New-Central-Bank-Act (1).pptx phil dvo cdo buki

central bank act

1. THE NEW CENTRAL BANK ACT ( ncba , r.a. no. 7653) as amended by r.a. no. 11211

2. Bangko sentral ng pilipinas It is the State’s central monetary authority. It is the government agency charged with the responsibility of administering the monetary, banking and credit system of the country and is granted the power of supervision and examination over banks and non-bank financial institutions performing quasi-banking functions, including savings and loan associations. It is a government-owned corporation which enjoys fiscal and administrative autonomy.

3. STATE POLICIES ( SeC. 1) The State shall maintain a central monetary authority that shall function and operate as an independent and accountable body corporate in the discharge of its mandated responsibilities concerning money, banking and credit. In line with this policy, and considering its unique functions and responsibilities, the central monetary authority established under the New Central Bank Act, while being a government-owned corporation, shall enjoy fiscal and administrative autonomy.

4. Fiscal – relating to treasury as in the Monetary Board. Administrative – being the regulatory agency in accordance with its policy directions.

5. Salient considerations on the creation of the bsp 1. It is established as an independent central monetary authority. 2. Its capital shall be P 200,000,000,000.00 to be fully subscribed by the Philippine Government. 3. The increase in capitalization shall be funded solely from the declared dividends of the BSP in favor of the National Government . 4. Any and all declared dividends of the BSP in favor of the National Government shall be deposited in a special account in the General Fund , and earmarked for the payment of BSP’s increase in capitalization. Such payment shall be released and disbursed immediately and shall continue until the increase in capitalization has been fully paid.

6. Responsibilities of the bsp 1. To provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit. 2. To supervise bank operations. 3. To exercise regulatory and examination powers over quasi-banking operations of non-bank financial institutions. 4. To exercise regulatory and examination powers over money service businesses and payment system operators, as may be determined by the Monetary Board.

7. PRIMARY OBJECTIVES OF THE BSP (SEC. 3) 1. To maintain price stability conducive to a balanced and sustainable growth of the economy and employment; 2. To promote and maintain monetary stability and convertibility of the peso; and 3. To promote financial stability and closely work with the National Government.

8. Corporate powers expressly conferred upon bsp by its charter 1. Adopt, alter, and use a corporate seal. 2. Enter into contracts. 3. Lease or own, or otherwise dispose of, real, and personal property. 4. Sue and be sued.

9. Corporate powers expressly conferred upon bsp by its charter 5. Acquire and hold assets and incur liabilities in connection with, or as may be essential to, the conduct of its operations. 6. Compromise, condone, or release any claim of or settles liability to Bangko Sentral . 7. Do and perform any and all things that may be necessary or proper to carry out the purpose of the New Central Bank Act.

10. FUNCTIONS OF THE BSP 1. Banker of the government – the BSP shall be the official depository of the Government and shall represent in all monetary fund dealings. 2. Custodian of reserves. 3. Financial advisor of the government. 4. Government agent. 5. Source of credit. 6. Issuer of currency. 7. Clearing channel or house; especially where the PCHC does not operate. Philippine Clearing House Corporation

11. FUNCTIONS OF THE BSP 8. Supervisor of the banking system – shall include the power to: a. Supervise and conduct regular or special examinations of banking institutions and quasi-banks, which power extends to subsidiaries and affiliates engaged in allied activities. This power may not be restrained by a restraining order or writ of injunction unless there is convincing proof that the action of the BSP is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith, and a bonds executed in favor of the BSP.

12. FUNCTIONS OF THE BSP b. Summarily and without need for prior hearing, forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the PDIC as receiver in case of banks and direct PDIC to proceed with the liquidation of the closed bank. c. Initiate criminal prosecution of erring officers of banks. 9. Extends rediscounts, discounts, loans and advances to banking institutions in order to influence the volume of credit consistent with the objective of price stability and financial stability.

13. Monetary board The powers and functions of the Bangko Sentral shall be exercised by the Bangko Sentral Monetary Board, hereafter referred to as the Monetary Board, composed of seven (7) members appointed by the President of the Philippines for a term of six (6) years.

