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REFERENCE AND DESCRIPTION

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REFERENCE
AND
DESCRIPTION
THE CASE AGAINST
TWO
-DIMENSIONALISM
Scott Soames
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS
PRINCETON AND OXFORD

Copyright © 2005 by Princeton University Press
Published by
Princeton University Press,
41 William Street,
Princeton, New Jersey 08540
In the United Kingdom:
Princeton University Press,
3 Market Place,
Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1SY
All Rights Reserved
Third printing, and first paperback printing, 2007
Paperback ISBN-13: 978-0-691-13099-6
Paperback ISBN-10: 0-691-13099-X
The Library of Congress has cataloged the cloth edition of this book as follows
Soames, Scott.
Reference and description : the case against two-dimensionalism /
Scott Soames.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-691-12100-1 (hardcover : alk. paper)
1. Description (Philosophy). I. Title.
B105.D4 S66 2005
121'.68—dc22
2004044533
British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available
This book has been composed in Galliard
Printed on acid-free paper. f
pup.princeton.edu
Printed in the United States of America
357910864

for martha

CONTENTS
A Word about Notation ix
Acknowledgments xi
Introduction1
PART ONE
THE REVOL T AGAINST DESCRIPTIVISM 5
CHAPTER 1
The Traditional Descriptivist Picture 7
CHAPTER 2
Attack on the Traditional Picture
Proper Names, Non-Descriptionality, and
Rigid Designation 14
PART TWO
DESCRIPTIVIST RESISTANCE:
THE ORIGINS OF AMBITIOUS
TWO-DIMENSIONALISM 33
CHAPTER 3
Reasons for Resistance and
the Strategy for Descriptivist Revival 35
CHAPTER 4
Roots of Two-Dimensionalism in Kaplan and Kripke43
CHAPTER 5
Stalnaker’s Two-Dimensionalist Model of Discourse 84
CHAPTER 6
The Early Two-Dimensionalist Semantics of Davies
and Humberstone 106

PART THREE
AMBITIOUS TWO-DIMENSIONALISM 131
CHAPTER 7
Strong and Weak Two-Dimensionalism 133
CHAPTER 8
Jackson’s Strong Two-Dimensionalist Program 149
CHAPTER 9
Chalmers’s Two-Dimensionalist Defense of Zombies 194
CHAPTER 10
Critique of Ambitious Two-Dimensionalism 267
PART FOUR
THE WAY FORWARD 327
CHAPTER 11
Positive Nondescriptivism 329
Index355
viiiCONTENTS

A WORD ABOUT NOTATION
In what follows, I will use either single quotation or italics when I want to
refer to particular words, expressions, or sentences—e.g., ‘good’ or good.
Sometimes both will be used in a single example—e.g., ‘ Knowledge is
good’ is a true sentence of English iff knowledge is good . This italicized sen-
tence refers to itself, a sentence the ﬁrst constituent of which is the quote
name of the English sentence that consists of the word ‘knowled ge’ fol-
lowed by the word ‘
is’ followed by the word ‘good’. In addition to using
italics for quotation, sometimes I will use them for emphasis, though nor-
mally I will use boldface for that purpose. I tr ust that in each case it will be
clear from the context how these special notations are being used.
In addition, when for mulating generalizations about words, expres-
sions, or sentences, I will often use the notati on of boldface italics, which
is to be understood as equivalent to the technical device known as “corner
q
uotes.” For example, when explaining how simple sentences of a lan-
guage L are combined to for m larger sentences, I may use an example like
(1a), which has the meaning given in (1b).
1a.For any sentences A and B of the langua ge L, A&Bis a sentence
of L.
b.For any sentences A and B of the langua ge L, the expressi on whi ch
consists of A followed by ‘&’ followed by B i s a sentence of L.
Given (1), we know that if ‘Knowledge is good’ and ‘Ignorance is bad’ are
sentences of
L, then ‘Knowledge is good & ignorance is bad’ and ‘Igno-
rance is bad & knowledge is good’ are also sentences of L.
Roughly speaking, a generalization of the sort illustrated by (2a) has the
meaning given by (2b).
2a.For any (some) expression E, ... E ... is so and so.
b.For any (some) expression E, the expression consisting of ‘... ’
followed by E, followed by ‘... ’ is so and so.
One slightly tricky example of this is given in (3).
3a.For any name n of L, ‘n’ refers to n expr
esses a truth.
b.For any name n of L, the expression consisting of the left-hand
quote mark, followed by n, followed by the right-hand quote
mark, followed by ‘refers to’, followed by n, expresses a truth.

Particular instances of (3a) are given in (4).
4a.‘Brian Soames’ refers to Brian Soames expresses a truth.
b.‘Greg Soames’ refers to Greg Soames expresses a truth.
Finally, I frequently employ the expression iff as short for if and only if .
Thus, (5a) is short for (5b).
5a.For all x, x is the referent of a description iff x, and only x, satis-
ﬁes the description.
b.For all x, x is the referent of a description if and only if x, and
only x, satisﬁes the description.
xA WORD ABOUT NOTATION

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The impetus for this book arose from two recent graduate seminars of
mine at Princeton University . The ﬁrst was a year-long seminar on Nam-
ing and Necessity and its aftermath jointly taught by David Lewis and me
in the 1999–2000 academic year . At the ﬁrst meeting, David announced
that although the work of Kripke and other anti-descriptivists was often
regarded as revolutionary, he himself was a counterrevolutionary . Accord-
i
ngly, during the course of the year, he developed a version of two-dimen-
sionalist descriptivism, and used it to accommodate and reinterpret central
Kripkean doctrines and examples—while adhering to an essentially pre-
Kripkean conception of meaning, belief, and modality . I was on the other
side, having announced at the ﬁrst meeting that the anti-descriptivist rev-
olution begun in the 1970s by Kripke, Kaplan, Putnam, and others was a
genuine advance that needed to be pushed even further .
For me the sem-
inar was extraordinarily productive. I beneﬁted not only from David’s
inspired and often brilliant presentation of the opposing v iew, but also
from the active participation of a number of accomplished graduate stu-
dents and professors who regularly attended the meetings—includi ng,
among others, Cian Dorr
, Mike Fara, Kit Fine, Delia Graff, Jonathan
McKeown-Green, Benj Helle, Sean Kelly, Mark Johnston, Michael Nel-
son, and Jeff Speaks. The second major occasion on which I dealt with
these issues was my seminar on two-dimensionalism in the spring of 2003.
There I presented, in skeletal for m, all the main themes developed more
fully in this book. A gain, I beneﬁted from the co mments of an exception-
ally acute group of graduate students and professors fr
om Princeton and
Rutgers, including Eliza Block, Alexis Bur gess, Sam C umming, David
Gordon, John Hawthorne, Jeff Kepple, Sarah-Jane Leslie, Stephen Leu-
enberger, David Manley, Mike McGlone, Jim Pryor, Dan Rothschild,
Gillian Russell, Mark Schroeder, Adam Sennet, Brett Sher man, Ted Sider,
and Jeff Speaks.
In addition to presenting material on two-dimensionalism at these se m-
inars, I gave several lectures on the s
ubject, ﬁrst at the University of Cal-
gary and the University of California, Los Angeles, in the fall of 2002, and
then at Wayne State University, the University of Connecticut, the Uni-
versity of Massachusetts, and the University of Southern California, as
well as at conferences in Bir mingham, England, Barcelona, Spain, and
Portland, Oregon, in 2003. A mong the many who attended my lectures

whose comments contributed to my thinking were Joseph Almog, John
Baxter, J. C . Beall, Phil Bricker, Mark Johnston, David Kaplan, Ali Kazmi,
Michael McKinsey, Barbara Partee, Larry Powers, Jonathan Schaffer,
Michael Thau, and Stephen Yablo. Wr itten versions of some of the mate-
rial given as lectures will appear in the articles, “Kripke, the Necessary
Aposteriori, and the Two-Dimensionalist Heresy,” in Manuel Garcia-
Carpintero and Josep Macià, eds., The Two-Dimensional Framework
(Oxford
: Oxford University Press) and “Reference and Description,” in
Frank Jackson and Michael Smith, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Contem-
porary Analytic Philosophy(Oxford: Oxford University Press). I am in-
debted to Ben Caplan, Ali Kazmi, and Jim Pryor for discussing those
works with me, and helping me develop some of the issues.
The book manuscript itself was read and extensively comm ented upon
by Alexis Bur gess, Ben Caplan, Mark Kalderon, M
ike McGlone, Ted
Sider, and Jeff Speaks. Each one saved me from n umerous mistakes, while
also making many positive suggestions. The book would have been far
worse without them, though all remaining errors are, of course, mine. I
have, as usual, had the good fortune to work w ith an excellent and sup-
portive editor—Ian Malcol m of the Princeton University Press
. Last and
most important, my greatest debt and deepest appreciation is owed to the
person to whom this book is dedicated, my (future) wife and sine qua
non, Martha.
xiiACKNOWLEDGMENTS

REFERENCE AND DESCRIPTION

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INTRODUCTION
A little over 30 years ago, a gro up of philosophers led by Saul Kripke,
Hilary Putnam, David Kaplan, and Keith Donnellan ushered in a new
era in philosophy by attacking a set of preconceptions about meaning
that occupied center stage—not only in philosophizing about lan-
guage, but also in the common practice of the discipline, and in the
self-conception of many of its practitioners. Among the central pre-
s
uppositions of the then reigning conception of language, and its role
in philosophy, were the following:
(i) The meaning of an expression is never identical with its ref-
erent. Rather, the meaning of a substantive, nonlogical ter m
is a descriptive sense that provides necessary and sufﬁc ient
conditions for deter mining its reference. For example, the
meaning of a singular ter m is a descriptive condition satisfac-
tion of which by an object is necessar y and s
ufﬁcient for the
term to refer to the object, whereas the meaning of a predi-
cate is a descriptive condition satisfaction of which by an ob-
ject is necessary and sufﬁc ient for the predicate to be tr ue of
the object.
(ii) Understanding a ter m amounts to associating it with the
correct descripti ve sense. In the case of or d
inary predicates
in the common language, all speakers who understand them
associate essentially the same sense with them. This is also
true for some widely used ordinary proper names—such as
London. However, for many proper names of less widely
known individuals, the deﬁning descriptive information, and
hence the meaning, associated with the name can be ex-
pected to vary from speaker to spea ker.
(iii)Since the meaning of a wor d, as
used by a speaker, is com-
pletely determined by the descriptive sense that the speaker
mentally associates with it, meaning is transparent. If two
words mean the same thing, then anyone who understands
both should easily be able to ﬁgure that out by consulting
the sense that he or she associates with them.

(iv) Further, since the meaning of a word, as used by a speaker, is
completely determined by the descriptive sense that he or
she mentally associates with it, the meaning of a word in the
speaker’s language is entirely dependent on factors internal
to the speaker . The same is true for the beliefs that the
speaker uses the word to express. External factors—like the
speaker’s relation to the environ ment, and to the commu-
nity of other speakers—are relevant only insofar as they
causally inﬂuence the factors inter nal to the spea
ker that de-
termine the contents of his or her beliefs.
(v) Apriori tr uth and necessary truth amount to essentially the
same thing. If they exist at all, both are gro unded in mean-
ing. Such truths are knowable on the basis of understanding
the words we use, and their necessity can be traced to our
linguistic conventions.
(vi) Claims about objects having or lacking properties necessar-
ily—independent of how they ar e descr
ibed—make no
sense. In some cases, a sentence Necessarily t is F, contain-
ing a singular ter m t designating o, might be tr ue, but if so
there will always be other sentences Necessarily t* is F, con-
taining a different singular ter m t* designating o, which are
false. (Here t and t* are coreferential ter ms that are associ-
ated with different descriptive conditions, which bear differ-
ent conceptual relati ons to the property expressed by F.)
Since sentences of both sorts ex
ist, it would be arbitrary to
take either one as indicating that the object designated has,
or lacks, the relevant property necessarily . Such an idea is ob-
jectionably metaphysical, and devoid of clear sense.
1
(vii) The job of philosophy is not to come up with new empirical
truths. Its central task is that of conceptual clariﬁcation,
which is gro unded in the analysis of meaning.
These doctrines and their corollaries provided the framework for much
of the philosophy done in the analytic tradition prior to the 1970s. Of
course, not every analytic philosopher accepted all major tenets of the
framework, and some, like W . V. Quine, rejected both the fra
mework
and the traditional notions of meaning, necessity, and apriority alto-
2INTRODUCTION
1
Here and throughout, I use boldface italics to play the role of corner quotes.

gether. It is interesting to note, however, that even Quine—the frame-
work’s most severe critic—believed that ifthe traditional notions of
meaning, necessity, and apriority make sense at all, then they must be
related more or less as along the lines indicated above. What was, for
the most part, absent at the time was a sense that all of these notions
domake sense, and areimportant for philosophy, even though they
are mischaracterized by the traditional framework.
This changed with Kripke, Putnam, Kaplan, Donnellan, and the line
of resear
ch grow ing out of their work. Today, each of the doctrines
(i–vii) has been vigorously challenged, and alternatives have been pro-
posed to put in their place. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to say that
a new, systematic consensus has been reached. Although everyone rec-
ognizes the need to take into account the observations and ar guments
of Kripke and his fellow anti-descriptivists, there are some who believe
that the traditional descriptivist paradigm contained much that was
corr
ect, and that a new, more sophisticated version of descriptivism
should be put in its place. Even those who reject the idea of a descrip-
tivist revival and want to pu sh the anti -descripti vist revolut ion further,
have fou nd the task of constructing a posi tive, non-descri ptivist con-
ception of meaning to be daunting. In shor t, all sor
ts of controversies
remain, and the struggle to assess the legacy of the original anti-
descriptivist challengers, and to for ge a new understanding of meaning
and its role in philosophy, is far from over .
This book is about what may be the most important aspect of that
struggle. In the last 25 years a systematic strategy has grown up
around a technical development, called two-dimensional modal logic ,
for reviving descriptivism, r econnect
ing meaning, apriority, and neces-
sity, and vindicating ph ilosophy as conceptual analysis along reco gniz-
ably traditional lines. Although the logical and semantic techniques
employed are new, a number of the motivating ph ilosophical ideas are
old. Since many of these ideas were not w ithout plausibility , and s
ince,
in any case, old ideas die hard, it is not surprising that a vigorous at-
tempt has been made to reinstate them. B ut there is more to the at-
tempted revival than this. Anti-descriptivism has brought with it puz-
zles and problems of its own. On top of that, even the most important
anti-descriptivist classics contai n errors and missteps that have led oth-
ers astray, and have so
metimes seemed to point away from, rather than
toward, their authors’ most important insights.
The aim of this book is to sort through all of this—to assess the
legacy of the original anti-descriptivist authors, to explain and evaluate
INTRODUCTION 3

the two-dimensionalist revival of descriptivism, and to provide the
outlines of what I hope will prove to be a lasting, non-descriptivist per-
spective on meaning. In Part 1, I sketch the revolution against de-
scriptivism led by Kripke and Kaplan, and I draw out some of its lead-
ing implications. In Part 2, I explain the reasons some philosophers
have resisted this revolution, and I outline the strategy for descriptivist
revi
val. This is followed by close examination and criticism of certain
passages in Kaplan’s “Demonstratives” and Kripke’s Naming and Ne-
cessity that have been seized upon by philosophically motivated two-
dimensionalists in an attempt to further their descriptivist agenda.
2
Part 2 closes with explication and criticism of the two most important
early two-dimensionalist systems—the pragmatic model of Robert
Stalnaker, and the semantic model of Martin Davies and Lloyd
Humberstone. Part 3 is devoted to developing and evaluating two-
dimensionalism in a systematic way . In the ﬁrst chapter of Part 3, I de-
ﬁne the two most philosophically important versions of this view . In
the last chapter of Part 3, I give what I take to be decisive ar guments
against both, while ar guing, in addition, that other , hybr
id, versions of
descriptive two-dimensionalism offer little hope of doing much better.
In between those two chapters, I examine and criticize the systems of
the leading philosophically motivated two-dimensionalists of our time,
Frank Jackson and David Chalmers. Part 4, draws together the lessons
learned along the way, provides positive non-descriptivist answers to
several of the pr
oblem s that m otivated descri ptive two-dimensi onalism,
assesses where the anti-descriptivist revolution stands today, and indi-
cates further work that remains to be done.
4INTRODUCTION
2
David Kaplan, “Demonstratives,” in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes
from Kaplan(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), and Saul Kripke,
Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1980), originally published in Donald
Davidson and Gilbert Har man (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language (Dordrecht: Reidel,
1972).

