Powerpoint_Aristotles_Criticism_of_Plato.pptx

aristotle vs plato on forms

1. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Forms

2. Aristotle's Criticism of Plato's Forms Disparaging remarks about the Forms The Third Man Argument Aristotle’s escape: the Theory of Categories Is the Theory of Categories coherent?

3. 1. Disparaging remarks about the Forms Metaphysics I.9 (same texts also at XIII.3) Metaphysics III.2 Posterior Analytics I.22

4. Metaphysics I.9 There are those who propose the Ideas as explanations. Their first problem: in trying to understand how to explain the things we can point to, they postulate other things equal in number to these. This is as if someone wanted to figure out how much he has and thinks he can’t count them up when there are only a few, but thinks he can when he has made more! (990a34-b4)

5. Metaphysics I.9 For they think that, corresponding to each of the things we can point to, there is something else, apart from their substance, with the same name. They think that there is a one over the many for everything, both over things we can point to and over eternal things. (990b6-8)

6. Metaphysics I.9 Another problem for them: none of the ways we have for proving that Forms exist is convincing. Some of the proofs just don’t work: the conclusion does not follow. Others work too well: they prove that there are Forms for things no one believes have Forms. For according to the arguments from the sciences there will be Forms of all things of which there are sciences. (990b8-13)

7. Metaphysics I.9 Further problems for the more accurate of the arguments: some . . . state that there is a third man. (990b15-17)

8. Metaphysics I.9 Above all one might ask what in the world the Forms contribute to our understanding of perceptible things. (991a8-10)

9. Metaphysics I.9 And to say that they are patterns and that other things share in them is to give an empty account and to use poetic metaphors. For what is it that works by taking a look at the Forms? Anything can either be or become like another without being copied from it, in the way that someone might become like Socrates whether Socrates exists or not. And clearly the same might happen even if Socrates were eternal. (991a20-27)

10. Metaphysics III.2 Such a doctrine has many kinds of difficulties. Its most absurd assertion is that there are natures apart from those in the world, and that these are the same as the perceptible things except that the one group is eternal while the other is perishable. (997b5- 8 )

11. Posterior Analytics I.22 It is not possible for something to be white [ such as White Itself ] which is not something else being white. For we can say goodbye to the Forms; they are mere twittering. Even if they exist, they add nothing to an explanation. (83a32-34)

12. 2. The Third Man Argument Plato, Parmenides Aristotle, On Ideas [Lost] Alexander of Aphrodisias , Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle

13. Plato, Parmenides 132a1-b2 Parmenides : I suppose that you think that each Form is one thing for the following sort of reason. Whenever many things seem to you to be large, there perhaps seems to be some one characteristic that is the same when you look at all of them. Hence you suppose that ‘large’ is one thing. Socrates : True. P : But now take ‘large’ itself and the other things that are large. Whenever in the same manner you look with the mind’s eye at this new collection, doesn’t one thing make its appearance -- another ‘large’, the ‘large’ by which all of these appear large? S : It seems so. P : Then another Form Largeness will have been brought to light, apart from Largeness itself and the things that share in it. Moreover, when you look at all these, another ‘large’ makes its appearance, by which all of these shall be large. So each of your Forms will no longer be one, but unlimited in number.

14. “Many things seem to you to be large”

15. “There perhaps seems to be some one characteristic that is the same when you look at all of them.”

16. “Hence you suppose that large is one thing.”

17. “Now take large itself and the other things that are large.”

18. “Doesn’t one thing make its appearance – another large, the large by which all of these appear large ?”

19. “Then another Form Largeness will have been brought to light, apart from Largeness itself and the things that share in it. Moreover, when you look at all these, another large makes its appearance, by which all of these shall be large. So each of your Forms will no longer be one, but unlimited in number.”

20. Plato, Parmenides 132c12-133a3 S: The best I can make of the matter is this. ‘Forms’ are as it were patterns fixed in the nature of things. The other things are copied from the Forms and are similarities. ‘Other things coming to share in the Forms’ means nothing but that they become likenesses of Forms. P: Well, if something is copied from the Form, doesn’t the Form have to be similar to the thing made like it in whatever way the thing became similar to it? Or is it feasible that the thing that’s similar not be similar to what it is similar to? S: That’s not possible.

