Indian Philosophy part 2 - philosophical systems

Part 2 of Presentation by Boram Lee (incomplete)

1. INDIAN PHILOSOPHY Part II: The Philosophical Systems Prepared by Boram Lee

2. Indian Philosophical Systems Accept the authority of the Vedas? Yes ( āstika ) No ( nāstika ) Materialistic Spiritual Cārvāka Jainism Nyāya & Vaisheshika Buddhism Sānkhya & Yoga Mīmāmsā & Vedānta

3. Indian philosophical systems are called darshana -s. Darshana means “vision”. Darshana -s are divided into orthodox ( āstika ) and unorthodox ( nāstika ). Orthodox ( āstika ) systems accept the authority of the Vedas. Unorthodox ( nāstika ) systems do not accept the authority of the Vedas. Indian Philosophical Systems

4. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

5. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

6. Nyāya means “Logic”. Foundational text is Nyāya - sūtra (c. 200 CE), attributed to Gautama. Nyāya

7. Best known Nyāya philosophers are Udayana (975~1050 CE), and Gangesha (fl. 1325 CE). Beginning with Udayana (c. 1000 CE), Nyāya epistemology (theory of knowledge) and Vaisheshika metaphysics (theory of reality) were explicitly combined into one system. Gangesha (c. 1325 CE) and his followers established the Navya Nyāya (“New Logic”) tradition, which refined the logical and linguistic tools of Nyāya to address skeptical challenges against the Nyāya-Vaisheshika system. Nyāya

8. Metaphysical Positions Pluralism: many things exist in reality, such as our individual selves, our bodies, and other ordinary objects (like tables, animals, etc.). Realism: all these things exist independently of our minds. Atomism: ordinary objects are ultimately made up of atoms. Dualism: the self/soul is distinct from the body. Theism: God † exists. † “God” here refers to Īshvara , a supreme personal being and creator of the universe. Nyāya

9. The Nyāya system developed out of canons of debate and informal logic. Nyāya focuses on epistemology ( pramāna shāstra or “theory of knowledge”). On the other hand, Nyāya’s sister school, the Vaisheshika, focuses on ontology ( prameya shāstra or “theory of objects [of knowledge]”). Nyāya pioneered discussion of the pramāna -s (“means of knowledge”). Nyāya

10. Means of Knowledge ( pramāna -s) A pramāna is a means by which we can acquire knowledge about the world. Here is a list of candidate pramāna -s (Nyāya accepts only the first four on the list): Perception ( pratyaksha ) Inference ( anumāna ) Verbal Testimony ( shabda ) Analogy ( upamāna ) Postulation ( arthāpatti ) Nonperception ( anupalabdhi ) Nyāya

11. (1) Perception ( pratyaksha ) All schools of Indian philosophy accept perception as a valid means of knowledge. Perception arises when the five sense organs ( indriya -s: sight, hearing, smell, taste, touch) come into contact with their objects, and the internal organ ( manas or mind) comes into contact with the five sense organs. Nyāya

12. (1) Perception ( pratyaksha ) There are two extreme views on perception: According to Grammarians: all perception is linguistic. According to Buddhists: perception is free from all concepts, including linguistic concepts. Most Hindu philosophers reconcile these two views by admitting two stages of perception. Nyāya

13. (1) Perception ( pratyaksha ) The two stages of perception: Indeterminate ( nirvikalpaka ) perception cannot be expressed in language cannot be true or false Determinate ( savikalpaka ) perception can be expressed in language can be true or false Nyāya

14. (1) Perception ( pratyaksha ) First, in indeterminate perception, elements of reality are grasped separately without conceptual organization. (E.g., we see the brown color and four-legged shape of the table, but we have not yet combined these sensations into a determinate perception of a brown table.) Indeterminate perception then gives rise to determinate perception, where conceptual organization structures the elements of reality. (E.g., we see the brown table as a brown table.) Nyāya

15. (1) Perception ( pratyaksha ) According to Buddhism, all determinate perception is ultimately false illusion—because there are no enduring composite structures in the real world which correspond to the conceptual structure of determinate perception. According to Nyāya, determinate perception can be true—because there are enduring composite structures in the real world which correspond to the conceptual structure of determinate perception. Nyāya

16. (2) Inference ( anumāna ) A sound inference must have the following structure: Statement of the thesis to be proved. Statement of the reason for the thesis. Statement of general rule connecting 1 & 2, and a familiar example supporting the rule. Application of the rule to the present case. Affirmation of the thesis as proven. Nyāya

17. (2) Inference ( anumāna ) Here is an often used illustration of sound inference: There is fire on that mountain. Because there is smoke on that mountain. Whenever there is smoke there is fire, e.g., as in the kitchen. There is smoke on that mountain, Therefore, there is fire on that mountain. Nyāya

18. (2) Inference ( anumāna ) Here is an often used illustration of sound inference: There is fire on that mountain. Because there is smoke on that mountain. Whenever there is smoke there is fire , e.g., as in the kitchen. There is smoke on that mountain, Therefore, there is fire on that mountain. Nyāya

19. (2) Inference ( anumāna ) Whenever there is smoke there is fire . This is the statement of general rule. Or in other words, statement of invariable concomitance ( vyāpti ) between the smoke and the fire. Because there is invariable concomitance between smoke and fire, we can infer from the smoke we see that there must be a fire on the mountain (even if we can’t see the fire). Nyāya

20. (2) Inference ( anumāna ) All schools of Indian philosophy, except Cārvāka, accept inference as a valid means of knowledge. Cārvāka rejects inference, arguing that we cannot know that invariable concomitance ( vyāpti ) obtains between A and B—e.g., cannot know that whenever there is smoke, there is fire. In Western philosophy this is known as the problem of induction , but Indian philosophers discovered this problem much earlier than Western philosophers. Nyāya

21. (2) Inference ( anumāna ) The Cārvāka argument as to why we cannot gain knowledge of invariable concomitance between A and B is as follows: Perception cannot give us knowledge of the invariable concomitance, because perception only tells us that A and B are observed together now or in the past. Perception cannot assure us that A and B will always occur together in unobserved cases. Inference cannot give us knowledge of the invariable concomitance, because inference relies on invariable concomitance. To rely on invariable concomitance to show that we know the invariable concomitance of A and B leads to the problem of circularity or infinite regress. So we cannot use inference to show the invariable concomitance of A and B. Nyāya

22. (2) Inference ( anumāna ) Buddhist logicians accept inference as a valid means of knowledge, but they do not consider it an ultimately authoritative source of knowledge. According to Buddhist logicians: Only indeterminate perception gives us authoritative knowledge of the impermanent elements of reality. Inference makes use of invariable concomitance between composite enduring things like smoke and fire, which do not exist in the real world, but are illusory products of conceptual organization by our minds. So inference, like determinate perception, is deceptive. The Buddhist uses inference not because it gives us knowledge about the real world, but only because it is pragmatically useful in our daily activities. Nyāya

23. (3) Verbal Testimony ( shabda ) Except Cārvāka, Buddhism, and Vaisheshika, all schools of Indian philosophy accept verbal testimony as a valid means of knowledge. But verbal testimony is accepted as a valid means of knowledge only when it fulfills the following conditions: The speaker (/writer) must be competent ( āpta ). The sentence spoken (/written) must be grammatically well-formed. The hearer (/reader) must understand the sentence. Nyāya

24. (3) Verbal Testimony ( shabda ) The speaker (/writer) must be competent ( āpta ). Here “competence” includes… intellectual competence: the speaker must know what he is talking about, moral competence: the speaker must be sincere and truthful. Another way of understanding “competence” is that the speaker must lack intellectual and moral defects ( dosha -s). Nyāya

25. (3) Verbal Testimony ( shabda ) Hindu philosophers tend to accept verbal testimony as a valid means of knowledge, because they want to defend the scriptural authority of the revealed texts ( shruti ), i.e., the infallibility of the Vedas and the Upanishads. Nyāya philosophers and theistic schools of Vedānta argue that the shruti texts are infallible because they are authored by God ( Īshvara ), who is free from intellectual and moral defects. Nyāya

