Bioterrorism
Definition
Biological agents—Categories ideal biological agents, routes of
administration
History –World and Indian perspective
Countermeasure against bioterrorism
Laboratory response Network
Laboratory diagnosis
Bioterrorism–
intentional use of biological agents
not related to any prophylactic, protective or other peaceful
purposes
inflict disease and death of human, animals or plants.
Biological weapons –
Microbial agents (bacteria, virus, fungi, protozoan)
Biologically derived bioactive substance eg; toxins and poisons
Artificially designed biological –mimicking substances
Source
•Natural environment
•Microbiology laboratory (ATCC) –creating and storing such agents
Mode of Delivering biological weapons
•scud missiles
•motor vehicle with spray
•hand pump sprayer
•humans ,books, letter guns
•remote control, robotic delivery
Ideal Biological Agents
Stable and resistant to environmental conditions
Inexpensive, grown and produced in large quantities
Easily disseminated
Small amount should produce devastating impact with Impact
multipling with time
Difficult to detect
Difficult eradicate or resistant to antibiotics
WHY TO WORRY ?
FACTORS
EASY DELIVARY
LOW VISIBILITY
INTERNET
AVAILABILITY
HIGH POTENCY
USE OF LOW
TECHNOLOGICAL
METHOD TO
;PRODUCE
CONCEALMENT
TRANSPORTATION
AND
DISSEMINATION IS
EASY
Types of agents
ANTI PLANT ANTI ANIMAL
ANTI
PERSONAL
ANTI
MATERIAL
Biowarfare
pathogen
Contagious
Lethal
Mass killing
Non lethal
Economic
destruction
Non contagious
Lethal
Area denial
Non lethal
Incapcitation
CATEGORIES OF BIOTERRORISM AGENTS
Category A
easily disseminated or transmitted easily
high mortality and greatly impact public health.
potential to create public panic
lead to disruption of daily lives.
special action for public health preparedness.
Category B-
less easy to disseminate
moderate morbidity and low mortality.
Category C
emerging pathogens
potential for mass dissemination.
.
TARGET??
METROPOLITAN CITIES, URBAN
CONGLOMERATION, DISTRICT WITH
INTERNATIONAL BORDER
MODE OF SPREAD--
Depends on type of agent used
Aerosol mechanism in closed , confined areas
Contamination of food and water
Deliberate infiltration of infected animals, pests, vectors via border
HISTORY
Pre 20
th
century
600 B.C. –crude filth, cadaver animal carcasses , animal bodies
1155 -Emperor Barbarossa poisons water wells with human bodies in
Tortona, Italy
1346 AD-epidemic plague converted to black death(pandemic
plague) covering Europe , east and north Africa
1495 Spanish mix wine with blood of leprosy patients to sell to their
French foes in Italy
1675 German and French forces agree to not use “poisonesbullets”
1710 Russian troops catapult human bodies of plague victims into Swedish
cities
1763 British distribute blankets from smallpox patients to Native Americans
1797 Napoleon floods the plains around Mantua, Italy, to enhance the
spread of malaria
1863 Confederates sell clothing from yellow fever and smallpox patients to
Union troops during the US Civil War
World War I German and French agents use glanders and anthrax
World War II Japan uses plague, anthrax, and other diseases; several other
countries experiment with and develop biological weapons programs
Early to mid 20
th
century-
Late 20
th
century
1980–1988 Iraq uses mustard gas, sarin, and tabun against Iran and
ethnic groups inside Iraq during the Persian Gulf War
1995 Aum Shinrikyo uses sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system
Early 21
st
century
2001-Bacillus anthracis was used against civillians via sevral letters
laced with spores in U.S.
Events in India (??)
