DefCamp_2018_Conference_Chemerkin_Yury_-_full_.pdf

This presentation discusses security and privacy risks associated with Internet of Things (IoT) devices, wearable technology, and connected home products. It covers topics like forensic analysis of smartwatches, fitness trackers, and health apps, emphasizing the need for improved risk management in these areas.

1. Mobile, IoT, Clouds…
It’s time to hire aRiskManager!
YURY CHEMERKIN
MULTI-SKILLED SECURITY EXPERT
CJSC ADVANCED MONITORING

2. YURY CHEMERKIN
I have ten+ years of experience in information
security. I‘m amulti-skilled security expert on
security & compliance and mainly focused on
privacy and leakage showdown. Key activity
fields are EMM and Mobile &, Cloud
Computing, IAM, Forensics & Compliance.
Ipublished many papers on mobile and cloud
security, regularly appears at conferences such
as CyberCrimeForum, HackerHalted, DefCamp,
NullCon, OWASP, CONFidence, Hacktivity,
Hackfest, DeepSec Intelligence, HackMiami,
NotaCon, BalcCon, Intelligence-Sec, InfoSec
NetSysAdmins, etc.
LINKEDIN:
HTTPS://WWW.LINKEDIN.COM/IN/YURYCHEMERKIN
TWITTER: @YURYCHEMERKIN
EMAIL: [email protected]

3. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

4. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

5. UNDERSTANDING THINGS

6. IoT TAXONOMY& FRAGMENTATION
Source: https://www.cbinsights.com/research/internet-of-things-periodic-table/

7. IoT TAXONOMY
Wearable Tech
Connected Home
Building Blocks & Platforms
Industrial Internet
Healthcare
In-store Retail
Connected Car
Venture Capital Firms
Corporate Investors
Angel Investors
Crowdfunding
Accelerators/Incubators
IoT Acquirers
Notable acquisitions

8. NARROW THINGS
Wearable Tech
Connected Home
Healthcare

9. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

10. WATCHES

12. WEARABLE TECH
SMARTWATCHES –APPLE WATCH
MITM
Breaking LockScreen
Jailbreak
Backup

13. APPLE WATCH
MITM
The Apple Watch Series communicates via Bluetooth with the owner’s iPhone. If
this is not available via Bluetooth, Wi-Fi is used for synchronization to Apple
servers and the iPhone.
Online communication (over Wi-Fi)
[iPhone apps iCloud] –prevents MITM, SSL Pinning
[Apple Watch iCloud] –prevents MITM , SSL Pinning
No way to install SSL to Apple Watch

14. APPLE WATCH
BREAKING THE LOCKSCREEN
Remove the Passcode Using Your iPhone
Go to a “Settings->General->Reset”
“Erase Apple Watch Content & Settings”
“Keep Plan” if iWatch has a Cellular Plan
Otherwise just “Erase All Content & Settings”
Pair it again

15. APPLE WATCH
BREAKING THE LOCKSCREEN
Removing Your Passcode Without an iPhone
Power Menu  Press & hold the side button
Instead of sliding "Power Off", press on it
Tap "Erase all content and settings,"
Tap the green checkmark to confirm
Pair it again

16. APPLE WATCH
BREAKING THE LOCKSCREEN
Unpair iWatch via Apple Watch app & Apple Password
Keep your Apple Watch and iPhone close together.
Open the Apple Watch app on iPhone
Tap “My Watch tab”, “iWatch name”, “Unpair Apple Watch”
Press “Keep Plan” for a cellular iWatches
Enter your Apple ID password and tap confirm

17. APPLE WATCH
JAILBREAKS
Jailbreaks for USB
Apple Watch series 1-4 & watchOS5 –no jailbreak
watchOS4.0 -4.1
v0rtex jailbreak for developers only
https://github.com/tihmstar/jelbrekTime
Apple Watch series 1-2 & watchOS3.0 –3.2.3
OverCl0ck jailbreak –still in development
https://github.com/PsychoTea/OverCl0ck
Jail & Bluetooth Connection over SSH
https://speakerdeck.com/mbazaliy/jailbreaking- apple-watch

18. APPLE WATCH -BACKUP
/mobile/Library/DeviceRegistry.state
/properties.bin
Binary PlistFile –Contains Paired Apple
Watch Specifics incl: Watch Name, Make,
Model, OS, GUID
Synced Data Path with GUID, date, local
Serial Number, UDID, WiFi MAC, SEID
(Secure Element ID), Bluetooth MAC

19. APPLE WATCH -BACKUP
Plistcontained installed apps on Apple
Watch (2 places)
/mobile/Library/DeviceRegistry /<GUID>/Na
noPreferencesSync/NanoDomains/ com.apple.C
arousel
/mobile/Library/DeviceRegistry /<GUID>
Example:
/mobile/Library/DeviceRegistry /<GUID>/
AddressBook/

20. APPLE WATCH
BACKUP
Email -
/mobile/Library/DeviceRegistry/<
GUID>/NanoMail/registry.sqlite
Voicemails -
/mobile/Library/DeviceRegistry/<
GUID>/PreferencesSync/NanoDo
mains/com.apple.mobilephone
Records containing Phone
Numbers and paths to synced
voicemail files

21. APPLE WATCH
BACKUP -PASSBOOK
/mobile/Library/DeviceRegistry/<
GUID>/NanoPasses/nanopasses.sqli
te3
Pass table
Unique_ID
Type_ID(boarding pass, loyalty
pass)
Encoded pass (value/data)

22. APPLE WATCH–BACKUP
APPLE HEALTH
Encrypted (.hfd) in password-protected
/ encrypted backups only
No data out of non-encrypted backup
Export in raw/plaintext
But take a time, we will back to Health
app soon 

23. APPLE WATCH
ACCESS ATTACK LOGIC

24. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

25. APPLE WATCH
SUMMARY
Apple Watch communicates via Bluetooth or Wi-Fi if BT is not available
Online communication (over Wi-Fi)
[iPhone apps iCloud] –prevents MITM, SSL Pinning
[Apple Watch iCloud] –prevents MITM , SSL Pinning
No way to install SSL to Apple Watch
Local data
Not many but jailbreaks are available
Backup still works to access the data
Wallet contains booking, card and other info
Apple Health app
Contains a lot of medical user data
Encrypted if backup is password- protected and out of backup otherwise
Contains non-encrypted basic medical user data and list of app-sources

27. WEARABLE TECH
SMARTWATCHES –ANDROID WATCH
Forensics: Physical, Logical, Network Acquisition
Screen Lock Bypassing Techniques
Root opportunities
Android wear app

28. ANDROID WATCH
FORENSICS OF WEARABLE TECH
Physical Acquisition
Logical Acquisition
Network Acquisition (omitted here)

29. ANDROID WATCH
IMAGING A SMARTWATCH DEVICE
The ADB tool should be used to image and explore the Android
smartwatch.
The ddcommand, ddif=/dev/block/mmcblk0p12
of=/sdcard/tmp.image can be used to copy the entire device to an
inserted SD card.
If time is a factor, investigators can copy specific directories by utilizing
the following commands:
DD if = /dev/block/mmcblk0p12/data of = /storage/extSdCard/data.dd
DD if = /dev/block/mmcblk0p8/cache of = /storage/extSdCard/cache.dd
DD if = /dev/block/mmcblk0p3/efsof = /storage/extSdCard/efs.dd
DD if = /dev/block/mmcblk0p09/system of = /storage/extSdCard/system.dd

30. ANDROID WATCH
BREACHING A LOCK SCREEN
GoogleaccountcredentialsisknownremoteunlockofconnectedwatchesviaGoogle’s
AndroidDeviceManager
Deleting/alteringthegesture.key&settings.dbfilestoremovethelockscreenentirely
adb.exeshell;cd/data/system; rmgesture.key
The“settings.db”filecontainssystemsettingsandcancausesystemwidechangesifmodified
updatesystemsetvalue=0
FlashingamodifiedROM/arebootinsafemode-toleverageathird-partylockscreen
Utilizeadbkeyandadbkey.pubfilesfromothercomputersthathavebeenpreviously
synchronizedwiththeexamineddevicetocreateatrustrelationshipwithanewdevice
/.android/<ADBkeys>-thosefilesareanSSHkey-pairthatallowmetomarkmy
computeras"trusted"tomyphone.
CopyofADBkeysstoredonsynchronizeddevicesinusers/<username>/.android
folders