PART ONE
THE REVOL T AGAINST DESCRIPTIVISM

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER 1
THE TRADITIONAL DESCRIPTIVIST PICTURE
The modern discussion of reference begins with the reaction of Gott-
lob Frege and Bertrand Russell to an initially attractive but overly sim-
ple conception of meaning and reference. The conception is based on
the observation that the most important feature of language is our
ability to use it to represent the world. D ifferent sentences represent
the world as being d ifferent ways, and to sincerely accept, or as-
sertively utter, a sentence is to believe, or assert, that the world is the
way the sentence represents it to be. The reason sentences are repre-
sentational in this way is that they are made up of words and phrases
that stand for objects and the properties we take them to have—phys-
ical objects, people, ideas, institutions, shapes, sizes, colors, locations,
relations, and the rest. What it is for language to be meaningful is for
it to have this representational capacity . But if meaning is essentially
representational, it would seem that the meaning of any word or
phrase shou ld be just what it represents, or stands for . In short, the
meaning of an expression is the thing it refers to; and the meaning of a
sentence is deter mined by the words that make it up.
Although attractive, and even undeniable in its broad outlines, this
picture gives rise to puzzles in particular cases that led Frege and Rus-
sell to suggest signiﬁcant modiﬁcations. In “On Sense and Reference,”
Frege considered an instance of the general problem posed by the ob-
servation that substitution of coreferential ter ms in a sentence some-
times changes meaning.
1
For example, in each of the following cases
he would contend that the (a) sentence differs in meaning from the
(b) sentence, even though they differ only in the substitution of ter ms
that designate the same individual.
1a.The ﬁrst Postmaster General of the United States was the au-
thor of Poor Richard’s Almanac
b.The ﬁrst Postmaster General of the United States was the ﬁrst
Postmaster General of the United States.
1
Gottlob Frege, “On Sense and Reference,” in Peter Geach and Max Black (eds.), Trans-
lations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970).

2a.Benjamin Franklin was the ﬁrst Postmaster General of the
United States.
b.Benjamin Franklin was Benjamin Franklin.
3a.Ruth Marcus is Ruth Barcan.
b.Ruth Marcus is Ruth Marcus.
In each case, this contention is supported by three facts: ( i) a person
can understand both sentences, and so know what they mean, without
taking them to mean the same thing, or to have the same tr uth valu e;
(ii) a person who assert
ively uttered the (a) sentence typically would be
deemed to have said more, and conveyed more information, than
someone who assertively uttered the (b) sentence; and (iii) the (a) and
(b) sentences would standardly be used in belief ascriptions, x believes
that S, to report different beliefs with potentially different tr uth values.
If, on this basis, one agrees that the (a) sentences differ in meaning
from the (b) sentences, then one must reject either T1, T2, or T3.
T1.The meaning of a genuinely r efer
ring expression is its refer-
ent.
T2.Both singular deﬁnite descriptions—i.e., expressions of the
form the so and so—and ordinary proper names—e.g., Ben-
jamin Franklin ,Ruth Barcan, and Ruth Marcus—are gen-
uinely referring expressions.
T3.The meaning of a sentence, of the sort illustrated by 1–3, is a
function of its grammatical str ucture t
ogether with the
meanings of its parts; in these sentences, substitution of ex-
pressions with the same meaning doesn’t change meaning.
Whereas Frege rejected T1, Russell rejected T2. However, both
agreed that the meaning of an ordinary proper name is not its bearer,
and the meaning of a singular deﬁnite description is not the unique
object that i t denotes.
Accord
ing to Frege, ordi nary proper nam es and si ngular deﬁni te de-
scriptions are terms that pu rport to refer to u nique individuals. How-
ever, the m eaning, or sense, of su ch an expressi on is never i dentical
with its referent; i nstead, it is something that determines reference. For
example, the m eaning, or sense, of the descri ption the even pri me num-
beris something like the proper
ty of bei ng both an even number and
prime (and bei ng unique in this); its referent i s whatever has thi s
8CHAPTER 1

property—the number 2. Although di fferent si ngular terms with the
same sense must have the sam e referents, terms with the sam e referents
may have di fferent senses. This explai ns the di fference in meaning be-
tween the (a) and (b) sentences i n (1) and (2). The explanati on is ex-
tended to the sentences i n (3) by Freg e’s contenti on that, like descri p-
tions, ordi nary proper nam es have senses that determine, bu t are
distinct from , their referents. This is, of cou rse, consi stent wi th there
being certa
in contrasts between nam es and descri ptions. One su ch con-
trast is that m ost ordi nary nam es are g rammati cally simple, and so, u n-
like descri ptions, thei r senses are not determined by the senses of thei r
grammati cally sign iﬁcant parts. Becau se of thi s, it is common for di ffer-
ent speak ers to u se the sam e nam e to refer to the sam e object, even
though they associ ate it with different properti es, or senses. Although
Fre
ge doesn’t dwell on thi s, the i llustrations he provi des su pport the
contenti on that he reg arded the sense of a proper nam e n, as u sed by a
speaker s at a time t, to be the sam e as that of som e descri ption the D
associated wi th n by s at t. Thus, he m ay be seen as adopti ng T4.
2
T4.An ordinary proper name, n, as used by a speaker s at a time
t, refers to (denotes) an object o iff o is the unique object
that has the property expressed by the D(associated with n
by s). When there is no such object, n remains meaningful
while failing to refer to (denote) anything. In general, the
meaning (for s at t) of a sentence…n…containing n is the
same as the meaning (for s at t) of the corresponding sen-
tence… the D …that arises by subst ituting the description
for the name.
It follows fro
m this that (3a) and (3b) differ in meaning for any
speaker who associates the names Ruth MarcusandRuth Barcanwith
descriptions that have different senses.
A second puzzle for the original conception of meaning and refer-
ence encompassing theses T1–T3 was Russell’s problem of negative
existentials, illustrated by (4).
3
4a.Santa Claus does not exist.
b.The largest prime number does not exist.
THE TRADITIONAL DESCRIPTIVIST PICTURE 9
2
Although Frege seems to have regarded the sense of names to be descriptive, some lati-
tude may be needed—including a ugmenting the descriptive vocabulary available to the
agent—in specifying the descriptions themselves.
3
Bertrand Russell, “On Denoting,” Mind14 (1905): 479–93.

It would seem, prima facie, that since these sentences are tr ue, there
must be no such individuals as Santa Claus or the lar gest prime num-
ber, and hence that the name Santa Claus and the deﬁnite description
the largest prime number do not denote, or refer to, anything. T1 and
T2 then lead to the result that the name and the description don’t
mean anything. B ut surely that can’t be right, since if these expressions
were meaningless, then either the sentences as a whole would be
meaningless, or they would both have the same degenerate meaning,
consisting of the meaning of their common pr ed
icate phrase, plus a
gap corresponding to their meaningless subject expressions. Neither of
these alternatives is correct.
The idea behind Russell’s solution is illustrated by the proposal that
the (b) sentences constitute analyses of the following (a) sentences.
4
5a.Men are mortal.
b.∀x (x is a man ⊃x is mortal)
The proposi tional fu nction that assigns to any object o the
proposi tion expressed by x is a man⊃x is mortal(relative to an
assignment of o to ‘x’) i s “always true”—i.e ., always yi elds a
true proposi tion.
6a.Honest men exist.
b.∃x (x is a man & x is honest)
The propositional function that assigns to any object o the
proposition expr essed by x i
s a man &x is honest (relative to
an assignment of o to ‘x’) is “sometimes tr ue”—i.e., some-
times yields a tr ue proposition.
7a.Carnivorous cows don’t exist.
b.~∃x (x is a cow & x is carnivorous)
It is not the case that the propositional function that assigns
to any object o the proposition expressed by x is a cow &x is
carnivorous (relative to an assig nment of o to ‘x’) is “some-
times true”—i.e., it never yields a tr ue propos
ition.
In each case, the simple subject-predicate grammatical for m of the
sentence differs from its more complex logical for m, which is quantiﬁ-
cational. For Russell, this means that it involves the attribution of a
10CHAPTER 1
4
I ignore the suggestion of plurality in (6a).

higher order property to a lower level property. Here, one may think
of propositional functions as playing the role of properties, and of
“sometimes tr ue” and “always true” as expressing the properties of
being instantiated and universally instantiated, respectively . Hence, (5)
tells us that the property of being mortal-if-human is instantiated by
everything, (6) that the property of being an honest man is instanti-
ated, and (7) that the property of being both carnivor o
us and a cow is
not instantiated.
Russell’s analysis of sentences containing s ingular deﬁnite descrip-
tions (phrases of the form the so and so) is rather complicated.
5
For ex-
ample, consider (8a), which he paraphrases as (8b), and analyzes as
(8c).
8a.The largest prime number is even.
b.There is a number n which has the property of being both (i)
even and (ii) identical with absolutely any number m iff m is
a prime number which is larger than all other prime numbers.
c.∃x [∀y (y is a prime number & y is lar ger than all other prime
numbers↔y=x) & x is even]
The proposi tional fu nction that assigns to any object o the
propos
ition expressed by ∀y (y is a pri me number & y is larger
than all ot her pri me numbers↔y=x)&x is even(relative to
an assign ment of o to ‘x’) i s “som etimes true”—i.e ., the prop-
erty of bei ng both even and a prime number lar ger than all
others i s instanti ated.
Russell’s analysis of (8a)—which may be seen as equivalent to The
largest prime number exists and i s even—contains his analysis of the
“positive existential” (9a).
9a.The largest prime number exists.
b.There i
s a number n which has the property of being identi-
cal with absolutely any number m iff m is a prime number
which is lar ger than all other prime numbers.
c.∃x∀y [y is a prime number & y is lar ger than all other prime
numbers↔y=x]
THE TRADITIONAL DESCRIPTIVIST PICTURE 11
5
For a more thorough explanation of Russell’s analysis, see chapter 5 of Scott Soames,
Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century , vol. 1:The Dawn of Analysis (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2003), hereafter referred to as The Dawn of Analysis .

The propositional function that assigns to any object o the
proposition expressed by ∀y [y is a prime number &y is larger
than all other prime numbers ↔y=x](relative to an assign-
ment of o to ‘x’) is “sometimes tr ue”—i.e., the property of
being a prime number lar ger than all others is instantiated.
With this analysis of (9a) in place, the corresponding R ussellian analy-
sis, (4c), of the negative existential (4b) is obvious.
4c.∼∃x∀y [y is a prime number & y is lar ger than all other prime
numbers↔y=x]
It is not the case that the propos
itional function that assigns
to any object o the proposition expressed by ∀y [y is a prime
number&y is larger than all other prime numbers ↔y=x]
(relative to an assignment of o to ‘x’) is “sometimes tr ue”—
i.e., the property of being a prime number lar ger than all oth-
ers is not instantiated.
For Russell, the virt ue of this analysis is that (4b) is no longer seen as
containing a constituent— the larges
t prime number— the job of which
it is to refer to something (the thing which is supposed to be its mean-
ing) which is then said not to exist. Hence there is nothing problem-
atic, or paradoxical, in recogniz ing its truth.
Russell is able to give a similar analysi s to (4a), si nce he holds that
whenever one u ses an ord
inary proper nam e n, one always has som e de-
scription in mind that one wou ld be prepared to give in answer to the
questionWho, or what, do you mean by n? Precisely whi ch descri ption
gives the content of the nam e may be expected to vary from speak er to
speaker and time to time . However, whenever a nam e is used, there i s al-
ways som e descri ption that m ay replace i t, without changin g meaning.
Since Ru ssell beli eves thi s to be true no m atter what the g rammati cal
form of the sentence, he i s able to ag ree w
ith Freg e both i n rejecti ng the
conjunction of T1 and T2, and i n accepti ng T4.
6
It is their common
agreement on thi s thesi s that phi losophers have i n mind when they
speak of the tradi tional Freg e-Russell vi ew of ordi nary proper nam es.
Two further points are worth noting. F irst, unlike Frege, Russell
never rejected the idea that the meanings of some expressions are sim-
ply their referents; rather, he believed this to be tr ue of a small cate-
gory of logically proper names—including certain demonstratives and
12CHAPTER 1
6
Russell would use denotes rather than refersin T4.

pure indexicals—which have no other function than to refer . For ex-
ample, he believed that when he said or thought to himself I am a
paciﬁst orThis is redthe proposition he expressed consisted, in the ﬁrst
case, simply of the attribution of the property of being a paciﬁst to
Russell himself, with no other descriptive information about him, and,
in the second case, of the attribution of the property of being red to
the object demonstrated, with no further attribution of descriptive
proper
ties to the object. Unfortunately, he combined his acceptance of
this category of “names” with severe epistemological restrictions on
the things capable of being named—essentially those about which
Cartesian certainty is achievable, and mistakes are impossible.
7
Al-
though this made for serious difﬁc ulties, including cr ippling proble ms
explaining the use of such expressions in communication, Russell’s
embrace of the idea of a logically proper name was historically impor-
tant in the later development of nondescriptive analyses of ordinary
proper names and indexicals.
Second, the traditional Frege-Russell analysi s of ordinar y pr
oper
names was later modiﬁed by John Searle and others to incorporate the
idea that the meaning of an ordinary name for a speaker, or a commu-
nity, was not given by a single description, but by an open-ended fam-
ily of descriptions.
8
On this view, the referent of the name is taken to
be whatever object satisﬁes a sufﬁc ient number of a family of associ-
ated descriptions, and the meaning of a sentence n is Fis, roughly,
given by the claim The thing of which most, or a sufﬁcient number, of
the claims: it is D1, it is D2, ... are true is also F. Two alleged virt ues
of this variant of the Frege-Russell view are (i) that it captures the
Wittgensteinian idea that the meaning of a sentence containing a name
is to som e degr ee vague and indeter mi
nate,
9
and (ii) that it accounts
for the fact that even when D is one of the descriptions most strongly
associated with n by speakers, the sentence If n exists, then n is Dis
not “true by deﬁnition”—sometimes, to our surprise, it can turn o ut
to be false, and even when it is tr ue, it often is not a necessary tr uth.
THE TRADITIONAL DESCRIPTIVIST PICTURE 13
7
Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” Proceedings
of the Aristotelian Society 11 (1910–11). For discussion, see pp. 110–13 and 122–26 of
Soames, The Dawn of Analysis.
8
John Searle, Mind67 (1958): 166–73.
9
See section 79 of Ludwig W ittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations (New York: Macmil-
lan Co., 1953); for discussion, see chapter 1 of Scott Soames, Philosophical Analysis in the
Twentieth Century , vol. 2 :The Age of Meaning (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
2003), herafter referred to as The Age of Meaning .