21. P: Then, by great necessity, must not the thing that’s similar to something share in some one thing with the thing that it is similar to? S: It is necessary. P: And won’t that which is shared in, which makes the similar things similar, be the Form itself? S: I guess so. P: Then it is not possible for something to be similar to a Form or for a Form to be similar to something else, unless -- apart from that Form -- another Form is always going to be appearing. And if that other Form is similar to the first, still another will appear. And a new Form will never stop appearing, again and again, so long as the Form is similar to what shares in it.

22. Aristotle, Metaphysics 990b17- “Further problems for the more accurate of the arguments: some . . . state that there is a third man .”

23. Premise 1: a shared predicate 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man .

24. Premise 2: Existence Premise 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2. There is something that “ is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself.

25. Premise 3: Non-identity Premise 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them,” that is: Man himself ≠ Socrates Man himself ≠ Plato Man himself ≠ Aristotle Etc.

26. Premise 4: Self-predication Premise 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man .” [That is, Man himself is a man. ]

27. Premise 1ʹ: Comparability Premise 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] 1ʹ . Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc . and Man himself are each a man . (From premises 1 & 4)

28. Premise 2ʹ : The Third Man 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] 1ʹ. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc . and Man himself are each a man . 2ʹ . There is something that “ is predicated of particular men and of the Idea ”—call it Man himself himself , or the Third Man !

29. I interpret the Third Man Argument to contain 6 steps : 1. True statements that share the predicate man . 2. The existence of a one over many. 3. The non-identity of the one with the many. 4. Self-predication . 1ʹ. Comparability, giving a new version of 1. 2ʹ. The Third Man, a new version of 2.

30. We can endlessly keep recycling the first four steps of the argument. “And in this way there will also be a fourth man, who is predicated of the third man, the Form, and the particular men. And in a similar way there will be a fifth, and so on without limit .”

31. Documenting my interpretation in Alexander’s Commentary

32. Alexander’s Commentary CAG I 83.34-84.7 Here is the argument that leads to the third man. The Platonists say that if something [call it F-itself ] is predicated in common of more than one substance, then F-itself is legitimately said to be F, and that F-itself is an Idea. They also say that things [call them Fs ] that are similar to each other are so by sharing in the same thing [call it F-itself ], and that F-itself is legitimately called an F, and that F-itself is an Idea. Let’s suppose that they’re right, and that the thing which is predicated in common of things, if it is not the same as any of these things of which it is predicated, is something different and apart from these. (This is why Man Himself is a genus: because while predicated of particular men, he is the same as none of them.) Then there will be a third man, apart from the particular men such as Socrates and Plato, and apart from the Idea. And this third man will itself be one in number .

33. More of Alexander’s Commentary CAG I 84.21-85.5 The third man is also proved as follows. Suppose that that which is truly predicated of more than one thing is different and apart from the things of which it is predicated and separated from them. (Those who believe in Forms are of the opinion that they have proved this. For this is why, according to them, there exists a Man Himself: because man is truly predicated of the particular men, who are numerous, and is different from them.) If this is so, there will be a third man. For if what is predicated [that is, man ] is different from the things of which it is predicated [that is, the particular men], and subsists independently, and man is predicated of particular men and of the Idea, there will be a third man apart from the particular men and the Idea. And in this way there will also be a fourth man, who is predicated of the third man, the Form, and the particular men. And in a similar way there will be a fifth, and so on without limit. This account is the same as the first one [CAG I 83.34-84.7], since it follows from the assumption that things that are similar are so by sharing in the same thing, for men and the Ideas are similar.

34. The Existence Premise CAG I 83.34-84.7 Here is the argument that leads to the third man. The Platonists say that if something [call it F-itself ] is predicated in common of more than one substance , then F-itself is legitimately said to be F, and that F-itself is an Idea. They also say that things [call them Fs ] that are similar to each other are so by sharing in the same thing [call it F-itself ], and that F-itself is legitimately called an F, and that F-itself is an Idea. Let’s suppose that they’re right, and that the thing which is predicated in common of things , if it is not the same as any of these things of which it is predicated, is something different and apart from these. (This is why Man Himself is a genus: because while predicated of particular men, he is the same as none of them.) Then there will be a third man, apart from the particular men such as Socrates and Plato, and apart from the Idea. And this third man will itself be one in number .

