Data Protection in a Connected World: Sovereignty and Cyber Security

Delve into the critical intersection of data sovereignty and cyber security in this presentation. Explore unconventional cyber threat vectors and strategies to safeguard data integrity and sovereignty in an increasingly interconnected world. Gain insights into emerging threats and proactive defense measures essential for modern digital ecosystems.

1. DATA SOVEREIGNTY
& CYBER SECURITY
Dr AnupamTiwari

3. ISDATA SOVEREIGNTY
EVEN POSSIBLE?

4. IS DATA SOVEREIGNTY
EVEN POSSIBLE?

5. WHAT MAKES ME THINK
SO?

6. NumberofFactorsandVectorseffectinto
Directly-IndirectlyeffectingintoDATA
sovereignty
DATA SOVEREIGNTY

7. Referstotheideathatacountryorjurisdiction
hastheauthorityandrighttogovernandcontrol
thedatageneratedwithinitsborders.
Source: https://www.cloudflare.com/en-gb/learning/privacy/what-is-data-sovereignty/

8. OPERATINGSYSTEMS

9. CRYPTOGRAPHY STANDARDS

10. ENCRYPTIONSTANDARDS

11. AADHARON ANDROID & iPHONE

12. UPI ON ANDROID & iPHONE

13. Newsyousee,thefactsyouseeand
eventhemapsyouseechange
dependingonWHEREYOUARE

14. AI MODELS

15. Regional versions of LLMs?

18. FRONTIER: Speed of 1685 PETAFLOPS
AIRAWAT: Speed of13.17 PETAFLOPS
SUPERCOMPUTERs

19. DO WE HAVE A TRULY INDIGENOUS INDIAN FOOT PRINT HERE OR WE ARE HAPPY
BEING USERS?
AR –VR –ER -MR

20. •Theoreticallyreducedriskofbuilt-infunctionalitiesthatcouldgatheruserdataforforeignentities.
•Alignmentwithgovernmentregulationsordataresidencyrequirementsfordatasovereignty.
BROWSERs

21. STORAGE SSD/HDD/RAMs
•HardwareBackdoors:Theoreticalriskthatforeigngovernmentscouldintroducehardware
backdoorsduringproduction
•SupplyChainVulnerabilities:Supplychainforforeign-madeHDDscanbecomplex,makingit
hardertotrackandpotentiallyintroducingvulnerabilitieswheremaliciousactorscouldtamperwiththe
drives.

22. •Enterprise routers/switches: Smaller process (14nm-7nm) for better performance
and lower power consumption.
•Home routers/basic switches: Larger process (28nm+) for lower cost.
MODEM / ROUTER / SWITCHES

23. ASIC/ FPGA/ TPU/ GPU
Potential vulnerabilities or backdoors built into the chips during manufacturing

24. SEMI CONDUCTORS & PROCESSORS
Semiconductors play a role in bigger picture of Data
Sovereignty
Potential vulnerabilities or backdoors built into the chips during manufacturing

25. SEMI CONDUCTORS & PROCESSORS
Number of countries involved in new generation nmchip
manufacturing is indeed difficult due to the complex and
global nature of the supply chain…any GUESSES?

26. 15 to 25 countries

27. MAIN FRAME OS
•Unisys
•IBM
•Fujitso
•HP
•BULL
•Vendor Lock-in
•Limited Customization
•Potential Backdoors

28. ZERO CLICK
THREATS

29. AD TECH

30. FMRI-AI

31. Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

32. Totallengthofoperationalunderseacables
isestimatedtobearound1.4million
kilometers(nearly870,000miles)&carries
vastmajority(~99%)ofinternettraffic
acrossoceans.
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

33. Cognyte& Septier
Who is Sniffing!!!!!
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

34. Individual undersea cables systems
(over 550)
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

35. Individual undersea cables systems
(over 550)
Chinesestate-ownedhavesoughtagreaterstakeinthe
globalsubmarinecablenetwork,almostcertainlyincreasing
China’sabilitytoManipulate,Surveil,andInterferewith
worldwidedataflows.
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

