Seminar(Spad) 08-11-18 - FINAL.ppt

Signal passing at Danger

1. SPAD
dkj.k
,oa
fuokj.k
ELTC/TATADt:08.11.2018

2. TIGER
LURKS
ON YOU
BEHIND
THE
RED SIGNAL

3. LP&ALPshallresponsible
foralargenumberofcasesof
SignalPassingAtDanger(SPAD)
andifaenginecrewovershootthe
signal,theirownlivesareatstake.
Hence theprocedureof
avoidingsuchaccidentsmustbe
initiatedbytheenginecrew
themselves.

4. Therefore we should find out the root
causes of the SPAD, and chalk out an
action plan to ignite each and every
mind of loco pilot to avoid SPAD
cases.

5. SPAD cases Since 2015 to 2018
Total No. of cases -155
KR

6. In the year 2018-19
up to 26/09/2018
Total Cases: 39.
It is 26% more to
same period of
previous year.
Ref:
Rly. boards letter No.2018/Elect(TRS)/113/Safety Misc.
Dated: 04.10.2018.

7. Reason for SPAD

8. SPAD
ds
dkj.k

9. Absence ofmind&Lackof
alertness.
Takingsedative,narcotic&
stimulantdrugs.
Sociopsychofactor&Fatigue,
whichinducesmicrosleepand
blankingofmind.
Useofmobilephoneonrun.
Packingofbagandbaggage
beforethehalt.

10. Poorvisibilityofsignal.
Blankingofsignal.
Sudden putback/failureof
signal.
Misreadingofsignalaspect.
Habitofpresumption without
actualobservationofsignal.
Failtocallouttheaspectofthe
signalsbyALP/LP.

11. Overconfidence.
Habittorunthetrainatexcessive
speed.
The errorofjudgment in
assessingthebrakingdistance
atthespeedofthetrain.
FailureofBrakeequipments.
Inadequatebrakepower.

12. Improperknowledge ofsafety
rule&L/R.
Ignoringofinstructionofthe
cautionorder.
Adoptionofshortcutmethod.
MisuseofVHFsetforsignal
aspect.

13. Let us
see
throug
h some

14. CASE NO-1
LP failed to
ensure brake
continuity test
before starting.

15. DNLine-3
RKSN
Starter
On Dt: 02.05.2008, BCN/RXL was stabled
at RKSN on L-3.
Gd & LP conducted GDR check.
The Brake power was as per check
memo 97%. After taking of signal, train
left RKSN at 13.05Hrs

16. Train passed AS-38,AS-36 & GSA-34
at One Yellow.
Noticing AS-32 at Danger, LP tried to
control the train but failed & overshoot
AS-32 at about 13.28 Hrs.
A
AAA
AS
38
GSA
34
AS
36
AS
32
RKSN MMV

17. MMV
Home
Resulting BCN/RXL collided in rear of
NSL/BURN which was standing at
Out side of MMV Home signal as it was
Danger.
A
Km. No.
285/22-18
The accident took place due to total loss
of brake power caused by discontinuity
in the brake pipe near to the train engine
and subsequent failure on the part of LP
& Gd in not ensuring brake continuity
test before starting

18. 1) Yes, the accident could have been
averted if the LP/ALP & Gd of
BCN/RXL, had checked brake
continuity before starting, they could
have detected the discontinuity in the
brake system and rectified it.
2) If the LP had been vigilant enough to
do the brake feel test immediately
after starting.
Could the accident
have been averted ?

19. 1)Perform GDR check properly and
ensure prescribed brake power during
clearing of stable load with invalid
BPC.
2) Before starting do the brake
continuity test.
3) The LP of a train shall invariably test
the adequacy of brake power of his
train at the start of his journey, before
hitting continuous down gradient.
Lesson learnt:-

20. CASE NO-2
Improper
Knowledge of
Safety Rules.

21. A
Issued
Caution Order
to LP
On dt.3.4.2013, PUI-DURG Exp stopped at
MCS at 20.03Hrs.On duty Dy.SS. issued a
sectional caution order stating
“you will passAS-8 and AS-10
at danger aspect”.