31. ANDROID WATCHES
ROOT
Root:
5.1.1 -SuperSU-5.1.1.zip
https://supersu.apk.gold/android- 5.1.1
6.0.1 -SuperSU-6.0.1.zip https://supersu.apk.gold/android- 6.0.1
Wear 2.0 -SuperSU-Wear
Wear-SuperSU2.4 -
https://androidfilehost.com/?fid=24269982086990060
Recovery:
TWRP -https://eu.dl.twrp.me/bass/
5.1.1 twrp-3.1.0-0.img
6.0.1 иWear 2.0 twrp- 3.0.0-0.img

32. ANDROID WATCH
WEAR OS
TizenOS -Samsung
Android Wear OS
Asus Zenwatch, Huawei Watch, LG
Watch and many other
Many root tools & images for
Android Wear up to 2.0
Lack of tools for 2.1 and beyond
Wear app to access data
Android Wear VersionAndroidbaseversionReleasedate
4.4W1 4.4 June 2014
4.4W2 4.4 October 2014
1.0 5.0.1 December 2014
1.1 5.1.1 May 2015
1.3 5.1.1 August 2015
1.4 6.0.1 February2016
1.5 6.0.1 June 2016
2.0 7.1.1 Feb 2017
2.6 7.1.1 Nov 2017
2.6 7.1.1/8.0.0 Dec 2017
2.7 7.1.1/8.0.0 Dec 2017
2.8 7.1.1/8.0.0 Jan 2018
2.9 7.1.1/8.0.0 Feb2018
Wear OS Version Androidbaseversion Releasedate
1.0 7.1.1/8.0.0 Mar 2018
1.1 7.1.1/8.0.0 April 2018
1.2 7.1.1/8.0.0 May 2018
1.3 7.1.1/8.0.0 June 2018
1.4 7.1.1/8.0.0 July 2018
1.5 7.1.1/8.0.0 August 2018
1.6 7.1.1/8.0.0 September 2018
1.7 7.1.1/8.0.0 October 2018
2.0 7.1.1/8.0.0 August 2018
2.1 7.1.1/9.0.0 September 2018

33. ANDROID WATCHES
SAMSUNG GEAR – ALL OF THEM (TIZEN)
TizenOS, Bluetooth, USB, No Wi-Fi, Optional Password
Protection
#1 Gain root:
turn on SDB ‘Smart Development Bridge‘,
find a ROM, uses Odin,
reboot to ‘download’ mode –hold down the main button through the
turn off prompt
Sdbshell, sdbroot

34. ANDROID WATCHES
SAMSUNG GEAR –ALL OF THEM
#2 Get Data as an image:
Requires root (see step #1)
Use anything to image the watches, like a Toybox
http://landley.net/toybox/
adbpush toybox/sdcard/download
adbshell; su
mv /sdcard/download/toybox /dev/
chownroot:roottoybox;
chmod755 toybox
cd /dev/block/platform/msm_sdcc ; ls -al by-name
/* image partition with ddand pipe to netcat, -L puts netcatin listening mode */
ddif=/dev/block/mmcblk0p21 | ./toyboxnc-L
/* Port number being listened to on the watch displayed for user */
44477 port displayed
adbforward tcp:44867 tcp:44867
/* Send request to watch on port number 44867 and send it to image file */
nc127.0.0.1 44867 > Samsung.IMG
Here is a user partition

35. ANDROID WATCHES
SAMSUNG GEAR – ALL OF THEM
#3 Results:
Messages -apps.com.samsung.message.data.dbspace/msg-
consumer-server.db
Health/Fitness Data -apps.com.samsung.shealth/ shealth.db
Email -apps.com.samsung.wemail.data.dbspace/wemail.db
Contacts/Address book -dbspace/contacts-svc.db

36. ANDROID WATCHES
LG WATCH –ALL OF THEM
Android Wear, USB, Bluetooth, No Wi-Fi
#1. Gain Root: Turn on ADB, use LG G Watch Restore Tools, reboot to
bootloader & unlock it, and push image
adbreboot-bootloader
fastbootoemunlock
adbpush <SuperSU>.zip /sdcard/download
adbreboot-bootloader
fastbootboot <twrp>.img
Install <SuperSu>.zip, wait for reboot

37. ANDROID WATCHES
LG WATCH –ALL OF THEM
#2 Get Data as an image:
Requires root (see step #1)
Use anything to image the watches, like a Toybox
http://landley.net/toybox/
adbpush toybox/sdcard/download
adbshell; su
mv /sdcard/download/toybox /dev/
chownroot:roottoybox;
chmod755 toybox
cd /dev/block/platform/msm_sdcc ; ls -al by-name
/* image partition with ddand pipe to netcat, -L puts netcatin listening mode */
ddif=/dev/block/mmcblk0p21 | ./toyboxnc-L
/* Port number being listened to on the watch displayed for user */
44477 port displayed
adbforward tcp:44867 tcp:44867
/* Send request to watch on port number 44867 and send it to image file */
nc127.0.0.1 44867 > LG.img
Here is a user partition

38. ANDROID WATCHES
LG WATCH –ALL OF THEM
Results:
Events/Notifications -
data.com.android.providers.calendar.databases/calendar.db
Contacts/Address book -
data.com.android.providers.contacts.databases/contacts2.db
Health/Fitness Data -
data.com.google.android.apps.fitness.databases/pedometer.db

39. ANDROID WATCHES
ANDROID WEAR
Mobile device paired with all watches in this app
/com.samsung.android.app.watchmanager
/auto_update.xml -a timestamp of the day the Samsung Gear was last
updated.
/com.samsung.android.app.watchmanagerstub/shared
preferences/hmonlinehelppref.xml
/data/com.google.android.wearable.app/databases/ devices.db
list of devices using Android wear which listed the LG G Watch.

40. ANDROID SMARTWATCHES
ACCESS ATTACK LOGIC

41. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

42. ANDROID WATCH
SUMMARY
Forensics
No forensics tools are NOT available for devices, such as Elcomsoft , Cellebrite
Forensics techniques are still available for devices
Forensics of wear-apps works too but no many useful data
Known techniques of breaking Android screenlockworks
OS
TizenOS -Samsung
Android Wear OS -Asus Zenwatch, Huawei Watch, LG Watch and many other
Root & Recovery
Many root tools & images for Android Wear up to 2.0
Lack of tools for 2.1 and beyond
SDB, ADB, Fastbook, OEM Unlock
Data
Contacts, Fitness, Health, Email –in the device

44. HUAWEI WEAR & HONOR BAND 3 -9C7
•Фоткибраслетаиприложения(ссылкинамагазины)
•Картинкинаспискивкруглыеформывставить??

45. FITNESS TRACKERS
HUAWEI WEAR. HONOR BAND 3-9C7
Device Mac Address & Crash log: DevInfo, debug info -/Documents/hms /oclog/<crash>,<log>
Last Wear’s values: sleep (many params ), wakeup (many params), distance (steps, ride, climb,…), heart rate,
calories
Firmware: Path to locally stored firmware, URL to download firmware (HTTP !!! ), Change log, Options
Geo: Speed, Timestamp, Longitude, Latitude, Distance, Course, Duration, Altitude
User Info: Picture, Name, Birthday, Height, Weight, Gender, Age
Account Details: UDID, Security Token, UserID, SessionID
Bluetooth Keys

46. CRASH LOG: DEVINFO, DEBUG INFO -
/DOCUMENTS/HMS/OCLOG/CRASH
CRASH: *** -[__NSArrayMreplaceObjectAtIndex:withObject:]: index 9223372036854775815 beyond
bounds [0 .. 6]Stack Trace: ( 0 CoreFoundation 0x00000001834d317c
<redacted> + 148 1 libobjc.A.dylib 0x000000018271c528 objc_exception_throw+
56 2 CoreFoundation 0x000000018346bc9c _CFArgv+ 0 3
CoreFoundation 0x00000001833a0324 <redacted> + 0 4 HuaweiWear
0x0000000100319064 HuaweiWear+ 315492 5 HuaweiWear
0x000000010030ffdc HuaweiWear+ 278492 6 libdispatch.dylib
0x0000000182e52a54 <redacted> + 24 7 libdispatch.dylib
0x0000000182e52a14 <redacted> + 16 8 libdispatch.dylib
0x0000000182e5f698 <redacted> + 1016 9 CoreFoundation
0x000000018347b344 <redacted> + 12 10 CoreFoundation
0x0000000183478f20 <redacted> + 2012 11 CoreFoundation
0x0000000183398c58 CFRunLoopRunSpecific+ 43612 GraphicsServices
0x0000000185244f84 GSEventRunModal+ 100 13 UIKit 0x000000018caf15c4
UIApplicationMain+ 23614 HuaweiWear 0x00000001005b13f8 HuaweiWear+
3036152 15 libdyld.dylib 0x0000000182eb856c <redacted> + 4)iPhone:iPhone8,4
ClientVersion:21.0.12 OSVersion:11.2.6

