NUS talk-interpreting Chinese element.pptx

This presentation introduces how China is different in terms of science, health, and environmental communication research.

1. Hepeng Jia School of Communication, Soochow Univ Exploring China perspectives in science, health and environmental communications: What we can do and how

2. Strong academic for climate comm Soochow University Science and SciComm Team The team was co-founded in 2019 by two professors, Hepeng Jia and Guoyan Wang. After four years of development, the team members have grown from 4 to 12 (2020: +2, 2021: +4, 2023: +4). The team’s research interests cover science communication, health communication, risk communication, science and technology policy, climate communication and other related fields. The team has received a total of 5 national social science projects (2 national social science key projects), two National Natural Science Foundation projects, 8 Ministry of Education, Jiangsu Province and other provincial and ministerial level research projects, 9 central government projects Projects commissioned by ministries and commissions; published a total of 60+ articles in core journals (SCI/SSCI>=50), 1 English monograph, and multiple textbooks. Faculty members

3. What has China done

4. What has China done S cientifically literate public surpassed the benchmark 10% of the population in 2019 . B y 2019, science museums certified by the association have reached 293 from nine in 10 years ago 2.7 billion attendances of science communication activities, both on-site and online, were recorded in 2020, an annual increase of 138%. T he new mid- and long-term scientific literacy working plan (2021–2035) .

5. What has China done But: The open debates on GM organisms (GMOs; Yuan, 2010), potentially polluting chemicals (Jia, 2014), trash incineration (Huang, 2015), and hydropower projects (Jia, 2021) organized by civil society organizations in the 2000s and early-2010s nearly disappeared in around the mid-2010s. Scientific Squirrel and PaperClip closed. Dialogic pattern of public engagement with science has not been formed in China, despite the convenience caused by social media. Citizen science versus citizen science communicators.

6. Public engagement versus participation H undreds of science museums, more interactive and attractive communication projects, more funding and encouraging policies, and flourishing social media accounts and celebrities popularizing science online. But on the other side, open debates, consensus conferences, the public hearing for science, and other initiatives that support the lay public to question science policies, have disappeared from view. Can the situation be called PES? But : T he classic mea n ing of PES is focused on the political dimension (Lewenstein, 2016). In China, t he public is increasingly “engaged” by diversified science stuff in increasingly interactive ways. You cannot engage the public against COVID-19 in a dialogic way.

7. Trends and patterns of the world’s SC scholarship – Is China similar? The role of scientific literacy is increasingly questioned and put into contexts. From popularization to polarization. Motivated reasoning and broadened cognitive models, e.g. Cultural cognition for science (communication). Misinformation intensively examined. Rethinking Public Engagement in Science. Rewriting other classic theories in the new SC environment.

8. The role of science litreacy reconsidered Improving the scientific literacy of the public has long been regarded as the primary goal of science popularization or science communication. The traditional view is that the higher the scientific quality, the easier it is to support scientific undertakings. Scientific literacy is also considered to make it easier to mobilize citizens to participate in and accept scientific innovations. Countries have formed relatively unified scales, most of which are derived from the indicator system developed by American scholar Jon Miller. Improving the scientific quality of citizens is regarded as the core pursuit and main assessment indicator of my country's science popularization work.

9. The role of science litreacy reconsidered Scientific knowledge (which forms the core component of scientific literacy) can predict overall positive attitudes toward science, but the degree of support for specific scientific issues depends on environmental factors (Sturgis & Allum, 2004). Overall scientific knowledge does not predict attitudes toward GMOs, while knowledge of genetics only weakly predicts attitudes toward GMOs (Allum et al., 2008). However, familiarity with scientific procedures (another component of the scientific literacy scale) can positively predict attitudes towards GM ( Ceccoli & Hixon, 2012). Scientific knowledge is useful in predicting attitudes toward less controversial technologies, such as nanotechnology (Brossard et al., 2009). However, once prior knowledge is acquired, even attitudes toward nanotechnology are affected by prior attitudes (Druckman & Bolsen, 2011).