36. Individual undersea cables systems
(over 550)
Chinesestate-ownedhavesoughtagreaterstakeinthe
globalsubmarinecablenetwork,almostcertainlyincreasing
China’sabilitytoManipulate,Surveil,andInterferewith
worldwidedataflows.
HuaweiMarine Systems, now owns ~10% of the cable laying
market, and 3state-owned Chinese telecom providers have
ownership stakes in nearly 40cables.
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

37. Individual undersea cables systems
(over 550)
Chinesecompanieshaveincreasedtheirinvolvementin
deployingcablesglobally,especiallyinSoutheastAsia,the
MiddleEast,andAfrica,aspartBeltandRoadInitiative(BRI),
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

38. Source: https://www.submarinecablemap.com/

39. ChinaCompany’shadbuiltorrepairedalmost
25%oftheworld’scables
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

40. RecentlycompletedthePakistan&EastAfricaConnecting
Europe(PEACE)submarinecable,bridgingSingapore,
Pakistan,Kenya,Egypt,andFrance,amongothercountries.
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

41. RecentlycompletedthePakistan&EastAfricaConnecting
Europe(PEACE)submarinecable,bridgingSingapore,
Pakistan,Kenya,Egypt,andFrance,amongothercountries.
Recently completed the Hong Kong landing of the Asia Direct
Cable, which will link mainland China, Japan, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

42. RecentlycompletedthePakistan&EastAfricaConnecting
Europe(PEACE)submarinecable,bridgingSingapore,
Pakistan,Kenya,Egypt,andFrance,amongothercountries.
Recently completed the Hong Kong landing of the Asia Direct
Cable, which will link mainland China, Japan, the Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam
Global ownership consortium of the 2 Africa cable project,
which will connect 46cable landing stations in33 countries
across Africa, Asia, and Europe
Source: https://go.recordedfuture.com/hubfs/reports/ta-2023-0627.pdf

44. PRISM
PATRIOT
TEMPORA

45. NTP

46. AccuratetimestampsfromNTParecrucialinlegal
settingstovalidateelectronicrecords,impactingdata
sovereigntyduringlegalscrutinyordisputes.

47. ANTIVIRUS-UTMs-FIREWALLS

48. WELCOME QUANTUM & POST
QUANTUM TIMES!!!

49. ICANN

50. ●GenericNamesSupportingOrganization(GNSO)-TheGNSOisresponsiblefordevelopingand
recommendingtotheICANNBoardglobalpoliciesrelatedtogenerictop-leveldomains(gTLDs).TheGNSO
includesstakeholdergroupsrepresentingbusiness,intellectualpropertyinterests,non-commercialusers,and
Internetserviceproviders.
●CountryCodeNamesSupportingOrganization(ccNSO)-TheccNSOisresponsiblefordevelopingpolicies
relatedtocountry-codetop-leveldomains(ccTLDs)andrepresentingtheinterestsofccTLDoperatorsinICANN's
decision-makingprocesses.
●AddressSupportingOrganization(ASO)-TheASOisresponsibleforadvisingtheICANNBoardonglobalIP
addressallocationpoliciesandrepresentingtheinterestsoftheRegionalInternetRegistries(RIRs).
●At-LargeAdvisoryCommittee(ALAC)-TheALACisresponsibleforrepresentingtheinterestsofindividual
InternetusersinICANN'sdecision-makingprocesses.TheALACiscomposedofmemberswhoareappointedby
regionalAt-Largeorganizations.
●GovernmentalAdvisoryCommittee(GAC)-TheGACprovidesadvicetotheICANNBoardonissuesrelated
topublicpolicyandgovernmentconcerns.
●RootServerSystemAdvisoryCommittee(RSSAC)-TheRSSACadvisestheICANNBoardonmattersrelated
totheoperation,administration,security,andintegrityoftherootserversystem,whichisacriticalpartofthe
Internet'sinfrastructure.
●SecurityandStabilityAdvisoryCommittee(SSAC)-TheSSACadvisestheICANNcommunityandBoardon
issuesrelatedtothesecurityandstabilityoftheInternet'snamingandaddressallocationsystems.
ICANN