22. A
18425 Exp
After taking OFF the signal train left
MANCHESWAR
and proceeded towards
BARANG

23. AA A
A A
AA
MCS Adv.
starter
BRAG
Home
AS 2
GSA
4
GSA
6
AS
8
AS
10
GSA
12
Signaling arrangement in between
MANCHESWAR & BARANG
Double line Automatic block system
DNLine

24. A A
AS
8
AS
10
Train no DN TLHR BOBRN (E) started
at 20.12Hrs after following the rule
passing Auto signal at ON

25. Km.
No.
423/32
A
AS
8
Train No.18425 Exp while proceeding
to wards BRAG, passed AS -8 at
Danger and while on run between
AS-8 & AS-10the train dashed at a
speed of 41Kmph with B/V of
TLHR/BOBRN(E) at about 20.15 Hrs.

26. Could the accident
have been averted ?
1)Yes, the accident could have
been averted had the rules
prescribed in GR & SR 9.02
were followed by the LP and
Gd. Of 18425 Exp.
2) The Dy. SS had not issued the
mislead caution order stating
“you will pass AS-8 & AS-10 at
danger aspect.”

27. Lesson learnt:-
1)Always pass a signal at ON/
Defective with applicable
rule/proper authority.
2) LP & Gd. Read the caution
order carefully and understand
the instructions properly
before starting the train.
3) SM should not issue mislead
caution order to LP & Gd.

28. CASE NO-3
Over confidence
& habit of using
VHF for signal
aspect by
LP/ALP.

29. On 30.6.2011 train no 12073 UP
(Janastabdhi Exp) was programmed to
cross with 18425 Exp. and 58514 Pass.
at GBK. 12073 Exp left CTC at 19.53Hrs
and kept outside Home of GBK for
admitting 18245 Exp. On (R/1) L/Line.

30. 18425 Exp
18425 Exp arrived on R/1 L/line at
19.59Hrs.

31. After taking OFF H/Signal for admitting
Janasatabdhi Exp on M/Line and Starter
was kept Danger as per program, but the
LP without stopping overshoot the
Starter & Adv Starter signal and passed
the station.
The LP & ALP of 12073 Exp have not
given attention to the aspect of signals
and callously gave attention to the VHF
instructions which was not meant for
them and speeded up the train with out
ensuring the aspect of Starter signal.

32. 1) Yes, the accident could have been
averted if the LP & ALP had paid
immediate attention to and obeyed
the signal aspect following the rule
GR 3.78(1),GR 3.81 & GR 3.83.
2) If they were vigilant and cautious.
3) If they were not attentive to the
instructions given on VHF.
4) Gd. Fails to obey GR 4.45.
Could the accident
have been averted ?

33. 1)The LP shall pay immediate attention
to and obey every signal whether the
cause of the signal being shown is
known to him or not.
2) ALP shall callout the aspect of signal
sighted by him to LP who after
checking the aspect himself, shall
repeat the same.
Lesson learnt:-

34. 3) VHF sets should not be used for
communicating the aspect & as an
alternative to written authority
to proceed, authority to pass a signal
at dangeretc.
4) The Gd. Should attract the attention
of LP when he sees reason to
apprehend danger or consider it is
necessary for any reason to stop the
train.

35. CASE NO-4
Improper LR
about position of
Signals & failed
to call out the
signal aspect.

36. DNLine-2
DNLine-1
RNG
Starter
On dt:19.12.2012 train No. DN/HDCG
was standing on DN line-2 at starter
signal of RNG from 00.30Hrs

37. RNG
Home
DNLine-2
DNLine-1
Train no. DN/BTPC stopped at
DN line-2 Home Signal at 00.44Hrs
As the signal was danger.

38. DNLine-2
DNLine-1
RNG
Home
LP of DN/BTPC started the train
without authority to proceed at about
1.12Hrs. from DN line-2 Home signal
by possible misreading the aspect of
Home signal of DN line-1, which was
taken OFF for MEMU(E) and bumped
with B/V of DN/HDCG

39. Yes, the accident could have
been averted if the LP/ALP of
DN/BTPC identify & call out the
aspect of signal to each other
after checking the aspect of the
signal pertaining to them .
Could the accident
have been averted ?

40. Lesson learnt:-
1)The LP of a train shall not pass a
Home signal at ON or defective
unless he is either authorized by a
written authority/ Calling ON
signal/ authorized by signal post
telephone along with proceed
hand signal where required.
2)The LP shall not however trust
entirely to signal but always be
vigilant and cautious.

