The Open Society and Its Enemies- K. Popper

bioterra 445 views 274 slides May 07, 2024
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About This Presentation

Written in political exile in New Zealand during the Second World War and published in two volumes in 1945, The Open Society and its Enemies was hailed by Bertrand Russell as a 'vigorous and profound defence of democracy'. This legendary attack on the philosophies of Plato, Hegel and Marx pr...


Slide Content

THEOPENSOCIETY
ANDITSENEMIES
THESPELLOFPLATO

THEOPENSOCIETY
ANDITSENEMIES
by
K.R.POPPER
Volume I
THESPELLOFPLATO
London
GEORGEROUTLEDGE&SONS,LTD.
BROADWAYHOUSE: 68-74CARTERLANE,E.G.

First
published
Reprinted1947
Itwillbeseen . . ,thattheErewhonians
areameekand
long-sufferingpeople,easily
led
by
thenose,and
quick
tooffer
upcommon
sense . . .whena
philosopher
arisesamong
them . . .SAMUELBUTLER.
THISBOOKISPRODUCEDINCOMPLETE
CONFORMITYWITHTHEAUTHORIZED
ECONOMYSTANDARDS
tintedinGreatBritainbyButler&TannerLtd.,FromeandLondon

PREFACE
Ifinthisbookharshwordsare
spoken
aboutsomeofthe
greatestamong
theintellectualleadersofmankind,my
motive
is
not,
I
hope,
thewishtobelittlethem. It
springs
ratherfrom
my
convictionthatifwewishourcivilizationtosurvivewemust
breakwiththehabitofdeferenceto
great
men.Greatmen
may
make
great
mistakes
;andasthebooktriestoshow,some
ofthe
greatest
leadersofthe
pastsupported
the
perennial
attack
onfreedomandreason.Their
influence,too
rarelychallenged,
continuestomisleadthoseonwhosedefencecivilization
depends,
andtodividethem.The
responsibility
forthis
tragic
and
possibly
fataldivisionbecomesoursifwehesitatetobe
outspoken
inourcriticismofwhat
admittedly
is
part
ofourintellectual
heritage.By
ourreluctancetocriticizea
part
of
it,wemay
help
to
destroy
itall.
Thebook isacriticalintroduction tothe
philosophy
of
politicsandof
history,
andanexamination ofsomeofthe
principles
ofsocialreconstruction. Itsaimandthelineof
approach
areindicatedintheIntroduction. Evenwhereitlooks
backintothe
past,
its
problems
arethe
problems
ofourown
time
;andIhavetriedhardtomakeitas
simple
as
possible,
hoping
to
clarify
matterswhichconcernusall.
Although
thebook
presupposesnothing
but
open-mindedness
inthereader,
its
object
isnotsomuchto
popularize
the
questions
treatedastosolvethem.Inordertoservethisdouble
purpose,
allmattersofmore
specialized
interesthavebeenconfinedto
thenotescollectedattheendofthebook.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Iwishto
expressmygratitude
toallmy
friendswhohave
madeit
possible
formetowritethisbook.Mr.C.G.F.Simkin
hasnot
onlyhelpedmewithanearlier
version,buthas
given
methe
opportunity
of
clarifyingmanyproblems
indetailed
discussionsovera
period
of
nearly
four
years.
Miss
Margaret
Dalzielhasassistedmeinthe
preparation
ofvariousdraftsand
ofthefinal
manuscript.
Her
untiringhelp
hasbeeninvaluable.
Mr.H.Larsen'sinterestinthe
problem
ofhistoricismwasa
greatencouragement. Mr.T.K.Ewerhasreadthe
manuscript
andhasmademanysuggestions
forits
improvement.
Miss
Helen
Hervey
has
put
a
great
dealofworkintothe
compilation
oftheIndex.
Iam
deeply
indebtedtoProfessorF.A.von
Hayek.
Without
hisinterestand
support
thebookwouldnothavebeen
published.
Dr.E.Gombrichhasundertakentoseethebook
through
the
press,
aburdentowhichwasaddedthestrainofan
exacting
correspondence
between
England
andNewZealand.Hehas
beenso
helpful
thatIcan
hardlysayhowmuchIowetohim.
K.R.P.
CHRISTCHURCH,
April1944.