26. (3) Verbal Testimony ( shabda ) On the other hand, Mīmāmsā and Advaita Vedānta philosophers argue that the shruti texts are infallible because they are eternal and authorless ( apaurusheya ) , and therefore free from the intellectual and moral defects that authors usually have. However, according to Advaita Vedānta, it is spiritual experience of union with Brahman that has the highest authority, not the revealed scriptures (because scriptural authority is based on the illusory distinction between the teacher and the taught). Nyāya

27. (4) Analogy ( upamāna ) Nyāya, Vedānta, and Mīmāmsā accept analogy as a valid means of knowledge. Analogy is the means by which we gain knowledge of a thing from its resemblance to another thing that is previously known. For Nyāya, we can know the meaning of a new word through analogy. E.g., suppose someone tells you that a gavaya resembles a cow. Then when you see an animal resembling a cow, you get to know what the word ‘ gavaya ’ means. Nyāya

28. (5) Postulation ( arthāpatti ) Only Vedānta and Mīmāmsā accept postulation as a valid means of knowledge. To postulate is to adopt the only possible explanation for an otherwise inexplicable fact. For example, Devadatta is growing fatter day by day, but he is always fasting during daytime. The only possible explanation for Devadatta’s increasing girth is that he must be eating secretly at night. Thus we can come to know something new through postulation. Nyāya

29. (5) Postulation ( arthāpatti ) Postulation is similar to what is called “abduction” or “inference to the best explanation” in Western philosophy of science. Inference to the best explanation is a form of reasoning often used by scientists to adopt the hypothesis that would best explain the evidence. The difference is that postulation is not inference to the best explanation, but inference to the only possible explanation of the evidence in question. Nyāya

30. (6) Nonperception ( anupalabdhi ) Nonperception is the means by which we know that something is absent. E.g., we know that there is no pot on the table, because we do not see the pot on the table. Nyāya does not accept nonperception as an independent means of knowledge. According to Nyāya, we perceive absences. E.g., we see the absence of a pot on the table. Nyāya

31. (6) Nonperception ( anupalabdhi ) There is a problem with the Nyāya position that we perceive absences. Namely, perception requires contact between the sense organ and the object. But how can there be contact between the sense organ and the absence of an object? To avoid this problem, Advaita Vedānta and the Bhātta school of Mīmāmsā admit nonperception as an independently valid means of knowledge. Nyāya

32. Means of Knowledge ( pramāna -s) Below is a list of pramāna -s accepted by different systems of Indian philosophy: Cārvāka perception Buddhism perception, inference Vaisheshika perception, inference Jainism perception, inference, verbal testimony Sānkhya-Yoga perception, inference, verbal testimony Nyāya perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy Prābhākara perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, Mīmāmsā postulation Bhātta perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, Mīmāmsā postulation, nonperception Vedānta perception, inference, verbal testimony, analogy, postulation, nonperception Nyāya

33. Means of Knowledge ( pramāna -s) Various other means of knowledge have been accepted by Indian philosophers (e.g., the Jains accept memory, clairvoyance, telepathy, etc. as independent means of knowledge). Most Indian schools of philosophy do not accept memory as an independent means of knowledge, because memory simply repeats what we already know through other means of knowledge, and does not give us new knowledge. Nyāya

34. Means of Knowledge ( pramāna -s) Although Advaita Vedānta recognizes six means of knowledge ( pramāna -s), these six all involve distinction between the knower and the object known. So the knowledge we gain through them only counts as lower knowledge ( aparā vidyā ). According to Advaita Vedānta, lower knowledge is shown to be illusory by the highest knowledge ( parā vidyā ), i.e., knowledge of Brahman. In knowing Brahman one becomes Brahman—in the highest knowledge there is no distinction between the knower and the object known. Nyāya

35. Means of Knowledge ( pramāna -s) The Buddhist philosopher and skeptic Nāgārjuna (c. 150 CE) questioned the viability of identifying valid means of knowledge. N ā g ā rjuna asked: if X is a valid means of knowledge, by what means of knowledge do we know that X is a valid means of knowledge? If one answers, “We know through X that X is a valid means of knowledge”, then this answer is circular. If one answers, “We know through another valid means of knowledge Y that X is a valid means of knowledge”, then this results in infinite regress. Either answer seems problematic, thus impugning the viability of identifying valid means of knowledge. Nyāya

36. Means of Knowledge ( pramāna -s) Following Nāgārjuna’s lead, the Cārvāka skeptic Jayarāshi (c. 750 CE) and the Advaita Vedānta skeptic Shr ī harsha (c. 1150 CE) continued the assault on Nyāya epistemology or theory of knowledge. In large part, it is in response to such skeptical challenges that the Nyāya philosophers developed and refined their epistemology—an epistemology that is adequate to the task of defending the pluralistic realism of Nyāya-Vaisheshika ontology. Nyāya

37. Natural Theology Udayana (975~1050 CE) and Navya Nyāya philosophers offered proofs of the existence of God ( Īshvara ). These Nyāya philosophers were usually Shaivites, who identified God with Shiva. Udayana’s Nyāyakusumāñjali (“A Garland Offering of Logic”) is the classic work on Nyāya arguments for the existence of God. God ( Īshvara ) is a supreme personal being who created the cosmos and maintains moral order (= the law of karma). Nyāya

38. Natural Theology God created the cosmos, not ex nihilo , but by imparting motion to eternally existing atoms, and arranging them into orderly complexes. In other words, God is the efficient cause of the physical universe, while the atoms are the material cause of the physical universe. (Just as the potter is the efficient cause of the clay jar which he fashions from a lump of clay, while the clay is the material cause of the jar.) Nyāya

39. Natural Theology Here is one of the Nyāya proofs, which uses inference to establish the existence of a supreme intelligent being, God: The earth, etc. have an intelligent being as efficient cause. Because the earth, etc., are effects. All effects have intelligent beings as their efficient causes, e.g., like the clay jar caused to exist by a potter. The earth, etc., are effects. So, the earth, etc. have an intelligent being as efficient cause. Nyāya

40. Natural Theology The earth, etc. have an intelligent being as efficient cause. Because the earth, etc., are effects. All effects have intelligent beings as their efficient causes, e.g., like the clay jar caused to exist by a potter. The earth, etc., are effects. So, the earth, etc. have an intelligent being as efficient cause. But how do we know from this argument that the efficient cause of the universe must be a supremely intelligent being, i.e., God? To make a jar out of clay, a potter needs to know the clay. In the same way, to make an orderly universe out of gazillions of atoms, the intelligent cause of the universe must have knowledge of gazillions of atoms—and this requires supreme intelligence. Nyāya

41. Natural Theology All effects have intelligent beings as their causes, e.g., like the pot caused to exist by a potter. Critics observe that the general rule in Step 3 of the argument seems to be false, because it seems to have plenty of counterexamples: Counterexample ? A sprout is caused to exist by a seed, but the seed is not an intelligent cause. Nyāya

42. Natural Theology All effects have intelligent beings as their efficient causes, e.g., like the clay jar caused to exist by a potter. Counterexample ? A sprout is caused to exist by a seed, but the seed is not an intelligent cause. Nyāya philosophers reply that the alleged counterexample is controversial. Many theists, including Nyāya philosophers, believe that God is ultimately the efficient cause of both the seed and the sprout, while atheists refuse to believe this. Nyāya philosophers then point out that no controversial counterexamples should be used in debate. For, according to rules of debate, counterexamples must be uncontroversial—acceptable to both sides of the debate. Nyāya

43. Natural Theology Udayana calls this proof of God “the argument from effect”. It bears some resemblance to the Design Argument (= Teleological Argument) in the Western philosophical tradition. Udayana also presents a monotheistic argument as to why God can only be one in number. The law of parsimony tells us not to multiply beyond necessity, or to adopt the simplest explanation consistent with phenomena. So, in accordance with parsimony, it is unnecessary to assume more than one efficient cause of the universe. Nyāya

44. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

45. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

46. Vaisheshika means “Atomism”. Foundational text is Vaisheshika - sūtra (c. 100 CE), attributed to Kanāda. Often paired with Nyāya, the Vaisheshika merged with the Nyāya system in the 11 th century CE, and ceased to be an independent system. Vaisheshika

47. Metaphysical Positions Pluralism: many things exist in reality, such as our individual selves, our bodies, and other ordinary objects (like tables, animals, etc.). Realism: all these things exist independently of our minds. Atomism: ordinary objects are ultimately made up of atoms. Dualism: the self/soul is distinct from the body. Theism: God † exists. † “God” here refers to Īshvara , a supreme personal being and creator of the universe. Vaisheshika

48. The Vaisheshika system focuses on ontology ( prameya shāstra or “theory of [knowable] objects”). On the other hand, Vaisheshika’s sister school, the Nyāya, focuses on epistemology ( pramāna shāstra or “theory of knowledge”). Vaisheshika is best known for its discussion of padārtha -s (“categories”). Vaisheshika

49. The Categories ( padārtha -s) The categories are a list of the most general kinds of things: Substance ( dravya ) Quality ( guna ) Motion ( karma ) Universal ( sāmānya ) Individuator ( vishesha ) Inherence ( samavāya ) Absence ( abhāva) Vaisheshika philosophers included 1~6 in their list. Nyāya philosophers added the 7 th . Vaisheshika

50. (1) Substance Substance is the locus of qualities and motions. Substance is the material cause. The material cause of X is that out of which X is made. E.g., the material cause of a clay jar is the clay, since the jar is made out of clay. Qualities, motions and universals inhere in substance, and substance-wholes inhere in substance-parts, but substance-parts do not inhere in anything else. So substance-parts are the most basic category, and other categories depend on it. Vaisheshika

51. (1) Substance According to Vaisheshika, there are nine kinds of substance: Earth ( prithvi ) Water ( ap ) Fire (tejas) Air ( vāyu ) Ether ( ākāsha ) Space ( dik ) Time ( kāla ) Soul ( ātman ) Mind ( manas ) Vaisheshika

52. (1) Substance, (2) Quality, (3) Motion Qualities are particular features of individual substances (as opposed to universals, which are general features). Substances, qualities, and motions are basic categories in the following sense: Universals and individuators inhere in substances, qualities, and motions. The locus of an absence must be a substance, quality, or motion. Vaisheshika

53. (4) Universal, (5) Individuator Universals are general features that individual substances, qualities, and motions have in common. Individuators inhere in individual substances that do not have parts. Namely, individuators inhere in: individual atoms and souls, ether, space, and time. Individuators make it possible to distinguish, e.g., one earth-atom from another earth-atom that looks exactly the same as itself. Vaisheshika

54. (6) Inherence Inherence is the ontological glue that ties together… a whole with its parts, a quality with a substance, a motion with a substance, a universal with a substance, quality, or motion, an individuator with a partless substance. Vaisheshika

55. (6) Inherence Here’s how inherence works (the arrows indicate direction of inherence): Vaisheshika A BROWN JAR Earth-atom Earth-atom individuator individuator UNIVERSALS SUBSTANCE-WHOLE SUBSTANCE-PARTS INDIVIDUATORS QUALITIES brown color Brownness Jarness

56. (7) Absence All absences occur somewhere, with respect to some locus. E.g., the absence of a pot on the floor . All absences have absentees. E.g., the absence of a pot on the floor. All absentees are real. E.g., the pot (that is not on the floor) exists elsewhere, or existed in the past. Vaisheshika

57. Why Inherence Is Important The relation of inherence ( samavāya ) binds the elements of different categories together, thus making it possible for unified composite objects to exist in the real world, despite Vaisheshika’s commitment to pluralistic ontology. Early Buddhist philosophers, who are also committed to a pluralistic ontology, deny that unified composite objects exist, and deny that universals exist. Only momentary atoms exist. So these Buddhist philosophers have no use for the relation of inherence. Vaisheshika

58. Why Inherence Is Important Advaita Vedā nta are committed to a monistic ontology: in reality there is only Brahman. The many different things that seem to exist in the world do not inhere in Brahman, but are ultimately identical with Brahman. Hence Advaita Ved ānta philosophers also have no need of the relation of inherence to bind together the elements of different categories. To refute Vaisheshika’s pluralistic ontology, Shankara (the Advaita Vedā nta philosopher) presents an argument against inherence…. Vaisheshika

59. Why Inherence Is Important …Here’s Shankara’s argument against inherence: Suppose that the inherence relation, I , relates two separate entities, A and B . Then, since I is also separate from A and B , the question arises what relates I to A and to B . If nothing relates I to A and to B , then I is unrelated to A and B , and so I does not relate A and B ! If something else J relates I to A , and something else K relates I to B , then the question arises how J can relate I and A , and how K can relate I and B . This leads to infinite regress. Vaisheshika

60. Why Inherence Is Important A diagram of Shankara’s argument: A B ? I ? QUESTION: If I is the inherence relation that ties together A & B , then what ties I to A and I to B ? If the answer is nothing , then I cannot tie together A & B. A B I If the answer is some other ties J and K , then repeat QUESTION for J and K : what ties J to I and to A , and what ties K to I and to B ? ? A B ? J ? ? K I Vaisheshika

61. Why Inherence Is Important Shankara concludes that A and B cannot be related by inherence, but by identity—A and B are ultimately one and the same thing. This argument for monism can also be found in the Western philosophical tradition, where it is known as Bradley’s Paradox. Nyāya-Vaisheshika philosophers respond that inherence is a self-linking relation—so inherence relates A and B without needing further ties to relate inherence to A and to B (just like the rope that ties a goat to a tree without needing other ropes to tie it to the goat and to the tree). Vaisheshika

62. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

63. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

64. Sānkhya means “Enumeration” or “Analysis”. The founder is said to be Kapila (7 th century BCE). The Sānkhya-kārikā (c. 375 CE), written by Īshvarakrishna, is the earliest available and the most popular textbook of this system. Sānkhya

65. Two thousand years ago, Sānkhya was the representative Hindu philosophy, though its dominance gradually faded. Sānkhya’s influence can be seen in the Epics and the Bhagavad Gītā. Its account of the three qualities of Nature ( guna -s) was widely accepted, and the Vedānta system adopted Sānkhya’s theory of cosmic evolution. The Yoga system of Patañjali is often seen as belonging to the Sānkhya tradition. Sānkhya

66. Metaphysical Positions Pluralism: many things exist in reality, such as our individual selves, our bodies, and other ordinary objects (like tables, animals, etc.). Realism: all these things exist independently of our minds. Stuffism: ordinary objects emerge ultimately from an original stuff. Dualism: the self/soul is distinct from the body. Atheism: God † does not exist. † “God” here refers to Īshvara , a supreme personal being and creator of the universe. Sānkhya

67. The importance of Sānkhya for Indian philosophy lies in its theory of cosmic evolution. The evolution of the world is due to interaction between two primal and independent principles, purusha (spirit) and prakriti (Nature). Nature is one, but there are many spirits. Nature consists of three guna -s (qualities): sattva , rajas and tamas . To become liberated, a spirit must achieve isolation ( kaivalya ) from Nature. Sānkhya

68. Dualism of Spirit and Nature Reality consists of two principles, the masculine principle of the Spirit ( purusha ), and the feminine principle of Nature ( prakriti ). Nature is one, but there are many spirits, as many spirits as there are conscious beings or individual souls. Spirits are passive, Nature is active. Spirits are passive spectators of Nature’s activities. Sānkhya

69. Dualism of Spirit and Nature Contrast between Spirit and Nature: Sānkhya Spirit ( purusha ) Nature ( prakriti ) Many One Self Non-Self Subject Object Conscious Non-conscious Passive Active Without qualities ( guna -s) Comprised of qualities ( guna -s) Without pleasure and pain Has pleasure and pain Never changing Ever changing

