Introduction to Threat Modelling in cyber security

minhajulislammoon 0 views 42 slides Sep 01, 2025
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About This Presentation

Introduction to Threat Modelling in cyber security


Slide Content

9

C3 SECURITY

C3 SECURITY

WHAT IS A
THREAT MODEL?

CYBER SECURITY HYGIENE

WHAT IS A THREAT MODEL? S
C3 SECURITY

OBJECTIVES OF A THREAT MODEL

IDENTIFY

» potential vulnerabilities and/or threats

DESCRIBE

» counter-measures to mitigate risk

PRIORITISE
» resources to maximise system security

O C3 SECURITY LTD 2020 https;

WHAT IS A THREAT MODEL? S

C3 SECURITY

OBJECTIVES OF A THREAT MODEL

DOCUMENTING RISK

WHAT IS A THREAT MODEL? S
C3 SECURITY

THE VALUE PROPOSITION: RISK MITIGATION

REPUTATION
» loss of customer confidence and trust; a weakened brand
OPERATIONS
» disruption of business operations
FINANCIAL
» loss of earnings, fines & restitution
GOVERNANCE & COMPLIANCE

> GDPR, Data Protection Act 2008, ISO27001 et. al.

O C3 SECURITY LTD 2020 https;

C3 SECURITY

JUST LIKE THE FUNCTIONAL, DESIGN AND TEST
SPECS, A THREAT MODEL IS A LIVING DOCUMENT —
AS YOU CHANGE THE DESIGN,

TO SEE IF ANY
NEW THREATS HAVE ARISEN SINCE YOU STARTED.

C3 SECURITY

THREAT
MODELLING

DOCUMENTING RISK

O C3 SECURITY LTD 2020

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

FUNDAMENTAL QUESTIONS: ASK YOURSELF

» What are we working on?

» What can go wrong?

» What are we going to do about it?

» Did we do a good job?

Adapted from “Application Threat Modelling” by OWASP
hutps:/owasp.ore/www-community/Application Threat "3

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THREAT MODELLING: A PROCESS

IDENTIFY

» Using DATA FLOW DIAGRAMS

CLASSIFY

» Using S.T.R.I.D.E and ATTACK TREES

QUANTIFY

» Using D.R.E.A.D methodology

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THREAT MODELLING: A PROCESS

IDENTIFY

» Using DATA FLOW DIAGRAMS

9

C3 SECURITY

\ 1. STORE
SN

DATA BUCKET
eam
1e)

e
A

>
E
S

+
ae | sess
=
5 DATA
| ©

z. /

GATEWAY

3. FE TCH DATA

4. RETURN

DATA

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THREAT MODELLING: A PROCESS

IDENTIFY

» Using DATA FLOW DIAGRAMS

CLASSIFY

» Using S.T.R.I.D.E and ATTACK TREES

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE S.T.R.I.D.E. METHODOLOGY

» SPOOFING

» TAMPERING

» REPUDIATION

> INFORMATION (disclosure)
> DENIAL (of service)

» ELEVATION (of privilege)

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE S.T.R.I.D.E. METHODOLOGY

» SPOOFING

C3 SECURITY

S.T.R.1.D.E.

SPOOFING

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE S.T.R.I.D.E. METHODOLOGY

» SPOOFING

» TAMPERING

C3 SECURITY

S.T.R.1.D.E.

TAMPERING

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE S.T.R.I.D.E. METHODOLOGY
» SPOOFING
» TAMPERING

» REPUDIATION

S.T.R.1.D.E.

REPUDIATION

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE S.T.R.I.D.E. METHODOLOGY

» SPOOFING
» TAMPERING
» REPUDIATION

> INFORMATION (disclosure)

C3 SECURITY

S.T.R.I.D.E.

INFORMATION DISCLOSURE

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE S.T.R.I.D.E. METHODOLOGY

» SPOOFING

» TAMPERING

» REPUDIATION

> INFORMATION (disclosure)

> DENIAL (of service)

C3 SECURITY

S.T.R.I.D.E.

DENIAL OF SERVICE (DOS)

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE S.T.R.I.D.E. METHODOLOGY

» SPOOFING

» TAMPERING

» REPUDIATION

> INFORMATION (disclosure)
> DENIAL (of service)

» ELEVATION (of privilege)

C3 SECURITY

S.T.R.I.D.E.

ELEVATION OF PRIVILEGE

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE S.T.R.I.D.E. METHODOLOGY

» SPOOFING

» TAMPERING

» REPUDIATION

> INFORMATION (disclosure)
> DENIAL (of service)

» ELEVATION (of privilege)

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THREAT MODELLING: A PROCESS

IDENTIFY

» Using DATA FLOW DIAGRAMS

CLASSIFY

» Using S.T.R.I.D.E and ATTACK TREES

9

C3 SECURITY

Learn

Combination Pick Lock Drill Lock
Code

Get Code from
written down Target

Bribe Blackmail Surveillan
Target Target (Eavesdrop)

Adapted from “Attack Trees” by Bruce Schneier, Dr. Dobb's Journal, 1999

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THREAT MODELLING: A PROCESS

IDENTIFY

» Using DATA FLOW DIAGRAMS

CLASSIFY

» Using S.T.R.I.D.E and ATTACK TREES

QUANTIFY

» Using D.R.E.A.D methodology

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE D.R.E.A.D. RISK ASSESSMENT
» DAMAGE

> R EPRODUCIBILITY

» E XPLOITABILITY

» AFFECTED (users)

> D ISCOVERABILITY

‘© C3 SECURITY LTD 2020

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE D.R.E.A.D. RISK ASSESSMENT

» DAMAGE

CREATING A THREAT MODEL =]

D.R.E.A.D.

DAMAGE

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE D.R.E.A.D. RISK ASSESSMENT
> DAMAGE

> R EPRODUCIBILITY

D.R.E.A.D.

REPRODUCIBILITY

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE D.R.E.A.D. RISK ASSESSMENT
> DAMAGE
» REPRODUCIBILITY

» E XPLOITABILITY

O C3 SECURITY LTD 2020

C3 SECURITY

D.R.E.A.D.

EXPLOITABILITY

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE D.R.E.A.D. RISK ASSESSMENT
» DAMAGE

> R EPRODUCIBILITY

» E XPLOITABILITY

> AFFECTED (users)

O C3 SECURITY LTD 2020

D.R.E.A.D.

AFFECTED USERS

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE D.R.E.A.D. RISK ASSESSMENT
» DAMAGE

> R EPRODUCIBILITY

» E XPLOITABILITY

» AFFECTED (users)

> D ISCOVERABILITY

‘© C3 SECURITY LTD 2020

D.R.E.A.D.

DISCOVERABILITY

CREATING A THREAT MODEL S

C3 SECURITY

THE D.R.E.A.D. RISK ASSESSMENT
» DAMAGE

> R EPRODUCIBILITY

» E XPLOITABILITY

» AFFECTED (users)

> D ISCOVERABILITY

‘© C3 SECURITY LTD 2020

C3 SECURITY

ITIS AND IT IS
TO DOCUMENT RISK. THE
BEST TIME TO THREAT MODEL IS