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About This Presentation
The Kennedy Doctrine of Flexible Response
Flexible Response
Flexible response was a defensestrategy implemented by John F. Kennedy in 1961 to address his administration's skepticism of Dwight Eisenhower's New Look policy of massive retaliation. Flexible response called for mutual deterr...
Slide Content
The Kennedy Doctrine of Flexible Response
Flexible Response
Flexible response was a defensestrategy implemented by John F.
Kennedy in 1961 to address his administration's skepticism of
Dwight Eisenhower's New Look policy of massive retaliation.
Flexible response called for mutual deterrence at strategic,
tactical and conventional levels, giving the United States the
capability to respond to aggression across the spectrum of
warfare, not limited only to nuclear arms.
History
The New Look policy, though initially useful, quickly became
obsolete with the introduction of inter-continental delivery
systems that undermined the credibility of a deterrence threat.
The cornerstone of U.S. and European defense strategy was then
threatened as the U.S. could no longer rely on nuclear threats to
provide security for it and its allies.
John F. Kennedy won the presidency by claiming that the
Republican party had allowed the U.S. to fall behind the Soviets
into a missile gap. Upon entering office Kennedy cited General
Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet to Congress for
its conclusion that massive retaliation left the U.S. with only
two choices: defeat on the ground or the resort to the use of
nuclear weapons. Technology had improved since massive
retaliation was adopted. Improvements in communication and
transportation meant U.S. forces could be deployed more
effectively, quickly, and flexibly than before. Advisers
persuaded Kennedy that having multiple options would allow
the president to apply the appropriate amount of force at the
right place without risking escalation or losing alternatives.
Flexible Response
Flexible response was a defensestrategy implemented by John F.
Kennedy in 1961 to address his administration's skepticism of
Dwight Eisenhower's New Look policy of massive retaliation.
Flexible response called for mutual deterrence at strategic,
tactical and conventional levels, giving the United States the
capability to respond to aggression across the spectrum of
warfare, not limited only to nuclear arms.
History
The New Look policy, though initially useful, quickly became
obsolete with the introduction of inter-continental delivery
systems that undermined the credibility of a deterrence threat.
The cornerstone of U.S. and European defense strategy was then
threatened as the U.S. could no longer rely on nuclear threats to
provide security for it and its allies.
John F. Kennedy won the presidency by claiming that the
Republican party had allowed the U.S. to fall behind the Soviets
into a missile gap. Upon entering office Kennedy cited General
Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet to Congress for
its conclusion that massive retaliation left the U.S. with only
two choices: defeat on the ground or the resort to the use of
nuclear weapons. Technology had improved since massive
retaliation was adopted. Improvements in communication and
transportation meant U.S. forces could be deployed more
effectively, quickly, and flexibly than before. Advisers
persuaded Kennedy that having multiple options would allow
the president to apply the appropriate amount of force at the
right place without risking escalation or losing alternatives.
This would improve credibility for deterrence as the U.S. would
now have low-intensity options and therefore would be more
likely to use them, rather than massive retaliation's all-or-
nothing options.
Flexible response was implemented to develop several options
across the spectrum of warfare, other than the nuclear option,
for quickly dealing with enemy aggression. In addition, the
survivability of the retaliatory capability was stressed, leading
to the diversification of the strategic force, development of the
strategic triad and half the Strategic Air Command force being
put on permanent alert status.
The Kennedy Doctrine did not include the ability to fight
nuclear wars because of the idea that it would undermine
deterrence, was technologically unworkable, would fuel the
arms race, and was not politically feasible. Importance was
also placed on counterinsurgency and the development of
unconventional military forces, unconventional tactics and
“civic action” programs.
Types of Flexible Response
There are four different avenues of response: informational,
diplomatic, economic, and military. Informational responses
are designed to both increase the awareness of the problem and
to gain support for potential conflict from both the public and
Congress. Diplomatic responses are centered on strengthening
international support for the issue and possibly withdrawing
embassy staff from the region to ensure their safety. Examples
of economic responses include imposing sanctions on the
offending country, embargoing their trade goods, and the
cancellation of any funding that the country may be receiving.
Finally, there is the multitude of military responses available,
ranging from increasing troop preparation and stationing them
in the target area all the way up to launch a limited nuclear
strike. Together, these options allow the president to decide
now have low-intensity options and therefore would be more
likely to use them, rather than massive retaliation's all-or-
nothing options.
Flexible response was implemented to develop several options
across the spectrum of warfare, other than the nuclear option,
for quickly dealing with enemy aggression. In addition, the
survivability of the retaliatory capability was stressed, leading
to the diversification of the strategic force, development of the
strategic triad and half the Strategic Air Command force being
put on permanent alert status.
The Kennedy Doctrine did not include the ability to fight
nuclear wars because of the idea that it would undermine
deterrence, was technologically unworkable, would fuel the
arms race, and was not politically feasible. Importance was
also placed on counterinsurgency and the development of
unconventional military forces, unconventional tactics and
“civic action” programs.
Types of Flexible Response
There are four different avenues of response: informational,
diplomatic, economic, and military. Informational responses
are designed to both increase the awareness of the problem and
to gain support for potential conflict from both the public and
Congress. Diplomatic responses are centered on strengthening
international support for the issue and possibly withdrawing
embassy staff from the region to ensure their safety. Examples
of economic responses include imposing sanctions on the
offending country, embargoing their trade goods, and the
cancellation of any funding that the country may be receiving.
Finally, there is the multitude of military responses available,
ranging from increasing troop preparation and stationing them
in the target area all the way up to launch a limited nuclear
strike. Together, these options allow the president to decide
what level of commitment is warranted in any given situation
and react accordingly without having to resort straight to threats
of nuclear annihilation.
Stages of Flexible Response
A staged plan was devised to counter any Soviet military action
other than a first strike consisting of three stages:
(1) Direct defense: In case of a conventional Soviet attack
(meaning non-nuclear or this would be considered a first strike)
initial efforts would be to try and stop the Soviet advance with
conventional weapons. This meant that the foreseen Soviet
attack on West-Germany would be tried to be forced to a halt by
NATO's European forces, Allied Command Europe.