70. Cosmic Evolution Contact between Spirit ( purusha ) and Nature ( prakriti ) triggers the evolution of the cosmos. Nature consists of three qualities ( guna -s), which are the agents of evolution, the actors in the unfolding drama of the universe. In its primordial state ( m ū lāprakriti ), Nature is in perfect equilibrium: the three qualities are held in a static balance. Sānkhya

71. Cosmic Evolution When Spirit comes into contact with Nature, this upsets the balance of the three qualities of Nature, and triggers Nature’s evolution. In evolving thus, Nature is acting for the sake of the Spirit. The Spirit is the enjoyer of the activities of Nature, and the ultimate goal of evolution is the liberation of the Spirit. Sānkhya

72. Cosmic Evolution The evolution of the present world from primordial Nature ( m ū lāprakriti ) proceeds as follows: Intellect ( buddhi ) evolves from primordial Nature. Egoity ( ahankāra , literally “I-maker”) evolves from the intellect. The mind ( manas ), the five sense capacities ( jñ ā nendriya -s), the five action capacities ( karmendriya -s), and the five subtle elements ( tanmātra -s) all evolve from egoity. The five gross elements ( bhuta -s) evolve from the five subtle elements. Sānkhya

73. Cosmic Evolution Spirit ( purusha ) Nature ( prakriti ) Intellect ( buddhi ) Egoity ( ahankāra ) mind 5 sense capacities 5 action capacities 5 subtle elements ( manas ) ( jñ ā nendriya -s) ( karmendriya -s) ( tanmātra -s) 5 gross elements ( bhuta -s) Sānkhya

74. Cosmic Evolution Taken together these are called the 25 principles ( tattva -s): 1 Spirit 2 Nature 3 Intellect 4 Egoity 5 Mind 6~10 Five sense capacities (hearing, touching, seeing, tasting, smelling) 11~15 Five action capacities (speaking, grasping, walking, excreting, procreating) 16~20 Five subtle elements (sound, contact, form, taste, smell) 21~25 Five gross elements (space, wind, fire, water, earth) Sānkhya

75. Cosmic Evolution Notice that intellect and mind belong to Nature ( prakriti ) , not to the Spirit ( purusha ) . This distinguishes Sānkhya dualism from mind-body dualism in Western philosophy. According to Western mind-body dualism: self = conscious being = mind But according to Sānkhya dualism: self = conscious being ≠ mind Sānkhya

76. The Three Qualities of Nature ( guna -s) The driving forces of evolution are the three qualities of Nature: sattva (lucidity), rajas (activity), and tamas (inertia). Sattva (lucidity) is buoyant and revealing. Its function is to illuminate, and it is the source of pleasure. Rajas (passion) is stimulating and active. Its function is to motivate, and it is the source of pain. Tamas (inertia) is dense and obscuring. Its function is to restrain, and it is the source of dejection or indifference. Sānkhya

77. The Three Qualities of Nature ( guna -s) The three qualities of Nature subdue one another, depend on each other, produce one another, and cooperate with each other. The varied interaction of these three qualities explains the variety of things we see in the world. The three qualities of Nature are found together in everything in Nature, but in varying proportions: at the highest level of existence sattva (lucidity) dominates, while at the lowest level tamas (inertia) is preponderant. Sānkhya

78. The Three Qualities of Nature ( guna -s) Like everything else in Nature, the intellect ( buddhi ) also has the three qualities: In its sattva (lucid) aspect, the intellect is marked by observance of duty, knowledge, freedom from desire and divine powers. In its rajas (passionate) aspect, the intellect is marked by desires. In its tamas (inert) aspect, the intellect is marked by ignorance and lethargy. Sānkhya

79. The Three Qualities of Nature ( guna -s) The intellect is the part of Nature through which the Spirit passively watches the rest of Nature. When the sattva (lucid) aspect dominates in the intellect, the intellect is able to serve the Spirit well—it can liberate the Spirit. But when the tamas (inert) aspect predominates in the intellect, the intellect is weak and muddled, and inept for the task of liberating the Spirit. Sānkhya

80. Theory of Causation The Sānkhya system developed a distinctive theory of causation to accompany its theory of cosmic evolution. The Sānkhya theory of causation is known as sat-kārya-vāda : the view ( vāda ) that the effect ( kārya ) is already existent ( sat ) in the cause. Therefore Sānkhya rejects the rival theory of causation known as asat-kārya-vāda : the view ( vāda ) that the effect ( kārya ) does not exist ( asat ) in the cause. Sānkhya

81. Theory of Causation Sat-kārya-vāda (“the effect pre-exists in the cause”) is held by Sānkhya-Yoga and Vedānta. According to this theory, an effect is not something new and different from its cause; it is already contained within the cause in potential form. An effect is just the cause developing what is latent in it, like an acorn (cause) growing into an oak tree (effect). Or an effect is just the material cause taking on a new form, like a lump of clay (cause) becoming a clay jar (effect). Sānkhya

82. Theory of Causation Sat-kārya-vāda (“the effect pre-exists in the cause”) is held by Sānkhya-Yoga and Vedānta. This theory naturally leads to the positing of some primordial stuff as the single material cause that contains all phenomena in potential form. All phenomena emerge out of this primordial stuff as modifications of it. Sānkhya

83. Theory of Causation Sat-kārya-vāda (“the effect pre-exists in the cause”) is held by Sānkhya-Yoga and Vedānta. For Sānkhya-Yoga, this primordial stuff is primordial Nature ( m ū lāprakriti ). It is also called unmanifest ( avyakta ) Nature, which evolves or develops into manifest ( vyakta ) Nature. For Vedānta schools of philosophy, this primordial stuff is Brahman. Sānkhya

84. Theory of Causation Sat-kārya-vāda (“the effect pre-exists in the cause”) is held by Sānkhya-Yoga and Vedānta. One important difference between the primordial Nature of Sānkhya-Yoga, and the Brahman of Vedānta philosophy, is this: The primordial Nature of Sānkhya-Yoga does not include the conscious self (purusha ); it is separate from the conscious self. The Brahman of Vedānta includes the conscious self ( Ā tman). Sānkhya

85. Theory of Causation Asat-kārya-vāda (“the effect does not pre-exist in the cause”) is held by Nyāya-Vaisheshika and early Buddhism. According to this theory, an effect is something new and different from its cause. This theory tends to be accepted by those schools of Indian philosophy who believe that the ultimate material cause of the phenomenal world is not some all-embracing primordial stuff, but a vast collection of discrete and indivisibly small entities. Sānkhya

86. Theory of Causation Asat-kārya-vāda (“the effect does not pre-exist in the cause”) is held by Nyāya-Vaisheshika and H ī nayāna Buddhism. For Nyāya-Vaisheshika, the indivisibly small entities that make up the phenomenal world are the atoms ( param ā nu -s). The atoms are the material causes of composite objects. Sānkhya

87. Theory of Causation Asat-kārya-vāda (“the effect does not pre-exist in the cause”) is held by Nyāya-Vaisheshika and early Buddhism. Nyāya-Vaisheshika philosophers maintain that a composite object is a new and different entity from the collection of atoms that compose it (the whole is more than the sum of its parts). Hence the effect (= the composite object) does not pre-exist in the cause (= the collection of atoms composing it). Sānkhya

88. Theory of Causation Asat-kārya-vāda (“the effect does not pre-exist in the cause”) is held by Nyāya-Vaisheshika and early Buddhism. For early Buddhism, the indivisibly small entities that make up the phenomenal world are the dharma -s, which are point-instants or aggregates of point-instants. The permanence of objects is just an illusion. In reality there are only point-instants that perish as soon as they are born, and thus are literally momentary ( kshanika ) . Sānkhya

