Hypotheses Development revised(1) (1).pp

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1. largely expected in manuscript writing - explicitly written section on hypotheses

2. Depends on the paper Management type papers (i.e for management journals)

3. Research Questions Hypotheses development (which is from the research questions) Wrong to use findings

4. Political connections in Malaysia The findings are largely telling us the same story There can be some deviation when the theoretical arguments are quite well- known and established as a mean for a baseline analysis

5. Google scholar Quality journals (important - some examiners or reviewers will go straight to the references to check whether you have read the appropriate literature) The key is to identify what are t he theoretical argument s RAISED by these papers Can be found in the hypotheses development, and some can be detected in the introduction

6. Positive bit Negative bit - often converging with political connection literature in either Indonesia (Fisman 2001)

7. Royal Family Family firms Royalty - political connections Create something new - new theoretical argument

8. Ismail et al. (2024) - Accounting Forum

9. This is a very simple hypothesis. The idea Studies investigating this relationship is Bear in mind — this is final version of the is to present a basic background of the quite huge. However, we have chosen a paper. The initial draft of the paper has a baseline analysis few to reflect what is closely related to much more comprehensive theoretical Some recent trend don t have this OU rS arguments anymore

10. Outsourced IAF, Nonaudit Services Fees, and Audit Fees Unlike the practice in the U.S., 7 the Malaysiiin Institute oi Accountants" (2() 10) By- Laws (on Professional Conduct and Elhics) do not specifically prohibit auditors in Malaysia from rendei ing ceiiain NAS, excepl for lA Venices, to their clients. Auditors can prtivide NAS so long as the provision of NAS dties not creale a significant threat to the firm’s prtifessitinal indepen‹lence. integrily. and objeclivity. The revised MIA By- Laws (panigr‹tph 298.156 to 290.161 I ftirlher eltlbOfille on llie ethical rules and guidelines pertaining to the provision of NAS to audit clients. These rules allow auditors to provide NAS to audit clients at a level that night not be deemed to compromise independence.'’ Theory suggests thal audit lii nos providing significant amounts ot’ NAS are likely to be more econoiiiically dependent on their clients. thtis leading to lower audiior independence (Leviti 2(ltl2). While some studies sugp•est that NAS adveivsely affect auditor independence using accounting accruals to measure repoi'ting quality (e.g.. Frankel. Johnson. and Nelstin 20tl2). other studies show no asst›ciation (e.u.. Ashbuuph. Luroncl. find Mayhew 2(1(l3). le:iding to lhe conclusion thitt the concerns abuut the auditor independence effeci of’ NAS are “I:irypely undocuniented" ( Kiniiey el al. 2(Jt)4. ñ68). Anoiher perspective tin NAS thai has not been given much atteni ion is its revenue-generating role and how this re lates lo audit lies. Levitt (2f)tl2) rind Kinney et al. (2flf)4). for example. point out thal NAS fees generate iiiore income for the :iuditor than audit fees. We argue that audilors who provide NAS lo client firms and rely on high quality outsourced IAFs (due to the perceived higher-qual ity audit ‹ssistance) are likely lo earn higher overall revenue while chiirg ink lower exiern‹il iiudit fees to keep the client happy. This argument is consistent wiih the li nding that auditors aie will ing to charge lower audit fees tt› entice the client to purchase more NAS in the future (Cilusholli ct al. 2f) 141 and consistent w iih the contention that the loss of NAS may retJuire auditors to r:rise rind it fees to maintain theii level of’ revenue without comproiiiising audit qu:ilily (H iggs und Skanlx 2iXlfi ). Furthermore, the irriportance of outsourced IAF to IAF reliance and enhanced audit efficiency c‹in be related to Felix. Gi'amling. and Miiletla's (2005 ) observ;ition that exlerriiil audittii's appear to be more affected t›y client pressure and less concerned about internal audit quality find coordination when makin;i internal audit reliance decisitins for cl ients to whtwri signilicani N AS are also prciv idecJ. Thus. given client pressure under conditions of prov iding xignilicunt amounts o1’ audit serv ices ancl NAS by the audilor, if is reasonable tn expeci that the atidiior will lend to rely more on outsourced rather th:m in- house IAW. The iibove reasoning leads io the following hy pothesis ( H2 ). H2: The negative associ:ition bet ween ciutsourced IAFs :ind audit fees ix likely to be strc›nper for client fi nos with higher NAS fees.