(2) Deliberate Escalation: This phase would be entered when
conventional NATO forces were succumbing under the Soviet
attack. This was actually expected as intelligence indicated
Soviet divisions outnumbered NATO divisions by far. In this
phase NATO forces would switch to a limited use of nuclear
weapons, such as recently developed tactical nuclear weapons
(like nuclear artillery).
(3) General Nuclear Response: This was the last phase or stage
which more or less corresponded to the mutual assured
destruction scenario, meaning the total nuclear attack on the
Communist world. If the Soviets had not already done so, this
would make them switch to all-out attack as well.
Development of the Strategic Triad
By 1960, the United States had three means of strategic forces:
ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. This triad made it
possible for the United States to impose unacceptable damage to
the Soviet Union with one strategic force independent of the
other two forces. These different forces had their advantages
and disadvantages. Bombers could deliver large payloads and
strike with great accuracy, but were slow, vulnerable while on
and react accordingly without having to resort straight to threats
of nuclear annihilation.
Stages of Flexible Response
A staged plan was devised to counter any Soviet military action
other than a first strike consisting of three stages:
(1) Direct defense: In case of a conventional Soviet attack
(meaning non-nuclear or this would be considered a first strike)
initial efforts would be to try and stop the Soviet advance with
conventional weapons. This meant that the foreseen Soviet
attack on West-Germany would be tried to be forced to a halt by
NATO's European forces, Allied Command Europe.
(2) Deliberate Escalation: This phase would be entered when
conventional NATO forces were succumbing under the Soviet
attack. This was actually expected as intelligence indicated
Soviet divisions outnumbered NATO divisions by far. In this
phase NATO forces would switch to a limited use of nuclear
weapons, such as recently developed tactical nuclear weapons
(like nuclear artillery).
(3) General Nuclear Response: This was the last phase or stage
which more or less corresponded to the mutual assured
destruction scenario, meaning the total nuclear attack on the
Communist world. If the Soviets had not already done so, this
would make them switch to all-out attack as well.
Development of the Strategic Triad
By 1960, the United States had three means of strategic forces:
ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. This triad made it
possible for the United States to impose unacceptable damage to
the Soviet Union with one strategic force independent of the
other two forces. These different forces had their advantages
and disadvantages. Bombers could deliver large payloads and
strike with great accuracy, but were slow, vulnerable while on
the ground, and could be shot down. ICBMs are safe in their
underground silos while on the ground, but were less accurate
than bombers and could not be called back when launched.
Submarines were least vulnerable but were also least accurate
and communication could be poor at times. Each of these forces
provided the United States with different options to tailor their
response to the situation.
The Two-and-a-half War Doctrine
Part of Flexible response was the strategy of being able to fight
over the entire spectrum of violence by developing diverse
forces for different types of warfare. This meant being able to
fight multiple wars simultaneously; specifically, the US should
have the peacetime capability to fight two large regional wars
and a small brushfire war at the same time. The consequence of
this was to increase recruiting, investment and research for the
U.S. force posture.
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
The strategic doctrine for Kennedy’s flexible response was
assured destruction. Flexible response made a second strike
capability its guiding principle of deterrence. In the event of
Soviet nuclear aggression, the Soviets would know that enough
U.S. nuclear capability would survive their strike to destroy
their cities and industry. Robert McNamara argued for the
definition of what was “unacceptable” to the enemy as the
destruction of 50% of industry and 25% of the population.
Deterrence depended on influence to show that violence and
aggression did not pay, and being explicit about the level of
destruction the U.S. was willing to inflict on the enemy was
one way to illustrate this point. Assured destruction relied on
deterrence by punishment, precision and credibility.
No-cities Doctrine
underground silos while on the ground, but were less accurate
than bombers and could not be called back when launched.
Submarines were least vulnerable but were also least accurate
and communication could be poor at times. Each of these forces
provided the United States with different options to tailor their
response to the situation.
The Two-and-a-half War Doctrine
Part of Flexible response was the strategy of being able to fight
over the entire spectrum of violence by developing diverse
forces for different types of warfare. This meant being able to
fight multiple wars simultaneously; specifically, the US should
have the peacetime capability to fight two large regional wars
and a small brushfire war at the same time. The consequence of
this was to increase recruiting, investment and research for the
U.S. force posture.
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
The strategic doctrine for Kennedy’s flexible response was
assured destruction. Flexible response made a second strike
capability its guiding principle of deterrence. In the event of
Soviet nuclear aggression, the Soviets would know that enough
U.S. nuclear capability would survive their strike to destroy
their cities and industry. Robert McNamara argued for the
definition of what was “unacceptable” to the enemy as the
destruction of 50% of industry and 25% of the population.
Deterrence depended on influence to show that violence and
aggression did not pay, and being explicit about the level of
destruction the U.S. was willing to inflict on the enemy was
one way to illustrate this point. Assured destruction relied on
deterrence by punishment, precision and credibility.
No-cities Doctrine
Defense Secretary McNamara sought to limit damage to the
U.S. by developing a separate strategy for offense and defense.
The offensive strategy was one of counterforce, seeking to
destroy Soviet military installations and hardware and thus
disable this hardware before it could be used. In a 1962 speech
to the University of Michigan, McNamara announced that the
U.S. would refrain from striking countervalue targets (cities)
early in nuclear war, reserving such force later in war should
the Soviets not show similar restraint. This would not only
induce the Soviets to spare American cities, but would secure
the United States bargaining advantage by holding hostage
something that the Soviets might want to keep.
The defensive strategy involved developing a system to
intercept incoming Soviet missiles. Bombers could be easily
shot down, but missiles still remained a credible threat. The
United States began developing anti-ballistic missile program,
modifying its Nike missiles to intercept incoming missiles.
Ultimately this program was abandoned by the adoption of the
anti-ballistic missile treaty.
(I) Flexible response
Also called Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), the term flexible
response first appeared in U.S. General Maxwell D. Taylor’s
The Uncertain Trumpet (1960), which sharply criticized U.S.
national security policy. Initially designed to thwart communist
expansion more effectively, the strategy has become a
fundamental principle of American military thinking.
