Locke_Essay_Concerning_Human_Understandi.pptx

An Essay concerning human understanding .First published in 1689, John Locke’s Essay concerning Human Understanding is widely recognized as among the greatest works in the history of Western philosophy. The Essay puts forward a systematic empiricist theory of mind, detailing how all ideas and knowledge arise from sense experience. Locke was trained in mechanical philosophy, and he crafted his account to be consistent with the best natural science of his day. The Essay was highly influential, and its rendering of empiricism would become the standard for subsequent theorists. The innovative ideas in this monumental work continue to speak to philosophers in the modern world.

1. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding By John Locke Book I: Of Innate Notions Chapter I: Introduction: §1: The faculty of the understanding gives human beings advantages and dominion over all other animals, and directs thought with respect to other things. The understanding is a faculty which, like the eye, does not see itself and so requires an effort [an effort of reflection] to be made an object of the understanding itself. §2: Locke’s purpose is to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, and its grounds. Locke will leave aside all questions concerning the physical or material basis of the mind and senses, its essence, or whether ideas depend in any way on matter, but will only consider the faculty and its objects.

2. §3: Locke will proceed: (1) to consider the original of ideas consciously observed in the mind, and how these ideas are given to the understandin g, (2) to show what knowledge the understanding has of ideas , and the evidence and extent of that knowledge, and (3) to find the grounds of assent to any proposition as true , but of which we have no certain knowledge. §4: Locke seeks to grasp the powers (capacities) of the understanding, its scope and limits (so as to not dispute about matters that are not clear and distinct or about which we can have no knowledge).

3. 5: While the understanding’s scope is limited, it suffices for practicalities and knowledge of virtue . If we cannot have certainty with respect to many things, but that is no reason to throw them all out as unknown [contra Descartes]. §6: We need not know all things, but only those that bear on our actions. §7: Inquiry into the powers and limits of the understanding will prevent us from making fruitless application of those powers or of extending our activities beyond their limits avoiding both dogmatism and skepticism [this presages Kant’s project] . §8: The term “ idea ” means whatever is the object of the understanding . Everyone is conscious of ideas in their own mind. Words and deeds show ideas are in the minds of others as well.

4. Chapter II: No Innate Principles in the Mind: §1: While many thinkers [e.g. Descartes] think there are ideas innate in the mind, it will suffice to show how knowledge arises in the mind from the natural faculties (without appeal to any innate ideas) to make this notion otiose [Occam’s razor, the rule of parsimony] , for example, the idea of color is not plausible as innate. §2: Locke claims that the primary argument for innate ideas is the argument from universal assent: (1) Everyone assents to certain ideas. (2) If everyone assents to some ideas, there must be innate ideas. Therefore, (3) there are innate ideas.

5. §3: Locke’s objection: If matters of fact were universally agreed upon, that would not make their truth innate . What is lacking is an account of how that agreement comes about. §4: If the principle of the argument from universal assent were true, then there would be no innate ideas, since there is no such universal agreement even about truths such as “It is impossible for a thing to both be and not be” (an innate idea, if there were any) . §5: Children and idiots do not assent to these truths. It is a contradiction to hold that an idea is innate and yet we have no understanding nor perception of it. [Here Locke’s assumption is that if we have an idea it cannot be unknown to us and that if we have an idea, then we must take notice of that idea]. Otherwise, there could be truths in the mind that are never known although the mind is capable of knowing them. If all it means for an idea to be innate is that the mind is capable of knowing a truth, then all truths would be innate or all adventitious (and this distinction would be otiose).

6. §6: The reply to Locke’s objection: we come to know these ideas only after coming to use reason. §7: This either means (a) as soon as we come to use reason these truths are known, or (b) the use of reason assists in discovering these truths. §8: If (b), then all the truths of mathematics will be innate. §9: Moreover, reason is the faculty of deduction of unknown truths from known truths . So, if the use of reason is needed to discover a truth, then that truth is not innate (or all certain truths are innate, as Descartes claims) . If (a) and these truths are only known when we come to the use of reason, and these truths are there while we are ignorant of them, then we both know and do not know these truths at the same time [ since there are, according to Locke, no obscure, i.e. unnoticed ideas ]. §10: If truths are not assented to as soon as they are proposed, then they are not innate, while innate truths are assented to as soon as proposed. But, if the latter, then reason is not necessary for assenting to them ( contra (a) and (b)) . §11: So, it false that these are known when we come to the use of reason. They must be known by some other faculty.

7. §12: Children and “savages’ come to the use of reason long before they come to know and assent truths such as “It is impossible for a thing to both be and not be” since they do not even frame these general thoughts. So, coming to the use of reason is not the time at which these truths come to be known. §13: So, all that can be said is that once the use of reason is attained, it is possible for these truths to be known. But, that can be said of truths which are clearly not innate. §14: Even if these truths did come to be known when the use of reason is attained, that would not show that they were innate . For, this can be said of the use of any faculty, that its objects are not known until the faculty is in operation. General ideas are only acquired after many particular ideas have been acquired.