89. Theory of Causation Asat-kārya-vāda (“the effect does not pre-exist in the cause”) is held by Nyāya-Vaisheshika and early Buddhism. Reality is an ever-changing flux, consisting of various series of point-instants that give rise to other point-instants. Each point-instant A , as it perishes, is followed by another point-instant B . The cause A must perish in order for the effect B to arise. So the effect has to be something new and different from the cause. Sānkhya

90. Theory of Causation Although Sānkhya-Yoga and the Vedānta schools hold sat-kārya-vāda , or the view that the effect pre-exists in the cause, there is disagreement over the nature of the effect: Parināma-vāda : Sānkhya-Yoga and the theistic schools of Vedānta (i.e., Vishishtādvaita and Dvaita) maintain that the effect is a real transformation ( parināma ) of the cause. Either primordial Nature (Sānkhya-Yoga) or Brahman (theistic schools of Vedānta) actually transforms into the many different things we see in the phenomenal world. Sānkhya

91. Theory of Causation Although Sānkhya-Yoga and the Vedānta schools hold sat-kārya-vāda , or the view that the effect pre-exists in the cause, there is disagreement over the nature of the effect: Vivarta-vāda : Advaita Vedānta maintains that the effect is only an illusory transformation of the cause. The cause does not undergo any real transformation, and the effect is mere appearance ( vivarta ). Brahman does not really transform into the phenomenal world, and the many different things we see in the phenomenal world are all mere appearance or illusion. Sānkhya

92. Theory of Causation To summarize, the different theories of causation and their proponents are as follows: Sānkhya sat-kārya-vāda “effect pre-exists in cause” ------------------------------- Sānkhya-Yoga Vedānta asat-kārya-vāda “effect does not pre-exist in cause” ----------------------------------------- Nyāya-Vaisheshika H ī nayāna Buddhism parināma-vāda “effect is real transformation” ----------------------------------- Sānkhya-Yoga Vishishtādvaita Vedānta Dvaita Vedānta vivarta-vāda “effect is mere appearance” -------------------------------- Advaita Vedānta

93. Theory of Causation Here is a Sānkhya argument for sat-kārya-vāda , the view that the effect pre-exists in the cause: If the cause did not contain the effect in latent form, then anything could produce anything. But clearly that’s not the case. Only a specific material cause can produce a specific effect. So the cause must contain the effect in latent form. E.g., if an acorn could produce an oak tree without containing the oak tree in latent form, then why couldn’t a pebble (which also does not contain an oak tree in latent form) also produce an oak tree? Also, if an acorn did not contain an oak tree in latent form, then it could have grown into a fir tree or anything else whatever. But clearly an acorn can only grow into an oak tree, so it must contain the oak in latent form. Sānkhya

94. Bondage and Liberation Contact between Spirit ( purusha ) and Nature ( prakriti ), as we have seen, gives rise to the cosmic evolution of Nature. This cosmic evolution is a process by which the Spirit first appears to become bound to Nature, and then appears to become liberated. Bondage consists in the Spirit’s confusing itself with Nature, and liberation consists in the Spirit’s realization that it is distinct from Nature. Sānkhya

95. Bondage and Liberation The first two steps in the cosmic evolution show how the Spirit comes to confuse itself with Nature: First, intellect ( buddhi ) evolves from primordial Nature ( m ū lāprakriti ). It is through the intellect that the Spirit mistakes Nature for itself. Then, egoity ( ahankāra , literally “I-maker”) evolves from the intellect. It is through egoity that the Spirit identifies itself with portions of Nature. Sānkhya

96. Bondage and Liberation The function of the intellect ( buddhi ) is to reflect and reveal the nature of things to the Spirit. The intellect is not conscious, but appears to be conscious because it reflects the conscious nature of the Spirit. The Spirit confuses itself with Nature, because it mistakes the reflections of Nature in the intellect for itself. Sānkhya

97. Bondage and Liberation The function of egoity ( ahankāra , “I-maker”) is to individuate and to identify as “mine”. From the cosmic point of view, egoity individuates the primordial stuff of Nature into many separate forms and objects. From the psychological point of view, egoity marks out portions of Nature as “me” and as “belonging to me”. The Spirit confuses itself with Nature, because it misidentifies itself with portions of Nature. Sānkhya

98. Bondage and Liberation To be more specific, the Spirit mistakenly identifies itself with a subtle body (one’s psychology) and a gross body (i.e., one’s physical body) which belong to Nature, not the Spirit. The gross body is made up of the five gross elements. This body is destroyed when one dies. The subtle body is made up of intellect, egoity, mind, sense and action capacities, and the five subtle elements . This body is the basis of rebirth—it is what transmigrates through the cycle of reincarnation ( samsāra ), stores up past merit and demerit, suffers pain and enjoys pleasure. Sānkhya

99. Bondage and Liberation This world of transmigration and constant change ( samsāra ) is full of suffering. Suffering is the basic human predicament. But it is only the subtle body that suffers pain. The Spirit seems to suffer only because it confuses itself with the subtle body. To stop the suffering, the Spirit must realize that it is distinct from Nature and all that is in it, and that the Spirit in fact cannot suffer pain. Sānkhya

100. Bondage and Liberation So, to attain liberation, the Spirit must be able to discriminate clearly between Spirit and Nature, and disidentify itself from all that belongs to Nature, including the subtle body. The discriminating knowledge ( viveka-khyāti ) is achieved by means of the intellect. When the quality ( guna ) of lucidity ( sattva ) is dominant in the intellect, the intellect clearly reflects the distinction between Spirit and Nature. Sānkhya

101. Bondage and Liberation But discriminating knowledge is not enough. Because the bonds between Spirit and Nature are so strong, one must sever those bonds through a special sort of meditation. Namely, going through all the components of Nature (the gross and subtle elements, the action and sense capacities, the mind, egoity, and the intellect), one must meditate: “I am not like this”, “This is not mine”, “This is not myself”. Sānkhya

102. Bondage and Liberation Through this meditational process of disidentification, one attains the state of liberation, which is called “isolation” ( kaivalya ). But the Spirit is never bound to transmigration and suffering, and it is never liberated—it only appears to be bound and liberated. It is the subtle body (a part of Nature) that is bound to transmigration and then liberated. The subtle body then dissolves into primordial Nature. Sānkhya

103. Bondage and Liberation Sānkhya philosophers compare the bond between Nature and Spirit to the relation between a dance performance and an observer of the dance. Nature is like a dancer, and Spirit is like an observer who is so captivated by her dance that he cannot take his eyes off of her. But the dancer performs for the sake of the observer, and once the performance is finished, she retires backstage, never to be seen again. Sānkhya

104. Bondage and Liberation The relation between Spirit and Nature in attaining liberation is compared to the cooperation between a lame man (= passive Spirit) and a blind man (= unconscious Nature). Lost in the wilderness, the blind man carries the lame man on his back, and the lame man serves as the eyes. Thus they find their way out of the wilderness together, and then go their separate ways home. Sānkhya

105. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

106. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

107. Yoga means “Discipline”. The Yoga system is sometimes called Rāja Yoga (“Royal Yoga”), to distinguish it from various other forms of discipline also called yoga. Foundational text is Yoga - sūtra (300~400 CE), attributed to Patañjali. Yoga

108. Metaphysical Positions Pluralism: many things exist in reality, such as our individual selves, our bodies, and other ordinary objects (like tables, animals, etc.). Realism: all these things exist independently of our minds. Stuffism: ordinary objects emerge ultimately from an original stuff. Dualism: the self/soul is distinct from the body. Theism: God † exists. † “God” here refers to Īshvara , a supreme personal being. Yoga

109. The philosophy of the Yoga system is basically the same as that of the S ā nkhya system. S ā nkhya focuses on liberation through knowledge, whereas Yoga focuses on liberation through practice. Yoga

110. But there are also some notable differences between S ā nkhya and Yoga: Ethics: Yoga places greater emphasis than S ā nkhya on ethical conduct ( dharma ) as a means of attaining liberation. Theism: Yoga is theistic, whereas S ā nkhya is atheistic. For this reason, Yoga is sometimes called theistic ( seshvara ) S ā nkhya, while S ā nkhya itself is called atheistic ( nir ī shvara ) S ā nkhya. Yoga