When President Kennedy took office in 1961, he modified
Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation and adopted a stance
of flexible response. This policy included the use of
conventional forces in war and offered alternatives to total
nuclear war. The alternatives consisted of an increase in
conventional weapons systems and introduced the concept of
limited nuclear war. Both President Kennedy and his successor,
Lyndon Johnson, determined that effective military power
U.S. by developing a separate strategy for offense and defense.
The offensive strategy was one of counterforce, seeking to
destroy Soviet military installations and hardware and thus
disable this hardware before it could be used. In a 1962 speech
to the University of Michigan, McNamara announced that the
U.S. would refrain from striking countervalue targets (cities)
early in nuclear war, reserving such force later in war should
the Soviets not show similar restraint. This would not only
induce the Soviets to spare American cities, but would secure
the United States bargaining advantage by holding hostage
something that the Soviets might want to keep.
The defensive strategy involved developing a system to
intercept incoming Soviet missiles. Bombers could be easily
shot down, but missiles still remained a credible threat. The
United States began developing anti-ballistic missile program,
modifying its Nike missiles to intercept incoming missiles.
Ultimately this program was abandoned by the adoption of the
anti-ballistic missile treaty.
(I) Flexible response
Also called Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), the term flexible
response first appeared in U.S. General Maxwell D. Taylor’s
The Uncertain Trumpet (1960), which sharply criticized U.S.
national security policy. Initially designed to thwart communist
expansion more effectively, the strategy has become a
fundamental principle of American military thinking.
When President Kennedy took office in 1961, he modified
Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation and adopted a stance
of flexible response. This policy included the use of
conventional forces in war and offered alternatives to total
nuclear war. The alternatives consisted of an increase in
conventional weapons systems and introduced the concept of
limited nuclear war. Both President Kennedy and his successor,
Lyndon Johnson, determined that effective military power
meant stronger conventional military forces and nuclear options
short of global nuclear war. Flexible response marked a shift
away from the previous policy of massive retaliation. While
Kennedy believed nuclear deterrence remained paramount, he
also understood that limited wars and low intensity conflicts
should be fought with conventional weapons.
The New Look Strategy
Flexible response was an alternative to President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s New Look national security policy. The New
Look approach relied heavily on the capacity for a devastating
assault with nuclear weapons — the strategy of massive
retaliation — to fight Soviet military provocations, regardless
of whether they involved nuclear weapons or not. New Look
was considered inexpensive because the Eisenhower
administration thought it could deter all forms of aggression by
the Soviet Union and China without maintaining large
conventional military forces.
Development of the Flexible Deterrent Options Strategy
By 1960, however, U.S. public opinion was turning against New
Look because it was not effective in stemming communist-
inspired Third World revolutions. Many felt that a new, more-
flexible approach was needed to address such low-level
“brushfire” conflicts. Almost as soon as he moved into the
White House in 1961, President Kennedy instructed his advisers
to begin drafting a new strategy to safeguard the U.S. role in the
world. The new administration strongly believed that the
United States should have a wide variety of military and
nonmilitary responses to communist provocations. Kennedy
presented to Congress an outline of a strategy that would come
to be known as Flexible Deterrent Options in March 1961, and it
was adopted as an official national security policy of the United
States. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted the
strategy in 1967.
short of global nuclear war. Flexible response marked a shift
away from the previous policy of massive retaliation. While
Kennedy believed nuclear deterrence remained paramount, he
also understood that limited wars and low intensity conflicts
should be fought with conventional weapons.
The New Look Strategy
Flexible response was an alternative to President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s New Look national security policy. The New
Look approach relied heavily on the capacity for a devastating
assault with nuclear weapons — the strategy of massive
retaliation — to fight Soviet military provocations, regardless
of whether they involved nuclear weapons or not. New Look
was considered inexpensive because the Eisenhower
administration thought it could deter all forms of aggression by
the Soviet Union and China without maintaining large
conventional military forces.
Development of the Flexible Deterrent Options Strategy
By 1960, however, U.S. public opinion was turning against New
Look because it was not effective in stemming communist-
inspired Third World revolutions. Many felt that a new, more-
flexible approach was needed to address such low-level
“brushfire” conflicts. Almost as soon as he moved into the
White House in 1961, President Kennedy instructed his advisers
to begin drafting a new strategy to safeguard the U.S. role in the
world. The new administration strongly believed that the
United States should have a wide variety of military and
nonmilitary responses to communist provocations. Kennedy
presented to Congress an outline of a strategy that would come
to be known as Flexible Deterrent Options in March 1961, and it
was adopted as an official national security policy of the United
States. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted the
strategy in 1967.
Flexible response gave the president the ability to select from
nonmilitary options, as well as military options, when
responding to a crisis and allowed the United States to meet
each hostile action with a proportional reaction. The lines of
attack included diplomatic measures (such as pursuing strong
relations with potential allies while being ready to withdraw
embassy personnel on short notice), political measures (such as
increasing the dialogue with the press and releasing frequent
public policy statements), economic measures (such as
increasing or canceling American aid to other countries), and,
perhaps most important, military measures (such as modernizing
the U.S. missile fleet, increasing conventional capabilities and
intensifying training for special forces).
The strategy was quite costly, however, because developing and
maintaining sizable conventional and unconventional weapons,
as well as various kinds of military personnel, required
considerable expenditures. During the Cold War, flexible
response contributed to both the avoidance of nuclear conflict
and the proliferation of limited yet vicious military clashes.
The strategy had the effect of increasing the credibility of the
American armed forces, because it could leverage an
appropriate proportional response to different kinds of crises
(which would deter an enemy’s appetite for smaller, limited
wars), while also reassuring allied countries.
