BATTLE OF HILLI which took place in the 1971

It is the btl which took place in hilli in 1971

5. BALURGHAT
BALURGHAT

6. BALURGHAT
HILLI

7. HILLI
REHANA SULTANA

8. REHANA SULTANA
MOMTAZ BOSA

9. 22 - 27 NOVEMBER 1971
(KNOWN AS OPERATION JONGA)
THE 1ST BATTLE
THE 2ND BATTLE
06 - 11 DECEMBER 1971

10. TO ANALYSE THE BATTLE OF
HILLI AND TO DERIVE LESSONS
THEREFROM

11. SCOPE
CONCEPT OF OPERATION
THE 1ST BATTLE OF HILLI
THE 2ND BATTLE OF HILLI
ANALYSIS OF THE BATTLE
LESSONS LEARNT

12. SCOPE
ADHERENCE AND NON-ADHERENCE OF
PRINCIPAL OF WAR
CRISIS MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP
QUALITY

13. CONCEPT OF OPERATION
PAKISTAN ARMY DEFENSIVE PLAN IN
THE NORTH-WESTERN SECTOR
THREAT ANALYSIS

15. XX

16. DIVISION OF ZONE
23 INFANTRY BRIGADE. DEPLOYED AT RANGPUR
TO GUARD THE NORTHERN APPROACH.

18. DIVISION OF ZONE
23 INFANTRY BRIGADE. DEPLOYED AT RANGPUR
TO GUARD THE NORTHERN APPROACH.
34 INFANTRY BRIGADE. RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
DEFENCE OF RAJSHAHI, NAWABGANJ AND PABNA.

20. DIVISION OF ZONE
23 INFANTRY BRIGADE. DEPLOYED AT RANGPUR
TO GUARD THE NORTHERN APPROACH.
34 INFANTRY BRIGADE. RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
DEFENCE OF RAJSHAHI, NAWABGANJ AND PABNA.
205 INFANTRY BRIGADE. RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
DEFENCE OF CENTRAL SECTOR.

22. DIVISION OF ZONE
23 INFANTRY BRIGADE. DEPLOYED AT RANGPUR
TO GUARD THE NORTHERN APPROACH.
34 INFANTRY BRIGADE. RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
DEFENCE OF RAJSHAHI, NAWABGANJ AND PABNA.
205 INFANTRY BRIGADE. RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
DEFENCE OF CENTRAL SECTOR.
AN ADHOCK BRIGADE. DEPLOYED AT RAJSHAHI
TO PREVENT ANY RIVERINE OPERATION
THROUGH THE PADMA..

23. INTEGRATION OF HILLI
DEFENCE INTO OVERALL
PAKISTAN DEFENSIVE PLAN

24. ALLIED OFFENSIVE PLAN
LEAVE THE HIGH WAY
AND FOLLOW THE BY-
WAY.

25. ALLIED OFFENSIVE PLAN

26. INITIAL PLAN
BY 20 MOUNTING DIVISION
MAJ GEN LACHMAN SING, V r C

27. INITIAL PLAN
71 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE. TO ADVANCE
ALONG AXIS PANCHAGAR-THAKURGAO,
CAPTURE KANCHON NAGAR AND SECURE
BRIDGE ON RIVER ATRAI WITH A VIEW TO
ADVANCE TOWARDS RANGPUR.
340 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE. TO CAPTURE
DINAJPUR AND LINKUP WITH 71 MOUNTAIN
BRIGADE AT MANDALPARA .

28. INITIAL PLAN
203 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE. TO CAPTURE
HILLI BY D+1.
66 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE. TO ADVANCE ON
SUITABLE AXIS TO CAPTURE PALASHBARI
AND CUT BAGURA-RANGPUR HIGH WAY BY
D+8.

29. INITIAL PLAN
165 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE. TO ESTABLISH A
FIRMBASE IN BALURGHAT BULGE FOR THE
THE DEFENCE OF BALURGHAT AND MALDA
AREA.