8. §15: The mind first acquires particular ideas from the senses, stores them in memory, and then gives them names (although these ideas come before language and before the development of reason) . By abstraction from and by noticing agreement and differences between these particular ideas, the mind then forms general ideas. This argues that general ideas are acquired and not innate. §16: The child acquires truths such as 3+4 = 7 only after acquiring the names of these ideas and the idea of equality . The child does not readily assent to such truths until it has come to the use of reason, and has acquired the clear and distinct ideas for which these are names. The same applies to “It is impossible for a thing to both be and not be.” Knowledge of higher arithmetic is yet a later acquisition.

9. §17: Truths that are assented to as soon as they are proposed are thought to be innate. §18: But, if this were the criterion of innateness, then many other truths would, implausibly, have to be innate. For example, much of arithmetic, physical truths such as “Two bodies cannot occupy the same place” “Sweet is not bitter” “Yellowness is not sweetness” “White is not black” “a square is not a circle,” and every idea which is denied of another idea would be innate (including, for example, “It is impossible for a thing to both be and not be”) . This would suppose that our ideas of color, sounds, tastes, and figures would be innate. This runs counter to reason and experience. So, self-evidence does not entail innateness . §19: Nor are particular judgment s consequences of universal judgment s , since many particular judgment s are assented to while ignorant of the general maxims.

10. §20: If judgment s such as “red is not blue” are not general maxims nor of any use, that makes no difference to whether the argument from universal assent shows them to be innate or not. §21: If a proposition is assented to when it is first proposed, that actually shows them not to be innate . Since, it assumes that those, who already understand other things, are ignorant of them. For, if they were innate, then they would not have to be proposed to gain assent. If proposing them merely makes them clearer, then others’ teaching them will make them more evident than nature has made them, which ill accords with their being innate and would make them unfit to be foundations of knowledge (which was the point in claiming they are innate ). §22: To say that these judgment s are implicit knowledge and not explicit, can only mean that the mind is capable of understanding and assenting to them. But then, those who find them harder to demonstrate than to assent to once demonstrated, will not take them as innate.

11. §23: Another problem with the claim that ideas are innate if assented to at first hearing is that the terms and their significations in these propositions, which are not innate, had to be learned beforehand , and even more the ideas for which these terms stand for are not innate. If the terms are not innate, then there is nothing left in the judgment s that is innate . These terms and ideas have to be acquired gradually acquiring particular ideas (and terms) before being able to frame abstract propositions such as “It is impossible for a thing to both be and not be.” If judgment s are presented for which one has no ideas, they are merely empty sounds. §24: Locke agrees that if a term is innate, then it will have universal assent, but argues that propositions cannot be innate for those who do not understand the terms and for many (including most people) who do but have never thought about them. §25: That these objections turn on what children think is irrelevant since children show that they do think by their words and action. It is implausible that they receive and assent to many adventitious ideas and yet are ignorant of what is supposed to be innate.

12. §26: So, the argument from universal assent fails to show any ideas are innate. If there were innate ideas, then they would be the first to be acquired, but they are not. Hence, there are no innate ideas. §27: Locke argues in addition that if any ideas were innate, these abstract ideas would be the “fairest and clearest” to those who in fact (children, idiots, savages, and the illiterate) do not have these with the greatest force and vigor as would be expected of these most “natural” of people were they innate.

13. Leibniz’s Objections to Locke’s critique of innate ideas (A) A distinction must be made between necessary truths which originate in the understanding, and truths of fact which originate from the senses. (B) Leibniz rejects the argument from universal assent . (1) Universal assent is merely a sign, not a proof , that certain principles are innate. (2) Even if such principles were not known, they would be innate (because accepted when proposed). (3) We use the law of non-contradiction , for example , without explicitly attending to it . For Leibniz, like Descartes, not all ideas are attended to since at any given time, we are not aware of many things, and we require memory to bring them back to our awareness. To be in the mind, it is sufficient for truths to be found there, not that we be presently aware of or comprehend them.

14. (C) To Locke’s objection that if particular ideas are innate, then all ideas are, Leibniz replies that: (1) ideas that do not depend on the senses [for example, ideas of mathematics] , and (2) necessary truths are all innate . (3) Moreover, that while it may be that we must have some ideas from the senses before innate ideas can be understood, that does not prevent the mind from getting these truths from itself [that these ideas originate in the mind]. (D) To the objection that innate merely means that for inexplicit thoughts to be in the mind means that the mind is capable of knowing them , Leibniz argues that the ideas can be in the mind without one being aware of them (as conceded for adventitious ideas that need to retrieved by memory – Leibniz invokes Plato’s doctrine of recollection, in which some prompting helps to make what is already in the mind explicit), and that things can be in the mind that are not being used .

15. (E) Moreover, necessary truths cannot be established by any experience . The issue for Leibniz is not merely that the mind has the capacity to know innate principles, but whether the mind is capable of finding them in itself and establishing their truth independent of the senses (in the mind). (1) The mere capacity to be receptive to ideas passively is insufficient to know necessary truths. (2) The mind must be active in coming to understand necessary truths, since no experiences can (inductively) justify their necessity , even though experience may be required to prompt the mind to activity in drawing them from within itself.