47. HUAWEI WEAR – LAST VALUES
/DOCUMENTS/<*.ARCHIVER> FILES
<string>{
"sleepTotalData":{" shallowSleepTime":0,"totalSleepTime":0,"deepSlee
pTime":0,"wakeupTimes":0,"wakeupDuration":0,"type":0,"sleepStartTim
e":0},
"distance":3940,"lastHeartRate ":0,"steps":4623,"lastHRTimeStamp ":0,"
calories":216,"date ":1537867958.8875299,"totalClimb ":0,"daySport
Info":[]
}</string>

48. HUAWEI WEAR: FIRMWARE
/DOCUMENTS/<*.ARCHIVER> FILES
<string>
{"fireWareMd5":"33E44F1B02292C8B9D00A5DEB91B72AB","firmwareDownloadFilePath":
"Nyx_1.5.35.bin.apk","identify ":"38:37:8B:B8:C9:C7","firmWareSize ":1410023,"deviceTyp
e":13,"workMode":2,"forceUpdateFlag":false,"netFirwareVersion":"1.5.35",
"firmwareLocalPath":"/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/9B666199- 342F-4897-
9577- 59B68F5CF40F/Documents/DownloadData/dfu_image_OTA.dfu_Nyx",
"changeLogContent":"[Optimizations]\nOptimizescalorie counting accuracy while
swimming.\ nFixesan issue where exercise sessions would suddenly exit due to accidental
touches.\nFixesan issue where fitness data would be occasionally cleared.\nOptimizesthe
TrusleepTMdata syncing speed on IOS.\n[Notes]\ n1. New features require that Huawei
Health APP is updated to version 8.0.1.302 or later for IOS, and 8.0.2.327 or later for
Android.\n2. Before updating, make sure the band is charged to at least 20%.\n","status":1,
"baseURL":"http://update.hicloud.com:8180/TDS/data/files/p7/s131/G3533/g3039/v1
55123/f1/"}
</string>

49. HUAWEI WEAR: GEO, SPEED
/DOCUMENTS/<*.ARCHIVER> FILES
<string>
{"speed":0.63999998569488525,"timestamp ":"2018- 06-
09T05:12:19+0300",
"longitude":41.512356810310401,"latitude ":52.571571199272356,
"totalDistance":0,"verticalAccuracy":4,
"course":10.546875,"duration":0,"distance":0,
"altitude":147.71790409088135,"distanceFilter":0,"horizontalAccuracy":5
}
</string>

50. HUAWEI WEAR: USER INFO
/DOCUMENTS/<*.ARCHIVER> FILES
<string>
{"headImgLocal":"\/var\/mobile\/Containers \/Data\/Application\/
9B666199- 342F-4897- 9577-
59B68F5CF40F\/Documents \/temp_user\/temp_user.jpg",
"age":29,"unitType":0,"nameIsNil":false,"isDefault":true,
"weight":78,"userName ":"Yury Chemerkin","walkStepLen":77.28,
"birthday":19880605,"height ":184,"modifyTime":0,"runStepLen":92.7
36,"gender":0}
</string>

51. HUAWEI WEAR:
/DOCUMENTS/<*.ARCHIVER> FILES
Account
Account details stored in protected way
Device Mac Address
<string>deviceMacAddress</string>
<string>38:37:8B:B8:C9:C7</string>
Bluetooth Keys

52. HUAWEI WEAR: PERSONAL DETAILS
/DOCUMENTS/<WEAR*.DB> FILES
User goals
Device details
User measures
m_7_DataSourceTable_temp_user
m_7_FitnessMergedDataTable_temp_user
m_14_FineSleepDayMergeTable_temp_user
m_7_MotionGoalTable_temp_user

53. HUAWEI WEAR: PERSONAL DETAILS
/DOCUMENTS/<WEAR*.DB> FILES
User measures
m_14_HeartRateByDay_temp_user
m_14_SportDataByDay_temp_user
m_133_MotionPathDetail_temp_user
m_7_MotionGoalTable_temp_user

54. HUAWEI WEAR: PERSONAL DETAILS
/DOCUMENTS/<WEAR*.DB> FILES
User measures
m_133_SingleMovementStatistic_temp_user
m_133_SingleMovement_temp_user

55. HUAWEI HONOR
SUMMARY
Local data
Credentials is protected
Personal and medical info –plaintext / as it
Communication
Local –encrypted
Online –SSL Pinning for all possible connections, registration,
login and synchronization

57. XIAOMI MIBAND 2 & MI FIT
Online communication
AWS storages in Ireland (EU) mainly, secondary US
TLS 1.2, No SSL Pinning
Local data
Action Log with detailsincl. URLs
https://api-mifit.huawei.com/v1/user/manualData.json?r=f8a9d00c3433&t= 1512648130831
https://api-
mifit.huawei.com/users/70000054661/heartRate?r=f8a9d00c3433&t=1512648130848
https://api-mifit.huawei.com/v1/data/band_data.json?r=f8a9d00c3433&t= 1512648130805

58. FITNESS APPS
ROAD BIKE, MOUNTAIN BIKE, …
GPS Data: longitude, latitude, altitude, accuracy, distanceInMeter,
upward/downward (meters), timestamp local, timestamp gps
Session Data: timestamp (start, end), distance, duration, avg& max
speed, upward/downward, heartZonevalues (need special device)
Speed Data: timestamp, speed, duration, distance
User Data: email, password, weight, height, gender, name, birthday

59. FITNESS APPS
DOCUMENTS\DATABASE.SQLITE3
Where to search data:
GPS & location
HeartRate(requires special devices)
Session Data
Speed
User Data

60. FITNESS APPS
LOCATION, MAPS AND USER INFO
Location and geo snapshots -
Documents\MapOpenCycleMap.sqlite
User info -Documents\database.sqlite3

61. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

62. FITNESS TRACKERS
SUMMARYAMONG TRACKERS & APPS
Local data
Credentials is usually protected
Personal and medical info –plaintext / as it
Communication
Local –encrypted
Online –SSL Pinning for all possible connections

63. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security & Tips
6. Risk
Management

65. APPLE HEALTHСЮДАКАРТИНКИ
УСТРОЙСТВ

66. HEALTHCARE
APPLE HEALTH
Valuable data encrypted and no public cracks is known
Small amount of data not encrypted in backup
List of app-sources (look here for non-encrypted original data)
However, secure built-in app-aggregator does not mean other app is a
secure in the same way  ofcnot 

67. APPLE HEALTH
WHERE TO FIND DATA?
HealthDomain\MedicalID\MedicalIDData.archive
HealthDomain\Health\healthdb.sqlite
HealthDomain\Health\healthdb_secure.sqlite
HealthDomain\Health\healthdb_secure.hfd
Exported Raw Data –any place chosen by user

68. APPLE HEALTH
DATA IN DETAILS
Name, User Pic, height (in cm), and mass (in kg)
Geo Tracking (Mainland/City), iOS version
Device Info: UDID, Name, Last connection time
Date of birth, sex, blood group, skin type, height (in cm), and mass (in kg)
Medical implants

69. APPLE HEALTH
HEALTHDOMAIN\MEDICALID\MEDICALIDDA
TA.ARCHIVE
Name Height Weight Medical implants

70. APPLE HEALTH
HEALTHDOMAIN\ HEALTH\HEALTHDB.SQLITE
Bundle_id, app_name
Device name, device model, vendor, hardware and software, timestamp

71. APPLE HEALTH
HEALTHDOMAIN\HEALTH\HEALTHDB_SE
CURE.SQLITE

72. APPLE HEALTH
RAW EXPORT
Recorded by the any Apple Devices & accessed through the Health App.
Detailed activity log with timestamps
Data can be exported in .xml file format without encryption (!) and
even without encrypting of zip file
Extracted data can be stored anywhere

73. APPLE HEALTH -RAW EXPORT
PERSONAL, FITNESS, MEDICAL INFO
Date of birth, sex, blood group, skin type, height (in cm), and mass (in kg)
Heart rate data (in count/min) or beats-per-minute (BPM)
Steps, distance covered (in km), active energy burned (in kJ), and exercise time (in mins)
Blood Pressure Diastolic, Systolic
The exact activity log time (creationDate), and activity start and end times (startDate, endDate)
XML Parser (Free): https://github.com/tdda/applehealthdata