10. The role of science litreacy reconsidered In the United States, where the issue of climate change is highly controversial, scientific literacy cannot predict support for policies and, on the contrary, predicts polarized attitudes (Drummond & Fischhoff , 2017). Scientific literacy predicts resistance to conspiracy theories, but the effect is relatively small. The impact of scientific literacy on health behavior depends on context ( Cavojova et al., 2020; He et al., 2021). The more opposed people are to GM, the more they think they have higher knowledge of GM (Fernbach et al., 2019; Min et al., 2021). The (European and American) left and right tend to have higher (objective) knowledge in the areas they support and more incorrect knowledge in the areas they oppose (Nisbet et al., 2015).

11. Is Everything about Conspiracy Theories? The Impact of Public Perception of Conspiracy Theories on Chinese Public’s Intention for Covid-19 Vaccination 杨正, 罗茜 , *贾鹤鹏 苏州大学传媒学院

12. Is Everything about Conspiracy Theories? Survey ： A nationwide questionnaire survey on 1,890 people who have not received the COVID-19 vaccine . Using hierarchical linear regression

13. Is Everything about Conspiracy Theories? 系数 a 模型 未标准化系数 标准化系数 t 显著性 B 标准错误 Beta 2 ( 常量 ) 2.629 .278   9.470 .000 年龄 .028 .030 .023 .934 .350 性别 .136 .058 .052 2.359 .018 学历 .064 .030 .052 2.120 .034 月收入 .053 .035 .038 1.500 .134 风险感知 -.069 .025 -.062 -2.759 .006 有效性感知 .099 .077 .051 1.283 .200 安全性感知 .331 .083 .158 4.003 .000 易得性感知 .171 .025 .159 6.829 .000 3 ( 常量 ) 3.195 .282   11.311 .000 年龄 .026 .029 .022 .893 .372 性别 .083 .057 .032 1.453 .146 学历 .050 .030 .040 1.679 .093 月收入 .060 .035 .043 1.722 .085 风险感知 -.010 .026 -.009 -.391 .696 有效性感知 .053 .076 .027 .703 .482 安全性感知 .318 .081 .152 3.909 .000 易得性感知 .188 .025 .175 7.620 .000 疫苗阴谋论 -.251 .039 -.221 -6.402 .000 新冠阴谋论 .053 .048 .038 1.109 .268 系数 a 模型 未标准化系数 标准化系数 t 显著性 B 标准错误 Beta 3 ( 常量 ) 2.601 .273   9.528 .000 年龄 .023 .029 .019 .782 .435 性别 .111 .057 .043 1.956 .051 学历 .038 .030 .031 1.283 .200 月收入 .050 .035 .036 1.433 .152 风险感知 -.055 .025 -.050 -2.234 .026 有效性感知 .051 .076 .026 .669 .504 安全性感知 .306 .081 .146 3.772 .000 易得性感知 .143 .025 .134 5.798 .000 疫苗知识 .139 .020 .173 7.016 .000 科学知识 .024 .011 .054 2.224 .026 4 ( 常量 ) 3.068 .281   10.900 .000 年龄 .022 .029 .019 .776 .438 性别 .077 .056 .030 1.370 .171 学历 .034 .030 .027 1.143 .253 月收入 .055 .034 .040 1.609 .108 风险感知 -.012 .026 -.011 -.480 .631 有效性感知 .022 .075 .011 .294 .769 安全性感知 .305 .080 .145 3.788 .000 易得性感知 .162 .025 .152 6.594 .000 疫苗知识 .119 .020 .148 5.957 .000 科学知识 .013 .011 .029 1.179 .239 疫苗阴谋论 -.178 .040 -.157 -4.422 .000 新冠阴谋论 .016 .048 .011 .324 .746

