Rhetorical AnalysisPresident Reagan’s Remarks on the 40th Anniv.docx
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About This Presentation
Rhetorical Analysis:
President Reagan’s Remarks on the 40th Anniversary of D-Day
Anonymous Student
EN1101: Composition I
April 23, 2016
On the 6th of June, 1984, then President Ronald Reagan gave a memorial address to those gathered at the site of the U.S. Ranger Monument at Pointe du Hoc, Norman...
Slide Content
Rhetorical Analysis:
President Reagan’s Remarks on the 40th Anniversary of D-Day
Anonymous Student
EN1101: Composition I
April 23, 2016
On the 6th of June, 1984, then President Ronald Reagan gave a
memorial address to those gathered at the site of the U.S.
Ranger Monument at Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, France. The
president’s epideictic oratory, although relatively short (just
over thirteen minutes), displays a wealth of rhetorical tropes
and tools and includes such devices as anamnesis, anaphora,
hypophora, polysyndeton, epistrophe, alliteration, and tricolon;
just to name a few. Mr. Reagan skillfully uses these tools to
build ethos with his audience, an understanding of the
incredible valor of those memorialized there, to emphasize his
own personal patriotism and faith, and to apply those values to
the current world’s troubles.
Within the first couple minutes of his speech, President Reagan
accomplishes three major tasks: he establishes his credibility,
creates in the minds of his audience a sober scene of a world at
war, and portrays the seemingly impossible odds that confronted
the men he is honoring. With the memorial as his backdrop, he
begins by taking the audience back in time as he gives a brief
historical account of the events that took place there in 1944.
This use of anamnesis, the calling to mind past events, builds
his authority and trustworthiness on the subject.
He brings to mind these relevant details by stating, “For four
long years, much of Europe had been under a terrible shadow.”
He uses descriptive terms such as “under a terrible shadow,”
“nations had fallen,” and “Europe was enslaved” to create for
the audience this picture of a waring world.
Not only does this remind those who were there of the
seriousness of that day, but it establishes and reinforces it for
President Reagan’s Remarks on the 40th Anniversary of D-Day
Anonymous Student
EN1101: Composition I
April 23, 2016
On the 6th of June, 1984, then President Ronald Reagan gave a
memorial address to those gathered at the site of the U.S.
Ranger Monument at Pointe du Hoc, Normandy, France. The
president’s epideictic oratory, although relatively short (just
over thirteen minutes), displays a wealth of rhetorical tropes
and tools and includes such devices as anamnesis, anaphora,
hypophora, polysyndeton, epistrophe, alliteration, and tricolon;
just to name a few. Mr. Reagan skillfully uses these tools to
build ethos with his audience, an understanding of the
incredible valor of those memorialized there, to emphasize his
own personal patriotism and faith, and to apply those values to
the current world’s troubles.
Within the first couple minutes of his speech, President Reagan
accomplishes three major tasks: he establishes his credibility,
creates in the minds of his audience a sober scene of a world at
war, and portrays the seemingly impossible odds that confronted
the men he is honoring. With the memorial as his backdrop, he
begins by taking the audience back in time as he gives a brief
historical account of the events that took place there in 1944.
This use of anamnesis, the calling to mind past events, builds
his authority and trustworthiness on the subject.
He brings to mind these relevant details by stating, “For four
long years, much of Europe had been under a terrible shadow.”
He uses descriptive terms such as “under a terrible shadow,”
“nations had fallen,” and “Europe was enslaved” to create for
the audience this picture of a waring world.
Not only does this remind those who were there of the
seriousness of that day, but it establishes and reinforces it for
those who were not.
Reagan also uses anaphora not only to build ethos with the
crowd but to also shape the scene in their minds. To emphasize
the distinction between the “lonely, windswept point” of the
current day to that of D-Day, Reagan states, “The air is soft, but
forty years ago at this moment, the air was dense with smoke
and the cries of men, and the air was filled with the crack of
rifle fire.”
By repeating the words “the air,” he makes this contrast
evident, creates a sense of soberness, and gives gravity to the
situation that faced the Rangers who fought there. In order to
further heighten the significance of that day, he concludes his
introduction by utilizing a brief polyptoton: by using two
cognate forms of “seize,” Reagan compares the “top of these
cliffs” with the “continent of Europe,” thereby equating the
importance of that particular battle with the winning back of the
entire continent.
The president shifts his focus to the subject of his eulogy: The
Rangers who valiantly and victoriously fought there so many
years ago. Reagan masterfully describes those men with a
progressive anaphora when he says, “These are the boys of
Pointe du Hoc. These are the men who took the cliffs. These are
the champions who helped free a continent. And these are the
heroes who helped end a war.”
From boys to men, from men to champions, and from
champions to heroes; Reagan elevates in the minds of his
audience those men from mere boys to mature men – from the
ordinary to the extraordinary. This evolution of the common to
the uncommon serves not only to praise those men, but, in a
subtle way, to give hope to all who currently seek honor and
glory through military service.
In order to recognize that these men did not perform alone that
day, President Reagan continues his tribute and includes several
illustrations of the valiant actions of the Allied forces. He
briefly tells of “Bill Millin of the 51st Highlanders,” “Lord
Reagan also uses anaphora not only to build ethos with the
crowd but to also shape the scene in their minds. To emphasize
the distinction between the “lonely, windswept point” of the
current day to that of D-Day, Reagan states, “The air is soft, but
forty years ago at this moment, the air was dense with smoke
and the cries of men, and the air was filled with the crack of
rifle fire.”
By repeating the words “the air,” he makes this contrast
evident, creates a sense of soberness, and gives gravity to the
situation that faced the Rangers who fought there. In order to
further heighten the significance of that day, he concludes his
introduction by utilizing a brief polyptoton: by using two
cognate forms of “seize,” Reagan compares the “top of these
cliffs” with the “continent of Europe,” thereby equating the
importance of that particular battle with the winning back of the
entire continent.
The president shifts his focus to the subject of his eulogy: The
Rangers who valiantly and victoriously fought there so many
years ago. Reagan masterfully describes those men with a
progressive anaphora when he says, “These are the boys of
Pointe du Hoc. These are the men who took the cliffs. These are
the champions who helped free a continent. And these are the
heroes who helped end a war.”
From boys to men, from men to champions, and from
champions to heroes; Reagan elevates in the minds of his
audience those men from mere boys to mature men – from the
ordinary to the extraordinary. This evolution of the common to
the uncommon serves not only to praise those men, but, in a
subtle way, to give hope to all who currently seek honor and
glory through military service.
In order to recognize that these men did not perform alone that
day, President Reagan continues his tribute and includes several
illustrations of the valiant actions of the Allied forces. He
briefly tells of “Bill Millin of the 51st Highlanders,” “Lord
Lavat of Scotland,” “the Poles,” “the Canadians,” and several
others.
This act of inclusive diplomacy is typical of presidents and
does not take honor away from Rangers, but instead increases it
by equating all of their bravery. He makes this clear in his
speech by saying, “All of these men were part of a roll call of
honor.”
Reagan then shifts time and focus back to the present day as he
engages the surviving members of the Rangers with a question
he then answers. This use of hypophora helps to smooth the
transition from discussing the men and their actions to
discussing the reason for those actions. He asks them, “Why?”
and briefly pauses, lowers his tone, and looks out to the
audience in order to engage them personally, draw attention to
the importance of his question, and give all listening the
opportunity to contemplate the answer.
He continues his query and almost immediately answers by
stating, “Why did you do it? What impelled you… it was faith
and belief; it was loyalty and love.”
By doing this, Reagan reveals the major theme of his speech –
those four values that he attributes to men such as these: faith,
belief, loyalty, and love.
The president begins to unfold the first two of these values with
another use of anaphora to emphasize faith by stating, “The
men… had faith that what they were doing was right, faith that
they fought for all humanity, faith that a just God would grant
them mercy.”
Reagan then immediately addresses the belief these men held.
In fact, he states that it was a “deep knowledge” that this war
was a moral war that exemplified the difference between “the
use of force for liberation” and the “use of force for conquest.”
Ronald Reagan continues to attribute these virtues to those men
others.
This act of inclusive diplomacy is typical of presidents and
does not take honor away from Rangers, but instead increases it
by equating all of their bravery. He makes this clear in his
speech by saying, “All of these men were part of a roll call of
honor.”
Reagan then shifts time and focus back to the present day as he
engages the surviving members of the Rangers with a question
he then answers. This use of hypophora helps to smooth the
transition from discussing the men and their actions to
discussing the reason for those actions. He asks them, “Why?”
and briefly pauses, lowers his tone, and looks out to the
audience in order to engage them personally, draw attention to
the importance of his question, and give all listening the
opportunity to contemplate the answer.
He continues his query and almost immediately answers by
stating, “Why did you do it? What impelled you… it was faith
and belief; it was loyalty and love.”
By doing this, Reagan reveals the major theme of his speech –
those four values that he attributes to men such as these: faith,
belief, loyalty, and love.
The president begins to unfold the first two of these values with
another use of anaphora to emphasize faith by stating, “The
men… had faith that what they were doing was right, faith that
they fought for all humanity, faith that a just God would grant
them mercy.”
Reagan then immediately addresses the belief these men held.
In fact, he states that it was a “deep knowledge” that this war
was a moral war that exemplified the difference between “the
use of force for liberation” and the “use of force for conquest.”
Ronald Reagan continues to attribute these virtues to those men
in his display of the next two values: loyalty and love. This can
be seen by his personal American patriotism and his notion of a
nation united that permeate his world view and ooze out of
almost every line of his speech. He displays both of these
principles through the utilization of the rhetorical devices
epistrophe and polysyndeton, respectively. In the case of the
former, he emphasizes the value of American patriotism and
democracy by repeatedly referring to them with the phrase
“worth dying for.”
As for the latter, polysyndeton and the idea of a country united
in support, Reagan provides a powerful image. He claims that
those who fought that day felt in their hearts the unified support
of their countrymen back home, and this was illustrated by
those “in Georgia,” “in Kansas,” and “in Philadelphia”
attending churches, praying, and honoring them by ringing the
Liberty Bell.
By using such language, Reagan molds the historical narrative
into a picture of ubiquitous support of the war effort, loyalty
and belief in America and her values, and faith in the
providence of God.
Reagan’s personal faith and patriotism is so strong that it colors
his view of those men’s actions throughout his speech. Just as
he transfers his fervent Americanism to those soldiers, he
ascribes the reason for their actions to a faith similar to his. His
references to God’s providence and protection in paragraph 15;
the prayer by Colonel Wolverton that God would bless their
endeavor; and General Ridgway’s thoughts on a quote from the
Holy Bible, “I will not fail thee nor forsake thee;” together
reveal a leader who relies on the importance of God’s direct
involvement in the hearts of men and believes they do, as well.
The concluding portion of Reagan’s eulogy is marked by a
major shift as he expands the focus out from the American
Rangers and back to the world. He uses mesodiplosis to
emphasize the enormity of the task that awaited a post-war
world by stating, “there were lives to be rebuilt… governments
be seen by his personal American patriotism and his notion of a
nation united that permeate his world view and ooze out of
almost every line of his speech. He displays both of these
principles through the utilization of the rhetorical devices
epistrophe and polysyndeton, respectively. In the case of the
former, he emphasizes the value of American patriotism and
democracy by repeatedly referring to them with the phrase
“worth dying for.”
As for the latter, polysyndeton and the idea of a country united
in support, Reagan provides a powerful image. He claims that
those who fought that day felt in their hearts the unified support
of their countrymen back home, and this was illustrated by
those “in Georgia,” “in Kansas,” and “in Philadelphia”
attending churches, praying, and honoring them by ringing the
Liberty Bell.
By using such language, Reagan molds the historical narrative
into a picture of ubiquitous support of the war effort, loyalty
and belief in America and her values, and faith in the
providence of God.
Reagan’s personal faith and patriotism is so strong that it colors
his view of those men’s actions throughout his speech. Just as
he transfers his fervent Americanism to those soldiers, he
ascribes the reason for their actions to a faith similar to his. His
references to God’s providence and protection in paragraph 15;
the prayer by Colonel Wolverton that God would bless their
endeavor; and General Ridgway’s thoughts on a quote from the
Holy Bible, “I will not fail thee nor forsake thee;” together
reveal a leader who relies on the importance of God’s direct
involvement in the hearts of men and believes they do, as well.
The concluding portion of Reagan’s eulogy is marked by a
major shift as he expands the focus out from the American
Rangers and back to the world. He uses mesodiplosis to
emphasize the enormity of the task that awaited a post-war
world by stating, “there were lives to be rebuilt… governments
to be returned… nations to be reborn… [and] a new peace to be
assured.”
Reagan wastes no time equating the Allied nations to those
Rangers and the battle of rebuilding to the battle at Point de
Hoc by telling his audience, “the Allies summoned strength [for
this task] from the faith, belief, loyalty, and love of those who
fell here.”
He clearly sees a connection between the values that won the
battle, the values that won the war, and the values that rebuilt
the nations in the aftermath.
Reagan seems to favor a trifold repetition of thoughts
throughout his closing remarks that compare the United States
and the Allied Nations with the Soviets. He first lays the
groundwork for praise by describing the United States’ Marshal
Plan as a “shield for freedom, for prosperity, and for peace” and
then rebukes the occupying Soviet troops by describing them
with the alliteration “uninvited, unwanted, [and] unyielding.”
He is, however, quick to offer an olive branch to the Soviets by
recognizing their losses in the war and stating, “I tell you from
my heart that we in the United States do not want war,” but
quickly adds that they must be, “willing to move forward…
share our desire and love for peace, and… give up the ways of
conquest.”
Then, like the climactic barrage of a fireworks finale, Reagan
unleashes with three uses of “bound;” a tricolon of “loyalties,
traditions, and beliefs;” and a triplicate of comparisons, “we
were with you then; we are with you now. Your hopes are our
hopes, and your destiny is our destiny” – all of this in only four
sentences.
Reagan is communicating to the Allies his belief that those four
values defined earlier are what secured their victory, and as
long as they are the shared values of those who treasure
freedom, it will stand secure.
In conclusion, President Reagan’s speech masterfully and
assured.”
Reagan wastes no time equating the Allied nations to those
Rangers and the battle of rebuilding to the battle at Point de
Hoc by telling his audience, “the Allies summoned strength [for
this task] from the faith, belief, loyalty, and love of those who
fell here.”
He clearly sees a connection between the values that won the
battle, the values that won the war, and the values that rebuilt
the nations in the aftermath.
Reagan seems to favor a trifold repetition of thoughts
throughout his closing remarks that compare the United States
and the Allied Nations with the Soviets. He first lays the
groundwork for praise by describing the United States’ Marshal
Plan as a “shield for freedom, for prosperity, and for peace” and
then rebukes the occupying Soviet troops by describing them
with the alliteration “uninvited, unwanted, [and] unyielding.”
He is, however, quick to offer an olive branch to the Soviets by
recognizing their losses in the war and stating, “I tell you from
my heart that we in the United States do not want war,” but
quickly adds that they must be, “willing to move forward…
share our desire and love for peace, and… give up the ways of
conquest.”
Then, like the climactic barrage of a fireworks finale, Reagan
unleashes with three uses of “bound;” a tricolon of “loyalties,
traditions, and beliefs;” and a triplicate of comparisons, “we
were with you then; we are with you now. Your hopes are our
hopes, and your destiny is our destiny” – all of this in only four
sentences.
Reagan is communicating to the Allies his belief that those four
values defined earlier are what secured their victory, and as
long as they are the shared values of those who treasure
freedom, it will stand secure.
In conclusion, President Reagan’s speech masterfully and
systematically creates two increasingly inward looks at the
world. First, his focus narrows from a world war to a battle;
from a battle to the soldier; and from the soldier to his
motivation. He then applies that same style again by shifting
from the aftermath of war to the tension of two factions; from
that tension to a solution; and from that solution he returns
focus to the motivations of faith in God, belief in freedom and
democracy, loyalty, and a love for all mankind. Reagan
promotes the belief that with these values the world will defeat
oppression, strengthen liberty, and overcome evil. His abundant
and skillful use of rhetoric reveal some of the reasons why he
was later given the moniker “The Great Communicator.”
Works Cited
Burton, Gideon O. Silva Rhetoricae. February 26, 2007.
http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Figures/A/anamnesis.htm
(accessed March 30, 2016).
Khachigian, Ken. The Orange County Register. February 5,
2011. http://www.ocregister.com/articles/reagan-287119-great-
dollar.html (accessed April 19, 2016).
Reagan, President Ronald. "Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemoration the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day. June 6, 1984.
https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf (accessed April 23, 2016).
Reagan, Ronald. Normandy Speech 6/6/84. YouTube (streaming
video). Posted April 16, 2009.
https://youtu.be/eEIqdcHbc8I?t=5m15s (accessed March 28,
2016).
� Gideon O. Burton, Brigham Young University, "Silva
Rhetoricae,” �HYPERLINK
world. First, his focus narrows from a world war to a battle;
from a battle to the soldier; and from the soldier to his
motivation. He then applies that same style again by shifting
from the aftermath of war to the tension of two factions; from
that tension to a solution; and from that solution he returns
focus to the motivations of faith in God, belief in freedom and
democracy, loyalty, and a love for all mankind. Reagan
promotes the belief that with these values the world will defeat
oppression, strengthen liberty, and overcome evil. His abundant
and skillful use of rhetoric reveal some of the reasons why he
was later given the moniker “The Great Communicator.”
Works Cited
Burton, Gideon O. Silva Rhetoricae. February 26, 2007.
http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Figures/A/anamnesis.htm
(accessed March 30, 2016).
Khachigian, Ken. The Orange County Register. February 5,
2011. http://www.ocregister.com/articles/reagan-287119-great-
dollar.html (accessed April 19, 2016).
Reagan, President Ronald. "Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemoration the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day. June 6, 1984.
https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf (accessed April 23, 2016).
Reagan, Ronald. Normandy Speech 6/6/84. YouTube (streaming
video). Posted April 16, 2009.
https://youtu.be/eEIqdcHbc8I?t=5m15s (accessed March 28,
2016).
� Gideon O. Burton, Brigham Young University, "Silva
Rhetoricae,” �HYPERLINK
"http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Figures/A/anamnesis.htm"�
http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Figures/A/anamnesis.htm�
(Burton 2007)
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 1, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 1.
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 2, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 3.
http://humanities.byu.edu/rhetoric/Figures/A/anamnesis.htm�
(Burton 2007)
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 1, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 1.
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 2, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 3.
� Ibid, Paragraph 5.
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 7, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 8.
� Ibid, Paragraph 9.
� Ibid, Paragraph 10.
� President Ronald Reagan, Normandy Speech 6/6/84, YouTube
(streaming video), posted April 16, 2009, accessed March 28,
2016, �HYPERLINK
"https://youtu.be/eEIqdcHbc8I?t=5m15s"�https://youtu.be/eEIq
dcHbc8I?t=5m15s�
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 7, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 8.
� Ibid, Paragraph 9.
� Ibid, Paragraph 10.
� President Ronald Reagan, Normandy Speech 6/6/84, YouTube
(streaming video), posted April 16, 2009, accessed March 28,
2016, �HYPERLINK
"https://youtu.be/eEIqdcHbc8I?t=5m15s"�https://youtu.be/eEIq
dcHbc8I?t=5m15s�
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 11, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 12.
� Ibid, Paragraph 12.
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 13, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 14.
� Ibid, Paragraph 15.
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 11, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 12.
� Ibid, Paragraph 12.
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 13, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 14.
� Ibid, Paragraph 15.
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 17, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_In vasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 17.
� Ibid, Paragraph 18.
� Ibid, Paragraph 19.
� Ibid, Paragraph 22.
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 24, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 17, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_In vasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ibid, Paragraph 17.
� Ibid, Paragraph 18.
� Ibid, Paragraph 19.
� Ibid, Paragraph 22.
� President Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at a Ceremony
Commemorating the 40th Anniversary of the Normandy
Invasion, D-day," June 6, 1984, Paragraph 24, The Ronald
Reagan Presidential Foundation & Library, �HYPERLINK
"https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%20_Ceremony_C
ommemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_Normandy_Invasi
on060684.pdf"�https://ml.reaganfoundation.org/pdf/Remarks%
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ken Khachigian, “What made Reagan the Great
Communicator,” February 5, 2011, Paragraph 1, The Orange
County Register, �HYPERLINK
"http://www.ocregister.com/articles/reagan-287119-great-
dollar.html"�http://www.ocregister.com/articles/reagan-
287119-great-dollar.html�
1
5 Page Rhetorical Analysis Paper:
Purpose: To analyze the way a speaker creates meaning
verbally, non-verbally, structurally, and performatively.
Assignment: Select a speech of about 20 minutes’ duration or
more. View the speech carefully multiple times, and analyze the
mechanics of your speaker’s rhetoric. How does the speaker
arrange and perform his speech to emphasize his meaning? How
does he arrange and perform the speech to make his message
more moving, appealing, and persuasive? How does he
manipulate the structure of his speech to reinforce his claims?
How does he employ rhetorical tropes to create connections
between ideas or to subtly emphasize central phrases and
words? How do your author’s appeals work? What about them
makes them work? Scrutinize the composition of the speech to
identify how structure and meaning correspond: in other words,
how does the design of the speech correspond with the speaker’s
message?
Thesis: Your thesis will most likely consist of some explanation
of the relationship between the speakers’ message and the
20_Ceremony_Commemorating_the_40th_Anniversary_of_the_
Normandy_Invasion060684.pdf�.
� Ken Khachigian, “What made Reagan the Great
Communicator,” February 5, 2011, Paragraph 1, The Orange
County Register, �HYPERLINK
"http://www.ocregister.com/articles/reagan-287119-great-
dollar.html"�http://www.ocregister.com/articles/reagan-
287119-great-dollar.html�
1
5 Page Rhetorical Analysis Paper:
Purpose: To analyze the way a speaker creates meaning
verbally, non-verbally, structurally, and performatively.
Assignment: Select a speech of about 20 minutes’ duration or
more. View the speech carefully multiple times, and analyze the
mechanics of your speaker’s rhetoric. How does the speaker
arrange and perform his speech to emphasize his meaning? How
does he arrange and perform the speech to make his message
more moving, appealing, and persuasive? How does he
manipulate the structure of his speech to reinforce his claims?
How does he employ rhetorical tropes to create connections
between ideas or to subtly emphasize central phrases and
words? How do your author’s appeals work? What about them
makes them work? Scrutinize the composition of the speech to
identify how structure and meaning correspond: in other words,
how does the design of the speech correspond with the speaker’s
message?
Thesis: Your thesis will most likely consist of some explanation
of the relationship between the speakers’ message and the
design/structure of the speech itself. The bulk of your essay will
then defend your thesis by considering particular instances and
details from the speech. Remember we are now deep in the
territory of academic writing. As such, state your thesis
explicitly in the introductory paragraph of your paper.
Then, for the rest of your paper, defend your thesis by
discussing examples and details that illustrate and prove it.
**NOTE #1: Your task is not to summarize what your author
says, but to analyze how he says it, or how the design of the
speech emphasizes the speaker’s meaning. Please do NOT
summarize the speech! ** NOTE #2: Your purpose in this paper
is to analyze how the speaker designs, structures, and performs
the speech. Your purpose is NOT to dispute whether he is right
or wrong. Do not argue with your speaker! Instead, analyze how
the speaker puts the speech together to create meaning. Essay
Requirements: • 5 pages • At least 8 short quotations, smoothly
and seamlessly integrated into your own sentences. • A footnote
for each quotation. Essay Format: Typed, doublespaced, Times
New Roman 12-point font, 1” margins all around.
1
Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?
by LINDA NOCHLIN
While the recent upsurge of feminist activity in this country has
indeed been a
liberating one, its force has been chiefly emotional--personal,
then defend your thesis by considering particular instances and
details from the speech. Remember we are now deep in the
territory of academic writing. As such, state your thesis
explicitly in the introductory paragraph of your paper.
Then, for the rest of your paper, defend your thesis by
discussing examples and details that illustrate and prove it.
**NOTE #1: Your task is not to summarize what your author
says, but to analyze how he says it, or how the design of the
speech emphasizes the speaker’s meaning. Please do NOT
summarize the speech! ** NOTE #2: Your purpose in this paper
is to analyze how the speaker designs, structures, and performs
the speech. Your purpose is NOT to dispute whether he is right
or wrong. Do not argue with your speaker! Instead, analyze how
the speaker puts the speech together to create meaning. Essay
Requirements: • 5 pages • At least 8 short quotations, smoothly
and seamlessly integrated into your own sentences. • A footnote
for each quotation. Essay Format: Typed, doublespaced, Times
New Roman 12-point font, 1” margins all around.
1
Why Have There Been No Great Women Artists?
by LINDA NOCHLIN
While the recent upsurge of feminist activity in this country has
indeed been a
liberating one, its force has been chiefly emotional--personal,
psychological, and
subjective--centered, like the other radical movements to which
it is related, on the
present and its immediate needs, rather than on historical
analysis of the basic
intellectual issues which the feminist attack on the status quo
automatically raises.
Like any revolution. however, the feminist one ultimately must
come to grips with the
intellectual and ideological basis of the various intellectual or
scholarly disciplines--
history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, etc.--in the same
way that it questions the
ideologies of present social institutions. If, as John Stuart Mill
suggested, we tend to
accept whatever is as natural, this is just as true in the realm of
academic investigation
as it is in our social arrangements. In the former, too, "natural"
assumptions must be
questioned and the mythic basis of much so-called fact brought
to light. And it is here
that the very position of woman as an acknowledged outsider,
the maverick "she"
instead of the presumably neutral "one"--in reality the white-
male-position-accepted-
subjective--centered, like the other radical movements to which
it is related, on the
present and its immediate needs, rather than on historical
analysis of the basic
intellectual issues which the feminist attack on the status quo
automatically raises.
Like any revolution. however, the feminist one ultimately must
come to grips with the
intellectual and ideological basis of the various intellectual or
scholarly disciplines--
history, philosophy, sociology, psychology, etc.--in the same
way that it questions the
ideologies of present social institutions. If, as John Stuart Mill
suggested, we tend to
accept whatever is as natural, this is just as true in the realm of
academic investigation
as it is in our social arrangements. In the former, too, "natural"
assumptions must be
questioned and the mythic basis of much so-called fact brought
to light. And it is here
that the very position of woman as an acknowledged outsider,
the maverick "she"
instead of the presumably neutral "one"--in reality the white-
male-position-accepted-
as-natural, or the hidden "he" as the subject of all scholarly
predicates--is a decided
advantage, rather than merely a hindrance or a subjective
distortion.