74. APPLE HEALTH -RAW EXPORT
IN EXAMPLES & DETAILS

75. APPLE HEALTH -RAW EXPORT
IN EXAMPLES & DETAILS

76. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

77. HEALTHCARE
SUMMARY
Apple Health App is good protected
Basic info -Date of birth, sex, blood group, skin type,
height (in cm), and mass (in kg)
Exported data is not protected at all
List of app sources & these app’s data is not
protected well

78. PICOOCMINI (BT) –
BODY COMPOSITION SMART SCALE
•Vertical fat index, body fat
Fat indexes
•Body weight, bone mass, muscle, skeletal muscle
Mass
•BMR, body water, protein, Metabolic Age
Productivity
•Tracking changes, charts, reports
Delta

79. PICOOCMINI (BT) –
BODY COMPOSITION SMART SCALE
BT Logs: Peripheral Info of nearby devices, and mac of itself (picoocscaler)
Body scale values: body, muscles, productivity, date & time, device mac
Dev Info: Mac, model name, user ID, Device Picture
Friends info: name, account_id, user_id, phone_id, sex (have to have them as PICOOC users)
User Info: nick name , userID , height, age, sex, race, type
Sensor values: time, age, OS, race, type, screen size, mobile device info model, environment, language
Preferences: Local Password, Unlocking method, last active day

80. PICOOC BT LOGS
PICOOC\DOCUMENTS\BLUETOOTHLOG.TEXT
DISCOVER INDIRECTLY WHAT DEVICES DOES YOUR NEIGHBORS HAVE 
扫描到设备 –means “Device scanning”
04-14 13:31:36:003 .扫描到设备 name:PeripheralInfo:Name: [TV]
Samsung 6 Series (49) RSSI: -85 UUID: 592ABA7A-F4A4-D687-7E2A -
45F9DDB731D6 ----.
04-14 13:31:36:453 .扫描到设备 name:PeripheralInfo:Name: honor band
A1 RSSI: -84 UUID: 626E22D2-AE05-4695-A0D3 -0099CF82DF96 ----.
04-14 13:31:37:408 .扫描到设备 name:PeripheralInfo:Name: PICOOC-CQ
RSSI: -66 UUID: 8C8E3EDA-7B8C-189F-3865-0A3B9B2C5744 ----.
info.macAddress= D0:49:00:1D:87:8A

81. PICOOC BT LOGS
PICOOC\DOCUMENTS\BLUETOOTHLOG.TEXT
04-14 13:31:36:003 .扫描到设备 name:PeripheralInfo:Name: [TV] Samsung 6
Series (49) RSSI: -85 UUID: 592ABA7A-F4A4-D687 -7E2A-45F9DDB731D6 ----
Connect a Galaxy S7 to your Samsung TV with Bluetoothto have a fun and
spread your content 
TV with enabled Bluetooth & Samsung Galaxy S7
Open the notification pane on your handset.
Select Quick Connect and then Scan for nearby devices
Select Register TV, Tap the new icon with a TV and an arrow
Tap the Share button and then Smart Viewto play any media you play
on your phone on the TV

82. BODY VALUES
PICOOC\DOCUMENTS\PICOOC.SQLITE
CREATE TABLE `body_indexs` (
`id`
`weight`
`body_fat`
`visceral_fat_level`
`muscle_race`
`body_age`
`bone_mass`
`basic_metabolism`
`bmi`
`local_time`
`water_race`
`abnormal`
`day_intValue`
`time_period`
`electric_resistance`
`mac`
`body_fat_reference_value`
`skeletal_muscle`);

83. PICOOC
DEVICE AND PREFERENCES
Dev Info -picooc\documents\picooc.sqlite
Preferences -picooc\Library\Preferences\com.picooc.international.plist
<key>PasswordLockType</key>
<integer>2</integer>
<key>PasswordNumherLockContnet</key>
<string>7124</string>
<key>currendDay</key>
<string>20180922</string>
<key>kStartupUserIdKey</key>
<integer>4611483</integer>

84. USER BASIC INFO –MAIN USER
PICOOC\DOCUMENTS\PLISTFILE\USERINFO.PLIST
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plistPUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN"
"http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plistversion="1.0">
<dict>
<key>nickName</key>
<string>Yury Chemerkin</string>
</dict>
</plist>

85. USER EXTENDED INFO – LAST ADDED USER ONLY
PICOOC\LIBRARY\SENSORSANALYTICS-
SUPER_PROPERTIES.PLIST
current_age_characteristic
current_role_is_athlete
current_role_height
current_language
current_role_age
current_role_sex
app_type
time_zone
current_role_race
current_role_type
3
false
178
英语
58
男
PICOOC国际版
Europe/Moscow
白
使用者
As is
As is
As is
English
As is
Man
PICOOC Worldwide
Version
As is
White
User

86. PICOOC SENSOR VALUES
PICOOC\LIBRARY\SENSORSANALYTICS-
MESSAGE-V2.PLIST.DB
•{"time":1537632555035,"_track_id":2682421375,"event":"$AppStart","distinct_id":"9144
339","properties":{"current_role_age":30,"$os":"iOS","current_role_race":"白
","current_role_type":"主角色
","current_role_is_athlete":false,"$screen_width":320,"event_type":"1","$app_version":"3.6.
1","current_age_characteristic":3,"$is_first_day":false,"$ model":"iPhone8,4","$device_id":"E
C640161- EC87-4A90-AD99- 5B29A3F86700","$ network_type":"WIFI","$carrier":"Mobile
TeleSystems","$resume_from_background":true,"$wifi":true,"current_role_height":184,"curren
t_language":"英语","$ screen_height":568,"app_type":"PICOOC国际版
","time_zone":"Europe\/Moscow","$lib_version":"1.9.3 ","$os_version":"12.0","$is_first_time":
false,"$lib":"iOS","$manufacturer":"Apple","current_role_sex":"男
","current_role_id":"9144339"},"type":"track","lib ":{"$lib_version":"1.9.3 ","$lib":"iOS","$app
_version":"3.6.1 ","$lib_method":"code"}}

87. PICOOC
MITM -NOT SSL-PINNED
•Profile URL (public accessible)
https://cdn2.picooc.com/head/201810/03/20181003_181034000_50589.png
•Request URL - https://api2.picooc-
int.com/v1/api/role/updateRole?sign=3DCE33B1B07E4639394F555F1D95C623&urlOfGetReque
st=https://api2.picooc-
int.com/v1/api&roleId=9144339&timestamp=1538579449&version=i3.6.1&appver=i3.6.1.0&re
questByChildThread=0&os=iOS&userId=4611483&lang=en&timezone=Europe/Moscow&push_to
ken=iOS::019290ade677be79f5fbded930b2435fa81eef103d89347108e265c0cd984cf2&devi
ce_id=EC640161-EC87-4A90-AD99 -5B29A3F86700&device_mac=&method=update_role&
•Same URL (public accessible)
https://picoocheadportrait.oss-cn-
beijing.aliyuncs.com/head%2F201810%2F03%2F20181003_181034000_50589.png
•Request URL - https://picoocheadportrait.oss-cn -beijing.aliyuncs.com

88. PICOOC
MITM -NOT SSL-PINNED
https://api2.picooc-int.com
GET /v1/api/email/getVerifyStatus?appver=i3.6.1.0&device_id=EC640161 -EC87-4A90-AD99 -
5B29A3F86700&device_mac=&lang=en&method=meishayong&os=iOS&push_token =iOS%3A%3AEC640161-
EC87-4A90-AD99 -
5B29A3F86700&roleId=9144339&sex=1&sign=5FB8BF2A5A7664591ECFFC52F5810E84&stimezone=Europe
/Moscow&timestamp=1538579363&userId=4611483&verifyUserId=4611483&version=i3.6.1&webver=6
HTTP/1.1

89. PICOOC
MITM -NOT SSL-PINNED
https://api2.picooc-
int.com/v1/api/role/updateRole?sign=2A082A983A3238FBEA7B66AEBF88B706&urlOfGetRequest=https://ap
i2.picooc-
int.com/v1/api&roleId=9144339&timestamp=1538580721&version=i3.6.1&appver=i3.6.1.0&requestByChildT
hread=0&os=iOS&userId=4611483 &lang=en&timezone=Europe/Moscow&push_token=iOS::019290ade677b
e79f5fbded930b2435fa81eef103d89347108e265c0cd984cf2&device_id=EC640161-EC87 -4A90-AD99 -
5B29A3F86700&device_mac=&method=update_role&