Like most Cold War strategies, flexible response yielded mixed
results. Although the combination of diplomacy, economic
sanctions, and a threatening military posture solved some crises,
including the Cuban missile crisis and the 1965 coup d’état in
the Dominican Republic, the same combination failed to bring
about a positive resolution to the Vietnam War. Flexible
response was no highly explicit theory nor written in a single
authoritative source, but it was realistic in that nuclear weapons
couldn't be used. It tried to provide credible means to match
nonmilitary options, as well as military options, when
responding to a crisis and allowed the United States to meet
each hostile action with a proportional reaction. The lines of
attack included diplomatic measures (such as pursuing strong
relations with potential allies while being ready to withdraw
embassy personnel on short notice), political measures (such as
increasing the dialogue with the press and releasing frequent
public policy statements), economic measures (such as
increasing or canceling American aid to other countries), and,
perhaps most important, military measures (such as modernizing
the U.S. missile fleet, increasing conventional capabilities and
intensifying training for special forces).
The strategy was quite costly, however, because developing and
maintaining sizable conventional and unconventional weapons,
as well as various kinds of military personnel, required
considerable expenditures. During the Cold War, flexible
response contributed to both the avoidance of nuclear conflict
and the proliferation of limited yet vicious military clashes.
The strategy had the effect of increasing the credibility of the
American armed forces, because it could leverage an
appropriate proportional response to different kinds of crises
(which would deter an enemy’s appetite for smaller, limited
wars), while also reassuring allied countries.
Like most Cold War strategies, flexible response yielded mixed
results. Although the combination of diplomacy, economic
sanctions, and a threatening military posture solved some crises,
including the Cuban missile crisis and the 1965 coup d’état in
the Dominican Republic, the same combination failed to bring
about a positive resolution to the Vietnam War. Flexible
response was no highly explicit theory nor written in a single
authoritative source, but it was realistic in that nuclear weapons
couldn't be used. It tried to provide credible means to match
non-nuclear escalation. The word "flexible" stressed the value
of having "multiple options" available should a crisis arise.
Having multiple options during a crisis appeared to be better
than reference to a few preset war scenarios. Having multiple
options was thought to enhance the credibility of the U.S.
deterrent (reassuring allies while deterring the opponent).
At the same time, however, flexibility also made it improbable
that the U.S. would want or need to initiate a nuclear attack. In
effect, flexible response called for the continued presence (in
Europe) of sizable conventional forces. Conventional forces
were to serve two functions, a deterrent function and the
function to fight limited wars. The main argument of the
Eisenhower administration had been that conventional forces
were too costly and nuclear weapons would have "more bang for
the buck." Kennedy wanted to deter all wars, general or limited,
nuclear or conventional, large or small. Eisenhower and Dulles
wanted to achieve similar goals but at minimal cost. Their risk
was to either not act at all or respond at all levels of threat
beyond the original provocation. Kennedy disregarded costs and
emphasized sufficient flexibility to avoid either escalation or
humiliation. In particular, Kennedy wanted to increase the
range of available options prior to resort to nuclear war. The
threshold beyond which the President might have to decide to
initiate the use of nuclear weapons had to be raised. Also, the
damage caused by a war with tactical nuclear weapons seemed
too high. Furthermore, Kennedy believed that the European
allies should contribute more to their defense. Moreover, a
continued reliance on nuclear weapons could lead to their
further proliferation. The basic idea of flexible response, then,
was to increase the ability to confine the response to non-
nuclear weapons.
1
of having "multiple options" available should a crisis arise.
Having multiple options during a crisis appeared to be better
than reference to a few preset war scenarios. Having multiple
options was thought to enhance the credibility of the U.S.
deterrent (reassuring allies while deterring the opponent).
At the same time, however, flexibility also made it improbable
that the U.S. would want or need to initiate a nuclear attack. In
effect, flexible response called for the continued presence (in
Europe) of sizable conventional forces. Conventional forces
were to serve two functions, a deterrent function and the
function to fight limited wars. The main argument of the
Eisenhower administration had been that conventional forces
were too costly and nuclear weapons would have "more bang for
the buck." Kennedy wanted to deter all wars, general or limited,
nuclear or conventional, large or small. Eisenhower and Dulles
wanted to achieve similar goals but at minimal cost. Their risk
was to either not act at all or respond at all levels of threat
beyond the original provocation. Kennedy disregarded costs and
emphasized sufficient flexibility to avoid either escalation or
humiliation. In particular, Kennedy wanted to increase the
range of available options prior to resort to nuclear war. The
threshold beyond which the President might have to decide to
initiate the use of nuclear weapons had to be raised. Also, the
damage caused by a war with tactical nuclear weapons seemed
too high. Furthermore, Kennedy believed that the European
allies should contribute more to their defense. Moreover, a
continued reliance on nuclear weapons could lead to their
further proliferation. The basic idea of flexible response, then,
was to increase the ability to confine the response to non-
nuclear weapons.
1
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The Kennedy Doctrine of Flexible Response
Flexible Response
Flexible response was a defensestrategy implemented by John F.
Kennedy in 1961 to address his administration's skepticism of
Dwight Eisenhower's New Look policy of massive retaliation.
Flexible response called for mutual deterrence at strategic,
tactical and conventional levels, giving the United States the
capability to respond to aggression across the spectrum of
warfare, not limited only to nuclear arms.
History
The New Look policy, though initially useful, quickly became
obsolete with the introduction of inter-continental delivery
systems that undermined the credibility of a deterrence threat.
The cornerstone of U.S. and European defense strategy was then
threatened as the U.S. could no longer rely on nuclear threats to
provide security for it and its allies.
John F. Kennedy won the presidency by claiming that the
Republican party had allowed the U.S. to fall behind the Soviets
into a missile gap. Upon entering office Kennedy cited General
Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet to Congress for
its conclusion that massive retaliation left the U.S. with only
two choices: defeat on the ground or the resort to the use of
nuclear weapons. Technology had improved since massive
retaliation was adopted. Improvements in communication and
transportation meant U.S. forces could be deployed more
effectively, quickly, and flexibly than before. Advisers
persuaded Kennedy that having multiple options would allow
the president to apply the appropriate amount of force at the
right place without risking escalation or losing alternatives.
The Kennedy Doctrine of Flexible Response
Flexible Response
Flexible response was a defensestrategy implemented by John F.
Kennedy in 1961 to address his administration's skepticism of
Dwight Eisenhower's New Look policy of massive retaliation.
