The Intersection between Competition and Data Privacy – COLANGELO – June 2024 OECD discussion

This presentation by Professor Giuseppe Colangelo, Jean Monnet Professor of European Innovation Policy, was made during the discussion “The Intersection between Competition and Data Privacy” held at the 143rd meeting of the OECD Competition Committee on 13 June 2024. More papers and presentations on the topic can be found at oe.cd/ibcdp.

This presentation was uploaded with the author’s consent.

1. THEPRIVACY/ANTITRUSTCURSE:
INSIGHTSFROMEU C OMPETITIONLAWPROCEEDINGS
Giuseppe Colangelo
sites.google.com/site/giuseppecolangelouni/
OECD Roundtable, 13 June 2024

2. Background and researchquestion
Integrationistperspective:unitymakesstrength(theemergenceof
businessmodelsinvolvingthecollectionandcommercialuseof
personaldatadeterminesaninevitableinterconnectionbetween
marketpoweranddataprotection)
Separatistperspective:differentinterests,objectives,andtools
•Testingthenarrativewhichdescribestherelationshipintermsof
synergyandcomplementarity:howdataprotectionrulesand
principleshavebeenappliedinantitrustproceedingsbythe
EuropeanCommissionandnationalcompetitionauthorities
•Fromtheprivacyoffencetotheprivacydefense: howcanthe
increasingconflictsbetweentheinterestsprotectedandthegoals
pursuedbydataprotectionandcompetitionlawberesolved?
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3. Privacy as an antitrust sword against data
accumulation strategies
Privacy harm as an antitrust abuse
•The German Facebookcase: the users’ privacy exploitation claim
•DMA:rivals’exclusionandprimacyofdataprotectioninterestsover
competitionpolicygoals
•NewSection19aGWBandtheGermanGooglecase
Privacyharminmergeranalysis:theCommission’sseparatiststance
•Google/DoubleClick
•Facebook/WhatsApp
•Microsoft/LinkedIn
•Apple/Shazam
•Google/Fitbit
•Microsoft/Nuance
•Meta/Kustomer
•DeutscheTelekom,Orange,TelefónicaandVodafoneJV
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4. Privacy as a shield against antitrust allegations
Therisksofregulatorygaming
Privacyasabusinessjustificationforanticompetitiveconduct:
privacyprotectionv.discrimination
•Apple’sATTpolicy
•Google’s Privacy Sandbox
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5. The missingintegratedapproach
Themuch-invokedintegratedapproachismoreproclaimedthan
adoptedinpractice
GermanFacebookasanisolatedcase
Comminglingdataprotectionandcompetitionlawmaybe
counterproductive:FacebookandAppleATTcasesastwofacesofthe
samecoin
FrenchandItalianepisodesofAppleATT: invokingthecooperation
betweenauthoritiesrisksbecomingarhetoricaldeception,unfitto
solvetensions;thedifferentgoalspursuedunderantitrustandprivacy
provisionsmaybeirreconcilableinpractice
DMA:privacyexceptionandcompetitionpolicydeferencetoprivacy
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6. The CJEU’ s Metajudgement
•Conductrelatingtodataprocessingmaybreachcompetitionrulesevenifit
complieswiththeGDPR;conversely,unlawfulconductundertheGDPR
doesnotautomaticallymeanthatitbreachescompetitionrules
•Assessingthepotentialuseofmeansotherthanthosewhichcomewithinthe
scopeofcompetitiononthemeritsrequirestotakeaccountofthe
circumstancesofthecase,therelevantlegalandeconomiccontext
•AGRantos: distinguishingthehypothesisinwhichanantitrustauthority,
whenprosecutingabreachofcompetitionprovisions,rules“primarily”onan
infringementoftheGDPR,fromthecaseinwhichsuchanevaluationis
merely“incidental”
•Cooperationbetweenauthorities: theetiquette
•Theexistenceofadominantpositionalonecannot,inprinciple,renderthe
consentinvalid:case-by-caseanalysis
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7. Compellingprinciples,however…
Ascompetitionauthoritieshavesignificantleewayinframingtheir
investigations,inpracticeitwillbeextremelydifficulttodemonstratethat
theyareprimarily,ratherthanincidentally,tacklingadataprotection
breach
Thejudgementexaminesonlythescenarioinwhichaninfringementofthe
GDPRmayoccur,whilenotbeingusefulinunravelingthedifferent
situationinwhichtheadoptionofaprivacy-enhancingsolutionisinvoked
asajustificationforanticompetitiveconduct
oInthelattercase,thecooperationbetweencompetitionanddata
protectionauthoritiescouldheraldnewissuesandconflicts,ratherthan
beingthepanaceaforallproblems
oWillthejudgementpromotealivelyandlovelycooperationbetween
authoritiesorfueltheirrivalry?SeetheItalianTelepasscase
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8. Concludingremarks
Thefallacyofasynergisticnarrative
•Theintegratedapproachismoreproclaimedthanadoptedinpractice
•Merelyinvokingaconvergenceofultimateaimswillnotdevisea
pragmaticsolution
•Dataprotectionhasbeenprogressivelytransformedfromaweaponused
byantitrustauthoritiestolimitdataaccumulationtoashieldexploitedby
digitalplatformstojustifyanticompetitivestrategy
•Thecooperationwithdataprotectionregulatorswouldensureacoherent
anduniforminterpretationandapplicationofGDPRprovisions,butit
willnothelptostrikethebalancebetweenprivacybenefitsand
anticompetitiverestrictions
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9. References
•Theprivacy/antitrustcurse: insightsfromGDPRapplicationin
competitionlawproceedings, ICLEWorkingPaper2024,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4599974
•Antitrustüberalles.WhithercompetitionlawafterFacebook?World
CompetitionLawandEconomicsReview,2019, 42(3),355
•DataAccumulationandthePrivacy-AntitrustInterface: Insightsfrom
theFacebookcase,InternationalDataPrivacyLaw,2018, 8(3),224
•DataProtectioninAttentionMarkets: ProtectingPrivacyThrough
Competition?JournalofEuropeanCompetitionLawandPractice,
2017, 8(6),363
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