41. CASE NO-5
Over look of
Signal aspect
by LP.

42. Loco Pilot passed
Starter Signal at Danger
Date & Time of accident:-31.10.2014
at 2.48 Hrs
Division:-DHN
Station:-GOMO
Train No.:-12282 NDLS -BBS
(Duronto Express)

43. At about 2.48 Hrs. 12282 Duronto Exp
admitted on PF No. 1 (C/L). Starter No. S-144
was taken ‘OFF’, but Intermediate Starter
No. S-114 was at ‘ON’. LP of 12282 instead of
stopping at Intermediate Starter,
passed at ‘ON’ position and
entered in Dead End.
PF-1 C/Loop
S-144 S-114

44. Resent Burning case
at BUL Station
CASE NO-6

45. BHALULATA

On date:20/08/2018, Tr. No. 12129 passed
BUL H/S ‘one yellow’ and failed to stop at
Starter signal resulting passed Starter &
Advance starter in Danger.

46. Cause of the accident
The LP & ALP presumed
the aspect of starter
signal as proceed
noticing the Green hand
Signal of Station TP.

47. ROLE OF ENGINE
CREW

48. Takeproperrestathomeandoutstation
&Keepyourselfhealthyandactive.
Don’ttakesedative,narcoticand
stimulantdrugs.
Engine crew should acquainted
themselvestothetopographyand
terrainandlocationofsignalsofsection
properly.
Gothroughthecurrentcircularsduring
signingon.

49. Beforestartingoftrainreadcaution
ordercarefullyandobserveit
meticulously.
EnsurethattheEngineisingood
workingcondition,thebraking
apparatusisinefficientandeffective
workingconditionbeforeleavingthe
shed.
PerformGDRcheckproperly.

50. Beforestartingthetrainsatisfyyourself
thatallcorrectfixedsignalsaregiven
andwherenecessaryhandsignalare
givenandlineisclearofvisible
obstructionandguardhasgivensignal
tostart.
Callouteachandeverysignalaspect
clearlyandloudlybyeachotherpointing
outwithfinger.
Don’tfailtoexchangehandsignalswith
theStationandCabinstaff.

51. Keepasharplookoutforeachsignal.
Don’ttakeoffyourmindandeyeswhile
approachingthesignal&Stayalertwhen
driving.
Dotheairpressurecontinuitytest
wheneverrequired.
Dothebrakefeeltesttocheckthe
adequacyofbrakepoweratfirst
opportunity&alwaysobeyauthorized
speedlimit.

52. Alwaysusefront/leadingcabdriving
duringshunting.
Don’tentirelytrustonsignalbutbe
vigilantandcautious.
Alwaystrytokeepthetrainunderyour
controlwhenevertheviewofsignalis
obstructedduetofog,stormorany
otherreason.
Bemorevigilantandcautiousduring
abnormalworking.

53. Donotdiscusspersonalproblem/un-
necessarytalkduringtrainoperation.
Don’tusemobilephoneonrunanddo
notuse VHFsetforgettingany
authorityortogetanyinformationabout
signalaspectduringfootplateduty.
Defectivesignalsshouldidentifiedin
timeandpassitasperprescribedrules.

54. Don’tpresumethatthetrainwillrun
throughbecausedailyitispassing
through&reducethespeed
proportionatelyincasesignalaspectis
restrictiveanddonotpresumeaspect
of
nextsignal.
Donotdivertyourattentionfromsignal
ifanytroubleoccurredinlocoandits
troubleshooting.
Securetheloadproperlyinmidsection
andatstationtoavoidrollingdown
whenandwhererequired.

55. Stopthetrainatadequatedistance
beforefootofsignalwhenthesameisat
‘ON’,soastohaveclearviewofsignal
fromcab,subjecttoclearingoffouling
mark.
SafetydevicelikeVCD,AWSetc.should
notbeisolatedonline,whichare
otherwiseinworkingorder.
ALPShouldapplyemergencybrakeby
D-1/RSvalvequicklyincaseLPisnot
vigilantornotreactingaccordingto
signalaspect.

56. Bring MP to ‘0’ before applying A-9or
SA-9.
Regarding abnormality about signal
enter in Signal defective register.

57. NO SAFETY
KNOW PAIN
KNOW SAFETY
NO PAIN

58. Sec : TATA TO CKP
Running time for super first train : 53 min.
Total Stations : 06
Total Signals : 50
Neutral sections : 04 (16 Boards)
Manned Level crossing : 08
Un Manned Level Crossing : 22
Permanent speed Restrictions: 02 (08boards)
Temporary Speed Restrictions: 04 (16boards)
---(On date 11/10)
Grand total : 114

59. Alone, we can do so
little,
Together, we can do so
BOX NSER
17128