Flexible response called for mutual deterrence at strategic,
tactical and conventional levels, giving the United States the
capability to respond to aggression across the spectrum of
warfare, not limited only to nuclear arms.
History
The New Look policy, though initially useful, quickly became
obsolete with the introduction of inter-continental delivery
systems that undermined the credibility of a deterrence threat.
The cornerstone of U.S. and European defense strategy was then
threatened as the U.S. could no longer rely on nuclear threats to
provide security for it and its allies.
John F. Kennedy won the presidency by claiming that the
Republican party had allowed the U.S. to fall behind the Soviets
into a missile gap. Upon entering office Kennedy cited General
Maxwell Taylor's book The Uncertain Trumpet to Congress for
its conclusion that massive retaliation left the U.S. with only
two choices: defeat on the ground or the resort to the use of
nuclear weapons. Technology had improved since massive
retaliation was adopted. Improvements in communication and
transportation meant U.S. forces could be deployed more
effectively, quickly, and flexibly than before. Advisers
persuaded Kennedy that having multiple options would allow
the president to apply the appropriate amount of force at the
right place without risking escalation or losing alternatives.
This would improve credibility for deterrence as the U.S. would
now have low-intensity options and therefore would be more
likely to use them, rather than massive retaliation's all-or-
nothing options.
Flexible response was implemented to develop several options
across the spectrum of warfare, other than the nuclear option,
for quickly dealing with enemy aggression. In addition, the
survivability of the retaliatory capability was stressed, leading
to the diversification of the strategic force, development of the
strategic triad and half the Strategic Air Command force being
put on permanent alert status.
The Kennedy Doctrine did not include the ability to fight
nuclear wars because of the idea that it would undermine
deterrence, was technologically unworkable, would fuel the
arms race, and was not politically feasible. Importance was
also placed on counterinsurgency and the development of
unconventional military forces, unconventional tactics and
“civic action” programs.
Types of Flexible Response
There are four different avenues of response: informational,
diplomatic, economic, and military. Informational responses
are designed to both increase the awareness of the problem and
to gain support for potential conflict from both the public and
Congress. Diplomatic responses are centered on strengthening
international support for the issue and possibly withdrawing
embassy staff from the region to ensure their safety. Examples
of economic responses include imposing sanctions on the
offending country, embargoing their trade goods, and the
cancellation of any funding that the country may be receiving.
Finally, there is the multitude of military responses available,
ranging from increasing troop preparation and stationing them
in the target area all the way up to launch a limited nuclear
strike. Together, these options allow the president to decide
now have low-intensity options and therefore would be more
likely to use them, rather than massive retaliation's all-or-
nothing options.
Flexible response was implemented to develop several options
across the spectrum of warfare, other than the nuclear option,
for quickly dealing with enemy aggression. In addition, the
survivability of the retaliatory capability was stressed, leading
to the diversification of the strategic force, development of the
strategic triad and half the Strategic Air Command force being
put on permanent alert status.
The Kennedy Doctrine did not include the ability to fight
nuclear wars because of the idea that it would undermine
deterrence, was technologically unworkable, would fuel the
arms race, and was not politically feasible. Importance was
also placed on counterinsurgency and the development of
unconventional military forces, unconventional tactics and
“civic action” programs.
Types of Flexible Response
There are four different avenues of response: informational,
diplomatic, economic, and military. Informational responses
are designed to both increase the awareness of the problem and
to gain support for potential conflict from both the public and
Congress. Diplomatic responses are centered on strengthening
international support for the issue and possibly withdrawing
embassy staff from the region to ensure their safety. Examples
of economic responses include imposing sanctions on the
offending country, embargoing their trade goods, and the
cancellation of any funding that the country may be receiving.
Finally, there is the multitude of military responses available,
ranging from increasing troop preparation and stationing them
in the target area all the way up to launch a limited nuclear
strike. Together, these options allow the president to decide
what level of commitment is warranted in any given situation
and react accordingly without having to resort straight to threats
of nuclear annihilation.
Stages of Flexible Response
A staged plan was devised to counter any Soviet military action
other than a first strike consisting of three stages:
(1) Direct defense: In case of a conventional Soviet attack
(meaning non-nuclear or this would be considered a first strike)
initial efforts would be to try and stop the Soviet advance with
conventional weapons. This meant that the foreseen Soviet
attack on West-Germany would be tried to be forced to a halt by
NATO's European forces, Allied Command Europe.
(2) Deliberate Escalation: This phase would be entered when
conventional NATO forces were succumbing under the Soviet
attack. This was actually expected as intelligence indicated
Soviet divisions outnumbered NATO divisions by far. In this
phase NATO forces would switch to a limited use of nuclear
weapons, such as recently developed tactical nuclear weapons
(like nuclear artillery).
(3) General Nuclear Response: This was the last phase or stage
which more or less corresponded to the mutual assured
destruction scenario, meaning the total nuclear attack on the
Communist world. If the Soviets had not already done so, this
would make them switch to all-out attack as well.
Development of the Strategic Triad
By 1960, the United States had three means of strategic forces:
ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. This triad made it
possible for the United States to impose unacceptable damage to
the Soviet Union with one strategic force independent of the
other two forces. These different forces had their advantages
and disadvantages. Bombers could deliver large payloads and
strike with great accuracy, but were slow, vulnerable while on
and react accordingly without having to resort straight to threats
of nuclear annihilation.
Stages of Flexible Response
A staged plan was devised to counter any Soviet military action
other than a first strike consisting of three stages:
(1) Direct defense: In case of a conventional Soviet attack
(meaning non-nuclear or this would be considered a first strike)
initial efforts would be to try and stop the Soviet advance with
conventional weapons. This meant that the foreseen Soviet
attack on West-Germany would be tried to be forced to a halt by
NATO's European forces, Allied Command Europe.
(2) Deliberate Escalation: This phase would be entered when
conventional NATO forces were succumbing under the Soviet
attack. This was actually expected as intelligence indicated
Soviet divisions outnumbered NATO divisions by far. In this
phase NATO forces would switch to a limited use of nuclear
weapons, such as recently developed tactical nuclear weapons
(like nuclear artillery).