14. Powers and functions of the Monetary board 1. Issue rules and regulations it considers necessary for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of its powers. 2. Direct the management, operations and administration of the BSP, reorganize its personnel, and issue such rules and regulations as it may deem necessary or convenient for this purpose. 3. Establish a human resource management system.

15. Powers and functions of the Monetary board 4. Adopt annual budget for and authorize such expenditures by the BSP as are in the interest of the effective administration and operations of the BSP in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. 5. Indemnify its members and other officials of the BSP, including personnel of the departments performing supervision and examination functions against all costs and expenses reasonably incurred by such persons in connection with any civil or criminal action, suit or proceedings (unless the person is finally adjudged to be liable for the willful violation of the New Central Bank Act, performed in evident bad faith or with gross negligence). (SEC.15)

16. COMPOSITION OF THE MONETARY BOARD (SEC. 6) The Monetary Board shall be composed of seven (7) members appointed by the President with a 6-year term. No member of the Monetary Board may be reappointed more than once.

17. COMPOSITION OF THE MONETARY BOARD (SEC. 6) Members 1. The BSP Governor who shall be the Chairman of the Monetary Board (with a deputy Governor designated as his alternate) 2. A Cabinet member to be designated by the President (with an Undersecretary in his Department designated as his alternate) 3. Five (5) members who shall come from private sectors , all of whom shall serve full-time

18. Qualifications (SEC. 8) 1. Citizenship – natural born citizens of the Philippines. 2. Age - General Rule: At least 35 years old. Exception: Governor must be at least 40 years old 3. Of good moral character. 4. Of unquestionable integrity. 5. Of known probity and patriotism. 6. With recognized competence in social and economic disciplines.

19. POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR The Governor shall be the chief executive officer of the Bangko Sentral . His powers and duties shall be to: 1. Prepare the agenda for the meetings of the Monetary Board and to submit for the consideration of the Board the policies and measures which he believes to be necessary to carry out the purpose and provisions of this Act. 2. Execute and administer the policies and measures approved by the Monetary Board.

20. POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR 3. Direct and supervise the operations and internal administration of the Bangko Sentral . The Governor may delegate certain of his administrative responsibilities to other officers or may assign specific tasks or responsibilities to any full-time member of the Monetary Board without additional remuneration or allowance whenever he may deem fit or subject to such rules and regulations as the Monetary Board may prescribe.

21. POWERS OF THE GOVERNOR 4. Appoint and fix the remuneration and other emoluments of personnel below the rank of a department head, as well as to impose disciplinary measures upon personnel of the Bangko Sentral . 5. Render opinions, decisions, or rulings, which shall be final and executory until reversed or modified by the Monetary Board, on matters regarding application or enforcement of pertinent banking laws. 6. Exercise such other powers as may be vested in him by the Monetary Board.

22. THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND BANKS IN distress In case of a distressed banks, the BSP appoints a conservator or receiver for closure of the bank. ILLIQUIDITY – occurs when the bank is not liquid. It means that the bank cannot meet its current liabilities . It is handled by conservatorship . LIQUIDITY – is the ability of an asset to be converted into cash. An entity is liquid when it is able to pay its liabilities when they fall due.

23. THE BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND BANKS IN distress The BSP may either appoint a conservator or a receiver , or direct the closure and liquidation of the financially distressed bank.

24. conservatorship In Conservatorship, the bank still has more assets than its liabilities but its assets are not liquid or not in cash thus it cannot pay its obligation when it falls due. A Conservator is appointed whenever the Monetary Board, on the basis of a report submitted by the appropriate supervising or examining department, finds that a bank or quasi-bank is in a state of continuing inability or unwillingness to maintain a condition of liquidity deemed adequate to protect the interest of depositors and creditors.

25. POWERS OF A CONSERVATOR 1. Collect all monies and debts due to the said institution. 2. To take charge of the assets, liabilities, and the management thereof. 3. Reorganize the management thereof. 4. And such other powers as the Monetary Board deems necessary.

