BRAZIL NEEDS TO OVERCOME ITS EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE TO EXERCISE ITS SOVEREIGNTY.pdf

This article aims to demonstrate that Brazil needs to overcome its dependence on foreign capital, foreign technology, export markets, and imports to exercise its sovereignty. In Brazil, large transnational corporations occupy the main and most dynamic economic segments at the heart of value chains, allowing them strategic control of production and marketing (both forward and backward) in each sector. In addition to Brazil's dependence on foreign capital for investment, it also relies on foreign technology. Brazil is also experiencing growth in its export revenues and import expenditures, contributing to Brazil's greater dependence on the export market and its increased dependence on imports of goods and services from abroad. Brazil will not be able to exercise its sovereignty as long as it remains dependent on foreign capital, foreign technology, export markets, and imports. For Brazil to ensure its sovereignty, it is necessary not only to increase its military deterrence power, but also and above all to overcome its dependence on external capital, external technologies, and export and import markets.

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BRAZIL NEEDS TO OVERCOME ITS EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE TO
EXERCISE ITS SOVEREIGNTY
Fernando Alcoforado*
This article aims to demonstrate that Brazil needs to overcome its dependence on foreign
capital, foreign technology, export markets, and imports to exercise its sovereignty. In
Brazil, large transnational corporations occupy the main and most dynamic economic
segments at the heart of value chains, allowing them strategic control of production and
marketing (both forward and backward) in each sector. In addition to Brazil's dependence
on foreign capital for investment, it also depends on foreign technology. There is a myth
that foreign capital transfers technology to the country, reflecting a naive view of the role
of foreign companies in technological development in peripheral countries like Brazil.
This myth hinders Brazil's own scientific and technological development efforts and
keeps the country at a permanently inferior technological level. It also continues to
contribute to a constant flow of payments abroad for the use of foreign technology and a
permanent deficit in the technology item of the current account balance. Brazil's foreign
trade reached a record relative to GDP in 2021. Brazil's trade flow, including exports and
imports, reached 39% of GDP (Gross Domestic Product). This is the highest percentage
in the World Bank's historical series, which began in 1960. This is the most relevant
performance indicator for increasing Brazil's presence in the global market. This means
Brazil's gains from export revenues and higher import spending, but also greater
dependence on the export market and its increased dependence on imports of goods and
services from abroad.
1. Brazil's Dependence on Foreign Capital
Figure 1 shows the evolution of foreign direct investment in Brazil from 1995 to 2024.
The expansion of foreign capital in Brazil was boosted starting in 1990 with the opening
of the Brazilian market and the Brazilian government's adoption of the neoliberal
economic model. After a spectacular expansion from 1995 to 2011, there was a decline
in foreign direct investment from 2011 to 2020 and a new expansion from 2020 to 2024.
Figure 1 - Foreign Direct Investment in Brazil from 1995 to 2024

Source: https://www.poder360.com.br/economia/investimento-direto-no-brasil-sobe-62-em-2024-diz-bc/
The dominant role of multinational corporations in the international division of labor
contributes to the reduction of decision-making space for governments in peripheral
countries, compromising national sovereignty [1]. The structure of domination continues
to have technological imports as a key factor in the uneven and dependent economic