CHAPTER 2
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE
proper names, non-descriptionality,
and rigid designation
In 1970, Saul Kripke gave a series of ar guments challenging traditional
descriptive analyses of ordinary proper names, and suggesting an alter-
native picture .
1
He attacked both the view that the meanings of names
are given by descriptions associated with them by speakers, and the
view that their referents are deter mined (as a matter of linguistic r ule)
to be the objects that satisfy such descriptions. Assuming that meaning
determines reference, Kripke takes the latter view, about reference, to
follow from the for mer view about meaning, but not vice versa. Th us,
all of his ar guments against descriptive theories of the reference of
proper names are also ar guments against descriptive theories of their
meanings, but some of his ar guments against the latter do not apply to
the former.
I begin with the more narrowly focused ar guments, which are di-
rected against two corollaries of the Frege-Russell thesis T4. Let n be
a proper name, D be a description or family of descriptions associated
with n by speakers, and …D*…be a sentence that arises from …n
…by replacing one or more occurrences of n with D*. When D is a
description, let D* =D, and when D is a family of descriptions D
1
…
D
k
, let D*be the complex description the thing of which most, or a
sufﬁcient number, of the claims: it is D
1
,…, it is D
k
are true.Kripke
attacks the following corollaries of descriptivism about the meanings
of names.
T4(i)S ince the semantic content of (i.e., the proposition ex-
pressed by) …n…(as used in context C) is the semantic
content of…D*…(as used in C), …n…is true (as
used in C) when evaluated at a possible world-state w iff
…D*…is true with respect to C and w. Since If D* ex-
1
Saul Kripke, Naming and Necessity (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1980), originally pub-
lished in Donald Davidson and Gilbert Har man (eds.), Semantics of Natural Language
(Dordrecht: Reidel, 1972).

ists, then D* is D*is a necessary truth, If n exists, then n
is D*is also necessary.
T4(ii)S ince the semantic content of (i.e., the proposition ex-
pressed by)…n…(as used in C) is the semantic content
of…D*…(as used in C), anyone who knows or believes
the proposition expressed by …n…(in C) knows or be-
lieves the proposition expressed by …D*…(in C), and
attitude ascriptions such as Ralph knows/believes that n is
FandRalph knows/believes that D* is F(as used in C)
agree i
n truth value (with respect to any world-state w).
Since the proposition expressed by If n exists, then n is D*
is the same as the proposition expressed by If D* exists,
then D* is D*,it is knowable apriori, and the claim It is
knowable apriori that if n exists, then n is D*is true.
Kripke’s argument against T4(i) is known as the modal argument .
Here is a particular version of it. Consider the name Aristotle , and the
descriptions the greatest s tudent of Plato ,the founder of formal log
ic,
andthe teacher of Alexander the Great. Although Aristotle satisﬁes
these descriptions,
1.If Aristotle existed, then Aristotle was D*.
is not a necessary truth, where D* is either any description in this fam-
ily, or the complicated description the individual of whom most, or a
sufﬁcient number, of the claims: . . . are true, constructed from descr ip-
tions in the family . On the contrary
, Aristotle could have existed with-
out doing any of the things for which he is known; he could have
moved to another city as a child, failed to go into philosophy, and
never been heard from a gain. In such a possible scenario the ante-
cedent of (1) is tr ue, since Aristotle still exists, while the consequent is
false, since he doesn’t satisfy any of the relevant descriptions. B ut then,
since (1) is false i n this scenario, it is not a necessary tru
th, which
means that the descriptions in the family do not give the meaning of
Aristotle . According to Kripke, this is no accident; there is, he sug-
gests, no family D
A
of descriptions such that: ( i) the referent of Aris-
totleis the unique individual who satisﬁes most, or a sufﬁc ient number,
of the descriptions in D
A
, (ii) ordinary speakers associate D
A
with the
name, believing its referent to be the unique individual who satisﬁes
most, or a sufﬁc ient number, of the descriptions in D
A
, and (iii) (1) ex-
presses a necessary truth when D* is the complicated description con-
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE 15

structed from D
A
. If this is right, then both T4 and its corollary T4(i)
are false, as is the view that names are synonymous with descriptions
associated with them by speakers.
Why does this ar gument work? According to Kripke, there was a
certain individual x—the person who actually was Aristotle—such that
a sentence, Aristotle was Fis true at an arbitrary world-state w iff at w,
x had the property expressed by F. What does it mean to say that a sen-
tence is true at w? It means that the proposition we actually use the
sentence to express
is a true description of what things would be like if
the world were in state w . So, Kripke’s view is that there was a unique
individual x such that for any predicate F and world-state w, the
proposition we actually use Aristotle was Fto express would be tr ue, if
the world were in w, iff had the world been in state w, x would have
had the property (actually) expressed by F . This is the basis of his doc-
trine that Aristotle is a rigid designator.
2
DEFINITION OF RIGIDITY
A singular ter m t is a rigid designator of an object o iff t des-
ignates o in all worlds in which o exists, and t never desig-
nates anything else.
INTUITIVE TEST FOR RIGIDITY
A singular ter m t is a rigid designator iff the individual who
is t could not have existed without being t, and no one who is
not the individual who is t could have been tis true; other-
wise t is nonrigid.
Using the notion of rigid designation, we can give the general for m
of Kripke’s modal ar gument.
THE GENERAL VERSION OF THE MODAL ARGUMENT
(i) Proper names are rigid designators.
(ii) If a description D gives the meaning or content of a ter m t,
then D is rigid iff t is.
16CHAPTER 2
2
Here and throughout I use the notion of a singular ter m in a slightly extended sense to
include variables, names, indexicals like Iandhe, and singular deﬁnite descriptions the x: Fx.
Although this usage might lead one to think that I am treating theas a term-forming func-
tor, rather than as a quantiﬁcational operator like allandsome, that is not my intenti on. Even
ifthe x: Fx is a generalized quantiﬁer, I her
e extend the category of singular ter ms to include
it. This ter minological extension is made solely to simplify the discussion, and is not in-
tended to have substantive import. For the same reason, sometimes when making claims
about the extensions of singular ter ms in my sense, I will speak of thei r referents. This should
be understood as including the denotations of singular deﬁnite descriptions.

(iii) So, the meanings or contents of proper names are not given
by nonrigid descriptions.
Since the descriptions we have been considering are nonrigid, the
meaning of Aristotle is not given by them. The same is true of other
proper names. In Naming and Necessity , Kripke leaves the modal ar-
gument at that, concluding that there are no meaning-giving descrip-
tions associated with names by speakers. In so doing, he appears, tac-
itly, to ass
ume that the only candidates for being meaning-giving
descriptions are nonrigid. Though understandable, this assumption is
not beyond question, and will be revisited later .
We next consider Kripke’s epistemological ar gument against T4,
and its corollary T4(ii).
THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT
(i) If D gave the meaning (semantic content) of n, then T4(ii)
would be true.
(ii) However, when D is a description or family of descriptions
concerning well-known achievements or characteristics of
the referent of an ordinary name n, it is not the case (a) that
anyone who knows or believes the proposition expressed by
n is Fknows or believes the proposition expressed by D* is
F, (b) that ascriptions such as Ralph knows/believes that n is
FandRalph knows/believes that D* is Finvariably agree in
truth value, (c) that the propos
ition expressed by If n exists,
then n is D*is knowable apriori, or (d) that It is knowable
apriori that if n exists, then n is D*is true.
(iii) So, descriptions concerning the well-known achievements or
characteristics of the referents of ordinary names do not give
their meanings (semantic contents).
(iv) Since these are the descriptions standardly associated with
names by speakers, the meanings of names are not standardly
given by the descriptions speak ers associate with them.
Three feat
ures of this ar gument stand out. F irst, it shares the assump-
tion, tacitly used to derive T4(ii) from the descriptivist account of
meaning, that if n meant the same as D, then Ralph believes, knows, or
knows apriori that n is Fwould have the same tr uth value as Ralph
believes, knows, or knows apriori that D* is F. Although a case can be
made that Kripke did tacitly assume this, the theoretical basis for the
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE 17

assumption goes beyond what is explicitly stated in his text. The im-
portant point is not so much the exact for mulation of the needed doc-
trines, as the recognition that the ar gument needs some theoretical as-
sumptions connecting the meanings of simple sentences with attitude
ascriptions in which they ﬁgure, in order to draw the desired conclu-
sion. Later, when the anti-descriptivist pictur e presented by Kripke i
s
challenged, it will be important to be aware of these.
Second, the argument form is general, and not limited to claims
about apriori knowledge, or even to claims about knowledge and be-
lief as opposed to other propositional attitudes.
3
The point of the ar-
gument is to show that the proposition expressed by n is Fis different
from the proposition expressed by D* is F. This is done by showing
that a person can bear a certain attitude relation to one of these propo-
sitions without bearing it to the other. Although the relation one bears
to a proposition when one knows it apriori is useful for making this
point, it is not the only such relation to wh ich one might appeal.
Third, when
used against certain views about the meanings of
names, the epistemological ar gument has the task of distinguishing be-
tween necessarily equivalent propositions. In light of this, it should
not be surprising that one has to appeal to intuitions, and theoretical
assumptions, about propositions and propositional atti tudes. Ther e is
so
mething a little ironic here, though. Often it is assumed that what-
ever the difﬁc ulties faced by descriptive analyses of the meanings of
names, at least they give plausible explanations of Frege’s puzzle about
substitution in attitude ascriptions, and a good account of the role of
names in these sentences generally . Kripke’s epi stemological ar gument
challenges this assumption.
I now tur n to Kr
ipke’s reason for accepting the second premise of
the epistemological ar gument. His text is replete with thought experi-
ments supporting it, one of them being the Gödel/Schmidt example,
concerning the origins of Gödel’s famous incompleteness theorem.
4
In
this example, Kripke imagines our belief that Gödel discovered the in-
completeness theorem being proven false by historical scholarship that
reveals that he stole it from Schmidt. Of course, Kripke is not saying
that any such thing really happened, or even that we don’t know that
it didn’t. The point is that we don’t know this apriori. Rather, our
18CHAPTER 2
3
The generalization is mine. Kripke contents himself with a speciﬁc version focusing on
apriori knowledge. It should be acknowledged that when the ar gument is stated in its gen-
eral form, the different clauses of (ii) tell differently against different for ms of descriptivism.
4
SeeNaming and Necessity , pp. 83–84.

knowledge that it was Gödel who proved the theorem ( if anyone did)
rests on, and is justiﬁed by, empirical evidence, and so is not apriori.
5
By contrast, we do know apriori that the discoverer of the incomplete-
ness of arithmetic discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic (if any-
one did). So, the epistemological ar gument shows that the proposition
expressed by Gödel discovered the incompleteness of arithmetic (if any-
one did) is not the same as the proposition expressed by The discoverer
of the incompleteness of arithmetic discovered the incompleteness of arit h-
metic (if anyone did).
6
Hence, the description does not give the mean-
ing of the name for us—no matter how central attribution of the the-
orem to Gödel is to our beliefs about him. Kripke takes this point to
extend to other descriptions speakers commonly associate with Gödel,
and to proper names generally. He concludes that the meanings of the
vast majority of proper names are not given by any descriptions that
pick out the individual in terms of famous achievements, or impor tant
character
istics. G iven this, one is hard-pressed to see how they could
be given by any descriptions at all. Kripke therefore concludes that
T4(ii) is false, and that the meanings of names are not synonymous
with descriptions.
He is, however, careful to distinguish this conclusion from one that
holds that the referents of proper names are not deter mined, as a mat-
ter of linguistic r ule, to be whatever objects satisfy the descriptions as-
sociated with them by speakers. Accor d
ing to this weakened version of
descriptivism, descriptions associated with a name semantically ﬁx its
referent at the actual world-state, without giving its meaning. Once its
referent is determined, it is stipulated to retain that referent with re-
spect to all other world-states; thus it is a rigid designator . Several
corollar
ies are taken to follow . (i) The speaker has a description, or
family of descri ptions, D associ ated with n that the speak er takes to be
uniquely satisﬁed by some object or other . (ii) It is semantically deter-
mined that o is the referent of n iff o uniquely satisﬁes D (or a sufﬁ-
cient number of the descriptions in D, if D is a family of descriptions).
(iii) Since the speaker knows this on the basis of his or her semantic
knowledge, the speaker knows on the basis of semantic knowledge
alone that the sentence If n exists, then n is D*expresses a tru
th. In
sum, when D semantically ﬁxes the reference of n, understanding n re-
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE 19
5
Ibid., p. 87.
6
Note, in order to reach this conclusion it is not necessary to mention apriority at all. It
is enough to observe that there is possible evidence that would make it rational for us to give
up our belief in the proposition expressed by one of the two sentences but not the other .

quires knowing that its reference is ﬁxed by D. This holds even though
D does not give the meaning of n.
Kripke’s arguments against this version of descriptivism are known
asthe semantic arguments , which are designed to constitute counterex-
amples to each of its corollaries. The Gödel/Sch midt scenario is taken
to provide a counterexample to both (ii) and (iii). It is a counter exa
m-
ple to (iii) because we don’t know, simply on the basis of our linguistic
competence, that the sentence If Gödel existed, then Gödel was D*is
true, when D is a description or family of descriptions encompassing
our most important knowledge of Gödel. It is a counterexample to (ii)
because when one imagines a state of the world just like ours except
that, unknown to speakers, Kripke’s fantasy about Gödel’s plagiar ism
is true, we take those speakers to be r efer
ring to Gödel, not Schmidt,
when they use the name Gödel.Thus, the referent of Gödel, as used by
those speakers, is not the individual that satisﬁes the descriptions they
associate with it. If these arguments are correct, description theories of
the referents of names are incorrect.
There is, however, a distinction to be made. Although Kripke sug-
gests that the meanings of na mes are never the same as those of de-
scr
iptions that speakers associate with them, he does allow that in
some, relatively rare, cases the referent of a name may be semantically
ﬁxed by a description. However, the status of these names has become
a matter of controversy. Naming and Necessity gives the appearance of
endorsing three views about them that are difﬁc ult to jointly maintain:
(i) that one is free to introduce a name n by stipulating that its refer-
ence is to be whatever object o satisﬁes some description D, even in
cases in which one does not know of any o that it is has the proper
ty
expressed by D, (ii) that in these cases what one means by n is Fis that
o has the property expressed by F,
7
and (iii) that in these cases (a) one
knows apriori, simply on the basis of one’s semantic knowledge, that
the sentence If n exists, then n is Dexpresses a truth, (b) the proposi-
tion expressed by this sentence is one that can be known to be tr ue
apriori, on the basis of one’s semantic knowledge, and (c) It is know-
able apriori, simply on the basis of one’s semantic knowledge, that if n
20CHAPTER 2
7
Regarding (ii), Kri pke says: “If, on the other hand, we m erely use the descri ption to ﬁx the
referentthen that m an will be the referent of ‘Ari stotle’ in all possi ble worlds. The only u se of
the descri ption will have been to pi ck out to whi ch man we m ean to refer. But then, when we
say cou nterfactu ally ‘su ppose Ari stotle had never g one into phi losophy at all’, we need not m ean
‘suppose a m an who stu died with Plato, and taught Alexander the Great, and wrote thi s and
that, and so on, had never g one into phi losophy at all’, whi ch might seem like a contradi ction.
We need only
mean, ‘su ppose that that manhad never g one into phi losophy at all’” (p. 57).