26. POWERS OF A CONSERVATOR 5. Exercise all powers necessary to restore its viability, with the power to overrule or revoke the actions of the previous management and board of directors of the bank or quasi-bank. 6. To bring court actions to assail or repudiate contracts entered into by the bank.

27. MAY A CONSERVATOR REVOKE A VALID CONTRACT OF THE BANK? First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115849, January 24, 1996

28. MAY A CONSERVATOR REVOKE A VALID CONTRACT OF THE BANK? First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115849, January 24, 1996 The vast and far-reaching powers of the conservator of a bank must be related to the preservation of the assets of the bank, the reorganization of the management thereof, and the restoration of its viability. Such powers cannot extend to the post-facto repudiation of perfected transactions, otherwise they would infringe against the non-impairment clause of the Constitution. The law merely gives the conservator the power to revoke contracts that are, under existing law, deemed to be defective . Hence, the conservator merely takes the place of a bank’s board of directors, so what the board cannot do, the conservator cannot do either.

29. TERMINATION OF CONSERVATORSHIP 1. Conservatorship is terminated when the Monetary Board is satisfied that the institution can operate on its own and the conservatorship is no longer necessary ; or 2. When the Monetary Board, on the basis of the report of the conservator or of its own findings, determine that the continuance in business of the institution would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors , in which case, the provisions of Section 30 on receivership and liquidation shall apply.

30. RECEIVERSHIP Receiver – one appointed when the Monetary Board, upon report of the head of the supervising or examining department, finds that a bank or quasi-bank: 1. Has notified the Bangko Sentral or publicly announced a unilateral closure, or has been dormant for at least sixty (60) days or in any manner has suspended the payment of its deposit/deposit substitute liabilities, or is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business: Provided, that this shall not include inability to pay caused by extraordinary demands.

31. RECEIVERSHIP 2. Has insufficient realizable assets , as determined by the BSP, to meet its liabilities. (Balance Sheet Test) 3. Unable to continue business without involving probable losses to its depositors and creditors.

32. RECEIVERSHIP 4. Has willfully violated a cease and desist order under Sec. 37 NCBA that has become final, involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or dissipation of the assets of the institution; in which cases, the Monetary Board may summarily and without need for prior hearing forbid the institution from doing business in the Philippines and designate the PDIC as receiver in the case of banks and direct the PDIC to proceed with the liquidation of the closed bank pursuant to this section and the relevant provisions of R.A. No. 3531, as amended. The Monetary Board shall notify in writing, through the receiver, the board of directors of the closed banks of its decision.

33. Legal effects when a bank is placed under receivership 1. Abacus Real Estate Development v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 162270, April 6, 2005. 2. Overseas Bank of Manila v. Court of Appeals, et.al ., G.R. No. L-45866, April 19, 1989. 3. Spouses Jaime and Matilde Poon v. Prime Savings Bank, represented by the PDIC as Statutory Liquidator, G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016 4. Cu v. Small Business Guarantee and Financial Corporation, G.R. No. 211222, August 7, 2017

34. Legal effects when a bank is placed under receivership 1. Abacus Real Estate Development v. Manila Banking Corporation, G.R. No. 162270, April 6, 2005. The appointment of a receiver operates to suspend the authority of the bank and of its directors and officers over its property and effects, such authority being reposed in the receiver, and in this respect, the receivership is equivalent to an injunction to restrain the bank officers from intermeddling with the property of the bank in any way. Since the bank officers were no longer authorized to transact business in connection with the bank’s assets and property, the exclusive option to purchase granted by the President of the bank is unenforceable against the bank.

35. Legal effects when a bank is placed under receivership 2. Overseas Bank of Manila v. Court of Appeals, et.al ., G.R. No. L-45866, April 19, 1989. The bank shall be forbidden to do business. As such, it is not liable to pay interest on deposits. It is however liable for obligations that accrued before the order forbidding it to do business.