51. ●GenericNamesSupportingOrganization(GNSO)-TheGNSOisresponsiblefordevelopingand
recommendingtotheICANNBoardglobalpoliciesrelatedtogenerictop-leveldomains(gTLDs).TheGNSO
includesstakeholdergroupsrepresentingbusiness,intellectualpropertyinterests,non-commercialusers,and
Internetserviceproviders.
●CountryCodeNamesSupportingOrganization(ccNSO)-TheccNSOisresponsiblefordevelopingpolicies
relatedtocountry-codetop-leveldomains(ccTLDs)andrepresentingtheinterestsofccTLDoperatorsinICANN's
decision-makingprocesses.
●AddressSupportingOrganization(ASO)-TheASOisresponsibleforadvisingtheICANNBoardonglobalIP
addressallocationpoliciesandrepresentingtheinterestsoftheRegionalInternetRegistries(RIRs).
●At-LargeAdvisoryCommittee(ALAC)-TheALACisresponsibleforrepresentingtheinterestsofindividual
InternetusersinICANN'sdecision-makingprocesses.TheALACiscomposedofmemberswhoareappointedby
regionalAt-Largeorganizations.
●GovernmentalAdvisoryCommittee(GAC)-TheGACprovidesadvicetotheICANNBoardonissuesrelated
topublicpolicyandgovernmentconcerns.
●RootServerSystemAdvisoryCommittee(RSSAC)-TheRSSACadvisestheICANNBoardonmattersrelated
totheoperation,administration,security,andintegrityoftherootserversystem,whichisacriticalpartofthe
Internet'sinfrastructure.
●SecurityandStabilityAdvisoryCommittee(SSAC)-TheSSACadvisestheICANNcommunityandBoardon
issuesrelatedtothesecurityandstabilityoftheInternet'snamingandaddressallocationsystems.
ICANN

52. CLOUD HARDWARE LEADING COMPANIES
•Dell Technologies
•Hewlett Packard Enterprise (HPE)
•Lenovo
•Cisco
•Inspur(Chinese company)
•Huawei(Chinese company)
•Gigabyte
•Supermicro
•NetApp
•NVIDIA
CLOUD SOFTWARE/APIs LEADING COMPANIES
•Microsoft Azure
•Amazon Web Services
•Google Cloud Platform
•VMware (Software)
•Red Hat (Software)
•OpenStack
•CloudBees
•Chef
•Puppet
•Ansible
CLOUD INFRASTRUCTURE
INSERT PIC ZERO DAY-SIDE CHANNEL ETC

53. NATIONAL E-MAIL??

54. DATA EMBASSIES?

55. DATA EMBASSIES?
•Indiatoestablish"DataEmbassies":Indiangovernmentwillfacilitatethecreation
ofdataembassiestohelpcountrieswithdigitalcontinuitysolutions.
•Digitalcontinuitysolutions:Involvestoringcopiesofcriticaldatainasecure
locationoutsideacountry'sborders,incasethemainserversarecompromised.
•InitialrolloutinGIFTCity:Initially,dataembassieswillbesetuponlyinGujarat
InternationalFinanceTec-City(GIFT),afinancialservicescenterinIndia.
•Nationwiderolloutpossible:infuture

56. •Snapdeal
•Swiggy
•Udaan
•Zomato
•Dream 11
•Flipkart
•Hike
•MakeMyTrip
•Byju's
•Ola
•Oyo
•PaytmMall
•Paytm.com
•PolicyBazaar
•Quikr
•Rivigo
•Snapdeal
•BigBasket
Source: https://sundayguardianlive.com/news/chinese-investments-deep-rooted-
india#:~:text=These%2018%20Unicorn%20companies%20in,of%20dollars%20in%20Chinese%20investments.
18Unicorncompanies
inIndiahaveover
$3,500 millionof
Chineseinvestments

57. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE DATA SOVEREIGN BY
DEFAULT ?
USA-RUSSIA-CHINA...........