16. (F) Not all ideas come from the senses , for example, ideas of reflection, [which Locke acknowledges] do not come from the senses. (G) That two bodies cannot occupy the same place needs proof, but identities [and negations of identites] such as “White is not red” do not require proof. (H) Moreover, principles, such as the law of non-contradiction, are prior to their applications , for example in the judgment “White is not red.” [or in Locke’s paradigm example:“It is impossible for a thing to both be and not be”] . (I) To the argument from terms, Leibniz replies that while “Sweet is not bitter” is not innate since the terms depend on the senses “Square is not round” is innate because the ideas square and circle are innate. (J) To the objection that the abstract general ideas are less familiar, Leibniz distinguishes between the order of nature and the chronological order of our thoughts. Abstract general principles [for example, the law of non-contradiciton] are preconditions, necessary for thought at all, even though we may not be aware of their role.

17. (K) Leibniz distinguishes between truths assented to because of the nature of things and those that are innate which only need consideration of the nature of our minds in order to be verified [For Lebniz the issue is not so much the source of the generation of ideas, as ideas, but the way the ideas are determined to be true or false] . (L) Leibniz rejects the claim that whatever is learned is not innate . We need to learn innate truths and so we can, in learning them. learn something new. Mathematics, for example, can be learned either from induction from cases or by demonstration which eliminates the need for testing particular cases.

18. (M) To the claim that our ideas come from outside us, consider ideas of reflection and ideas such as the idea of being [the “transcendentals” of medieval thought. which apply across the categories to all things, other examples include unity, truth, thing, and, perhaps, goodness, cannot be derived from the senses, since the transcendentals apply to everything]. The potential (not the actual) knowledge of these ideas is innate like the veins of marble which can be brought out by a sculptor. (N) To the argument that children learn particular sensory ideas first, Leibniz replies that methodical attentiveness is necessary for us to be aware of what is in us [for example, Socrates and the slave boy in Plato’s Meno ] . Moreover, to the claim that nature would not imprint us with innate ideas to no purpose, Leibniz replies that otherwise we could not know necessary truths, nor understand the reasons for facts. (O) There need not be innate thoughts; there only need to be innate truths , since thinking is an action, whereas innate truths are in us as dispositions or tendencies . If truths were thoughts, then we would lose truths when not actually thinking them. (P) To the argument that innate truths should show up most in people who are more “primitive”, Leibniz replies that innate maxims require attentiveness , whereas these people do not attend to them.

19. Book II: Of Ideas Chapter I: Of Ideas in General and their Original: §1: “men have in their minds several ideas, such as are those expressed by the words, whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others:” The problem is how these ideas are acquired. [“ Idea ” means whatever is the object of the understanding .]

20. §2: The mind is a blank page [ tabula rasa ] and is only furnished with ideas by experience , which either of perceived external sensible objects or of reflection on the operations of the mind. §3: The senses perceive sensations of sensible qualities (red, hard, loud, bitter, acrid, etc.) conveyed into the mind according to the ways external objects affect the senses. §4: Reflection takes notice of operations (actions and passions) of the mind , furnishing the mind with ideas of thinking, perceiving, reasoning, knowing, doubting, willing, etc. This internal or inner sense is a source of ideas we have in ourselves independent of external objects. §5 : All ideas originate initially either in sensation or reflection. Here Locke appeals to introspection.

21. §6: A child must, then, acquire its ideas gradually even before memory registers time and order. The child can have no ideas of, e.g. colors, it has not seen. §7: We come to have simple ideas in accord with the variety of objects that have affected the senses or operations of the mind to the degree they have been reflected upon . In both cases, these ideas of reflection are only clear and distinct to the extent they are attended to. §8: Ideas of sensation occupy children first, and only later ideas of reflection on the operations of the mind, since these operations only leave clear and distinct impressions when the understanding reflects on the mind’s own operations.

22. §9: The mind begins to have ideas (and to think) only when it begins to perceive (since perceive means to have ideas) . This runs counter to the Cartesian notion that the mind always thinks, since the essential feature of the mind was, according to Descartes, to think and so that thinking would begin with the beginning of the mind. §10: Thinking is an activity of the mind , the way motion is activity of a body. So, the mind does not always think since the mind may not always be in action (as is God, who is always active and never passive) . Just declaring that thinking is essential to the mind is question begging. Introspection shows that we sometimes think and sometimes do not , and so a proof is needed for the claim that the mind always thinks. The mind may exist without actually thinking. §11: In dreamless sleep, we do not think, and were we to think (have pleasures and pains) these ideas may as well belong to another person so long as, waking, we have no knowledge of them.

23. §12: The mind necessarily is conscious of its own perceptions . If Castor’s soul occupies Pollux’s body when Castor sleeps and they alternate sleeping and waking, then despite having one soul ( ex hypothesis ) they would count as two persons [note here that the criterion of personal identity is continuity of memory]. §13: So, those that sleep without dreaming do not think [even though they continue to exist]. §14: If we say that the mind thinks while sleeping, but does not retain this in memory, then one would not be able to be convinced that one was thinking without recalling those thoughts.