exists, then n is Dexpresses a truth.Later, we will discuss the conse-
quences of these views, the difﬁc ulties to which they give rise, and the
proper lessons to draw from them.
There is another distinction to be noted regarding Kripke’s response
to the two kinds of descriptive theories that he criticizes. Although he
argues that descriptive theories of the meaning of names and of their
reference are both false, he offers a replacement for only the latter . Ac-
cording to Kri pke, the vast majority of pr oper na
mes have their refer-
ence semantically ﬁxed not by a family of associated descriptions, but
by a historical chain of reference transmission. Typ ically, the chain be-
gins with an ostensive baptism in which an individual is stipulated to
be the bearer of a name n. Later, when n is used in conversation, new
speakers encounter it for the ﬁrst time and for m the intention to use it
with the same r efer
ence as those from whom they picked it up. Differ-
ent speakers may, of course, come to associate different descriptions
with n, but usually this doesn’t affect reference transmission. As a re-
sult, speakers further down the historical chain may use n to refer to its
original referent o, whether or not they associate descriptions with n
that uniquely denote o.
So Kri pke does have an apparently plau sible alternat
ive to descri ptivist
theories of reference determinati on. What abou t meaning? On hi s ac-
count, it wou ld seem that the only sem antic function of a nam e is to
refer, in which case one wou ld expect ordi nary proper nam es to be Ru s-
sellian logically proper nam es (without Russell’s epi stemological restri c-
tions on thei r bearers). However, Kri pke does not draw thi s, or any
other, deﬁni te conclu sion abou t the m eanings of nam es, or the propos
i-
tions sem antically expressed by sentences contai ning them. Along with
nearly everyone else, he recog nizes that one can u nderstand di fferent
coreferenti al nam es without knowing that they are coreferenti al, and
certainly wi thout judging them to have the sam e meaning. However,
this doesn’t show that the nam es don’t m ean the sam e thing, unless one
accepts the highly qu estionable pri nciple that anyone who u nderstands a
pair of synonym ous express
ions must recog nize them to be synony-
mous—som ething upon whi ch Kri pke never deﬁni tively pronou nces.
InNaming and Necessity , he does argue that the proposition that
Hesperus is Phosphorus is not knowable apriori, whereas the proposi-
tion that Hesperus is Hesperus is—and that one can know that Hespe-
rus is Hesperus without knowing that Hesper us is Phosphorus.
8
These
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE 21
8
For explication and criticism of Kripke’s ar gument, see chapter 15 of Soames, The Age of
Meaning .

views together with natural assumptions about meaning, composition-
ality, propositions, and propositional attitude ascriptions could be used
to argue that the names HesperusandPhosphorusdiffer in meaning, de-
spite being coreferential. However, Kripke neither gives such an ar gu-
ment, nor draws such a conclusion . Moreover, he has no account of
what, over and above the
ir referents, the meanings of these names
might be. F inally, in “A Puzzle about Belief,” he maintains that no
deﬁnite conclusions should be drawn about the meanings of names
from apparent failures of substitution of coreferential names in belief
ascriptions.
9
On his view, these puzzles arise from principles of belief
attribution that transcend any view about the meaning of names.
Hence, he resists drawing any positive conclusion about their mean-
ings, or about the propositions semantically expressed by sentences
containing them.
Natural Kind Terms
The challenge to descriptive analyses of meaning and reference is not
limited to proper names. In addition, both Saul Kripke and Hilary
Putnam challenged descriptive analyses of natural kind terms like gold,
tiger, water, heat, light, color, andred.
10
These philosophers, whose
views were broadly similar, maintained that, like proper names, natural
kind terms are not synonymous with descriptions associated with them
by speakers; and, like names, they may acquire reference in two ways.
One way involves direct presentation of samples, together with the
stipulation that the ter m is to apply to all and only instances of the
unique natural kind (of a certain sort) of which nearly all members of
the sample are instances; the other involves the use of a description to
pick out a kind by some, usually contingent, pr oper
ties. Later, when
the kind term is passed from speaker to speaker, the way in which the
reference was initially established nor mally doesn’t matter—just as
with proper names. As a result, speakers further down the linguistic
chain may use the term to apply to instances of the kind, whether or
22CHAPTER 2
9
Saul Kripke, “A Puzzle about Belief,” originally published in 1979, reprinted in Peter
Ludlow (ed.), Readings in the Philosophy of Language (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2003).
10
Putnam, “Is Semantics Possible?,” ﬁrst published in 1970; “Explanation and Refer-
ence,” ﬁrst published in 1973; and “The Meaning of ‘Meaning,’” ﬁrst published 1975; all
reprinted in Philosophical Papers, vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975);
Kripke, lecture 3 of Naming and Necessity.

not the descriptive properties they associate with the ter m really pick
out its members. In addition, scientiﬁc investigation may lead to the
discovery of properties that are necessary and/or sufﬁc ient for mem-
bership in the kind. These discoveries are for mulated by theoretical
identiﬁcation sentences like those in (2), which are said to express
truths that are necessary but knowable only aposteriori.
2a.Water i s H
2
O.
b. Lightning is electricity .
c. Light is a stream of photons.
d.Whales are mammals.
Examples like these are often thought to parallel corresponding sen-
tencesα=β in which αandβare rigid singular ter ms. It follows from
the deﬁnition of rigidity that if α andβrefer to the same individual,
then they do so in every world-state in which that indivi dual exists,
and never refer to anyth
ing else. Thus, α=β (ifαexists)is a necessary
truth, if it is true at all. Nevertheless, Kripke regards many such tr uths,
e.g., those in (3), to be knowable only aposteriori.
3a.Hesperus is Phosphorus (if Hesperus exists).
b.Cicero is T ully (if Cicero exists).
c.The man who actually won the U.S. Presidenti al election in
2000 was George W. Bush (if Bush exists).
However, ther
e are two related difﬁc ulties with extending Kripke’s
theses about (3) to sentences like (2). F irst, many natural kind terms N
are not singular ter ms, but general terms used to form simple predi-
cates of the sort is N,is an N, or are N’s. Since rigid designation is de-
ﬁned only for singular ter ms, it is not clear what role the not
ion of
rigidity plays in explaining the putative fact that statements of theoret-
ical identiﬁcation involving natural kind predicates are necessary, if
true. Second, many so-called statements of theoretical identiﬁcation,
including those in (2), are more naturally regarded as having the lo gi-
cal form ∀x (Ax⊃Bx)rather than A=B.
11
Although, in my opinion,
these difﬁc ulties do not under mine Kripke’s attack on descriptivist ac-
counts of natural kind terms, or his contention that many theoretical
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE 23
11
Note, although (2a) and (2b) and Ice is H
2
Oare true, Electricity is lightning andH
2
O
is iceare not.

identiﬁcation statements involving natural kind terms are examples of
the necessary aposteriori, they do raise questions about the proper way
of extending his theses about names to this class of ter ms.
12
Indexicals, Quantiﬁcation, and Direct Reference
Starting w ith lectures given by David Kaplan in 1971, and continuing
with published work of Kaplan and John Perry, a further challenge to
descriptivism was mounted, focusing on the role of context in under-
standing indexicals like I, now, today, here, actually, you, she, and that.
13
Although the referents of these terms vary from one context of utter-
ance to another, their meanings do not. For example, to know the
meanings of I, today, and sheis, roughly, to know the r ules in (4).
4a.One who uses I—e.g., in a sentence I am F—refers to one-
self, and says of oneself that one “is F .”
b.One who uses today—e.g., in a sentence Today is F—refers to
the day the utterance takes place, and says of that day that it
“is F.”
c.One who uses she—e.g., in a sentence She is F—refers to a
context
ually salient female, and says of her that she “is F .”
These rules provide two kinds of infor mation: they tell us how the ref-
erents of indexicals depend on aspects of contexts in which they are
used, and they implicitly identify the semantic contents of these ter ms
with their referents in contexts.
In order to understand this talk of content, one must grasp Kaplan’s
intuitive semantic framework. Sentences express propositions, which
are their semant ic contents; those containing indexicals express d
iffer-
ent propositions, and so have different contents, in different contexts.
Nevertheless, the meaning of a sentence is constant; it is a function
24CHAPTER 2
12
For further discussion, see chapters 9 through 11 of Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2002). For critical discussion, see Nathan Salmon,
“Naming, Necessity, and Beyond,” Mind112 (2003); Bernard Linsky, “General Ter ms as
Rigid Designators,” forthcoming in Philosophical Studies ; and Scott Soames, “Reply to Crit-
ics,” forthcoming in the same issue as Linsk y.
13
David Kaplan, “On the Logic of Demonstratives,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 8
(1979) and “Demonstratives,” in J. Almog, J. Perry, and H. Wettstein (eds.), Themes From
Kaplan(New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); John Perry, “The Problem
of the Essential Indexical,” Nous13 (1979), and “Frege on Demonstratives,” Philosophical
Review, 86 (1977).

from contexts to contents. Kaplan’s word for this is character . The pic-
ture is recapitulated for subsentential expressions. For example, the
character of Iis a function that maps an arbitrary context C onto the
agent (often the speaker) of C, which is the semantic content of Irel-
ative to C.
There are two anti-descriptivist implications here. F irst, the refer-
ents of at least some indexicals are not determined by descriptions
speakers associate with them. One example fr o
m Perry is Rip Van W in-
kle, who awakens on October 20, 1823 after sleeping for twenty years,
and says, not realizing what happened, Today is October 20, 1803. In so
doing, he speaks falsely because his use of todayrefers to the day of the
context, no matter what description he may have in mind.
14
Another
example involves Kaplan’s identical twins, Castor and Pollux, raised in
qualitatively identical environ ments to be molecule for molecule iden-
tical and so, presumably, to associate the same purely qualitative de-
scriptions with the same ter ms.
15
Despite this, each refers to himself,
and not the other, when he uses I.These examples show that the ref-
erents of indexicals are not always deter mined by purely qualitative de-
scriptions that speakers associate with them. Although this leaves open
the possibility that some indexicals may have their referents semanti-
cally ﬁxed by descriptions containing other indexicals, it precludes the
possibility that all indexical reference is deter mined in this way .
The second anti-descriptivist implication is that since the semantic
content of an indexical in a context is its refer
ent, its content is not
that of any description. In order to make this point, one must move
beyond the formal system developed in “On the Logic of Demonstra-
tives,” to the conception of str uctured contents that Kaplan character-
izes in “Demonstratives” as the intuitive philosoph ical picture u
nder-
lying his approach.
16
On this picture, the proposition expressed by S in
C is a complex entity encoding the syntactic str ucture of S, the con-
stituents of which are (or encode) the semantic contents in C of the
words and phrases in S. For example, the proposition expressed in C
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE 25
14
Perry, “Frege on Demonstratives,” p. 487.
15
Kaplan, “Dem onstrati ves,” p. 531. By a purely qualita tive descri ption, I mean a descri p-
tion not contai ning indexicals, nam es, or any similar kinds of terms. Since the descri ptivist
view under attack holds that the reference of all su ch terms is descri ptively ﬁxed, i t shou ld
countenance the eliminati on of any su ch terms from reference-ﬁxi ng descri ptions them selves.
16
Pages 496–97. In the for mal system, contents of expressions are functions from c ir-
cumstances of evaluation (pairs of world-states and times) to extensions; thus contents of
sentences are functions from c ircumstances to truth values. Though useful in formal work,
Kaplan regards this conception of content as, at best, a very rough approximation of the
more accurate and ﬁne-grained conception of str uctured content.

by a sentence i is Fis a complex in which the property expressed by F
is predicated of the referent o of the indexical i; this is the same as the
singular proposition expressed by x is F, relative to an assignment of o
to the variable ‘x’. By contrast, the proposition expressed by The D is
Fin C is a complex consisting of the property expressed by F plus a
complex consisting of the content of thetogether with the str uctured
complex which is the semantic content in C of the descr iptive phrase
D. On one natural analysis, this pr opos
ition predicates the higher
order property of being instantiated by whatever uniquely instantiates
the property expressed by D to the property expressed by F.
The claim that the sem antic content of an i ndexical relati ve to a
context is not the sam e as that of any descri ption is supported by
commonplace observati ons abou t proposi tional atti tudes. Suppose,
to adapt Ru ssell’s fam ous exam ple, that on som e occasi on in which
George IV spi ed Walter Scott, he
gave voi ce to hi s newfou nd convi c-
tion, sayi ng He[gesturing at Scott]isn’t the aut hor of W
averley. Had
this occu rred, each of the followi ng ascriptions wou ld have been
true.
5a.The author of W averley, namely Scott, is such that Geor ge IV
said that he wasn’t the author of W averley.
b.George IV said that you weren’t the author of W averley.(said
addressing Scott)
c.George IV said that I wasn’t the author of W averley. (said by
Scott)
d.George IV said that he [pointing at Scott] wasn’t the author
of Waverley. (said by a third party in another context)
On Kaplan’s picture, these reports are tr ue because the semantic con-
tent of the sentence George IV uttered (in his context), and so the
proposition he asserted, is the same as the content of the complement
clauses in the reports of what he said. Whatever descriptions speakers
who utter (5b,c,d) may associate with the indexicals are irrelevant to
the semantic contents of the reports. These indexicals, like the variable
hein (5a), are used to report the attitude of an agent toward a partic-
ular person, abstracting away fr o
m the particular manner in which the
agent thinks of, or characterizes, that person. All they contribute to
the proposition Geor ge IV is reported as asserting is the individual
Scott.
26CHAPTER 2