36. Legal effects when a bank is placed under receivership 3. Spouses Jaime and Matilde Poon v. Prime Savings Bank, represented by the PDIC as Statutory Liquidator, G.R. No. 183794, June 13, 2016 The period during which the bank cannot do business due to insolvency is not fortuitous event, unless it is shown that the government’s action to place a bank under receivership or liquidation proceedings is tainted with arbitrariness, or that the regulatory body has acted without jurisdiction.

37. Legal effects when a bank is placed under receivership 4. Cu v. Small Business Guarantee and Financial Corporation, G.R. No. 211222, August 7, 2017 A criminal case for violation of BP 22 against a bank placed under receivership by the Monetary Board may be dismissed for the demandability of the obligation to be performed has been suspended. The filing of a petition for assistance in liquidation by PDIC as receiver as a result of the Monetary Board’s order for closure made it legally impossible for the officer who signed the check to comply with his obligation with the payee.

38. RECEIVERSHIP The appointment of a receiver shall shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board. In banks , the receiver shall be the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). In quasi-banks and non-stock savings and loan associations, any person of recognized competence in banking, credit or finance may be designated by the Bangko Sentral as receiver.

39. RECEIVERSHIP The insolvency of a bank and a consequent appointment of a receiver restrict the bank’s capacity to act, especially in relation to its property. The receiver is not authorized to transact business in connection with the bank’s assets and property. A receiver can only perform acts of administration and not acts of dominion.

40. May a closed bank under receivership sue or be sued? Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , G.R. No. 200678, June 4, 2018

41. May a closed bank under receivership sue or be sued? Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , G.R. No. 200678, June 4, 2018 A closed bank under receivership can only sue or be sued through its receiver, the PDIC. Hence, the petition filed by the petitioner bank which has been placed under receivership is dismissible if it did not join PDIC as a party to the case.

42. May a closed bank under receivership sue or be sued? Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , G.R. No. 200642, April 26, 2021

43. May a closed bank under receivership sue or be sued? Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , G.R. No. 200642, April 26, 2021 A bank under receivership can only be sue or be sued through its receiver, the PDIC. Thus, a petition filed on behalf of a bank under receivership that is neither filed through nor authorized by the PDIC must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The mandatory inclusion of the PDIC as a representative party is grounded on its statutory role as the fiduciary of the closed bank which, under the New Central Bank Act, is authorized to conserve the latter’s property for the benefit of its creditors.

44. Can A BANK UNDER RECEIVERSHIP BE REHABILITATED? Under Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653, the receiver has 90 days from appointment to rehabilitate the bank. If it fails, it shall recommend to BSP the bank’s closure and liquidation. If it succeeds, it shall recommend to BSP the resumption of bank’s business. HOWEVER, R.A. No. 11211, which became effective on March 1, 2019, removed the authority of the receiver to rehabilitate the closed bank . Upon its appointment for any of the statutory grounds, the receiver must proceed with the liquidation of the closed bank.

45. DISTINGUISH CONSERVATOR FROM RECEIVERSHIP A conservator is appointed if the bank is in a continuing state of lack of liquidity adequate to protect the interest of the bank’s creditors and depositors (meaning, its assets are more than liabilities but are not in cash or readily convertible cash), whereas a receiver is generally appointed if the bank is insolvent. A conservator takes charge of the assets, liabilities and management of the bank in distress, whereas a receiver shall immediately gather and take charge of all the assets and liabilities of the institution, administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, and exercise the general powers of the receiver under the Rules of Court.

46. DISTINGUISH CONSERVATOR FROM Receiver The bank is allowed to do business if it is only under conservatorship but cannot do business if it is placed under receivership . A conservator has one (1) year from appointment to restore the financial viability, whereas the receiver , upon its appointment based on any of the statutory grounds, must proceed with the liquidation of the closed bank.

47. LIQUIDATION Acts of liquidation are those which constitute the conversion of the assets of the banking institution to money or the sale, assignment or disposition of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of paying debts of such institution. The liquidator of a bank can prosecute and defend suits against the bank.