(3) General Nuclear Response: This was the last phase or stage
which more or less corresponded to the mutual assured
destruction scenario, meaning the total nuclear attack on the
Communist world. If the Soviets had not already done so, this
would make them switch to all-out attack as well.
Development of the Strategic Triad
By 1960, the United States had three means of strategic forces:
ICBMs, SLBMs, and strategic bombers. This triad made it
possible for the United States to impose unacceptable damage to
the Soviet Union with one strategic force independent of the
other two forces. These different forces had their advantages
and disadvantages. Bombers could deliver large payloads and
strike with great accuracy, but were slow, vulnerable while on
the ground, and could be shot down. ICBMs are safe in their
underground silos while on the ground, but were less accurate
than bombers and could not be called back when launched.
Submarines were least vulnerable but were also least accurate
and communication could be poor at times. Each of these forces
provided the United States with different options to tailor their
response to the situation.
The Two-and-a-half War Doctrine
Part of Flexible response was the strategy of being able to fight
over the entire spectrum of violence by developing diverse
forces for different types of warfare. This meant being able to
fight multiple wars simultaneously; specifically, the US should
have the peacetime capability to fight two large regional wars
and a small brushfire war at the same time. The consequence of
this was to increase recruiting, investment and research for the
U.S. force posture.
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
The strategic doctrine for Kennedy’s flexible response was
assured destruction. Flexible response made a second strike
capability its guiding principle of deterrence. In the event of
Soviet nuclear aggression, the Soviets would know that enough
U.S. nuclear capability would survive their strike to destroy
their cities and industry. Robert McNamara argued for the
definition of what was “unacceptable” to the enemy as the
destruction of 50% of industry and 25% of the population.
Deterrence depended on influence to show that violence and
aggression did not pay, and being explicit about the level of
destruction the U.S. was willing to inflict on the enemy was
one way to illustrate this point. Assured destruction relied on
deterrence by punishment, precision and credibility.
No-cities Doctrine
underground silos while on the ground, but were less accurate
than bombers and could not be called back when launched.
Submarines were least vulnerable but were also least accurate
and communication could be poor at times. Each of these forces
provided the United States with different options to tailor their
response to the situation.
The Two-and-a-half War Doctrine
Part of Flexible response was the strategy of being able to fight
over the entire spectrum of violence by developing diverse
forces for different types of warfare. This meant being able to
fight multiple wars simultaneously; specifically, the US should
have the peacetime capability to fight two large regional wars
and a small brushfire war at the same time. The consequence of
this was to increase recruiting, investment and research for the
U.S. force posture.
Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD)
The strategic doctrine for Kennedy’s flexible response was
assured destruction. Flexible response made a second strike
capability its guiding principle of deterrence. In the event of
Soviet nuclear aggression, the Soviets would know that enough
U.S. nuclear capability would survive their strike to destroy
their cities and industry. Robert McNamara argued for the
definition of what was “unacceptable” to the enemy as the
destruction of 50% of industry and 25% of the population.
Deterrence depended on influence to show that violence and
aggression did not pay, and being explicit about the level of
destruction the U.S. was willing to inflict on the enemy was
one way to illustrate this point. Assured destruction relied on
deterrence by punishment, precision and credibility.
No-cities Doctrine
Defense Secretary McNamara sought to limit damage to the
U.S. by developing a separate strategy for offense and defense.
The offensive strategy was one of counterforce, seeking to
destroy Soviet military installations and hardware and thus
disable this hardware before it could be used. In a 1962 speech
to the University of Michigan, McNamara announced that the
U.S. would refrain from striking countervalue targets (cities)
early in nuclear war, reserving such force later in war should
the Soviets not show similar restraint. This would not only
induce the Soviets to spare American cities, but would secure
the United States bargaining advantage by holding hostage
something that the Soviets might want to keep.
The defensive strategy involved developing a system to
intercept incoming Soviet missiles. Bombers could be easily
shot down, but missiles still remained a credible threat. The
United States began developing anti-ballistic missile program,
modifying its Nike missiles to intercept incoming missiles.
Ultimately this program was abandoned by the adoption of the
anti-ballistic missile treaty.
(I) Flexible response
Also called Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), the term flexible
response first appeared in U.S. General Maxwell D. Taylor’s
The Uncertain Trumpet (1960), which sharply criticized U.S.
national security policy. Initially designed to thwart communist
expansion more effectively, the strategy has become a
fundamental principle of American military thinking.
When President Kennedy took office in 1961, he modified
Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation and adopted a stance
of flexible response. This policy included the use of
conventional forces in war and offered alternatives to total
nuclear war. The alternatives consisted of an increase in
conventional weapons systems and introduced the concept of
limited nuclear war. Both President Kennedy and his successor,
Lyndon Johnson, determined that effective military power
U.S. by developing a separate strategy for offense and defense.
The offensive strategy was one of counterforce, seeking to
destroy Soviet military installations and hardware and thus
disable this hardware before it could be used. In a 1962 speech
to the University of Michigan, McNamara announced that the
U.S. would refrain from striking countervalue targets (cities)
early in nuclear war, reserving such force later in war should
the Soviets not show similar restraint. This would not only
induce the Soviets to spare American cities, but would secure
the United States bargaining advantage by holding hostage
something that the Soviets might want to keep.
The defensive strategy involved developing a system to
intercept incoming Soviet missiles. Bombers could be easily
shot down, but missiles still remained a credible threat. The
United States began developing anti-ballistic missile program,
modifying its Nike missiles to intercept incoming missiles.
Ultimately this program was abandoned by the adoption of the
anti-ballistic missile treaty.
(I) Flexible response
Also called Flexible Deterrent Options (FDO), the term flexible
response first appeared in U.S. General Maxwell D. Taylor’s
The Uncertain Trumpet (1960), which sharply criticized U.S.
national security policy. Initially designed to thwart communist
expansion more effectively, the strategy has become a
fundamental principle of American military thinking.