In the field of art history, the white Western male viewpoint,
unconsciously accepted
as the viewpoint of the art historian, may--and does--prove to be
inadequate not
merely on moral and ethical grounds, or because it is elitist, but
on purely intellectual
ones. In revealing the failure of much academic art history, and
a great deal of history
in general, to take account of the unacknowledged value system,
the very presence of
an intruding subject in historical investigation, the feminist
critique at the same time
lays bare its conceptual smugness, its meta-historical naivete.
At a moment when all
disciplines are becoming more self-conscious, more aware of
the nature of their
presuppositions as exhibited in the very languages and
structures of the various fields
of scholarship, such uncritical acceptance of "what is" as
"natural" may be
predicates--is a decided
advantage, rather than merely a hindrance or a subjective
distortion.
In the field of art history, the white Western male viewpoint,
unconsciously accepted
as the viewpoint of the art historian, may--and does--prove to be
inadequate not
merely on moral and ethical grounds, or because it is elitist, but
on purely intellectual
ones. In revealing the failure of much academic art history, and
a great deal of history
in general, to take account of the unacknowledged value system,
the very presence of
an intruding subject in historical investigation, the feminist
critique at the same time
lays bare its conceptual smugness, its meta-historical naivete.
At a moment when all
disciplines are becoming more self-conscious, more aware of
the nature of their
presuppositions as exhibited in the very languages and
structures of the various fields
of scholarship, such uncritical acceptance of "what is" as
"natural" may be
intellectually fatal. Just as Mill saw male domination as one of
a long series of social
injustices that had to be overcome if a truly just social order
were to be created, so we
may see the unstated domination of white male subjectivity as
one in a series of
2
intellectual distortions which must be corrected in order to
achieve a more adequate
and accurate view of historical situations.
It is the engaged feminist intellect (like John Stuart Mill's) that
can pierce through the
cultural-ideological limitations of the time and its specific
"professionalism" to reveal
biases and inadequacies not merely in dealing with the question
of women, but in the
very way of formulating the crucial questions of the discipline
as a whole. Thus, the
so-called woman question, far from being a minor, peripheral,
and laughably
provincial sub-issue grafted on to a serious, established
discipline, can become a
a long series of social
injustices that had to be overcome if a truly just social order
were to be created, so we
may see the unstated domination of white male subjectivity as
one in a series of
2
intellectual distortions which must be corrected in order to
achieve a more adequate
and accurate view of historical situations.
It is the engaged feminist intellect (like John Stuart Mill's) that
can pierce through the
cultural-ideological limitations of the time and its specific
"professionalism" to reveal
biases and inadequacies not merely in dealing with the question
of women, but in the
very way of formulating the crucial questions of the discipline
as a whole. Thus, the
so-called woman question, far from being a minor, peripheral,
and laughably
provincial sub-issue grafted on to a serious, established
discipline, can become a
catalyst, an intellectual instrument, probing basic and "natural'
assumptions, providing
a paradigm for other kinds of internal questioning, and in turn
providing links with
paradigms established by radical approaches in other fields.
Even a simple question
like "Why have there been no great women artists?" can, if
answered adequately,
create a sort of chain reaction, expanding not merely to
encompass the accepted
assumptions of the single field, but outward to embrace history
and the social
sciences, or even psychology and literature, and thereby, from
the outset, can
challenge the assumption, that the traditional divisions of
intellectual inquiry are still
adequate to deal with the meaningful questions of our time,
rather than the merely
convenient or self-generated ones.
Let us, for example, examine the implications of that perennial
question (one can, of
course, substitute almost any field of human endeavor, with
appropriate changes in
phrasing): "Well, if women really are equal to men, why have
there never been any
assumptions, providing
a paradigm for other kinds of internal questioning, and in turn
providing links with
paradigms established by radical approaches in other fields.
Even a simple question
like "Why have there been no great women artists?" can, if
answered adequately,
create a sort of chain reaction, expanding not merely to
encompass the accepted
assumptions of the single field, but outward to embrace history
and the social
sciences, or even psychology and literature, and thereby, from
the outset, can
challenge the assumption, that the traditional divisions of
intellectual inquiry are still
adequate to deal with the meaningful questions of our time,
rather than the merely
convenient or self-generated ones.
Let us, for example, examine the implications of that perennial
question (one can, of
course, substitute almost any field of human endeavor, with
appropriate changes in
phrasing): "Well, if women really are equal to men, why have
there never been any
great women artists (or composers, or mathematicians, or
philosophers, or so few of
the same)?
"Why have there been no great women artists?" The question
tolls reproachfully in the
background of most discussions of the so-called woman
problem. But like so many
other so-called questions involved in the feminist
"controversy," it falsifies the nature
of the issue at the same time that it insidiously supplies its own
answer: "There have
been no great women artists because women are incapable of
greatness."
The assumptions behind such a question are varied in range and
sophistication,
running anywhere from "scientifically proven" demonstrations
of the inability of
human beings with wombs rather than penises to create anything
significant, to
relatively open-minded wonderment that women, despite so
many years of near-
equality--and after all, a lot of men have had their
disadvantages too-have still not
achieved anything of exceptional significance in the visual arts.
The feminist's first
philosophers, or so few of
the same)?
"Why have there been no great women artists?" The question
tolls reproachfully in the
background of most discussions of the so-called woman
problem. But like so many
other so-called questions involved in the feminist
"controversy," it falsifies the nature
of the issue at the same time that it insidiously supplies its own
answer: "There have
been no great women artists because women are incapable of
greatness."
The assumptions behind such a question are varied in range and
sophistication,
running anywhere from "scientifically proven" demonstrations
of the inability of
human beings with wombs rather than penises to create anything
significant, to
relatively open-minded wonderment that women, despite so
many years of near-
equality--and after all, a lot of men have had their
disadvantages too-have still not
achieved anything of exceptional significance in the visual arts.
The feminist's first
reaction is to swallow the bait, hook, line and sinker, and to
attempt to answer the
question as it is put: that is, to dig up examples of worthy or
insufficiently appreciated
women artists throughout history; to rehabilitate rather modest,
if interesting and
productive careers; to "rediscover" forgotten flower painters or
David followers and
3
make out a case for them; to demonstrate that Berthe Morisot
was really less
dependent upon Manet than one had been led to think-in other
words, to engage in the
normal activity of the specialist scholar who makes a case for
the importance of his
very own neglected or minor master. Such attempts, whether
undertaken from a
feminist point of view, like the ambitious article on women
artists which appeared in
the 1858 Westminster Review, or more recent scholarly studies
on such artists as
attempt to answer the
question as it is put: that is, to dig up examples of worthy or
insufficiently appreciated
women artists throughout history; to rehabilitate rather modest,
if interesting and
productive careers; to "rediscover" forgotten flower painters or
David followers and
3
make out a case for them; to demonstrate that Berthe Morisot
was really less
dependent upon Manet than one had been led to think-in other
words, to engage in the
normal activity of the specialist scholar who makes a case for
the importance of his
very own neglected or minor master. Such attempts, whether
undertaken from a
feminist point of view, like the ambitious article on women
artists which appeared in
the 1858 Westminster Review, or more recent scholarly studies
on such artists as
Angelica Kauffmann and Artemisia Gentileschi, are certainly
worth the effort, both in
adding to our knowledge of women's achievement and of art
history generally. But
they do nothing to question the assumptions lying behind the
question "Why have
there been no great women artists?" On the contrary, by
attempting to answer it, they
tacitly reinforce its negative implications.
Another attempt to answer the question involves shifting the
ground slightly and
asserting, as some contemporary feminists do, that there is a
different kind of
"greatness" for women's art than for men's, thereby postulating
the existence of a
distinctive and recognizable fermnine style, different both in its
formal and its
expressive qualities and based on the special character of
women's situation and
experience.
This, on the surface of it, seems reasonable enough: in general,
women's experience
and situation in society, and hence as artists, is different from
men's, and certainly the
worth the effort, both in
adding to our knowledge of women's achievement and of art
history generally. But
they do nothing to question the assumptions lying behind the
question "Why have
there been no great women artists?" On the contrary, by
attempting to answer it, they
tacitly reinforce its negative implications.
Another attempt to answer the question involves shifting the
ground slightly and
asserting, as some contemporary feminists do, that there is a
different kind of
"greatness" for women's art than for men's, thereby postulating
the existence of a
distinctive and recognizable fermnine style, different both in its
formal and its
expressive qualities and based on the special character of
women's situation and
experience.
This, on the surface of it, seems reasonable enough: in general,
women's experience
and situation in society, and hence as artists, is different from
men's, and certainly the
art produced by a group of consciously united and purposefully
articulate women
intent on bodying forth a group consciousness of feminine
experience might indeed be
stylistically identifiable as feminist, if not feminine, art.
Unfortunately, though this
remains within the realm of possibility it has so far not
occurred. While the members
of the Danube School, the followers of Caravaggio, the painters
gathered around
Gauguin at Pont-Aven, the Blue Rider, or the Cubists may be
recognized by certain
clearly defined stylistic or expressive qualities, no such
common qualities of
"femininity" would seem to link the styles of women artists
generally, any more than
such qualities can be said to link women writers, a case
brilliantly argued, against the
most devastating, and mutually contradictory, masculine critical
clich6s, by Mary
Ellmann in her Thinking AboutWomen. No subtle essence of
femininity would seem to
link the work of Artemisia Gentileschi, Mme. Vigee-Lebrun,
Angelica Kauffmann,
articulate women
intent on bodying forth a group consciousness of feminine
experience might indeed be
stylistically identifiable as feminist, if not feminine, art.
Unfortunately, though this
remains within the realm of possibility it has so far not
occurred. While the members
of the Danube School, the followers of Caravaggio, the painters
gathered around
Gauguin at Pont-Aven, the Blue Rider, or the Cubists may be
recognized by certain
clearly defined stylistic or expressive qualities, no such
common qualities of
"femininity" would seem to link the styles of women artists
generally, any more than
such qualities can be said to link women writers, a case
brilliantly argued, against the
most devastating, and mutually contradictory, masculine critical
clich6s, by Mary
Ellmann in her Thinking AboutWomen. No subtle essence of
femininity would seem to
link the work of Artemisia Gentileschi, Mme. Vigee-Lebrun,
Angelica Kauffmann,
Rosa Bonheur, Berthe Morlsot, Suzanne Valadon, Kathe
Kollwitz, Barbara Hepworth,
Georgia O'Keeffe, Sophle Taeuber-Arp, Helen Frankenthaler,
Bridget Riley, Lee
Bontecou, or Loulse Nevelson. any more than that of Sappho,
Marle de France, Jane
Austen, Emily Bronte, George Sand, George Eliot, Virginia
Woolf, Gertrude Stein,
Anais Nin, Emily Dickinson, Sylvia Plath, and Susan Sontag. In
every instance,
women artists and writers would seem to be closer to other
artists and writers of their
own period and outlook than they are to each other.
4
Women artists are more inward-looking, more delicate and
nuanced in their treatment
of their medium, it may be asserted. But which of the women
artists cited above is
more inward-turning then Redon, more subtle and nuanced in
the handling of pigment
than Corot? Is Fragonard more or less feminine than Mme.
Vigee-Lebrun? Or is it not
Kollwitz, Barbara Hepworth,
Georgia O'Keeffe, Sophle Taeuber-Arp, Helen Frankenthaler,
Bridget Riley, Lee
Bontecou, or Loulse Nevelson. any more than that of Sappho,
Marle de France, Jane
Austen, Emily Bronte, George Sand, George Eliot, Virginia
Woolf, Gertrude Stein,
Anais Nin, Emily Dickinson, Sylvia Plath, and Susan Sontag. In
every instance,
women artists and writers would seem to be closer to other
artists and writers of their
own period and outlook than they are to each other.
4
Women artists are more inward-looking, more delicate and
nuanced in their treatment
of their medium, it may be asserted. But which of the women
artists cited above is
more inward-turning then Redon, more subtle and nuanced in
the handling of pigment
than Corot? Is Fragonard more or less feminine than Mme.
Vigee-Lebrun? Or is it not
more a question of the whole Rococo style of eighteenth-
century France being
"feminine," if judged in terms of a binary scale of "masculinity"
versus "femininity"?
Certainly, if daintiness, delicacy, and preciousness are to be
counted as earmarks of a
feminine style, there is nothing fragile about Rosa Bonheur's
Horse Fair, nor dainty
and introverted about Helen Frankenthaler's giant canvases. If
women have turned to
scenes of domestic life, or of children. so did Jan Steen,
Chardin, and the
Impressionists--Renoir and Monet as well as Morisot and
Cassatt. In any case, the
mere choice of a certain realm of subject matter, or the
restriction to certain subjects,
is not to be equated with a style, much less with some sort of
quintessentially feminine
style.
The problem lies not so much with some feminists' concept of
what femininity is, but
rather with their misconception--shared with the public at large-
-of what art is: with
the naive idea that art is direct, personal expression of
individual emotional
century France being
"feminine," if judged in terms of a binary scale of "masculinity"
versus "femininity"?
Certainly, if daintiness, delicacy, and preciousness are to be
counted as earmarks of a
feminine style, there is nothing fragile about Rosa Bonheur's
Horse Fair, nor dainty
and introverted about Helen Frankenthaler's giant canvases. If
women have turned to
scenes of domestic life, or of children. so did Jan Steen,
Chardin, and the
Impressionists--Renoir and Monet as well as Morisot and
Cassatt. In any case, the
mere choice of a certain realm of subject matter, or the
restriction to certain subjects,
is not to be equated with a style, much less with some sort of
quintessentially feminine
style.
The problem lies not so much with some feminists' concept of
what femininity is, but
rather with their misconception--shared with the public at large-
-of what art is: with
the naive idea that art is direct, personal expression of
individual emotional
experience, a translation of personal life into visual terms. Art
is almost never that,
great art never is. The making of art involves a self-consistent
language of form, more
or less dependent upon, or free from, given temporally defined
conventions, schemata,
or systems of notation, which have to be learned or worked out,
either through
teaching, apprenticeship, or a long period of individual
experimentation. The language
of art is, more materially, embodied in paint and line on canvas
or paper, in stone or
clay or plastic or metal-it is neither a sob story nor a
confidential whisper.
The fact of the matter is that there have been no supremely
great women artists, as far
as we know, although there have been many interesting and very
good ones, who
remain insufficiently investigated or appreciated; nor have there
been any great
Lithuanian jazz pianists, nor Eskimo tennis players, no matter
how much we might
wish there had been. That this should be the case is regrettable,
but no amount of
is almost never that,
great art never is. The making of art involves a self-consistent
language of form, more
or less dependent upon, or free from, given temporally defined
conventions, schemata,
or systems of notation, which have to be learned or worked out,
either through
teaching, apprenticeship, or a long period of individual
experimentation. The language
of art is, more materially, embodied in paint and line on canvas
or paper, in stone or
clay or plastic or metal-it is neither a sob story nor a
confidential whisper.
The fact of the matter is that there have been no supremely
great women artists, as far
as we know, although there have been many interesting and very
good ones, who
remain insufficiently investigated or appreciated; nor have there
been any great
Lithuanian jazz pianists, nor Eskimo tennis players, no matter
how much we might
wish there had been. That this should be the case is regrettable,
but no amount of
manipulating the historical or critical evidence will alter the
situation; nor will
accusations of male-chauvinist distortion of history. There are
no women equivalents
for Michelangelo or Rembrandt, Delacroix or Cezanne, Picasso
or Matisse, or even, in
very recent times, for de Kooning or Warhol, any more than
there are black American
equivalents for the same. If there actually were large numbers
of "hidden" great
women artists, or if there really should be different standards
for women's art as
opposed to men's--and one can't have it both ways--then what
are feminists fighting
for? If women have in fact achieved the same status as men in
the arts, then the status
quo is fine as it is.
5
But in actuality, as we all know, things as they are and as they
have been, in the arts as
in a hundred other areas, are stultifying, oppressive, and
discouraging to all those,
situation; nor will
accusations of male-chauvinist distortion of history. There are
no women equivalents
for Michelangelo or Rembrandt, Delacroix or Cezanne, Picasso
or Matisse, or even, in
very recent times, for de Kooning or Warhol, any more than
there are black American
equivalents for the same. If there actually were large numbers
of "hidden" great
women artists, or if there really should be different standards
for women's art as
opposed to men's--and one can't have it both ways--then what
are feminists fighting
for? If women have in fact achieved the same status as men in
the arts, then the status
quo is fine as it is.
5
But in actuality, as we all know, things as they are and as they
have been, in the arts as
in a hundred other areas, are stultifying, oppressive, and
discouraging to all those,
women among them, who did not have the good fortune to be
born white, preferably
middle c1ass, and above all, male. The fault lies not in our
stars, our hormones, our
menstrual cycles, or our empty internal spaces, but in our
institutions and our
education--education understood to include everything that
happens to us from the
moment we enter this world of meaningful symbols, signs, and
signals. The miracle
is, in fact, that given the overwhelming against women, or
blacks, that so many of
both have managed to achieve so much sheer excellence, in
those bailiwicks of white
masculine prerogative like science, politics, or the arts.
It is when one really starts thinking about the implications of
"Why have there been
no great women artists?" that one begins to realize to what
extent our consciousness
of how things are in the world has been conditioned--and often
falsified--by the way
the most important questions are posed. We tend to take it for
granted that there really
is an East Asian Problem, a Poverty Problem, a Black Problem--
born white, preferably
middle c1ass, and above all, male. The fault lies not in our
stars, our hormones, our
menstrual cycles, or our empty internal spaces, but in our
institutions and our
education--education understood to include everything that
happens to us from the
moment we enter this world of meaningful symbols, signs, and
signals. The miracle
is, in fact, that given the overwhelming against women, or
blacks, that so many of
both have managed to achieve so much sheer excellence, in
those bailiwicks of white
masculine prerogative like science, politics, or the arts.
It is when one really starts thinking about the implications of
"Why have there been
no great women artists?" that one begins to realize to what
extent our consciousness
of how things are in the world has been conditioned--and often
falsified--by the way
the most important questions are posed. We tend to take it for
granted that there really
is an East Asian Problem, a Poverty Problem, a Black Problem--
and a Woman
Problem. But first we must ask ourselves who is formulating
these "questions," and
then, what purposes such formulations may serve. (We may, of
course, refresh our
memories with the connotations of the Nazis' "Jewish
Problem.") Indeed, in our time
of instant communication, "problems" are rapidly formulated to
rationalize the bad
conscience of those with power: thus, the problem posed by
Americans in Vietnam
and Cambodia is referred to by Americans as the "East Asian
Problem, " whereas East
Asians may view it, more realistically, as the "American
Problem"; the so-called
Poverty Problem might more directly be viewed as the "Wealth
Problem" by denizens
of urban ghettos or rural wastelands; the same irony twists the
White Problem into its
opposite, a Black Problem; and the same inverse logic turns up
in the formulation of
our present state of affairs as the "Woman Problem. "
Now, the "Woman Problem," like all human problems, so-called
(and the very idea of
Problem. But first we must ask ourselves who is formulating
these "questions," and
then, what purposes such formulations may serve. (We may, of
course, refresh our
memories with the connotations of the Nazis' "Jewish
Problem.") Indeed, in our time
of instant communication, "problems" are rapidly formulated to
rationalize the bad
conscience of those with power: thus, the problem posed by
Americans in Vietnam
and Cambodia is referred to by Americans as the "East Asian
Problem, " whereas East
Asians may view it, more realistically, as the "American
Problem"; the so-called
Poverty Problem might more directly be viewed as the "Wealth
Problem" by denizens
of urban ghettos or rural wastelands; the same irony twists the
White Problem into its
opposite, a Black Problem; and the same inverse logic turns up
in the formulation of
our present state of affairs as the "Woman Problem. "
Now, the "Woman Problem," like all human problems, so-called
(and the very idea of
calling anything to do with human beings a "problem" is, of
course, a fairly recent
one), is not amenable to "solution" at all, since what human
problems involve is
reinterpretation of the nature of the situation, or a radical
alteration of stance or
program on the part of the "problems" themselves. Thus, women
and their situation in
the arts, as in other realms of endeavor, are not a "problem" to
be viewed through the
eyes of the dominant male power elite. Instead, women must
conceive of themselves
as potentially, if not actually, equal subjects, and must be
willing to look the facts of
their situation full in the face, without self-pity, or cop-outs; at
the same time they
must view their situation with that high degree of emotional and
intellectual
commitment necessary to create a world in which equal
achievement will be not only
made possible but actively encouraged by social institutions.
6
course, a fairly recent
one), is not amenable to "solution" at all, since what human
problems involve is
reinterpretation of the nature of the situation, or a radical
alteration of stance or
program on the part of the "problems" themselves. Thus, women
and their situation in
the arts, as in other realms of endeavor, are not a "problem" to
be viewed through the
eyes of the dominant male power elite. Instead, women must
conceive of themselves
as potentially, if not actually, equal subjects, and must be
willing to look the facts of
their situation full in the face, without self-pity, or cop-outs; at
the same time they
must view their situation with that high degree of emotional and
intellectual
commitment necessary to create a world in which equal
achievement will be not only
made possible but actively encouraged by social institutions.
6
It is certainly not realistic to hope that a majority of men, in the
arts or in any other
field, will soon see the light and find that it is in their own self-
interest to grant
complete equality to women, as some feminists optimistically
assert, or to maintain
that men themselves will soon realize that they are diminished
by denying themselves
access to traditionally "feminine" realms and emotional
reactions. After all, there are
few areas that are really "denied" to men, if the level of
operations demanded be
transcendent, responsible, or rewarding enough: men who have
a need for "feminine"
involvement with babies or children gain status as pediatricians
or child psychologists,
with a nurse (female) to do the more routine work; those who
feel the urge for kitchen
creativity may gain fame as master chefs; and of course, men
who yearn to fulfill
themselves through what are often termed "feminine" artistic
interests can find
themselves as painters or sculptors, rather than as volunteer
museum aides or part-
arts or in any other
field, will soon see the light and find that it is in their own self-
interest to grant
complete equality to women, as some feminists optimistically
assert, or to maintain
that men themselves will soon realize that they are diminished
by denying themselves
access to traditionally "feminine" realms and emotional
reactions. After all, there are
few areas that are really "denied" to men, if the level of
operations demanded be
transcendent, responsible, or rewarding enough: men who have
a need for "feminine"
involvement with babies or children gain status as pediatricians
or child psychologists,
with a nurse (female) to do the more routine work; those who
feel the urge for kitchen
creativity may gain fame as master chefs; and of course, men
who yearn to fulfill
themselves through what are often termed "feminine" artistic
interests can find
themselves as painters or sculptors, rather than as volunteer
museum aides or part-
time ceramists, as their female counterparts so often end up
doing; as far as
scholarship is concerned, how many men would be willing to
change their jobs as
teachers and researchers for those of unpaid, part-time research
assistants and typists
as well as full-time nannies and domestic workers?
Those who have privileges inevitably hold on to them, and hold
tight, no matter how
marginal the advantage involved, until compelled to bow to
superior power of one sort
or another.
Thus, the question of women's equality--in art as in any other
realm--devolves not
upon the relative benevolence or ill-will of individual men, nor
the self-confidence or
abjectness of individual women, but rather on the very nature of
our institutional
structures themselves and the view of reality which they impose
on the human beings
who are part of them. As John Stuart Mill pointed out more than
a century ago:
"Everything which is usual appears natural. The subjection of
wom en to men being a
universal custom, any departure from it quite naturally appears
doing; as far as
scholarship is concerned, how many men would be willing to
change their jobs as
teachers and researchers for those of unpaid, part-time research
assistants and typists
as well as full-time nannies and domestic workers?
Those who have privileges inevitably hold on to them, and hold
tight, no matter how
marginal the advantage involved, until compelled to bow to
superior power of one sort
or another.
Thus, the question of women's equality--in art as in any other
realm--devolves not
upon the relative benevolence or ill-will of individual men, nor
the self-confidence or
abjectness of individual women, but rather on the very nature of
our institutional
structures themselves and the view of reality which they impose
on the human beings
who are part of them. As John Stuart Mill pointed out more than
a century ago:
"Everything which is usual appears natural. The subjection of
wom en to men being a
universal custom, any departure from it quite naturally appears
unnatural." Most men,
despite lip service to equality, are reluctant to give up this
"natural" order of things in
which their advantages are so great; for women, the case is
further complicated by the
fact that, as Mill astutely pointed out, unlike any other
oppressed groups or castes,
men demand of them not only submission but unqualified
affection as well; thus,
women are often weakened by the internalized demands of the
male-dominated
society itself, as well as by a plethora of material goods and
comforts: the middle-
class woman has a great deal more to lose than her chains.
The question "Why have there been no great women artists?" is
ismply the top tenth
of an iceberg of misinterpretation and misconception; beneath
lies a vast dark bulk of
shaky idees recues about the nature of art and its situational
concomitants, about the
nature of human abilities in general and of human excellence in
particular, and the
role that the social order plays in all of this. While the "woman
problem" as such may
despite lip service to equality, are reluctant to give up this
"natural" order of things in
which their advantages are so great; for women, the case is
further complicated by the
fact that, as Mill astutely pointed out, unlike any other
oppressed groups or castes,
men demand of them not only submission but unqualified
affection as well; thus,
women are often weakened by the internalized demands of the
male-dominated
society itself, as well as by a plethora of material goods and
comforts: the middle-
class woman has a great deal more to lose than her chains.