111. The Aim of Yoga According to Patañjali, the aim of Yoga is the cessation ( nirodha ) of the modification ( vritti ) of mentality ( citta ) . Yoga

112. The Aim of Yoga The aim of Yoga is the cessation ( nirodha ) of the modification ( vritti ) of mentality ( citta ) . “Mentality” ( citta ) comprises the three internal organs of S ā nkhya—i.e., intellect ( buddhi ), egoity ( ahank ā ra ), and mind ( manas ). Since mentality belongs to Nature ( prakriti ), it is not conscious by itself. It only reflects the consciousness of the Spirit ( purusha ). Yoga

113. The Aim of Yoga The aim of Yoga is the cessation ( nirodha ) of the modification ( vritti ) of mentality ( citta ) . When mentality ( citta ) is directed toward any object, it assumes the form of that object. In other words, mentality transforms itself to reflect the form of the object, and this transformation is called a mental “modification” ( vritti ). Yoga

114. The Aim of Yoga The aim of Yoga is the cessation ( nirodha ) of the modification ( vritti ) of mentality ( citta ) . There are five kinds of mental modification: True cognition ( pramāna ) False cognition ( viparyaya ) Imaginary construction ( vikalpa ) Sleeping state ( nidrā ) Memory ( smriti ) Yoga

115. The Aim of Yoga The aim of Yoga is the cessation ( nirodha ) of the modification ( vritti ) of mentality ( citta ) . When these mental modifications lead toward bondage ( samsāra ) , they are called “afflicted” ( klishta ). When these mental modifications lead toward liberation, they are called “unafflicted” ( aklishta ). Yoga

116. The Aim of Yoga The aim of Yoga is the cessation ( nirodha ) of the modification ( vritti ) of mentality ( citta ) . There are five kinds of mental affliction ( klesha ): ignorance ( avidyā ) egoism ( asmitā ) attachment ( rāga ) aversion ( dvesha ) instinctive clinging to life and fear of death ( abhinivesha ) Yoga

117. The Aim of Yoga The aim of Yoga is the cessation ( nirodha ) of the modification ( vritti ) of mentality ( citta ) . The practice of Yoga makes use of unafflicted mental modifications that lead toward liberation. Yoga eventually leads to the suppression of all mental modifications, whether afflicted or unafflicted. Yoga

118. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) Patañjali’s Yoga - sūtra lists eight stages in the practice of Yoga: abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dh ā ran ā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

119. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) Patañjali’s Yoga - sūtra lists eight stages in the practice of Yoga: abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) external aids breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

120. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) Patañjali’s Yoga - sūtra lists eight stages in the practice of Yoga: abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) internal aids absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

121. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) The first two stages, absention ( yama ) and observance ( niyama ), highlight the ethical preparation necessary for the practice of Yoga. Yoga ethical preparation

122. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

123. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) There are five abstentions ( yama -s) from immoral actions: Nonviolence ( ahims ā ) Truthfulness ( satya ) Not stealing ( asteya ) Celibacy ( brahmacarya ) Non-possessiveness ( aparigraha ) Nonviolence is the most important moral duty, and all other abstentions follow from it. Yoga

124. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) According to Patañjali, the five abstentions ( yama -s) are universally binding moral duties that everyone has to follow, regardless of caste, country, time or custom. Patañjali also calls the five abstentions as the Great Vows ( mah ā vrata -s). Since Jainism prescribes five Great Vows with exactly the same content, it is likely that Jaina ethics is the source of Yoga’s five abstentions. Yoga

125. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

126. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) There are five observances ( niyama -s) that should be cultivated: Purity ( shauca ) Contentment ( santosha ) Penance ( tapas ) Study of Vedic scriptures ( sv ā dhy ā ya ) Devotion to God ( Īshvara-pranidhāna ) Yoga

127. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) The five rules of observance ( niyama ) are religious practices, whereas the five rules of abstention ( yama ) are moral duties. While the rules of abstention ( yama ) morally constrain one’s conduct towards others, the rules of observance ( niyama ) are religiously prescribed duties for oneself. Yoga

128. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

129. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) Bodily posture ( ā sana ) is a seated position that is suitable for meditation. The posture should be still and pleasant, and enable continuous effort and endless relaxation. This allows freedom from disturbances due to opposed elements in nature. Yoga

130. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

131. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) After bodily posture has been mastered, one should exercise breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ). Regulating one’s breath has a steadying influence on one’s mind, and one’s mind becomes fit for concentration ( dhāranā ). Yoga

132. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

133. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) Once body and mind are disciplined through mastery of posture and breath control, one must exercise sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ). Praty ā h ā ra involves withdrawing one’s mind from the outside world that we experience through our senses. Then the mind turns inward to its own nature, and the sense organs are brought under the control of the Spirit ( purusha ). Yoga

134. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

135. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) Concentration ( dhāranā ) involves steadfastly fixing one’s mind on a particular item. This is difficult because the mind is at first unsteady—it constantly strays and wavers, flitting from one idea to another. But by constant practice one can become steadfast in concentration. Yoga

136. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

137. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) Meditation ( dhy ā na ) arises from sustained concentration ( dhāranā ) . Meditation involves a steady current of focused thought on a particular item, uninterrupted by other thoughts. Through meditation one’s thought assumes the form of the object of meditation. Yoga

138. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) abstention ( yama ) observance ( niyama ) bodily posture ( ā sana ) breath control ( pr ā n ā y ā ma ) sense control ( praty ā h ā ra ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) absorption ( sam ā dhi ) Yoga

139. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) Meditation ( dhy ā na ) culminates in absorption ( sam ā dhi ). In absorption the mind is united with the object of meditation. Whereas in meditation thought and the object of thought remain separate, in absorption thought and the object of thought become one and the same. Yoga

140. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) Absorption ( sam ā dhi ) is of two kinds— Conscious ( samprajñāta ): the meditator and the object of meditation are fused as one, but there continues to be consciousness of the object of meditation. So new mental modifications arise in the form of the object of meditation. Superconscious ( asamprajñāta ): the meditator and the object of meditation are united as one, and there is no longer consciousness of the object of meditation. So new mental modifications do not arise, they are suppressed ( niruddha ). Yoga

141. Eight Limbs of Yoga ( asht ā nga yoga ) concentration ( dhāranā ) meditation ( dhy ā na ) samyama absorption ( sam ā dhi ) The combined practice of concentration, meditation and absorption, focused on one object, is called samyama . Samyama can be focused on any object, and this will give extraordinary powers of knowing or controlling that object. Samyama is a finely honed instrument of discrimination, kind of like a microscope. Yoga

142. Liberation As in the Sānkhya system, liberation consists in the isolation ( kaivalya ) of Spirit ( purusha ) from Nature ( prakriti ) . The Spirit seems to suffer because it confuses itself with Nature, in particular with afflicted ( klishta ) mentality ( citta ). But it is difficult to distinguish Spirit from mentality, because mentality reflects and resembles the Spirit like a mirror. Yoga

143. Liberation So, for the purpose of liberation, one should use the finely honed instrument of samyama to distinguish one’s Spirit from Nature, and especially from mentality ( citta ). This culminates in superconscious absorption ( asamprajñāta samādhi ), where the Spirit rises above the state of confusion with mental modifications ( vritti -s) and afflictions ( klesha -s), and realizes its independence from Nature. Yoga

144. God ( Īshvara ) According to the Yoga system, God ( Īshvara ) is a special kind of Spirit ( purusha ), distinct from other Spirits. Unlike liberated Spirits who are isolated from Nature ( prakriti ), God is eternally connected to the purest part of Nature, i.e., to a body made of pure lucidity ( sattva ) untainted by passion ( rajas ) and inertia ( tamas ). So God is free from affliction and suffering, and above the law of karma . Yoga