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development of peripheral capitalist countries like Brazil in relation to central capitalist
countries. The monopoly exercised by multinational companies in Brazil generates
dependence on imports of inputs and products, patent payments for the use of technology,
and, therefore, the transfer of the economic surplus generated in Brazil by technological
purchases and by financial loans to the metropolis. The most dynamic sectors of the
Brazilian economy are connected to and controlled by foreign companies because inputs
such as knowledge and technology are produced by developed countries.
The transfer of production facilities from central capitalist countries to peripheral
capitalist countries further contributes to increased dependence, as it entails significant
imports of capital goods and production inputs linked to more complex production chains
that are not manufactured in the capitalist periphery [1]. According to economist Celso
Furtado, the underdevelopment of peripheral capitalist countries is characterized, on the
one hand, by their economic, technological, and financial dependence. On the other,
underdevelopment is characterized by income concentration and the importation of
consumer goods by very small economic elite. The Brazilian elite copies the consumption
and development model of central capitalist countries in a backward and underdeveloped
economy like Brazil's. Thus, according to Furtado, the economic surplus generated is not
connected to capital formation in Brazil, but is exclusively directed to supplying the
consumption of this same elite.
The positive aspects of foreign investment are essentially two [2]: 1) foreign investment
generates foreign exchange earnings and constitutes a type of capital contribution that, in
addition to not increasing the country's external debt, covers a potential current account
balance of payments deficit in a relatively stable manner; and 2) foreign investment can
contribute to increasing gross fixed capital formation, translating into increased potential
long-term economic growth. There are two distinct types of foreign investment [2]: those
that create new capacity (new companies or expansions of existing companies) and those
that lead to the acquisition of pre-existing capacity. In the latter case, one of the negative
aspects of foreign investment occurs: the denationalization of the peripheral country's
economy (except in cases of acquisition by other foreigners of existing branches or
subsidiaries of foreign companies).
Another negative aspect of foreign investment is the privatization of state-owned
enterprises. When foreign capital acquires control of these companies, privatization leads
to their outright denationalization. New productive capacity is not created, resulting in
another negative aspect because business decision-making centers are transferred abroad
[2]. Another negative aspect of foreign investment lies in the fact that, when opening the
economy to foreign capital, the government of a peripheral country like Brazil may not
establish strategic counterparties, such as commitments to technology transfer and
purchases from domestic suppliers to stimulate production and job creation in the country.
China, for example, often establishes these types of conditions. Brazil, due to its size,
would, in principle, have the bargaining power to establish requirements for technology
transfer and purchases within the country.
The Brazilian government has moved in a different direction, according to economist
Paulo Nogueira Batista Jr. [2]. Instead of negotiating counterparties, the Brazilian
government offers guarantees. To stimulate certain foreign investments, the Brazilian
government nationalizes exchange rate risk. In the event of a sharp depreciation of the
Brazilian currency, the National Treasury foots the bill. This policy generates fiscal and
exchange rate risk. The risk of unexpected expenses incurred by foreign companies is
transferred to the public coffers. If the devaluation of the national currency exceeds

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expectations, the government incurs exchange rate and fiscal losses, reducing
international reserves and increasing the public deficit. Interestingly, the financial market
and the media, always so alarmed by fiscal risk, seem to unreservedly support this policy.
Hoping to increase foreign investment, the Brazilian government ends up assuming the
exchange rate risk of investments that would have entered the country anyway. Since the
beneficiaries of this decision are large capitalists, no one protests or complains. It is
worrying that Brazil is enormously dependent on foreign capital, which has a significant
share in the Brazilian economy, whether in the industrial, commercial, service, or
financial sectors [6]. This situation needs to be reversed.
The development of peripheral countries is supported by technological progress targeted
at a minority of the population, culminating in a brutal concentration of income [1]. In
the view of economist Celso Furtado, a key characteristic is technological dependence.
The degree of economic dependence is increasing and is reproduced in several
dimensions, such as technological dependence, the payment of royalties for the use of
patents, and intellectual property rights. The import substitution model adopted by Brazil
in the 1950s contributed to its greater dependence on the central capitalist countries, the
rich countries. From the 1960s onward, dependence within the import substitution model
increased with the emergence of oligopolies and foreign capital, upon which the
international division of labor and science, technology, and knowledge began to be
structured. From this perspective, Brazil's economic backwardness represents a
consequence of the disparity between the center and the periphery, which is difficult to
overcome under current conditions.
The dismantling of the Brazilian state beginning in the 1990s with the adoption of the
neoliberal economic model made it impossible for the government to act to dynamize the
national economy by hindering the adoption of policies and strategies for developing the
Brazilian economy, science, technology, and industry. The adoption of the neoliberal
model in Brazil deepened the country's technological dependence, which occurred most
drastically mainly in sectors linked to information technology, such as artificial
intelligence, big data, microchips, and next-generation communication networks, such as
5G, which peripheral countries like Brazil cannot replicate except through purchases and
payments to foreign companies. The electronics industry in Brazil is quite fragile [1]. In
international terms, comparing its technical efficiency to that of the United States and
other countries, it is still fragile. The low content of the electronics industry in Brazil in
capital goods and derived applications, as well as in research and advances related to fiber
optics, makes Brazilian technology obsolete, preventing technological leaps in important
sectors for the high-tech industry, such as chip production.
2. Brazil's Technological Dependence
Brazil spends billions of Reais annually on foreign technologies, especially from US
companies, revealing significant technological dependence. This dependence is
evidenced by the high amount spent on software licenses, cloud services, and digital
security, with a financial impact that compromises Brazil's autonomy in strategic areas.
Brazil, like many peripheral capitalist countries, faces significant technological
dependence on central capitalist countries. This dependence manifests itself in the
purchase of foreign technologies, including equipment, software, and components, as
well as a flow of technological knowledge that is often not internalized.
Dependence on foreign technologies leads to greater economic dependence, as Brazil
becomes more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices and supply conditions from other