14. Is Everything about Conspiracy Theories? The Chinese public's awareness and acceptance of conspiracy theories does affect their willingness to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. There is no significant relationship between the Chinese public's willingness to be vaccinated and their awareness of Covid-19 related conspiracy theories; the public's awareness of Covid-19 vaccines-related conspiracy . There is a significant correlation between attitudes and willingness to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. The public's scientific literacy serves as an intermediary factor mediating the correlation between the Chinese public's willingness to be vaccinated against COVID-19 and their awareness of conspiracy theories. Similar to the classification of conspiracy theories, the public's general scientific literacy does not play a significant moderating role in vaccination intention; however, the public's vaccine-related literacy plays a significant moderating role. Main findings

15. 强国通行证： 探究中国公众对疫苗接种证明的态度及其社会文化基础 2021 data

16. 强国通行证 — 疫苗接种证明的态度 Nationalism, which reflects support for the government, has the highest predictive power. However, in the absence of a large-scale epidemic in China, the perceived national benefits are not significant. Subjective norms reflecting perceived vaccination attitudes of those around them also strongly predicted attitudes toward passes. The weak negative effect of scientific literacy deserves attention. Passport to a mighty nation

17. Weak relationship between scientific literacy and a weaker belief in almost all COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Nationalism was associated with a stronger belief in theories favorable to China and a weaker belief in “China as culprit” theories. Media trust and attitudes toward science were also associated with conspiracy beliefs. However, the association depended on the nature of the media outlets and conspiracy theories. The multifaceted nature of conspiracy beliefs in China and the robust political dimensions of the relationship between such beliefs and science or media factors. Underlying factors in the Chinese public’s belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories

18. Belief that the coronavirus has a foreign natural origin is associated with increased rather than decreased willingness to engage in protective behaviors. Belief that the origin of the pandemic was a Chinese laboratory may be significantly associated with a reduced willingness to protect one's health. People's levels of nationalism, as measured by national pride and satisfaction with China's pandemic control efforts, were closely related to their intentions to adopt protective behaviors, which moderated the health consequences of believing false conspiracy theories. Scientific literacy is also associated with an increased likelihood of taking preventive measures. But the effect is far less remarkable than nationalistic and conspiracy theory beliefs. The diverse health consequences of conspiracy beliefs are revealed, demonstrating the importance of examining collectivist sociopolitical structures in health communication. H ealth consequences of conspiracy theories

19. Majority of the public approve of mandatory vaccination in China . Factors Influencing Chinese Public Attitudes to Compulsory COVID-19 Vaccination: Demographic variables were not associated with attitude. Nothing to do with vaccine knowledge. In addition to the perceived threat of worrying about being isolated and the perceived benefit of keeping oneself free from infection, other classic health belief model variables (susceptibility, vulnerability, severity, etc.) susceptibility, community vulnerability, serious threat to family, community and country) were not significant. Scientific literacy negatively affects attitudes toward compulsory vaccination. Main findings Subjective norm of vaccination (perceived population of others who vaccinated themselves) significantly and positively affected attitudes The perception of national economic benefits significantly and positively affects attitudes. Concerns about foreign economies overtaking China significantly negatively impacted attitudes. Nationalism significantly positively affects attitudes. Altruism significantly positively affects attitude. Belief in virus conspiracy theories significantly affects attitudes in positive direction. Conspiracy thinking significantly and positively affect attitudes toward mandatory vaccination. Attitudes to compulsory COVID-19 vaccination (2022 data)

20. Puzzle for Chinese youth Willingness to visit science museums is strongly and positively correlated with scientific attitude , but has no correlation with scientific literacy and scientific trust. U nexpectedly, a positive correlation between the w illingness to visit science museums and supernatural behavior s, such as taking fortune-telling. Do metaphysical behavior s play a more important role than scientific quality? It is awe rather than knowledge or trust in science that leads people to go to science museums.