When President Kennedy took office in 1961, he modified
Eisenhower’s policy of massive retaliation and adopted a stance
of flexible response. This policy included the use of
conventional forces in war and offered alternatives to total
nuclear war. The alternatives consisted of an increase in
conventional weapons systems and introduced the concept of
limited nuclear war. Both President Kennedy and his successor,
Lyndon Johnson, determined that effective military power
meant stronger conventional military forces and nuclear options
short of global nuclear war. Flexible response marked a shift
away from the previous policy of massive retaliation. While
Kennedy believed nuclear deterrence remained paramount, he
also understood that limited wars and low intensity conflicts
should be fought with conventional weapons.
The New Look Strategy
Flexible response was an alternative to President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s New Look national security policy. The New
Look approach relied heavily on the capacity for a devastating
assault with nuclear weapons — the strategy of massive
retaliation — to fight Soviet military provocations, regardless
of whether they involved nuclear weapons or not. New Look
was considered inexpensive because the Eisenhower
administration thought it could deter all forms of aggression by
the Soviet Union and China without maintaining large
conventional military forces.
Development of the Flexible Deterrent Options Strategy
By 1960, however, U.S. public opinion was turning against New
Look because it was not effective in stemming communist-
inspired Third World revolutions. Many felt that a new, more-
flexible approach was needed to address such low-level
“brushfire” conflicts. Almost as soon as he moved into the
White House in 1961, President Kennedy instructed his advisers
to begin drafting a new strategy to safeguard the U.S. role in the
world. The new administration strongly believed that the
United States should have a wide variety of military and
nonmilitary responses to communist provocations. Kennedy
presented to Congress an outline of a strategy that would come
to be known as Flexible Deterrent Options in March 1961, and it
was adopted as an official national security policy of the United
States. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted the
strategy in 1967.
short of global nuclear war. Flexible response marked a shift
away from the previous policy of massive retaliation. While
Kennedy believed nuclear deterrence remained paramount, he
also understood that limited wars and low intensity conflicts
should be fought with conventional weapons.
The New Look Strategy
Flexible response was an alternative to President Dwight D.
Eisenhower’s New Look national security policy. The New
Look approach relied heavily on the capacity for a devastating
assault with nuclear weapons — the strategy of massive
retaliation — to fight Soviet military provocations, regardless
of whether they involved nuclear weapons or not. New Look
was considered inexpensive because the Eisenhower
administration thought it could deter all forms of aggression by
the Soviet Union and China without maintaining large
conventional military forces.
Development of the Flexible Deterrent Options Strategy
By 1960, however, U.S. public opinion was turning against New
Look because it was not effective in stemming communist-
inspired Third World revolutions. Many felt that a new, more-
flexible approach was needed to address such low-level
“brushfire” conflicts. Almost as soon as he moved into the
White House in 1961, President Kennedy instructed his advisers
to begin drafting a new strategy to safeguard the U.S. role in the
world. The new administration strongly believed that the
United States should have a wide variety of military and
nonmilitary responses to communist provocations. Kennedy
presented to Congress an outline of a strategy that would come
to be known as Flexible Deterrent Options in March 1961, and it
was adopted as an official national security policy of the United
States. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization adopted the
strategy in 1967.
Flexible response gave the president the ability to select from
nonmilitary options, as well as military options, when
responding to a crisis and allowed the United States to meet
each hostile action with a proportional reaction. The lines of
attack included diplomatic measures (such as pursuing strong
relations with potential allies while being ready to withdraw
embassy personnel on short notice), political measures (such as
increasing the dialogue with the press and releasing frequent
public policy statements), economic measures (such as
increasing or canceling American aid to other countries), and,
perhaps most important, military measures (such as modernizing
the U.S. missile fleet, increasing conventional capabilities and
intensifying training for special forces).
The strategy was quite costly, however, because developing and
maintaining sizable conventional and unconventional weapons,
as well as various kinds of military personnel, required
considerable expenditures. During the Cold War, flexible
response contributed to both the avoidance of nuclear conflict
and the proliferation of limited yet vicious military clashes.
The strategy had the effect of increasing the credibility of the
American armed forces, because it could leverage an
appropriate proportional response to different kinds of crises
(which would deter an enemy’s appetite for smaller, limited
wars), while also reassuring allied countries.
Like most Cold War strategies, flexible response yielded mixed
results. Although the combination of diplomacy, economic
sanctions, and a threatening military posture solved some crises,
including the Cuban missile crisis and the 1965 coup d’état in
the Dominican Republic, the same combination failed to bring
about a positive resolution to the Vietnam War. Flexible
response was no highly explicit theory nor written in a single
authoritative source, but it was realistic in that nuclear weapons
couldn't be used. It tried to provide credible means to match
nonmilitary options, as well as military options, when
responding to a crisis and allowed the United States to meet
each hostile action with a proportional reaction. The lines of
attack included diplomatic measures (such as pursuing strong
relations with potential allies while being ready to withdraw
embassy personnel on short notice), political measures (such as
increasing the dialogue with the press and releasing frequent
public policy statements), economic measures (such as
increasing or canceling American aid to other countries), and,
perhaps most important, military measures (such as modernizing
the U.S. missile fleet, increasing conventional capabilities and
intensifying training for special forces).
The strategy was quite costly, however, because developing and
maintaining sizable conventional and unconventional weapons,
as well as various kinds of military personnel, required
considerable expenditures. During the Cold War, flexible
response contributed to both the avoidance of nuclear conflict
and the proliferation of limited yet vicious military clashes.
The strategy had the effect of increasing the credibility of the
American armed forces, because it could leverage an
appropriate proportional response to different kinds of crises
(which would deter an enemy’s appetite for smaller, limited
wars), while also reassuring allied countries.
Like most Cold War strategies, flexible response yielded mixed
results. Although the combination of diplomacy, economic
sanctions, and a threatening military posture solved some crises,
including the Cuban missile crisis and the 1965 coup d’état in
the Dominican Republic, the same combination failed to bring
about a positive resolution to the Vietnam War. Flexible
response was no highly explicit theory nor written in a single
authoritative source, but it was realistic in that nuclear weapons
couldn't be used. It tried to provide credible means to match
non-nuclear escalation. The word "flexible" stressed the value
of having "multiple options" available should a crisis arise.