35. More of The Existence Premise CAG I 84.21-85.5 The third man is also proved as follows. Suppose that that which is truly predicated of more than one thing is different and apart from the things of which it is predicated and separated from them. (Those who believe in Forms are of the opinion that they have proved this. For this is why, according to them, there exists a Man Himself: because man is truly predicated of the particular men, who are numerous , and is different from them.) If this is so, there will be a third man. For if what is predicated [that is, man ] is different from the things of which it is predicated [that is, the particular men], and subsists independently, and man is predicated of particular men and of the Idea, there will be a third man apart from the particular men and the Idea. And in this way there will also be a fourth man, who is predicated of the third man, the Form, and the particular men. And in a similar way there will be a fifth, and so on without limit. This account is the same as the first one [CAG I 83.34-84.7], since it follows from the assumption that things that are similar are so by sharing in the same thing, for men and the Ideas are similar.

36. Non-identity CAG I 84.21-85.5 The third man is also proved as follows. Suppose that that which is truly predicated of more than one thing is different and apart from the things of which it is predicated and separated from them. (Those who believe in Forms are of the opinion that they have proved this. For this is why, according to them, there exists a Man Himself: because man is truly predicated of the particular men, who are numerous, and is different from them .) If this is so, there will be a third man. For if what is predicated [that is, man ] is different from the things of which it is predicated [that is, the particular men] , and subsists independently, and man is predicated of particular men and of the Idea, there will be a third man apart from the particular men and the Idea. And in this way there will also be a fourth man, who is predicated of the third man, the Form, and the particular men. And in a similar way there will be a fifth, and so on without limit. This account is the same as the first one [CAG I 83.34-84.7], since it follows from the assumption that things that are similar are so by sharing in the same thing, for men and the Ideas are similar.

37. Self-predication CAG I 83.34-84.7 Here is the argument that leads to the third man. The Platonists say that if something [call it F-itself ] is predicated in common of more than one substance, then F-itself is legitimately said to be F , and that F-itself is an Idea. They also say that things [call them Fs ] that are similar to each other are so by sharing in the same thing [call it F-itself ], and that F-itself is legitimately called an F, and that F-itself is an Idea. Let’s suppose that they’re right, and that the thing which is predicated in common of things, if it is not the same as any of these things of which it is predicated, is something different and apart from these. (This is why Man Himself is a genus: because while predicated of particular men, he is the same as none of them.) Then there will be a third man, apart from the particular men such as Socrates and Plato, and apart from the Idea. And this third man will itself be one in number .

38. Comparability CAG I 84.21-85.5 The third man is also proved as follows. Suppose that that which is truly predicated of more than one thing is different and apart from the things of which it is predicated and separated from them. (Those who believe in Forms are of the opinion that they have proved this. For this is why, according to them, there exists a Man Himself: because man is truly predicated of the particular men, who are numerous, and is different from them.) If this is so, there will be a third man. For if what is predicated [that is, man ] is different from the things of which it is predicated [that is, the particular men], and subsists independently, and man is predicated of particular men and of the Idea , there will be a third man apart from the particular men and the Idea. And in this way there will also be a fourth man, who is predicated of the third man, the Form, and the particular men. And in a similar way there will be a fifth, and so on without limit. This account is the same as the first one [CAG I 83.34-84.7], since it follows from the assumption that things that are similar are so by sharing in the same thing, for men and the Ideas are similar.

39. Existence Premise Recycled CAG I 83.34-84.7 Here is the argument that leads to the third man. The Platonists say that if something [call it F-itself ] is predicated in common of more than one substance, then F-itself is legitimately said to be F, and that F-itself is an Idea. They also say that things [call them Fs ] that are similar to each other are so by sharing in the same thing [call it F-itself ], and that F-itself is legitimately called an F, and that F-itself is an Idea. Let’s suppose that they’re right, and that the thing which is predicated in common of things, if it is not the same as any of these things of which it is predicated, is something different and apart from these. (This is why Man Himself is a genus: because while predicated of particular men, he is the same as none of them.) Then there will be a third man, apart from the particular men such as Socrates and Plato, and apart from the Idea. And this third man will itself be one in number .

40. More Existence Premise Recycled CAG I 84.21-85.5 The third man is also proved as follows. Suppose that that which is truly predicated of more than one thing is different and apart from the things of which it is predicated and separated from them. (Those who believe in Forms are of the opinion that they have proved this. For this is why, according to them, there exists a Man Himself: because man is truly predicated of the particular men, who are numerous, and is different from them.) If this is so, there will be a third man. For if what is predicated [that is, man ] is different from the things of which it is predicated [that is, the particular men], and subsists independently, and man is predicated of particular men and of the Idea , there will be a third man apart from the particular men and the Idea . And in this way there will also be a fourth man, who is predicated of the third man, the Form, and the particular men. And in a similar way there will be a fifth, and so on without limit. This account is the same as the first one [CAG I 83.34-84.7], since it follows from the assumption that things that are similar are so by sharing in the same thing, for men and the Ideas are similar.