24. §15 : If one thinks but cannot recall the thinking, then such thinking would be useless [serve no practical purpose] . Moreover, if one says that the body retains impressions without leaving an impression on the mind, then Locke replies that those thoughts, that do not depend on the body, the mind can retain without the body, or else these thoughts are useless and Nature never makes excellent things that are useless. §16: Were there to be thoughts that occur in sleep, they would be irrational (and so useless) or we would have to say that r ationality depends on the body. §17: What ideas can one have other than those of sensation or reflection? If there are such, then why does the mind not retain them, and why are the ideas that come in dreams borrowed from waking life and why are they so incoherent?

25. §18: If the mind always thinks, then since this is not self-evident, it needs proof , yet it is more probable that the mind does not always think , and the burden of proof is on those who claim that mind always thinks. §19: It is unintelligible to say that the mind thinks without being conscious of it or perceiving that it does so. No one is in a better position to say that someone is thinking than the person who is doing the thinking [each of us has privileged access to one’s own ideas] . So, defining the mind as a thinking substance , so that the mind always thinks, is to no avail since it conflicts with experience. §20: Therefore, we have no reason to conclude that the mind thinks until it receives ideas from the senses (or reflection) .

26. §21: There are few signs that infants think: they sleep much of the time and are only stimulated to act by pains, hunger etc. The fetus is like a vegetable. §22: The child thinks more as experience, furnishing it with more ideas, by degrees,. §23: So, we begin to have ideas when we start having sensations. Ideas in the understanding begin with sensation and operations of the mind act on these ideas. §24: The mind reflects on its own operations which act on sensations, and so produces new ideas (of reflection) . So, sensation, and subsequently reflection, are the ground for the discovery of anything. §25: In receiving simple ideas the mind is passive and has no power over whether it receives these simple ideas on which all knowledge is grounded.

27. Chapter II: Of Simple Ideas: §1: Qualities that affect the senses are united in the things themselves . But, the senses differ from one another, and produce ideas that separate out simple ideas and distinguish them (for example, ideas of color, motion, coldness, hardness) . We thus have clear and distinct perception of those simple ideas as uniform appearances, which are not distinguishable into different ideas . §2: Simple ideas are furnished to the mind only by sensation and reflection . The mind can then repeat, compare, and unite them into complex ideas of great variety, but it cannot furnish nor destroy simple ideas . [Note the comparison with Newtonian physics in which atoms cannot be created destroyed] . Locke appeals to introspection to support these claims. §3: Human beings cannot imagine any other qualities than those that are given to the five [this is a conventional count ] senses (sounds, tastes, smells, visible and tangible qualities) . There could be creatures with other senses, but we are unable to have any ideas but those furnished by our particular senses.

28. Chapter III: Of Ideas of One Sense: §1: Classification of simple ideas: (1) Ideas that are given by only one sense, (2) Ideas that are given by more than one sense, (3) Ideas that are given by reflection, (4) Ideas suggested by all senses and reflection. Ideas given by only one sense, the organ of which is adapted to receive them (for example colors/eye, sounds/ear, smells/nose, tastes/palate) . If the sense organs are disordered, then they cannot admit their respective simple ideas. §2: There are many more simple ideas than those for which we have names : consider the great varieties of tastes and that we tend to name them with respect to pleasure or displeasure, rather than having names for the qualities that produce them.

29. Chapter IV: Of Solidity: §1: The idea of solidity is given by touch when a body resists a body entering into it. We feel solidity all the time from some body or other, and we get the idea of solidity when an object resists our body. (1) Note that Locke says ‘solidity’ rather than ‘impenetrability’ because the latter is negative and more of a consequence of solidity. (2) Solidity is only found in matter (and matter in some bulk). §2: The idea of solidity belongs to body and allows us to conceive filling space .

30. §3: No force can overcome the resistance of solidity. This resistance distinguishes bodies from pure space which can have neither resistance nor motion . We have an idea of pure space from seeing two bodies approach one another until they meet and manifest resistance . (A) So [contra Descartes, and in accord with Newton] we can have the idea of one body moving without another being displaced, since the idea of one body moving does not include the idea of any other body moving. This is not a claim about bodies in themselves. (B) It is a question whether one body can actually move without another moving. So, the claim about the independence of ideas of motion does not settle the issue whether there can be a vacuum.

31. §4: Solidity differs from hardness, in that the former excludes other bodies out of its space, while the latter and softness are relative to our body as to how much effort it takes to deform the body’s figure . So, water is no less solid than marble, but it takes less effort to move the particles of water aside (Locke cites the example of the solidity of air in a football which is solid and resists because movement aside is prevented). §5: Extension of bodies is distinguished from extension in space by the cohesion or continuity of solid, separable, moveable parts ; and the extension of space, the continuity of unsolid, inseparable, and immoveable parts. Mutual impulse, resistance, and thrust of bodies depends on solidity. We can then have a clear and distinct idea of empty space. §6: This idea of solidity can only be made clearer by trying to compress a solid object with one’s hands, and not by more persuasion by words.

32. Chapter V: Of Simple Ideas of Divers Senses: The ideas we get by more than one sense, are of space, or extension, figure, rest, and motion : for these make perceivable impressions, both by the eyes and by touch.

33. Chapter VI: Of Simple Ideas of Reflection: §1: The mind not only has ideas that come from outside the mind but also can turn inward and take its own actions as objects of its contemplation . §2: The two most obvious actions of the mind are perceiving (thinking) and volition (willing) . The power (faculty) of thinking is the understanding , the power (faculty) of volition is the will .