The question "Why have there been no great women artists?" is
ismply the top tenth
of an iceberg of misinterpretation and misconception; beneath
lies a vast dark bulk of
shaky idees recues about the nature of art and its situational
concomitants, about the
nature of human abilities in general and of human excellence in
particular, and the
role that the social order plays in all of this. While the "woman
problem" as such may
be a pseudo-issue, the misconceptions involved in the question
"Why have there been
7
no great women artists?" points to major areas of intellectual
obfuscation beyond the
specific political and ideological issues involved in the
subjection of women. Basic to
the question are many naive, distorted, uncritical assumptions
about the making of art
in general, as well as the making of great art. These
assumptions, conscious or
unconscious, link such unlikely superstars as Michelangelo and
van Gogh, Raphael
and Jackson Pollock under the rubric of "Great"--an honorific--
attested to by the
number of scholarly monographs devoted to the artist in
question--and the Great Artist
is, of course, conceived of as one who has "Genius"; Genius, in
turn, is thought of as
an atemporal and mysterious power somehow embedded in the
person of the Great
"Why have there been
7
no great women artists?" points to major areas of intellectual
obfuscation beyond the
specific political and ideological issues involved in the
subjection of women. Basic to
the question are many naive, distorted, uncritical assumptions
about the making of art
in general, as well as the making of great art. These
assumptions, conscious or
unconscious, link such unlikely superstars as Michelangelo and
van Gogh, Raphael
and Jackson Pollock under the rubric of "Great"--an honorific--
attested to by the
number of scholarly monographs devoted to the artist in
question--and the Great Artist
is, of course, conceived of as one who has "Genius"; Genius, in
turn, is thought of as
an atemporal and mysterious power somehow embedded in the
person of the Great
Artist. Such ideas are related to unquestioned, often
unconscious, meta-historical
premises that make Hippolyte Taine's race-milieu-moment
formulation of the
dimensions of historical thought seem a model of sophistication.
But these
assumptions are intrinsic to a great deal of art-historical
writing. It is no accident that
the crucial question of the conditions generally productive of
great art has so rarely
been investigated, or that attempts to investigate such general
problems have, until
fairly recently, been dismissed as unscholarly, too broad, or the
province of some
other discipline, like sociology. To encourage a dispassionate,
impersonal,
sociological, and institutionally oriented approach would reveal
the entire romantic,
elitist, individual-glorifying, and monograph-producing
substructure upon which the
profession of art history is based, and which has only recently
been called into
question by a group of younger dissidents.
Underlying the question about woman as artist, then, we find
the myth of the Great
unconscious, meta-historical
premises that make Hippolyte Taine's race-milieu-moment
formulation of the
dimensions of historical thought seem a model of sophistication.
But these
assumptions are intrinsic to a great deal of art-historical
writing. It is no accident that
the crucial question of the conditions generally productive of
great art has so rarely
been investigated, or that attempts to investigate such general
problems have, until
fairly recently, been dismissed as unscholarly, too broad, or the
province of some
other discipline, like sociology. To encourage a dispassionate,
impersonal,
sociological, and institutionally oriented approach would reveal
the entire romantic,
elitist, individual-glorifying, and monograph-producing
substructure upon which the
profession of art history is based, and which has only recently
been called into
question by a group of younger dissidents.
Underlying the question about woman as artist, then, we find
the myth of the Great
Artist--subject of a hundred monographs, unique, godlike--
bearing within his person
since birth a mysterious essence, rather like the golden nugget
in Mrs. Grass's chicken
soup, called Genius or Talent, which, like murder, must always
out, no matter how
unlikely or unpromising the circumstances.
The magical aura surrounding the representational arts and their
creators has, of
course, given birth to myths since the earliest times.
Interestingly enough, the same
magical abilities attributed by Pliny to the Greek sculptor
Lysippos in antiquity--the
mysterious inner call in early youth, the lack of any teacher but
Nature herself--is
repeated as late as the 19th century by Max Buchon In his
biography of Courbet. The
supernatural powers of the artist as Imitator, his control of
strong, possibly dangerous
powers, have functioned historically to set him off from others
as a godlike creator,
one who creates Being out of nothing. The fairy tale of the
discovery by an older artist
or discerning patron of the Boy Wonder, usually in the guise of
bearing within his person
since birth a mysterious essence, rather like the golden nugget
in Mrs. Grass's chicken
soup, called Genius or Talent, which, like murder, must always
out, no matter how
unlikely or unpromising the circumstances.
The magical aura surrounding the representational arts and their
creators has, of
course, given birth to myths since the earliest times.
Interestingly enough, the same
magical abilities attributed by Pliny to the Greek sculptor
Lysippos in antiquity--the
mysterious inner call in early youth, the lack of any teacher but
Nature herself--is
repeated as late as the 19th century by Max Buchon In his
biography of Courbet. The
supernatural powers of the artist as Imitator, his control of
strong, possibly dangerous
powers, have functioned historically to set him off from others
as a godlike creator,
one who creates Being out of nothing. The fairy tale of the
discovery by an older artist
or discerning patron of the Boy Wonder, usually in the guise of
a lowly shepherd boy,
has been stock-in-trade of artistic mythology ever since Vasari
immortaized the young
Glotto, discovered by the great Cimabue while the lad was
guarding his flocks,
drawing sheep on a stone; Cimabue, overcome admiration for
the realism of the
drawing, immediately invited the humble youth to be his pupil.
Through some
8
mysterious coincidence, later artists including Beccafumi,
Andrea Sansovino, Andrea
del Castagno, Mantegna, Zurbarfin, and Goya were all
discovered in similar pastoral
circumstances. Even when the young Great Artist was fortunate
enough to come
equipped with a flock of sheep, his talent always seems to have
manifested itself very
early, and independent of external encouragement: Filippo Lippi
and Poussin, Courbet
and Monet are all reported to have drawn caricatures in the
margins of their
has been stock-in-trade of artistic mythology ever since Vasari
immortaized the young
Glotto, discovered by the great Cimabue while the lad was
guarding his flocks,
drawing sheep on a stone; Cimabue, overcome admiration for
the realism of the
drawing, immediately invited the humble youth to be his pupil.
Through some
8
mysterious coincidence, later artists including Beccafumi,
Andrea Sansovino, Andrea
del Castagno, Mantegna, Zurbarfin, and Goya were all
discovered in similar pastoral
circumstances. Even when the young Great Artist was fortunate
enough to come
equipped with a flock of sheep, his talent always seems to have
manifested itself very
early, and independent of external encouragement: Filippo Lippi
and Poussin, Courbet
and Monet are all reported to have drawn caricatures in the
margins of their
schoolbooks instead of studying the required subjects--we
never, course, hear about
the youths who neglected their studies and scribbled in the
margins of their notebooks
without ever becoming anything more elevated than department-
store clerks or shoe
salesmen. The great Michelangelo himself, according to his
biographer and pupil,
Vasari, did more drawing than studying as a child. So
pronounced was his talent,
reports Vasari, that when his master, Ghirlandaio, absented
himself momentarily from
his work in Santa Maria Novella, and the young art student took
the opportunity to
draw "the scaffolding, trestles, pots of paint, brushes and the
apprentices at their
tasks" in this brief absence, he did it so skillfully that upon his
return the master
aimed: "This boy knows more than I do."
As is so often the case, such stories, which probably have some
Even when based on
fact, these myths about the early manifestations of genius are
misleading. It is no
doubt true, for example, that the young Picasso passed all the
never, course, hear about
the youths who neglected their studies and scribbled in the
margins of their notebooks
without ever becoming anything more elevated than department-
store clerks or shoe
salesmen. The great Michelangelo himself, according to his
biographer and pupil,
Vasari, did more drawing than studying as a child. So
pronounced was his talent,
reports Vasari, that when his master, Ghirlandaio, absented
himself momentarily from
his work in Santa Maria Novella, and the young art student took
the opportunity to
draw "the scaffolding, trestles, pots of paint, brushes and the
apprentices at their
tasks" in this brief absence, he did it so skillfully that upon his
return the master
aimed: "This boy knows more than I do."
As is so often the case, such stories, which probably have some
Even when based on
fact, these myths about the early manifestations of genius are
misleading. It is no
doubt true, for example, that the young Picasso passed all the
examinations for
entrance to the Barcelona and later to the Madrid, Academy of
Art at the age of fifteen
in a single day, a feat of such difficulty that most candidates
required a month of
preparation. But one would like to find out more about similar
precocious qualifiers
for art academies who then went on to achieve nothing but
mediocrity or failure--in
whom, of course, art historians are uninterested--or to study in
greater detail the role
played by Picasso's art professor father in the pictorial
precocity of his son.
What if Picasso had been born a girl? Would Senor Ruiz have
paid as much attention
or stimulated as much ambition for achievement in a little
Pablita?
What is stressed in all these stories is the apparently
miraculous, nondetermined, and
asocial nature of artistic achievement; this semi-religious
conception of the artist's role
is elevated to hagiography in the 19th century, when art
historians, critics, and, not
least, some of making of the artists themselves tended to elevate
the making of art into
entrance to the Barcelona and later to the Madrid, Academy of
Art at the age of fifteen
in a single day, a feat of such difficulty that most candidates
required a month of
preparation. But one would like to find out more about similar
precocious qualifiers
for art academies who then went on to achieve nothing but
mediocrity or failure--in
whom, of course, art historians are uninterested--or to study in
greater detail the role
played by Picasso's art professor father in the pictorial
precocity of his son.
What if Picasso had been born a girl? Would Senor Ruiz have
paid as much attention
or stimulated as much ambition for achievement in a little
Pablita?
What is stressed in all these stories is the apparently
miraculous, nondetermined, and
asocial nature of artistic achievement; this semi-religious
conception of the artist's role
is elevated to hagiography in the 19th century, when art
historians, critics, and, not
least, some of making of the artists themselves tended to elevate
the making of art into
a substitute religion, the last bulwark of higher values in a
materialistic world. The
artists in the 19
t-
century Saints' Legend, struggles against the most determined
parental and social opposition, suffering the slings and arrows
of social opprobrium
like any Christian martyr, and ultimately succeeds against all
odds-generally, alas,
after his death-because from deep within himself radiates that
mysterious, holy
effulgence: Genius. Here we have the mad van Gogh, spinning
out sunflowers despite
epileptic seizures and near-starvation; Cezanne, braving
paternal rejection and public
scorn in order to revolutionize painting; Gauguin, throwing
away respectability and
9
financial security with a single existential gesture to pursue his
calling in the tropics;
or Toulouse-Lautrec, dwarfed, crippled, and alcoholic,
sacrificing his aristocratic
materialistic world. The
artists in the 19
t-
century Saints' Legend, struggles against the most determined
parental and social opposition, suffering the slings and arrows
of social opprobrium
like any Christian martyr, and ultimately succeeds against all
odds-generally, alas,
after his death-because from deep within himself radiates that
mysterious, holy
effulgence: Genius. Here we have the mad van Gogh, spinning
out sunflowers despite
epileptic seizures and near-starvation; Cezanne, braving
paternal rejection and public
scorn in order to revolutionize painting; Gauguin, throwing
away respectability and
9
financial security with a single existential gesture to pursue his
calling in the tropics;
or Toulouse-Lautrec, dwarfed, crippled, and alcoholic,
sacrificing his aristocratic
birthright in favor of the squalid surroundings that provided him
with inspiration.
Now, no serious contemporary art historian takes such obvious
fairy tales at their face
value. Yet it is this sort of mythology about artistic
achievement and its concomitants
which forms the unconscious or unquestioned assumptions of
scholars, no matter how
many crumbs are thrown to social influences, ideas of the times,
economic crises, and
so on. Behind the most sophisticated investigations of great
artists--more specifically,
the art-historical monograph, which accepts the notion of the
great artist as primary,
and the social and institutional structures within which he lived
and worked as mere
secondary "influences" or "background"--lurks the golden-
nugget theory of genius
and the free-enterprise conception of individual achievement.
On this basis, women's
lack of major achievement in art may be formulated as a
syllogism: If women had the
golden nugget of artistic genius, then it would reveal itself. But
it has never revealed
with inspiration.
Now, no serious contemporary art historian takes such obvious
fairy tales at their face
value. Yet it is this sort of mythology about artistic
achievement and its concomitants
which forms the unconscious or unquestioned assumptions of
scholars, no matter how
many crumbs are thrown to social influences, ideas of the times,
economic crises, and
so on. Behind the most sophisticated investigations of great
artists--more specifically,
the art-historical monograph, which accepts the notion of the
great artist as primary,
and the social and institutional structures within which he lived
and worked as mere
secondary "influences" or "background"--lurks the golden-
nugget theory of genius
and the free-enterprise conception of individual achievement.
On this basis, women's
lack of major achievement in art may be formulated as a
syllogism: If women had the
golden nugget of artistic genius, then it would reveal itself. But
it has never revealed
itself. Q.E.D. Women do not have the golden nugget of artistic
genius. If Giotto, the
obscure shepherd boy, and van Gogh with his fits could make it,
why not women?
Yet as soon as one leaves behind the world of fairy tale and
self-fulfilling prophecy
and, instead, casts a dispassionate eye on the actual situations in
which important art
production has existed, in the total range of its social and
institutional structures
throughout history, one finds that the very questions which are
fruitful or relevant for
the historian to ask shape up rather differently. One would like
to ask, for instance,
from what social classes artists were most likely to come at
different periods of art
history, from what castes and subgroup. What proportion of
painters and sculptors, or
more specifically, of major painters and sculptors, came from
families in which their
fathers or other close relatives were painters and sculptors or
engaged in related
professions? As Nikolaus Pevsner points out in his discussion of
the French Academy
genius. If Giotto, the
obscure shepherd boy, and van Gogh with his fits could make it,
why not women?
Yet as soon as one leaves behind the world of fairy tale and
self-fulfilling prophecy
and, instead, casts a dispassionate eye on the actual situations in
which important art
production has existed, in the total range of its social and
institutional structures
throughout history, one finds that the very questions which are
fruitful or relevant for
the historian to ask shape up rather differently. One would like
to ask, for instance,
from what social classes artists were most likely to come at
different periods of art
history, from what castes and subgroup. What proportion of
painters and sculptors, or
more specifically, of major painters and sculptors, came from
families in which their
fathers or other close relatives were painters and sculptors or
engaged in related
professions? As Nikolaus Pevsner points out in his discussion of
the French Academy
in the 17th and 18th centuries, the transmission of the artistic
profession from father to
son was considered a matter of course (as it was with the
Coypels, the Coustous, the
Van Loos, etc.); indeed, sons of academicians were exempted
from the customary fees
for lessons. Despite the noteworthy and dramatically satisfying
cases of the great
father-rejecting revoltes of the 19th century, one might be
forced to admit that a large
proportion of artists, great and not-so-great, in the days when
was normal for sons to
follow their fathers' footsteps, had artist fathers. In the rank of
major artists, the names
of Holbein and Durer, Raphael and Bernini, immediately spring
to mind; even in our
own times, one can cite the names of Picasso, Calder,
Giacometti, and Wyeth as
members of artist-families.
As far as the relationship of artistic occupation and social class
is concerned, an
interesting paradigm for the question "Why have there been no
great women artists?"
might well be provided by trying to answer the question "Why
profession from father to
son was considered a matter of course (as it was with the
Coypels, the Coustous, the
Van Loos, etc.); indeed, sons of academicians were exempted
from the customary fees
for lessons. Despite the noteworthy and dramatically satisfying
cases of the great
father-rejecting revoltes of the 19th century, one might be
forced to admit that a large
proportion of artists, great and not-so-great, in the days when
was normal for sons to
follow their fathers' footsteps, had artist fathers. In the rank of
major artists, the names
of Holbein and Durer, Raphael and Bernini, immediately spring
to mind; even in our
own times, one can cite the names of Picasso, Calder,
Giacometti, and Wyeth as
members of artist-families.
As far as the relationship of artistic occupation and social class
is concerned, an
interesting paradigm for the question "Why have there been no
great women artists?"
might well be provided by trying to answer the question "Why
have there been no
10
great artists from the aristocracy?" One can scarcely think,
before the anti-traditional
19th century at least, of any artist who sprang from the ranks of
any more elevated
class than the upper bourgeoisie; even in the 19th century,
Degas came from the lower
nobility-more like the haute bourgeoisie, in fact--and only
Toulouse-Lautrec,
metamorphosed into the ranks of the marginal by accidental
deformity, could be said
to have come from the loftier reaches of the upper classes.
While the aristocracy has
always provided the lion's share of the patronage and the
audience for arts, indeed, the
aristocracy of wealth does even in our own more democratic
days--it has contributed
little beyond amateurish efforts to the creation of art itself,
despite the fact that
aristocrats (like many women) have had more than their share of
educational
10
great artists from the aristocracy?" One can scarcely think,
before the anti-traditional
19th century at least, of any artist who sprang from the ranks of
any more elevated
class than the upper bourgeoisie; even in the 19th century,
Degas came from the lower
nobility-more like the haute bourgeoisie, in fact--and only
Toulouse-Lautrec,
metamorphosed into the ranks of the marginal by accidental
deformity, could be said
to have come from the loftier reaches of the upper classes.
While the aristocracy has
always provided the lion's share of the patronage and the
audience for arts, indeed, the
aristocracy of wealth does even in our own more democratic
days--it has contributed
little beyond amateurish efforts to the creation of art itself,
despite the fact that
aristocrats (like many women) have had more than their share of
educational
advantages, plenty of leisure and, indeed, like women, were
often encouraged to
dabble in the arts and even develop into respectable amateurs,
like Napoleon III's
cousin the Princess Mathilde, who exhibited at the official
Salons, or Queen Victoria,
who, with Prince Albert, studied art with no less a figure than
Landseer himself.
Could it be that the little golden nugget--genius--is missing
from the aristocratic
makeup the same way that it is from the feminine psyche? Or
rather, is it not that the
kinds of demands and expectations placed before both
aristocrats and women--the
amount of time necessarily devoted to social functions, the very
kinds of activities
demanded--simply made total devotion to profession out of the
question, indeed
unthinkable, both for upper-class males and for women
generally, rather than its being
a question of genius and talent?
When the right questions are asked about the conditions for
producing art, of which
the production of great art a subtopic, there will no doubt have
often encouraged to
dabble in the arts and even develop into respectable amateurs,
like Napoleon III's
cousin the Princess Mathilde, who exhibited at the official
Salons, or Queen Victoria,
who, with Prince Albert, studied art with no less a figure than
Landseer himself.
Could it be that the little golden nugget--genius--is missing
from the aristocratic
makeup the same way that it is from the feminine psyche? Or
rather, is it not that the
kinds of demands and expectations placed before both
aristocrats and women--the
amount of time necessarily devoted to social functions, the very
kinds of activities
demanded--simply made total devotion to profession out of the
question, indeed
unthinkable, both for upper-class males and for women
generally, rather than its being
a question of genius and talent?
When the right questions are asked about the conditions for
producing art, of which
the production of great art a subtopic, there will no doubt have
to be some discussion
of the situational concomitants of intelligence and talent
generally, not merely of
artistic genius. Piaget and others have stressed in their genetic
epistemology that in the
development of reason and in the unfolding of imagination in
young children,
intelligence--or, by implication, what we choose to call genius--
is a dynamic activity
rather than a static essence, and an activity of a subject in a
situation. As further
investigations in the field of child development imply, these
abilities, or this
intelligence, are built up minutely, step by step, from infancy
onward, and the patterns
of adaptation-accommodation may be established so early
within the subject-in-an-
environment that they may indeed appear to be innate to the
unsophisticated observer.
Such investigations imply that, even aside from meta-historical
reasons, scholars will
have to abandon the notion, consciously articulated or not, of
individual genius as
innate, and as primary to the creation of art.
of the situational concomitants of intelligence and talent
generally, not merely of
artistic genius. Piaget and others have stressed in their genetic
epistemology that in the
development of reason and in the unfolding of imagination in
young children,
intelligence--or, by implication, what we choose to call genius--
is a dynamic activity
rather than a static essence, and an activity of a subject in a
situation. As further
investigations in the field of child development imply, these
abilities, or this
intelligence, are built up minutely, step by step, from infancy
onward, and the patterns
of adaptation-accommodation may be established so early
within the subject-in-an-
environment that they may indeed appear to be innate to the
unsophisticated observer.
Such investigations imply that, even aside from meta-historical
reasons, scholars will
have to abandon the notion, consciously articulated or not, of
individual genius as
innate, and as primary to the creation of art.
The question "Why have there been no great women artists?"
has led us to the
conclusion, so far, that art is not a free, autonomous activity of
a super-endowed
individual, "influenced" by previous artists, and more vaguely
and superficially, by
"social forces," but, rather, that the total situation of art
making, both in terms of the
11
development of the art maker and in the nature and quality of
the work of art itself,
occur in a social situation, are integral elements of this social
structure, and are
mediated and determined by specific and definable social
institutions, be they art
academies, systems of patronage, mythologies of the divine
creator, artist as he-man
or social outcast.
The Question of the Nude
We can now approach our question from a more reasonable
standpoint, since it seems
has led us to the
conclusion, so far, that art is not a free, autonomous activity of
a super-endowed
individual, "influenced" by previous artists, and more vaguely
and superficially, by
"social forces," but, rather, that the total situation of art
making, both in terms of the
11
development of the art maker and in the nature and quality of
the work of art itself,
occur in a social situation, are integral elements of this social
structure, and are
mediated and determined by specific and definable social
institutions, be they art
academies, systems of patronage, mythologies of the divine
creator, artist as he-man
or social outcast.
The Question of the Nude
We can now approach our question from a more reasonable
standpoint, since it seems
probable that the answer to why there have been no great
women artists lies not in the
nature of individual genius or the lack of it, but in the nature of
given social
insititutions and what they forbid or encourage in various
classes or groups of
individuals. Let us first examine such a simlee, but critical,
issue as availability of the
nude model to aspiring women artists, in the period extending
from the Renaissance
until near the end of the 19th century, a period in which careful
and prolonged study
of the nude model was essential to the training of every young
artist, to the production
of any work with pretensions to grandeur, and to the very
essence of History Painting,
generally accepted as the highest category of art. Indeed, it was
argued by defenders
of traditional painting in the 19th century that there could be no
great painting with
clothed figures, since costume inevitably destroyed both the
temporal universality and
the classical idealization required by great art. Needless to say,
central to the training
women artists lies not in the
nature of individual genius or the lack of it, but in the nature of
given social
insititutions and what they forbid or encourage in various
classes or groups of
individuals. Let us first examine such a simlee, but critical,
issue as availability of the
nude model to aspiring women artists, in the period extending
from the Renaissance
until near the end of the 19th century, a period in which careful
and prolonged study
of the nude model was essential to the training of every young
artist, to the production
of any work with pretensions to grandeur, and to the very
essence of History Painting,
generally accepted as the highest category of art. Indeed, it was
argued by defenders
of traditional painting in the 19th century that there could be no
great painting with
clothed figures, since costume inevitably destroyed both the
temporal universality and
the classical idealization required by great art. Needless to say,
central to the training
programs of the academies since their inception late in the 16th
and early in the 17th
centuries, was life drawing from the nude, generally male,
model. In addition, groups
of artists and their pupils often met privately for life drawing
sessions from the nude
model in their studios. While individual artists and private
academies employed the
female model extensively, the female nude was forbidden in
almost all public art
schools as late as 1850 and after--a state of affairs which
Pevsner rightly desigates as
"hardly believable. " Far more believable, unfortunately, was
the complete
unavailability to the aspiring woman artist of any nude models
at all, male or female.
As late as 1893, "lady" students were not admitted to life
drawing at the Royal
Academy in London, and even when they were, after that date,
the model had to be
"partially draped."
A brief survey of representations of life-drawing sessions
reveals: an all-male
clientele drawing from the female nude in Rembrandt's studio;
working from male
and early in the 17th
centuries, was life drawing from the nude, generally male,
model. In addition, groups
of artists and their pupils often met privately for life drawing
sessions from the nude
model in their studios. While individual artists and private
academies employed the
female model extensively, the female nude was forbidden in
almost all public art
schools as late as 1850 and after--a state of affairs which
Pevsner rightly desigates as
"hardly believable. " Far more believable, unfortunately, was
the complete
unavailability to the aspiring woman artist of any nude models
at all, male or female.
As late as 1893, "lady" students were not admitted to life
drawing at the Royal
Academy in London, and even when they were, after that date,
the model had to be
"partially draped."
A brief survey of representations of life-drawing sessions
reveals: an all-male
clientele drawing from the female nude in Rembrandt's studio;
working from male
nudes in 18
th
century representations of academic instruction in The Hague
and
Vienna; men working from the seated male nude in Boilly's
charming painting of the
interior of Houdon's studio at the beginning of the 19th century.
Leon-Mathieu
Cochereau's scrupulously veristic Interior of David's Studio,
exhibited in the Salon of
1814, reveals a group of young men diligently drawing or
painting from a male nude
model, whose discarded shoes may be seen before the models'
stand.
12
The very plethora of surviving "Academies"--detailed,
painstaking studies from the
nude male studio model--in the youthful oeuvre of artists down
through the time of
Seurat and well into the 20th century, attests to the central
importance of this branch
th
century representations of academic instruction in The Hague
and
Vienna; men working from the seated male nude in Boilly's
charming painting of the
interior of Houdon's studio at the beginning of the 19th century.
Leon-Mathieu
Cochereau's scrupulously veristic Interior of David's Studio,
exhibited in the Salon of
1814, reveals a group of young men diligently drawing or
painting from a male nude
model, whose discarded shoes may be seen before the models'
stand.
12
The very plethora of surviving "Academies"--detailed,
painstaking studies from the
nude male studio model--in the youthful oeuvre of artists down
through the time of
Seurat and well into the 20th century, attests to the central
importance of this branch
of study in the pedagogy and development of the talented
beginner. The formal
academic program itself normally proceeded, as a matter of
course, from copying
from drawings and engravings, to drawing from casts of famous
works of sculpture, to
drawing from the living model. To be deprived of this ultimate
stage of training
meant, in effect, to be deprived of the possibility of creating
major art works, unless
one were a very ingenious indeed, or simply, as most of the
women aspiring to be
painters ultimately did, restricting oneself to the "minor" fields
of portraiture, genre,
landscape, or still life. It is rather as though a medical student
were denied the
opportunity to dissect or even examine the naked human body.
There exist, to my knowledge, no historical representations of
artists drawing from the
nude model which include women in any other role but that of
the nude model itself,
an interesting commentary on rules of propriety: that is, it is all
right for a ("low," of
course) woman to reveal herself naked-as-an object for a group
of men, but forbidden
beginner. The formal
academic program itself normally proceeded, as a matter of
course, from copying
from drawings and engravings, to drawing from casts of famous
works of sculpture, to
drawing from the living model. To be deprived of this ultimate
stage of training
meant, in effect, to be deprived of the possibility of creating
major art works, unless
one were a very ingenious indeed, or simply, as most of the
women aspiring to be
painters ultimately did, restricting oneself to the "minor" fields
of portraiture, genre,
landscape, or still life. It is rather as though a medical student
were denied the
opportunity to dissect or even examine the naked human body.