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countries. The lack of domestic technological development compromises national
sovereignty, limiting the ability of peripheral capitalist countries like Brazil to make
autonomous decisions in strategic areas such as defense and national security.
Technological dependence hinders the development of local industrial and technological
sectors, limiting economic growth and job creation. While peripheral capitalist countries
are technologically dependent, core capitalist countries are more prominent in supplying
technologies and leading global markets, such as the United States, Germany, Japan, and
China, which possess significant technological capabilities, with companies and
technologies frequently adopted in other countries.
For the first time, a study quantified the extent of Brazil's technological dependence on
global technology giants, known as Big Tech [3]. The Center for Scientific Computing
and Free Software (C3SL) at the Federal University of Paraná revealed the cost of Brazil's
technological dependence on Big Tech: more than R$23 billion invested annually in
foreign platforms and services. The study warns of the risks of this dependence, which
range from the vulnerability of national data to the loss of autonomy over strategic
decisions in areas such as the economy, health, education, and national security.
Technological sovereignty is a prerequisite for the country's economic sovereignty. In
2024, one of the largest increases—58%—in Brazil's current account balance of payments
occurred in the deficit in intellectual property services, linked to streaming services and
software sales, totaling US$8.683 billion. Telecommunications, computing, and
information services, also driven by digital platform operations, reached US$7.158 billion
[5].
The study, entitled “Contratos, Códigos e Controle – A influência das Big Techs no
Estado Brasileiro” (Contracts, Codes, and Control – The Influence of Big Tech on the
Brazilian State), was prepared by the Study Group on Technologies and Innovations in
Public Management (GETIP/EACH/USP), linked to the Interdisciplinary Observatory of
Public Policies "Prof. Dr. José Renato de Campos Araújo" (OIPP/EACH/USP); and also
by the Strategy, Data, and Sovereignty Working Group of the Study and Research Group
on International Security (GEPSI Data), of the Institute of International Relations of the
University of Brasília (IREL-UnB), conducted a survey of procurement portals to
determine the extent of the technological dependence of the Brazilian public sector in the
acquisition of foreign technology goods and services. For the first time, there is concrete
data to assess how fragile Brazil is in the face of the power of "big tech," a worrying
factor for the discussion on national security [4]. The study “Contratos, Códigos e
Controle – A influência das Big Techs no Estado Brasileiro” (Contracts, Codes, and
Control – The Influence of Big Tech in the Brazilian State) points out that we are paying,
month after month, for systems we don't control, for technologies we don't master, and
for solutions that don't belong to our innovation ecosystem [4]. Instead of investing in
strengthening the national software industry, training a skilled workforce, or developing
open and interoperable solutions, the Brazilian government chooses to contract ready-
made products offered by large foreign corporations, especially so-called Big Techs. This
model adopted in Brazil cannot be attributed to a single government. The conditions of
subordination, technological dependence, and the practices that sustain them have
become natural because they are accepted by successive Brazilian governments, at all
three levels of the federation, by the three branches of government, and by Brazilian
society in general. They are part of the mindset of many of Brazil's public technology
technicians and managers. The study indicates that the numbers demonstrate that control
over the world's digital infrastructure, data, and algorithmic logic that controls
information ensures that Big Tech companies like Microsoft, Meta, Apple, Amazon, and