34. Chapter VII: Of Simple Ideas of both Sensation and Reflection: §1: Ideas of pleasure and pain, power, existence, and unity have their source in both sensation and reflection . §2 : Ideas of pleasure (and its degrees: satisfaction, delight, pleasure, happiness, etc. ) and pain (and its degrees: uneasiness, trouble, pain, torment, anguish, misery, etc. ) a re joined with almost all our ideas of sensation and reflection. §3: The mind has the power to choose which ideas to attend to. That our ideas are joined with pleasure or pain gives us a reason to prefer some thoughts or actions over others , and to not live in a lethargic dream.

35. §4: The same objects may produce either pain or pleasure in us . This contributes to our preservation. So, for example, warmth is pleasurable, while too much heat or cold is painful (and harmful) , while too much light is painful, too much darkness is not. §5: Our finding imperfection and dissatisfaction in creature pleasures, i.e. our seeking happiness, can also lead us to God. §6: Pleasure and pain cannot be made clearer than the experience of them , but understanding the reason we have them joined to other ideas give us sentiments of the wisdom and goodness of God.

36. §7: Ideas of existence and unity are suggested by every object (inner or outer) . We consider every idea as actually there and consider things as actually outside us . Whatever can be considered as one thing is a unity. §8: The idea of power comes from our ability to move our body , and by observing the effects of bodies. §9: The idea of succession arises from reflection on the passing train of ideas . §10: There are no ideas that are neither simple nor complex , i.e. made out of simple ones. A very few simple ideas are sufficient to make up all our ideas , in analogy with language making infinite use of finite means.

37. Chapter VIII: Some further Considerations concerning our Simple Ideas:: §1: Whatever is able to affect the senses causes a perception in the mind and produces a simple idea in the understanding . Such simple ideas are positive even when caused by a privation. §2: Simple ideas of, for example, heat and cold, light and darkness are positive ideas in the mind whatever may be true of the things that cause them, some of which may be privations . The understanding considers distinct positive ideas regardless of their causes. Investigation of such causes is a different enterprise than inquiry into that which is perceived by the understanding. These inquiries, into ideas and things must be clearly distinguished. §3: For example, a painter or a dyer have ideas of black and white without knowing their causes, or whether those causes are privations or something positive.

38. §4: Privations may cause ideas to form in the understanding by affecting our animal spirits to different degrees. §5: For example, a shadow is a privation which causes a positive idea in the mind. §6: So, darkness is a positive idea produced by a privation. However, whether the causes be privations is not settled, and depends on whether rest is something positive or merely a privation of motion. §7: Distinguishing clearly between the distinct ideas in the mind and their causes does not tell us whether the ideas resemble their causes. Perhaps, most ideas do not resemble their causes.

39. §8: The powers to produce ideas in the mind are qualities of the things themselves, while the immediate objects of perceptions of are ideas . §9: Qualities inseparable from bodies and which remain upon alteration of those bodies, application of force to them, and division of those bodies, include solidity, extension, figure, motion, or rest, and number . These are the primary qualities . These produce simple ideas in us. §10: Qualities that are nothing in the object but the powers of their primary qualities to produce sensations in us are secondary qualities (for example, colors, smells, and tastes) . Powers in objects to produce changes in another objects’ secondary qualities are also secondary qualities (for example, the power of fire to produce changes in the color of other objects).

40. §11: Bodies produce ideas in us by impulse . §12: Some sort of contact with our sense organs transmitted by nerve fibers to the brain produce the particular ideas we have in the mind . In the case of distance senses, for example, sight and hearing, there must be some sort of bodies coming from the objects to the sense organs, the eye and ear, etc.. §13: This is true not only of the primary qualities, but also of the secondary qualities, which are produced by the different motions, bulk, number, and figures [the primary qualities] of very small bodies. The ideas of secondary qualities [differ from the ideas of primary qualities in that they] do not resemble the objects that produce them [as do the ideas of the primary qualities] , nevertheless, the ideas of secondary qualities are really produced by the bodies themselves. §14: This applies to all the secondary qualities (including, for example, colors and sounds).

41. §15: So, the primary qualities resemble the objects that produce them, while the secondary qualities do not. §16: (1) If warmth were in the bodies themselves, then when the heat increases and turns into pain, then the pain would be in the bodies themselves. (2) Pain is not, plausibly, in the bodies themselves. Therefore, (3) the warmth is not in the bodies themselves either. §17: So, the primary qualities are real qualities in bodies , (for example, manna – a sweet granular substance excreted on the leaves of plants by certain insects, especially aphids) and are there in those bodies whether we perceive them or not , while the secondary qualities are not really in the bodies.

42. §18 : Secondary qualities , then, should no more be thought to be in bodies, than pain and nausea should be thought to be in them. §19: Moreover, colors , like the purple of porphyry (a mineral) disappear when the light is dim and reappears when the light is returned . But, there is no real change in the mineral by the light striking it or not. §20: Argument: (1) Pounding an almond with a pestle changes its color and taste. (2) Pounding an almond with a pestle can only change its primary qualities. Therefore, (3) the change in color and taste cannot be in the almond. The change must be in the way the changes in the primary qualities affect the senses.