41. We can recycle the premises endlessly CAG I 84.21-85.5 The third man is also proved as follows. Suppose that that which is truly predicated of more than one thing is different and apart from the things of which it is predicated and separated from them. (Those who believe in Forms are of the opinion that they have proved this. For this is why, according to them, there exists a Man Himself: because man is truly predicated of the particular men, who are numerous, and is different from them.) If this is so, there will be a third man. For if what is predicated [that is, man ] is different from the things of which it is predicated [that is, the particular men], and subsists independently, and man is predicated of particular men and of the Idea, there will be a third man apart from the particular men and the Idea. And in this way there will also be a fourth man, who is predicated of the third man, the Form, and the particular men. And in a similar way there will be a fifth, and so on without limit. This account is the same as the first one [CAG I 83.34-84.7], since it follows from the assumption that things that are similar are so by sharing in the same thing, for men and the Ideas are similar.

42. Evaluation of the Third Man Argument Which premises are false?

43. Existence: Is there a one over many? 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2. There is something that “ is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself.

44. Nominalists deny the existence of a one. “One may admit that there are red houses, roses, and sunsets [or that Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle are each a man], but deny, except as a popular and misleading manner of speaking, that they have anything in common .”

45. How does nominalism work? The words ‘houses’, ‘roses’, and ‘sunsets’ are true of sundry individual entities which are houses and roses and sunsets, and the word ‘red’ or ‘red object’ is true of each of sundry individual entities which are red houses, red roses, red sunsets; but there is not, in addition, any entity whatever, individual or otherwise, which is named by the word ‘redness’, nor, for that matter, by the word ‘ househood ’, ‘ rosehood ’, ‘ sunsethood ’. That the houses and roses and sunsets are all of them red may be taken as ultimate and irreducible, and it may be held that [the Platonist] is no better off, in point of real explanatory power, for all ‘ redness’.

46. Nominalist ontology The man Socrates exists.

47. Nominalist ontology The man Socrates exists. The man Plato exists.

48. Nominalist ontology The man Socrates exists. The man Plato exists. The man Aristotle exists.

49. Nominalist ontology The man Socrates exists. The man Plato exists. The man Aristotle exists. The word ‘man’ exists.

50. Nominalist ontology The man Socrates exists. The man Plato exists. The man Aristotle exists. The word nomen ‘man’ exists. In Latin: thus the doctrine is called ‘Nominalism’.

51. Nominalist ontology The man Socrates exists. The man Plato exists. The man Aristotle exists. The word ‘man’ exists. But: “ the occult entity” that the Platonist posits under the name ‘Man Himself’ does not exist.

52. Alexander is not a nominalist.

53. Alexander accepts the argument from the sciences “Such arguments do not prove what they pretend to, that the Ideas exist. But they do prove that there is something apart from particular and perceptible things. It does not follow from the fact that there are things apart from the particulars that these things are the Ideas, for there are Universals apart from the particulars. Our own position is that the Universals are what the sciences are of."

54. Aristotle is not a nominalist

55. He accepts the argument from science “For there to be scientific reasoning, you do not need the existence of a Form or some one thing apart from the many things. However, you do need it to be true to say some one thing of many things. For unless you have this much, there will not be a Universal. And if you don’t have a Universal, you won’t have any generality, or, therefore, any scientific reasoning. So there has to be something over the many that is one and the same and non-homonymous .” -- APo i.11 77a5-9  

56. More documentation “Whenever you have some one definition and the Universal is not homonymous, you have some one thing that is no less one than some of the particulars. Indeed it is more one , inasmuch as the definitions are imperishable, while the particulars are more perishable. But remember, there is no need to draw the conclusion that something is apart from the particulars, just because a one shows .” APo i.24 88b15-22 ?

57. Still more documentation “If there is nothing apart from the particulars, and the particulars are unlimited, how is it possible to get scientific understanding of the unlimited? For it is insofar as there is something that is one and the same, it is insofar as there is something universal , that we have knowledge of anything .” M iii.4 999a26-29

58. Is the non-identity premise true? Man himself is “different from them,” that is: Man himself ≠ Socrates Man himself ≠ Plato Man himself ≠ Aristotle Etc.