There exist, to my knowledge, no historical representations of
artists drawing from the
nude model which include women in any other role but that of
the nude model itself,
an interesting commentary on rules of propriety: that is, it is all
right for a ("low," of
course) woman to reveal herself naked-as-an object for a group
of men, but forbidden
to a woman to participate in the active study and recording of
naked-man-as-an-object
or even of a fellow woman. An amusing example of this taboo
on confronting a
dressed lady with a naked man is embodied in a group portrait
of the members of the
Royal Academy of London in 1772, represented by Johan
Zoffany as gathered in the
life room before two nude male models; all the distinguished
members are present
with but one noteworthy exception--the single female member,
the irenowned
Angelica Kauffmann, who, for propriety's sake, is merely
present in effigy in the form
of a portrait hanging on the wall. A slightly earlier drawing,
Ladies in the Studio by
the Polish artist Daniel Chodowiecki, shows the ladies
portraying a modestly dressed
member of their sex. In a lithograph dating from the relatively
liberated epoch
following the French Revolution, the lithographer Marlet has
represented some
women sketchers in a group of students working from the male
model, but the model
naked-man-as-an-object
or even of a fellow woman. An amusing example of this taboo
on confronting a
dressed lady with a naked man is embodied in a group portrait
of the members of the
Royal Academy of London in 1772, represented by Johan
Zoffany as gathered in the
life room before two nude male models; all the distinguished
members are present
with but one noteworthy exception--the single female member,
the irenowned
Angelica Kauffmann, who, for propriety's sake, is merely
present in effigy in the form
of a portrait hanging on the wall. A slightly earlier drawing,
Ladies in the Studio by
the Polish artist Daniel Chodowiecki, shows the ladies
portraying a modestly dressed
member of their sex. In a lithograph dating from the relatively
liberated epoch
following the French Revolution, the lithographer Marlet has
represented some
women sketchers in a group of students working from the male
model, but the model
himself has been chastely provided with what appears to be a
pair of bathing trunks, a
garment hardly conducive to a sense of classical elevation; no
doubt such license was
considered daring in its day, and the young ladies in question
suspected of doubtful
morals, but even this liberated state of affairs seems to have
lasted only a short while.
In an English stereoscopic color view of the interior of a studio
of about 1865, the
standing, bearded male model is so heavily draped that not an
iota of his anatomy
escapes from the discreet toga, save for a single bare shoulder
and arm: even so, he
obviously had the grace to avert his eyes in the presence of the
crinoline-clad young
sketchers.
The women in the Women's Modeling Class at the Pennsylvania
Academy were
evidently not afforded even this modest privilege. A photograph
by Thomas Eakins of
13
pair of bathing trunks, a
garment hardly conducive to a sense of classical elevation; no
doubt such license was
considered daring in its day, and the young ladies in question
suspected of doubtful
morals, but even this liberated state of affairs seems to have
lasted only a short while.
In an English stereoscopic color view of the interior of a studio
of about 1865, the
standing, bearded male model is so heavily draped that not an
iota of his anatomy
escapes from the discreet toga, save for a single bare shoulder
and arm: even so, he
obviously had the grace to avert his eyes in the presence of the
crinoline-clad young
sketchers.
The women in the Women's Modeling Class at the Pennsylvania
Academy were
evidently not afforded even this modest privilege. A photograph
by Thomas Eakins of
13
about 1885 reveals these students modeling from a cow (bull?
ox? the nether regions
are obscure in the photograph), a naked cow to be sure, perhaps
a daring liberty when
one considers that even piano legs might be concealed beneath
pantalettes during this
era. (The idea of introducing a bovine model into the artist's
studio stems from
Courbet, who brought a bull into his short lived studio academy
in the 1860s). Only at
the very end of the 19
th
century, in the relatively liberated and open atmosphere of
Repin's studio and circle in Russia, do we find representations
of women art students
working uninhibitedly from the nude--the female model to be
sure in the company of
men. Even in this case, it must be noted that certain
photographs represent a private
sketch group meeting in one of the women artists' homes; in
another, the model is
draped; and the large group portrait, a cooperative effort by two
men and two women
ox? the nether regions
are obscure in the photograph), a naked cow to be sure, perhaps
a daring liberty when
one considers that even piano legs might be concealed beneath
pantalettes during this
era. (The idea of introducing a bovine model into the artist's
studio stems from
Courbet, who brought a bull into his short lived studio academy
in the 1860s). Only at
the very end of the 19
th
century, in the relatively liberated and open atmosphere of
Repin's studio and circle in Russia, do we find representations
of women art students
working uninhibitedly from the nude--the female model to be
sure in the company of
men. Even in this case, it must be noted that certain
photographs represent a private
sketch group meeting in one of the women artists' homes; in
another, the model is
draped; and the large group portrait, a cooperative effort by two
men and two women
students of Repin's, is an imaginary gathering together of all of
the Russian realist's
pupils, past and present, rather than a realistic studio view.
I have gone into the question of the availability of the nude
model, a single aspect of
the automatic, institutionally maintained discrimination against
women, in such detail
simply to demonstrate both the universality of this
discrimination and its
consequences, as well as the institutional rather than individual
nature of but one facet
of the necessary preparation for achieving mere proficiency,
much less greatness, in
the realm of art during a long period. One could equally well
examine other other
dimensions of the situation, such as the apprencticeship system,
the academic
educational pattern which, in France especially, was almost the
only key to success
and which had a regular progression and set competitions,
crowned by the Prix de
Rome which enabled the young winner to work in the French
Academy in that city--
unthinkab1e for women, of course--and for which women were
unable to compete
the Russian realist's
pupils, past and present, rather than a realistic studio view.
I have gone into the question of the availability of the nude
model, a single aspect of
the automatic, institutionally maintained discrimination against
women, in such detail
simply to demonstrate both the universality of this
discrimination and its
consequences, as well as the institutional rather than individual
nature of but one facet
of the necessary preparation for achieving mere proficiency,
much less greatness, in
the realm of art during a long period. One could equally well
examine other other
dimensions of the situation, such as the apprencticeship system,
the academic
educational pattern which, in France especially, was almost the
only key to success
and which had a regular progression and set competitions,
crowned by the Prix de
Rome which enabled the young winner to work in the French
Academy in that city--
unthinkab1e for women, of course--and for which women were
unable to compete
until the end of the 19th century, by which time, in fact the
whole academic system
had lost its importance anyway. It seems clear, to take France in
the 19th century as an
example (a country which probably had a larger proportion of
women artists than any
other-that is to say, in terms of their percentage in the total
number of artists
exhibiting in the Salon), that "women were not accepted as
professional painters. In
the middle of the century, there were only a third as many
women as men artists, but
even this mildly encouraging statistic is deceptive when we
discover that out of this
relatively meager number, none had attended that major
stepping-stone to artistic
success, the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, only 7 percent had ever
received any official
commission or had held any official office-and these might
include the most menial
sort of work only 7 percent had ever received any Salon medal,
and none had ever
received the Legion of Honor. Deprived of encouragements,
educational facilities, and
whole academic system
had lost its importance anyway. It seems clear, to take France in
the 19th century as an
example (a country which probably had a larger proportion of
women artists than any
other-that is to say, in terms of their percentage in the total
number of artists
exhibiting in the Salon), that "women were not accepted as
professional painters. In
the middle of the century, there were only a third as many
women as men artists, but
even this mildly encouraging statistic is deceptive when we
discover that out of this
relatively meager number, none had attended that major
stepping-stone to artistic
success, the Ecole des Beaux-Arts, only 7 percent had ever
received any official
commission or had held any official office-and these might
include the most menial
sort of work only 7 percent had ever received any Salon medal,
and none had ever
received the Legion of Honor. Deprived of encouragements,
educational facilities, and
rewards it is almost incredible that a certain women did
persevere and seek a
profession in the arts.
14
It also becomes apparent why women were able to compete on
far more equal terms
with men--and even become innovators--in literature. While art
making traditionally
has demanded the learning of specific techniques and skills, in a
certain sequence, in
an institutional setting outside the home, as well as becoming
familiar with a specific
vocabulary of iconography and motifs, the same is by no means
true for the poet or
novelist. Anyone, even a woman, has to learn the language, can
learn to read and
write, and can commit personal experiences to paper in the
privacy of one's room.
Naturally this oversimplifies the real difficulties and
complexities involved in creating
good or great literature, whether by man or woman but it still
gives a clue as to the
persevere and seek a
profession in the arts.
14
It also becomes apparent why women were able to compete on
far more equal terms
with men--and even become innovators--in literature. While art
making traditionally
has demanded the learning of specific techniques and skills, in a
certain sequence, in
an institutional setting outside the home, as well as becoming
familiar with a specific
vocabulary of iconography and motifs, the same is by no means
true for the poet or
novelist. Anyone, even a woman, has to learn the language, can
learn to read and
write, and can commit personal experiences to paper in the
privacy of one's room.
Naturally this oversimplifies the real difficulties and
complexities involved in creating
good or great literature, whether by man or woman but it still
gives a clue as to the
possibility of the existence of an Emily Bronte or an Emily
Dickenson and the lack of
their counterparts, at least until quite recently, in the visual
arts.
Of course we have not gone into the "fringe" requirements for
major artists, which
would have been, for the most part, both psychically and
socially closed to women,
even if hypothetically they could have achieved the requisite
grandeur in the
performance of their craft: in the Renaissance and after, the
great artist, aside from
participating in the affairs of an academy, might well be
intimate with members of
humanist circles with whom he could exchange ideas, establish
suitable relationships
with patrons, travel widely and freely, perhaps politic and
intrigue,nor have we
mentioned the organizational acumen and ability involved
involved in running a
major studio-factory, like that of Rubens. An enormous amount
of self-confidence and
worldly knowledgeability, as well as a natural sense well-earned
dominanace and
Dickenson and the lack of
their counterparts, at least until quite recently, in the visual
arts.
Of course we have not gone into the "fringe" requirements for
major artists, which
would have been, for the most part, both psychically and
socially closed to women,
even if hypothetically they could have achieved the requisite
grandeur in the
performance of their craft: in the Renaissance and after, the
great artist, aside from
participating in the affairs of an academy, might well be
intimate with members of
humanist circles with whom he could exchange ideas, establish
suitable relationships
with patrons, travel widely and freely, perhaps politic and
intrigue,nor have we
mentioned the organizational acumen and ability involved
involved in running a
major studio-factory, like that of Rubens. An enormous amount
of self-confidence and
worldly knowledgeability, as well as a natural sense well-earned
dominanace and
power was needed by the great chef d'ecole both in the running
of the production end
of painting, and in the control and instruction of the numerous
students and assistants.
The Lady's Accomplishment
In contrast to the single-mindedness and commitment demanded
of a chef d'ecole, we
might set the image of the "lady painter" established by 19
th
century etiquette books
and reinforced in the literature of the times. It is precisely the
insistence upon a
modest, proficient, self demeaning level of amateurism as a
"suitable
accomplishment" for the well brought up young woman, who
naturally would want to
direct her major attention to the welfare of others--family and
husband--that militated,
and still militates, against any real accomplishment on the part
of women. It is this
emphasis which transforms serious commitment to frivolous
self-indulgence, busy
work, or occupational therapy, and today, more than ever, in
suburban bastions of the
of the production end
of painting, and in the control and instruction of the numerous
students and assistants.
The Lady's Accomplishment
In contrast to the single-mindedness and commitment demanded
of a chef d'ecole, we
might set the image of the "lady painter" established by 19
th
century etiquette books
and reinforced in the literature of the times. It is precisely the
insistence upon a
modest, proficient, self demeaning level of amateurism as a
"suitable
accomplishment" for the well brought up young woman, who
naturally would want to
direct her major attention to the welfare of others--family and
husband--that militated,
and still militates, against any real accomplishment on the part
of women. It is this
emphasis which transforms serious commitment to frivolous
self-indulgence, busy
work, or occupational therapy, and today, more than ever, in
suburban bastions of the
feminine mystique, tends to distort the whole notion of what art
is and what kind of
social role it plays. In Mrs. Ellis's widely read The Family
Monitor and Domestic
Guide, published before the middle of the 19th century, a book
of advice popular both
in the United States and in England, women were warned
against the snare of trying
too hard to excel in any one thing:
15
It must not be supposed that the writer is one who would
advocate,
as essential to woman, any very extraordinary degree of
intellectual
attainment, especially if confined to one particular branch of
study.
'I should like to excel in something' is a frequent and, to some
extent,
laudable expression; but in what does it originate, and to what
does
it tend? To be able to do a great many things tolerably well, is
is and what kind of
social role it plays. In Mrs. Ellis's widely read The Family
Monitor and Domestic
Guide, published before the middle of the 19th century, a book
of advice popular both
in the United States and in England, women were warned
against the snare of trying
too hard to excel in any one thing:
15
It must not be supposed that the writer is one who would
advocate,
as essential to woman, any very extraordinary degree of
intellectual
attainment, especially if confined to one particular branch of
study.
'I should like to excel in something' is a frequent and, to some
extent,
laudable expression; but in what does it originate, and to what
does
it tend? To be able to do a great many things tolerably well, is
of
infinitely more value to a woman, than to be able to excell in
any
one. By the former, she may render herself generally useful; by
the
latter she may dazzle for an hour. By being apt, and tolerably
well
skilled in everything, she may fall into any situation in life with
dignity and ease--by devoting her time to excellence in one, she
may
remain incapable of every other.
So far as cleverness, learning, and knowledge are conducive to
woman's moral excellence, they are therefore desirable, and no
further. All that would occupy her mind to the exclusion of
better
things, all that would involve her in the mazes of flattery and
admiration, all that would tend to draw away her thoughts from
others and fix them on herself, ought to be avoided as an evil to
her,
however brilliant or attractive it may he in itself.
Lest we are tempted to laugh, we may refresh ourselves with
more recent samples of
infinitely more value to a woman, than to be able to excell in
any
one. By the former, she may render herself generally useful; by
the
latter she may dazzle for an hour. By being apt, and tolerably
well
skilled in everything, she may fall into any situation in life with
dignity and ease--by devoting her time to excellence in one, she
may
remain incapable of every other.
So far as cleverness, learning, and knowledge are conducive to
woman's moral excellence, they are therefore desirable, and no
further. All that would occupy her mind to the exclusion of
better
things, all that would involve her in the mazes of flattery and
admiration, all that would tend to draw away her thoughts from
others and fix them on herself, ought to be avoided as an evil to
her,
however brilliant or attractive it may he in itself.
Lest we are tempted to laugh, we may refresh ourselves with
more recent samples of
exactly the same message cited in Betty Friedan's Feminine
Mystique, or in the pages
of recent issues of popular women's magazines.
The advice has a familiar ring: propped up by a bit of
Freudiansim and some tag-lines
from the social sciences about the well-rounded personality,
preparation for woman's
chief career, marriage and the unfemininity of deep involvement
with work rather
than sex, it is still the mainstay of the Feminine Mystique. Such
an outlook helps
guard men from unwanted competition in their "serious"
professional activities and
assures them of "wellrounded" assistance on the home front so
that they can have sex
and family in addition to the fulfillment of their own
specialized talents at the same
time.
As far as painting specifically is concerned, Mrs. Ellis finds
that it has one immediate
advantage for the young lady over its rival branch of artistic
activity, music--it is quiet
and disturbs no one (this negative virtue, of course, would not
be true of sculpture, but
Mystique, or in the pages
of recent issues of popular women's magazines.
The advice has a familiar ring: propped up by a bit of
Freudiansim and some tag-lines
from the social sciences about the well-rounded personality,
preparation for woman's
chief career, marriage and the unfemininity of deep involvement
with work rather
than sex, it is still the mainstay of the Feminine Mystique. Such
an outlook helps
guard men from unwanted competition in their "serious"
professional activities and
assures them of "wellrounded" assistance on the home front so
that they can have sex
and family in addition to the fulfillment of their own
specialized talents at the same
time.
As far as painting specifically is concerned, Mrs. Ellis finds
that it has one immediate
advantage for the young lady over its rival branch of artistic
activity, music--it is quiet
and disturbs no one (this negative virtue, of course, would not
be true of sculpture, but
accomplishment with the hammer and chisel simply never
occurs as a suitable
accomplishment for the weaker sex); in addition, says Mrs.
Ellis, "it [drawing] is an
employment which beguiles the mind of many cares. . .
.Drawing is, of all other
occupations, the one most calculated to keep the mind from
brooding upon self, and to
maintain that general cheerfulness which is a part of social-and
domestic duty. . . . It
16
can also," she adds, "be laid down and resumed, as circumstance
or inclination may
direct, and that without serious loss." Again, lest we feel that
we have made a great
deal of progress in this area in the past one hundred years, I
might bring up the remark
of a bright young doctor who, when the conversation turned to
his wife and her
friends "dab bling" in the arts, snorted: "Well, at least it keeps
them out of trouble!"
occurs as a suitable
accomplishment for the weaker sex); in addition, says Mrs.
Ellis, "it [drawing] is an
employment which beguiles the mind of many cares. . .
.Drawing is, of all other
occupations, the one most calculated to keep the mind from
brooding upon self, and to
maintain that general cheerfulness which is a part of social-and
domestic duty. . . . It
16
can also," she adds, "be laid down and resumed, as circumstance
or inclination may
direct, and that without serious loss." Again, lest we feel that
we have made a great
deal of progress in this area in the past one hundred years, I
might bring up the remark
of a bright young doctor who, when the conversation turned to
his wife and her
friends "dab bling" in the arts, snorted: "Well, at least it keeps
them out of trouble!"
Now as in the 19
th
century, amateurism and lack of real commitment, as well as
snobbery and emphasis on chic on the part of women, in their
artistic "hobbies" feeds
the contempt of the successful, professionally committed man,
who is engaged in
"real" work and can, with a certain justice, point to his wife's
lack of seriousness in
her artistic activities. For such men, the "real" work of women
is only that which
directly or indirectly serves the family; any other commitment
falls under the rubric of
diversion, selfishness, egomania, or, at the unspoken extreme,
castration. The circle is
a vicious one, in which philistinism and frivolity mutually
reinforce each other.
In literature, as in life, even if the woman's commitment to art
was a serious one, she
was expected to drop her career and give up this commitment at
the behest of love and
marriage: this lesson is, today as in the 19
th
century, still inculcated in young girls,
th
century, amateurism and lack of real commitment, as well as
snobbery and emphasis on chic on the part of women, in their
artistic "hobbies" feeds
the contempt of the successful, professionally committed man,
who is engaged in
"real" work and can, with a certain justice, point to his wife's
lack of seriousness in
her artistic activities. For such men, the "real" work of women
is only that which
directly or indirectly serves the family; any other commitment
falls under the rubric of
diversion, selfishness, egomania, or, at the unspoken extreme,
castration. The circle is
a vicious one, in which philistinism and frivolity mutually
reinforce each other.
In literature, as in life, even if the woman's commitment to art
was a serious one, she
was expected to drop her career and give up this commitment at
the behest of love and
marriage: this lesson is, today as in the 19
th
century, still inculcated in young girls,
directly or indirectly, from the moment they are born. Even the
determined and
successful heroine of Mrs. Craik's mid-19
th
-century novel about feminine artistic
success, Olive, a young woman who lives alone, strives for
fame and independence,
and actually supports herself through her art--such unfeminine
behavior is at least
partly excused by the fact that she is a cripple and automatically
considers that
marriage is denied to her--even Olive ultimately succumbs to
the blandishments of
love and marriage. To paraphrase the words of Patricia
Thomson in The Victorian
Heroine, Mrs. Craik, having shot her bolt in the course of her
novel, is content,
finally, to let her heroine, whose ultimate greatness the reader
has never been able to
doubt, sink gently into matrimony. "Of Olive, Mrs. Craik
comments imperturbably
that her husband's influence is to deprive the Scottish Academy
of 'no one knew how
many grand pictures.'" Then as now, despite men's greater
determined and
successful heroine of Mrs. Craik's mid-19
th
-century novel about feminine artistic
success, Olive, a young woman who lives alone, strives for
fame and independence,
and actually supports herself through her art--such unfeminine
behavior is at least
partly excused by the fact that she is a cripple and automatically
considers that
marriage is denied to her--even Olive ultimately succumbs to
the blandishments of
love and marriage. To paraphrase the words of Patricia
Thomson in The Victorian
Heroine, Mrs. Craik, having shot her bolt in the course of her
novel, is content,
finally, to let her heroine, whose ultimate greatness the reader
has never been able to
doubt, sink gently into matrimony. "Of Olive, Mrs. Craik
comments imperturbably
that her husband's influence is to deprive the Scottish Academy
of 'no one knew how
many grand pictures.'" Then as now, despite men's greater
"tolerance" the choice for
women seems always to be marriage or a career, i.e., solitude as
the price of success
or sex and companionship at the price of personal renunciation.
That achievement in the arts, as in any field of endeavor,
demands struggle and
sacrifice is undeniable; that this has certainly been true after the
middle of the 19
th
century, when the traditional institutions of artistic support and
patronage no longer
fulfilled their customary obligations, is also undeniable. One
has only to think of
Delacroix, Courbet, Degas, van Gogh, and Toulouse-Lautrec as
examples of great
artists who gave up the distractions and obligations of family
life, at least in part, so
that they could pursue their artistic careers more
singlemindedly. Yet none of them
was automatically denied the pleasure of sex or companoinship
on account of this
choice. Nor did they ever conceive that they had sacrificed their
manhood-or their
women seems always to be marriage or a career, i.e., solitude as
the price of success
or sex and companionship at the price of personal renunciation.
That achievement in the arts, as in any field of endeavor,
demands struggle and
sacrifice is undeniable; that this has certainly been true after the
middle of the 19
th
century, when the traditional institutions of artistic support and
patronage no longer
fulfilled their customary obligations, is also undeniable. One
has only to think of
Delacroix, Courbet, Degas, van Gogh, and Toulouse-Lautrec as
examples of great
artists who gave up the distractions and obligations of family
life, at least in part, so
that they could pursue their artistic careers more
singlemindedly. Yet none of them
was automatically denied the pleasure of sex or companoinship
on account of this
choice. Nor did they ever conceive that they had sacrificed their
manhood-or their
17
sexual role on account of their single mindedness in achieving
professional
fulfillment. But if the artist in question happened to be a
woman, one thousand years
of guilt, self-doubt, and objecthood would have been added to
the undeniable
difficulties of being an artist in the modern world.
The unconscious aura of titillation that arises from a visual
representation of an
aspiring woman artist in the mid-19th century, Emily Mary
Osborn's heartfelt
painting, Nameless and Friendless (1857), a canvas representing
a poor but lovely and
respectable young girl at a London art dealer nervously awaiting
the verdict of the
pompous proprietor about the worth of her canvases while two
ogling "art lovers"
look on, is really not too different in its underlying assumptions
from an overtly
salacious work like Bompard's Debut of the Model. The theme
in both is innocence,
delicious feminine innocence, exposed to the world. It is the
sexual role on account of their single mindedness in achieving
professional
fulfillment. But if the artist in question happened to be a
woman, one thousand years
of guilt, self-doubt, and objecthood would have been added to
the undeniable
difficulties of being an artist in the modern world.
The unconscious aura of titillation that arises from a visual
representation of an
aspiring woman artist in the mid-19th century, Emily Mary
Osborn's heartfelt
painting, Nameless and Friendless (1857), a canvas representing
a poor but lovely and
respectable young girl at a London art dealer nervously awaiting
the verdict of the
pompous proprietor about the worth of her canvases while two
ogling "art lovers"
look on, is really not too different in its underlying assumptions
from an overtly
salacious work like Bompard's Debut of the Model. The theme
in both is innocence,
delicious feminine innocence, exposed to the world. It is the
charming vulnerability of
the young woman artist, like that of the hesitating model, which
is really the subject of
Osborn's painting, not the value of the young woman's work or
her pride in it: the
issue here is, as usual, sexual rather than serious. Always a
model but never an artist
might well have served as the motto of the seriously aspiring
young woman in the arts
of the 19th century.
Successes
But what of the small band of heroic women, who, throughout
the ages, despite
obstacles, have achieved preeminence, if not the pinnacles of
grandeur of a
Michelangelo, a Rembrandt, or a Picasso? Are there any
qualities, that may be said to
have characterized them as a group and as individuals? While 1
cannot go into such
an investigation in great detail in this article, I can point to a
few striking
characteristics of women artists generally: they all, almost
without exception, were
either the daughters of artist fathers, or generally later, in the
the young woman artist, like that of the hesitating model, which
is really the subject of
Osborn's painting, not the value of the young woman's work or
her pride in it: the
issue here is, as usual, sexual rather than serious. Always a
model but never an artist
might well have served as the motto of the seriously aspiring
young woman in the arts
of the 19th century.
Successes
But what of the small band of heroic women, who, throughout
the ages, despite
obstacles, have achieved preeminence, if not the pinnacles of
grandeur of a
Michelangelo, a Rembrandt, or a Picasso? Are there any
qualities, that may be said to
have characterized them as a group and as individuals? While 1
cannot go into such
an investigation in great detail in this article, I can point to a
few striking
characteristics of women artists generally: they all, almost
without exception, were
either the daughters of artist fathers, or generally later, in the
19
th
and 20
th
centuries,
had a close personal connection with a stronger or more
dominant male artistic
personality. Neither of these character* tics is, of course,
unusual for men artists,
either, as we have indicated above in the case of artist fathers
and sons: it is simply
true almost without exception for their feminine counterparts, at
least until quite
recently. From the legendary sculptor Sabina von Steinbach, in
the13th century, who,
according to local tradition, was responsible for the South
Portal groups on the
Cathedral of Strasbourg, down to Rosa Bonheur the most
renowned animal painter of
the 19th century, and including such eminent women artists as
Marietta Robusti
(daughter of Tintoretto), Lavinia Fontana, Artemisia
Gentileschi, Elizabeth Cheron,
Mme. Vigee Lebrun, and Angelica Kauffmann--all, without
th
and 20
th
centuries,
had a close personal connection with a stronger or more
dominant male artistic
personality. Neither of these character* tics is, of course,
unusual for men artists,
either, as we have indicated above in the case of artist fathers
and sons: it is simply
true almost without exception for their feminine counterparts, at
least until quite
recently. From the legendary sculptor Sabina von Steinbach, in
the13th century, who,
according to local tradition, was responsible for the South
Portal groups on the
Cathedral of Strasbourg, down to Rosa Bonheur the most
renowned animal painter of
the 19th century, and including such eminent women artists as
Marietta Robusti
(daughter of Tintoretto), Lavinia Fontana, Artemisia
Gentileschi, Elizabeth Cheron,
Mme. Vigee Lebrun, and Angelica Kauffmann--all, without
exception, were the
daughters of artists. In the 19th century, Berthe Morisot was
closely associated with
Manet, later marrying his brother, and Mary Cassatt based a
good deal of her work on
the style of her close friend Degas. Precisely the same breaking
of traditional bonds
and discarding of time-honored practices that permitted men
artists to strike out in
18
directions quite different from those of their fathers in the
second half of the
nineteenth century enabled women, with additional difficulties,
to be sure, to strike
out on their own as well. Many of our more recent women
artists, like Suzanne
Valadon, Paula Modersohn-Becker, Kathe.Kollwitz, or Louise
Nevelson, have come
from non-artistic backgrounds, although many contemporary
and near contemporary
women artists have married fellow artists.