31. ORBAT
PAKISTANI FORCE
205 INFANTRY BRIGADE (BRIGADIER TOJAMMEL HOSSAIN
4 FRONTIER FORCE REGIMENT (FFR)
2 x COMPANY 13 FFR
D COMPANY 46 MUJHID BATTALION
80 FIELD REGIMENT ARTILLERY
ONE MORTAR BATTERY
COMPOSITE PLATTON 34 PUNJAB
FEW SHAFI TANKS (29 CAVALERY)

32. ORBAT
INDIAN FORCE
202 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE ( BRIGADIER FARHAT BHATTY)
8 GUARDS
5 GARWHAL RIFLES
22 MATRATHAS
A SQUADRON 63 CAVALLERY
38 MOUNTAIN REGIMENT LESS ONE BATTERY
100 MOUNTAIN REGIMENT
97 MOUNTAIN REGIMENT
PL 75 COMPANY 235 ENGINEER REGIMENT
118 LIGHT BATTERY

33. PAKISTAN’S DEPLOYMENT
HILLI DEFENCE CONSISTED OF
SEVEN MAIN POSTS

36. MORAPARA

37. OUT LINE PLAN
CAPTURE NOAPARA MORAPARA
AND BASUDEBPUR BOP BY 230600
NOVEMBER 1971 IN THREE PHASES

38. HAKIMPUR
BARACHENGRAM
DANGAPARA
HIGH SCHOOL
CHANDIPUR
NOAPARA BY 222030 NOV 71
MORAPARA BY 230300 NOV 71
BASUDEBPUR BY 230400 NOV 71

39. ATTACK WAS SUPPORTED BY
TWO MOUNTAIN REGIMENT
ONE MEDIUM REGIMENT
ONE LIGHT BATTERY

40. CONDUCT OF BATTLE
CAPTURE OF NOAPARA

41. FUP
C
GHASHURIA

42. CONDUCT OF BATTLE
CAPTURE OF NOAPARA
ATTACK ON MORAPARA

43. FUP
C
GHASHURIA

44. CONDUCT OF BATTLE
CAPTURE OF NOAPARA
ATTACK ON MORAPARA
LAUNCHING BATTALION
RESERVES

45. FUP
C
GHASHURIA
BN
RES

46. CONDUCT OF BATTLE
CAPTURE OF BASUDEBPUR

48. CONDUCT OF BATTLE
CAPTURE OF BASUDEBPUR
USE OF BRIGADE RESERVE

50. CONDUCT OF BATTLE
CAPTURE OF BASUDEBPUR
USE OF BRIGADE RESERVE
PAKISTAN COUNTER ATTACK
ON MORAPARA

52. SECOND BATTLE OF HILLI
•MODIFIED PLAN
202 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE

54. SECOND BATTLE OF HILLI
•MODIFIED PLAN
202 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
66 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE

56. SECOND BATTLE OF HILLI
•MODIFIED PLAN
202 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
66 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
165 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE

58. SECOND BATTLE OF HILLI
•MODIFIED PLAN
202 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
66 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
165 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE
340 MOUNTAIN BRIGADE

59. HAKIMPUR
BARACHENGRAM 09 DEC
BAIGRAM
11 DEC
DANGAPARA
HIGH SCHOOL
CHANDIPUR

60. CAUSES OF ALLIED FORCES
VICTORY
•EMPLOYMENT OF NEW TACTICS
•INITIATIVE OF JUNIOR LEADER
•SOUND TACTICAL PLAN
•SURPRISE
•OFFENSIVE SPIRIT
•FIRE SUPPORT

61. REASONS FOR PAKISTANI
DEFEAT
•LACK OF EARLY WARNING
•LACK OF TIMELY AND
JUDICIOUS DECISION
•LACK OF AGGRESSIVENESS IN
DEFENCE
•LACK OF OFFINSIVE ACTION

62. DEFENDER’S POINT OF
VIEW
•MERIT OF GROUND MUST BE EXPLOITED
•USE OF LOCAL RESOURCES MAY
REDUCE ADMINSTRATIVE BUILDUP
•STRONG POINT AND FORTRESS
DEFENCE GENERATE PPASSIVITY IN
DEFENCE
•STRONG POINT DEFENCE GIVES FALSE
SECURITY OF INVINCIBILITY

63. ATTACKER’S POINT OF
VIEW
•FLEXIBILITY IN PLANNING AND
EXECUTION AT MID AND HIGHER
LEVEL OF COMMAND IS NECESSARY
FOR SUCCESS
•UNORTHODOX TACTICAL
MANOEUVRE MAY BRING SUCCESS
•GROUPING OF FORCES MAY
CHANGE THE RESULT

64. ATTACKER’S POINT OF
VIEW
•GROUND RECONNAISSANCE IN
VITAL PRIOR TOANY TACTICAL
OPERATION
•AIR SUPPORT MAY BE
ANADDITIONAL EDGE

65. ADHERENCE/NON-ADHERENCE
OF PRINCIPLES OF WAR
•SELECTION AND
MAINTENANCE OF THE AIM
•MAINTENANCE OF MORALE
•OFFENSIVE ACTION
•FLEXIBILITY
•SURPRISE