indicate that it is a subcategory of animalia. Three entries specifically use the word monstrum
to refer to the animal under consideration: the bonnacon, an Indian bull with a horse’s mane
and the peculiar ability to defend itself with flaming excrement; the monoceros or unicorn; and
the crocote, the offspring of a union between a hyena and a lioness. Belua, a slightly more
ambiguous word that can be synonymous with monster, is used in reference to three other
animals: the whale; the flying fish; and the hyena, whose monstrosity probably derives both
from its hermaphroditic physique and its diet of human corpses (Aberdeen Bestiary).
Despite the Bestiary’s use of these terms and its insistence on defining the subcategories
of animalia, the necessary conditions for being categorized as a monster remain elusive and
seemingly arbitrary; the bestiarist apparently just knew a monster when he saw it. The function
of the beasts, monsters, and animals of the Bestiary, a work that has often been described as a
source book for sermons, clearly relates to the “morals” to be derived from the behaviors
described. Once again, the monstrum monstrat, but, as chapter three will demonstrate, unlike
the monsters found in Isidore’s Etymologies, for example, the monsters and mere animals of
the Bestiary do not “show” only in the religious realm; by this point their potential moralities
have branched out into areas I would designate secular morality.
Ironically, the Travels of Sir John Mandeville, a fourteenth-century work that was
rewritten, abridged, emended, and expanded dozens of times over the following centuries,
offers the first really useful definition of monster: “a monstre is a Þing difformed aзen kynde
bothe of man or of best or of ony Þing elles” (30). “Deformed against kind” is the best, most
concise definition of monster offered by any of the primary sources I consulted for this study,
but even so, the phrase “aзen kynde” presents some difficulties. In Middle English “kind” often
means “nature,” and such a definition would put the late medieval definition in direct
opposition to Isidores insistence that nothing can be against nature. This would underscore
how far the monstrous signification of the later Middle Ages has moved away from a direct
correspondence with divinity, and such a dynamic may in part be at work here, but “kind” does
not necessarily mean “nature” in this case. According to the Middle English Dictionary,
“kinde” can also correspond approximately to what we mean by that word: “A class of
creatures; human beings, birds, reptiles, etc.” More pointedly, the phrase “aзen kynde” can
mean “contrary to the nature of a bird, animal, planet etc.” or “abnormal, monstrous, unusual;
pathogenic; abnormally.” In this light, “deformed against kind” may mean not “deformed
against nature itself” but rather “deformed against the nature of the general category of creature
under consideration.”
In order for “deformed against kind” to function as a suitable working definition, the
reader must agree to interpret it broadly. For example, one might argue that races of unusual
men, such as sciopods, cannot be classified as monstrous because they are not actually
deformed against their own kind. To such an objection I would reply that “kind” is to be
broadly interpreted as humankind with the medieval European representing the standard form;
accordingly, sciopods, a single-footed hopping race of men, are clearly monstrous.
A broad interpretation of “deformed” would include behavior as well as appearance.
Surprisingly, this corresponds nicely to the late medieval definition of “kind” as a form of
moral feeling, for “aзen kynde” can also mean “morally perverted” (Middle English
Dictionary). Thus a race of cannibals can be designated “monsters” because the consumption