21. National survey of more than 2800 civil servants in partnership with Chinese Association of Agricultural Science Societies. Examine both attitude to GMOs, belief in conspiracy theories, scientific literacy, administrative literacy, and so on. Administrative literacy is a major moderator to adjust the relationship between attitude to GMOs and belief in conspiracy theories. Echoing the worldwide effort to reconsider the role of scientific literacy and looking for other measure, e.g. a professional literacy here. Beyond COVID-19: Civil servants’ attitude to GMOs in China

22. Belief that the coronavirus has a foreign natural origin is associated with increased rather than decreased willingness to engage in protective behaviors. Belief that the origin of the pandemic was a Chinese laboratory may be significantly associated with a reduced willingness to protect one's health. People's levels of nationalism, as measured by national pride and satisfaction with China's pandemic control efforts, were closely related to their intentions to adopt protective behaviors, which moderated the health consequences of believing false conspiracy theories. Scientific literacy is also associated with an increased likelihood of taking preventive measures. But the effect is far less remarkable than nationalistic and conspiracy theory beliefs. The diverse health consequences of conspiracy beliefs are revealed, demonstrating the importance of examining collectivist sociopolitical structures in health communication. Zero-COVID and science literacy (Under review)

23. Partisanship and attitude polarization Attitudinal polarization is often associated with the politicization of science (Bolsen and Druckman, 2015). Left-leaning ideology on China’s social media Weibo is generally associated with anti-GMO attitude (Zhang and Sun, 2018). Polarization and its effects prompt reconsideration of some long-held simplistic views, such as the direct link between knowledge and attitude.

24. How ideologies shape people’s science & health belief For economic right’s moderating role, among more radical economic rightists, which account for a significant portion of China’s liberals , and among milder political leftists, perceived severity was more strongly associated with the attitude toward zero-COVID policy. The patterns demonstrate that holders of these ideological values may be more likely to rely on individual risk perceptions to make judgments . For the political left’s moderating role, more extreme political leftists were more likely to link trust in science to support the zero-COVID policy. It possibly shows that political stance distorted people’s perception of science. For nationalism’s moderating role, extreme nationalists seemed to support a zero-COVID policy without feeling too severe. The moderating roles of ideological and political values show political distortions of people's threat perception and scientific trust in their attitude to zero-COVID policy. Zero-COVID or coexistence

25. Weak relationship between scientific literacy and a weaker belief in almost all COVID-19 conspiracy theories. Nationalism was associated with a stronger belief in theories favorable to China and a weaker belief in “China as culprit” theories. Media trust and attitudes toward science were also associated with conspiracy beliefs. However, the association depended on the nature of the media outlets and conspiracy theories. The multifaceted nature of conspiracy beliefs in China and the robust political dimensions of the relationship between such beliefs and science or media factors. Underlying factors in the Chinese public’s belief in COVID-19 conspiracy theories

26. Nationalism is an important positive predictor of climate actions: People who rate higher on nationalism are more willing to act. Chinese public has only limited knowledge about climate policy. Knowledge about climate policy can positively predict public a ttitude . Both economic leftism and rightism can positively predict climate actions, which indicates economy is the major consideration of Chinese public regarding climate actions. Scientific literacy is a positive but weak predictor of climate perception but NOT of climate action . Beyond COVID-19: Ideological division shapes climate attitude too

27. So, as in the United States and Europe, ideological attitudes are linked to people’s attitudes to GMOs, climate change, COVID-conspiracy theories and COVID-19 policies. Ideology also distorted people’s cognitive judgement on Zero-COVID policies. Science literacy cannot determine attitude or only slightly influence attitude. Can we say China is the same as US and EU in terms of attitude polarization? But, In COVID-19 preventive behaviors, it is NOT ideological direction but the polarization degree that determines Chinese public’s intentions for preventive behaviors. The more polarized in ideological spectrum, the more likely are people to take preventive actions. Is China unique?