43. §21: Warmth and cold are not in bodies. When one places one hand in hot water and the other in cold water, and then places both in water at room temperature, then that water feels cold to one hand and warm to the other: (1) The same water can produce warmth in one hand and cold in the other at the same time. (2) The contrary properties (warmth and cold) cannot be in the same water at the same time. Therefore, (3) warmth and cold cannot be in the water. This does not happen with figure [a primary quality] , since a body can never produce a sensation of a cube in one hand and a globe in the other. Differences in warmth and cold can be explained by motion of minute particles differing in one hand and the other. §22: This excursus into physics of bodies , while outside Locke’s project, is useful to help us distinguish clearly between qualities in bodies and the ideas of they produce in us.

44. §23: Therefore, there are three sorts of qualities in bodies: (1) primary qualities (really in the things themselves, whether they are perceive or not, and which resemble our ideas of those qualities), (2) powers o f (the primary qualities of) bodies to act on our senses to produce sensible qualities in the mind, (3) powers of the primary qualities of one body to alter the primary qualities of another body so as to make the latter produce different effects on the senses. §24: Hence: (1) Secondary qualities are powers to produce sensations in us. (2) Powers of bodies to act on our senses are thought to resemble the objects that produce sensations in us, but [in the case of secondary qualities] they do not. (3) While the third sort of powers , as when the sun acts on wax to melt it or change its color, these are not qualities of the sun, but rather e ffects of powers in the sun (determined by its primary qualities) on the wax.

45. §25: The reason we tend to think that ideas of secondary qualities resemble their causes is that ideas of secondary qualities contain nothing of extension, bulk, etc. [the primary qualities] , and we are not apt to think of them as effects of or connected with primary qualities . Whereas, in case (3) [powers of the primary qualities of one body to alter the primary qualities of another body] , we observe that the effects of one body upon another do not resemble that which produces them (for example, we do not tend to think the melted wax resembles the sun) , since we observe the qualities of both of the objects. §26: So, to mark the distinction, we call (2) [powers of bodies to act on our senses] immediately perceivable secondary qualities , and (3) [powers of the primary qualities of one body to alter the primary qualities of another body] mediately perceivable secondary qualities .

46. Chapter IX Of Perception: §1: Perception is the faculty of mind that is simplest and the idea of perception is the first idea of reflection . Bare perception is , for the most part, passive . §2: Locke appeals to introspection through which we notice perception, but only through reflection. §3: Only those changes in the body which are noticed and produce an idea in the mind are perceptions. §4: Vibrations striking the body , for example, produce no sensations of sound in the mind unless they are noticed . So, whenever there is a perception there is an idea actually produced in the understanding.

47. §5: Children receive ideas such as warmth and hunger even in the womb. §6: But such ideas are not innate, since they come from sensations of something outside the mind. §7: Various ideas of sensible qualities come into the mind of children as soon as they are born, for example, light. Various ideas come into the mind very early and it is not clear in what order.

48. §8 : Ideas received by sensation are often altered by adults through the exercise of the power of judgment (without the alteration being noticed) . For example, when we receive an impression of a flat circle, our judgment through habit arising from many experiences alters our sensation so as to give us the idea of a globe with its convex curvature. Molineux’s problem : can someone born blind, able to distinguish a globe from a cube by touch, having had sight returned, distinguish them by sight? Both Locke and Molineux say No! [Leibniz says, Yes!]. §9: That people at first say “Yes!” to this is explained by the nature of sight and the habit (which works constantly and very quickly) of connecting the ideas of sight with other ideas, so an act performed by judgment is mistaken for one performed by sensation.

49. §10: That this judgment is performed without noticing its actions, is due to the quickness of actions of the mind , which not being spatial, seem to require no time (compare understanding a whole proof taken in at a glance) . Moreover, we do not take notice of habits which produce actions without our noticing those habits, for example, we seldom notice the dark when we blink. §11: The faculty of perception distinguishes between animals and plants. §12: Perception of some degree occurs in all animals , although in some animals this is obscure, occurring quickly and in as great a variety as is suited to their needs. §13: For example, oysters which do not move have no need of sight do not have eyes. §14: Even so such animals have “some small perception” and are not completely insensible (compare people with dementia). §15: Perception is the first input into the mind and the first step towards knowledge . The fewer senses an animal has and the duller they are, the farther is an animal from knowledge.

50. Chapter X: Of Retention: §1: Retention is the faculty that keeps simple ideas received from sensation and reflection , firstly by contemplation , i.e. keeping the idea in view. §2: Secondly, simple ideas are kept by memory which is a storehouse of ideas, which only means that memory is a power of the mind to revive (“paint them anew”) perceptions it has once had (since ideas, for Locke must be actual perceptions in the mind, and so former, but no longer present, perceptions are nowhere) combined with the idea that the mind has had these perceptions before. §3: Attention and repetition help memory , but more than anything the deepest and most lasting impressions arise by being accompanied by pain and pleasure (since these preserve us) .