90. PICOOC
MITM -NOT SSL-PINNED
https://api2.picooc-
int.com/v1/api/account/updateUserPa
ssword?sign=41EE8 B396970992A 85E
9259B134B96BE&urlOfGetRequest=ht
tps://api2.picooc-
int.com/v1/api&roleId=9144339&tim
estamp=1538581202&version=i 3.6.1
&appver=i3.6.1.0&requestByChildThre
ad=0&os=iOS&userId=4611483&lan
g=en&timezone=Europe/Moscow&pus
h_token=iOS::019290ade 677be79f5f
bded930b 2435fa 81eef103d893471
08e265c 0cd984cf2&device_id=EC64
0161- EC87-4A90-AD99-
5B29A3F86700&device_mac=&metho
d=update_user_password&

91. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

92. PICOOC
SUMMARY
Body indexes and changes day-by-day
Fat indexes, Mass
Productivity, Delta
Dev Info, Friends results, User data
Network
Data stored on Alibaba servers
Profile, Device Info, Credentials, additionally passwon pass-change tab
Bonus: Bluetooth scanner of near located devices
Preferences: Local Password, Unlocking method, last active day

94. ~30 mHEALTHAPPS
Google Fit
MyFitnessPal
RunKeeper-GPS
Nike+ Running
WebMD
Blood Pressure (BP) Watch
Water Your Body
Instant Heart Rate
Drugs.com Medication Guide
RuntasticPedometer
NoomWalk Pedometer: Fitness
StravaRunning and Cycling GPS
Bleep Fitness Test
Fitness Buddy: 300+ Exercises
BodySpace- Social Fitness
Walk with Map My Walk
EndomondoRunning Cycling Walking
FitNotes–gym Workout Log
Period Calendar
Period Tracker
My Pregnancy Today
My Baby Today
Calorie Counter by FatSecret
MyNetDiaryCalorie Counter PRO
My Diet Diary Calorie Counter
Calories! Basic –calcounter
Calorie Counter
Lifesum-Calorie Counter
User credentials and pins
Personal details of users
User activities
User location
Activity timestamps
Images

95. ~30 mHEALTHAPPS
MYFITNESSPAL
User profile Pics  com.myfitnesspal.android/cache/Picasso-cache
User profile Pics /sdcard /
/data/data/com.myfitnesspal.android/databases/myfitnesspal.db
User details including time zone, gender, date of birth and email
-in tables <user_properties, users> -see a pic
User profile pictures - in table <images>
User personal notes -in table <diary_notes>
User records of exercises, food habits and personal measurements - in tables
<exercise_entries; exercises; food_entries; foods; measurement_types;
measurements>
User last synched items with the server -in table <last_sync_pointers>
User food search history - in table <search_history>

96. ~30 mHEALTHAPPS
RUNKEEPER
User profile Pics / fitnesskeeper.runkeeper.pro /cache/Picasso-cache
/ fitnesskeeper.runkeeper.pro /databases/RunKeeper.sqlite
User details including activities, trips
Trips deleted by user - in table <deleted_trips>
Activities posted by user - in table <feed>
List of user’s friends -in table <friends>
Images uploaded during trips by user -in table <status_updates>
User settings for each trip -in table <trip_settings>
Places visited during all the trips -in table <points>
Information about each trip -in table <trips>
More tables
The points table is to locate the map coordinates of a user’s route

97. ~30 mHEALTHAPPS
PERIOD CALENDAR
•Personal info –/data/data/ fitnesskeeper.runkeeper.pro
/databases/PC.db. Tables
•User -List of the users with passwords (Plaintext passwords, secret questions
and answers)
•Period -Period start time and length of users
•Note -Diary notes inserted by users
•Personal info –/data/data/ fitnesskeeper.runkeeper.pro
/databases/PC_PILL.db. Tables
•pill -Pills used by users including date and time
•pill_record-Details about the pills

98. ~30 MEDICAL/FITNESS/HEALTH APPS
Usercredentials: Appsmayrequireuserstologinusingtheirusercredentials(e.g.usernameand
password,PIN,andauthenticationtokens)inordertousetheapps.Therefore,usercredentialsshouldbe
anartefactthatforensicinvestigatorsseektolocateduringtheappforensicprocess(e.g.determine
whetherthecredentialsarestoredinandcanberecoveredfromtheapp’sdatabases).
Userpersonaldetails:Userpersonaldetailsincludename,gender,dateofbirth,emailaddress,height,
weightandotherpersonaldatawouldbehelpfulforforensicinvestigatorstopositivelyidentifytheapp
ordeviceusers.
Useractivities:ThemHealthappsrequireuserstoentertheirday-to-dayfoodhabit,healthconditions,
activityorexercisedetails,diagnosisdetails,medicationdetailsandsymptomdetails,etc.
Userlocation:Fitnessappsallowuserstokeeptrackoftheirexercise,running,jogging,cyclingandother
activities.Theseappsgenerallystorethegeographicalcoordinatesoftheuserlocationduringthese
activitieswhichcanprovideusefulevidencetotheinvestigators.
Activitytimestamps:Anotherimportantartefactisthetimestampoftheuseractivity.Forexample,linking
activitytimestampswithcorrespondinguserlocations(e.g.geographicalcoordinates)andotherrelevant
information(e.g.CCTVfeeds)wouldprovideusefulinformationinaninvestigation.
Images:Thisartefactincludesprofileimages,andimagestakenandpostedfromalocation.

99. ~30 MEDICAL/FITNESS/HEALTH APPS
App Name /Data
User credentials
and pins
Personal details
of users
User activities
User location
Activity
timestamps
Images
Google Fit N N P N F N
MyFitnessPal P F F N F F
RunKeeper-GPS N N F F F N
Nike+ Running N F F N F F
WebMD N N P N N N
Blood Pressure (BP) Watch N P F N F N
Water Your Body N N F N N N
Instant Heart Rate N N N N N N
Drugs.com Medication
Guide
N F N N P N
RuntasticPedometer N N F N F N

100. ~30 MEDICAL/FITNESS/HEALTH APPS
App Name /Data
User credentials
and pins
Personal details
of users
User
activities
User
location
Activity
timestamps
Images
NoomWalk Pedometer:
Fitness
N N F N F F
StravaRunning and Cycling
GPS
N F F F F N
Bleep Fitness Test N F F N P N
Fitness Buddy: 300+
Exercises
N N F N F N
BodySpace- Social Fitness N F F N P F
Walk with Map My Walk N F F F F P
EndomondoRunning Cycling
Walking
N N F F F F
FitNotes–gym Workout
Log
N N F N P N
Period Calendar F F F N P N
Period Tracker N N F N P N
My Pregnancy Today P N N N N F
My Baby Today N F N N P N

101. ~30 MEDICAL/FITNESS/HEALTH APPS
App Name /Data
User credentials
and pins
Personal details
of users
User
activities
User
location
Activity timestamps
Images
Calorie Counter by
FatSecret
N N F N P N
MyNetDiaryCalorie
Counter PRO
N N N N N F
My Diet Diary Calorie
Counter
N P F N F N
Calories! Basic –calcounter N N P N F N
Calorie Counter N F F N F N
Lifesum-Calorie Counter N P F N F F

102. ~30 MEDICAL/FITNESS/HEALTH APPS
THE VALUE IS HIGHER, THE MORE DATA STORED LOCALLY)
3
9
6
8
1
5
2
0
3
4
6
8
5
4
7
9
8
3
7
3333
2
5
3
6
7
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Average Issue Index

103. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

104. HEALTHCARE
SUMMARY
Native Health App is good protected, however not a basic information
Basic info - Date of birth, sex, blood group, skin type, height (in cm), and mass (in kg)
Exported data is not protected at all
Source apps (medical, fitness, health, …)
Data contains everything with GPS, timestamp and lot of day-by-day changes
Usually stores data locally, but basic activity over network is intercepted and
credentials gained
Pseudo health apps – usually requires user to handle all data by himself
Friend list, Credentials, secret questions & answers
Body values, timestamp, visited places & geo
Medical periods, schedule, pills and so on
Preferences, searches

105. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

108. APPLE TV – FIVES GENERATIONS
MacOSX, iOS, tvOS
Common ways to break into
Jailbreak tools
Password management
USB Acquisition
Backup
Jailbroken acquisition
Profiling

109. APPLE TV – I GENERATION
EASILY TO BREAK
First edition of TV, Mac OS X & HDD makes breaking much easier
All possible ways to break into the first Apple TV 8 years ago:
“Hacking the Apple TV and Where Your Forensic Data Lives”, Kevin Estisand
Randy Robbins, Def Con 2009
https://www.defcon.org/images/defcon-17/dc-17-presentations/defcon- 17-
kevin_estis- apple_tv.pdf
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=z- WCy3Bdzkc