59. Subargument for Non-identity “If it is not the same as any of these things of which it is predicated, it is something different and apart from these.” To say Socrates is a man is NOT to say Socrates is Socrates or Socrates is Plato or Socrates is Aristotle or etc .—so Man himself is different from Socrates, from Plato, etc.

60. Is the self-predication premise true? Self-predication seems fishy to most people ever since Russell’s paradox. Think about the barber in a small town who shaves everyone who doesn’t shave himself, and then ask yourself: does this barber shave himself or not?

61. Predication as set membership A sentence of the form ‘X is a man’ is true if and only if X is a member of the set of all men: X ∈ {Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc.}

62. If predication is set membership, self-predication is obviously false. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle are each a man. But the set of all men is not a man!

63. Predication as giving an answer

64. To the question, “What is a man?” the following are all answers: Socrates is a man Plato is a man Aristotle is a man

65. I can direct your attention to these perceptual objects: drawings or, even better, flesh-and-blood people. Socrates is a man Plato is a man Aristotle is a man

66. But I can also answer your question by drawing your attention to a conceptual object. The scientific definition of man AKA the Form Man AKA Man Himself

67. But I can also answer your question by drawing your attention to a conceptual object. The scientific definition of man AKA the Form Man AKA Man Himself Man Himself is an answer to the question, ‘What is a man?’

68. Predication as giving an answer A sentence of the form ‘X is a man’ is true if and only if X is an answer to the question, What is a man?

69. The following are four answers to the question, What is a man ? Man Himself 1 2 3 4

70. If predication is answering a question, self-predication is true. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle—as drawings or in the flesh—are each answers to the question, What is a man? The abstract or conceptual object Man Himself is an answer to the same question.

71. Plato accepted self-predication and seems to think of predication as answering a question. Republic 523-526: Both Largeness and large objects are similar in this way: they both provide answers to the question, What is it to be large ?

72. Aristotle accepts self-predication and seems to think of predication as giving an answer to a question. What in the world do [Platonists] mean by ‘a thing itself’, if (as is the case) in Man-himself and in a particular man the account of man [that is, the answer you give to the question, What is it to be man?] is one and the same ? For insofar as they are man, they will in no way differ.-- NE i.6 1096a34-b2

73. More documentation Each kind of predicate, if either it be asserted of itself [for example, ‘man is a man ’], or its genus be asserted of it [for example, ‘man is an animal ’] signifies [an answer to the question] what it is." -- T i.9 103b35-37

74. So Aristotle accepts the following premises of the Third Man Argument: 1. There are true statements that share the predicate man . 2. The existence of a one over many. 3. The non-identity of the one with the many. 4. Self-predication .

75. How does Aristotle escape the Third Man Argument?

76. How does Aristotle escape the Third Man Argument? There is also the argument that there is a third man apart from Man-himself and particular men. The fallacy is that man and everything predicated in common is not a this but either a such or a in relation to something or a how or the like. -- SE xxii 178b36-179a1

77. What does this mean? “The fallacy is that man is not a this but a such.”

78. Another way Aristotle describes Plato’s mistake If the thing predicated in common is made out to be a this and one thing , Socrates will be many animals! -- himself, man, and animal! -- this will happen if man and animal each indicates a this and one thing. -- M iii.6 1003a7-12

79. Plato and Aristotle agree: Socrates is one. Man is one. It is not the case that Socrates and man are the same.

80. Aristotle thinks it absurd to conclude: Socrates is one. Man is one. It is not the case that Socrates and man are the same. Therefore, Socrates and man are two!

81. Socrates is one. Man is one. It is not the case that Socrates and man are the same. Therefore, Socrates and man are two! To draw this conclusion is to make the alleged mistake of “separating” the Universal.

82. Socrates is one. Man is one. It is not the case that Socrates and man are the same. Therefore, Socrates and man are two! But how can Aristotle avoid drawing the conclusion?

83. Example: my purchase.

84. Ryle on category mistakes A purchaser may say that he bought a left-hand glove and a right-hand glove, but not that he bought a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove and a pair of gloves . (1949: 22)

85. Ryle would freely admit all of the following (wouldn’t you?): I bought this left-hand glove. I bought this right-hand glove. I bought this pair of gloves. It is not the case that either the left - hand, the right- hand, or the pair are the same item.