1994-Plague episodes in Surat
1996—Dengue outbreak in Delhi
2001–Eastern India (Siliguri) suffered from encephalitis
Counter measure for Bioterrorism
Deterrence –state actor and non state actor
Prevention
surveillance
Lab investigation and research
Medical management
Dissemination of public safety
DETERRANCE
Geneva protocol –
world war 1 1925
prohibit 1
st
use of asphyxiating, poisonous, and other bacteriological
method in war
ratified in 2013 signed by 137 country
prohibit the use & possession, production of biological warfare
Other programs
National security decision memorandum 35 –1969
Toxin weapon programs 1970
Biological weapon convention-1975 (169 countries)
18 research laboratories and centre
60 000 staff
research over biological weapons of
VECTOR, ISBM
at present Russian federation ministry of defense microbiology scientific
research institute
collection of dangerous pathogen like Ebola Marburg Lassa virus
UNESCOM-U.N. special commission
site inspection of Iraq’s biological , chemical, missile capabilities
Iraq Russia and china were also investigated
Non state actors
1990-1999 -185 documented biological weapons
27 cases-terrorist
56 –criminals
97 were uncertain
Sep 1984 religious cult contaminated salad bars along Oregon interstate
highway with salmonella typhimurium
UNESCOM resolution
Require all country to set laws to prevent biological attacks by preventing
production delivery and dissemination
Indian perspective
India have defensive biological weapon capabilities
conducted research on diseases like plague, brucellosis, and
smallpox.
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
July 15, 1974
India has improved its capabilities in biotechnology & other
peaceful capacity.
Defense Research and Development Establishment (DRDE) at
Gwalior
Centers for countering disease threats such as anthrax, brucellosis,
cholera, plague, smallpox, viral hemorrhage fever, and botulism
Central Industrial Security Force (CISF)
Prepare group of specially-trained first responders for nuclear or
biological attack.
Prevention
Global conference-2004
launches $ 1 million grant for preventing bioterrorism
examine risk of bioterror, case studies, attack prevention, law
enforcement and legal political frame work
National Disaster Management Authority (NDMA)
eight battalions -1000 trained personal
Training of existing existing force to deal with chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats
Under NDMA India enforce revised international health regulation in
June 2007
deal with outbreaks and other emergencies related to national and
international concern
Survillence and asssessment
System must be timely , sensitive, specific, and practical,
Key elements---
Harnessing information<epidemiological clues of bioterror attack
Verification and confirmation of cases
Initiation of appropriate prevention and control measures
When to suspect??????
similar disease or syndrome, in a discrete population .
unexplained diseases or deaths
severe disease than expected
Unusual routes of exposure to pathogen e.g. inhalational route for
diseases that occur through other exposures
disease unusual in geographic area or season
Disease normally transmitted by a vector that is not present in the local
area
Simultaneous or serial epidemics in same population
single case of disease by an uncommon agent
Unusual strains or variants of organisms,
Higher attack rates in certain areas
Disease outbreaks of the same illness occurring in non-contiguous areas
Intelligence report showing suspect of a potential attack
India-------
Integrated Disease Surveillance Project (IDSP)
Decentralized and state-based surveillance program, November 2004
Integrates the public sector, private sector, rural and urban health system,
Health Agencies (WHO, CDC, NIC, etc.)
Regulate surveillance activities
Strengthening of public health laboratories,
Human resource development
Use of information technology for collection,compilation, analysis, and
dissemination of data
Lab investigation–role of clinical microbiology
LABORATORY REFERENCE NETWORK
1999, collaboration of CDC, APHL AND
FBI
Integration of National & International
network of laboratories that are fully
equipped to respond quickly to acts of
chemical or biological terrorism,
emerging infectious diseases, and other
public health threats and emergencies
Sentinel laboratory
•Capable of analysing or referring samples containing infectious agent
•Able to perform all complex testing as per ASM 1988 guideline and Clinical
Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988
•Packing and shipping of infectious agents according to standard protocol
•Maintain testing protocol in accordance to ASM guidelines and participate in
proficiency test
•Biosafety level II
•Not required to register with Select Agent rules, but must be familiar
Confirmatory reference laboratory
Typically public health laboratories, which represent states, countries, in large
metropolitan areas.
160 reference laboratories,
To confirm or rule out suspected bioterrorism agents
responsibility to produce high-confidence test results for threat analysis
National laboratories
Definativecharacterisation OF samples
CDC and U.S. Army Medical Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID)
Biosafety level IV (BSL-4) facilities.
List of some laboratories in india linked to NACD
NACD, New Delhi; National Institute of Cholera and Enteric Diseases
Department of Microbiology, AIIMS (Virology)
National Institute of Virology, Pune
Enterovirus Research Centre, Mumbai (polio)
Vector Control Research Centre, Pondicherry (vectors, filariasis)
Centre for Research in Medical Entomology, Madurai (vectors and other
vector-borne diseases);
Defense Research Development Establishment, Gwalior.