11. Wepn õfBBSt]XCÓSİ00 İ6 .0Ł {łas0 paßOæge.:‹s aptxé’ ,y w ¢¢0it0Øłt po gbaa@. oæ aeswl pave e pas0nd dĂe/ISÎ0ß o aptwe eonoĂc.ómasiæ ofg1ôcd-paborage, we uæ.Áæt ğovœoient orcenhip &«ause Ñe.govemæ1t,łłas 1deju@uõa to âsl1ffie ãll eqüÏty gsiüon n» is not c0mpaù .e u iu eoŒico ., 2006). PRYÎOtlS Stü IčS Oft rep0xed earnings oí p0liùcély connect4 łîms (Btll et al., 2003; €ul, 200ó; Choiey et al., 2011) sh0W łÎlzt ÈlillS W1È higher ț0vemment ownerùip (Bush et al., 2004) caphe xderIyin§ 9t0iï0lïtİt ¢Y0ñtS ÎBS ãtClJlâtčÎ/. Iß Mdayśa, æecdotd eùdace ad Wİdeęead pf66 I@0fk sh0W łÎlâç ÎTI âdàćofł t0 Ôsÿb}Î8§ tŃłIâCt@İsktS 0(îI reIaó0ft- ship- bued system su Ğ a conyisæ ølišcdly connected ßms have lower leYeü of kałxpaacy Ùx non<oxtected êms (Jomo and €omeî, 2000), which oakB Í0fčC3Stixg earnings m0re óAcrlŁ %e xceæüț Ń &e timing ad oagnihde oí ńe payb»ù mom żae f0fißS oí polificd paB0ß8§ß dlS0 lßdİtßS hß İIHON£ SBßdiß lJl0R £naQc, reducing eanings prdicaòility hlüer. Tlćs aQunœt is in ltte wlŁ Łe fact Ñat fvms wiż ec0n0ißic ană ÿßH0fldl ÿ0liócal pakonage tpicdl} dœire gains ß0n że g0r- ØMlMØßOVØradaboeżepașmmb ie\mãe. flez&Œ80!żeepa¿mezbadș mmgn !eaćÓh0Iì MŒRkV8İ0 SüÿÿRSS ÂfìIł- S{ł¢CĞC İîìÎOfilłäłlOß İ8 0fÉčf ł0 hide expopriaüo acüùües by øliticiałłs ad ùeč oošes (BMÎIIïIãIł gt ML, 2004; Chaney et al., 2011). lx Mdaysia, for ixtæce, buśxœsøa wiŃ iźornd ørsond ties šń gžtiti3Jts Fig Ohæ rewxded WİŃ lucr»óve sbte raB Ń ńe fom oí tlcaceĘ t0AłTätu, ãIlÉ ÈMÎñ9SS Éč3ÌS ł¥İtÎt Stâtt t0f|Xifätİ0AS dltd ÿfİ¥ãtšed state shæh0lôings (Cm, 2012). Tkae connected ßxis may & cæ less about Úe quáț offÎttaxcid ĞOrmâüOfl dİsdoæü beaixe of Úe protecù0fl &ey reeive Ë0m gtińúaxs, æd beaue ńey kave 1œs xeed to gè extœat capitd due to ńür priŃleged accøs to toaix ńOm 0¥tlTlłûčft( t0ftß0Ł@ ó3îîb (Fattio et d., 2006; Caetsai et al., 2008).

12. Iss› a Allah, the next sharing session will be on the cuttent trencl of