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Google play the role of economic and political agents with the ability to shape technical
standards, define norms of conduct, and influence strategic government decisions. This
means that regulating Big Tech in Brazil is not enough. It is necessary to develop its own
technology in Brazil to overcome its technological dependence.
It is therefore clear that the Brazilian government has been spending billions of Reais on
foreign technology, with an exponential increase in spending on software licenses, cloud
storage, and digital security. The country's critical infrastructure, including defense,
energy, and telecommunications systems, depends on foreign components and software,
creating vulnerabilities to exploitation and compromising national security. Brazil
depends on large technology companies, the American Big Tech companies, for software,
cloud storage, and digital security solutions. The priority given to the consumption of
foreign technology, to the detriment of the development of domestic solutions, distances
the country from its potential in free software. Brazil's technological dependence prevents
it from having autonomy over strategic decisions in the areas of the economy, health, and
national security. The vulnerability of national data poses a significant risk, with the
possibility of access by foreign entities that control the technological tools used.
To reduce and eliminate its technological dependence, Brazil needs to invest in research
and development, education, and innovation in strategic sectors. It is crucial to invest in
its own infrastructure and strengthen research and development of domestic technological
solutions. It is necessary to develop public policies that encourage innovation and
technological production within the country. Strengthening domestic industry, promoting
local companies, and collaboration between universities, companies, and governments
are important steps toward building a more solid and autonomous technological base.
Brazil's technological dependence is manifested in the high consumption of products and
services from foreign Big Tech companies, public spending exceeding R$ 10 billion
annually on software licensing and cloud computing, and the strategic vulnerability of
critical infrastructure due to the use of imported components. This dependence, which
contrasts with the country's cutting-edge legacy in free software, compromises national
sovereignty, economic autonomy, and data security, making investment in proprietary
infrastructure essential to building digital sovereignty.
3. Brazil's Dependence on Export Markets
Figure 2 shows the evolution of exports from 2013 to 2024. Figure 2 shows that there was
a significant expansion in Brazilian exports from 2020 to 2023.
Figure 2 - Evolution of Brazil's Exports from 2013 to 2024

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Source: https://coreconsp.gov.br/nota-economica-no-6-2024-por-fernando-maciel-exportacoes-no-ano-de-
2024/
Brazil's main export markets include China, the United States, Argentina, and the
European Union. China is the largest buyer of Brazilian products, particularly soybeans,
iron ore, and beef. The United States has also been an important trading partner for Brazil,
importing products such as oil, coffee, and aircraft. Argentina is a relevant market for
Brazilian exports, especially for products such as soybeans, iron ore, and beef. The
European Union is an important economic bloc for Brazil, particularly for imports of
products such as coffee, soybeans, and forestry products. In addition to these countries,
the Netherlands, Spain, Japan, and South Korea are also important markets for Brazilian
exports. Market diversification is an important factor for the Brazilian economy, reducing
dependence on certain trading partners and increasing the resilience of the Brazilian
export sector. The Trump administration's tariff hike against Brazil highlights the need to
immediately redirect to new markets products that will become unviable for export to the
United States due to the tariff hike, as well as to the domestic market [6].
The Trump administration's tariff hike highlights the significant vulnerability of the
Brazilian export sector. This fact highlights the need for the Brazilian government to
prevent the country's production system from remaining highly dependent on foreign
export markets, as it could once again be harmed by decisions made by leaders of
countries with which Brazil maintains trade relations. This means that, in addition to
seeking new markets for exportable products, the Brazilian government should place
greater emphasis on developing the production system to primarily serve the domestic
market and become less dependent on the export market [6].
4. Brazil's Dependence on Imports
Figure 3 shows the evolution of the trade balance (exports, imports, and trade surplus)
from 2000 to 2023. Figure 3 shows that only in 2013 and 2014 was the trade balance
negative, and that there was an expansion in both exports and imports from 2000 to 2023.
This means that Brazil became dependent not only on exports, but also on imports of
goods and services.
Figure 3 - Brazil's trade balance from 2000 to 2023