28. Perceived national rather than personal or community risks/benefits dominate personal attitude. However, for climate-friendly behaviors, national risks/benefits fail to work. A powerful nation can address climate change itself, and no need to involve citizens. Efficacy is important, but the current messages lack it. For climate-friendly behaviors, perceived personal benefit and obedience to policy dominates. Science doesn’t matter, as long as China becomes a powerful low-carbon nation. Unlike in other countries, online climate messages focus on nation rather individuals. Explanation: Statism-oriented climate attitude and behaviors

29. More China uniqueness happens here – Strong organization in SC The top-down publicity system (Jia & Liu, 2009). Science popularization behavior is highly correlated with the communication frequency of publicity personnel. This illustrates the high organization and mobilization of science communication in China (Jia, Shi & Wang, 2018). It is highly dependent on organizations for communication, and individual attitudes are not significant (Jia, 2020; 2022). Science popularization training actually leads to a weakening of willingness (Jia, Yang & Luo, 2022).

30. Chinese scientists’ communication paradox Chinese scientists’ media contacts were highly associated with the frequency with which they talked with their PIOs (public information officers; Jia et al., 2018). But the same dataset showed Chinese scientists’ perception of institutional censorship was statistically positively associated with their media contacts (both 2016 and 2018 data) . Should not awareness of censorship discourage Chinese scientists? What’s wrong? Our follow-up interviews with scientists and PIOs at a large research university in central China indicated that many scientists were wary of media outlets’ request for payment in order to propagandize their research achievements. The sense of censorship comforted rather than upset them. Science communication scholars need to explore the underlying mechanism of this specific context to better understand Chinese scientists’ communication behaviors. Variable Name β Status Organizational Position 0.052 Scientific Productivity -0.011 Discipline * 0.097 Perceived Public Interests in Their Research 0.058 Past media experience New media use 0.029 Media engagement -0.063 Understanding of media mechanism ** 0.131 Perceived media role Evaluation of media contact -0.012 Evaluation of media coverage on own research field *** 0.181 Expectation on media report Recognition Leader recognition * 0.098 Peer recognition 0.010 Institutional support -0.046 Institutional censorship * 0.090 Public recognition ** 0.159 Control variables Gender 0.064 Age * 0.053 Institution attribute 0.037 Media interaction * 0.088 *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001

31. COVID-19 and Chinese scientists’ communication paradox T he more surveyed scientists thought they had received sufficient science communication training, the less likely they would communicate COVID-19 to the public, utterly contrary to the widely held view on the positive role of self-efficacy (The measurement of self-efficacy commonly covers whether the surveyed scientists believe they have received science communication training; Dudo, 2013). G uessed Chinese scientists’ organization reliance also caused this. It is also possible that science communication training provided by the Chinese research institutions might stress the need to keep silent on certain issues. But, at the early stage of COVID-19, featuring massive lockdowns, the organized science communication in ordinary research institutions seemed nonexistent, which discouraged these “privileged scientists” from communicating COVID-related science to the public.

32. Chinese scientists’ communication paradox: Are Chinese scientists different?

33. 科普 科技传播 科学传播 Pandemic and scientists’ crisis communication 态度 Attitude 感知行为控制 Perceived Behavior Control 主观规范 Subjective Norms 道德规范 Moral Norms 描述性规范 Descriptive Norms 意愿 Intention 感知机构支持 Perceived Institutional Support 感知行为收益 Perceived Behavior Benefits H1 H7 H2 H3 H4 H5 H9 H6 H8 H1： 态度→意愿 H2： 主观规范→意愿 H3： 感知行为控制 →意愿 H4： 描述性规范 →意愿 H5： 道德规范 →意愿 H6： 感知机构支持 →意愿 H7： 感知行为收益 → 意愿 H8：感知机构 机构支持 → 行为收益 H9：感知机构 支持→ 态度 H10：感知机构 支持→收益

