The Communist Party of the Russian Federation

A presentation about the history of the post-Soviet Communist Party, its impact on Russian politics, its ideology, and the extent to which it really challenges Kremlin orthodoxy. Received a First Class grade at Exeter University.

1. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation Its history, role in Russian politics today, and future Owen Bell

2. Introduction to the Party A divided, catch-all party. Broadly split into anti-Marxist social democratic reformists, orthodox Marxist-Leninists, and nationalistic communists. Informed by both the internationalism of Lenin and Trotsky, and the ‘Socialism in One Country’ of Stalin and Bukharin. Not revolutionary in the conventional sense. A conservative communist party. Like Putin’s United Russia, the CPRF is opposed to the US-led liberal world order, albeit from a Marxist as well as a nationalist perspective. Led by Gennady Zyuganov since February 1993, a Duma deputy who was a prominent critic of both Gorbachev and Yeltsin. He advocated a return to pre-Perestroika Communism. Zyuganov’s nationalism and charismatic leadership is the primary reason for the CPRF’s success.

3. History The CPRF is the successor organisation to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, which was banned by Yeltsin in 1991. In December 1992, the Russian Constitutional Court ordered that former Communist Party property was now the property of the new Russian state. But Yeltsin could not ban new parties, nor could he successfully supress the CPSU’s grassroots infrastructure. The CPRF emerged the strongest of a plethora of communist parties. Since 1993, it has been the main opposition party. Its influence is exerted through both effective parliamentary organisation and strong links with extra-parliamentary groups. The CPRF’s status as the political legacy of the Soviet Union, and its affinity for cultural nationalism, have prevented it from being the left of centre opposition seen in other former Soviet Republics and Warsaw Pact nations.

4. The Party in the present day The CPRF played a prominent role in celebrating the centenary of the Russian Revolution, despite the Kremlin’s silence. It held week-long celebrations in Moscow and St Petersburg, including a wreath-laying ceremony at Lenin’s tomb. This drew criticism from the Russian Orthodox Church, which believes the Party is ignoring the Soviets’ anti-Christian persecution, despite Zyuganov being a Christian. The Soviet adulation of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Statin continues to the present, embodying those figures in the cult of personality. The party has 160 000 members and 42 out of 450 seats in the Duma. Despite being the second largest party, it has no hope of entering government. It lost 50 seats in 2016. The CPRF run Pravda, the Bolshevik newspaper founded in 1912, but the online edition is privately owned.

5. Presidential Election 2018 At the time of making this presentation, the election results were yet to be announced. But Putin’s victory is inevitable, with even a run-off vote unlikely. Pavel Grudinin is the CPRF’s candidate, with Zyuganov as his campaign manager. He somewhat bourgeois for a communist, having successfully privatised a state-owned strawberry company and turning a profit. The party is running on a social democratic platform. It wants taxes to be higher and more progressive, pensions to be more generous, and state investment to increase. In theory, this would be an effective; Russia is currently suffering from high inflation and slow growth due to low commodity prices. Putin has failed to diversify the economy. The power of the oligarchs has been curbed post-Yeltsin, but they remain highly influential. But most Russians approve of Putin, particularly his record on foreign affairs. Trump’s non-interventionism gives Putin the change to demonstrate Russian strength and competence, i.e. Libya and Syria.

6. The Kremlin’s ‘Useful Idiots’? The CPRF’s revolutionary socialism and limited organisational capacity makes them a favourable opposition party to United Russia. Putin’s re-election prospects become certain when the alternatives are so unpalatable. The CPRF provides no opposition to Putin’s foreign policies, nor the encroachments of the Russian state. The ban on ‘gay propaganda’ was endorsed by CPRF Duma deputies, as well as all other opposition parties. The party is plagued by internal divisions, whereas Putin’s control of the government is virtually absolute. The Kremlin’s control of the media means that all opposition, the CPRF or anyone else, is unviable. The CPRF submitted 70 complains about unfair and scant coverage of Grudinin’s campaign to the Central Election Commission, yet none were seriously considered.

7. The CPRF’s future The CPRF maintains links with communist parties around the world, attending the annual International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties and the International Communist Seminar. But although it would like to assist revolution abroad, it has come to accept parliamentary democracy, markets and private property at home. Its theoretical commitment to one-partyism has limited its effectiveness in the global era of increasing democratisation. In my view, communist parties are never viable in multi-party systems. Their revolutionary nature requires a political monopoly. Rather, the CPRF can only stay relevant by abandoning any notion of revolution in favour of a constructive alternative to Putin’s economic policies. Opposition to Putin’s foreign policies and authoritarianism is likely to be futile, because both are popular amongst the public. But Russia’s insignificance relative to the Soviet Union means there is still a fair amount of Soviet nostalgia amongst the older generations, which the CPRF can capitalise on.

8. Conclusion The CPRF is the undisputed leader of the Russian far left. After the early 1990s, it has had no serious opposition. But such a status has never mattered less. United Russia’s control over the country, even when Putin steps down, will not face a credible and threatening challenge in the medium term. Nostalgia for the Soviet Union has been largely satisfied by Putin’s foreign policy. With Russia an increasingly significant player in world affairs, Putin has restored the country’s place as a global player, without bringing back Communist ideology or symbolism. Anti-communist philosophies- ethnic Russian nationalism, Pan- Slavism, liberalism and religious conservatism- are too influential for the CPRF to monopolise its opposition status. There is no widespread demand for the Communist economic system, even if there is resentment at the power of the oligarchs and wealth inequality.

9. Bibliography CPRF, “About us”, http://cprf.ru/about-us/, accessed 17 March 2018 Flikke, Geir. “Patriotic Left-Centrism: The Zigzags of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.”  Europe-Asia Studies , vol. 51, no. 2, 1999, pp. 275–298. Hinks, Joseph, “Your Complete Guide to Russia’s 2018 Presidential Election,” Time Magazine (online), 13 March 2018 Lipman, Masha, “Why Putin won’t be making the hundredth anniversary of Bolshevik Revolution,” The New Yorker ( online), November 3, 2017 March, Luke. “For Victory? The Crises and Dilemmas of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation.”  Europe-Asia Studies , vol. 53, no. 2, 2001, pp. 263–290. Reisinger, William M., and Bryon J. Moraski. “Post-Soviet Russia’s Political Trajectory.”  The Regional Roots of Russia's Political Regime , University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2017, pp. 21–52. Pigman, Lincoln, “Putin’s Last Hurrah? Cementing his legacy,” RUSI ( online), 15 March 2018 Sputnik International, “Russia Communist Party Made 70 Complaints Over Coverage of Candidate Grudinin,” https://sputniknews.com/russia-elections-2018-news/201803091062375889-russia-communists-grudinin-election/, 9 March 2018