58. DEVELOPED COUNTRIES ARE DATA SOVEREIGN BY
DEFAULT ?
USA-RUSSIA-CHINA...........
OPERATINGSYSTEMS
USA -WINDOWS/iOS
RUSSIA -Astra Linux, Mandriva, Sailfish
China -HarmonyOS
GPS
USA -NAVSTAR
RUSSIA -GLONASS
China -BeiDou
CRYPTOGRAPHY
USA -NIST
RUSSIA -GOST
(GosudarstvennyĭStandart)
China -SCA (State Cryptography
Administration)
INTERNET
USA -ICANN(Non Govt)
RUSSIA -RuNET
China -GFW

59. GFWIN CHINA

60. RuNET2020

61. CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA

62. Windows AI Feature

64. •Laplace Mechanism
•Gaussian Mechanism
•Randomized Response
•Smoothing
•Clipping
•Quantization
•Privacy-Preserving Data Synthesis
Differential Privacy
Data Sovereignty + Differential Privacy = Stronger Protection

65. •FedAvg(Federated Averaging)
•FedSGD(Federated Stochastic
Gradient Descent)
•FedProx(Federated Proximal)
•Differential Private Federated Learning
•Secure Aggregation Techniques
Federated Learning

66. Trust|ThirdpartyNegation|HashCash|PublicKeys|PrivateKeys|y2=x3+7|RIPEMD-160|SHA-256|Finite
Fields|Secp256k1standard|DistributedLedger|03Jan2009|SatoshiNakamoto|ASIC|Mining|Proofofwork
|Consensus|ECDSA|PrimeNumbers|Immutability|Cryptography|Transactions|Wallets|Walletfile|data
extraction|Linuxsystem|BitcoinCore|BitcoinScripts|Bloomfilters|BIP0037Bloomfilters|GettingMerkle
blocks|gettingtransactionsofinterest|Usingmultiplehashfunctions|GossipProtocol|GPU|FPGA|The
transactionlifecycle|Thetransactiondatastructures|Typesofscripts|Coinbasetransactions|Transaction
validations|Transactionbugs|Difficultyadjustmentandretargetingalgorithms|KimotoGravityWellDifficulty
adjustmentandretargetingalgorithms|KimotoGravityWell|DarkGravityWave|Bitcoinlimitations|Privacyand
anonymity|ExtendedprotocolsontopofBitcoin|Coloredcoins|Hashingalgorithms|Difficultyadjustment
algorithms|Inter-blocktime|Blockrewards|Rewardhalvingrate|Blocksizeandtransactionsize|DarkGravity
Wave|DigiShield|Difficultyadjustmentalgorithms|Inter-blocktime|Blockrewards|Rewardhalvingrate|Block
sizeandtransactionsize|BitcoinDevelopmentEnvironment|CompilingBitcoinCorefromtheSourceCode|
SelectingaBitcoinCoreRelease|ConfiguringtheBitcoinCoreBuild|BuildingtheBitcoinCoreExecutables|
RunningaBitcoinCoreNode|RunningBitcoinCorefortheFirstTime|ConfiguringtheBitcoinCoreNode|Bitcoin
CoreApplicationProgrammingInterface(API)|GettingInformationontheBitcoinCoreClientStatus|Exploringand
DecodingTransactions|ExploringBlocks|UsingBitcoinCore’sProgrammaticInterface|AdvancedTransactionsand
Scripting|Multisignature|Pay-to-Script-Hash(P2SH)|P2SHAddresses|BenefitsofP2SH|RedeemScriptand
Validation|DataRecordingOutput(RETURN)|Timelocks|TransactionLocktime(nLocktime)|CheckLockTime
Verify(CLTV)|RelativeTimelocks|RelativeTimelockswithnSequence|RelativeTimelockswithCSV|Median-
Time-Past|TimelockDefenseAgainstFeeSniping|ScriptswithFlowControl(ConditionalClauses)|Conditional
ClauseswithVERIFYOpcodes|UsingFlowControlinScripts|BlockHeader|BlockIdentifiers:BlockHeaderHash
andBlockHeight|TheGenesisBlock|LinkingBlocksintheBlockchain
PQ BLOCKCHAIN

67. Homomorphic
Encryption

68. Retrieval
Augmented
Generation

69. PALAPA RING INDONESIA