CONTENTS
VOLUMEI:THESPELLOFPLATO
PAOB
PREFACE........... v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......... vi
INTRODUCTION.......... i
THESPELLOFPLATO......... 5
THEMYTHOFORIGINANDDESTINY...... 5
Chapter
i.HistoricismandtheMyth
ofDestiny...
5
Chapter
2.Heraclitus........ 9
Chapter3.
Plato'sTheoryofIdeas 15
PLATO'SDESCRIPTIVESOCIOLOGY....... 29
Chapter4.ChangeandRest . . . . . .-29
Chapter5.NatureandConvention...... 49
PLATO'SPOLITICALPROGRAMME..>.... 74
Chapter
6.Totalitarian
Justice....... 74
Chapter7.The
Principle
of
Leadership
. . . ..106
Chapter
8.The
PhilosopherKing
121
Chapter9.^Estheticism,Radicalism,Utopianism
. . .138
PLATOATTACKS.......... 149
Chapter
10.TheOpenSocietyanditsEnemies . . . .
149
NOTES 178

THEOPENSOCIETYANDITSENEMIES
INTRODUCTION
Concerningmetaphysics
. .
,
Iadmitthatmy
formulationsmay
hereortherehavebeeninsuffi-
ciently
conditionalandcautious.YetIdonot
wishtohidethefactthatIcan
only
lookwith
repugnance
. .upon
the
puffed-uppretentious-
nessofallthesevolumesfilledwithwisdom,such
asarefashionable
nowadays.
ForIam
fully
satisfiedthat . .the
acceptedmethodsmustend-
lessly
increasethesefolliesand
blunders,and
thateventhe
complete
annihilationofallthese
fancifulachievements couldnot
possibly
beas
harmfulasthisfictitioussciencewithitsaccursed
fertility.
KANT.
Thisbookraisesanumberofissueswhichmay
notbe
apparent
fromthetableofcontents.
Itsketchessomeofthedifficultiesfaced
by
acivilization
whichaimsathumanenessandreasonableness, at.
equality
and
freedom
;acivilizationwhichisstillinits
infancy,
andwhich
continuesto
grow
in
spite
ofthefactthatithasbeen
betrayed
by
somany
oftheintellectualleadersofmankind. It
attempts |
toshowthatthiscivilizationhasnot
yetfully
recoveredfrom
theshockofits
birth,thetransitionfromthetribalor
*
closedl
society ',withitssubmissionto
magicalforces,tothe
*
open
society
'
whichsetsfreethecritical
powers
ofman. It
attempts
toshowthattheshockofthistransitionisoneofthefactorsthat
havemade
possible
theriseofthose
reactionarymovements
whichhave
tried,andstill
try,
tooverthrowcivilizationandto
returntotribalism.Andit
suggests
thatwhatwecall
nowadays
totalitarianism
belongs
tothesemovements,whichare
just
as
oldor
just
as
young
asourcivilization itself.
Ittries
thereby
tocontributetoour
understanding
oftotali-
tarianism,andofthe
significance
ofthe
perennialJjghtagainstjt.
Itfurthertriestoexaminethe
application
ofthecriticaland
rationalmethodsofsciencetothe
problems
ofthe
opensociety.
It
analyses
the
principles
ofdemocraticsocialreconstruction,the
principles
ofwhatImay
term
*
piecemen.1
Social
engineering
*
in
opposition
to
c
Utopian
social
engineering
'
(asexplained
in
Chapterg).tAndittriestoclear
awaysomeoftheobstacles
i