Having multiple options during a crisis appeared to be better
than reference to a few preset war scenarios. Having multiple
options was thought to enhance the credibility of the U.S.
deterrent (reassuring allies while deterring the opponent).
At the same time, however, flexibility also made it improbable
that the U.S. would want or need to initiate a nuclear attack. In
effect, flexible response called for the continued presence (in
Europe) of sizable conventional forces. Conventional forces
were to serve two functions, a deterrent function and the
function to fight limited wars. The main argument of the
Eisenhower administration had been that conventional forces
were too costly and nuclear weapons would have "more bang for
the buck." Kennedy wanted to deter all wars, general or limited,
nuclear or conventional, large or small. Eisenhower and Dulles
wanted to achieve similar goals but at minimal cost. Their risk
was to either not act at all or respond at all levels of threat
beyond the original provocation. Kennedy disregarded costs and
emphasized sufficient flexibility to avoid either escalation or
humiliation. In particular, Kennedy wanted to increase the
range of available options prior to resort to nuclear war. The
threshold beyond which the President might have to decide to
initiate the use of nuclear weapons had to be raised. Also, the
damage caused by a war with tactical nuclear weapons seemed
too high. Furthermore, Kennedy believed that the European
allies should contribute more to their defense. Moreover, a
continued reliance on nuclear weapons could lead to their
further proliferation. The basic idea of flexible response, then,
was to increase the ability to confine the response to non-
nuclear weapons.
1
of having "multiple options" available should a crisis arise.
Having multiple options during a crisis appeared to be better
than reference to a few preset war scenarios. Having multiple
options was thought to enhance the credibility of the U.S.
deterrent (reassuring allies while deterring the opponent).
At the same time, however, flexibility also made it improbable
that the U.S. would want or need to initiate a nuclear attack. In
effect, flexible response called for the continued presence (in
Europe) of sizable conventional forces. Conventional forces
were to serve two functions, a deterrent function and the
function to fight limited wars. The main argument of the
Eisenhower administration had been that conventional forces
were too costly and nuclear weapons would have "more bang for
the buck." Kennedy wanted to deter all wars, general or limited,
nuclear or conventional, large or small. Eisenhower and Dulles
wanted to achieve similar goals but at minimal cost. Their risk
was to either not act at all or respond at all levels of threat
beyond the original provocation. Kennedy disregarded costs and
emphasized sufficient flexibility to avoid either escalation or
humiliation. In particular, Kennedy wanted to increase the
range of available options prior to resort to nuclear war. The
threshold beyond which the President might have to decide to
initiate the use of nuclear weapons had to be raised. Also, the
damage caused by a war with tactical nuclear weapons seemed
too high. Furthermore, Kennedy believed that the European
allies should contribute more to their defense. Moreover, a
continued reliance on nuclear weapons could lead to their
further proliferation. The basic idea of flexible response, then,
was to increase the ability to confine the response to non-
nuclear weapons.
1
_1595852975.bin
Written Assignment: The Cold War and Presidential Doctrines
Due Week 7 and worth 300 points
Select a president from the table, “Presidents and Their
‘Doctrines,’” in Roskin, Chapter 4. Then write at least a six-
eight-page paper on the doctrine that president used according
to Roskin. Your research must include at least seven credible
sources, apart from your textbook. Your paper must address the
following:
1. Fully define a doctrine and identify why the president of your
choice announced a doctrine while he was in office.
2. Describe the diplomatic doctrine the president followed, with
reference to specific actions or events that occurred.
3. Describe the effect that the presidential doctrine has had on
regional or global affairs since it was announced during the
Cold War.
4. Cite at least seven reputable sources, excluding Wikipedia,
encyclopedias, dictionaries, blogs and other material that does
not qualify as reputable academic sourcework.
Your assignment must:
· Be typed, double spaced, using Times New Roman font (size
12), with one-inch margins on all sides; citations and references
must follow APA or school-specific format. Check with your
professor for any additional instructions.
· NOT INCLUDE AN ABSTRACT but do include a cover page
containing the title of the assignment, the student’s name, the
professor’s name, the course title, and the date. The cover page
and the reference page are not included in the required
assignment page length.
· Acknowledge that graphs, tables, drawings and photographs do
not count toward the length of the paper; only what you have
Written Assignment: The Cold War and Presidential Doctrines
Due Week 7 and worth 300 points
Select a president from the table, “Presidents and Their
‘Doctrines,’” in Roskin, Chapter 4. Then write at least a six-
eight-page paper on the doctrine that president used according
to Roskin. Your research must include at least seven credible
sources, apart from your textbook. Your paper must address the
following:
1. Fully define a doctrine and identify why the president of your
choice announced a doctrine while he was in office.
2. Describe the diplomatic doctrine the president followed, with
reference to specific actions or events that occurred.
3. Describe the effect that the presidential doctrine has had on
regional or global affairs since it was announced during the
Cold War.
4. Cite at least seven reputable sources, excluding Wikipedia,
encyclopedias, dictionaries, blogs and other material that does
not qualify as reputable academic sourcework.
Your assignment must:
· Be typed, double spaced, using Times New Roman font (size
12), with one-inch margins on all sides; citations and references
must follow APA or school-specific format. Check with your
professor for any additional instructions.
· NOT INCLUDE AN ABSTRACT but do include a cover page
containing the title of the assignment, the student’s name, the
professor’s name, the course title, and the date. The cover page
and the reference page are not included in the required
assignment page length.
· Acknowledge that graphs, tables, drawings and photographs do
not count toward the length of the paper; only what you have
written as text itself.
The specific course learning outcomes associated with this
assignment are:
· Identify the cultural, economic, and political context of
information resources, and interpret information in light of that
context.
· Use technology and information resources to research issues in
international problems.
· Write clearly and concisely about international problems using
proper writing mechanics.
The specific course learning outcomes associated with this
assignment are:
· Identify the cultural, economic, and political context of
information resources, and interpret information in light of that
context.
· Use technology and information resources to research issues in
international problems.
· Write clearly and concisely about international problems using
proper writing mechanics.
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