48. LIQUIDATION Once liquidation proceedings have been initiated, the majority stockholders of the bank can no longer file a separate action or petition to assail the order of closure. Instead, issues on validity of closure should be raised as affirmative defenses in the liquidation proceeding. This is necessary to prevent multiplicity of suits or conflicting resolutions.

49. LIQUIDATION Unlike in voluntary dissolution of a corporation under the Revised Corporation Code, BSP can liquidate the bank even without tax clearance from the Bureau of Internal Revenue.

50. LIQUIDATION Filing of Claims against the insolvent bank All claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceedings. It is not necessary that a claim be initially disputed in a court or agency before it is filed with the liquidation court. However, where it is the bank that files a claim against a another person or legal entity, the claim should be filed in the regular courts.

51. CLOSURE (Sec. 30) Grounds for Closure of a Bank or Quasi-Bank 1. Unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of business. (Cash Flow Test) 2. Insufficiency of realizable assets to meet its liabilities. (Balance Sheet Test) 3. Inability to continue business without involving probable losses to its depositors and creditors. 4. Willful violation of a cease and desist order under Sec. 37 that has become final, involving acts or transactions which amount to fraud or a dissipation of the assets.

52. CLOSURE (Sec. 30) Grounds for Closure of a Bank or Quasi-Bank 5. Notification to the BSP or public announcement of a unilateral closure. 6. Has been dormant for at least sixty (60) days or in any manner has suspended the payment of its deposit/deposit substitute. 7. Persisting in conducting its business in an unsafe or unsound manner.

53. CLOSURE Close Now-Hear Later Doctrine - It is the rule that allows BSP to order the closure of the bank even without prior notice and hearing. BSP may rely on the report of the head of its supervising and examining department, or of the conservator, if one is appointed. - It is grounded on practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public. - It is justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest.

54. CLOSURE Remedy available for the Bank to set aside the order of BSP designating a conservator, appointing a receiver, or directing the closure and liquidation of the bank The remedy available to the bank is to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the action taken by the BSP was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within 10 days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, closure/liquidation or conservatorship.

55. CLOSURE Vivas v. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013

56. CLOSURE Vivas v. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , G.R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013 This doctrine is founded on practical and legal considerations to obviate unwarranted dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders, and the general public. Swift, adequate and determined actions must be taken against financially distressed and mismanaged banks by government agencies lest the public faith in the banking system deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy.

57. Is bsp required to conduct an audit of the bank before its closure? Rural Bank of San Miguel v. Monetary Board, G.R. No. 150886, February 16, 2007.

58. Is bsp required to conduct an audit of the bank before its closure? Rural Bank of San Miguel v. Monetary Board, G.R. No. 150886, February 16, 2007. It is not required to conduct a thorough audit of the bank before ordering its closure. Under R.A. No. 7653, only a report of the head of the supervising or examining department is necessary . Needless to say, the decision of the MB and BSP, like any other administrative body, must have something to support itself and its findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence . But it is clear under R.A. Bo, 7653 that the basis need not arise from an examination as required in the old law.

59. Does an injunction, as a remedy, lie against the authority of bsp to appoint a conservator, or designate receiver, or direct the closure of a financially distressed bank? No. The authority of the BSP to designate a conservator or appoint a receiver, or direct its closure, is a valid exercise of police power. The order is final and executory and not subject to injunction. However, such order is subject to judicial scrutiny. The authority may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably and could be set aside if it is either capricious, discriminatory, whimsical, arbitrary, unjust, or is tantamount to a denial of due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The order may set aside through a petition for certiorari if the action was taken in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction In other words, the remedy of the bank is not prior to but after issuance of the order by the BSP.