SELECT AGENTS
agents derived from biological sources
cause significant harm to public health and safety.
Listed by U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) humans) & the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA)
Updated in October2012,
13 tier1 agents were identified.
The criteria for a tier1 agents
mass casualty and economic devastation
communicability
low infectious dose,
history of interest in weaponization.
The 2012 update also added the SARS-associated coronavirus and Chapareand Lujoviruses
(Arena viridae) to the list
MEDICAL MANAGEMENT -PREVENTIVE PROMOTIVE AND
CURATIVE SERVICE
Biothreat may disrupt health care delivery even in well-resourced health system
Increase resilience, HHS -the National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness Program
(NBHPP),2002
Funding and guidance to hospitals
Provided more than $2 billion to states, territories, and eligible municipalities
Administered by the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) until
2006,
At present by ASPR
renamed as hospital preparedness programe(HPP)
All hazards –biowarfare or any health outbreak
Activation of National Disaster Medical System (NDMS)
the Medical Reserve Corps (MRC)-groups of health care volunteers
Disaster medical assistance teams (DMATs) -to aid medical facility
U.S. ->300 units of MRC
MEDICAL COUNTERMEASURES
Easy availability of Diagnostic tests, drugs, vaccines and other equipment
and supplies needed to respond emergency.
Formation of medical teams for easy and efficient delivery of services
migration of health professional at effected site
Applying Triage
Public Health Emergency Medical Countermeasures Enterprise (PHEMCE),
mitigate the adverse health consequences associated with biological
threats
ANTHRAX
Zoonotic disease,
Aerosol and Inhalational-pulmonary anthrax (hemorrhagic pneumonia) most
common
Orogastric route causing bloody diarrhoea
High fatality rate
Easily extracted from soil (spores) around the world.
It’s cheap and can be grown in large quantities.
Anthrax as war weapon has been explored by many times over a century
dipicolinicacid –stability and germinatiion
Diagnosis (cdc, 2001)
Presumptive diagnosis(SLN)-any large gram positive bacilli with cultural
properties similar to B. anthracis
Confirmatory test(CLN & NLN)-
Initial –gamma phage lysis (PHAGE W)
--direct immunofluroscence test
Final-PCR (primer –BA pX01 & BA pX02)
•Bio Thrax-Antitoxin
•Raxibacumab
PRE-EXPOSURE
PROPHYLAXIS
•Ciprofloxacin+ Doxycycline/Amoxicillin –60
Day
POST EXPOSURE
PROPHYLAXIS
•Ciprofloxacin/Doxycycline + Clindamycin
&/Or Rifampicin –60 Day
TREATMENT
MANAGEMENT
PREVENTION
Decontamination of
animal products
Proper handling of
infected materials
As well as following
proper hygiene
Disposal of animal
carcasses
Decontamination of
animal products
Disposal of animal
carcasses
Small pox
DNA virus-orthopoxvirus–variola(major and minor)
-vaccina
Exclusive reservoir –human
Eradicated 8may 1980
Accidental laboratory spread 1978
Only two laboratories hold stocks-
Institute of Virus Preparations in Moscow, Russia
CDC in Atlanta, USA
Potentioal biowarfare-
No vaccination after 1980
Highly contagious and aerosole
No subclinical stage or carrier state
High case fatality rate
Severe complication-hemorrhagic small pox
Lab diagnosis
collected by someone recently vaccinated with all PPE
pustular fluid or scabs
BSL-4
Presumptive diagnosis
electron microscopy rapid method
Serological-immunofluorescent assay, enzyme immunoassay
Immunoglobulin M capture
Immunoglobulin G enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
Definative method
Viral culture
polymerase chain reaction (PCR) E9L, A25R,HA, HTI, crmB
Summary of characteristics of selected bioterrorism agents
Agent
Incubation
period
Person-to-
person spread
Morbidiity/mort
ality if
untreated
Diagnosisa
B. anthracis1-5 days Cutaneous High/highCulture,
serology
Y. pestis 2-3 days Yes High/highCulture,
serology
F. tularensis2-10 days
Skinlesion
High/lowCulture,
serology
Brucella spp.5 days-2
months
No High/lowCulture,
serology
Botulinum
toxins
1-5 days No High/highELISA or mouse
inoculation for
toxin detection
Variola virus7-17 days Yes High/highDetection via
ELISA, PCR, or
virus isolation