110. APPLE TV – II-V GENERATION
EASILY TO BREAK TOO
Perform breaks in the same way like any other Apple Mobile device (iPhone, iPad)
Backup contains valuable data (forensics tool works too)
Find a jailbreak to obtain the whole OS
Look for user content: Netflix, iTunes, NHL, NBA, Vimeo, YouTube
Get access to App’s data and reveal credentials, card –depend on application
Why Apple TV can be jailbroken (why men jail it)?
Outdated compromised TV 2 with OpenSSH and default password
https://www.tvaddons.co/appletv2-jailbreak-threat/
Direct access to filesystem and file management beyond the backups & cloud
Stream media from devices beyond AirPlayor iOS devices
Sideloading3rd party tools
Kodi, Hulu, LastFM, XBMC, NitoTV, , Pandora Radio, and other apps.
Don’t pay $100 for dev license and get access to hundreds, of music, TV, movies

111. APPLE TV
DATA EXAMINATION & FORENSICS
Apple TV jailbreak support
https://pangu8.com/appletv.html
Apple TV 1 –scripts, ssh, HD extraction and other way
Apple TV 2 –Seas0npass jail for TV running tvOS4.3 -tvOS5.3 (untethered) & tvOS 6.1.2
(tethered)
Apple TV 3 –No jailbreak, many scams, probably Snow3rd jail works for TV running 5.0, 5.0.1,
and not beyond 5.0.2
Apple TV 4
Pangu9 jail for TV running tvOS9.0 -tvOS9.0.1
LiberTVjail for TV running tvOS9.1 -tvOS10.1
GreenG0blin jail for TV running tvOS10.2.2
Apple TV 4 / 5
LiberTVjail for TV running tvOS11.0 and 11.1
Apple TV 4 / 5 – Electra jail for TV running tvOS11.2 -tvOS11.3

112. APPLE TV
DATA EXAMINATION & FORENSICS
USB port is reserved for “service and support” purpose
Vanished since Apple 5
th
Gen (4k)
No password management –we trust you, breakers 
Seriously, No Password or Passcode protection at all ! Restrictions instead:
Use Restrictions on your Apple TV
https://support.apple.com/en-md/HT200198
Allow all by default
Restrict blocks by passcode purchases, apps, content, settings and remote pairing
(no one blocks pairing usually)
Account-Password requires for purchases in a way like any Apple device
(
https://support.apple.com/en-us/HT204030)

113. APPLE TV –2
TH
–4
TH
GEN
USB ACQUISITION (USB, MICRO, USB-C)
5
TH
GEN IS OUT OF SCOPE (NO USB)
AFC (Apple File Conduit) service works here
/private/var/mobile/Media
USB Acquisition gives:
Basic device information
Real Time Log (Syslog), Crash Logs
Part of the file system (“Media” folder)
Device information
MAC –WiFi, Bluetooth, Ethernet
Name, Timezone, Serial ID, Model
Ideviceinfo, idevicesyslog
http://www.libimobiledevice.org/

114. APPLE TV
BACKUP
Real Time Log
Crash Log
MediaLibrary.sqlitedb
iCloud Account Name
iCloud ID
Wi-Fi networks
Device usage timeline
Shopping database

115. APPLE TV – 2
TH
–5
TH
GEN
JAILBREAK
Timezone
/private/var /db/timezone/localtime
Network tcp/iplease
/private/var /db/dhcpclient/leases/
Network wi-fihistory
/private/var /preferences/com.apple.wifi.plist

116. APPLE TV – 2
TH
–5
TH
GEN
JAILBREAK
Keyboard dictionary
/private/var/mobile/library/keyboard/dynamic-
text.dat
Accounts
/private/var/mobile/library/accounts/
/private/var/mobile/library/preferences/com.apple.ids
.service.com
User email
User info: email + phone
[email protected]
[phone]
Network

117. APPLE TV – 2
TH
–5
TH
GEN
JAILBREAK
iCloud synced preferences
/var/mobile/Library/SyncedPreferences/
Wi-Fi Access Points
com.apple.wifid.plist
Weather Cities
com.apple.nanoweatherprefsd.plist
Moskva, LianozovoDictrict
55.800149, 37.565483

118. APPLE TV – 2
TH
–5
TH
GEN
JAILBREAK
Headboard
/private/var/mobile/library/com.apple.headboard
/apporder.plist
/private/var/mobile/library/caches/com.apple.tvic
onscache/com.apple.headboard
/private/var/mobile/library/caches/com.apple.hea
dboard/ fscacheddata

119. APPLE TV – 2
TH
–5
TH
GEN
JAILBREAK
App snapshots
/private/var/mobile/library/caches/com.app
le.pineboard/ assetlibrary/snapshots/
Cached video
/private/var/mobile/library/caches/appletv
/video/

120. APPLE TV – 2
TH
–5
TH
GEN
JAILBREAK
Installed applications
/private/var /db/lsd/com.apple.lsdidentifiers.plist
Installed applications
/private/var /mobile/containers/bundle/
Installed applications
/private/var /mobile/containers/data/application/

121. APPLE TV – 2
TH
–5
TH
GEN
JAILBREAK
Country, last activity
App snapshots
Youtube

122. APPLE TV –ANY GEN
PROFILING AS A KIND OF PROTECTION
TV Remote Payload
The TV Remote payload is designated by specifying com.apple.tvremote as the
PayloadTypevalue. If not present, or the list is empty, any device will be allowed
to connect.
Availability: Available in tvOS11.3 and iOS 11.3 and later
AllowedRemotes
AllowedTVs
RemoteDeviceID
TVDeviceID
https://developer.apple.com/enterprise/documentation/Configuration-
Profile-Reference.pdf

123. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

124. APPLE TV
SUMMARY
Lot of jailbreaks
Except Apple TV 3
Apple TV 1 is based on Mac OS X, so breaking is the same way like Mac
Password management
No password
No restrictions by default
Restrictions handle the content only
Apple TV 2 –5
Apple TV 2 –4 equipped with USB that gives dev info, timelog , crashlog, media folder
Apple TV 5 does not have USB ports
Jailbroken TV
Timezone, Network Info & History, Keyboard & Account Info
iCloud preferences, Wi-Fi Accent Point, Weather cities (list)easy to remap geo
TVs -Headboard, App snapshots, Cached video
App List, App Data, App Snapshots

126. AMAZON TV: PREREQUISITE
Amazon Fire TV Stick
Amazon account plus other accounts per app
MITM is out of scope, but wait for Amazon Dot 
Forensics tools (no support atm)
Known ways to break into
Root
Data acquisition (streaming, photo, app, sideloaded Android app)

127. AMAZON TV
BREAK OPPORTUNITIES
No support of Forensics tools
Sideloadingis allowed, ADB exists and is off by default
Rooting
many root-apps (like KingRoot) is around of outdated FireOS
such as 5.0.5but not limited it
The rooting requires a keyboard, no support for TV remote
devices
Use ddcommand to obtain an image of Fire TV

128. AMAZON TV
ROOT, BOOTLOADER, SIDELOADING
Non-root things
Sideloadingis allowed without root like on Android
Bootloader: 51.1.x.x –non-locked, 5.x.x.x –locked but 5.0.x are unlockable (no info about
older versions)
Downgrading might be possible
Roots
Fire TV 1 –rootablefor 51.1.0.0 -51.1.6.3, 5.0.3, 5.0.5, and no root for 5.0.5.1, 5.2.1.0 -
5.2.6.3
Fire TV 2 –rootablefor 5.0.0 –5.2.1.1, no root for 5.2.4.0 –5.2.6.3
Fire TV 2 –5.2.6.6 –pre-rooted ROM (
http://www.aftvnews.com/pre-rooted-5-2-6-6-rom-
is-now-available-for-the-fire-tv-2/)
Fire TV 3, Fire TV Cube –no root or pre-rooted ROM
Fire TV Stick 1 –rootablefor 5.0.0 -5.2.1.1 and no root 54.1.2.3 and older, 5.2.1.2 -
5.2.6.3
Fire TV Stick 2 –no root, except hardware rooting to direct access to the device eMMC
storage (
http://www.aftvnews.com/amazon-fire-tv-hardware-root-demonstrated/)
Fire TV Edition television –rootablefor 5.2.5.0 and no root for 5.2.5.1-5.2.6.3

