvrirent leur feu du fond de la forêt; mes hommes leur
ripostèrent de leur mieux. Si les Indiens avaient été quelque peu en
vue, la lutte aurait été moins défavorable: mais vous savez, mon
cher Enseigne, combien il est démoralisant pour un corps d'armée
régulier de se débattre contre un ennemi invisible, qui sème tout
autour de lui une tempête mortelle de feu et de plomb.
«Les Indiens s'aperçurent sans doute de l'hésitation de nos
soldats, car au bout d'un instant, leur bande entière sortit du bois
avec des hurlements si épouvantables, qu'en y pensant seulement,
mon sang se glace dans mes veines.
«Je recommandai à mes hommes de se tenir fermes: mais il avait
suffi de la présence des Indiens pour les consterner. Le centre de
mon petit bataillon céda sous le choc, se laissa entamer, et tout le
monde se retourna vers les bateaux. Ce fut un moment affreux: les
braves cœurs qui essayèrent de résister furent mis en pièces; les

autres furent culbutés jusque dans les bateaux, où les sauvages,
avec une audace incroyable, arrivèrent en même temps que nous.
«Tant bien que mal on démarra cinq bateaux sur lesquels les
survivants s'empilèrent précipitamment, et on poussa au large.
Voyant tout perdu, je me jetai à l'eau le dernier, et je me cramponnai
au dernier bateau qui fuyait. On me hissa ensuite, une fois en pleine
eau, car dans la confusion du premier moment, personne ne s'était
aperçu de ma disparition.
«Mais, le croiriez-vous, Sir! Les sauvages eurent l'acharnement de
se jeter sur trois de nos bateaux, d'en renverser les hommes et de
les jeter à l'eau tout sanglants. Nos malheureux camarades
épouvantés ne firent pas la moindre résistance; ce fut une
boucherie. Les deux embarcations restantes s'échappèrent à force
de rames: nous avons erré toute la nuit et la matinée sur le Lac, et
nous voilà.»
—Avez-vous passé au fort Sandusky?
—Oui; nous n'avons trouvé que des cendres.
—Ciel! est-il possible?
—Mon Dieu oui! il a disparu, et je vous l'annonce, votre poste ne
tardera pas à subir le même sort.
—Parlez-vous sérieusement, lieutenant?
—Malheureusement oui. Quelle est la bande Indienne qui
résistera à la tentation de vous attaquer, ayant devant les yeux de
semblables précédents? Voyez, d'ailleurs, ce côteau d'où sort votre
ruisseau, voyez le bord du Lac! Nos ennemis peuvent-ils désirer
mieux pour avoir sur nous tous les avantages?
—Je reconnais que ce fort a été établi d'une façon aussi misérable
et inintelligente qu'incompréhensible. Mais, avant de détruire les
murailles, il faudra anéantir la garnison.
—C'est possible: néanmoins souvenez-vous de mes paroles, votre
fort tombera; il n'est pas au pouvoir des forces humaines de prévenir
ce désastre. Mon intention n'est pas de vous effrayer, je vous avertis,
c'est mon devoir.

—Oh! vous ne m'effrayez pas, répondit Christie avec un triste
sourire; il y a ici des bras robustes et des cœurs inébranlables; nous
nous ensevelirons sous les ruines plutôt que de reculer.
—Je n'en doute pas; pourtant, je persiste dans mon opinion. Cet
archi-diable de Pontiac a soulevé toutes les peuplades indiennes, les
plus épouvantables périls sont suspendus sur nos têtes. Et
maintenant, mon cher Enseigne, j'accepterai volontiers votre
bienveillante hospitalité.
On rentra dans le fort, où tous les efforts furent mis en œuvre
pour réconforter les pauvres fugitifs autant que le permettaient les
circonstances.
Le lendemain ils se remirent en route dans la direction de
Niagara, pour porter à leur chef la nouvelle du désastre qu'ils avaient
essuyé.
Pour compléter les détails relatifs à cet épisode, nous ferons
connaître au lecteur le sort des trois embarcations et des hommes
capturés par les Indiens.
«Les malheureux» dit Parkmann dans son histoire de la vie de
Pontiac «furent entraînés au camp du chef, près de la rivière Détroit:
là, on les massacra de la façon la plus révoltante; après les avoir
brûlés vifs, on les coupa en morceaux, et, pendant plusieurs jours, la
garnison consternée du fort, put voir flotter sur la rivière des débris
humains, des têtes, des bras, des jambes, des troncs calcinés et
tailladés, que se disputait la voracité des poissons.»