86. But Ryle (don’t you agree ?) thinks it is absurd to conclude: I bought this left-hand glove. I bought this right-hand glove. I bought this pair of gloves. It is not the case that either the left - hand, the right- hand, or the pair are the same item . Therefore I bought three items: a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove, and a pair of gloves.

87. Aristotle on fallacies due to grammatical form A fallacy due to grammatical form occurs when what is not the same is expressed in the same form, for example, when . . . quality is expressed by a quantity or quantity by quality or an active by a passive or a condition by an active and so on according to the distinctions drawn earlier. SE iv 166b10- 14

88. Aristotle on fallacies due to grammatical form I t is possible for something that is not in the category of actions to wear, grammatically, the sign of something that is in the category of actions. For example, ‘to flourish’ is of the same grammatical form as ‘to cut’ or ‘to build’, yet ‘to flourish’ refers to a kind of quality, namely, a condition , while ‘to cut’ and ‘to build’ each refer to a kind of action . It works the same way in the other cases. -- SE iv 166b15- 19

89. Aristotle’s Theory of Categories Aristotle says that we can deal with these sorts of fallacies, "since we possess the different kinds of categories.” SE xxii 178a4- 6

90. Categories ii 1a16-19 Some things that are said are said linked together. Other things are said without being linked. Examples of things that are said linked together are a man runs or a man wins . Examples of things that are said without being linked together are man , ox , runs , wins .

91. Categories iv 1b25-27 Of the things that are said without being linked in any way, each indicates either what it is or how much of it there is or what sort it is or in what relation it is to something or where it is or when it is or how it lies or what state it is in or what it is doing or what is being done to it .

92. Ten categories What How much W hat sort In relation to what Where When How it lies What state W hat it is doing W hat is being done to it

93. Ten categories What = Substance How much = Quantity What sort = Quality In relation to what = Relation Where = Location When = Time How it lies = Orientation What state = State W hat it is doing = Action W hat is being done to it = Passion

94. Categories iv 1b27-2a4 To give a rough idea, here are some examples. Substance: man, horse. Quantity: one meter, two meters. Quality: white, literate. Relation: double, half, larger. Location: in the Lyceum, in the marketplace. Time: yesterday, last year. Orientation/Posture: lying down, sitting. State: shod [wearing shoes], armed. Action: cutting, burning. Passion: being cut, being burned.

95. Using the Categories to avoid fallacy

96. Using the Categories to avoid fallacy (a ) George lost money [and so he lost one substance , that is, the money].

97. Using the Categories to avoid fallacy (a ) George lost money [and so he lost one substance , that is, the money]. (b) George lost $500 [and so he lost one amount , that is, the $500].

98. A silly conclusion: (a ) George lost money [and so he lost one substance , that is, the money]. (b) George lost $500 [and so he lost one amount , that is, the $500]. (c) Therefore George lost two things: money and $ 500!

99. One way to block the conclusion: (c) Therefore George lost two things: money and $ 500! Conclusion c does not follow, because: (d) The money is the $500. (They are the same!)

100. This is NOT Aristotle’s way to avoid the fallacy. (d) The money is the $500. (They are the same!)

101. This ‘identification’ or ‘reductive’ strategy will not work in general. (d) The money is the $500. (They are the same!)

102. More of the story: (e) George lost last night [and so he lost one time ]. ( b) George lost $500 [and so he lost one amount , that is, the $500].

103. T ry to identify the amount with the time in my story: ( f ) Last night is $ 500?

104. No! ( f ) Last night is $ 500.

105. The rest of the story: (h ) George lost self-respect. ( i ) George lost playing pool. ( j ) George lost drunk .   (k ) George lost standing up. ( l ) George lost burning with anger. ( m ) George lost downtown .

106. Do any of these seem identical with each other? (h ) self -respect. ( i ) playing pool. ( j ) drunk.   (k ) standing up. ( l ) burning with anger. ( m ) downtown.

107. If not, does it follow that: (n) George lost nine things: money, $500, last night, self-respect , playing pool, etc.?

108. Aristotle’s solution (again) A fallacy due to grammatical form occurs when what is not the same is expressed in the same form, for example, when . . . quality is expressed by a quantity or quantity by quality or an active by a passive or a condition by an active and so on according to the distinctions drawn earlier. SE iv 166b10-14

109. An example from Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations xxii 178b9 Could you see with an eye that you don’t have?