We are now ready to deﬁne the notion of a directly referential ter m,
and contrast it with a generalized notion of rigid designation.
17
DIRECT REFERENCE
A term t is directly referential iff for all contexts C, assign-
ments A, and world-states w, the referent of t with respect to
C, A, and w=the referent of t with respect to C and A =the
content of t with respect to C and A.
18
GENERALIZED RIGID DESIGNATION
A singular ter m t is a rigid designator iff for all contexts C,
assignments A, world-states w, and objects o, if t refers to o
with respect to C, A, and w, then t refers to o with respect to
C, A, and w′, for all world-states w′in which o exists, and t
never refers to anything else with respect to C, A, and any
world-state w*.
With this understanding, all directly referential singular ter ms are rigid
designators, but not vice versa (e.g., the square root of 25 is rigid but
not directly referential). According to Kaplan, indexicals and variables
are d
irectly referential. Nathan Salmon and I extend this view to
proper names.
19
Before leaving Kaplan’s framework, it is important to consider two
indexical operators used to constr uct rigidiﬁed descriptions out of
nonrigid descriptions. One, dthat, combines with a description the D
to form a directly referential singular ter m dthat [the D]the content of
which, relative to C and A, is the unique object o denoted by the D
relative to C and A (if there is such an object). The other, actually,
stands for the world-state C
W
of the context in a manner analogous to
the way in which nowstands for the time C
t
of the context, and I
stands for the agent C
A
of the context. Actuallycombines with a sen-
tence S to form a complex sentence Actually Sthe content of which in
C is a proposition that predicates of C
W
the property of being a world-
state in which the proposition expressed by S in C is tr ue; hence Actu-
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE 27
17
Here, and in what follows, I treat what Kaplan calls circumstances of evaluation as
world-states, rather than, as he does, pairs of times and world-states. Although there are real
issues here, in order to keep the discussion as simple as possible, I will not pursue them.
18
Intuitively, one can think of this as follows: ( i) The content of t w.r.t. C and A is identi-
ﬁed with its referent there. S ince an object has already been determined, there is no further
object determination to be done with respect to other world-states. So, for any world-state
w, the referent of t with respect to C, A, and w is the referent of t with respect to C and A.
19
Nathan Salmon, Frege’s Puzzle(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1986); Scott Soames, Be-
yond Rigidity .

ally Sis true with respect to C and arbitrary world-state w iff S is tr ue
with respect to C and C
W
, and whenever S is tr ue in C
W
,Actually Sis
a necessary truth.
The corresponding fact about descriptions is that whenever the x:
Fxsuccessfully denotes a unique individual o in the world-state of the
context C, the x: actually Fxdenotes o with respect to C and all possi-
ble world-states in which o exists, and never denotes anything else.
Hence,actuallyis a rigidiﬁer; however, the resulting r igidiﬁed descrip-
tions are not directly referential. For example, if the x: Fxandthe x: Gx
are contingently codesignative descriptions of the same object o, then
the x: actually Fxandthe x: actually Gxwill be non-dir ectly r
eferen-
tial, rigid designators of the same object, with different semantic con-
tents, relative to a context and actual world state C
W
of the context.
The former may be paraphrased the unique object which is F in C
W
,
while the latter is paraphrased the unique object which is G in C
W
.In
Kaplan’s intuitive semantic framework—in which the semantic content
of a compound expression e is a str uctured entity constr ucted out of
the semantic contents of the grammatical constituents of e—the se-
mantic contents of actually-rigidiﬁed descriptions will be different
whenever the semantic contents of the original, unrigidiﬁed descrip-
tions are different. This is not so with descriptions rigidiﬁed using the
dthat operator. Any pair of dthat-rigidiﬁed descriptions that r efer to
the sa
me thing have the same semantic content. Hence, substitution of
codesignative dthat-rigidiﬁed descriptions in a sentence (not contain-
ing quotation or quasi-quotat ional devices) always pr eser
ves the se-
mantic content of the sentence, whereas substitution of codesignative
actually-rigidiﬁed descriptions does not.
20
Another difference between dthat-rigidiﬁed descriptions and actu-
ally-rigidiﬁed descriptions involves existence. A dthat-rigidiﬁed de-
scription, dthat [the x:Fx], which designates an object o in the world-
state of the context, designates o in all world-states, even those in
which o does not exist. By contrast, an actually-rigidiﬁed description,
the x: actually Fx, which designates o in the world-state of the con-
28CHAPTER 2
20
This difference between dthat-rigidiﬁed descriptions and actually-rigidiﬁed descriptions
(as well as between directly referential singular ter ms in general and other, merely rigid,
terms) all but washes away in semantic systems in which the content of an expression in a
context is identiﬁed with its intension (i.e., function from c ircumstances of evaluat ion to ex-
tensions) in the context. In such systems the content of a rigid designator in a context is a
function fro
m circumstances of evaluation that always returns the same object as extension
(when it returns any extension at all). Though Kaplan uses such systems in his formal work,
he does not believe that they capture the philosophical tr uth about content.

text, designates o in all world-states in which o exists. However, if dif-
ferent objects exist at different world-states, and the range of the, and
other quantiﬁers, at a world-state is restricted to objects existing at
that world-state (two very common assumptions), then the x: actually
Fxwill fail to designate anything at a world-state in which o does not
exist.
For most discussions, this difference between dthat-rigidiﬁed de-
scriptions and actually-rigidiﬁed descriptions doesn’t matter much.
However, ther
e is one further peculiarity about actually-rigidiﬁed de-
scriptions that is potentially more serious, and even calls into question
the characterization of them as rigid designators . The peculiarity in-
volves cases in which the x: actually Ffails to designate an object at the
world-state of a context C* because more than one object existin g at
that world-state has the proper
ty expressed by F.
21
Suppose further
that there are exactly two such objects o
1
, o
2
, and that, of these two,
only o
1
exists at possible world-state w
1
, while only o
2
exists at w
2
.
Then, since the x: actually Fxdesignates an object o with respect to a
context C and world-state w iff o is the unique object existing at w
which, in the world-state C
W
of the context, has the property ex-
pressed by F, the x: actually Fxwill designate o
1
with respect to C*
and w
1
, while designating o
2
with respect to C* and w
2
. Obviously,
this description is not a rigid designator . Thus, not all descriptions to
whichactuallyhas been added in this way qualify as rigid.
This does not materially affect our discussion thus far of what I have
been calling actually-rigidiﬁed descriptions, since in introducing these
descriptions, I said “whenever the x: Fxsuccessfully denotes a unique
individual o in the world-state of the context C, the x: actually Fxde-
notes o with r espect to C and all poss
ible world-states in which o ex-
ists, and never denotes anything else.” This remains tr ue. What is not
true is that descriptions to which actuallyhave been added in this way
standardly satisfy the deﬁnition of generalized rigid designation just
given. We can, however, bring s uch descript ions under the general
rubric rigid designation by introd
ucing the following contextualized
notion.
CONTEXTUALIZED RIGID DESIGNATION
A singular ter m t is a rigid designator with respect to a con-
text C and assignment A iff there is an object o such that (i)
t refers to o with respect to C, A, and the world-state C
W
of
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE 29
21
Thanks to Ali Kazmi for bringing this peculiarity to my attention.

C, and (ii) for all world-states w in which o exists, t refers to
o with respect to C, A, and w, and (iii) t never refers to any-
thing else with respect to C, A, and any world-state w*.
It is only this weakened, contextualized deﬁnition of rigid designation
that is guaranteed to be satisﬁed by the description the x: actually Fx
in contexts in which it successfully designates something. This is the
sense in which I will refer to such descriptions as rigid designators .
22
Philosophical Implications of Rigidity, Direct Reference, and
Non-Descriptionality
Although it seems evident that the propositions expressed by (6) are
knowable only aposteriori, it appears to be a consequence of the non-
descriptive semantics of names, natural kind terms, and the actuality
operator that each of these sentences expresses a necessary truth, if it is
true at all.
6a.Saul Kripke ≠David Kaplan
b.Water is H
2
O.
c.Ice is H
2
O.
d.Actually it was the case that George Washington was the ﬁrst
President of the United States.
e.If Thomas Jefferson existed, then the person who actually
wrote the Declaration of Independence was Thomas Jeffer-
son.
Since we know that (6a–e) are tr ue, it follows that they are examples of
the necessary aposteriori. Moreover, nondescriptional semantics of the
30CHAPTER 2
22
A further point brought to my attention by Kazmi is that if we start with a sentence The
actual F is Gand (i) eliminate the description in favor of its Russellian expansion, while (ii)
allowing o urselves to place the actuality operator between the quantiﬁers of that expansion,
then we can give the sentence a highly intuitive reading—namely ∃x [actually ∀y (Fy↔x=
y)&Gx]—in which the uniqueness condit ion is correctly imposed on things that have the
pr
operty expressed by F in the world-state of the context. Th is reading is not available if the
actual Fis treated in the usual manner as a singular ter m or restricted quantiﬁer, the x: ac-
tually Fx, in which theis an operator with the usual semantics, ranging over objects ex isting
at the world-state of evaluation. Perhaps we should allow actualto combine with theto form
a complex quantiﬁer the-actual x.

sort introduced by Kripke and Kaplan provide recipes for generating
many more examples of the same type. One of the simplest such
recipes involves examples containing the actuality operator . If S ex-
presses an ordinary tr ue, but contingent, proposition p that is know-
able only aposteriori, then Actually Sexpresses a necessary truth that
says of the actual world-state @ that it is a world-state with respect to
which p is tr ue. If, as seems evident, th is proposition about @ is k
now-
able apriori only if p is knowable apriori, then we have a recipe for
cooking up instances of the necessary aposteriori, virt ually at will. An-
other simple recipe involves directly referential singular ter ms. Let P
be a predicate with the following two characteristics: ( i) it expresses an
essential property of anything that has it (i.e., a pr operty that anything
wh
ich has it couldn’t exist without), and (ii) in order to know of a par-
ticular object that it has this property, one must possess empirical evi-
dence to this effect. In addition, suppose (a) that o has the property
expressed by P, and (b) that t is a directly referential ter m that desig-
nates o, and, hence, that the proposition expressed by t is P(relative to
a context C) can be known only if one knows of o that it has the prop-
erty which P expresses. It w ill then follow that (in C) If t exists, then t
is Pexpresses a proposition that is both necessary and knowable only
aposteriori. If nondescriptivists ar e r
ight, then there are many exam-
ples of this type in which t is a name, an indexical, or a dthat-rigidiﬁed
description. S imilar recipes can be given for more complex sentences,
as well as for sentences containing natural kind ter ms.
23
The best examples of the contingent apriori are sentences like (7).
7.If some one person wrote the Declaration of Independence,
then the person who actually wrote the Declaration of Inde-
pendence wrote something.
It follows from the semantics of actually,plus the fact that Thomas
Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence, that (7) is false at a
world-state in which Thomas Jefferson wrote nothing, and someone
else wrote the Declaration of Independence. Assuming that the world
could have been in such a state, we conclude that (7) expresses a con-
tingent truth. However, this tr uth can be known withou t doing any
empirical investigation. S ince anyone in the actual world-state can
know it to be true simply by understanding (7), and r eason
ing about
ATTACK ON THE TRADITIONAL PICTURE 31
23
In the case of natural kind terms, the generation of instances of the necessary aposteri-
ori raises a number of complicated and controversial questions. See chapters 9 through 11 of
Beyond Rigidity for discussion.

it—without appeal to empirical evidence for justiﬁcation—the propo-
sition expressed would seem to be knowable apriori. Thus, it seems
that a proper understanding of nondescriptive semantics shows that—
contrary to what philosophers have thought for centuries—not all nec-
essary truths are apriori, and not all apriori tr uths are necessary.
32CHAPTER 2

PART TWO
DESCRIPTIVIST RESISTANCE:
THE ORIGINS OF AMBITIOUS
TWO-DIMENSIONAL ISM

This page intentionally left blank

CHAPTER 3
REASONS FOR RESISTANCE AND THE
STRATEGY FOR DESCRIPTIVIST REVIVAL
Motivations
Despite the attack on descriptivism, some believe that the anti-descrip-
tivists’ conclusions are too extreme, and that properly modiﬁed de-
scriptive analyses should be capable of withstanding their ar guments.
This view is fueled by three main factors. F irst is the conviction that
anti-descriptivists have not adequately addressed Frege’s puzzle about
substitut ion of coreferential ter ms in attitude ascriptions and Russell’s
problem of negative existentials. There is still a widespread belief that
these problems show that names cannot be directly referential. Al-
though Kripke never asserted that they were, it is hard to see how, if
his doctrines are correct, they could be anything else. According to
him, the meaning of a name is never the same as that of any descrip-
tion, and the vast m ajority of names do not even have their referents
semantically ﬁxed by descriptions. If these names are so thoroughly
nondescriptional, it is not clear how their meanings could be other
than their referents. Consequently, one who takes that view to have
been refuted by Frege and Russell will suspect that the power of
Kripke’s arguments must have been exaggerated, and will be moti-
vated to ﬁnd a way of modifying descriptivism that can withstand
them.
The second factor m otivating descri ptivists is their convi ction that
critics like Kri pke have focu sed on the wrong descri ptions. To be su re,
it will be admitted, for m any speak ers s and proper nam es or natu ral
kind terms n, the descri ptions most likely to be volu nteered by s i n an-
swer to the qu estion To what, or to whom, do you refer when you use n?
neither give the m eaning of n, nor sem antically ﬁx i ts reference. Often s
will respond by ci ting what s tak es to be the m ost well-k nown and im-
portant characteri stics of the pu tative referent, abou t which s m ay be
mistak en. However, the referents of these terms must be determined in
some way, and su rely, whatever way i t is can be descri bed. Thus, for

each nam e or natu ral kind term n, there must be som e descri ption D
that correctly pi cks out its referent(s)—perhaps one encapsu lating
Kripke’s own cau sal-historical picture of reference transmissi on.
Is there any reason to believe that speakers associate D with n? Some
descriptivists think so. In fact, the very success of Kripke and others in
eliciting uncontroversial judgments about what names would r efer to
i
f used in various counterfactual situations has been taken to show that
speakers must be implicitly guided by a descriptive theory that deter-
mines reference. For example, Frank Jackson ar gues that
Our ability to answer questions about what various words refer to
in various possible worlds, it should be emphasized, is common
ground with crit ics of the description theor y.
The critics’ writings
are full of descriptions ( descriptions ) of possible worlds and claims
about what refers, or fails to refer, to what in these possible
worlds. Indeed, their impact has derived precisely from the intu-
itive plausibility of many of their claims about what refers, or fails
to refer, to what in various possible worlds. B ut if speakers can say
what refers to what when various possible worlds ar e descr
ibed to
them, description theorists can identify the property associated in
their minds with, for example, the word ‘water’: it is the disjunc-
tion of the properties that guide the speakers in each particular
possible world when they say which stuff, if any, in each world
counts as water. This disjunction is in their minds in the sense that
they can deliver the answer for each possible world when it is de-
scribed in sufﬁci
ent detail, but it is implicit in the sense that the
pattern that brings the various disjuncts together as part of the,
possibly highly complex, disjunction may be one they cannot
state.
1
This is a remarkable defense. If correct, it might seem to suggest that
descriptive theories of reference are virt ually guaranteed, apriori, to be
irrefutable, since any refutation would require a clear, uncontroversial
sketch of a possible scenario in which n referred to something o not
satisfying the description putatively associated with n by ordinary
speakers like us (or failed to refer to the thing that was denoted by this
description)—wher eas the ver
y judgment that n does refer to o in this
scenario (or does not refer to what the description denotes there)
would be taken by Jackson to demonstrate the existence of a different,
36CHAPTER 3
1
Frank Jackson, “Reference and Descriptions Revisited,” Philosophical Perspectives 12
(1998): 212.