34. I will write science popularization articles related to COVID-19 I will participate in discussions related to COVID-19 (including online). I will provide information related to COVID-19 on Weibo, Zhihu , Toutiao , Wukong Q & A, Tiktok and other social media platforms. I will correct others' misconceptions about the COVID-19. I will provide scientific knowledge about the COVID-19 in my WeChat group. I will accept media interviews about the COVID-19 or communicate with reporters. I will correct the misconceptions about the COVID-19 in wechat groups. Science Communication or knowledge expression ？ The willingness of Chinese scientists to participate in science communication may not be as low as we think, but the indicators to measure this willingness need to be adjusted accordingly under the usage habits of social media. It is not only engaging in traditional science popularization activities or media behavior that is "qualified" science communication for the public. In addition, scientists‘ move towards “knowledge expression ” is the result of rich media patterns in the digital age. Scientists' active participation in science popularization is inseparable from emerging popular science media. The strong organization of Chinese scientific research institutions should provide more support and services in the process of scientists moving from ”public communication" to "knowledge expression". Pandemic and scientists’ crisis communication

35. Offers a new perspective to examine the medialization of science: When science was “medialized” due to bureaucratic order, we can hardly expect any consequential impact of the so-called medialization on science as observed in the West. This may explain Chinese scientists’ passive and impassive attitude to science communication through mass media mentioned above (Jia et al., 2018). But it also echoes earlier study findings examining the dominant organizational feature of China’s SC. Can organizational strategy ensure everything? Beyond COVID-19: Medialization real in China?

36. R esearchers (Chapman et al., 2007; Dumas-Mallet et al., 2020; Fanelli, 2013; Kiernan, 2003; Phillips et al., 1991) have general ly found that media coverage can increase the citation frequency of a reported paper. No China data. U tilizing data from the “Scientific Journals meet Mass Media” project (2007-2011) sponsored by the China Association for Science and Technology (CAST), the only regular media-journal exchange platform in the countr y. A large sample of over 7,000 papers in six journals over five years. Beyond COVID-19: Medialization real in China?

37. The citations of papers recommended by science journals to the mass media were indeed statistically significantly higher than those of articles in the control group (unrecommended papers in the same issue of the same journal Whether news released to the media End of the second year after media coverage End of the sixth year M T Sig M T Sig Yes 1.75 6.101 .000** 11.2 6.219 .000** No （ control ） 1.10 7.4

38. However, among the recommended papers, those reported by the media haven’t resulted in statistically significantly higher citation than the papers that the media didn’t report. Whether news released to the media End of the second year after media coverage End of the sixth year M T Sig M T Sig Yes 1.81 0.474 .636 11.57 0.516 .606 No （ control ） 1.70 10.94

39. The time to consider China’s uniqueness Is China different (this time it came to Science-media interaction system)?

40. The time to consider China’s uniqueness 1) The overall citation volume of Chinese domestic science and technology journals during the period of this study (2007-2011) was relatively low. P apers recommended by editors themselves may have reached the citation ceiling, 2) The press releases of the papers recommended by the media face-to-face project are too professional and difficult for the media . 3) When Chinese journals participated in media face-to-face projects and face the mass media, their work is very unsystematic, making it difficult to achieve consistent results. So, should we say China is different, or simply say China hadn’t reached a quality standard (which means it can be the same later)? 3) Yet, another China difference emerged in our data: The effect of professional media reporting on increasing citations is interior to that of mass media. It shouldn’t be. P rofessional media should be read by more scientists than mass media can. But why? Before determining China’s difference, let’s analyze the journal/media citation data

41. The time to consider China’s uniqueness, but 1) Overall, WeChat public accounts’ coverage of papers can indeed lead to higher paper downloads and citations. 2) Compare findings in previous slide: The effect of professional media reporting on increasing citations is interior to that of mass media . So, should we say China is different, or simply existing journal-media research hasn’t investigated the complicated pattern across different media, lay media, professional, and social media accounts of journals? When we move to social media world……

42. The time to consider China’s uniqueness S ocial, political, communication, and knowledge control factors (Hilgartner, 2017) that have jointly suspended or delayed the Chinese government’s decisions to commercialize GM crops, build more dams and develop inland nuclear power plants. Should debates be the only option ? How to decipher China’s uniqueness academically? Where is the research opportunities linked to the uniqueness?