It would be interesting to investigate the role of benign, if not
daughters of artists. In the 19th century, Berthe Morisot was
closely associated with
Manet, later marrying his brother, and Mary Cassatt based a
good deal of her work on
the style of her close friend Degas. Precisely the same breaking
of traditional bonds
and discarding of time-honored practices that permitted men
artists to strike out in
18
directions quite different from those of their fathers in the
second half of the
nineteenth century enabled women, with additional difficulties,
to be sure, to strike
out on their own as well. Many of our more recent women
artists, like Suzanne
Valadon, Paula Modersohn-Becker, Kathe.Kollwitz, or Louise
Nevelson, have come
from non-artistic backgrounds, although many contemporary
and near contemporary
women artists have married fellow artists.
It would be interesting to investigate the role of benign, if not
outright encouraging,
fathers in the formation of women professionals: both Kathe
Kollwitz and Barbara
Hepworth, for example, recall the influence of unusually
sympathetic and supportive
fathers on their artistic pursuits. In the absence of any
thoroughgoing investigation,
one can only gather impressionistic data about the presence or
absence of rebellion
against parental authority in women artists, and whether there
may be more or less
rebellion on the part of women artists than is true in the case of
men or vice versa.
One thing, however, is clear: for a woman to opt for a career at
all,--much less for a
career in art, has required a certain amount of individuality,
both in the past and at
present; whether or not the woman artist rebels against or finds
strength in the attitude
of her family, she must in any case have a good strong streak of
rebellion in her to
make her way in the world of art at all, rather than submitting to
the socially approved
role of wife and mother, the only role to which every social
fathers in the formation of women professionals: both Kathe
Kollwitz and Barbara
Hepworth, for example, recall the influence of unusually
sympathetic and supportive
fathers on their artistic pursuits. In the absence of any
thoroughgoing investigation,
one can only gather impressionistic data about the presence or
absence of rebellion
against parental authority in women artists, and whether there
may be more or less
rebellion on the part of women artists than is true in the case of
men or vice versa.
One thing, however, is clear: for a woman to opt for a career at
all,--much less for a
career in art, has required a certain amount of individuality,
both in the past and at
present; whether or not the woman artist rebels against or finds
strength in the attitude
of her family, she must in any case have a good strong streak of
rebellion in her to
make her way in the world of art at all, rather than submitting to
the socially approved
role of wife and mother, the only role to which every social
institution consigns her
automatically. It is only by adopting, however covertly, the
"masculine" attributes of
single-mindedness, concentration, tenaciousness, and absorption
in ideas and
craftsmanship for their own sake that women have succeeded,
and continue to
succeed, in the world of art.
Rosa Bonheur
It is instructive to examine in greater detail one of the most
successful and
accomplished women painters of all time, Rosa Bonheur (1822-
1899), whose work,
despite the ravages wrought upon its estimation by changes of
taste and a certain
admitted lack of variety, still stands as an impressive
achievement to anyone
interested in the art of the 19th century and in the history of
taste generally. Rosa
Bonheur is a woman artist in whom, partly because of the
magnitude of her
reputation, all the various conflicts, all the internal and external
contradictions and
struggles typical of her sex and profession, stand out in sharp
relief.
automatically. It is only by adopting, however covertly, the
"masculine" attributes of
single-mindedness, concentration, tenaciousness, and absorption
in ideas and
craftsmanship for their own sake that women have succeeded,
and continue to
succeed, in the world of art.
Rosa Bonheur
It is instructive to examine in greater detail one of the most
successful and
accomplished women painters of all time, Rosa Bonheur (1822-
1899), whose work,
despite the ravages wrought upon its estimation by changes of
taste and a certain
admitted lack of variety, still stands as an impressive
achievement to anyone
interested in the art of the 19th century and in the history of
taste generally. Rosa
Bonheur is a woman artist in whom, partly because of the
magnitude of her
reputation, all the various conflicts, all the internal and external
contradictions and
struggles typical of her sex and profession, stand out in sharp
relief.
The success of Rosa Bonheur firmly establishes the role of
institutions, and
institutional change, as a necessary, if not a sufficierit, cause
for achievement in art.
We might say that Bonheur picked a fortunate time to become
an artist if she was, at
the same time, to have the disadvantage of being a woman: she
came into her own in
the middle of the 19th century, a time in which the struggle
between traditional
history painting as opposed to the less pretentious and more
freewheeling genre
19
painting, landscape and still-life was won by the latter group
hands down. A major
change in the social and institutional support for art itself was
well under way: with
the rise of the bourgeoisie and the fall of the cultivated
aristocracy, smaller painting
generally of everyday subjects, rather than grandiose
mythological or religious scenes
institutions, and
institutional change, as a necessary, if not a sufficierit, cause
for achievement in art.
We might say that Bonheur picked a fortunate time to become
an artist if she was, at
the same time, to have the disadvantage of being a woman: she
came into her own in
the middle of the 19th century, a time in which the struggle
between traditional
history painting as opposed to the less pretentious and more
freewheeling genre
19
painting, landscape and still-life was won by the latter group
hands down. A major
change in the social and institutional support for art itself was
well under way: with
the rise of the bourgeoisie and the fall of the cultivated
aristocracy, smaller painting
generally of everyday subjects, rather than grandiose
mythological or religious scenes
scenes were much in demand. To cite the Whites: "Three
hundred provincial
museums there might be, government commissions for public
works there might be,
but the only possible paid destinations for the rising flood of
canvases were the homes
of the bourgeoisie. History painting had not and never would
rest comfortably in the
middle-class parlor. 'Lesser' forms of image art--genre,
landscape, still-life--did." In
mid-century France, as in 17
th
century Holland, there was a tendency for artists to
attempt to achieve some sort of security in a shaky market
situation by specializing,
by making a career out of a specific subject: animal painting
was a very popular field,
as the Whites point out, and Rosa Bonheur was no doubt its
most accomplished and
successful practitioner, followed in popularity only by the
Barbizon painter Troyon
(who at one time was so pressed for his paintings of cows that
he hired another artist
to brush in the backgrounds). Rosa Bonheur's rise to fame
hundred provincial
museums there might be, government commissions for public
works there might be,
but the only possible paid destinations for the rising flood of
canvases were the homes
of the bourgeoisie. History painting had not and never would
rest comfortably in the
middle-class parlor. 'Lesser' forms of image art--genre,
landscape, still-life--did." In
mid-century France, as in 17
th
century Holland, there was a tendency for artists to
attempt to achieve some sort of security in a shaky market
situation by specializing,
by making a career out of a specific subject: animal painting
was a very popular field,
as the Whites point out, and Rosa Bonheur was no doubt its
most accomplished and
successful practitioner, followed in popularity only by the
Barbizon painter Troyon
(who at one time was so pressed for his paintings of cows that
he hired another artist
to brush in the backgrounds). Rosa Bonheur's rise to fame
accompanied that of the
Bar bizon landscapists, supported by those canny dealers, the
Durand-Ruels, who later
moved on to the Impressionists. The Durand-Ruels were among
the first dealers to tap
the expanding market in movable decoration for the middle
classes, to use the Whites'
terminology. Rosa Bonheur's naturalism and ability to capture
the individuality--even
the "soul"--of each of her animal subjects coincided with
bourgeois taste at the time.
The same combination of qualities, with a much stronger dose
of sentimentality and
pathetic fallacy to be sure, likewise assured the success of her
animalier
contemporary, Landseer, in England.
Daughter of an impoverished drawing master, Rosa Bonheur
quite naturally showed
her interest in art early; at the same time, she exhibited an
independence of spirit and
liberty which immediately earn ed here the label of tomboy.
According to her own
later accounts, her "masculine protest" established itself early;
to what extent any
Bar bizon landscapists, supported by those canny dealers, the
Durand-Ruels, who later
moved on to the Impressionists. The Durand-Ruels were among
the first dealers to tap
the expanding market in movable decoration for the middle
classes, to use the Whites'
terminology. Rosa Bonheur's naturalism and ability to capture
the individuality--even
the "soul"--of each of her animal subjects coincided with
bourgeois taste at the time.
The same combination of qualities, with a much stronger dose
of sentimentality and
pathetic fallacy to be sure, likewise assured the success of her
animalier
contemporary, Landseer, in England.
Daughter of an impoverished drawing master, Rosa Bonheur
quite naturally showed
her interest in art early; at the same time, she exhibited an
independence of spirit and
liberty which immediately earn ed here the label of tomboy.
According to her own
later accounts, her "masculine protest" established itself early;
to what extent any
show of persistence, stubbornness, and vigor would be counted
as masculine" in the
first half of the 19th century is conjectural. Rosa Bonheur's
attitude toward her father
is somewhat ambiguous: while realizing that he had been
influential in directing her
toward her life's work, there is no doubt that she resented his
thoughtless treatment of
her beloved mother, and in her reminiscences, she half
affectionately makes fun of his
bizarre form of social idealism. Raimond Bortheur had been an
active member of the
short-lived Saint-Simonian community, established in the third
decade of the
nineteenth century by "Le Pere" Enfantin at Menilmontant.
Although in her later years
Rosa Bonheur might have made fun of some of the more
farfetched eccentricities of
the members of the community, and disapproved of the
additional strain which her
father's apostolate placed on her overburdened mother, it is
obvious that the Saint-
Simonian ideal of equality for women--they disapproved of
marriage, their trousered
as masculine" in the
first half of the 19th century is conjectural. Rosa Bonheur's
attitude toward her father
is somewhat ambiguous: while realizing that he had been
influential in directing her
toward her life's work, there is no doubt that she resented his
thoughtless treatment of
her beloved mother, and in her reminiscences, she half
affectionately makes fun of his
bizarre form of social idealism. Raimond Bortheur had been an
active member of the
short-lived Saint-Simonian community, established in the third
decade of the
nineteenth century by "Le Pere" Enfantin at Menilmontant.
Although in her later years
Rosa Bonheur might have made fun of some of the more
farfetched eccentricities of
the members of the community, and disapproved of the
additional strain which her
father's apostolate placed on her overburdened mother, it is
obvious that the Saint-
Simonian ideal of equality for women--they disapproved of
marriage, their trousered
20
feminine costume was a token of emancipation, and their
spiritual leader, Le Pere
Enfantin, made extraordinary efforts to find a Woman Messiah
to share his reign--
made a strong jmpression on her as a child, and may well have
influenced her future
course of behavior.
"Why shouldn't I be proud to be a woman?" she exclaimed to an
interviewer. "My
father, that enthusiastic apostle of humanity, many times
reiterated to me that
woman's mission was to elevate the human race, that she was
the Messiah of future
centuries. It is to his doctrines that I owe the great, noble
ambition I have conceived
for the sex which I proudly affirm to be mine, and whose
independence I will support
to my dying day. . . ." When she was hardly more than a child,
he instilled in her the
ambition to surpass Mine. Vigee Lebrun, certainly the most
eminent model she could
feminine costume was a token of emancipation, and their
spiritual leader, Le Pere
Enfantin, made extraordinary efforts to find a Woman Messiah
to share his reign--
made a strong jmpression on her as a child, and may well have
influenced her future
course of behavior.
"Why shouldn't I be proud to be a woman?" she exclaimed to an
interviewer. "My
father, that enthusiastic apostle of humanity, many times
reiterated to me that
woman's mission was to elevate the human race, that she was
the Messiah of future
centuries. It is to his doctrines that I owe the great, noble
ambition I have conceived
for the sex which I proudly affirm to be mine, and whose
independence I will support
to my dying day. . . ." When she was hardly more than a child,
he instilled in her the
ambition to surpass Mine. Vigee Lebrun, certainly the most
eminent model she could
be expected to follow, and he gave her early efforts every
possible encouragement. .At
the same time the spectacle of her uncomplaining mother's slow
decline--from sheer
overwork and poverty might have been an even more realistic
influence on her
decision to control her own destiny and never to become the
slave of a husband and
children. What is particularly interesting from the modern
feminist viewpoint is Rosa
Bonheur's ability to combine the most vigorous and
unapologetic masculine protest
with unabashedly self-contradictory assertions of "basic"
femininity.
In those refreshingly straightforward pre-Freudian days, Rosa
Bonheur could explain
to her biographer that she had never wanted to marry for fear of
losing her
independence. Too many young girls let themselves be led to
the altar like lambs to
the sacrifice, she maintained. Yet at the same time that she
rejected marriage for
herself and implied an inevitable loss of selfhood for any
woman who engaged in it,
she, unlike the Saint-Simonians, considered marriage "a
possible encouragement. .At
the same time the spectacle of her uncomplaining mother's slow
decline--from sheer
overwork and poverty might have been an even more realistic
influence on her
decision to control her own destiny and never to become the
slave of a husband and
children. What is particularly interesting from the modern
feminist viewpoint is Rosa
Bonheur's ability to combine the most vigorous and
unapologetic masculine protest
with unabashedly self-contradictory assertions of "basic"
femininity.
In those refreshingly straightforward pre-Freudian days, Rosa
Bonheur could explain
to her biographer that she had never wanted to marry for fear of
losing her
independence. Too many young girls let themselves be led to
the altar like lambs to
the sacrifice, she maintained. Yet at the same time that she
rejected marriage for
herself and implied an inevitable loss of selfhood for any
woman who engaged in it,
she, unlike the Saint-Simonians, considered marriage "a
sacrament indispensable to
the organization of society."
While remaining cool to offers of marriage, she joined in a
seemingly cloudless,
lifelong, and apparently Platonic union with a fellow woman
artist, Nathalie Micas,
who provided her with the companionship and emotinal warmth
which she needed.
Obviously the presence of this sympathetic friend did not seem
to demand the same
sacrifice of genuine commitment to her profession which
marriage would have
entailed: in any case, the advantages of such an arrangement for
women who wished
to avoid the distraction of children in the days before reliable
contraception are
obvious.
Yet at the same time that she frankly rejected the conventional
feminine role of her
times, Rosa Bonheur still was drawn into what Betty Friedan
has called the "frilly
blouse syndrome, " that innocuous version of the feminine.
protest which even today
compels successful women psychiatrists or professors to adopt
the organization of society."
While remaining cool to offers of marriage, she joined in a
seemingly cloudless,
lifelong, and apparently Platonic union with a fellow woman
artist, Nathalie Micas,
who provided her with the companionship and emotinal warmth
which she needed.
Obviously the presence of this sympathetic friend did not seem
to demand the same
sacrifice of genuine commitment to her profession which
marriage would have
entailed: in any case, the advantages of such an arrangement for
women who wished
to avoid the distraction of children in the days before reliable
contraception are
obvious.
Yet at the same time that she frankly rejected the conventional
feminine role of her
times, Rosa Bonheur still was drawn into what Betty Friedan
has called the "frilly
blouse syndrome, " that innocuous version of the feminine.
protest which even today
compels successful women psychiatrists or professors to adopt
some ultra feminine
item of clothing or insist n proving their prowess as pie-bakers.'
Despite the fact that
21
she had early cropped hair and adopted men's clothes as her
habitual attire, following
the example of George Sand, whose rural Romanticism exerted
a powerful influence
over her imagination, to her biographer she insisted, and no
doubt sincerely believed,
that she did so only because of the specific demands of her
profession. Indignantly
denying rumors to the effect that she had run about the streets
of Paris dressed as a
boy in her youth, she proudly provided her biographer with a
daguerreotype of herself
at sixteen, dressed in perfectly conventional feminine fashion,
except for her shorn
hair, which she excused as a practical measure taken after the
death of her mother;
"Who would have taken care of my curls?" she demanded.
As far as the question of masculine dress was concerned, she
item of clothing or insist n proving their prowess as pie-bakers.'
Despite the fact that
21
she had early cropped hair and adopted men's clothes as her
habitual attire, following
the example of George Sand, whose rural Romanticism exerted
a powerful influence
over her imagination, to her biographer she insisted, and no
doubt sincerely believed,
that she did so only because of the specific demands of her
profession. Indignantly
denying rumors to the effect that she had run about the streets
of Paris dressed as a
boy in her youth, she proudly provided her biographer with a
daguerreotype of herself
at sixteen, dressed in perfectly conventional feminine fashion,
except for her shorn
hair, which she excused as a practical measure taken after the
death of her mother;
"Who would have taken care of my curls?" she demanded.
As far as the question of masculine dress was concerned, she
was quick to reject her
interlocutor's suggestion that her trousers were a symbol of
emancipation. "I strongly
blame women who renounce their customary attire in the desire
to make themselves
pass for men," she affirmed. "If I had found trousers suited my
sex, I would have
completely gotten rid of my skirts, but this is not the case, nor
have I ever advised my
sisters of the palette to wear men's clothes in the ordinary
course of life. If, then, you
see me dressed as I am, it is not at all with the aim of making
myself interesting, as all
too many women have tried, but in order to facilitate my work.
Remember that at a
certain period I spent whole days in the slaughterhouses.
Indeed, you have to love
your art in order to live in pools of blood. . . . I was also
fascinatted with horses, and
where better can one study these animals than at the fairs . . . ?
I had no alternative but
to realize that the garments ofmy own sex were a total nuisance.
That is why I decided
to ask the Prefect of Police for the authorization to wear
interlocutor's suggestion that her trousers were a symbol of
emancipation. "I strongly
blame women who renounce their customary attire in the desire
to make themselves
pass for men," she affirmed. "If I had found trousers suited my
sex, I would have
completely gotten rid of my skirts, but this is not the case, nor
have I ever advised my
sisters of the palette to wear men's clothes in the ordinary
course of life. If, then, you
see me dressed as I am, it is not at all with the aim of making
myself interesting, as all
too many women have tried, but in order to facilitate my work.
Remember that at a
certain period I spent whole days in the slaughterhouses.
Indeed, you have to love
your art in order to live in pools of blood. . . . I was also
fascinatted with horses, and
where better can one study these animals than at the fairs . . . ?
I had no alternative but
to realize that the garments ofmy own sex were a total nuisance.
That is why I decided
to ask the Prefect of Police for the authorization to wear
masculine clothing. But the
costume I am wearing is my working outfit, nothing else. The
remarks of fools have
never bothered me. Nathalie [her companion] makes fun of them
as I do. It doesn't
bother her at all to see me dressed as a man, but if you are even
the slightest bit put
off, I am completely prepared to put on a skirt, especially since
all I have to do is to
open a closet to find a whole assortment of feminine outfits."
At the same time Rosa Bonheur was forced to admit: "My
trousers have been my
great protectors. . . . Many times I have congratulated myself
for having dared to
break with traditions which would have forced me to abstain
from certain kinds of
work, due to the obligation to drag my skirts everywhere. . . ."
Yet the famous artist
again felt obliged to qualify her honest admission with an ill-
assumed "femininity":
"Despite my metamorphoses of costume, there is not a daughter
of Eve who
appreciates the niceties more than I do; my brusque and even
slighty unsociable
nature has never prevented my heart from remaining completely
costume I am wearing is my working outfit, nothing else. The
remarks of fools have
never bothered me. Nathalie [her companion] makes fun of them
as I do. It doesn't
bother her at all to see me dressed as a man, but if you are even
the slightest bit put
off, I am completely prepared to put on a skirt, especially since
all I have to do is to
open a closet to find a whole assortment of feminine outfits."
At the same time Rosa Bonheur was forced to admit: "My
trousers have been my
great protectors. . . . Many times I have congratulated myself
for having dared to
break with traditions which would have forced me to abstain
from certain kinds of
work, due to the obligation to drag my skirts everywhere. . . ."
Yet the famous artist
again felt obliged to qualify her honest admission with an ill-
assumed "femininity":
"Despite my metamorphoses of costume, there is not a daughter
of Eve who
appreciates the niceties more than I do; my brusque and even
slighty unsociable
nature has never prevented my heart from remaining completely
feminine."
It is somewhat pathetic that this highly successful artist,
unsparing of herself in the
painstaking study of animal anatomy, diligently pursuing her
bovine or equine
subjects in the most unpleasant surroundings. industriously
producing popular
canvases throughout the course of a lengthy career, firm,
assured, and incontrovertibly
22
masculine in her style, winner of a first medal in the Paris
Salon, Officer of the Legion
of Honor, Commander of the Order of Isabella the Catholic and
the Order of Leopold
of Belgium, friend of Queen Victoria--that this world-renowned
artist--should feel
compelled late in life to justify and qualify her perfectly
reasonab1e assumption of
masculine ways for any reason whatsoever, and to feel
compelled to attack her less
modest trouser wearing sisters at the same time, in order to
satisfy the demands of her
It is somewhat pathetic that this highly successful artist,
unsparing of herself in the
painstaking study of animal anatomy, diligently pursuing her
bovine or equine
subjects in the most unpleasant surroundings. industriously
producing popular
canvases throughout the course of a lengthy career, firm,
assured, and incontrovertibly
22
masculine in her style, winner of a first medal in the Paris
Salon, Officer of the Legion
of Honor, Commander of the Order of Isabella the Catholic and
the Order of Leopold
of Belgium, friend of Queen Victoria--that this world-renowned
artist--should feel
compelled late in life to justify and qualify her perfectly
reasonab1e assumption of
masculine ways for any reason whatsoever, and to feel
compelled to attack her less
modest trouser wearing sisters at the same time, in order to
satisfy the demands of her
own conscience. For her conscience, despite her supportive
father, her unconventional
behavior, and the accolade of worldly success, still condemned
her for not being a
"feminine" woman.
The difficulties imposed by such demands on the woman artist
continue to add to her
already difficult enterprise even today. Compare, for example,
the noted
contemporary, Louise Nevelson, with her combination of utter,
"unfeminine"
dedication to her work and her conspicuously "feminine" false
eyelashes, her
admission that she got married at seventeen despite her
certainty that she couldn't live
without creating because "the world said you should get
married." Even in the case of
these two outstanding artists--and whether we like The Horse
Fair or not, we still
must admire Rosa Bonheur's professional achievement the voice
of the feminine
mystique--with its potpourri of ambivalent narcissism and guilt,
internalized--subtly
dilutes and subverts that total inner confidence, demanded by
father, her unconventional
behavior, and the accolade of worldly success, still condemned
her for not being a
"feminine" woman.
The difficulties imposed by such demands on the woman artist
continue to add to her
already difficult enterprise even today. Compare, for example,
the noted
contemporary, Louise Nevelson, with her combination of utter,
"unfeminine"
dedication to her work and her conspicuously "feminine" false
eyelashes, her
admission that she got married at seventeen despite her
certainty that she couldn't live
without creating because "the world said you should get
married." Even in the case of
these two outstanding artists--and whether we like The Horse
Fair or not, we still
must admire Rosa Bonheur's professional achievement the voice
of the feminine
mystique--with its potpourri of ambivalent narcissism and guilt,
internalized--subtly
dilutes and subverts that total inner confidence, demanded by
the highest and most
innovative work in art.
Conclusions
I have tried to deal with one of the perennial questions used to
challenge women's
demand for true, rather than token, equality, by examining the
whole erroneous
intellectual substructure upon which the question "Why have
there been no great
women artists?" is based; by questioning the validity of the
formulation of so-called
problems in general and the "problem" of women specifically;
and then, by probing
some of the limitations of the discipline of art history itself. By
stressing the
institutional--that is, the public--rather than the individual, or
private, preconditions
for achievement or the lack of it in the arts,I have tried to
provide paradigm for the
investigation of other area in the field. By examining in some
detail a single instance
of deprivation or disadvantage--the unavailability of nude
models to women art
innovative work in art.
Conclusions
I have tried to deal with one of the perennial questions used to
challenge women's
demand for true, rather than token, equality, by examining the
whole erroneous
intellectual substructure upon which the question "Why have
there been no great
women artists?" is based; by questioning the validity of the
formulation of so-called
problems in general and the "problem" of women specifically;
and then, by probing
some of the limitations of the discipline of art history itself. By
stressing the
institutional--that is, the public--rather than the individual, or
private, preconditions
for achievement or the lack of it in the arts,I have tried to
provide paradigm for the
investigation of other area in the field. By examining in some
detail a single instance
of deprivation or disadvantage--the unavailability of nude
models to women art
students-I have suggested that it was indeed institutionally
made impossible for
women to achieve artistic excellence, or success, on the samr
footing as men, no
matter what the potency of their so called talent or genius. The
existence of a tiny
band of successful, if not great, women artists throughout
history does nothing to
gainsay this fact, any more than does the existence of a few
superstars or token
achievers among the members of any minority groups. And
while great achievement
is rare and difficult at best, it is still rare and more difficult if,
while you work, you
must at the same time wrestle with inner demons of self-doubt
and. guilt and outer
23
monsters of ridicule or patronizing encouragement, neither of
which have any specific
connection with the quality of the art work as such.
What is important is that women face up to the reality of their
history and of their
made impossible for
women to achieve artistic excellence, or success, on the samr
footing as men, no
matter what the potency of their so called talent or genius. The
existence of a tiny
band of successful, if not great, women artists throughout
history does nothing to
gainsay this fact, any more than does the existence of a few
superstars or token
achievers among the members of any minority groups. And
while great achievement
is rare and difficult at best, it is still rare and more difficult if,
while you work, you
must at the same time wrestle with inner demons of self-doubt
and. guilt and outer
23
monsters of ridicule or patronizing encouragement, neither of
which have any specific
connection with the quality of the art work as such.
What is important is that women face up to the reality of their
history and of their
present situation, without making excuses or puffing
mediocrity. Disadvantage may
indeed be an excuse; it is not, however, an intellectual position.