110. An example from Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations xxii 178b9 Could you see with an eye that you don’t have? Of course not!

111. But you must admit: You can see with only one eye.

112. But you must admit: You can see with only one eye. You don’t have only one eye.

113. It follows that: You can see with only one eye. You don’t have only one eye. Therefore you can see with an eye that you don’t have!

114. How some people try to escape this argument: You can see with only one eye. You don’t have only one eye. Therefore you can see with an eye that you don’t have! “Some people try to escape by saying that even if you have more than one eye, you might also have only one.” SE xxii 178b10-11

115. About this sort of escape, Aristotle says: You can see with only one eye. You don’t have only one eye. Therefore you can see with an eye that you don’t have! I f you have more than one eye, you might also have only one —it “might satisfy the person who uses them, but it doesn’t really escape the argument. We [who understand how the categories work] can grant all the premises yet still deny that the conclusion follows .” SE xxii 178b10-11

116. How the categories escape: You can see with only one eye . You don’t have only one eye. Therefore you can see with an eye that you don’t have! True: this is a manner of seeing!

117. How the categories escape: You can see with only one eye. You don’t have only one eye . Therefore you can see with an eye that you don’t have! True: but this is something you have !

118. How the categories escape: You can see with only one eye. You don’t have only one eye. Therefore you can see with an eye that you don’t have ! Obviously, you can see in a manner that uses only one eye, even if you don’t have only one eye!

119. Feel the power! “We [who understand how the categories work] can grant all the premises yet still deny that the conclusion follows.” SE xxii 178b10-11

120. Aristotle’s strategy with the Third Man Argument: Find in it a fallacy due to grammatical form.

121. Where’s the fallacy? 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] Thus t here is something that “ is predicated of particular men and of the Idea ”—call it Man himself himself , or the Third Man !

122. Where’s the fallacy? 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] Thus t here is something that “ is predicated of particular men and of the Idea ”—call it Man himself himself , or the Third Man ! Escape by denying the existence of Man himself?

123. Where’s the fallacy? 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] Thus t here is something that “ is predicated of particular men and of the Idea ”—call it Man himself himself , or the Third Man ! Escape by denying that Man himself is different from particular men?

124. Where’s the fallacy? 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] Thus t here is something that “ is predicated of particular men and of the Idea ”—call it Man himself himself , or the Third Man ! Escape by denying that there is some way in which Man himself is legitimately said to be a man—a way in which particular men are also men?

125. Where’s the fallacy? 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] Thus t here is something that “ is predicated of particular men and of the Idea ”—call it Man himself himself , or the Third Man !

126. Here is Aristotle’s escape from the Third Man: “There is also the argument that there is a third man apart from Man-himself and particular men. The fallacy is that man and everything predicated in common is not a substance but either a quality or a relation or a manner or the like .” SE xxii 178b36-39

127. Here is Aristotle’s escape from the Third Man: “ To agree that man is a this produces the third man. For man is not a this in the way that Callias is .” SE xxii 179a3-5

128. Here’s the fallacy, in Ryle’s words: “A purchaser may say that he bought a left-hand glove and a right-hand glove, but not that he bought a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove and a pair of gloves.”

129. Here’s the fallacy, in Ryle’s words: “A purchaser may say that he bought a left-hand glove and a right-hand glove, but not that he bought a left-hand glove, a right-hand glove and a pair of gloves.” Likewise, you may talk about Socrates and Plato (a this and a this), but not about Plato and Man Himself (a this and a such).

130. The fallacy, in other words, is in the Comparability premise: 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] 1ʹ. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc . and Man himself are each a man . 2ʹ. There is something that “ is predicated of particular men and of the Idea ”—call it Man himself himself , or the Third Man !

131. The fallacy, in other words, is in the Comparability premise: 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] 1ʹ. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc . and Man himself are each a man . 2ʹ. There is something that “ is predicated of particular men and of the Idea ”—call it Man himself himself , or the Third Man ! “We [who understand how the categories work] can grant all the premises [1-4] yet still deny that the conclusion [2’] follows.”