145. God ( Īshvara ) God is all-knowing, all-powerful, and all-good. But God is not the creator of this world, for this world is the product of the evolution of Nature ( prakriti ). Instead, God disturbs the equilibrium of primordial Nature to launch its evolution, and removes those barriers in the course of evolution that obstruct Nature’s goal of serving and liberating the Spirit. Yoga

146. God ( Īshvara ) God does not grant liberation itself. But God in his mercy aids those who are devoted to him or meditate on him, by removing the obstacles in their progress towards liberation. Liberation is not achieved by union with God. Instead, liberation is achieved through separation of Spirit from Nature. So devotion to God and meditation on God are optional ways of progressing towards liberation. Yoga

147. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

148. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

149. Mīmāmsā means “Exegesis”. Also called Pūrva-Mīmāmsā (“Former Exegesis”), because the school is concerned with the earlier portion of the Vedas, i.e., the karma kānda (action portion). In other words, Mīmāmsā is chiefly concerned with dharma (religious and moral duty). Foundational text is Mīmāmsā - sūtra (200 BCE ~ 200 CE), attributed to Jaimini. Mīmāmsā

150. Best known Mīmāmsā philosophers are Kumārila Bhatta (fl. 660 CE) and Prabhākara Mishra (fl. 700 CE). There are 2 main subschools of Mīmāmsā: Bhātta: founded by Kumārila Bhatta Prābhākara: founded by Prabhākara Mishra. Mīmāmsā

151. Metaphysical Positions Pluralism: many things exist in reality, such as our individual selves, our bodies, and other ordinary objects (like tables, animals, etc.). Realism: all these things exist independently of our minds. Atomism: ordinary objects are ultimately made up of atoms. Dualism: the self/soul is distinct from the body. Polytheism: there are many gods and goddesses. Mīmāmsā

152. The main concern of the Mīmāmsā system is the proper interpretation of the Vedas, more specifically the Vedic injunctions , which it regards as an authoritative and infallible source of religious and moral duties ( dharma ). Accordingly, Mīmāmsā doctrines about the sources of knowledge (epistemology) and the nature of reality (metaphysics) fall in line with this main concern of the Mīmāmsā system. Mīmāmsā

153. Epistemology: here the primary concern of Mīmāmsā philosophy is to uphold the verbal testimony ( shabda ) of the Vedas as the only source by which we can know our religious and moral duties. The Mīmāmsā system admits other sources of knowledge only… in order to show that our religious and moral duties cannot be derived from these sources of knowledge, and to the extent that these sources of knowledge are required to properly interpret the Vedas. Mīmāmsā

154. Metaphysics: here the primary concern of Mīmāmsā philosophy is to uphold the picture of reality implicit in the Vedic injunctions concerning rituals and sacrifices. The Vedic injunctions imply the existence of various performers, recipients, and implements of sacrifice, the various gods to whom one sacrifices, and souls separate from our bodies that can go to heaven or hell according as they observe or violate their ritual and sacrificial duties. Accordingly, Mīmāmsā philosophy tends to accept: pluralistic realism (like Nyāya-Vaisheshika, and e.g., as opposed to Advaita Vedānta’s monistic idealism), polytheism with regard to divinity, dualism with regard to the soul and the body. Mīmāmsā

155. Duty ( dharma ) Duty ( dharma ) is defined as an injunction ( codanā ) which impels a person to action. Mīmāmsā

156. Duty ( dharma ) There are three types of duty— Obligatory ( nitya & naimittika ) : an action that must be performed. Performance of the action does not lead to merit, but non-performance results in sin. Optional ( kāmya ) : an action that may or may not be performed. Performance of the action leads to merit, and non-performance does not result in sin. Prohibited ( pratishiddha ) : an action that must not be performed. Performance of the action leads to sin, but non-performance does not lead to merit. Mīmāmsā

157. Duty ( dharma ) Obligatory ( nitya & naimittika ) : an action that must be performed. Performance of the action does not lead to merit, but non-performance results in sin. Obligatory actions are of two kinds: those which must be performed daily ( nitya ) , those which must be performed on specific occasions ( naimittika ) . Mīmāmsā

158. Duty ( dharma ) Optional ( kāmya ) : an action that may or may not be performed. Performance of the action leads to merit, and non-performance does not result in sin. Example of an optional duty that leads to merit: He who wants to go to heaven should perform sacrifices ( svargakāmo yajeta ). Mīmāmsā

159. Duty ( dharma ) Prohibited ( pratishiddha ) : an action that must not be performed. Performance of the action leads to sin, but non-performance does not lead to merit. Performance of prohibited actions incurs sin and leads to hell ( naraka ) . To prevent or mitigate the evil of performing prohibited actions, one must perform expiatory acts ( prāyashcitta ). Mīmāmsā

160. Verbal Testimony ( shabda ) three classes of injunctions: apūrva-vidhi : an injunction that commands something not otherwise known. niyama-vidhi : parisankhyā-vidhi : Mīmāmsā

161. Philosophy of Language blah Mīmāmsā

162. Heaven ( svarga ) and Liberation ( apavarga ) blah Mīmāmsā

163. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

164. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

165. Vedānta means “end of the Vedas”, i.e., the philosophy of the Upanishads. Also called Uttara-Mīmāmsā (“Later Exegesis”), because the school is concerned with the later portion of the Vedas, i.e., the jñāna kānda (knowledge portion). In other words, Vedānta is chiefly concerned with moksha (liberation through knowledge of Brahman). Foundational text is Vedānta - sūtra , also called Brahma - sūtra (200 BCE ~ 200 CE), attributed to Bādarāyana. Vedānta

166. Best known Vedānta philosophers are Shankara (c. 700~750 CE), Rāmānuja (fl. 1120 CE), Shr ī harsha (c. 1150 CE) and Madhva (c. 1280 CE). There are 3 main subschools of Vedānta: Advaita (“Non-Dualism”): founded by Shankara. Vishishtādvaita (“Qualified Non-Dualism”): founded by Rāmānuja. Dvaita (“Dualism”): founded by Madhva. Vedānta

167. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

168. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

169. Named after its alleged founder, Cārvāka. This school is also called Lokāyata, which means “those who follow the ways of the world”. The only extant Cārvāka text is Tattvopaplavasimha (“The Lion that Devours All Principles”), written by Jayarāshi (c. 750 CE). Cārvāka

170. Metaphysical Positions Dualism: the self is the body, there is no soul. Atheism: God s do not exist. Cārvāka

171. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

172. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

173. A religion founded by Vardhamāna (c. 500 BCE), who is more commonly known as Mahāv ī ra (“Great Hero”), also called the Jina (“The Conqueror”). The name “Jainism” comes from “Jina”. Jainism

174. Metaphysical Positions Pluralism: many things exist in reality, such as our individual selves, our bodies, and other ordinary objects (like tables, animals, etc.). Realism: all these things exist independently of our minds. Atomism: ordinary objects are ultimately made up of atoms. Dualism: the self/soul is distinct from the body. Atheism: God † does not exist. † “God” here refers to Īshvara , a supreme personal being and creator of the universe. Jainism

175. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

176. Indian Philosophical Systems Orthodox Nyāya Vaisheshika Sānkhya Yoga Mīmāmsā Vedānta Unorthodox Cārvāka Jainism Buddhism

177. A religion founded by Siddhārtha Gautama (c. 500 BCE), who is more commonly known as the Buddha (“The Awakened One”), also called Shākyamuni (“Sage of the Clan of Shākya”). The name “Buddhism” comes from “Buddha”. Buddhism

178. Best known Buddhist philosophers are Nāgārjuna (c. 150 CE), Vasubandhu (fl. 360 CE), Dignāga (c. 500 CE), and Dharmak ī rti (fl. 625 CE). Buddhism