Rather, using as a
vantage point their situation as underdogs in the realm of
grandeur, and outsiders in
that ideology, women can reveal institutional and intellectual
weaknesses in general,
and at the same time that they destroy false consciousness, take
part in the creation of
institutions in which clear thought--and true greatness--are
challenges open to anyone,
man or woman, courageous enough to take the necessary risk,
the leap into the
unknown.
NOTES
1. Kate Millett's Sexual Politics (Doubleday, 1970) and Mary
Ellman's
Thinking about Women (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968)
provide
notable exceptions.
2. "Women Artists," review of Die Frauen in die
Kunstgescbichte by Ernst
Guhl, The Westminster Review (American edition), 70 (July
mediocrity. Disadvantage may
indeed be an excuse; it is not, however, an intellectual position.
Rather, using as a
vantage point their situation as underdogs in the realm of
grandeur, and outsiders in
that ideology, women can reveal institutional and intellectual
weaknesses in general,
and at the same time that they destroy false consciousness, take
part in the creation of
institutions in which clear thought--and true greatness--are
challenges open to anyone,
man or woman, courageous enough to take the necessary risk,
the leap into the
unknown.
NOTES
1. Kate Millett's Sexual Politics (Doubleday, 1970) and Mary
Ellman's
Thinking about Women (Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968)
provide
notable exceptions.
2. "Women Artists," review of Die Frauen in die
Kunstgescbichte by Ernst
Guhl, The Westminster Review (American edition), 70 (July
1858), 91-
104. 1 am grateful to Elaine Showalter for having brought this
review to
my attention.
3. See, for example, Peter S. Walch's excellent studies of
Angelica
Kauffmann or his unpublished doctoral dissertation, "Angelica
Kauffmann," Princeton University, 1968, on the subject; for
Artemisia
Gentileschi, see R. Ward Bissell, "Artemisia Gentileschi-A New
Documented Chronology," Art Bulletin, 50 (June 1968), 153-68.
4. New York, 1968.
5. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (1869) in Three
Essays
byjohn Stuart Mill (World Classics Series, 1966), 441.
6. For the relatively recent genesis of the emphasis on the artist
as the
nexus of aesthetic experience, see M. H. Abrams, The Mirror
and the
Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (Norton,
1953), and
Maurice Z. Shroder, Icarus: The Image of the Artist in French
104. 1 am grateful to Elaine Showalter for having brought this
review to
my attention.
3. See, for example, Peter S. Walch's excellent studies of
Angelica
Kauffmann or his unpublished doctoral dissertation, "Angelica
Kauffmann," Princeton University, 1968, on the subject; for
Artemisia
Gentileschi, see R. Ward Bissell, "Artemisia Gentileschi-A New
Documented Chronology," Art Bulletin, 50 (June 1968), 153-68.
4. New York, 1968.
5. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (1869) in Three
Essays
byjohn Stuart Mill (World Classics Series, 1966), 441.
6. For the relatively recent genesis of the emphasis on the artist
as the
nexus of aesthetic experience, see M. H. Abrams, The Mirror
and the
Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical Tradition (Norton,
1953), and
Maurice Z. Shroder, Icarus: The Image of the Artist in French
Romanticism (Harvard University Press, 1961).
7. A comparison with the parallel myth for women, the
Cinderella story, is
revealing: Cinderella gains higher status on the basis of a
passive, "sex-
object" attribute--small feet--whereas the Boy Wonder always
proves
himself through active accomplishment. For a thorough study of
myths
about artists, see Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz, Die Legende vom
Kiinstler:
Ein Geschichtlicher Yersuck (Krystall Verlag, 1934).
24
8. Nikolaus Pevsner, Academies of Art, Past and Present (Da
Capo
Press[1940]), 96f.
9. Contemporary directions- earthworks, conceptual art, art as
information,etc.--certainly point away from emphasis on the
individual
genius and his salable products; in art history, Harrison C. and
7. A comparison with the parallel myth for women, the
Cinderella story, is
revealing: Cinderella gains higher status on the basis of a
passive, "sex-
object" attribute--small feet--whereas the Boy Wonder always
proves
himself through active accomplishment. For a thorough study of
myths
about artists, see Ernst Kris and Otto Kurz, Die Legende vom
Kiinstler:
Ein Geschichtlicher Yersuck (Krystall Verlag, 1934).
24
8. Nikolaus Pevsner, Academies of Art, Past and Present (Da
Capo
Press[1940]), 96f.
9. Contemporary directions- earthworks, conceptual art, art as
information,etc.--certainly point away from emphasis on the
individual
genius and his salable products; in art history, Harrison C. and
Cynthia
A. White's Canvases and-Careers: Institutional Change in the
French
Painting World (Wiley, 1965) opens up a fruitful new direction
of
investigation, as did Nikolaus Pevsner's pioneering Academies
of Art.
Ernst Gombrich and Pierre Francastel, in their very different
ways,
always have tended to view art and the artist as part of a total
situation
rather than in lofty isolation.
10. Female models were introduced in the life class in Berlin in
1875, in
Stockholm in 1839, in Naples in 1870, at the Royal College of
Art In
London after 1875. Pevsner, Academies of Art, 231. Female
models at
the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts wore masks to hide
their
identity as late as about 1866-as attested to in a charcoal
drawing by
Thomas Eakins-if not later.
A. White's Canvases and-Careers: Institutional Change in the
French
Painting World (Wiley, 1965) opens up a fruitful new direction
of
investigation, as did Nikolaus Pevsner's pioneering Academies
of Art.
Ernst Gombrich and Pierre Francastel, in their very different
ways,
always have tended to view art and the artist as part of a total
situation
rather than in lofty isolation.
10. Female models were introduced in the life class in Berlin in
1875, in
Stockholm in 1839, in Naples in 1870, at the Royal College of
Art In
London after 1875. Pevsner, Academies of Art, 231. Female
models at
the Pennsylvania Academy of the Fine Arts wore masks to hide
their
identity as late as about 1866-as attested to in a charcoal
drawing by
Thomas Eakins-if not later.
11. Pevsner, Academies of Art, 231.
12. H. C. and C. A. White, Canvases and Careers, 51.
13. Ibid., Table 5.
14. Mrs. Ellis, "The Daughters of England: Their Position in
Society,
Character, and Responsibilities," in The Family Montitor and
Domestic
Guide (1844), 35.
15. Ibid., 38-39.
16. Patricia Thomson, The Victorian Heroine: A Cbanging Ideal
(Oxford
University Press, 1956), 77
17. 17. H. C. and C. A. White, Canvases and Careers, 91.
18. Anna Klumpke, Rosa Bonheur: Sa vie, son oeuvre (E.
Flammarion,
1908), 311.
19. Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (Norton, 1963), 158.
20. Klumpke, Rosa Bonheur, 166.
21. Paris, like many cities even today, had laws against cross-
dressing on its
books.
12. H. C. and C. A. White, Canvases and Careers, 51.
13. Ibid., Table 5.
14. Mrs. Ellis, "The Daughters of England: Their Position in
Society,
Character, and Responsibilities," in The Family Montitor and
Domestic
Guide (1844), 35.
15. Ibid., 38-39.
16. Patricia Thomson, The Victorian Heroine: A Cbanging Ideal
(Oxford
University Press, 1956), 77
17. 17. H. C. and C. A. White, Canvases and Careers, 91.
18. Anna Klumpke, Rosa Bonheur: Sa vie, son oeuvre (E.
Flammarion,
1908), 311.
19. Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (Norton, 1963), 158.
20. Klumpke, Rosa Bonheur, 166.
21. Paris, like many cities even today, had laws against cross-
dressing on its
books.
22. Klumpke, Rosa Bonheur, 308-9.
23. Ibid., 310-11.
24. 24. Cited in Elizabeth Fisher, "The Woman as Artist: Loulse
Nevelson,"
Aphra 1 (Spring 1970), 32.
Non-Western Art and Art’s Definition
Stephen Davies, Philosophy, University of Auckland
Important note: This is a final draft without endnotes and
differs from the
definitive version, which is published in Theories of Art Today,
Noël Carroll
(ed), (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 199-216.
I have been
assured by the University of Auckland's research office that if
they have made
this publicly available then it does not violate the publisher's
copyright rules.
Non-Western Art and Art’s Definition
The members of all cultures always have engaged in
storytelling, drawing,
carving and whittling, song, dance, and acting or mime.
Frequently these
activities are tied to social functions, such as the production of
23. Ibid., 310-11.
24. 24. Cited in Elizabeth Fisher, "The Woman as Artist: Loulse
Nevelson,"
Aphra 1 (Spring 1970), 32.
Non-Western Art and Art’s Definition
Stephen Davies, Philosophy, University of Auckland
Important note: This is a final draft without endnotes and
differs from the
definitive version, which is published in Theories of Art Today,
Noël Carroll
(ed), (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2000), 199-216.
I have been
assured by the University of Auckland's research office that if
they have made
this publicly available then it does not violate the publisher's
copyright rules.
Non-Western Art and Art’s Definition
The members of all cultures always have engaged in
storytelling, drawing,
carving and whittling, song, dance, and acting or mime.
Frequently these
activities are tied to social functions, such as the production of
tools, the
enactment of ritual, the preservation of a historical record.
Their pervasiveness
suggests that they are integral, not incidental, to the social ends
they serve.
Whenever items with handles are made, those handles are
decorated; once pots
are thrown, they are marked with depictions or patterns; when a
couple is
married, there is singing and dancing. Moreover, the skills
displayed in the
exercise of these activities—for instance, in the carver’s
treatment of his chosen
medium—are widely respected and valued.
It seems evident that these practices arose independently within
geographically separated societies, rather than being invented
once and
subsequently transmitted through cultural contact. No doubt
there has long
been intercourse between societies concerning such matters, but
this must often
have dealt with innovations in types of action that already were
familiar.
The practices just described can reasonably be called artistic, I
believe,
and their ubiquity suggests that art is universal. Artistic
activity may not be
necessary for human social life, but, if not, it appears to be an
inevitable spin off
from things that are. Its constant presence indicates that it
answers and gives
expression to deeply ingrained human needs and patterns of
experience.
enactment of ritual, the preservation of a historical record.
Their pervasiveness
suggests that they are integral, not incidental, to the social ends
they serve.
Whenever items with handles are made, those handles are
decorated; once pots
are thrown, they are marked with depictions or patterns; when a
couple is
married, there is singing and dancing. Moreover, the skills
displayed in the
exercise of these activities—for instance, in the carver’s
treatment of his chosen
medium—are widely respected and valued.
It seems evident that these practices arose independently within
geographically separated societies, rather than being invented
once and
subsequently transmitted through cultural contact. No doubt
there has long
been intercourse between societies concerning such matters, but
this must often
have dealt with innovations in types of action that already were
familiar.
The practices just described can reasonably be called artistic, I
believe,
and their ubiquity suggests that art is universal. Artistic
activity may not be
necessary for human social life, but, if not, it appears to be an
inevitable spin off
from things that are. Its constant presence indicates that it
answers and gives
expression to deeply ingrained human needs and patterns of
experience.
This first observation should be coupled with another, the
significance of
which is easily overlooked. We are capable of recognizing that
art is made by
people in cultures other than our own and of identifying many
of their
artworks as such. I am impressed by how accessible to
Westerners is much sub-
Saharan music, Chinese painting, and woven carpets from the
Middle East. If
art relies on a complex semiotic system, or on an atmosphere of
theory, this
recognition would be surprising, for such things are culturally
arbitrary. If art
were as this view supposes, we might learn or infer that other
societies have it,
or something like it, through very close contact and study, but
as outsiders who
are largely ignorant of the beliefs and values prevailing in those
societies, we
could have no immediate access to their art. That we do have
this access
suggests that the properties crucial in inviting an art-regard
sometimes are ones
that can be perceived with very little culture-specific
background knowledge.
This is not to deny that there is likely to be much more to the
art of other
societies than is available to an outsider. After considering
ethnographic
features of art in ten cultures, Richard L. Anderson concludes:
“Art is culturally
significance of
which is easily overlooked. We are capable of recognizing that
art is made by
people in cultures other than our own and of identifying many
of their
artworks as such. I am impressed by how accessible to
Westerners is much sub-
Saharan music, Chinese painting, and woven carpets from the
Middle East. If
art relies on a complex semiotic system, or on an atmosphere of
theory, this
recognition would be surprising, for such things are culturally
arbitrary. If art
were as this view supposes, we might learn or infer that other
societies have it,
or something like it, through very close contact and study, but
as outsiders who
are largely ignorant of the beliefs and values prevailing in those
societies, we
could have no immediate access to their art. That we do have
this access
suggests that the properties crucial in inviting an art-regard
sometimes are ones
that can be perceived with very little culture-specific
background knowledge.
This is not to deny that there is likely to be much more to the
art of other
societies than is available to an outsider. After considering
ethnographic
features of art in ten cultures, Richard L. Anderson concludes:
“Art is culturally
significant meaning, skillfully encoded in an affecting, sensuous
medium.” I do
not doubt that he is correct in this observation. But even if art
“skillfully
encodes culturally significant meanings” that the outsider is in
no position to
appreciate, something more universal and basic must be
involved if we are to
explain the outsider’s response. In this vein, Denis Dutton
suggests that
Picasso was validly reacting to vivid aesthetic aspects intrinsic
to African
carvings he viewed at the Palais du Trocadéro in 1907, though
he knew little of
the context in which they were produced or of the social
purposes they served.
The outsider might be incapable of fully understanding the
artworks of other
cultures where these deal in “culturally significant meanings”
but, nevertheless,
often can recognize the “artiness” of such pieces and enjoy at
least some aspects
of this.
In this chapter I discuss non-Western art and, in particular, what
follows
from the capacity of Westerners to identify and respond to such
pieces as art.
This commentary has implications for the philosophical
definition of art, as I
outline in the last section. But before addressing these issues, I
look more
closely at challenges often raised to the idea that there is non-
Western art as
such. It might be thought that the notion of art is a Western one
that cannot be
medium.” I do
not doubt that he is correct in this observation. But even if art
“skillfully
encodes culturally significant meanings” that the outsider is in
no position to
appreciate, something more universal and basic must be
involved if we are to
explain the outsider’s response. In this vein, Denis Dutton
suggests that
Picasso was validly reacting to vivid aesthetic aspects intrinsic
to African
carvings he viewed at the Palais du Trocadéro in 1907, though
he knew little of
the context in which they were produced or of the social
purposes they served.
The outsider might be incapable of fully understanding the
artworks of other
cultures where these deal in “culturally significant meanings”
but, nevertheless,
often can recognize the “artiness” of such pieces and enjoy at
least some aspects
of this.
In this chapter I discuss non-Western art and, in particular, what
follows
from the capacity of Westerners to identify and respond to such
pieces as art.
This commentary has implications for the philosophical
definition of art, as I
outline in the last section. But before addressing these issues, I
look more
closely at challenges often raised to the idea that there is non-
Western art as
such. It might be thought that the notion of art is a Western one
that cannot be
applied, except ethnocentrically and inappropriately, to the
products and
practices of other cultures. If this were so, the kind of
recognition and response
that I have described above would reveal, not the presence of
art in other
societies, but the tendency of Westerners to impose their
conceptual categories
upon contexts to which they do not apply.
I
It has been held by some anthropologists that there is no non-
Western art. The
concept is a Western one. Other cultures have different,
possibly parallel,
concepts of their own. The artifacts of non-Western cultures
become art only by
being appropriated by Westerners to their own art institutions.
Now, if the claim is that they have their concepts and we have
ours, just
as I have my beliefs and you have yours, it is innocuous
enough. To make the
Wittgensteinian point, this reveals something about the
“grammar” of
possessive pronouns. It does not show that the non-Western
concept must be
different from ours, or that we cannot share the same concept.
But if the claim
is that theirs is a different concept—not solely in being theirs as
opposed to
ours, but also in its content—that needs to be substantiated.
products and
practices of other cultures. If this were so, the kind of
recognition and response
that I have described above would reveal, not the presence of
art in other
societies, but the tendency of Westerners to impose their
conceptual categories
upon contexts to which they do not apply.
I
It has been held by some anthropologists that there is no non-
Western art. The
concept is a Western one. Other cultures have different,
possibly parallel,
concepts of their own. The artifacts of non-Western cultures
become art only by
being appropriated by Westerners to their own art institutions.
Now, if the claim is that they have their concepts and we have
ours, just
as I have my beliefs and you have yours, it is innocuous
enough. To make the
Wittgensteinian point, this reveals something about the
“grammar” of
possessive pronouns. It does not show that the non-Western
concept must be
different from ours, or that we cannot share the same concept.
But if the claim
is that theirs is a different concept—not solely in being theirs as
opposed to
ours, but also in its content—that needs to be substantiated.
(Otherwise the
claim looks no less ethnocentric than the position it sets out to
debunk in that it
assumes that only the West has achieved art creation, which is
an activity highly
valued as the mark of civilization.) Several arguments that have
been offered
for this conclusion are reviewed and rejected below.
In the West, art often is distinguished from craft. This
dichotomy is
stressed in the writings of Plato, Hegel, Tolstoy, and R. G.
Collingwood, for
example. It is widely claimed that art lacks “utility,” being
made for
contemplation distanced from social concerns; that artists
should be indifferent
to worldly matters in pursuing their muse; that artworks have an
intrinsic value
and should be preserved and respected. If these views
characterize the Western
concept of art, many non-Western societies must lack that
concept, for their
approach and attitude are different. In them, all artifacts or
performances are
created to meet socially useful functions—masks are worn in
religious rituals,
carvings propitiate the gods or decorate items for domestic use,
songs lighten
the burden of repetitive labor, and so on. Nothing is created
solely for aesthetic
contemplation. Either most people are “artists” or the relevant
social roles are
occupied by people who are regarded neither as requiring a
special spirituality
nor as meriting a respect beyond what is due to the skills they
claim looks no less ethnocentric than the position it sets out to
debunk in that it
assumes that only the West has achieved art creation, which is
an activity highly
valued as the mark of civilization.) Several arguments that have
been offered
for this conclusion are reviewed and rejected below.
In the West, art often is distinguished from craft. This
dichotomy is
stressed in the writings of Plato, Hegel, Tolstoy, and R. G.
Collingwood, for
example. It is widely claimed that art lacks “utility,” being
made for
contemplation distanced from social concerns; that artists
should be indifferent
to worldly matters in pursuing their muse; that artworks have an
intrinsic value
and should be preserved and respected. If these views
characterize the Western
concept of art, many non-Western societies must lack that
concept, for their
approach and attitude are different. In them, all artifacts or
performances are
created to meet socially useful functions—masks are worn in
religious rituals,
carvings propitiate the gods or decorate items for domestic use,
songs lighten
the burden of repetitive labor, and so on. Nothing is created
solely for aesthetic
contemplation. Either most people are “artists” or the relevant
social roles are
occupied by people who are regarded neither as requiring a
special spirituality
nor as meriting a respect beyond what is due to the skills they
bring to their
work. In many cases, pieces are discarded once they have
served the particular
purpose for which they were created.
In reviewing this position we might question whether the
Western
ideology of art corresponds to its reality. Is it the case that we
think artworks
are useless? That “artist” names a spiritual calling? That art
making is
unaffected by the market? That artworks are appreciated only
when abstracted
from the moral, political, and social settings within which they
are generated?
If the answer to these questions is “no” (as I believe it to be),
this ideology
would be exposed as a fiction, irrelevant to the heart of our
concept of art.
Rather than develop this line, however, I take a different tack. I
accept
that the notions listed above characterize what has come to be
known as fine or
high art. The fine arts were described and typed at the close of
the eighteenth
century, and the associated notion of the artist as a genius
unfettered by the
rules of a craft, as well as by social conventions, was presented
at much the
same time. Along with this went the idea that the aesthetic
attitude is a
psychologically distinctive state of distanced contemplation.
The creation of art
museums and an interest in the works of past eras date from the
same period.
work. In many cases, pieces are discarded once they have
served the particular
purpose for which they were created.
In reviewing this position we might question whether the
Western
ideology of art corresponds to its reality. Is it the case that we
think artworks
are useless? That “artist” names a spiritual calling? That art
making is
unaffected by the market? That artworks are appreciated only
when abstracted
from the moral, political, and social settings within which they
are generated?
If the answer to these questions is “no” (as I believe it to be),
this ideology
would be exposed as a fiction, irrelevant to the heart of our
concept of art.
Rather than develop this line, however, I take a different tack. I
accept
that the notions listed above characterize what has come to be
known as fine or
high art. The fine arts were described and typed at the close of
the eighteenth
century, and the associated notion of the artist as a genius
unfettered by the
rules of a craft, as well as by social conventions, was presented
at much the
same time. Along with this went the idea that the aesthetic
attitude is a
psychologically distinctive state of distanced contemplation.
The creation of art
museums and an interest in the works of past eras date from the
same period.
Prior to that time, Western artists were employed as servants
and worked
mainly to order. Their art was expected to be functional. Its
purposes were to
illustrate and instruct, to uplift or delight, to glorify God or
art’s patrons, to
improve the social environment or, at least, to make it more
pleasant. Now, if it
is silly (as I think it is) to suggest that Bach’s music or
Michelangelo’s statues or
Shakespeare’s plays became art retrospectively, only when they
were
appropriated by the art establishment and thereby were
abstracted from their
original settings and functions, it must be accepted that there is
a broader
notion of art than is covered by the rubric of fine art. Fine or
high art is art. It is
art with a capital A. But it is only one kind within a wider
genus. So, we can
agree with the anthropologist who argues that non-Western
cultures do not
share the Western notion of fine art without also accepting that
this shows them
to lack art or its concept. The crucial question is whether non-
Western cultures
self-consciously create art with a small a, something that is
properly called art
for what it shares with our basic concept, though their practice
might not be
institutionalized and ideologically freighted to the extent that
ours is.
and worked
mainly to order. Their art was expected to be functional. Its
purposes were to
illustrate and instruct, to uplift or delight, to glorify God or
art’s patrons, to
improve the social environment or, at least, to make it more
pleasant. Now, if it
is silly (as I think it is) to suggest that Bach’s music or
Michelangelo’s statues or
Shakespeare’s plays became art retrospectively, only when they
were
appropriated by the art establishment and thereby were
abstracted from their
original settings and functions, it must be accepted that there is
a broader
notion of art than is covered by the rubric of fine art. Fine or
high art is art. It is
art with a capital A. But it is only one kind within a wider
genus. So, we can
agree with the anthropologist who argues that non-Western
cultures do not
share the Western notion of fine art without also accepting that
this shows them
to lack art or its concept. The crucial question is whether non-
Western cultures
self-consciously create art with a small a, something that is
properly called art
for what it shares with our basic concept, though their practice
might not be
institutionalized and ideologically freighted to the extent that
ours is.
A second argument tending to the conclusion that non-Western
societies
are without art relies on a linguistic claim: that the languages of
these cultures
lack a single term that translates readily to our “art.” This
interpretation of the
linguistic data misses what is at issue, however. The crux
concerns the concepts
possessed within non-Western cultures, not the vocabularies of
their languages.
It may be that a culture employs a complex phrase instead of a
single word.
That we use “second cousin once removed,” not a solitary term,
does not mean
that we have no concept of that familial relationship. Or, more
likely, it may be
that the culture uses a word with a reference that is apparently
too broad, one
that covers all ritual artifacts or all crafts as well as artworks.
But again, this
does not show that it does not make the relevant conceptual
distinctions. The
ancient Greek techne referred both to arts and to more mundane
crafts, but the
Greeks acknowledged significant differences between the
products of the
activities covered by the general term. And the French
“conscience”
corresponds to both “conscience” and “consciousness,” but this
does not entail
that the French do not discriminate between morality and
mentation.
A third and final argument claims that members of traditional
societies
are unconscious of their culture. Simply, they do what they do,
societies
are without art relies on a linguistic claim: that the languages of
these cultures
lack a single term that translates readily to our “art.” This
interpretation of the
linguistic data misses what is at issue, however. The crux
concerns the concepts
possessed within non-Western cultures, not the vocabularies of
their languages.
It may be that a culture employs a complex phrase instead of a
single word.
That we use “second cousin once removed,” not a solitary term,
does not mean
that we have no concept of that familial relationship. Or, more
likely, it may be
that the culture uses a word with a reference that is apparently
too broad, one
that covers all ritual artifacts or all crafts as well as artworks.
But again, this
does not show that it does not make the relevant conceptual
distinctions. The
ancient Greek techne referred both to arts and to more mundane
crafts, but the
Greeks acknowledged significant differences between the
products of the
activities covered by the general term. And the French
“conscience”
corresponds to both “conscience” and “consciousness,” but this
does not entail
that the French do not discriminate between morality and
mentation.
A third and final argument claims that members of traditional
societies
are unconscious of their culture. Simply, they do what they do,
regarding it as
natural while remaining oblivious of the history of their
practices, of the
influences that shaped them, and of the “latent functions”
served by the
maintenance of their traditions. It is only in confrontation with
the “other,”
with an intrusive alien presence, that the society is forced to
define itself, to
reflect on its own character. “Construction of culture,” creative
self-definition
through contrast, is the result.
The view is exemplified in this passage by Adrian Vickers:
Tourism defines what Balinese culture is in a context where
such
definitions have hitherto not been needed. . . . Tourism
encourages
Balinese to reflect on their own culture. Members of a culture
usually
learn and express their culture unconsciously—it is something
they have
grown up with, a matter of habit. Balinese culture has long
been an
object of study. For over a century various Balinese have had
to make
statements to outsiders, first Dutch scholars and civil servants,
then
tourists, describing their culture and the elements of their
religion. This
process of articulation has meant that the Balinese have had to
be
conscious of their own culture, producing both a sense of pride
natural while remaining oblivious of the history of their
practices, of the
influences that shaped them, and of the “latent functions”
served by the
maintenance of their traditions. It is only in confrontation with
the “other,”
with an intrusive alien presence, that the society is forced to
define itself, to
reflect on its own character. “Construction of culture,” creative
self-definition
through contrast, is the result.
The view is exemplified in this passage by Adrian Vickers:
Tourism defines what Balinese culture is in a context where
such
definitions have hitherto not been needed. . . . Tourism
encourages
Balinese to reflect on their own culture. Members of a culture
usually
learn and express their culture unconsciously—it is something
they have
grown up with, a matter of habit. Balinese culture has long
been an
object of study. For over a century various Balinese have had
to make
statements to outsiders, first Dutch scholars and civil servants,
then
tourists, describing their culture and the elements of their
religion. This
process of articulation has meant that the Balinese have had to
be
conscious of their own culture, producing both a sense of pride
in their
cultural identity as Balinese, and an ability to sum up what may
be
considered as the essential aspects of culture . . . in a way that
can be
conveniently understood by others. Tourism is only one
element in this
process of externalising culture, and nowadays the Indonesian
Government plays as big a role as tourism in the process, since
the
government requires formal rationalisations and criteria in order
that
cultural and artistic activities can be bureaucratically described
and
supported.