Source: https://folhadepalotina.com.br/economia/recorde-da-balanca-comercial-em-2023-esconde-
dilemas-estruturais-da-economia-brasileira/

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In 2024, the total value of Brazilian imports was US$ 262.5 billion, a 14.3% increase
compared to 2023, according to data from the National Treasury and FGV. This growth
was driven by the increase in import volume, especially of capital and durable consumer
goods, and by the rise in the exchange rate. The main imported products were fuels,
fertilizers, and machinery and equipment. The main countries from which Brazil imports
are China, the United States, Germany, and Argentina. China leads Brazilian imports,
followed by the United States, Germany, and Argentina, in that order. Brazil's import
spending by country is as follows:
• China: US$ 48.5 billion.
• United States: US$ 34.9 billion.
• Germany: US$ 12.1 billion.
• Argentina: US$ 11.1 billion.
• Russia: US$ 10.9 billion.
• India: US$ 6.8 billion.
• Italy: US$ 6.3 billion.
• France: US$ 6.1 billion.
• Mexico: US$ 5.7 billion.
• Japan: US$ 5.4 billion.
Brazil's main imports, according to recent data, include petroleum-derived fuel oils,
natural gas, chemical fertilizers, and non-electric machinery and motors and their parts.
Other significant items include automobiles and their parts, medicines,
telecommunications equipment, plastics, and electronic components such as transistors
and diodes. Petroleum or bituminous mineral fuel oils (except crude) and liquefied natural
gas are highly important items in Brazilian imports. Chemical fertilizers (except crude
fertilizers) are also among Brazil's main imports. Non-electric motors and machinery and
their parts, as well as telecommunications equipment, are crucial items in the
manufacturing industry. Medicines and pharmaceutical products, including those for
veterinary use, represent a significant portion of the country's imports. Automobiles and
vehicle accessories are also among the main imports. Plastics and polymers are essential
for several industries. Diodes, transistors, and thermionic valves, important for the
electronics industry, are imported. Oil platforms and other floating structures also appear
on import lists.
To reduce import spending, the Brazilian government needs to adopt an import
substitution policy by adopting the strategies described below [7]:
1) Encourage the establishment of import-substituting industries for inputs and products
with financing and tax incentives to ensure national self-sufficiency.
2) Promote the selective opening of the Brazilian economy to protect domestic industry
from predatory competition from imported inputs and products.
3) Promote the strengthening of existing domestic industry in Brazil by offering financing
and tax incentives.