60. WHAT IS THE REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THE BANK TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF BSP DESIGNATING A CONSERVATOR, APPOINTING A RECEIVER, OR DIRECTING THE CLOSURE AND LIQUIDATION OF THE BANK? Yuseco v. PDIC, as the statutory liquidator of the Unitrust Development Bank, G.R. No. 217899, September 28, 2016

61. WHAT IS THE REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THE BANK TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF BSP DESIGNATING A CONSERVATOR, APPOINTING A RECEIVER, OR DIRECTING THE CLOSURE AND LIQUIDATION OF THE BANK? Yuseco v. PDIC, as the statutory liquidator of the Unitrust Development Bank, G.R. No. 217899, September 28, 2016 The remedy available to the bank is to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals on the ground that the action taken by the BSP was in excess of jurisdiction or with such grave abuse of discretion as to amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The petition for certiorari may only be filed by the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock within 10 days from receipt by the board of directors of the institution of the order directing receivership, closure/liquidation or conservatorship.

62. WHAT IS THE REMEDY AVAILABLE TO THE BANK TO SET ASIDE THE ORDER OF BSP DESIGNATING A CONSERVATOR, APPOINTING A RECEIVER, OR DIRECTING THE CLOSURE AND LIQUIDATION OF THE BANK? There must be convincing proof, after hearing, that the resolution of BSP is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. The Board of Directors of a bank may also question the validity of the conservator’s (or receiver’s) fraudulent acts and abuses and the arbitrary action of the Monetary Board but subject to the same requisites above-mentioned. Note that appeal is not the remedy.

63. LEGAL TENDER All notes coins issued by the BSP are fully guaranteed by the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and shall be legal tender in the Philippines for all debts, both public and private.

64. LEGAL TENDER Legal tender power of Coins 1. 1-peso, 5-peso, and 10-peso coins: In amounts not exceeding P 1,000.00; 2. 1-centavo, 5-centavo, 10-centavo, and 25-centavo coins: In amounts not exceeding P 100.00.

65. LEGAL TENDER Rules on the authority of the BSP to replace legal tender 1. Notes and coins called in for replacement shall remain legal tender for a period of one (1) year from the date of call. 2. After this period, they shall cease to be legal tender but during the following year, or for such longer period as the Monetary Board may determine, they may be exchanged at par and without charge in the BSP and by its agents duly authorized for that purpose. 3. After the expiration of this latter period one (1) year, the notes and coins which have not been exchanged shall cease to a be liability of the BSP and shall be demonetized. (Sec 57)

66. LEGAL TENDER Checks representing demand deposits do not have legal tender power and their acceptance in the payment of debts, both public and private, is at the option of the creditor. However, a check which has been cleared and credited to the account of the creditor shall be equivalent to a delivery to the creditor of cash in an amount equal to the amount credited to his account.

67. LEGAL TENDER Coins which show signs of filing, clipping, or perforation and notes which have lost more than 2/5 of their surface or all of the signatures inscribed therein shall be withdrawn from the circulation and demonetized without compensation to the bearer.

68. LEGAL TENDER Actions taken by the BSP when international stability of Peso is threatened 1. Take such remedial measures as are appropriate and within the powers granted to the Monetary Board, and the BSP. 2. Submit to the President of the Philippines and the Congress, a detailed report which shall include, as a minimum, a description and analysis of:

69. LEGAL TENDER a. The nature and causes of the existing or imminent decline; b. The remedial measures already taken or to be taken by the Monetary Board; c. The monetary, fiscal or administrative measures further proposed; and d. The character or extent of the cooperation required from other government agencies for the successful execution of the policies of the Monetary Board.

70. LEGAL TENDER How BSP handles exchange crisis To protect the international reserves of the BSP in the imminence of, or during an exchange crisis, or in time of national emergency and to give the Monetary Board and the Government time in which to take constructive measures to forestall, combat, or overcome such a crisis or emergency, the Monetary Board, with the concurrence of at least five (5) of its members and with the approval of the President of the Philippines, may:

71. LEGAL TENDER 1. Temporarily suspend or restrict sales of exchange by the BSP; 2. May subject all transactions in gold and foreign exchange to license by the BSP; and 3. May require that any foreign exchange thereafter obtained by any person residing or entity operating in the Philippines be delivered to the BSP or to any bank or agent designated by the BSP for the purpose, at the effective exchange rate or rates.

72. LEGAL TENDER Foreign currency deposits made under RA No. 6426 shall be exempt from these requirements. (Sec. 72)