Now, if the creation of art must be self-conscious, it will follow
that
members of non-Western societies, in being blind to their own
cultures, could
have no basic concept of art as such. If they acquire one, it will
be through
exposure to Western views, and their notion will be affected by
ours. Moreover,
their artlike cultural practices will have no defense against
outside influences,
whether good or bad. According to Maud Karpeles, folk music
develops
mainly unconsciously, with cultural insiders lacking awareness
of the history
and values of their tradition. As a result, untutored singers (in
the
Appalachians early this century) adapt indiscriminately from
traditional and
external sources; the natural selection by which the folk
tradition evolves then
cultural identity as Balinese, and an ability to sum up what may
be
considered as the essential aspects of culture . . . in a way that
can be
conveniently understood by others. Tourism is only one
element in this
process of externalising culture, and nowadays the Indonesian
Government plays as big a role as tourism in the process, since
the
government requires formal rationalisations and criteria in order
that
cultural and artistic activities can be bureaucratically described
and
supported.
Now, if the creation of art must be self-conscious, it will follow
that
members of non-Western societies, in being blind to their own
cultures, could
have no basic concept of art as such. If they acquire one, it will
be through
exposure to Western views, and their notion will be affected by
ours. Moreover,
their artlike cultural practices will have no defense against
outside influences,
whether good or bad. According to Maud Karpeles, folk music
develops
mainly unconsciously, with cultural insiders lacking awareness
of the history
and values of their tradition. As a result, untutored singers (in
the
Appalachians early this century) adapt indiscriminately from
traditional and
external sources; the natural selection by which the folk
tradition evolves then
cannot operate freely, because the ordinary process of musical
change is
continuously subverted.
I regard this third argument to be insupportable. The enactment
of
culture might be largely unconscious in that a society’s
members do not have to
describe to themselves, or to those who share their cultural
habits, what they
are doing, or why, as they act. They call on behavioral
repertoires and values
that have been thoroughly assimilated and which, therefore, do
not need to be
justified or worked out each time they are pressed into service.
Also, the
transmission of culture clearly depends more on imitation and
rote learning
than on social analysis. It does not follow, however, that a
society’s members
are unconscious of their culture in the further sense of being
incapable of
articulating, if occasion requires, their practices and mores.
(After all, sociology
would not exist unless Westerners could do this!) Neither does
it follow that
they are unable to reflect on the bases and functions of the
strands that make up
their social fabric. Social practices may be “unconscious” in
one sense, that of
being enacted unthinkingly under normal circumstances, but not
in another,
that of being beyond the agent’s ken. In fact, surely the
change is
continuously subverted.
I regard this third argument to be insupportable. The enactment
of
culture might be largely unconscious in that a society’s
members do not have to
describe to themselves, or to those who share their cultural
habits, what they
are doing, or why, as they act. They call on behavioral
repertoires and values
that have been thoroughly assimilated and which, therefore, do
not need to be
justified or worked out each time they are pressed into service.
Also, the
transmission of culture clearly depends more on imitation and
rote learning
than on social analysis. It does not follow, however, that a
society’s members
are unconscious of their culture in the further sense of being
incapable of
articulating, if occasion requires, their practices and mores.
(After all, sociology
would not exist unless Westerners could do this!) Neither does
it follow that
they are unable to reflect on the bases and functions of the
strands that make up
their social fabric. Social practices may be “unconscious” in
one sense, that of
being enacted unthinkingly under normal circumstances, but not
in another,
that of being beyond the agent’s ken. In fact, surely the
evidence suggests not
that societies are indifferent to their own histories and values,
or that they are
insensitive to outside influences, but the reverse.
Even if it is accepted that cultural self-consciousness inevitably
presupposes awareness of the “other,” of the outsider, it is hard
to imagine the
society that is without this. The most closed groups recognize
distinctions of
sex, tribe, clan, and family. And most have long known of the
wider world. To
take Vickers’ example, the Balinese have been explaining their
culture to
outsiders, such as the Javanese (with their different languages,
religion,
customs, music, dance, carving, and so on), for more than five
centuries.
More particularly, we should challenge Karpeles’ assumption
that a
mindless process of evolution explains the maintenance of, and
change in, folk
traditions. Her line, like that of the anthropologists who
conceive of their
studies as dealing with “latent functions” not appreciated by
their subjects,
reduces the artifacts produced within these cultures to the level
of aesthetically
pleasing objects shaped by the forces of nature. Denis Dutton
(in discussing
analyses of the pottery and rain dances of the Amerindian Hopi)
has taken this
approach to task for ignoring levels of intention manifest in
what is achieved.
Although art production does not always involve the explicit
that societies are indifferent to their own histories and values,
or that they are
insensitive to outside influences, but the reverse.
Even if it is accepted that cultural self-consciousness inevitably
presupposes awareness of the “other,” of the outsider, it is hard
to imagine the
society that is without this. The most closed groups recognize
distinctions of
sex, tribe, clan, and family. And most have long known of the
wider world. To
take Vickers’ example, the Balinese have been explaining their
culture to
outsiders, such as the Javanese (with their different languages,
religion,
customs, music, dance, carving, and so on), for more than five
centuries.
More particularly, we should challenge Karpeles’ assumption
that a
mindless process of evolution explains the maintenance of, and
change in, folk
traditions. Her line, like that of the anthropologists who
conceive of their
studies as dealing with “latent functions” not appreciated by
their subjects,
reduces the artifacts produced within these cultures to the level
of aesthetically
pleasing objects shaped by the forces of nature. Denis Dutton
(in discussing
analyses of the pottery and rain dances of the Amerindian Hopi)
has taken this
approach to task for ignoring levels of intention manifest in
what is achieved.
Although art production does not always involve the explicit
articulation of
goals and intentions, it does not follow that these are absent.
The preservation
and development of cultural traditions indicate care, attention,
commitment,
concentration, and deference—for the material and the heritage
of works,
genres, and styles—on the part of native practitioners and their
audiences.
Such traditions survive only by being carefully passed down.
(This is not to
insist that innovation and novelty must always be excluded from
living
traditions. Instead, it is to maintain that, where these are
sanctioned, it is
because they are valued within the history of the tradition in
which they occur.)
As just indicated, there is a tendency for those who would deny
that non-
Western cultures share our concept of art to describe the
products of those
cultures in a fashion that ignores the artistic goals, intentions,
and achievements
that such pieces manifest. This kind of reduction creates the
conclusion that art
is absent from non-Western cultures because it factors out the
“artiness” of their
artworks. But this reveals more about the methodologies
employed than the
cultures studied. As illustration, consider Alfred Gell’s
requirement that the
anthropologist adopt “methodological philistinism.”
Methodological philistinism consists of taking an attitude of
resolute
goals and intentions, it does not follow that these are absent.
The preservation
and development of cultural traditions indicate care, attention,
commitment,
concentration, and deference—for the material and the heritage
of works,
genres, and styles—on the part of native practitioners and their
audiences.
Such traditions survive only by being carefully passed down.
(This is not to
insist that innovation and novelty must always be excluded from
living
traditions. Instead, it is to maintain that, where these are
sanctioned, it is
because they are valued within the history of the tradition in
which they occur.)
As just indicated, there is a tendency for those who would deny
that non-
Western cultures share our concept of art to describe the
products of those
cultures in a fashion that ignores the artistic goals, intentions,
and achievements
that such pieces manifest. This kind of reduction creates the
conclusion that art
is absent from non-Western cultures because it factors out the
“artiness” of their
artworks. But this reveals more about the methodologies
employed than the
cultures studied. As illustration, consider Alfred Gell’s
requirement that the
anthropologist adopt “methodological philistinism.”
Methodological philistinism consists of taking an attitude of
resolute
indifference towards the aesthetic value of works of art—the
aesthetic
value that they have, either indigenously, or from the standpoint
of
universal aestheticism. Because to admit this kind of value is
equivalent
to admitting, so to speak, that religion is true, and just as this
admission
makes the sociology of religion impossible, the introduction of
aesthetics
(the theology of art) into the sociology or anthropology of art
immediately turns the enterprise into something else. . . . [T]he
anthropology of art has to begin with a denial of the claims
which objects
of art make on the people who live under their spell, and also on
ourselves.
Now it may be appropriate for the anthropologist to put aside
his own
(perhaps ethnocentric) values, but, pace Gell, it cannot be
appropriate to the
study of non-Western art as art that he also puts aside a concern
with the
aesthetic judgments of the local culture, since their art is such
only because it
possesses the relevant properties. Because he takes his
methodological
philistinism so far as to reject “the claims which objects of art
make on the
people who live under their spell,” Gell cannot analyse non-
Western art on its
own terms. In trying to save anthropology from becoming
“something else,” he
aesthetic
value that they have, either indigenously, or from the standpoint
of
universal aestheticism. Because to admit this kind of value is
equivalent
to admitting, so to speak, that religion is true, and just as this
admission
makes the sociology of religion impossible, the introduction of
aesthetics
(the theology of art) into the sociology or anthropology of art
immediately turns the enterprise into something else. . . . [T]he
anthropology of art has to begin with a denial of the claims
which objects
of art make on the people who live under their spell, and also on
ourselves.
Now it may be appropriate for the anthropologist to put aside
his own
(perhaps ethnocentric) values, but, pace Gell, it cannot be
appropriate to the
study of non-Western art as art that he also puts aside a concern
with the
aesthetic judgments of the local culture, since their art is such
only because it
possesses the relevant properties. Because he takes his
methodological
philistinism so far as to reject “the claims which objects of art
make on the
people who live under their spell,” Gell cannot analyse non-
Western art on its
own terms. In trying to save anthropology from becoming
“something else,” he
turns art into something less than it is. In his view, it is “a
component of the
technology of enchantment.” My point is this: if it is essential
to something
that it is created to possess properties of a kind that can be
recognized only by
those prepared to make the relevant judgments, then identifying
putative
instances of the type requires reference to such evaluations,
even if that process
of identification does not require the identifier to share the
relevant values.
II
If non-Western societies were without cultural self-
consciousness, and if their
artlike practices were controlled only by natural evolution,
rather than human
design, then, indeed, there would be grounds for supposing that
they do not
possess a concept of art. While non-Western cultures and their
products have
been described in such terms, these accounts are unconvincing
(and insulting as
well). I have argued above against the claim that non-Western
cultures do not
have the concept of art and do not create art, small a, within
their own
artworlds. It remains now to offer a positive characterization of
non-Western
art, and to do so in a way that explains the ability of cultural
outsiders to
recognize (if not to thoroughly understand) it as what it is.
I begin by considering a position sketched by Arthur Danto. He
component of the
technology of enchantment.” My point is this: if it is essential
to something
that it is created to possess properties of a kind that can be
recognized only by
those prepared to make the relevant judgments, then identifying
putative
instances of the type requires reference to such evaluations,
even if that process
of identification does not require the identifier to share the
relevant values.
II
If non-Western societies were without cultural self-
consciousness, and if their
artlike practices were controlled only by natural evolution,
rather than human
design, then, indeed, there would be grounds for supposing that
they do not
possess a concept of art. While non-Western cultures and their
products have
been described in such terms, these accounts are unconvincing
(and insulting as
well). I have argued above against the claim that non-Western
cultures do not
have the concept of art and do not create art, small a, within
their own
artworlds. It remains now to offer a positive characterization of
non-Western
art, and to do so in a way that explains the ability of cultural
outsiders to
recognize (if not to thoroughly understand) it as what it is.
I begin by considering a position sketched by Arthur Danto. He
is
impressed by the fact that some Western artworks are
perceptually
indistinguishable from nonartworks to those who are unaware of
their
provenance. The most graphic illustration of the point is
provided by
Duchamp’s readymades, in which a “mere real thing” attains the
status of art
without alteration in its physical properties. This leads Danto
to conclude that
what differentiates art from other things is “an atmosphere of
theory the eye
cannot de[s]cry.” By this he seems to mean an art-historical
context. He applies
his idea to non-Western art by means of a “philosopher’s
example” concerning
two nearby but isolated African tribes, the Pot People and the
Basket Folk. Both
make pots and baskets, and the pots and baskets of the Pot
People are not
perceptually discriminable from those of the Basket Folk.
Nevertheless, the
pots of the Pot People are artworks, whereas their baskets are
not, and vice
versa for the Basket Folk. Whereas the artworks in both
cultures have deep
spiritual importance for the tribe, symbolizing their relation to
the cosmic order,
to life and death, and so on, the nonartworks lack special
significance, being no
more than practical objects. The tale illustrates Danto’s theory,
as it is designed
impressed by the fact that some Western artworks are
perceptually
indistinguishable from nonartworks to those who are unaware of
their
provenance. The most graphic illustration of the point is
provided by
Duchamp’s readymades, in which a “mere real thing” attains the
status of art
without alteration in its physical properties. This leads Danto
to conclude that
what differentiates art from other things is “an atmosphere of
theory the eye
cannot de[s]cry.” By this he seems to mean an art-historical
context. He applies
his idea to non-Western art by means of a “philosopher’s
example” concerning
two nearby but isolated African tribes, the Pot People and the
Basket Folk. Both
make pots and baskets, and the pots and baskets of the Pot
People are not
perceptually discriminable from those of the Basket Folk.
Nevertheless, the
pots of the Pot People are artworks, whereas their baskets are
not, and vice
versa for the Basket Folk. Whereas the artworks in both
cultures have deep
spiritual importance for the tribe, symbolizing their relation to
the cosmic order,
to life and death, and so on, the nonartworks lack special
significance, being no
more than practical objects. The tale illustrates Danto’s theory,
as it is designed
to do. What makes something art, whether in an African tribe
or in the United
States, is an “atmosphere of theory,” not properties perceptible
to someone
ignorant of that conceptual context.
Dutton raises this objection to Danto’s tale: If a tribe makes
pots that
have developed over many generations into their most treasured
art, they will
be meticulous about the construction and decoration of these.
They would presumably work according to an evolved canon of
excellence . . . [P]ot making would be a central element in a
whole
culture, with much thought and worry going into obtaining the
perfect
clay for making them, firing them for exactly the right kind of
finish.
Why? Because people just behave in those ways when they
create things
that mean something to them.
If a group has a practice they value as art, it has a great
importance to them.
This is reflected—usually, if not for every instance—in the
serious care they
invest in its creation and reception. This results in perceptible
properties that
distinguish most examples of their art types from the products
of other, less
culturally significant, activities. Contrary to Danto’s
hypothesis, it is incoherent
to imagine that the artworks of a society would be
indistinguishable from
merely utilitarian objects.
or in the United
States, is an “atmosphere of theory,” not properties perceptible
to someone
ignorant of that conceptual context.
Dutton raises this objection to Danto’s tale: If a tribe makes
pots that
have developed over many generations into their most treasured
art, they will
be meticulous about the construction and decoration of these.
They would presumably work according to an evolved canon of
excellence . . . [P]ot making would be a central element in a
whole
culture, with much thought and worry going into obtaining the
perfect
clay for making them, firing them for exactly the right kind of
finish.
Why? Because people just behave in those ways when they
create things
that mean something to them.
If a group has a practice they value as art, it has a great
importance to them.
This is reflected—usually, if not for every instance—in the
serious care they
invest in its creation and reception. This results in perceptible
properties that
distinguish most examples of their art types from the products
of other, less
culturally significant, activities. Contrary to Danto’s
hypothesis, it is incoherent
to imagine that the artworks of a society would be
indistinguishable from
merely utilitarian objects.
I think that Dutton succeeds in calling into question the
plausibility of
Danto’s scenario. His argument is that artisans take pains over
perceptible
features of the artifacts that are of central importance to the
culture (and that
they will be less inclined to do the same with trivially
utilitarian objects). As it
stands, however, that suggestion would apply as readily to
culturally
significant nonart items as to artworks. How can we distinguish
culturally
significant practices in which art is absent from those in which
it is present?
One suggestion, with which I agree, is developed by Dutton and
H. Gene
Blocker as a result of their communications respectively with
carvers in New
Guinea and Africa. The crucial claim is that, even if non-
Western artists’
carvings are utilitarian and not created for “distanced”
contemplation, those
artists (and other members of their culture) are vitally
concerned with the
aesthetic nature of what is produced. Their work involves
achievements that
are aesthetic in character. It is appreciated within the culture in
light of these
and it is valued for displaying them. As Dutton puts it, art
involves
accomplishment; it displays persistent intelligence and
directedness in realizing
plausibility of
Danto’s scenario. His argument is that artisans take pains over
perceptible
features of the artifacts that are of central importance to the
culture (and that
they will be less inclined to do the same with trivially
utilitarian objects). As it
stands, however, that suggestion would apply as readily to
culturally
significant nonart items as to artworks. How can we distinguish
culturally
significant practices in which art is absent from those in which
it is present?
One suggestion, with which I agree, is developed by Dutton and
H. Gene
Blocker as a result of their communications respectively with
carvers in New
Guinea and Africa. The crucial claim is that, even if non-
Western artists’
carvings are utilitarian and not created for “distanced”
contemplation, those
artists (and other members of their culture) are vitally
concerned with the
aesthetic nature of what is produced. Their work involves
achievements that
are aesthetic in character. It is appreciated within the culture in
light of these
and it is valued for displaying them. As Dutton puts it, art
involves
accomplishment; it displays persistent intelligence and
directedness in realizing
aesthetic goals. And Blocker writes:
the primitive peoples who make and use such artifacts manifest
enough
of the artistic and aesthetic attitudes and dispositions to warrant
and
justify us in calling such artifacts “works of art” and treating
them as
such.
From my point of view, this account displays an important
virtue: it
stresses aesthetic properties—qualities such as beauty, balance,
tension,
elegance, serenity, energy, grace, vivacity. Traditionally,
philosophical aesthetics
has conceived of aesthetic properties not only as central to the
character of art,
but also as not requiring for their apprehension a detailed
knowledge of the
social context of production. If (some) non-Western items
qualify as art by
virtue of displaying humanly produced aesthetic features, this
allows us to
explain how outsiders, despite their ignorance of the wider
sociohistorical
context in which such items are created, might recognize them
for the artworks
they are. To put the claim more broadly: There is a
transcultural notion of the
aesthetic; aesthetic properties have interest and appeal for
humans in general.
It is this cultural overlap that licenses the judgment that non-
Western cultures
make art (small a) for, in valuing the attainment of aesthetically
pleasing effects,
the primitive peoples who make and use such artifacts manifest
enough
of the artistic and aesthetic attitudes and dispositions to warrant
and
justify us in calling such artifacts “works of art” and treating
them as
such.
From my point of view, this account displays an important
virtue: it
stresses aesthetic properties—qualities such as beauty, balance,
tension,
elegance, serenity, energy, grace, vivacity. Traditionally,
philosophical aesthetics
has conceived of aesthetic properties not only as central to the
character of art,
but also as not requiring for their apprehension a detailed
knowledge of the
social context of production. If (some) non-Western items
qualify as art by
virtue of displaying humanly produced aesthetic features, this
allows us to
explain how outsiders, despite their ignorance of the wider
sociohistorical
context in which such items are created, might recognize them
for the artworks
they are. To put the claim more broadly: There is a
transcultural notion of the
aesthetic; aesthetic properties have interest and appeal for
humans in general.
It is this cultural overlap that licenses the judgment that non-
Western cultures
make art (small a) for, in valuing the attainment of aesthetically
pleasing effects,
their members reveal themselves to be concerned with the
artistic character of
their products.
I am inclined to supplement the account offered so far, because
I do not
think that it is sufficient to distinguish artworks from other
items that display
humanly created aesthetic properties. I suggest that, in the case
of art, the
aesthetic effects achieved must be integral to the whole, rather
than minor or
incidental side features. A tool handle does not become an
artwork merely by
having a minuscule, but aesthetically pleasing, carving added to
it. In addition,
I think that the aesthetic character of an artwork must be
regarded as essential
to its function, so that it cannot be evaluated properly without
taking into
account the aesthetic achievement it involves. Its function need
not be solely
that of providing pleasure through the contemplation of its
aesthetic properties.
Much more often in non-Western cultures, artworks serve
socially useful
purposes in rituals and the like. They are for use, not
contemplation. They
substitute for gods, serve to ward off spirits, are offerings
intended to guarantee
the fruitfulness of the marriage at which they are presented, and
so on. In this
way, art might always be utilitarian. But it remains
distinguishable from mere
craft in terms of the totality and functional significance of the
aesthetic
artistic character of
their products.
I am inclined to supplement the account offered so far, because
I do not
think that it is sufficient to distinguish artworks from other
items that display
humanly created aesthetic properties. I suggest that, in the case
of art, the
aesthetic effects achieved must be integral to the whole, rather
than minor or
incidental side features. A tool handle does not become an
artwork merely by
having a minuscule, but aesthetically pleasing, carving added to
it. In addition,
I think that the aesthetic character of an artwork must be
regarded as essential
to its function, so that it cannot be evaluated properly without
taking into
account the aesthetic achievement it involves. Its function need
not be solely
that of providing pleasure through the contemplation of its
aesthetic properties.
Much more often in non-Western cultures, artworks serve
socially useful
purposes in rituals and the like. They are for use, not
contemplation. They
substitute for gods, serve to ward off spirits, are offerings
intended to guarantee
the fruitfulness of the marriage at which they are presented, and
so on. In this
way, art might always be utilitarian. But it remains
distinguishable from mere
craft in terms of the totality and functional significance of the
aesthetic
properties it is created to possess. Mere craftworks lack
aesthetic properties, or
are not made to have them, or are made to have them in a
manner that is
incidental or trivial with respect to their intended function.
Even with the amendments I have suggested, it might be thought
that
the position I have advocated is too liberal, for it seems to
admit to the realm of
art such things as fine Italian cars. As a first response, I would
grasp the offered
nettle. If (and I am not sure about this) their aesthetic attributes
are essential to
their evaluation as cars, Maseratis, Lamborghinis, and Ferraris
are artworks
(small a). To accept this is not to encourage undue expansion
of the concept of
art but, rather, to stress that the notion has (always had) a wider
scope than that
of fine art. Under the influence of the ideology of fine art, the
Western notion of
art has atrophied. Acknowledgment of the artistic character of
these vehicles
involves the reclamation of lost ground, not territorial
expansion. And a second
response builds on this first. Over time, art practices can
become regularized
and institutionalized. If cars manufactured by Maserati,
Lamborghini, and
Ferrari do not qualify as art, this could be because they are not
created within
the context of the Western art institution. But now, if that art
aesthetic properties, or
are not made to have them, or are made to have them in a
manner that is
incidental or trivial with respect to their intended function.
Even with the amendments I have suggested, it might be thought
that
the position I have advocated is too liberal, for it seems to
admit to the realm of
art such things as fine Italian cars. As a first response, I would
grasp the offered
nettle. If (and I am not sure about this) their aesthetic attributes
are essential to
their evaluation as cars, Maseratis, Lamborghinis, and Ferraris
are artworks
(small a). To accept this is not to encourage undue expansion
of the concept of
art but, rather, to stress that the notion has (always had) a wider
scope than that
of fine art. Under the influence of the ideology of fine art, the
Western notion of
art has atrophied. Acknowledgment of the artistic character of
these vehicles
involves the reclamation of lost ground, not territorial
expansion. And a second
response builds on this first. Over time, art practices can
become regularized
and institutionalized. If cars manufactured by Maserati,
Lamborghini, and
Ferrari do not qualify as art, this could be because they are not
created within
the context of the Western art institution. But now, if that art
institution is best
to be seen as establishing a social context for the production of
fine art, this
concession is not harmful, for I stressed earlier that I was
interested in a broader
conception of art.
In summary: The care devoted to the production of art typically
concerns
features of the kind that is called “aesthetic.” That is, the
creators of art within
the culture make some of their choices for the sake of creating
qualities that are
aesthetically pleasing. Just which aesthetic properties count for
the art in
question, and how they will be structured and conditioned by
conventions,
depend on the medium and on traditions and practices
established for the
relevant genre. The local appreciation and evaluation of such
pieces will take
some account of the success or otherwise with which they are
created to realize
the desired properties. This is consistent with the possibility
that all artworks
have a place in socially important practices, such as religious
observances. In
discovering whether a people possess the concept of art, what
matters is not
that they separate art from other important concerns but that
they make items
presenting humanly generated aesthetic properties which are
essential to the
main purposes served by those items. Moreover, such artworks
often will be
recognizable as such to cultural outsiders, who are not
to be seen as establishing a social context for the production of
fine art, this
concession is not harmful, for I stressed earlier that I was
interested in a broader
conception of art.
In summary: The care devoted to the production of art typically
concerns
features of the kind that is called “aesthetic.” That is, the
creators of art within
the culture make some of their choices for the sake of creating
qualities that are
aesthetically pleasing. Just which aesthetic properties count for
the art in
question, and how they will be structured and conditioned by
conventions,
depend on the medium and on traditions and practices
established for the
relevant genre. The local appreciation and evaluation of such
pieces will take
some account of the success or otherwise with which they are
created to realize
the desired properties. This is consistent with the possibility
that all artworks
have a place in socially important practices, such as religious
observances. In
discovering whether a people possess the concept of art, what
matters is not
that they separate art from other important concerns but that
they make items
presenting humanly generated aesthetic properties which are
essential to the
main purposes served by those items. Moreover, such artworks
often will be
recognizable as such to cultural outsiders, who are not
prohibited by their
ignorance of life within the culture from noting the aesthetic
effects they
manifest, perceiving that these concern the whole, seeing that
they are humanly
created, and observing (or inferring) that such effects are
deemed essential to
the nature and purpose of the items in question.
III
It remains to investigate the implications of the preceding for
the philosophical
enterprise of defining art. I consider two questions.
1. If the presence of humanly created aesthetic properties is
crucial to our
acknowledging that other cultures have art and to our ability to
identify at least
some of their artworks, must reference to such properties
feature in a successful
definition? That is, should “aesthetic” definitions be preferred
to other
varieties?