CHAPITRE VII
RÉSURRECTION D'UN VIVANT
La visite du lieutenant Cuyler eut au moins ce bon résultat qu'elle
fut un avertissement salutaire pour l'enseigne Christie et sa
garnison, d'avoir à se tenir sur leurs gardes; en même temps elle
leur fit connaître des événements très-importants qu'ils ignoraient.
Ce fut pour eux un trait de lumière qui les éclaira sur la
conspiration gigantesque ourdie par Pontiac, et sur le danger
imminent qui menaçait les garnisons isolées dans le désert. En effet,
ces corps détachés, perdus à des centaines de milles au fond des
bois, pouvaient être assaillis facilement par des nuées de sauvages;
une fois bloqués dans leurs citadelles rustiques, ce n'était plus pour
eux qu'une affaire de temps; tôt ou tard il fallait succomber.
Christie, à la tournure que prenaient les choses s'attendait
parfaitement à voir arriver son tour. C'était un noble et vaillant
homme de guerre, incapable de faiblir, disposé à se faire hacher en
morceaux plutôt que de céder aux Indiens un pouce de terrain. Il se
tenait merveilleusement sur ses gardes; il avait su animer ses
hommes de son souffle courageux; chacun autour de lui était prêt à
combattre jusqu'au dernier rayon d'espoir, jusqu'au dernier souffle
de vie.
Le seul point qui le tînt en peine, était la faiblesse de la citadelle
au point de vue de l'emplacement. Il savait trop bien que les
Sauvages, qui d'ailleurs se perfectionnaient tous les jours dans l'art
de la guerre, sauraient parfaitement profiter de tous les avantages
du terrain pour s'abriter; et que, derrière les terrassements naturels

qui dominaient le fort, ils pourraient braver une grêle de balles, tout
en accablant les assiégés d'une fusillade meurtrière.
Le lendemain du départ de Cuyler, l'Enseigne Christie était debout
sur l'extrême pointe de la presqu'île, considérablement occupé à
lancer des petits cailloux avec la pointe de son pied, et à méditer sur
les obscurités de l'avenir.
Il faisait une de ces splendides matinées comme le ciel se plaît
fréquemment à en accorder aux contrées placées sous cette latitude.
En tout autre temps, le commandant du fort se serait senti léger et
joyeux; mais, ce jour là, son esprit était oppressé par une sorte de
pressentiment vague et sinistre, qui peu à peu l'enveloppa comme
d'un brouillard de mélancolie.
Un bruit de pas légers frappa son oreille; il se retourna et aperçut
Basil Veghte qui s'approchait.
—Je ne sais pas ce qu'il faudrait pour vous distraire, fit ce dernier
en gesticulant avec sa pipe qu'il venait de retirer de sa bouche; voilà
une heure que je vous examine, et vous êtes toujours tête baissée,
remuant les petits cailloux, aussi absorbé par vos méditations qu'un
chasseur à l'affût du castor. Vous avez dans l'esprit quelque chose
qui vous trouble.
—Ah! c'est vous Basil! je suis bien aise de vous voir; mon esprit
se remettra en votre société. Depuis que ce malheureux Cuyler et
ses hommes ont passé par ici, je n'ai fait que penser à leur aventure
et à leurs discours; je ne puis pas m'ôter de l'idée que le fort Détroit
et tous ceux des frontières seront anéantis successivement.
—D'où vous vient cette opinion, Enseigne?
—Tous les commandants sont assez fous pour s'endormir dans je
ne sais quelle molle insouciance; ils se livrent, pour ainsi dire, eux-
mêmes aux Indiens. Le major Gladwyn, peut-être, est sur ses
gardes, mais, mais comme son poste est le plus important, Pontiac
s'en est chargé lui-même et il l'assiége avec fureur. Si Cuyler et ses
hommes avec leurs munitions, avaient réussi à rejoindre Détroit, le
major et sa garnison auraient été sauvés, aujourd'hui tout est perdu.

Welcome to our website – the perfect destination for book lovers and
knowledge seekers. We believe that every book holds a new world,
offering opportunities for learning, discovery, and personal growth.
That’s why we are dedicated to bringing you a diverse collection of
books, ranging from classic literature and specialized publications to
self-development guides and children's books.
More than just a book-buying platform, we strive to be a bridge
connecting you with timeless cultural and intellectual values. With an
elegant, user-friendly interface and a smart search system, you can
quickly find the books that best suit your interests. Additionally,
our special promotions and home delivery services help you save time
and fully enjoy the joy of reading.
Join us on a journey of knowledge exploration, passion nurturing, and
personal growth every day!
ebookbell.com

Intellectual Property Policy Reform Fostering Innovation And Development Christopher Arup

About This Presentation

Slide Content

Tags

Categories

Download

Quick Actions

Statistics

Related Slideshows

Intellectual Property Policy Reform Fostering Innovation And Development Christopher Arup

About This Presentation

Slide Content

Slide 1

Slide 3

Slide 5

Slide 6

Slide 7

Slide 8

Slide 9

Slide 10

Slide 11

Slide 12

Slide 13

Slide 14

Slide 15

Slide 16

Slide 17

Slide 19

Slide 21

Slide 22

Slide 23

Slide 24

Slide 25

Slide 26

Slide 27

Slide 28

Slide 29

Slide 30

Slide 31

Slide 32

Slide 33

Slide 34

Slide 35

Slide 36

Slide 37

Slide 38

Slide 39

Slide 40

Slide 41

Slide 42

Slide 43

Slide 44

Slide 45

Slide 46

Slide 47

Slide 48

Slide 49

Slide 50

Slide 51

Slide 52

Slide 53

Slide 54

Slide 55

Slide 56

Slide 57

Slide 58

Slide 59

Slide 60

Slide 61

Slide 62

Slide 63

Slide 64

Slide 65

Slide 66

Slide 67

Slide 68

Slide 69

Slide 70

Slide 71

Slide 72

Slide 73

Tags

Categories

Download

Quick Actions

Statistics

Related Slideshows

TLE-9-Prepare-Salad-and-Dressing.pptxkkk

LESSON 1 ABOUT MEDIA AND INFORMATION.pptx