179. There are 2 main divisions of Buddhism: H ī nayāna: “the lesser vehicle” to salvation (disparagingly so called by Mahāyāna Buddhists). This is a historically earlier tradition of Buddhism that professed the arhat ideal. This ideal consists in pursuing the goal of attaining liberation for oneself only. The only surviving H ī nayāna tradition now is Theravāda (“the Doctrine of the Elders”), now found in Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, and Cambodia. Mahāyāna: “the greater vehicle” to salvation. This is a historically later tradition that aspired to the bodhisattva ideal. This ideal consists in pursuing the goal of attaining liberation not just for oneself but for all sentient beings, out of compassion for their suffering. Mahāyāna forms of Buddhism are now found in Tibet, Mongolia, Vietnam, China, Korea and Japan. Buddhism

180. There are two major philosophical schools of Mahāyāna Buddhism in India: Mādhyamika: school of skeptical philosophy founded by Nāgārjuna (c. 150 CE). Its philosophy is called shūnya-vāda (“emptiness-doctrine”), because its central claim is that everything is “empty” (shūnya ) , i.e., everything lacks its own essence and depends on other things for its existence. Yogācāra: school of idealist philosophy. Its philosophy is called vijñāna-vāda (“consciousness-doctrine”), because its central claim is that everything is “consciousness” ( vijñāna ). This school is divided into Early and Late. The key philosopher of Early Yogācāra is Vasubandhu (fl. 360 CE). Late Yogācāra philosophers like Dignāga (c. 500 CE) and Dharmak ī rti (fl. 625 CE) defended their school’s doctrines by specializing in logic. Buddhism

181. Three Marks ( tri-lakshana ) of Existence According to Buddhism, everything in this world is marked by three features: Impermanence ( anitya ) No self ( anātman ) Suffering ( duhkha ) Everything that comes into being is impermanent and will fade away shortly. Likewise, there is no such thing as a permanent self that endures over time. We suffer because we are attached to the transient objects of this world that are bound to pass away. Buddhism

182. The Four Noble Truths ( ārya-satya -s) According to tradition, the Buddha’s first sermon was on the Four Noble Truths: There is suffering ( duhkha ). There is a cause of suffering ( duhkha-samudaya ).* There is a cessation of suffering ( duhkha-nirodha ).† There is a way leading to this cessation of suffering ( duhkha-nirodha-gāmin ī pratipat ).‡ __________ * In brief, the cause of suffering is desire (trishnā). † Namely, the cessation of suffering consists in the elimination of desire. ‡ This is the middle way ( madhyamā-pratipat ) between extreme self-indulgence and extreme self-mortification, and consists in the Noble Eightfold Path. Buddhism

183. The Noble Eightfold Path ( ārya-ashtāngika-mārga ) Right View ( samyag-drishti ) Right Resolve ( samyak-sankalpa ) Right Speech ( samyag-vāk ) Right Conduct ( samyak - karmānta ) Right Livelihood ( samyag-āj ī va ) Right Endeavor ( samyag - vyāyāma ) Right Mindfulness ( samyak-smriti ) Right Contemplation ( samyak-samādhi ) Buddhism wisdom ( prajña ) ethical conduct ( sh ī la ) mental discipline ( samādhi )

184. Dependent Origination ( prat ī tya-samutpāda ) The Buddhist doctrine of causation is called “dependent origination” ( prat ī tya-samutpāda ). “Dependent origination” refers to the interrelations between phenomena, whereby events depend upon other events, and composite entities depend upon their parts. Buddhism

185. Dependent Origination ( prat ī tya-samutpāda ) Dependent origination is often described by the following formula: When this is, that comes to be, From the arising of this, that arises; When this is not, that is no more, From the ceasing of this, that ceases. Buddhism

186. Dependent Origination ( prat ī tya-samutpāda ) The most important application of the doctrine of dependent origination is to the Second Noble Truth, i.e., that there is a cause of suffering. The cause of suffering is usually identified as desire (i.e., the sort of strong attachment or craving that leads to emotional pain when one is separated from the object of desire). So, by eliminating one’s desires one can eliminate suffering. Buddhism

187. Dependent Origination ( prat ī tya-samutpāda ) A more elaborate diagnosis of the cause(s) of suffering is provided in the Twelve-linked Chain of Causation ( dvādasha-nidāna ): Ignorance ( avidyā ) Karmic impressions ( samskāra ) Consciousness ( vijñāna ) Name and form ( nāma-rūpa ) Sense organs ( shadāyatana ) Sense-object contact ( sparsha ) Sensation ( vedanā ) Desire ( trishnā ) Attachment ( upādāna ) Becoming ( bhava ) Rebirth ( jāti ) Old age and death ( jarā-marana ) Each link in the chain gives rise to the next, launching a vicious cycle of suffering that can be stopped by first removing its root cause, ignorance. Buddhism from past life in future life during present life

188. Nirvāna We are bound to the cycle of birth, death and rebirth ( samsāra ), which is full of suffering, and in which our good or bad thoughts and actions have good or bad consequences according to the law of karma. Liberation from this world of samsāra is called nirvāna . Nirvāna means “blowing out”, like the extinguishing of a flame. Buddhism

189. Hīnayāna Buddhist Philosophy The canonical scriptures of Hīnayāna Buddhism are known as the Three Baskets ( tripitaka ): Vinaya-pitaka : rules of conduct and discipline of the monastic order ( sangha ) . Sūtra-pitaka : collections of the sayings, sermons and dialogues of the Buddha. Abhidharma-pitaka : philosophical analyses of human psychology and of the nature of reality. Buddhism

190. Hīnayāna Buddhist Philosophy Hīnayāna Buddhist philosophy is based on the Abhidharma texts, which list the constituent elements ( dharma -s) of the self and the world. The dharma -s, or constituent elements of reality, are either composite ( samskrita ) or incomposite ( asamskrita ). The self and objects in the world are analyzed as ever-changing bundles of composite dharma -s. Buddhism

191. Hīnayāna Buddhist Philosophy For instance, the self is analyzed into a bundle of five aggregates ( skandha -s): Visual form ( rūpa ) Feeling ( vedanā ) Sensation ( samjñā ) Karmic impressions ( samskāra ) Volition ( cetanā ) Each of these aggregates is a series of momentary events. Buddhism

192. Hīnayāna Buddhist Philosophy So the self Buddhism

193. Hīnayāna Buddhist Philosophy The two most notable schools of Hīnayāna Buddhist philosophy in India are: Sautrāntika Vaibhāshika Because of this meaning—and also due to the Buddhist doctrine of no self ( anātman )— nirvāna is sometimes thought to be a state of complete dissolution or annihilation, and criticized as such by Hindu philosophers. Buddhism

194. Sources: Chakrabarti, K., “The Problem of Induction: A Comparative Approach”, APA Newsletter on Asian and Asian-American Philosophers and Philosophies , Vol.2, No.1. Dasgupta, S., A History of Indian Philosophy , Volume 1. De Bary, Wm., ed., Sources of Indian Tradition , 1 st edition, Volume 1. Deutsch, E., Advaita Vedānta: A Philosophical Reconstruction. Deutsch, E., and Dalvi, R., eds., The Essential Vedānta: A New Source Book of Advaita Vedānta . Frauwallner, E., History of Indian Philosophy , Volume 1. Garfield, J., trans., The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way: Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. __________., “Why Did Bodhidharma Go to the East? Buddhism’s Struggle with the Mind in the World”, Sophia , Vol.45, No.2. Hiriyanna, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy . Mohanty, J., Classical Indian Philosophy . Perrett, R., Hindu Ethics: A Philosophical Study . Phillips, S., Classical Indian Metaphysics: Refutations of Realism and the Emergence of “New Logic”. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy , Volumes 1 and 2. Ranganathan, S., “Hindu Philosophy”,  The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , URL = < http://www.iep.utm.edu/h/hindu-ph.htm >. __________., trans., Patañjali’s Yoga Sūtra . Ruzsa, F., “Sānkhya”,  The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy , URL = < http://www.iep.utm.edu/s/sankhya.htm >. Sharma, C., A Critical Survey of Indian Philosophy .