I answer “no.” Though I have stressed the importance of
aesthetic
properties in addressing the issue of how we know that other
cultures have art,
it is not my view that the possession of these is essential for
something’s being
art. I accept that conceptual pieces can qualify as art, though
these do not
possess perceptible aesthetic attributes, and I also accept that
ignorance of life within the culture from noting the aesthetic
effects they
manifest, perceiving that these concern the whole, seeing that
they are humanly
created, and observing (or inferring) that such effects are
deemed essential to
the nature and purpose of the items in question.
III
It remains to investigate the implications of the preceding for
the philosophical
enterprise of defining art. I consider two questions.
1. If the presence of humanly created aesthetic properties is
crucial to our
acknowledging that other cultures have art and to our ability to
identify at least
some of their artworks, must reference to such properties
feature in a successful
definition? That is, should “aesthetic” definitions be preferred
to other
varieties?
I answer “no.” Though I have stressed the importance of
aesthetic
properties in addressing the issue of how we know that other
cultures have art,
it is not my view that the possession of these is essential for
something’s being
art. I accept that conceptual pieces can qualify as art, though
these do not
possess perceptible aesthetic attributes, and I also accept that
ordinary objects
might be appropriated to the artworld, as Duchamp’s
readymades were, so that
their being art does not depend on the aesthetic properties they
happen to
display. Indeed, it could be that, over time, art practices change
so that the
emphasis falls on the creation of theory-dependent, historically
conditioned
artistic properties that have little to do with aesthetic properties
as these were
traditionally described. All that follows from my argument is
that works that
are without aesthetic properties, or that attain their art status for
some reason
other than their possessing the aesthetic properties they display,
will not be
identifiable as art by cultural outsiders.
More needs to be said, though, because I do not mean to leave
the
impression that there could be an art-making tradition that at no
time focused
on the realization of perceptible aesthetic effects. I do not
believe that a culture
could have a tradition generating artworks all of which are
nonaesthetic, or are
only incidentally aesthetic, in character. I suspect that a
concern with achieving
aesthetic effects is historically necessary in the development of
art practices,
though not logically necessary to any particular item’s being an
artwork. It is
no more easy to imagine a culture that begins with nonaesthetic
art than one
that develops mathematical calculus before it cultivates
might be appropriated to the artworld, as Duchamp’s
readymades were, so that
their being art does not depend on the aesthetic properties they
happen to
display. Indeed, it could be that, over time, art practices change
so that the
emphasis falls on the creation of theory-dependent, historically
conditioned
artistic properties that have little to do with aesthetic properties
as these were
traditionally described. All that follows from my argument is
that works that
are without aesthetic properties, or that attain their art status for
some reason
other than their possessing the aesthetic properties they display,
will not be
identifiable as art by cultural outsiders.
More needs to be said, though, because I do not mean to leave
the
impression that there could be an art-making tradition that at no
time focused
on the realization of perceptible aesthetic effects. I do not
believe that a culture
could have a tradition generating artworks all of which are
nonaesthetic, or are
only incidentally aesthetic, in character. I suspect that a
concern with achieving
aesthetic effects is historically necessary in the development of
art practices,
though not logically necessary to any particular item’s being an
artwork. It is
no more easy to imagine a culture that begins with nonaesthetic
art than one
that develops mathematical calculus before it cultivates
counting and
measurement. I commented at the outset that the universality
of art marks its
creation as a response to deep-seated human needs and
experiences. At that
level—that is, at the level of the lowest denominators common
to human
existence—it is more likely to be the intrinsic, sensuous appeal
of aesthetic
properties than the cognitive interest of culturally arbitrary
symbols that
explains why art making, or the activities that preceded it, first
occurred.
2. Do current theories, most of which are prompted by
reflection on
Western art practice, accommodate non-Western art? That is,
can the
contemporary crop of definitions be applied perspicuously to
the art of other
cultures? In discussing these questions, I review the definitions
of art proposed
by George Dickie and Jerrold Levinson.
Dickie’s institutional theory holds that something is art if and
only if it is
enmeshed within a complex set of institutionally structured
social relations.
Art status is achieved by an item only if it is appropriately
situated within an
institutional matrix involving the roles of artist and public,
along with artworld
practices. What is distinctive to the institution in terms of
measurement. I commented at the outset that the universality
of art marks its
creation as a response to deep-seated human needs and
experiences. At that
level—that is, at the level of the lowest denominators common
to human
existence—it is more likely to be the intrinsic, sensuous appeal
of aesthetic
properties than the cognitive interest of culturally arbitrary
symbols that
explains why art making, or the activities that preceded it, first
occurred.
2. Do current theories, most of which are prompted by
reflection on
Western art practice, accommodate non-Western art? That is,
can the
contemporary crop of definitions be applied perspicuously to
the art of other
cultures? In discussing these questions, I review the definitions
of art proposed
by George Dickie and Jerrold Levinson.
Dickie’s institutional theory holds that something is art if and
only if it is
enmeshed within a complex set of institutionally structured
social relations.
Art status is achieved by an item only if it is appropriately
situated within an
institutional matrix involving the roles of artist and public,
along with artworld
practices. What is distinctive to the institution in terms of
which art is defined
is its structure, not its history or function.
Dickie is exclusively concerned with the institutional aspect of
Western
art, though he describes this in terms that are rather general. He
does not apply
his theory to non-Western cultures, but it is easy to see what
this would involve.
For these cultures to be art-producing ones, they would have to
contain art
institutions of the kind Dickie outlines. In particular, those
institutions would
have to manifest the structure that he describes as distinctive to
artworlds.
I readily allow of the Western art institution that it is an
informal
arrangement reaching beyond government councils, official
academies, and the
like. And I accept that in some non-Western cultures—those of
Japan, China,
Indonesia, India, Iran, and Iraq, for instance—art has long been
formalized and
professionalized in some respects. In many other societies,
however, I doubt
that art is served by a distinctively structured institution; rather,
it is an
inseparable aspect of wider social practices concerning kinship,
religion,
commerce, ritual, and government. I conclude, therefore, that
the institutional
theory is not adequate to explain the presence of art in these
cultures. I do not
deny the power and attraction of Dickie’s theory as one that
limns central
is its structure, not its history or function.
Dickie is exclusively concerned with the institutional aspect of
Western
art, though he describes this in terms that are rather general. He
does not apply
his theory to non-Western cultures, but it is easy to see what
this would involve.
For these cultures to be art-producing ones, they would have to
contain art
institutions of the kind Dickie outlines. In particular, those
institutions would
have to manifest the structure that he describes as distinctive to
artworlds.
I readily allow of the Western art institution that it is an
informal
arrangement reaching beyond government councils, official
academies, and the
like. And I accept that in some non-Western cultures—those of
Japan, China,
Indonesia, India, Iran, and Iraq, for instance—art has long been
formalized and
professionalized in some respects. In many other societies,
however, I doubt
that art is served by a distinctively structured institution; rather,
it is an
inseparable aspect of wider social practices concerning kinship,
religion,
commerce, ritual, and government. I conclude, therefore, that
the institutional
theory is not adequate to explain the presence of art in these
cultures. I do not
deny the power and attraction of Dickie’s theory as one that
limns central
features of Western fine art, but I do not think that it lends
itself to the definition
of non-Western art, or of art (small a) in general.
Jerrold Levinson offers a recursive account of the extension of
“artwork”
according to which something is art if it is intended for regard
in one of the
ways prior artworks have been correctly regarded. He allows
that the artist’s
intention can be referentially opaque; that is, he accepts that
something
intended for a particular regard would be art in the case where
that regard was
invited by earlier artworks although the intender was not aware
of this fact. On
non-Western art, he says this:
We can only hope to say anything about art in other cultures, or
in
historically remote circumstances, by trying to understand our
own
concept as surely as we can, and then gauging the extent to
which it
can be made to fit with or to illuminate what we find in those
cultures
and circumstances. To put this more pithily, if another culture
has art,
it must have art in our sense, more or less—whatever the
inevitable
differences between its art and ours in terms of materials,
structure,
expressiveness, ritual-embededness, object-orientedness, and so
itself to the definition
of non-Western art, or of art (small a) in general.
Jerrold Levinson offers a recursive account of the extension of
“artwork”
according to which something is art if it is intended for regard
in one of the
ways prior artworks have been correctly regarded. He allows
that the artist’s
intention can be referentially opaque; that is, he accepts that
something
intended for a particular regard would be art in the case where
that regard was
invited by earlier artworks although the intender was not aware
of this fact. On
non-Western art, he says this:
We can only hope to say anything about art in other cultures, or
in
historically remote circumstances, by trying to understand our
own
concept as surely as we can, and then gauging the extent to
which it
can be made to fit with or to illuminate what we find in those
cultures
and circumstances. To put this more pithily, if another culture
has art,
it must have art in our sense, more or less—whatever the
inevitable
differences between its art and ours in terms of materials,
structure,
expressiveness, ritual-embededness, object-orientedness, and so
on.
I agree, though for the sake of political correctness and
appropriate emphasis I
prefer the wording “if another culture has art, it must be that
our two cultures
share the same concept.”
Levinson’s definition makes no explicit appeal to the intender’s
cultural
location. For that reason, it appears to be indifferent to social
boundaries and,
thereby, to claim a universality that would have it applying to
all artworks,
whatever their provenance. But this impression is misleading.
Suppose a Chinese person in the fourteenth century intended a
piece to
be regarded as were European paintings in the thirteenth
century, though she
was entirely ignorant of the existence of Europe and its
artworks, and, further,
no extant Chinese artworks called for that kind of regard.
Levinson’s definition
would appear to entail that the Chinese person creates an
artwork via cross-
cultural reference. This result strikes me as extremely
implausible, and I doubt
that Levinson would embrace it. Quite rightly, he emphasizes
that artists’ art-
regarding intentions usually are self-conscious in invoking or
referring to past
art. He allows for the case in which the intention is
referentially opaque not in
order to cut art making adrift from its cultural history but,
rather, to
I agree, though for the sake of political correctness and
appropriate emphasis I
prefer the wording “if another culture has art, it must be that
our two cultures
share the same concept.”
Levinson’s definition makes no explicit appeal to the intender’s
cultural
location. For that reason, it appears to be indifferent to social
boundaries and,
thereby, to claim a universality that would have it applying to
all artworks,
whatever their provenance. But this impression is misleading.
Suppose a Chinese person in the fourteenth century intended a
piece to
be regarded as were European paintings in the thirteenth
century, though she
was entirely ignorant of the existence of Europe and its
artworks, and, further,
no extant Chinese artworks called for that kind of regard.
Levinson’s definition
would appear to entail that the Chinese person creates an
artwork via cross-
cultural reference. This result strikes me as extremely
implausible, and I doubt
that Levinson would embrace it. Quite rightly, he emphasizes
that artists’ art-
regarding intentions usually are self-conscious in invoking or
referring to past
art. He allows for the case in which the intention is
referentially opaque not in
order to cut art making adrift from its cultural history but,
rather, to
acknowledge that the required connection might be made, if not
by the artist
herself, then by other members of her culture. The recursive
character of
Levinson’s definition aims to stress the extent to which art
making is rooted
within a historicized, culturally unified practice, not to admit
the possibility of
cross-cultural art creation that rides roughshod over the artistic
traditions of the
respective cultures. He means to indicate how art draws on (or
sets out to
repudiate) its cultural forebears, so that what is possible within
the art of a
culture depends on what has been previously accepted as art
within that same
culture. In consequence, Levinson’s account must be seen as
committed to a
kind of cultural relativism in art production, not as espousing
universalism. It
presupposes a historically continuous tradition to which the art-
defining
intention relates the newly created piece. His theory assumes
the background
of a historically and culturally unified body of works to which
the artist’s
intention relates the candidate work. In other words, Levinson
makes art
relative to what Danto may have had in mind when he coined
the term
“artworld.”
I have already claimed that artworlds are themselves the
products of
particular cultures with their individual histories. There may be
as many
by the artist
herself, then by other members of her culture. The recursive
character of
Levinson’s definition aims to stress the extent to which art
making is rooted
within a historicized, culturally unified practice, not to admit
the possibility of
cross-cultural art creation that rides roughshod over the artistic
traditions of the
respective cultures. He means to indicate how art draws on (or
sets out to
repudiate) its cultural forebears, so that what is possible within
the art of a
culture depends on what has been previously accepted as art
within that same
culture. In consequence, Levinson’s account must be seen as
committed to a
kind of cultural relativism in art production, not as espousing
universalism. It
presupposes a historically continuous tradition to which the art-
defining
intention relates the newly created piece. His theory assumes
the background
of a historically and culturally unified body of works to which
the artist’s
intention relates the candidate work. In other words, Levinson
makes art
relative to what Danto may have had in mind when he coined
the term
“artworld.”
I have already claimed that artworlds are themselves the
products of
particular cultures with their individual histories. There may be
as many
independently generated artworlds as there are distinct cultures.
The
acknowledgment that different cultures produce their own
artworks comes
precisely to this. So, if definitions such as Levinson’s are
committed to seeing
art as relative to an artworld, and if they focus narrowly on the
Western one,
they leave non-Western art and the notion of art in general
underanalyzed.
In reply, it might be pointed out that the proposed definition is
at a level
of generality that allows it to explain, if it is correct, how
something might
become art within any artworld. What makes something art is
the maker’s
intention that it be regarded in a fashion appropriate to the prior
artworks of
the creator’s culture, whether it is the Western artworld or the
artworld of some
African tribe within which the artist operates, and whether the
art regards
appropriate to prior art in the one artworld resemble those in the
other.
According to this suggestion, it is the structure of the
intentional relation, not
the content of the relevant intention, that is crucial. Something
is art within a
given culture if it is intended to be regarded as its predecessors
were regarded,
regardless of the kind of regard that is intended.
The
acknowledgment that different cultures produce their own
artworks comes
precisely to this. So, if definitions such as Levinson’s are
committed to seeing
art as relative to an artworld, and if they focus narrowly on the
Western one,
they leave non-Western art and the notion of art in general
underanalyzed.
In reply, it might be pointed out that the proposed definition is
at a level
of generality that allows it to explain, if it is correct, how
something might
become art within any artworld. What makes something art is
the maker’s
intention that it be regarded in a fashion appropriate to the prior
artworks of
the creator’s culture, whether it is the Western artworld or the
artworld of some
African tribe within which the artist operates, and whether the
art regards
appropriate to prior art in the one artworld resemble those in the
other.
According to this suggestion, it is the structure of the
intentional relation, not
the content of the relevant intention, that is crucial. Something
is art within a
given culture if it is intended to be regarded as its predecessors
were regarded,
regardless of the kind of regard that is intended.
As it stands, this approach is inadequate. A definition that
characterizes
art making as artworld-relative and that also concedes the
existence of
autonomous artworlds must explain how artworlds are of a
single type. An
account is required of what makes the various artworlds
artworlds. Without
this the definition is incomplete at best. While it might identify
a factor
necessarily common to artworlds, reference solely to the
structure of the
intentional relationship—that the maker intends the present
object to be viewed
as similar predecessors have been—is not sufficient to explain
how artworlds
are of a distinctive kind. Many practices that are not art-
making ones are
historically reflexive in a similar way and thereby exhibit the
same structure of
intention.
Levinson does not apply his definition to the autonomous art of
other
cultures, but he does consider how his intentional-historical
conception of art
might assimilate Western activities that are like, but marginal
to, Western fine
art. (As examples, he mentions handmade furniture, sculpted
masks,
commercial design, ritual music, and baton twirling.) For that
case, he allows
that identifying ‘simply the same structure of connectedness, of
intentional
invocation, whether immediate or mediate, of predecessor
objects or the
characterizes
art making as artworld-relative and that also concedes the
existence of
autonomous artworlds must explain how artworlds are of a
single type. An
account is required of what makes the various artworlds
artworlds. Without
this the definition is incomplete at best. While it might identify
a factor
necessarily common to artworlds, reference solely to the
structure of the
intentional relationship—that the maker intends the present
object to be viewed
as similar predecessors have been—is not sufficient to explain
how artworlds
are of a distinctive kind. Many practices that are not art-
making ones are
historically reflexive in a similar way and thereby exhibit the
same structure of
intention.
Levinson does not apply his definition to the autonomous art of
other
cultures, but he does consider how his intentional-historical
conception of art
might assimilate Western activities that are like, but marginal
to, Western fine
art. (As examples, he mentions handmade furniture, sculpted
masks,
commercial design, ritual music, and baton twirling.) For that
case, he allows
that identifying ‘simply the same structure of connectedness, of
intentional
invocation, whether immediate or mediate, of predecessor
objects or the
treatment they were accorded’ is too weak to do the job. A
stronger suggestion,
Levinson thinks, holds that the content of the relevant
intentions is the same or
similar between, say, handmade chairs and art sculptures. That
is, not only are
both projected for regards appropriate to predecessors of the
same ilk, but also
the regards invited by handmade chairs include ones
paradigmatic for art
sculptures.
These remarks show how Levinson would attempt to extend his
definition to the case of non-Western art. Probably he would
maintain that at
least some of the regards intended for artworks are common to
all the artworlds
there are and that it is this feature that unifies these artworlds
as of a single
type. In the case of activities that are marginal to art-making
ones, the
resemblance in intended regards only needs to be partial. When
it comes to
artworlds, however, the resemblance in intended regards must
be substantial.
Only then will it be revealed as a feature possessed
independently by each
artworld that is essential to its being an artworld.
Is there a kind of regard projected for artworks that is common
to all
artworlds and that is such as to explain how artworlds can be
recognized for
stronger suggestion,
Levinson thinks, holds that the content of the relevant
intentions is the same or
similar between, say, handmade chairs and art sculptures. That
is, not only are
both projected for regards appropriate to predecessors of the
same ilk, but also
the regards invited by handmade chairs include ones
paradigmatic for art
sculptures.
These remarks show how Levinson would attempt to extend his
definition to the case of non-Western art. Probably he would
maintain that at
least some of the regards intended for artworks are common to
all the artworlds
there are and that it is this feature that unifies these artworlds
as of a single
type. In the case of activities that are marginal to art-making
ones, the
resemblance in intended regards only needs to be partial. When
it comes to
artworlds, however, the resemblance in intended regards must
be substantial.
Only then will it be revealed as a feature possessed
independently by each
artworld that is essential to its being an artworld.
Is there a kind of regard projected for artworks that is common
to all
artworlds and that is such as to explain how artworlds can be
recognized for
what they are? In effect, this is what I aimed to establish
earlier in this chapter.
The discussion with which I began provides the key element
missing from
definitions, such as Levinson’s, that are artworld-relative but
which do not
explain what it is that allows us to identify the many artworlds
there are.
Initially if not always, artworks in all cultures are projected for
aesthetic regard
—that is, for consideration of the aesthetic achievements they
are created to
display, where these effects concern the whole and are essential
to the function
the article is designed to serve. This is to say, there is a
historically primary
regard for which at least some artworks in all artworlds are
intended. And this
is such a striking feature of art making, viewed across the
spread of human
cultures, that it explains how we can perceive all cultures as art-
making ones
and, hence, as having artworlds.
PHL317-001—PHILOSOPHY OF ART
ASSIGNMENT #2
Instructions: · Answer one question. Concentrate on a providing
clear and complete answer to the question. Don’t worry about
writing an engaging or literary introduction. Just get right to the
point. It is important to answer every part of each question;
each question should be thought of as leading the essay writer
step-by-step through the writing of a satisfactory essay. Note
that, because of the relations among the parts of each question,
it may be difficult or impossible at times to answer a later part
earlier in this chapter.
The discussion with which I began provides the key element
missing from
definitions, such as Levinson’s, that are artworld-relative but
which do not
explain what it is that allows us to identify the many artworlds
there are.
Initially if not always, artworks in all cultures are projected for
aesthetic regard
—that is, for consideration of the aesthetic achievements they
are created to
display, where these effects concern the whole and are essential
to the function
the article is designed to serve. This is to say, there is a
historically primary
regard for which at least some artworks in all artworlds are
intended. And this
is such a striking feature of art making, viewed across the
spread of human
cultures, that it explains how we can perceive all cultures as art-
making ones
and, hence, as having artworlds.
PHL317-001—PHILOSOPHY OF ART
ASSIGNMENT #2
Instructions: · Answer one question. Concentrate on a providing
clear and complete answer to the question. Don’t worry about
writing an engaging or literary introduction. Just get right to the
point. It is important to answer every part of each question;
each question should be thought of as leading the essay writer
step-by-step through the writing of a satisfactory essay. Note
that, because of the relations among the parts of each question,
it may be difficult or impossible at times to answer a later part
of a question adequately without having accurately answered an
earlier part of that question. · The reasoned evaluation in the
final part of your essay is not expected to be comprehensive or
all-inclusive; it is sufficient either (i) to press one or two clear
and relevant objections to the philosopher’s position or
argument(s), (ii) to defend the philosopher’s position or
argument against one or two clear and relevant objections, or
(iii) to propose a clear and relevant additional argument for or
against the philosopher’s position.
· Please defend your interpretation of a thinker by citing
passages that support it. But don’t quote passage after passage.
Instead, put the thinker’s points into your own words and
indicate the page on which he or she makes them.· There is no
specific length requirement, just concentrate on providing a
clear and complete answer to the question. Around 2 pages
would be certainly sufficient. · Grading is based on the
accuracy, completeness, and philosophical acuity of the essay
considered as a response to the question posed.· Answers must
be typed and double-spaced. Answers must also be typed in a
normal sized font (12 x Times New Roman is usually a good
size), and in an acceptable format. Leave margins of your essay
at the top, bottom, left and right sides of each and every page.
One-inch margins all around the page are standard. Separate
cover sheets are unnecessary. · Please keep a copy of your
answer as insurance against loss.
· Your answer must be your own work. You must take care not
to incorporate others’ ideas without explicit acknowledgment. If
you draw on any external sources, you should do both of the
following. First, provide, at the end of your essay or in a
footnote, a full bibliographic entry for the source (including the
author’s name, the title, the journal, book or other location in
which it was published, the year of publication, and the
beginning and ending page numbers). Second, every time your
ideas rely on that source, credit the additional reading by giving
the author’s last name, the year of publication, and the page
number in parentheses. Please note that any material taken from
earlier part of that question. · The reasoned evaluation in the
final part of your essay is not expected to be comprehensive or
all-inclusive; it is sufficient either (i) to press one or two clear
and relevant objections to the philosopher’s position or
argument(s), (ii) to defend the philosopher’s position or
argument against one or two clear and relevant objections, or
(iii) to propose a clear and relevant additional argument for or
against the philosopher’s position.
· Please defend your interpretation of a thinker by citing
passages that support it. But don’t quote passage after passage.
Instead, put the thinker’s points into your own words and
indicate the page on which he or she makes them.· There is no
specific length requirement, just concentrate on providing a
clear and complete answer to the question. Around 2 pages
would be certainly sufficient. · Grading is based on the
accuracy, completeness, and philosophical acuity of the essay
considered as a response to the question posed.· Answers must
be typed and double-spaced. Answers must also be typed in a
normal sized font (12 x Times New Roman is usually a good
size), and in an acceptable format. Leave margins of your essay
at the top, bottom, left and right sides of each and every page.
One-inch margins all around the page are standard. Separate
cover sheets are unnecessary. · Please keep a copy of your
answer as insurance against loss.
· Your answer must be your own work. You must take care not
to incorporate others’ ideas without explicit acknowledgment. If
you draw on any external sources, you should do both of the
following. First, provide, at the end of your essay or in a
footnote, a full bibliographic entry for the source (including the
author’s name, the title, the journal, book or other location in
which it was published, the year of publication, and the
beginning and ending page numbers). Second, every time your
ideas rely on that source, credit the additional reading by giving
the author’s last name, the year of publication, and the page
number in parentheses. Please note that any material taken from
the writings of another person must be placed in quotation
marks, with the source explicitly cited.
· Your answer is to be handed in D2L by Friday, August 2nd by
11:00p.m.
1. In 1971 Nochlin famously posed the question, ‘why have
there been no great women artists?’ Explain at least one
possible answer to the question that Nochlin rejects and why
she rejects it, and her own preferred answer to the question. In
the final part of your answer provide a reasoned evaluation of
some aspect of Nochlin’s take on the role of women in art.
2. Explain the two major trends in feminist art that Korsmeyer
identifies. How do these trends challenge traditional
conceptions of art according to Korsmeyer? In the final part of
your answer provide a reasoned evaluation of some aspect of
Korsmeyer’s take on the impact of feminism on art.
3. Compare and contrast Nochlin and Korsmeyer’s approaches
to gender and art. Explain the authors’ key points and comment
on where they seem to agree or disagree. In the final part of
your answer provide a reasoned evaluation of Nochlin and
Korsmeyer on the relation between feminism and art.
4. Describe Wingo’s encounter with the ceremonial African
mask in the Western museum and explain the role of art in
African culture. In the final part of your answer, provide a
reasoned evaluation of some aspect of Wingo’s contribution to
the philosophy of art.
5. Explain Davies ‘arguments against the view that non-Western
societies have no concept of art and his own positive concept of
art that includes non-Western art. In the final part of your
answer, provide a reasoned evaluation of some aspect of
marks, with the source explicitly cited.
· Your answer is to be handed in D2L by Friday, August 2nd by
11:00p.m.
1. In 1971 Nochlin famously posed the question, ‘why have
there been no great women artists?’ Explain at least one
possible answer to the question that Nochlin rejects and why
she rejects it, and her own preferred answer to the question. In
the final part of your answer provide a reasoned evaluation of
some aspect of Nochlin’s take on the role of women in art.
2. Explain the two major trends in feminist art that Korsmeyer
identifies. How do these trends challenge traditional
conceptions of art according to Korsmeyer? In the final part of
your answer provide a reasoned evaluation of some aspect of
Korsmeyer’s take on the impact of feminism on art.
3. Compare and contrast Nochlin and Korsmeyer’s approaches
to gender and art. Explain the authors’ key points and comment
on where they seem to agree or disagree. In the final part of
your answer provide a reasoned evaluation of Nochlin and
Korsmeyer on the relation between feminism and art.
4. Describe Wingo’s encounter with the ceremonial African
mask in the Western museum and explain the role of art in
African culture. In the final part of your answer, provide a
reasoned evaluation of some aspect of Wingo’s contribution to
the philosophy of art.
5. Explain Davies ‘arguments against the view that non-Western
societies have no concept of art and his own positive concept of
art that includes non-Western art. In the final part of your
answer, provide a reasoned evaluation of some aspect of
Davies’s approach to non-Western art.
2
2
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