XConf Unplugged: Secure Design with Threat Modelling

XConf Unplugged is a meet up series for technologists to stay up to date with the latest tech trends and news. This event is the fourth in our series and is focused on security in software development.

No-one needs convincing that they need to write secure software and deal with their users' data responsibly anymore. But there's a steep learning curve on the topic of security, as the number (and profile) of threats seems to just keep climbing – everything from organised crime and government spying to teenagers who attack systems "for the lulz" – it can all be pretty overwhelming. Threat Modelling and the use of STRIDE as a model provides a set of techniques that help you identify and address the most important threats in both design and in delivery. While only part of a strategy to stay ahead, when used in conjunction with other techniques in your secure software delivery lifecycle, Threat Modelling with STRIDE can help to keep your system secure.

This presentation was made by Jim Gumbley, Technical Principal at ThoughtWorks and Fraser Scott, Cyber Threat Modelling Engineer at Capital One.

1. Jim Gumbley - ThoughtWorks
Fraser Scott - Capital One

4. Thinking about things that can go wrong...
…so you can do something about them...
...before they go wrong.

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9. The are determined by
you threat model, is
involved, and you do it

10. DESIGN
BUILD
DEPLOY
MAINTAIN

11. ●Three Amigos
●Whole Team
●Multi-Team

13. ●What are we building?

●What can go wrong?

●What are we going to do about it?

●Did we do a good enough job?

15. ●Identity
●Authentication

16. ●Integrity
●Injection
●Validation

17. ●Non-Repudiation
●Logging
●Audit

18. ●Confidentiality
●Encryption
●Leakage
●Man in the middle

19. ●Availability
●Botnets
●DDoS / DDoSaaS

20. ●Authorisation
●Isolation
●Blast radius
●Remote Code Execution

21. It would be very remarkable if any system
existing in the real world could be exactly
represented by any simple model. The only
question of interest is: "Is the model
illuminating and useful?"

23. Juice Shop


Juice Shop

24. DEMO

26. Welcome to the
Juice Shop!

Juice Shop

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28. 1.REVIEW THE JUICE SHOP SECURITY DEBT
2.THREAT MODEL THE DISCOUNT USER STORY

29. Amazon Web Services













Container Runtime
Docker / AWS ECS




SQL
AWS RDS PostgresJuice Shop
Server NodeJS
Juice
Buyer
Shop
Admin
Files
AWS EBS
Engineers
Logs
ELK Stack
Juice Shop
Frontend

AngularJS
Bootstrap CSS
Google
Oauth
Travis
CI
Github




Payment
Service NodeJS

30. Login
View Product
View Basket
Confirm
Order
Add item to basket
[item id]
Go to BasketReturn to products
Redirect
Checkout
Remove item
[item id]
Apply Discount
Unauthenticated
on Internet
Authenticated
Juice Buyer
[Discount Code]
Checkout

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34. threat-modeling
/r/threatmodeling/See Reddit :) www.thoughtworks.com/xconf-eu