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Creek, sixteen miles from the city hall of Charleston the Royal
Arms have never come down! The ancient edifice stands in a
tranquil woodland, quite near The Oaks, home of Arthur Middleton in
early years. At the foot of the altar is a tomb with this inscription:
“Here lyeth the body of the Reverend Francis Le Jau, Doctor in
Divinity, of Trinity College, Dublin, who came to this Province October,
1706, and was one of the first missionaries sent by the honourable
society to this Province, and was the first Rector of St. James, Goose
Creek, Obijt. 15th September, 1717, ætat 52, to whose memory this
stone is fixed by his only Son, Francis Le Jau.” In the records left by
Dr. Le Jau is mentioned that he christened Indians. Four acres for the
old parsonage were the gift of Arthur Middleton, and another pioneer
gave the Glebe of one hundred acres. The cherubs in stucco over
each of the keystones are famous and so is the pelican feeding her
young, over the west door. Interesting memorial tablets have places.
In the present day this picturesque and historic church is easily
reached by automobile. Each year at Easter divine services are held
in the church, the congregation invariably overflowing the building.
The original church was built soon after Dr. Le Jau’s arrival.
ST. ANDREW’S, BERKELEY, on the Ashley River Road: The parish of
St. Andrew’s, Berkeley (the district about Charles Town was Berkeley
in olden times), was founded in 1706 and a simple brick building
erected. Seventeen years later this was enlarged, taking the form of
a cross. The gallery was intended for non-pewholders and was later
set aside for negroes. Destroyed by fire it was rebuilt in 1764 and is
one of the few rural churches that has survived the Revolution
and the War for Southern Independence. St. Andrew’s was one
of ten parishes authorized by act of the Assembly in 1706 regulating
religious worship in accordance with the forms of the Church of
England. In quite recent years a question relative to the jurisdiction
of the Bishop of London was raised! St. Andrew’s had its genesis
when the colony had a population of 9,000, “of whom 5,000 were
Negro and Indian slaves.”

36
ASHLEY RIVER ROAD, Leading to Famous Gardens: St. Andrew’s
Church is but one of many interesting and historic places on the
Ashley River Road. Two miles from the Ashley River Bridge the road
passes near the site of the original Charles Town in South Carolina
and three miles farther is the Ashley Hall plantation of the Bull family,
distinguished in provincial and colonial periods. It was on the Bull
place that Attakullakulla, a chief of the Cherokee Indians, signed a
treaty of peace in the 1760’s after his tribe had been severely
humbled by the whites. Just across the highway were the lovely
Magwood Gardens, now the property of a granddaughter of President
Abraham Lincoln. Here the highway passes through a grove of
majestic live oaks festooned with Spanish moss. Seven miles from the
bridge one passes St. Andrew’s Church and a short distance farther
through old Fort Bull, the moat about which has been filled. Next, on
the right, is the entrance to Drayton Hall, then Magnolia Gardens,
Runnymede, home of John Julius Pringle, Speaker of the House of
the Assembly in 1787, and later the property of Charles Cotesworth
Pinckney, of the famous Pinckney family; Middleton Place (gardens)
where is buried Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of
Independence; the seat of the old Wragg barony; the Ashley River is
crossed at Bacon’s Bridge near which stands an ancient oak beneath
the spreading boughs of which General Francis Marion is alleged to
have entertained a British officer (it is a pretty legend, but its site is
severally located). Half a mile beyond the bridge is the road leading
down to the ruins of old Dorchester, established in 1696 by colonists
from Dorchester, Massachusetts, led by the Reverend Joseph Lord. In
this year ruins of fort and churches are mute reminders of a brave
village in a primeval wilderness infested with savage Indians. From
Bacon’s Bridge the distance to Summerville is five miles. It is a drive
every visitor to this section should follow. In the season, the
Middleton Place and Magnolia Gardens are open to visitors.

Foreground, Unitarian Church; Background, St. John’s Lutheran
Church

37
Huguenot Church. Only One in America
CASTLE PINCKNEY, in Charleston Harbor: Stand on the
incomparable Battery and look seaward. Fort Sumter is in plain
view, of course, but nearer the gaze is Castle Pinckney, holding the
status nowadays of a government monument. It is to be reached only
by boat. The fort at the edge of the sand bank known as Shute’s Folly
was built after the Revolution, in 1797-1804. Later, it was enlarged.
In the War for Southern Independence, it lacked opportunity to

38
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contribute materially to the defense of Charleston. Really there is
more legend than history about Castle Pinckney, but long it has been
a well-known landmark. The government used it as a depot for aids
for navigation until the depot was established at the foot of Tradd
Street, on the Ashley River, site of the old Chisolm’s rice mill. An
excuse for including it among Landmarks of Charleston is that many
strangers promenading on the High Battery wish to know what
Castle Pinckney is.
ST. MICHAEL’S CHURCH, 78 Meeting Street: Five times have the bells
of St. Michael’s crossed the Atlantic ocean. They came from England
in 1764 and returned there after the British evacuated the town in
1784. Repurchased for Charleston, they came back to their steeple.
During the War for Southern Independence they were taken for
safekeeping to Columbia and in the burning of that town charged to
General William Tecumseh Sherman (who had been a social favorite
in Charleston before the war) they were so damaged that they were
shipped to England. There they were recast in the original molds.
Brought back they are still in the steeple, pealing on occasions. When
Charles Town on the peninsula was laid out, a lot was designed for
the English church, St. Philip’s. A wooden building was erected. This
being outgrown a brick church was built on Church Street, on the
present site of St. Philip’s. By act of the Assembly, June, 1751,
Charlestown was divided into two parishes; the lower, St. Michael’s,
and the upper, St. Philip’s. February 17, 1752, the corner stone was
laid with much ceremony, the South Carolina Gazette carrying an
account. The reputed successor of Sir Christopher Wrenn was the
architect and the edifice is declared to resemble St. Martin’s-in-the-
Field, London, near Trafalgar Square. From the pavement to the ball
of the steeple is 182 feet. During the War for Southern
Independence, the steeple, and that of St. Philip’s, offered shining
marks for the Union artillerists. Cannon balls struck the church, but
not with serious results. Heavy damage was done by the earthquake
of August 31, 1886. The old clock in the steeple, with four
dials, began the keeping of Charlestown time in 1764.

40
President George Washington and the Marquis de Lafayette have
worshipped in St. Michael’s. In the taxed tea excitement of 1774, the
assistant rector of St. Michael’s preached a sermon that aroused his
congregation and he received his walking papers. In the yard of this
church are illustrious dead, including James Louis Petigru, eminent
South Carolina lawyer, an opponent of Nullification in the 1830’s and
of Secession in 1860; however, when his state had seceded, Mr.
Petigru cast his fortune with the Confederacy. The incumbent Bishop
of South Carolina, the Right Reverend Albert S. Thomas was rector of
St. Michael’s when he was elected to this high office.
CATHEDRAL OF ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST, 122 Broad Street: John
Morica England, first Bishop of Charleston, arrived in Charleston
December 30, 1820, and the Cathedral of St. Finbar was dedicated by
him a year later. It was a plain frame structure. Thirty years it stood.
Then it was razed for the building of the St. John and St. Finbar
Cathedral, burned in 1861; it was similar in design to the present
Cathedral of St. John the Baptist on the same site, the northeast
corner of Broad and Legare Streets. This handsome Gothic edifice of
brown stone was begun late in 1888 by the Right Reverend Henry
Pinckney Northrop, Bishop of Charleston. April 14, 1907, it was
consecrated, Cardinal Gibbons being one of the celebrants. The site is
that of the Vauxhall Gardens. Between December, 1861, and the
occupancy of the new cathedral, the congregation worshipped in the
pro-cathedral in Queen Street, built by the Right Reverend Patrick
Nielsen Lynch, then Bishop of Charleston. St. John the Baptist’s is 200
feet long from the entrance to the rear of the vestry, the nave
being 150 feet long by eighty feet wide; from the floor to the
top of clerestory is sixty feet. The interior is beautifully decorated and
contains fine paintings and stained-glass windows. To the north of
the Cathedral is the Convent of Our Lady of Mercy. Graves of bishops
are under the cathedral. The edifice is one of Charleston’s cardinal
show places.

41
TRUMBULL’S WASHINGTON, in Charleston City Hall: One of the most
famous and valuable portraits of General George Washington hangs
in the City Hall, northeast corner of Meeting and Broad Streets. It
was done by John Trumbull on the order of the City Council in honor
of President Washington’s visit in 1791. It is reputed to be worth a
million dollars! Art connoisseurs have come long distances to inspect
this great portrait. Washington is shown full length, with his horse
near him. While this is Charleston’s most valuable painting, there are
other fine paintings in the Municipal Gallery, including President
James Monroe, commemorating his visit in 1819, by Samuel F. B.
Morse (inventor of the telegraph); the damage done by a Union shell
in the 1860’s does not show; President Andrew Jackson, in uniform
after the Battle of New Orleans, by Vanderlyn, student under the
celebrated Gilbert Stuart; General Zachary Taylor, with spyglass in
hand in Mexico, by Beard; John Caldwell Calhoun, eminent
statesman, addressing the United States senate, by Healy; General
William Moultrie, defender of Fort Moultrie against Sir Peter Parker’s
British fleet in 1776, by Fraser; Marquis de Lafayette, miniature, by
Fraser, commemorating the Frenchman’s visit in 1825; General
Francis Marion, the “Swamp Fox,” in Revolutionary uniform, by
John Stolle (here the famous coonskin cap is replaced by a
brigadier’s hat, by order of William A. Courtenay, then Mayor); Queen
Anne, of England, by Sir Godfrey Kneller, a fragment of the original
cherished as a relic; Joel Roberts Poinsett, statesman, by Jarvis;
William Campbell Preston, statesman, by Jarvis; General and
Governor Wade Hampton, the hero of Reconstruction, by Prescott;
General P. G. T. Beauregard, Confederate Chieftain, by Carter;
General Thomas A. Huguenin, the last Confederate commander of
Fort Sumter; statuary busts of James Louis Petigru, Robert Young
Hayne, Christopher Gustavus Memminger, Robert Fulton, and others.
An informing sketch of this gallery by Joseph C. Barbot, Clerk of
Council, is recommended. In Colonial years the site of the City Hall
was the town’s market place. On it the United States Bank was
housed about 1802 and this building became the City Hall. It is
related that the money for the purchase came from the sale of the

42
Exchange to the United States government. The interior has been
rearranged.
THE OLD EXCHANGE, East End of Broad Street: From the standpoint
of history, this building is incomparably the most interesting in South
Carolina and one of the most interesting in America, the Rev. William
Way, D.D., told the Rebecca Motte Chapter of the Daughters of the
American Revolution, whose property it is by gift of the United States.
When Charles Town was laid out in 1680 this site was the Court of
Guards, the place of arms for the early colonists. Here were
imprisoned Stede Bonnet and other pirates in 1718 when South
Carolina was putting down piracy after its previous years of friendship
and fraternizing. The Exchange and Custom House was built in
1767 at a cost of 44,016 pounds. Most of the material was
brought from England in sailing vessels. The date of completion was
1771. Taxed tea from England was stored in the Exchange in 1774
and citizens prevented its sale. A second cargo, arriving November 3,
1774, was dumped by merchants of Charlestown into the Cooper
River. In July, 1774, delegates to the Provincial Congress gathered in
this building and set up the first independent government established
in America; the congress also elected delegates to the General
Congress meeting in Philadelphia. Patriotic men and women of
Charlestown were incarcerated in the Exchange by the British during
the Revolution; it was from the Exchange that the martyr Colonel
Isaac Hayne was led to his execution in 1781. President George
Washington was entertained in the building, Charles Fraser writing in
his Reminiscences: “Amidst every recollection that I have of that most
imposing occasion, the most prominent is the person of that great
man as he stood upon the steps of the Exchange uncovered, amidst
the enthusiastic acclamation of the citizens.” Saturday, May 7, 1791,
General Washington was guest of honor at a “sumptuous
entertainment” given by the merchants of Charleston in the
Exchange. During the War of 1812 patriotic meetings were held in
the Exchange. In 1818 the city of Charleston sold the Exchange to
the United States government for the sum of $60,000 and a week

43
later the city government paid the sum of $60,000 for the building of
the United States Bank, to be converted into the City Hall. The
following year President James Monroe was in the Exchange. The
federal government used the building for a customhouse and post
office, the customhouse transferring to its own building after the War
for Southern Independence and the post office to its present home in
1896. In the earthquake of 1886, the cupola designed by the artist
Fraser was so badly damaged that it was removed. For years the
building has been headquarters for the Sixth lighthouse district; these
offices continue in it although the government has presented the
historic building to the Daughters of the American Revolution in and
of the State of South Carolina as an historical memorial, to be
occupied by the Rebecca Motte Chapter; this was effective in March
of 1913. When the United States entered the World War the
Exchange by unanimous vote of the D.A.R. was tendered the Federal
government which it used to the end of the conflict. On the
centennial of George Washington’s death a handsome bronze tablet
on the west side of the Exchange was unveiled. There is no question
that this ante-Revolutionary building is one of Charleston’s greatest
landmarks.

First (Scotch) Presbyterian Church

44
45
Bethel Methodist Church
SITE OF INSTITUTE HALL, 134 Meeting Street: South Carolina
declared itself free and independent, seceding from the United
States, December 20, 1860. This bold act was taken in the hall of the
South Carolina Institute. The Ordinance of Secession had been
adopted in the hall of the St. Andrew’s Society, 118 Broad Street, but
the delegates came to the Institute Hall because of its greater
capacity; the wish was to accommodate as many as possible of the
thousands who hoped to see the ordinance signed. With the great
hall crowded to suffocation, after all the signatures had been affixed,
President Jamison advanced to the front of the rostrum and
announced, that South Carolina was an independent sovereignty, free
of the United States. And the War for Southern Independence was
nascent. In this hall several months before had been held the
famous Democratic National Convention that adjourned without

46
decision with respect to candidates for President and Vice President.
On the site are published The News and Courier, one of the oldest
daily newspapers in the United States, founded in 1803, with its roots
going back to 1786, and the Charleston Evening Post. They carry on
the traditions of the South.
CONFEDERATE MUSEUM, at the Head of the Market: Valuable relics
of the Confederacy are preserved in their hall at the head of Market
Street, at Meeting Street, by the Charleston Chapter of the United
Daughters of the Confederacy. A gun on the porch was fashioned
from Swedish wrought iron from one of the first locomotives operated
by the South Carolina Railroad, the world’s oldest long-distance
steam railroad. It was among the first rifled cannon made in the
United States. This piece was in Columbia when General William
Tecumseh Sherman’s Union troops occupied that town, and Union
soldiers tried to burst the cannon, cracking it near the muzzle. During
riots in the period of Reconstruction the Washington Light Infantry
manned the gun. The Confederate Museum is in a hall over the west
end of the old City Market established between 1788 and 1804,
extending from East Bay Street to Meeting Street. Through many
years all household marketing was done in the stalls. Into recent
years it was a common sight to see a gentleman doing the
marketing, a negro with a large basket following him from stall to
stall. There survive stalls in the Market, but the long low building is
not congested as it was in other years. The telephone has
contributed much toward the discontinuance of the good old
Charleston custom of marketing in person.
MARION SQUARE, King, Meeting and Calhoun Streets: Named in
honor of General Francis Marion, hero of the Revolution,
affectionately called the “Swamp Fox,” this six-acre square in the very
heart of Charleston was from 1882 to 1921 the parade ground of The
Citadel, the military college of South Carolina, giving rise to the
nickname, Citadel Green. The Citadel is now at Hampton Park, on the
Ashley River, but its main building and four wings stand as reminders.