129. AMAZON TV
ROOTED TV
browser.db–Browser History & navigating to websites using
Mozilla Firefox
[root]/data/com.amazon.bueller.photos/files/cmsimages–Pictures
from Amazon cloud drive but formatted for better viewing up to
Fire TV Stick
[root]/data/com.amazon.device.controllermanager/
databases/devices–Bluetooth Devices and their names, MAC
paired with Fire TV (such as, keyboard mouse, Amazon Fire TV
remote)
[root]/data/com.amazon.device.logmanager/files–Amazon Logs
including Log.amazon\main

130. AMAZON TV
ROOTED TV
/data/data/ = All application data is stored in this directory
com.amazon.venezia/ = Amazon appstoredata
/cache/ = thumbnails & previews for appstoreapps
/databases/ = sqlitefiles in each folder
/contentProvider= Table "Apps" contains app-names("key") with relation
thumbnails("thumbnailUri"), Preview("previewUri") found in ../cache directory
/locker = workflow, orders, wishlist, applications, cache, content tokens.
/logging = logs for appstoreapplication
com.android.cloud9/ = Amazon browserdata
/cache/webviewcache/ = any cache data
/databases/ = sqlitefiles in each folder
/webview.db= webviewcookies & form data.
/webviewCache.db= association of files in ../cache/webviewcache/ directory to urls.
/browser.db= history & bookmarks also have path to page previews and thumbnails stored in ../files
/files/ = page previews & thumbnails stored as JPEG (crosslink to ‘browser.db’ above)
/shared_prefs= preferences for a cross-access
com.amazon.providers.contacts/databases/contacts2.db = All contacts

131. FORENSIC ANALYSIS METHOD FOR
THE AMAZON FIRE TV STICK

132. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

133. AMAZON TV: SUMMARY
Several older firmwaresare affected by rooting tools
Rooting requires BT-keyboard that’s is not a big deal for TV
Sideloadingis allowed without root
ADB is possible
Downgrading the Fire TV Stick software/firmware might possible
Personal data is revealed
Credentials of streaming services is found
Netflix, NHL, NBA, Vimeo, … Kodito get access to hundreds, of music, TV, movies
No way to restrict connection and bind TV and device to themselves only
FireOSver5.x is based on Android 5.1.1 Lollipop, ver6.x is based on
Android 7.1 Nougat

134. AMAZON ECHO DOT
•Картинкииспецификацию

135. AMAZON ECHO DOT
Local access
Bootloader
MITM: SSL, MITM, Firmware MITM
Credentials breaks

136. AMAZON ECHO DOT
LOCAL ACCESS, LACK OF ROOT
Alexa doesn’t have ADB, but have a MTK
bus 001 Device 010: ID 0ed8d:2000 MediaTekInc. MT65xx Preloader
However a SP Flash Tool does not work atm
Bootloader –press and keep ‘Uber’ while it is loading, but bootloader is locked
and no unlocking key is available
Bus 001 Device 019: ID 0bb4:0c01 HTC (High Tech Computer Corp.) Dream / ADP1 / G1 /
Magic / Tattoo
# fastbootdevices
fastboot
# fastbootgetvarall
lk_build_desc: c1…..
prod: 1
unlock_status: false
serialno: […..]
product: BISCUIT
version-preloader: 0.1.00
version: 0.5

137. AMAZON ECHO DOT
MITM. WHAT ABOUT SSL?
Self signed certificates is allowed on Alexa for devs
https://developer.amazon.com/docs/custom-
skills/configure-web-service-self-signed-certificate.html
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.ht
ml?nodeId=201589180
Change endpoint configuration and region
Make your Alexa installs a SSL from Intercepting tools
No lack, Alexa Echo Dot as a device prevents this shit 
Try with Alex app that comes installed by default on the
Kindle Fire Tablets, or download for Android or iOS
devices even (!)

138. AMAZON ECHO DOT
MITM. FIRST TIME SETUP
Navigate via browser
https://alexa.amazon.com
Up to end of 2017 a redirect to Alexa setup was a http
URL (!)
Expected credentials stolen in plaintext & expiring in
2036 like before, but no lack
before
POST
/ap/signin?ie=UTF8&pf_rd_r=yyyyyyy&pf_rd_m=xxxxxx&
pf_rd_t=6301&pf_rd_i=amzn_dp_project_dee&pf_rd_p=x
xxxx&pf_rd_s=signin-slot HTTP/1.1
Host: www.amazon.com
Content-Length: 1349
“name”: “Set-Cookie”,

“value”: “session-token=\”xx/y//zz==\”; Version=1;
Domain=.amazon.com; Max-Age=630720000; Expires=Sat,
01-Nov-2036 22:39:37 GMT; Path=/”
Now
HTTPS, prevents MITM attack
Certificate expires every 2 years

139. AMAZON ECHO DOT
MITM. FIRMWARE
Intercepting firmware updates is possible
Here is a bin-firwarehttp request
GET /obfuscated-otav3-9/…/update-kindle-full_biscuit-XXXX_user_[XXXXXXXXX].bin
HTTP/1.1
Host: amzdigitaldownloads.edgesuite.net
Connection: close
User-Agent: AndroidDownloadManager/5.1.1 (Linux; U; Android 5.1.1; AEOBC
Build/LVY48F)
Firmware contains build.prop = designed as a Android & have .APKs
ro.build.version.fireos=5.5.0.3
ro.build.version.fireos.sdk=4
Non-Encrypted bin-firmware
-rw-r--r-- boot.img; file_contexts
drwxr-xr-x images; META-INF
-rw-r--r-- ota.prop
drwxr-xr-x system
-rw-r--r-- system.new.dat; system.patch.dat; system.transfer.list

140. AMAZON ALEXA APP
Alexa app has a good a solid protection
No sensitive data stored locally
Well encrypted communication (online, internal) and used the TLS 1.2
However, MITM is possible, because no SSL Pinning used
Credentials and all communication compromised

141. AMAZON ECHO DOT
ALEXA APP – MITM, NOT PINNED
Credentials
{"Credentials":{"AccessKeyId":"ASIAXHE6EPSWNVIGFBVP","Expiration":1.538588872E9,"SecretKey":"+8gS
x7/H.....U="},"IdentityId":"us-east-1:503e25f6-2302-4dcd-8cb2-64a0e888f76b"}
Email, Password from POST action ‘https://www.amazon.com/ap/signin’
Device Info plus token
Metrics -
https://device- metrics-us-2.amazon.com/metricsBatch
HTTP_USER_AGENTDAMZN(SmartPhone/iPhone/A2IVLV5VM2W81,iOS/12.0,Alexa//2.2.233205,DCM)"
CountryCodeRU"
Profile
Name, Billing Address, Shipping Address
Device IDs, types, Account ID, Device capabilities
First answer in .mp3 (https://tinytts.amazon.com/) stored for a long time (at least couple months)

142. AMAZON ALEXA APP
LOCAL
Library\Application Support\device.sqlite–device list with
ID, serials
Library\METRICS_NORMAL\* -Logs &
MetricsHTTP_USER_AGENT(SmartPhone/iPhone/A2IVLV5VM
2W81,iOS/12.0,Alexa//2.2.233205,DCM)
Library\Preferences\com.amazon.echo.plist–Account Info
Documents\LocalData.sqlite–settings of devices

143. AMAZON ECHO DOT
ALEXA APP
Alexa and Echo allow many users to manage devices
Echo has no voice differentiation capabilities nor protection against non-human or repeated speech
Each device locks by 4 digit PIN
The Set of PINs is ~10k values
Two attempts and have to restart but no limit the number of total attempts
Bruteforceit for 2 days
How to break
1.Computer says “wake word” followed by the command to order an Amazon Echo Dot
2.Alexa responds with top Amazon search for and asks if user wants to place the order
3.Computer confirms order
4.Alexa asks for 4-digit PIN
5.Computer guesses next PIN in numerical order
6.Alexa accepts or rejects PIN
7.Computer guesses next PIN in numerical order
Repeat until you break it take up to 48h max

144. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

145. AMAZON ECHO DOT& ALEXA APP
SUMMARY
Intercepting firmware updates is possible
Alexa allows to use self- signed SSLs but not accepts Burp/Charles certificate?
True for Alexa Echo Dot
Alexa app that relies on TLS 1.2 but affected to MITM attack with self signed cert
Not everything is HTTPS
FireOSis based on Android -https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_OS
ver5.x –Android 5.1.1 Lollipop. Alexa is still on 5.x
ver6.x –Android 7.1 Nougat
Even hardware root is possible
https://vanderpot.com/Clinton_Cook_Paper.pdf