51. §4: Memory lasts or fades to the degree that we take notice of ideas remembered or take notice of ideas impressed by repetition and care (and the memory may be weak due to flaws or other failures in the body). §5: So, early childhood ideas often fade out of lack of repetition. For example, people early made blind do not retain ideas of color. All ideas tend to fade if not renewed by repeated sensation or reflection. §6: So, the ideas most often refreshed are retained the longest , especially simple ideas of the primary qualities which remain clearest, being constantly renewed, as are ideas which constantly affect our bodies (for example, ideas of heat and cold) , and ideas that are affections of almost all objects that affect our senses (for example, existence, duration, number) .

52. §7: Memories are often passive , arising of their own accord or as aroused by the passions, but memory is sometimes active (and so depend on the will) . No ideas revived by memory are new ones, and all are accompanied by the idea that they were formerly imprinted on the mind. §8: Memory is so important (in intellectual creatures) that without it our other faculties would be useless , since our faculties could, then, not go beyond present objects. Memory is subject to two Defects: (1) if an idea is lost to memory , then we are ignorant of it, (2) if memory functions too slowly , then it can be of no use (this is stupidity) . §9: These two defects are defects noticed in comparing one person’s capacities with another. But, memory in people is generally defective in comparison with God’s omniscience or with angels. §10: That other animals have memory is evident in birds who learn and retain their songs.

53. Chapter XI: Of Discerning and other Operations of the Mind: §1: The faculty of discerning which distinguishes ideas – perceiving them as the same or different from one another – is necessary for knowledge , since we need to have distinct ideas of different objects to have much knowledge, and since the evidence and certainty of certain judgment s (mistakenly thought to be innate) depends on such distinctions. §2: People differ regarding how well they exercise the faculty of discerning . Wit consists in assembling ideas quickly in variety by their resemblance and harmony (often using metaphor and allusion) . But, this does not imply that those with wit make good judgments, which consist in carefully distinguishing ideas so as not to be misled by resemblance. Wit is easy, since it does not, like judgment, require strict rules for good reasoning to get to the truth.

54. §3: Distinguishing ideas contributes to their clarity and determinateness , and so avoids confusions. While the senses may seem to err (as when, in illness, sugar tastes bitter) , there is no confusion between the idea of sweet and the idea of bitter. §4: Comparing (with respect to extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumstances) is an operation of the mind that operates on relations. §5: Human beings compare , not only the sensible relations of objects, as do beasts, but also general ideas which are of use in abstract reasoning. §6: Compounding is an operation of the mind that puts simple (r) ideas together to form complex ideas . Enlarging is an operation of the mind that puts together ideas of the same kind , for example, the idea of a unit put together 12 times to form the idea of a dozen. §7: Animals do not seem to form complex ideas by operations of compounding.

55. §8: Children after repetition, having fixed ideas in memory, then, begin to form words for them and understand signs to signify their ideas to others . §9: Since ideas are too numerous for us to have names for each one, the mind makes particular ideas received from particular objects to represent of all objects of a kind as a general idea by the operation of abstraction in which the idea is considered separate from all other existents, their times, places, and other particular circumstances. §10: Animals have no power of abstraction, and so do not form general ideas. §11: It is not due to the inability to form words that animals do not form general ideas, but the lack of the power of abstraction. §12: It is not clear the lack or failure of which of the above faculties occur in “idiots”. §13: The mad do not lack reason, but rather put wrong ideas together and then reason correctly from them ( for example, thinking they are made of glass, they tread cautiously).

56. §14: So far, Locke has only considered these operations of the mind as applied to simple ideas, but they operate , generally, on all ideas , because: (1) they are applied to simple ideas first , and can be understood more clearly in this context, (2) simple ideas are more clear, precise, and distin ct than complex ideas , it is easier to understand the operations of the mind than complex ideas, (3) sensation comes before reflection on the ideas of operations of the mind. §15: Here Locke claims to have given the history of the beginning of human knowledge. §16: The only way ideas come into the understanding is through sensations and operations on sensations. Again, Locke appeals to introspection to deny innate ideas. §17: While there may be other ways ideas come into the understanding than through internal and external sense, Locke can only find these two by introspection. Locke gives an analogy between the senses and a closet shut off from light with some openings through which light can enter.

57. Chapter XII: Of Complex Ideas: §1: The mind is passive in receiving simple ideas from sensation and reflection. But it acts in several ways, combining , setting them before it together without combining (the source of ideas of relations) , and abstraction , by which it forms general ideas, and complex ideas (for example, beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe ) . The power of combining [what Leibniz and Kant call synthesis] unites several ideas into one, complex, idea. §2: By repeating and joining ideas together by its operations the mind has the power to vary and multiply the objects of its thought. §3: Complex ideas come in three types, ideas of : modes, substances, and relations .

58. §4: M odes are complex ideas that cannot subsist in themselves, and which depend on or are affections of substances (for example, triangle, gratitude, murder). §5: Simple modes combine some same simple idea without being mixed with other ideas (for example, a dozen which is an idea of distinct same units) . Mixed modes combine simple ideas of several kinds to make a complex idea (for example, beauty, theft). §6 : Ideas of substances are ideas taken to represent distinct particular things that can subsist on their own. The confused idea of substance, itself, is the first such idea which then is combined with simple ideas to derive ideas of this or that substance (for example, man, lead) . Ideas of substance may be (1) singular , for example, of man or sheep, or (2) collective , for example, army of men, flock of sheep. §7: Ideas of relation arise from comparing of one idea with another . §8: Starting with simple ideas and applying the operations of the mind to them will generate even the most abstruse of ideas (for example, of space, time, and infinity).