43. Science in movements: Media & comm   Hydropower GMO Nuclear 争议基本形态 Collective efforts of ENGOs to resist hydropower projects Long-lasting and massive public rejection Low-profiled internal elite strife. No organized anti-nuclear campaigns 科技争议的社会共源 Growing public concerns about uncontrolled technologies; Competing knowledge claims; the rise of environmentalism and civil society; the rise of mass media, Internet, and social media; Scientists’ slow response to the public concerns. Decreased public trust in the government and official science. 公众对正统科学的信任 Low Low Generally high except the short period after Fukushima accident 媒体因素 Media actively reported hydropower controversies to highlight their environmental agenda. Few censorship Media actively reported GMO controvers y to win public attention. Censorship only after public rejection widespread Media positively reported domestic nuclear power, largely rejecting to offer platforms for controversies. No censorship   Most debates ceased before the rise of social media.   Social media diversified public rejection of GMOs and intensified controversies.     Social media debates on nuclear power were untraceable.

44. Science in movements: Social movements 社会运动视角   Hydropower GMO Nuclear 政治机会结构 Moderate opportunities and favorable structure for activism . Many opportunities and moderate ly favorable structure for activism   Few opportunities and unfavorable structure for activism 框架争夺 Lack of public accountability in environment. Lack of public accountability in food safety.   Avoid a strong anti-nuclear frame; Public accountability frame not dominant. 争议的社会动员 Periodically effective mobilization among elites Successful mass mobilization Unsuccessful mobilization Fragmented authoritarianism (FA) framework （碎片化的威权主义） Wide FA framework, with visible bureaucratic fragmentation between hydropower and environmental agencies Bureaucratic fragmentation less apparent but actors’ massive participation brings wide fragmentation. No bureaucratic fragmentation, only minor FA within industry and slightly between host local government and nuke industry.

45. Science in movements: STS perspectives                         STS   Hydropower GMO Nuclear 知识控制体系（ Knowledge (kn)-control regimes of establishments ）     Moderate to weak     Moderate to weak     Strong 国家社会技术记忆（ National sociotechnical imaginaries ） Sociotechnical imaginaries of hydropower of developmentalism challenged by environmentalism Sociotechnical imaginaries of food as the bases for national existence Sociotechnical imaginaries of atomic power as national independence, social prosperity and S&T progress . Actively strengthen. 公民认识论与另类知识（ Civic epistemology & alternative knowledge ） Environmental justice, ecology integrity and social justice for dam relocation Generally adopted among ENGOs and experts, allied with SEPA Food more for substance than for S&T progress, innovation . Conspiracy theories adopted/ Widely adopted by the general publics   Alternative knowledge motivated elite activists to dispute. Only limited to small elite activists.

46. Science in movements: Multidisciplinary studies needed Results of controversy & protesting campaigns Hydropower GMO Nuclear Outcomes of science as a tool of social movements Successful for all targeted dams. Completely successful for the time being . ONLY with limited effect (delayed new projects for t hree years) .

47. We must pay attention to the essential difference between Chinese and foreign health and science communication: individual persuasion and collective action. For Chinese science and health communication scholars, exploring local issues based on internationally mature theories may overlook some unique factors in local contexts. Local factors may play a more important predictive or explanatory role than the classical variables in international theory. On the other hand, non-classical variables such as nationalism, collectivism, and filial piety can also become the main indicators of international mainstream theories. In situations like the COVID-19 outbreak, classic strategies that rely on persuading individual citizens to take action to achieve social goals are often ineffective in oriental situation. Health and environmental behavior, both individual and collective, should persuade and mobilize individuals within the framework of collective action, as well as provide individuals with policy and social support to practice collective action. Theoretical innovation and implications to science and health communication Theoretical implications: Take a glocalisti approach

48. Strategic planning of Soochow University Mid and long-term plans; expand & c oordinate partners . Research goes ahead first. Persuade more partners to get involved. Research, projects, and partnership integrated together. Design climate exhibitions with institutional partners. Workshops, training and content provisions. Collaborating on Media Sustainability Index. Develop citizen science projects on climate perceivability. Rigorous annual assessments. Publicity activities with WRI.