146. READYFORSKY-???
a

147. CONNECTED HOME
READYFORSKY
Backup
MITM: Hub, Remote
BT MITM: out of scope

148. READYFORSKY
DOCUMENTS\R4S.SQLITE
Device list, models, pairing text
Receipts per device (how to cook, basic details &
requirements)
Username, email
User devices & Mac

149. READYFORSKY
MITM
Firmware version –2.29 -
http://service2.readyforsky.com/firmware/list/148/["2.29"]
Device Pic - http://image-
server.readyforsky.com/i/1899/200x200.png
Recipes –BlackTea, GreenTea, Others
Do smthwith a Kettle
https://content.readyforsky.com/api/program/catalog/id:IN:90,9
7?locale=en
"id": 90,
"protocol_id": 0,
"value": "BOILING", / HEATING
"value": "40", | "value": "55", | "value": "70", | "value": "85", | "value": "95",

150. READYFORSKY
MITM
Credentials, password, tokens
https://content.readyforsky.com/headless/change- password
{"current_password": "1", "plainPassword ": "1"}
{ "error": "invalid_grant ", "error_description": "The access token provided is
invalid."}
{ "access_token":
"YjNhYmEwOWM1ZDcwYTk0ODU1ODhmZDZiMDRjNjA5NzUyN2YzM2VhN
GUyMjBhYzc0ZjBhYWRhY2IzZmNjMzdiOA",
"expires_in": 86400, "token_type": "bearer", "scope": "r4s", "refresh_token":
"YzE4ZGUwN2NkMzdiMDBlYmM5NGQwMGVjYmU4YThkYTVkMGE1ZTc4
ODQ2MDRkNjhhZWY4NGIxZjlkODRhZGI3MQ“ }

151. READYFORSKY
MITM
User details -
https://content.readyforsky.com/api/user/current
"username": "yurychemerkin",
"username_canonical": "yurychemerkin",
"email": "[email protected]",
"last_login": null,
"enabled": true,
"locked": false,
"expired": false,
"id": 527679
Client Address192.168.1.38:50654 | this port changes
Remote Addresscontent.readyforsky.com/178.62.194.132:443 | fixed port

152. READYFORSKY
MITM
Device detailshttps://content.readyforsky.com/
api/device/user
“name": "RK-G200S",
"address": "E7:7F:BC:60:C2:2A",
"name": "Gateway XIAOMI Redmi 4X",
"address": "77d3efcf-f627-
402e-bbed-4ee0c8290417",
Client Address192.168.1.38:50654 | this port changes
Remote
Address
content.readyforsky.com/178.62.194.132:443 |
fixed port

153. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

154. REDMOND
SUMMARY
Communications & MITM
App, Hub, Device IP, Ports including internal info, Device info (name,
model, network info)
Actions, receipts, to-do
Credentials, password, tokens
User details & Login details
Local
Device list, models, pairing text
Receipts per device (how to cook, basic details & requirements)
Username, email
User devices & Mac

156. LIGHTNING
Lightify
IKEA TRÅDFRI
Philips HUE

158. LIGHTIFY
Lightifyis the IoT platform with a simplest integration of wireless lighting.
Need to have an Lightify-account
Online communication uses QUIC-protocol with encryption over UDP
Wireshark does not support QUIC decryption at the moment. The drafts
at tools.ietf.org/wg/quicare also not really detailed on the ciphers.
LightifyGateway communicates over TCP completely unencrypted locally,
but via a binary protocol
https://github.com/noctarius/lightify-binary-
protocol#basics-about-the-protocoland here a plugin to manage the
light https://github.com/tfriedel/python-lightify
Credentials stored in a local folder –shared preferences

159. IKEA TRADFRI
Smart lightning and assistant to control it
No online communications except firmware requests in plaintext
GET
http://fw.ota.homesmart.ikea.net/feed/version_info.json
User-Agent: HertzClient/1.0
Host: fm.ota.homesmart.ikea.net
Connection: close
Response : No response
Local communication is DTLS (SSL over UDP)
Pairing via QR code
(Serial Number = Mac Address, Security Code/ pre-shared key)
QR code can be revealed for further decryption
Locally stored data
Encrypted QR- code and store in keystore–need root to get an access
Keystoredoesn’t work for outdated Android (< 4.3)
AES encryption algfor outdated Android and built APK with encryption key “Bar12345Bar12345” as a resource in “key_file.txt”
The Issue here is a patched APK file with a removed strong encryption

160. PHILIPS HUE
HUE light, lamps and other with a smart assistant and bridge to works over Philips servers
The list of paired Apps and services with timestamp sent across Hue apps
Online communication
[BridgeServers] works over HTTP with additional layer of AES- encryption. Guess they store secret key somewhere
but no lack to find it
[AppServers] works over HTTPS with SSL Pinning
Local communication works over HTTP
PUT
http://192.168.1.38/api/Ds7KfNjjYtC8uN
mU8azGBiOSj-uacXI0q0JKaTs/groups/1/action
Host http://192.168.1.38
Accept *.*
Content-Type: application-json
Content-Length: 11
Json{“on:true”}
Loading malicious firmware over-the-air http://iotworm.eyalro.net/
In 2016, researchers hacked Hue lights via ZigBee over a distance of more than 200 meters
http://iotworm.eyalro.net/iotworm.pdf

161. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

162. LIGHTNING
SUMMARY
IoT platforms: Lightify, IFTTT
One account to access all tokens & credentials to manage services, devices
and data
Communication
Online –usually encrypted, MITM sometimes possible
Local –non-protected, custom protocols & encryption –usually analyzed
Firmware –plaintext usually, malicious attacks are possible
Local
Credentials, log, data

163. CONNECTED HOME
SUMMARY
Jailbreaks & roots
Available for popular devices
Sideloadingapps are possible
New in-house manager devices, such as Alexa Dot doesn’t have root tools
Backup & Data
Works for many devices
Works for synchronizing apps, like Alexa
In-house smart manageable things works over app- manager that, in turn
Allow itself to be manageable by any devices BT, Wi-Fi, e.g. cast video or other content
Doesn’t have a good protection and available over Internet
Has a firmware issues with malicious over-air-attacks
Locally stored lot of data in app installed on the mobile device
Moved in an user’s pocket everywhere

165. IoT: CONCEPT, FACTS, ISSUES
1. IoT
2. Wearable
Tech
3. Healthcare
4. Connected
Home
5. Security &
Tips
6. Risk
Management

166. IoT
HOW TO SECURE
Risk Management
Device Profiling –divide your devices according to a critical info & risk score
Use cases –define where and what for are you going to use devices
Compatibility-use devices that are compatible with existing technologystack, and security equipment and
software
Lost of smartphones –avoid devices to be lost or left unattended
In-home Secured Network
Obscure name –NOT for vendor & model names or revealing user identity e.g. personal
Encryption–use up-to-date devices with the latest & strongest encryption schemes
Guest network –setupit if you’re sure but better to Disable guest network access entirely
Two or more different Wi-Fi networks (logically or physically)–one for typical activities (networking,
messaging, etc.), second for IoT, third for critical banking, shopping
Firewall-a stand-alone software or shipped with the router, allow traffic on those specific ports & no others
Limit of public network usage–avoid pairing device or using device apps over public network due to lack
of encryption of data
Password Management
Defaultcredentials–change it for router’s , IoT devices’ password
Unique passwords -use unique, complex passwords made up of letters, numbers, and symbols

167. IoT
HOW TO SECURE
Software Management
Settings–change it to default privacy policies & security settings
Features –disable features you don’t need, such as a remote access
Apps–avoid use apps that don’t encrypt data locally or while it’s transferring
Patches–keep all devices & software up-to-date
VPN–stand alone software or shipped with router to protect connections of IoT device that working over Internet
Multifactor & Hubs –use all security settings that require additional actions before it’s being easily hacked
Data
Data Analysis -analyzing data generated by IoT devices to understand what data might be monetized
Activity Analysis – identifying unusual activity of IoT devices to understand what data might be leaked
Breaking tools
Risky app –avoid apps out of store, junk apps from app store
Broken-don’t break any device in a chain of devices, rely on supported vendor ROMs
Flashed–flash clean & secure ROMs to remove unwanted apps but rely on well-known supported ROMs
Cloud & third party tools
IoT clouds – audit it before using for your personal/business need
Third party services–there are many automation toolsto manage IoT devices. Use secured and audited and be
informed

168. MOBILE, Io T, CLOUDS…
IT’S TIME TO HIRE A RISK MANAGER!
HOW TO CONTACT ME ?
ADD ME IN LINKEDIN:
HTTPS://WWW.LINKEDIN.COM/IN/YURYCHEMERKIN
YURY CHEMERKIN SEND A MAIL TO:
[email protected]