59. Chapter XXIII: Of Our Complex Ideas of Substances: §1: Some simple ideas which constantly go together are presumed to belong to one thing. We suppose in these cases that there is some substratum in which they subsist and from which they result; this is the idea of substance . §2: The only idea we have of substance is of a something we know not what which supports qualities (accidents), and which produce simple ideas in us. We have no distinct idea of substance, but only the confused idea of a something which supports these conjoined qualities. §3: Having established this obscure and relative idea of substance in general, we come to have ideas of particular substances by noticing which simple ideas exist together and combining those with the confused idea of something, a thing, to which they belong and in which they subsist. For example a body is a thing that is extended, figured, and capable of motion; a spirit, a thing capable of thinking.

60. §4: Since we cannot conceive how these ideas of qualities can subsist alone or in one another, so we suppose them subsisting in and supported by substance of which we have only a confused and obscure idea. §5: Similarly, we have ideas of the operations of the mind and conclude that they cannot subsist in themselves but must subsist in some substance, the mind (in a spirit, or spiritual substance) . So, we have just as clear [or obsure] a notion of, and as much reason for accepting the existence of, mental substance as we do of corporeal substance [body ] . §6: All the ideas we have of particular substances are of the complex of simple ideas that co-exist, even though the cause of their union is unknown.

61. §7: The best idea of substance includes all of the simple ideas which exist in it including ideas of its active powers (for example, the power of a magnet to draw iron) and passive capacities (for example, the capacity of iron to be drawn to a magnet) , which for present purposes such potentialities can treated as simple ideas. These powers and capacities are both mediate and immediate , the former discovered by the changes the thing makes in other things, the latter by the thing’s producing ideas in us. §8: Powers compose much of our complex idea of substance, and are known through their secondary qualities , since secondary qualities are themselves merely powers in things which depend on its primary qualities.

62. §9: Three sorts of ideas make up our complex idea of substance: (1) ideas of primary qualities which are in the things, themselves, regardless of our taking notice of them, (2) ideas of secondary qualities which in the things are powers to produce those ideas in us, (3) the aptness (active and passive powers) of substances to produce or receive changes in the primary qualities so as to produce different ideas in us. §10: So, powers make up a great part of our complex idea of substance (for example, the power of gold to produce the idea of yellow in us, or the power of the sun to melt wax and at the same time to produce the idea of heat in us).

63. §11: Secondary qualities of substances would disappear were we able to see the small particles that make them up , for example, colors disappear when things are viewed through a microscope. §12: We are better off not having such accute senses, since the senses we do have are conducive to the practical conveniences of life. §13: Conjecture: spirits (angels) can take on different bodies. §14: So, our specific complex ideas of substances are of many simple ideas considered as united in a single thing , for example, the idea of a swan.

64. §15: The operations of the mind considered as coexisting in one substance, allow us to form the complex idea of an immaterial spirit , which [since it is formed in the same way] is as clear as complex ideas of material substances. Moreover, since every act of sensation includes both spiritual and corporeal parts, we cannot accept that there are nothing but material things. §16: We , thus, have no clearer idea of material substances than we do of spiritual substances.

65. §17: The idea of body differ from those of spirit in that (a) bodies cohere as solids, (b) have separable parts, and (c) have the capacity to communicate motion by impulse. §18: The ideas specific to spirit are thinking and willing, and the ability to freely move the body by thought (not by impulse which does not act freely). §19: Since spirits can only operate where they are, they can change the distince between themselves and other things and so are capable of motion. §20: Every spirit can operate on its body in its place, but cannot operate on other bodies not in that place. §21: If someone says spirits cannot move because they have no location at all, then Locke replies that this is unintelligible. §22: Our idea of body is of an extended solid substance, capable of communicating motion by impulse. Our idea of an immaterial spirit is of a substance that thinks, and has a power of exciting motion in body, by will, or thought.

66. §23-§31: We know no more of the substance of an immaterial thinking thing than we do of the substance of a solid material thing. We do not know how we think, but nor do we know how the solid parts of body cohere so as to be extended. (A) Here Locke considers the Cartesian theory that external pressures cause bodies to cohere, and rejects this theory because he accepts the possibility of empty space. (B) We are as familiar in experience with the operations of the mind as we are of the cohesion of bodies. Conceiving water as tiny particles in constant motion makes the cohesion of water every bit as problematic as conceiving spiritual substances. (C) The idea we have of body includes the power of communication of motion by impulse; and of our souls, the power of exciting of motion by thought. These are equally ignorant about these powers. So, we have as much reason to accept our idea of and the existence of spirit as we do our idea of and the existence of body.

67. §32-36: We have ideas of existence and duration; knowledge, power; pleasure and happiness; and of several other qualities and powers, which it is better to have, than to be without. By enlarging these ideas (since we have the power of enlarging our ideas) to infinity, we are able to form the idea of God. §37: This section summarizes what has been said of our ideas of specific substances and of substance as substratum of powers.