132. The fallacy, in other words, is in the Comparability premise: 1. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc. are each a man . 2 . There is something that “is truly predicated of the many particular men,” call it Man himself . 3. Man himself is “different from them.” 4. Man himself is “legitimately said to be a man.” [That is, Man himself is a man.] 1ʹ. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, etc . and Man himself are each a man . 2ʹ. There is something that “ is predicated of particular men and of the Idea ”—call it Man himself himself , or the Third Man ! Feel the power of the Categories!

133. The power of the Theory The Theory of Categories (if it is coherent) allows Aristotle to be able to recognize the force of metaphysical arguments, such as the A rgument from the Sciences, while appearing as close to common sense as any nominalist.

134. Review Aristotle rejects nominalism.

135. “Why are these bricks and stones a house?”

136. Nominalism: The house = the bricks and stones.

137. “ The house is not its elements. For after the house is decomposed...”

138. “After the house is decomposed, it no longer exists, but the elements still do ...”

139. “ The bricks and stones still exist .”

140. “ Therefore the house is something, and not just the elements—the bricks and stones—but something else ”

141. Nominalism: The house = the bricks and stones. The Earthquake Argument refutes nominalism about houses.

142. Review Aristotle rejects nominalism. Aristotle rejects Platonism.

143. Platonism: The house = the bricks and stones and something else: call it ‘Composition’.

144. “ If the something else is an element, the same reasoning applies.”

145. “After the house is decomposed, it no longer exists, but the elements still do ...”

146. “ The bricks and stones still exist .”

147. And , of course, the form of the house, “Composition,” still exists, as an object of science.

148. “ And so the house will be composed of bricks, stones, Composition, and something else ! And so on to infinity .”

149. “ And so the house will be composed of bricks, stones, Composition, and something else ! And so on to infinity .” You could call this the Third House Argument!

150. Platonism: The house = the bricks and stones and something else: call it ‘Composition’. The Third House Argument refutes Platonism

151. So what is Aristotle’s view?

152. “ It would seem that the something else does exist and is not an element. And it is this which provides the explanation why this material is a house.”

153. “ It would seem that the something else does exist and is not an element. And it is this which provides the explanation why this material is a house.” Here is where categories appear: the something else is not a this but a such.

154. N: The house is just bricks and stones. P: The house is bricks, stones and composition. A: The house is bricks and stones in composition.

155. “Why are these things—for example, bricks and stones—a house ?”

156. Is the Theory of Categories coherent?

157. The Theory claims: When you use a phrase like ‘the left-hand glove and the pair of gloves ’ in a sentence, you are making a category mistake, which means that what you say is nonsense and cannot be true.

158. Why is 1 true? When you use a phrase like ‘the left-hand glove and the pair of gloves ’ in a sentence, you are making a category mistake, which means that what you say is nonsense and cannot be true.

159. Why is 1 true? When you use a phrase like ‘the left-hand glove and the pair of gloves ’ in a sentence, you are making a category mistake, which means that what you say is nonsense and cannot be true. Because, as Aristotle says, "We have the categories." (SE xxii 178a4-6)

160. As we see from the Theory of Categories: The left-hand glove and the pair of gloves belong to different categories.

161. As we see from the Theory of Categories: The left-hand glove and the pair of gloves belong to different categories. Substance

162. As we see from the Theory of Categories: The left-hand glove and the pair of gloves belong to different categories. Substance Quantity

163. Sentence 2 is the reason for Sentence 1 When you use a phrase like ‘the left-hand glove and the pair of gloves’ in a sentence, you are making a category mistake, which means that what you say is nonsense and cannot be true. The left-hand glove and the pair of gloves belong to different categories.

164. But there’s a problem here. When you use a phrase like ‘the left-hand glove and the pair of gloves’ in a sentence, you are making a category mistake, which means that what you say is nonsense and cannot be true. The left-hand glove and the pair of gloves belong to different categories.

165. If 1 is true, 2 cannot be true. When you use a phrase like ‘the left-hand glove and the pair of gloves’ in a sentence, you are making a category mistake, which means that what you say is nonsense and cannot be true. The left-hand glove and the pair of gloves belong to different categories.

166. Because 2 uses the phrase forbidden by 1. When you use a phrase like ‘the left-hand glove and the pair of gloves’ in a sentence, you are making a category mistake, which means that what you say is nonsense and cannot be true. The left-hand glove and the pair of gloves belong to different categories.

167. Conclusion “The history of philosophy is a continual discovery of problems that baffle existing concepts and existing methods of solution .” --Thomas Nagel

168. "The sense of wonder is the mark of the philosopher." --Plato