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4) Promote the development of the domestic capital goods industry to make it
permanently competitive in the international market.
5) End the country's economic and technological dependence on foreign countries by
promoting autonomous scientific and technological progress, the only way to make
domestic companies permanently competitive in the international market, by
strengthening Brazilian universities and research centers.
6) Promote the modernization of Brazilian industry through its integration into Industry
4.0, encouraging significant investments and intensive training of managers, engineers,
systems analysts, and technicians in new technologies, as well as strategic partnerships
and alliances with entities in other countries and massive investments in education to train
people with a focus on technology.
5. Conclusions
From the above, it can be concluded that no government of a country can exercise its
sovereignty while remaining dependent on foreign capital, external technologies, export
markets, and imports. While a country is in these conditions, it cannot fully exercise its
national sovereignty, which is the supreme power and authority that a State and its people
have to govern themselves, without external interference, defining their laws, policies,
and direction, maintaining control over their territory and their own will. For the Brazilian
State and people to achieve autonomy, which manifests itself internally through the power
to create their own legal order and choose their rulers, and externally through the ability
to not submit to any other power or nation, it is necessary not only to increase its military
deterrence power, but also, and above all, to overcome its dependence on foreign capital,
external technologies, and export markets and imports by adopting the measures proposed
in this article.
The lack of military deterrence and Brazil's current external dependence on foreign
capital, foreign technologies, export markets, and imports make Brazil vulnerable to
threats to its sovereignty, such as those practiced by the Trump administration of the
United States, which is blackmailing the Brazilian government with a 50% tariff hike to
force it not to punish Jair Bolsonaro for the attempted coup d'état. Trump's letter to Lula
makes it quite clear that his purpose is to prevent Bolsonaro from being arrested. The lack
of military deterrence and Brazil's current external dependence on foreign capital, foreign
technologies, export markets, and imports prevent the Lula administration from
responding adequately to the Trump administration's tariff hike.
REFERENCES
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4. QUEIROZ, Luiz. A conta da dependência tecnológica do Brasil: R$ 23.001.418.740,04.
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2024. Available on the website
<https://agenciabrasil.ebc.com.br/economia/noticia/2025-01/contas-externas-tem-
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
Fernando Alcoforado, awarded the medal of Engineering Merit of the CONFEA / CREA System, member
of the SBPC- Brazilian Society for the Progress of Science and IPB- Polytechnic Institute of Bahia, engineer
from the UFBA Polytechnic School and doctor in Territorial Planning and Regional Development from the
University of Barcelona, college professor (Engineering, Economics and Administration) and consultant
in the areas of strategic planning, business planning, regional planning, urban planning and energy systems,
was Advisor to the Vice President of Engineering and Technology at LIGHT S.A. Electric power
distribution company from Rio de Janeiro, Strategic Planning Coordinator of CEPED- Bahia Research and
Development Center, Undersecretary of Energy of the State of Bahia, Secretary of Planning of Salvador, is
the author of the books Globalização (Editora Nobel, São Paulo, 1997), De Collor a FHC- O Brasil e a
Nova (Des)ordem Mundial (Editora Nobel, São Paulo, 1998), Um Projeto para o Brasil (Editora Nobel,
São Paulo, 2000), Os condicionantes do desenvolvimento do Estado da Bahia (Doctoral thesis. Barcelona
University, http://www.tesisenred.net/handle/10803/1944, 2003), Globalização e Desenvolvimento
(Editora Nobel, São Paulo, 2006), Bahia- Desenvolvimento do Século XVI ao Século XX e Objetivos
Estratégicos na Era Contemporânea (EGBA, Salvador, 2008), The Necessary Conditions of the Economic
and Social Development- The Case of the State of Bahia (VDM Verlag Dr. Müller Aktiengesellschaft &
Co. KG, Saarbrücken, Germany, 2010), Aquecimento Global e Catástrofe Planetária (Viena- Editora e
Gráfica, Santa Cruz do Rio Pardo, São Paulo, 2010), Amazônia Sustentável- Para o progresso do Brasil e
combate ao aquecimento global (Viena- Editora e Gráfica, Santa Cruz do Rio Pardo, São Paulo, 2011), Os
Fatores Condicionantes do Desenvolvimento Econômico e Social (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2012), Energia
no Mundo e no Brasil- Energia e Mudança Climática Catastrófica no Século XXI (Editora CRV, Curitiba,
2015), As Grandes Revoluções Científicas, Econômicas e Sociais que Mudaram o Mundo (Editora CRV,
Curitiba, 2016), A Invenção de um novo Brasil (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2017), Esquerda x Direita e a sua
convergência (Associação Baiana de Imprensa, Salvador, 2018), Como inventar o futuro para mudar o
mundo (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2019), A humanidade ameaçada e as estratégias para sua sobrevivência
(Editora Dialética, São Paulo, 2021), A escalada da ciência e da tecnologia e sua contribuição ao progresso
e à sobrevivência da humanidade (Editora CRV, Curitiba, 2022), a chapter in the book Flood Handbook
(CRC Press, Boca Raton, Florida United States, 2022), How to protect human beings from threats to their
existence and avoid the extinction of humanity (Generis Publishing, Europe, Republic of Moldova,
Chișinău, 2023), A revolução da educação necessária ao Brasil na era contemporânea (Editora CRV,
Curitiba, 2023), Como construir um mundo de paz, progresso e felicidade para toda a humanidade (Editora
CRV, Curitiba, 2024) and How to build a world of peace, progress and happiness for all humanity (Editora
CRV, Curitiba, 2024).

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