47
In Lowndes Street, from Calhoun to the Citadel sally port, is a statue
of John Caldwell Calhoun, eminent South Carolina statesman, atop a
tall granite shaft. On the Meeting Street side is a monument to
General and Governor Wade Hampton, savior of his State in
Reconstruction, and on the west side a section of “horn work,” part of
the Revolutionary line of fortifications for the defense of Charlestown
against the invading British. It was just outside the town, Boundary
Street becoming Calhoun Street after the town limits were extended
to their present line in 1849. Before the purchase by the now defunct
Fourth Brigade, the square was solidly built. After the evacuation of
Charleston until 1882 the United States army was in possession of
the Citadel buildings. On the east side and on the west side are
fountains fed by a great artesian well near King and Calhoun Streets,
formerly in the waterworks system.
THE OLDEST DRUG STORE, 125 King Street: America’s oldest drug
store business is in Charleston. It has had a career antedating 1781
as in that year Dr. Andrew Turnbull bought the business and
began the dispensing of his own remedies. In 1792 Joseph
Chouler was the proprietor, in 1806 William Burgoyne, in 1816 Jacob
De La Motta. The mortar and pestle he displayed over his
Apothecary’s Hall is still extant, and in the store now used. Felix
l’Herminier took over the business in 1845 and soon afterward it was
in the name of William G. Trott who in 1870 sold it to C. F.
Schwettmann. In 1894 the style was C. F. Schwettmann & Son. This
continues with John F. Huchting as proprietor. In 1920 Mr. Huchting
presented much of the old Apothecary’s Hall to the Charleston
Museum which has reset it and where it may be seen. More than one
hundred and fifty years for a drug business is a worth-while record!
CHARLESTON LIGHTHOUSE, on Morris Island: During Colonial years
the only coastal light south of the Delaware capes was the Charleston
Lighthouse on Morris Island, built in 1767. The present tower was
built in 1876; it is of brick, 161 feet high. The earthquake of 1886
cracked the tower and threw the lens out of adjustment. From the

48
first Charleston Light came a copper plate in the corner stone,
reading: “The first stone of this Beacon was laid on the 30th of May
1767 in the seventh year of His Majesty’s reign, George the III,” and
so on. December 18, 1860, the first incident of the War for Southern
Independence affecting the lighthouse service occurred at the
Charleston Light. The Secretary of the Treasury was told by the
Secretary of the Lighthouse Board that he would not recommend that
the coast of South Carolina “be lighted by the Federal Government
against her will.” December 30, the lighthouse inspector reported that
“the Governor of the State of South Carolina has requested me
to leave the State.” By the latter part of April, 1861, the
Confederates had extinguished this and other lights; they were
furnishing no aids to navigation for Union mariners. Morris Island is at
the left entrance to the harbor of Charleston. From the eastern end
of the Folly Beach, accessible by automobile, a clear view of the
Charleston Light may be had.
MIDDLETON PLACE, Gardens on the Ashley River: This was the seat
of Arthur Middleton, Signer of the Declaration of Independence.
Henry Middleton, of The Oaks, president of the Continental Congress,
obtained the land through his wife. Two English landscape gardeners
were brought oversea to fashion the show place, which was
completed about 1740. The fine Tudor house was put to the torch
late in the War for Southern Independence. Only the left wing stands,
and in it the owner, J. J. Pringle Smith, descendant of the Signer,
lives. The old steps to the main building are in place, and from them
a commanding view of the broad formal terraces and the winding
Ashley River is had. The first japonicas brought into this country were
transplanted at Middleton Place about 1805 and one of the original
plants was alive in 1939. Middleton Place is famous not only for its
gorgeous azalea show in spring, but for the wide variety of plants. It
has been praised with lavish enthusiasm by distinguished visitors.
Annually thousands of people travel many miles to walk about these
wonderful gardens, a living reminder of the beauty wrought before
the Revolution. The grave of the Signer is at Middleton Place. The

49
Gardens are on the Ashley River Road, about fourteen miles from the
Ashley River Bridge. If one would see gardens, terraces and hedges
substantially as they were in 1740; if one would see one of the
world’s most beautiful places, he should be sure of visiting Middleton
Place.
Alluring Views of Magnolia-on-the-Ashley

50
MAGNOLIA GARDENS, on the Ashley River: Distinguished
authors have heaped glowing compliments on the enchantment
that is Magnolia-on-the-Ashley, “a sight unrivalled,” said a writer in
the Chicago Tribune. The fame of these gardens has gone wide and
far. Thomas P. Lesesne, of Charleston, was in the great Kew Gardens,
London. Coming to the azalea section he was surprised to find a sign
declaring to all who came that way that if one would see the azalea
in the zenith of its beauty, he should visit Magnolia-on-the-Ashley,
near Charleston, South Carolina, United States of America! In Kew!
Think of that! John Galsworthy, Owen Wister and other notables have
shed superlatives in describing the gardens. In this show place on the
Ashley River, the Reverend John Grimke Drayton planted the first
Azalea Indica. They had been imported from the East to Philadelphia
in 1843, but, the Pennsylvania climate being too rigorous for them,
Mr. Drayton was invited to see what he could do with them. And what

51
he has done with them brings thousands of people from distant
places each spring when the azaleas are in the full glory of their
bloom! The gardens, about twenty-five acres in extent, have what is
declared to be the most valuable collection of the Camellia Japonica;
there are more than 250 varieties. They come into bloom in the
winter, and the gardens are open for their inspection. Carlisle
Norwood Hastie, present owner of Magnolia, is grandson of the
Reverend Mr. Drayton, an Episcopalian minister. Two hundred years
the property has been in possession of the Drayton family.
During the Revolution the Colonial mansion was burned and a
second building was burned during the War for Southern
Independence. Mr. Hastie has purchased the old Tupper house in
Charleston (its site on Meeting Street) for rëerection at Magnolia-on-
Ashley. Moss-covered oak and cypress trees, bordering mirroring
lagoons, furnish a bewitching background for the gardens, with the
Ashley River in front.
ASHLEY RIVER BRIDGE, on the Coastal Highway (17): Until the first
of July, 1921, the bridge over the Ashley River at the head of Spring
Street was privately owned. At that time the county of Charleston
acquired it by purchase and at once the toll was taken off. In the
spring of 1926, the present handsome and commodious concrete
bridge was formally opened. It is slightly down-stream from the
rather ramshackle wooden bridge. It cost a million and a quarter
dollars. It is wide enough for four vehicles abreast and on each side
is a sidewalk for pedestrians. Its huge bascule leaves provide plenty
of clearance for the greatest seagoing vessels. This bridge, a
memorial to Charleston soldiers who lost their lives in the World War,
is an essential link in the Coastal Highway between the provinces of
eastern Canada and the keys of Florida, thence by “ferry” to Havana,
Cuba. It connects the city of Charleston with all the trans-Ashley
region. From the town it leads to James Island (on which are the
Country Club and the Municipal Links, Riverland Terrace and Wappoo
Hall) and the popular Folly Beach; by way of James Island to the
Stono River bridge which is near the famous Fenwick Hall, a great

52
53
estate in pre-Revolutionary years; it leads to Walterboro, Beaufort,
Port Royal (site of the earliest French colony) and Savannah and
Jacksonville; it leads to the Ashley River Road for St. Andrew’s
Church, Middleton Place, Magnolia-on-the-Ashley, Drayton Hall,
Runnymede, Wragg Barony and Bacon’s Bridge over the upper Ashley
River. In the War Between the States the old bridge was burned and
after Appomattox more than fifteen years elapsed before it was
restored. Near the Ashley River Bridge in St. Andrew’s Parish are sites
of the earliest English plantations. Quite near it Eliza Lucas, daughter
of the Governor of Antigua and mother of the Generals Charles
Cotesworth and Thomas Pinckney, carried forward her indigo
experiments. David Ramsay says that the indigo planters doubled
their capital every three or four years.
COOPER RIVER BRIDGE, on the Old King’s Highway: Coming to
Charleston President George Washington, President James Monroe
and the Marquis de Lafayette traveled over the old King’s Highway.
Washington was here in 1791, Monroe in 1819 and Lafayette in 1825.
From the Mount Pleasant shore to the City of Charleston they crossed
by primitive ferry. To August of 1929 ferries over the broad Cooper
River were continued. In that month the great bridge over the
Cooper River was opened to traffic. This is the world’s third highest
vehicular bridge! Its span over Town Creek affords vertical clearance
of 132 feet, as much as that of the famous Brooklyn Bridge, and the
span over the Cooper River a vertical clearance of 152 feet at mean
high water. From the crest of this engineering achievement are
provided commanding views. In the distance to the right is Fort
Sumter, looking for all the world like a toy fortress in a toy pool. From
this coign of vantage one sees the many bold and little creeks that
flow into the Cooper. To the middle left one sees the heavy
woods of Christ Church Parish. Give the imagination rein and
appear ghosts of almost naked Indians, of early English, French,
Irish, Scotch; of bitter conflicts of man against man; of Sir Peter
Parker and his naval armada smiting the little palmetto fort with shot
and shell. At Charleston, over the Cooper River Bridge the old Kings

54
Highway makes junction with the Coastal Highway. It is the short
route from Charleston to Georgetown, Wilmington, Norfolk, crossing
the lower Santee and other bold coastal streams almost within sight
of the sea. There is every promise that the old King’s Highway,
paved, will develop into a paramount route between East and
Southeast, an important alternate to the Coastal Highway. No visitor
to Charleston should forego the opportunity of passing over the
three-mile Cooper River Bridge. It is a sensation well worth the trivial
Journey.
THE CITADEL, the Military College of South Carolina: General Charles
Pelot Summerall is now a Charlestonian and proud of it. He would
add that his pride is the greater in that he is president of The Citadel,
the military college of South Carolina, an institution whose illustrious
record goes back to 1842, which furnished distinguished officers for
the Confederacy, in the Spanish and World Wars. As the Cadet
Battalion went into the Confederate service the college was closed in
1864. From the evacuation of Charleston to The Citadel’s reopening
in 1882, it was occupied by Union soldiers. From its establishment in
1842 to the fall of 1922, The Citadel was on Marion Square. Because
it needed more room, it went into new quarters at Hampton Park on
the Ashley River where now it is. It was a cadet battery that fired the
first gun of the War for Southern Independence; the Union ship
Star of the West was driven off while attempting to bring
supplies to the garrison besieged in Fort Sumter. Year after year the
War Department of the United States designates The Citadel as a
distinguished military college. Its academic standards are high.
PORTER MILITARY ACADEMY, Distinguished Military School: “Through
the noble efforts” of the Reverend Anthony Toomer Porter, D.D., then
Rector of the Episcopal Church of the Holy Communion, the Porter
Military Academy had its origin in 1867 as the Holy Communion
Church Institute, in its genesis “a classical school for the children of
parents in straitened circumstances,” due to the War for Southern
Independence. In Dr. Porter’s absence his board of trustees named

55
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the institution for him. Among its distinguished alumni is General
Charles Pelot Summerall, former Chief of Staff of the United States
Army and now President of The Citadel. The Porter Military Academy
occupies the grounds of the United States Arsenal; it is bounded by
Ashley Avenue and Bee, President and Doughty Streets. It continues
to earn a high place among Southern educational institutions, its
boarding cadets coming from many States. It is a fully accredited
preparatory school.
COLLEGE OF CHARLESTON, Oldest Municipal College: To claim the
distinction of being America’s oldest municipal college is a large order,
but the College of Charleston, on George Street between St. Philip
and College Streets, earns it by the record. The institution was
founded in 1770 and takes rank as fifteenth in the list of American
colleges. Its roll of graduates sounds like a list of South Carolina’s
illustrious: John C. Fremont, explorer and candidate for the
presidency; James B. DeBow, ante-bellum economist; Edward
McCrady, historian; Bishop William Wightman, of the Methodist
Episcopal Church; Bishop Bowen, of the Protestant Episcopal Church;
William H. Trescott, diplomat; Paul Hamilton Hayne, poet; Chancellor
Henry Deas Lesesne; United States Judge Henry A. M. Smith,
historian and scholar; the Rev. J. L. Girardeau, eminent Presbyterian
minister. On its governing board have served such distinguished men
as James Louis Petigru, Robert Young Hayne, John Julius Pringle,
Daniel Elliott Huger, Langdon Cheves, Henry Middleton, General
William Washington, Joel Roberts Poinsett, Judge Mitchell King. In
1837 the college was taken over by the Corporation of Charleston; it
is the oldest municipal college in America. Among the founders of the
College of Charleston were the ablest men in the Royal Province of
South Carolina, among them two Signers of the Declaration of
Independence (Arthur Middleton and Thomas Heyward, Jr.) and three
Signers of the Constitution of the United States (Charles Pinckney,
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney and John Rutledge, “The Dictator”).

57
St. Mary’s, 79 Hasell Street; Mother Parish of Catholics in Carolinas
and Georgia
ORIGINAL DEPARTMENT STORE, King Street at Market:
“Ghosts rush out every time I pass,” said a friend. He was
growing sentimental about the Academy of Music building, razed in
1937. In 1830 in this “whale of a building,” for its time, was opened
the world’s first department store. With great stocks from all parts of
the world the Kerrisons built up an enormous business, their
customers coming from as far as the Mississippi River! It was a

58
massive building of massive construction. Its masonry was notable
and it may be that its great heart cypress timbers were more notable.
To the coming of the War for Southern Independence, Charleston
being capital of a far-flung slave empire, business in the building
prospered. Kerrison’s of this time is descendant of the original
Kerrison’s; it is across and higher up King Street, one of the leading
department stores of the South. After Appomattox Charleston was
without a theater. The Charleston Theater had been destroyed in the
fire of 1861. John Chadwick, a school master, acquired the building
and converted the rear portion into a theater, the Academy of Music,
wherein have appeared famous actors, actresses and singers, great
bands and orchestras. Georges Barrere, solo flautist and conductor of
the Little Symphony Orchestra and the Barrere Ensemble, after
playing his flute on the stage, remarked: “Here is a veritable ‘Strad.’
of a theater!” Barrere was justly complimenting the remarkable
acoustics of the theater. It is well to bear in mind that Charleston had
a great department store before the first of the steam railroads
began operation in America! A century ago in a mezzanine gallery on
the top floor were displayed laces, embroideries and other fine goods
from the world’s finest makers. As a theater the Academy of Music
was owned for some years by John A. Owens, nationally known for
his portrayal of Solon Shingle. It may be permissible here to say that
Joseph Jefferson used to manage a theater in Charleston, that his
mother was born in Charleston.
WASHINGTON SQUARE, Called also City Hall Park: In the northwest
corner of this park is the first fireproof building built in America, for
which salient reason Charleston knows it as The Fireproof Building. It
was erected about 1826. Robert Mills was the architect. It is used for
county offices and records. In the southwest corner is the City
Hall which is discussed elsewhere. On Broad, Meeting and
Chalmers Streets are handsome wrought-iron gates and wrought-iron
railings of great grace. In the center of the park is a shaft of granite
to the three companies of the Washington Light Infantry which
served the Confederacy valiantly on the battlefields of Virginia in the

