retreat. This was done with ease, for Del Parque had not brought
over his two intact divisions, preferring to use them as a second line
behind which the others could retire. Alba was stormed, and two
guns, which had been placed behind a barricade at its main exit,
were taken by the French.
Here the fighting stopped: the Spaniards had lost five flags, nine
guns, most of their baggage, and about 3,000 killed or taken—no
very ruinous deductions from an army of 32,000 men. The French
casualties were less than 300 in all
[105]
. Del Parque was determined
not to fight again next morning, and bade his army make off under
cover of the night. The disorder that followed was frightful: the three
divisions that had been in the battle dispersed, and went off in all
directions, some towards Ciudad Rodrigo, others towards Tamames,
others by the hill-road that leads towards Tala and the Pass of
Baños. Many of the raw Leonese troops, though they had not been
engaged, also left their colours in the dark
[106]
. It was a full month
before Del Parque could collect his whole army, which, when it had
been reorganized, was found to number 26,000 men, despite all its
misfortunes. It would seem, therefore, that beside the losses in the
battle some 3,000 men must have gone off to their homes. The duke
fixed his head quarters at San Martin de Trebejos in the Sierra de
Gata, and dispersed his infantry in cantonments about Bejar,
Fuenteguinaldo, and Miranda de Castanar. Having only the ruined
region around Coria and Plasencia, and the small district about
Ciudad Rodrigo, to feed them, these troops suffered dreadful
privations during the winter, living on half-rations eked out with
edible acorns. By the middle of January they had lost 9,000 men
from fever, dysentery, and starvation.
Despite all this, it is fair to say that Del Parque’s campaign
contrasts most favourably with that of Areizaga. He showed a
laudable prudence when he twice evacuated Salamanca rather than
fight a battle in the plain. His victory of Tamames was most
creditable, showing that when prudently conducted, and ranged in a
well-chosen hill-position, his army could give a good account of
itself. But for the disaster of Alba de Tormes his record might be