Report in civil pro 2 - Case Digest.pptx

Civil Procedure

1. REPLEVIN (Rule 60) Mikaela S. Rapanan JD – 2A

2. ROMEO S. CHUA, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DENNIS CANOY AND ALEX DE LEON, respondents. G.R. NO. 79021 : May 17, 1993

3. Facts: Judge Francisco of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City Branch XIII, after examining 2Lt. Dennis P. Canoy and two (2) other witnesses, issued a search warrant directing the immediate search of the premises of R.R. Construction located at M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City, and the seizure of an Isuzu dump truck with plate number GAP-175. At twelve noon of the same date (April 12, 1986) , respondent Canoy seized the aforesaid vehicle and took custody thereof.

4. A civil action for Replevin/Sum of Money for the recovery of possession of the same Isuzu dump truck was filed by petitioner against respondent Canoy and one "John Doe" in the Regional Trial Court presided by Judge Leonardo B. Cañares Judge Cañares directed the issuance of a writ of replevin upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00. The writ of replevin was also issued on the same date, and the subject vehicle was seized by Deputy Sheriff Galicano V. Fuentes. Respondent Canoy filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaint and for the quashal of the writ of replevin. The motion was opposed by petitioner. The motion to dismiss and to quash the writ of replevin was denied.

5. Issue: Whether or n ot replevin applies to custodia legis?

6. Ruling: No. It is a basic tenet of civil procedure that replevin will not lie for property in custodia legis. A thing is in custodia legis when it is shown that it has been and is subjected to the official custody of a judicial executive other in pursuance of his execution of a legal writ. The reason posited for this principle is that it it was otherwise, there would be interference with the possession before the function of the law had been performed as to the process under which the property was taken. Thus, a defendant in an execution or attachment cannot replevy goods in the possession of an officer under a valid process, although after the levy is discharged, an action to recover possession will lie .

7. Also, the Court rule that where personal property is seized under a search warrant and there is reason to believe that the seizure will not anymore be followed by the filing of a criminal and there are conflicting claims over the seized property, the proper remedy is the filing of an action for replevin, or an interpleader filed by the Government in the proper court, not necessarily the same one which issued the search warrant; however, where there is still a probability that the seizure will be followed by the filing of a criminal action, as in the case at bar where the case for carnapping was "dismissed provisionally, without prejudice to its reopening once the issue of ownership is resolved in favor of complainant" (emphasis supplied), or the criminal information has actually been commenced, or filed, and actually prosecuted, and there are conflicting claims over the property seized, the proper remedy is to question the validity of the search warrant in the same court which issued it and not in any other branch of the said court.

8. Thus, the Regional Trial Court of Cebu Branch VIII erred when it ordered the transfer of possession of the property seized to petitioner when the latter filed the action for replevin. It should have dismissed the case since by virtue of the "provisional dismissal", of the carnapping case there is still a probability that a criminal case would be filed, hence a conflict in jurisdiction could still arise. WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 7, 1987 is AFFIRMED.

9. INTERPLEADER (Rule 62) Mikaela S. Rapanan JD – 2A

10. URSULA MAGLENTE, CONSOLACION BERJA, MERCEDITA FERRER, THELMA ABELLA and ANTONIO NGO, Petitioners, vs. HON. PRISCILLA BALTAZAR-PADILLA, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC, Manila Branch 38, VISITACION GABELO, ERLINDA ABELLA, PETRA PEREZ, ERLINDA TRAQUENA, BEN CARDINAL, EDUARDO TRAQUENA, LEOPOLDO TRAQUENA, MARIFE TUBALAS, ULYSIS MATEO, JOCELYN FERNANDEZ, ALFONSO PLACIDO, LEONARDO TRAQUENA, SUSAN RENDON and MATEO TRINIDAD, Respondents. G.R. No. 148182 : March 7, 2007

11. Facts: Philippine Realty Corp (PRC) owned a parcel of land in Intramuros, which it leased to petitioners Maglente. The lease agreement included a right of first refusal in favor of Maglente, as well as an agreement whereby PRC prohibited Maglente from subleasing the property. Nonetheless, Maglente subleased the property to the private respondents. Later on, PRC decided to sell the property and offered the land to Maglente in accordance with her right of first refusal. Maglente intimated that she would exercise her right of first refusal to purchase the property. However, PRC received a letter from the private respondents expressing their desire to purchase the same property.

12. PRC filed a complaint for interpleader with the Manila RTC to determine who between the 2 parties had the right to purchase the property. The RTC ruled in favor of the Maglente, ordering PRC to execute a deed of sale. PRC executed a deed of sale in favor of the petitioners, who then filed a motion for a writ of possession. Private respondents objected on the ground that the trial court's decision on the interpleader case merely resolved petitioners right to purchase the leased property but did not declare them as the owners entitled to possession. Dissatisfied with the above decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA) which affirmed the judgment of the trial court. So the petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari.

13. Issue: Whether or not petitioners entitled to a writ of possession after being adjudged (in the interpleader case) as the proper parties to buy the subject property, considering that a deed of sale has already been executed in their favor.

14. Ruling: No. A writ of possession shall issue only in the following instances: (1) land registration proceedings; (2) extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage of real property; (3) judicial foreclosure of property provided that the mortgagor has possession and no third party has intervened, and (4) execution sales. Here, petitioners seek the writ as a consequence of the trial courts decision ordering the execution of a contract of sale/contract to sell in their favor. The writ does not lie in such a case.

15. Furthermore, the trial court’s decision in the interpleader case (affirmed by both the CA and the SC) merely resolved the question of who, between petitioners and respondents, had the right to purchase PRCs property. The directive was only for PRC to execute the necessary contract in favor of petitioners as the winning parties, nothing else. It was clear that, at that point, petitioners were not yet the owners of the property. The execution of the deed of sale in their favor was only preliminary to their eventual acquisition of the property. Likewise, although we stated in G.R. No. 111743 that the contract of sale between petitioners and PRC had already been perfected, we refrained from declaring them the owners since, pending the execution of the deed of sale or delivery of the property, ownership had yet to transfer to them at that time.

16. Thus, petitioners’ argument that the trial courts writ of execution in the interpleader case carried with it the corollary right to a writ of possession is without merit. A writ of possession complements the writ of execution only when the right of possession or ownership has been validly determined in a case directly relating to either. The interpleader case obviously did not delve into that issue. Furthermore, the rule is that the enforcement of a judgment may not vary or alter the tenor of the judgment but must strictly conform to it. It should be in harmony with the judgment that gives it life and not exceed it. We thus cannot fault the trial court for refusing to issue a writ of possession to petitioners as its issuance would not be in conformity with the trial courts judgment in the interpleader case.

17. Finally, petitioners cannot recover possession of the property via a mere motion. They must file the appropriate action in court against respondents to recover possession. While this remedy can delay their recovery, this Court cannot permit an abbreviated method without subverting the rules and processes established for the orderly administration of justice. WHEREFORE, the assailed order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 38, is hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition is DISMISSED.