59
60’s, and in the defense of Charleston. Southward of this is a bust to
the lilting Carolina poet, Henry Timrod, and eastward a monument to
General Pierre G. T. Beauregard, for some time in the War for
Southern Independence, commanding officer at Charleston. New
Orleans paid tribute to this illustrious soldier long after Charleston
had done so. Near the west gate is the statue of William Pitt.
WILLIAM PITT STATUE, in Washington Park: “The gentleman
(Benjamin Franklin) tells us that America is obstinate, America is
almost in open rebellion. Sir, I rejoice that America has resisted!
Three millions of people so dead to all the feelings of liberty as
voluntarily to submit to be slaves would have been fit instruments to
make slaves of all the rest!” William Pitt was speaking in the House of
Commons, London, denouncing the iniquitous stamp tax.
Charlestown heard of the Pitt speech and Charlestown applauded.
Charlestown ordered a statue of the great statesman in recognition of
his noble position. The statue was received in Charlestown May 31,
1770, and was erected in the intersection of Broad and Meeting
Streets, the most prominent position in the town at that time. During
the Revolution a shell from a British gun on James Island struck off
the right arm, explaining its absence into this day. Years
afterward, interfering with traffic, it was removed to the yard of
the Charleston Orphan House and in 1881, through the Carolina Art
Association, placed where now it is in Washington Park.
LORD CAMPBELL’S HOUSE, 34 Meeting Street: Last of the Royal
Governors, Lord William Campbell, precipitately left Charlestown
September 16, 1775, taking refuge aboard H.M.S. Tamar. Lord
Campbell by night went through his garden to a boat in Vanderhorst
Creek (Water Street nowadays). He had come to Charlestown June
18, 1775, and was “received civilly, but without enthusiasm.” Fleeing,
he carried with him the Great Seal of the Province. South Carolina
was on the way to independence. The house was built about 1760
and was owned by Mrs. Blake, first cousin to Sarah Izard who
married Lord Campbell. She belonged to one of the richest and most

60
influential families in the Province. After the Revolution, about 1795,
Colonel Lewis Morris, a Revolutionary officer, acquired the property.
Colonel Francis Kinloch Huger, who had part in the frustrated plot to
liberate the Marquis de Lafayette from the Austrian prison of Olmutz,
was wounded on the steps of this house; a section of the bull’s-eye in
the roof fell and fractured his skull. In the earthquake of 1886, a
young Englishman was killed on the steps; a piece of the parapet fell
on him. The house has been in the Huger family for years. The
handsome piazzas on the south side were built for the late William E.
Huger, whose son, Daniel Elliott Huger, is the present owner.
WILLIAM BULL’S HOUSE, 35 Meeting Street: Across Meeting
Street from the Charlestown home of Lord William Campbell
was the home of the first Lieutenant Governor of the Royal Province
of South Carolina, William Bull, who is said to have erected it; he died
in 1755. It was his son, William Bull, then also Lieutenant Governor
who was occupying it at the outbreak of the Revolution. The office of
Lieutenant Governor was devised to safeguard against an
interregnum between the naming of Governors by the King of
England.
MILES BREWTON HOUSE, 27 King Street: History, romance, legend
and tradition crowd upon this famous mansion, built by Miles Brewton
about 1765. Brewton and his family perished at sea and the property
descended to his sister, the famous Mrs. Rebecca Motte (whose name
is perpetuated in the Rebecca Motte Chapter of the Daughters of the
American Revolution). This gallant and patriotic lady was living in the
house when the British took possession of Charleston. Sir Henry
Clinton commandeered it as his headquarters, and Lord Rawdon did
the same thing. Lord Cornwallis was quartered in the house. Again,
when the Union forces occupied Charleston in the War for Southern
Independence, the general commanding set up his headquarters
here. Later the house was the residence of the Pringle family, hence
it is commonly known nowadays as the Pringle House. The visitor
should observe the picturesque old coach house adjoining and to the

61
north. The old garden is behind high brick walls, so typical of the old
Charlestown. Her home in possession of the invading British, Rebecca
Brewton Motte, widow of Jacob Motte, retired with his family to her
plantation house in Orangeburg County on the Congaree River. The
British, seizing the residence, built a parapet around it. Francis Marion
and Henry Lee laid siege to it. Apprised that British reinforcements
were approaching, the officers considered the burning of the fine
property, but hesitated. Mrs. Motte, however, overcame their
scruples. Bringing out an African bow and arrows for it, she
deliberately sent flaming arrows to the roof which caught afire,
causing the British garrison to surrender with alacrity. After
independence Mrs. Motte undertook rice planting on scale and built
up a considerable property. Her two eldest daughters, in succession,
were wives of the great Thomas Pinckney.

62
Cathedral of St. John the Baptist
Trinity Methodist Church
WILLIAM GIBBES HOUSE, 64 South Battery Street: William
Gibbes came to Charlestown direct from England and was
active in behalf of the colonies until the actual break with the Crown,
when he fled to Bermuda, thence going back to England. The
handsome house was built before 1776; the exact date is obscured.
Gibbes was with others interested in reclaiming marshy areas in that
section. Five years after his death the records show that Mrs. Sarah
Smithe purchased the property, the consideration being twenty-five
hundred pounds. An elegant ballroom occupies the width of the
upper story. Within brick walls on three sides was, and is, a beautiful
garden. For years the property belonged to the Drayton family and

63
64
some years after the War for Southern Independence it was occupied
by James Petigru Lesesne, son of the Chancellor Henry Deas Lesesne
and a great-grandson of the Huguenot pastor, Jean Louis Gibert who
came from the Channel Islands leading a French colony into upper
South Carolina. It passed into the ownership of Colonel J. B. E.
Sloan and in late years is the property of Mrs. Washington A.
Roebling, widow of the builder of the Brooklyn Bridge over the East
River, New York.
WILLIAM BLACKLOCK HOUSE, 18 Bull Street: This fine mansion, built
about 1800, is considered one of the best examples of its type of
architecture. It is a two-story brick dwelling, with a double set of
steps leading to an entrance platform. The carriage gates are
gracefully ornate. There is the peculiarity that the gates are of wood,
rather than of the wrought-iron pieces that would be expected.
THE WASHINGTON HOUSE, 87 Church Street: President George
Washington, visiting Charleston in May, 1791, was “domiciled” in the
residence of Thomas Heyward, Jr., one of the four South Carolina
Signers of the Declaration of Independence. Edward Rutledge, also a
Signer of the Declaration, was of the company that greeted the
soldier-statesman across the Cooper River and escorted him to town.
A complete equipment was organized by the City of Charleston for
the President’s comfort. The house has undergone changes. For some
years a baker did business on the ground floor. The property is now
owned and maintained by the Society for the Preservation of Old
Dwellings. Down the street and on the opposite side at No. 78,
President Washington addressed citizens from the balcony, which is a
graceful reminder of the French influence in Charleston.
MYTHICAL OLD SLAVE MARKET, 6 Chalmers Street: Chalmers in this
year is fairly famous for two things: It is Charleston’s surviving
“cobble-stone” street, the stones coming in ballast from
European shores in the old sailing days, and on it is a building

65
that tourists are told was the old Slave Market. The myth has been
exploded repeatedly, but it persists, and since there are no black
slaves it probably doesn’t matter. Authorities are positive in saying
that nowhere in Charleston was there a constituted slave market for
the public auctioning of blacks from Africa. Several houses in this
vicinity were used in olden times to quarter slaves who were to be
sold on the block. Authorities also agree, propagandists to the
contrary notwithstanding, that the black slaves in the South were in
better care than were the peasantry in any other part of the world.
CHARLESTON LIBRARY, 164 King Street: Organized in 1748 by
seventeen young gentlemen of Charlestown, third oldest in this
country, the Charleston Library Society, a private enterprise governed
by a Board of Trustees, moved into a new fireproof building in recent
years. In 1835 the society bought the building of the old South
Carolina Bank, at the northwest corner of Broad and Church Streets,
using this until the transfer to King Street. The society has more than
60,000 volumes. It owns the only surviving file of the South Carolina
State Gazette and one of three files of The Courier (1803). Valuable
books were lost in the fire of 1778. In the War for Southern
Independence most of the volumes were taken to Columbia for
safekeeping; those left in the society’s building were destroyed. In
1874 the old Apprentices’ Society was merged with the Charleston
Library Society. In 1900, dissolving, the South Carolina Jockey Club
transferred its property to the library; the club and the society were
about of an age. Generous bequests have greatly assisted the
society.
CHARLESTON MUSEUM, 123 Rutledge Avenue: This, the oldest
Museum in the country, is housed in the former Thomson Auditorium,
built in 1899 for conventions, with money bequeathed by John
Thomson. The Charlestown Museum was organized in 1773 and
incorporated in 1915. Very fine collections of natural history and of
the history of human culture are owned. Lately the Museum had the
great good fortune to come into possession of the priceless collection

66
of birds preserved by the distinguished South Carolina ornithologist,
Arthur Trezevant Wayne. A skeleton of a large whale which found its
way into Charleston harbor and was harpooned is one of the
Museum’s unique specimens, unique in that the cetacean was caught
in this harbor.
THE BATTERY, White Point Gardens: It is no use to call the Battery by
its proper name; even in Charleston, White Point Gardens is not
recognized as the Battery. Nonetheless the name of this famous and
beautiful park and promenade is White Point Gardens. Its sea walls
are laved on the south by the Ashley River and on the east by the
Cooper River; their confluence is at and off the southeast corner of
the Battery. This pleasure ground has been favorably compared with
the world’s most famous plazas and promenades. It is a source of
never-ending delight to visitors. East, or High Battery begins at the
old Granville Bastion, now Omar Temple of the Mystic Shrine. It is a
great promenade, with a commanding view of the harbor seaward,
with Fort Sumter in the middle-ground. South Battery, proper, is
between the East Battery and the extension of King Street to the
water. Somewhat more than eight acres constitute South Battery,
which, to the westward, becomes the Murray Boulevard, lined, as
East and South Battery are, with fine residences. In its origin
East Battery had a wall of palmetto logs with a plank walk on
top. It was swept away in the great gale of 1804. William Crafts, Jr.,
originated the first stone wall, with rock ballast from incoming ships
as “riprap” to strengthen the wall. The work was completed before
1820. In the War of 1812 guns were emplaced along East Battery,
thus, it is held, accounting for its name, The Battery. Fort Broughton
and Fort Mechanic have long since disappeared. Fort Street became
South Bay Street and later South Battery for its whole length from
East Battery through the Boulevard area to the junction with Tradd
Street a mile away. It was in 1830 that the first steps toward creating
a beautiful pleasure ground were taken. By 1852 White Point Gardens
was an accomplished fact. Fine oak and palmetto trees enhance the
attractiveness of the Battery. Years ago a bathhouse was removed.

67
The monument to the defenders of Fort Moultrie, commonly called
the Sergeant Jasper monument because of the figure of a soldier
rescuing the flag, was unveiled June 28 (Carolina Day), 1876, the
hundredth anniversary of the repulse of Sir Peter Parker’s British
fleet. The monument to William Gilmore Simms, editor, author and
historian, was erected in June, 1879. At the foot of Meeting Street is
a memorial fountain to the men of the first submarine, Confederates.
Facing Fort Sumter is a monument to the defenders of Fort Sumter.
On the Battery are relics of all the wars Charleston has seen, the
Spanish War being represented by the capstan of the battleship
Maine, destroyed in Havana harbor in 1898. To visit Charleston and
not to see the Battery is unthinkable. From time to time concerts are
given in the band stand. The late Andrew B. Murray contributed
generously to the improvement of the Battery and of the driveway
named in his honor.

Trumbull’s Portrait of General George Washington, in the City Hall

68
69
THE COLONIAL COMMON, and Ashley River Embankment: In
Charleston beautiful Colonial Lake is The Pond. It came into
being in the 1880’s with the reclaiming of the area. The official
designation is The Colonial Common and Ashley River Embankment.
About this salt-water pond are garden areas, and west of it is the
new Moultrie Playground which greatly improves the appearance of
the neighborhood. Some of Charleston’s most desirable residences
face the pond. Off its northwest corner is the Baker Sanatorium, one
of the South’s largest and most completely equipped private
hospitals, founded by Archibald E. Baker, surgeon. Less than fifty
years ago there was a causeway at the head of Broad Street;
nowadays the whole area is populated. Colonial Lake is bounded by
Broad Street, Rutledge Avenue, Beaufain Street, and Ashley Avenue,
paramount traffic arteries. Its water is from the Ashley River,
regulated by a flood-gate.
MEDICAL COLLEGE, 16 Lucas Street: While the Medical College of the
State of South Carolina dates from 1823, it did not move to the
present site until 1913. For years before that it was in Queen Street.
The college maintains schools of medicine, pharmacy and nursing.
The News and Courier is quoted: “The early faculty included men of
national and international reputation, who gave the college a prestige
which placed it at once amongst the foremost institutions of the kind,
and among its graduates were not a few whose fame added further
luster to their alma mater.... The sessions of the college were carried
on without intermission until the outbreak of the War Between
the States when lectures had to be discontinued. In 1865 the
college was reopened, and in spite of adverse conditions has been in
successful operation ever since.” In the session of the Legislature in
1913 the college passed under State control.
THE ROPER HOSPITAL, 15 Lucas Street: On the site of the old City
Hospital is the Roper Hospital; riverward is its auxiliary pavilion, the
Riverside Infirmary, a high-class private hospital. The Roper is a
general hospital operated by the Medical Society of South Carolina,

70
the City of Charleston and the County of Charleston contributing to
the care of “free” patients. The institution includes a special building
for contagious diseases. The hospital owes its origin to the
benevolence of Colonel Thomas Roper. In 1849 the Medical Society
proceeded to arrange the building of a hospital, “prompted by the
deficient and faulty hospital accommodations of the city at that time.”
The City Council appropriated $20,000 and a lot was acquired at
Queen and Mazyck Streets. Public spirited citizens swelled the
building fund. The building was completed in 1852. Before it was
completely furnished and equipped, it had to be opened because of
the yellow fever epidemic that raged in 1852. In effect, the old Roper
Hospital was leased to the City of Charleston, the arrangement
between the Board of Trustees and the City Council beginning in
1856 and terminating in 1865. With the evacuation of Charleston by
the Confederates, the Union invaders took it over; its trustees were
impotent. Next to the Roper, the city improvised and operated its own
hospital, and the Roper trustees closed their institution in 1871. The
city hospital was virtually destroyed in the earthquake of 1886.
The City Council had it transferred to Lucas Street. On this site
the present Roper building was erected. It has been greatly enlarged
in the last twenty years. Nurses’ homes are on the property, the
student nurses being enrolled at the Medical College.
ASHLEY HALL, 172 Rutledge Avenue: Originally one of the historic
mansions of Charleston, Ashley Hall, a preparatory school for young
ladies, draws its students from many states. In the language of Miss
Mary Vardrine McBee, founder and principal: “It is but a little while
since Ashley Hall was a venturous experiment. Begun in the
conviction that South Carolina and her sister States were ready to
welcome a school for girls of high intellectual standing, while
cherishing still those amenities of feminine culture which give
Southern life its distinctive charm, Ashley Hall was welcomed in its
very inception. It had hardly been opened before the necessity of
enlargement, alike of building and staff, became apparent.” The
grounds about this fine mansion are among the most beautiful in the

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Reference And Description The Case Against Twodimensionalism Course Book Scott Soames

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