2 INTRODUCTION
impeding
arational
approach
tothe
problems
ofsocialrecon-
struction. Itdoesso
bycriticizing
thosesocial
philosophies
which
are
responsible
forthe
widespreadprejudiceagainst
the
pos-
sibilities
jrfdemocratic
reform.Themost
powerful
ofthese
reactionaryphilosophies
Ts~onewhicRIhavecalledhistoricism.
The
story
oftheriseandinfluenceofsome
important
formsof
historicism isoneofthemain
topics
ofthebook,which
might
evenbedescribedasacollectionof
marginal
notesonthe
develop-
mentofcertainhistoricist
philosophies.Afewremarksonthe
origin
ofthebookwillindicatewhatismeantby
historicismand
howitisconnectedwiththeotherissuesmentioned.
Althoughmy
maininterestsarethemethodsof
physics(and
consequently
certaintechnical
problems
whicharefarremoved
fromthosetreatedinthis
book),
Ihavealsobeeninterestedfor
manyyears
inthe
problem
ofthebackwardness ofthesocial
sciences. This
is,ofcourse,nothing
butthe
problem
oftheir
method.My
interestinthis
problem
was
greatly
stimulated
by
theriseof
totalitarianism,
and
by
thefailureofthevarioussocial
sciencesandsocial
philosophies
tomakesenseofit.
Inthisconnection,one
pointappeared
tome
particularlyurgent.
Toooftenwehearit
suggested
thatsomeformorotherof
totalitarianism
isinevitable.Manywhobecauseoftheir
ii^elli;-
gence^and[traimng_shoulc^
beheld
responsible
forwhat
they
say,
announcethatthereisno
escape
fromit.They
askus
whetherweare
really
naive
enough
tobelievethat
democracy
canbe
permanent ;whetherwedonotseethatitis
justoneof
themany
formsof
government
thatcomeand
go
inthecourse
of
history.Theyargue
that
democracy,
inorderto
fight
totalitarianism,
isforcedto
copy
itsmethodsandthustobecome
totalitarian itself.Or
they
assertthatourindustrial
system
cannotcontinuetofunctionwithout
adopting
themethodsof
collectivist
planning,
and
they
inferfromthe
inevitability
ofa
collectivisteconomic
system
thatthe
adoption
oftotalitarian
formsofsociallifeisalsoinevitable.
Such
argumentsmay
sound
plausibleenough.
But
plausi-
bility
isnotareliable
guide
insuchmatters. In
fact,oneshould
notenterintoadiscussionofthese
speciousarguments
before!
having
consideredthe
followingquestion
ofmethod :Isitwithin
the
power
of
any
socialsciencetomakesuch
sweeping
historical
prophecies
?Canwetexpectto
get
morethanthe
irresponsible!
reply
ofthe
soothsayer
ifweaskamanwhatthefuturehasin
storeformankind?

INTRODUCTION
3
Thisisa
question
ofthemethodofthesocialsciences. Itis
clearlymorefundamentalthan
any
debateon
anyparticular
argument
offeredin
support
of
any
historical
prophecy.
Acarefulexaminationofthis
question
hasledmetothe
convictionthatsuch
sweeping
historical
prophecies
are
entirely
beyond
the
scope
ofscientificmethod.Thefuture
depends
on
ourselves,andwedonot
depend
onany
historical
necessity.
Thereare,however,influentialsocial
philosophies
whichhold
the
opposite
view.They
claimthat
everybody
triestousehis
brainsto
predictimpending
events
;thatitis
certainlylegitimate
fora
strategist
to
try
toforeseetheoutcomeofabattle
;and
thattheboundariesbetweensucha
prediction
andmore
sweeping
historical
prophecies
arefluid.They
maintainthatitisthe
taskofsciencein
general
tomake
predictions,
orrather,to
improve.upon
our
everydaypredictions,
andto
put
them
upon
a
moresecurebasis
;andthatitisthetaskofthesocialsciences
in
particular
tofurnishuswith
long-term
historical
prophecies.
They
alsobelievethat
they
havediscoveredlawsof
history
which
enablethemto
prophesy
thecourseofhistoricalevents.The
varioussocial
philosophies
whichraiseclaimsofthis
kind,
Ihave
groupedtogether
underthenamehistoricism. Elsewhere, in
The
Povertyof
Historicism
(Economic^1944/45),
Ihavetriedto
argueagainst
theseclaims,andtoshowthatin
spite
oftheir
glausibilitY^thgy^
arc^based^-jpnu-^L
grossj^jsirnJgr
fstanH^ng.jrf
scientific^method.Whileengaged
inthe
systematic analysis
ancTcriticism of
thejiain^
Itriedaswellto
collectsomematerialtoillustrate its
development.
Thenotes
collectedforthat
purpose
constitutethemain
part
ofthisbook.
The
systematicanalysis
ofhistoricismaimsat
something
like
scientificstatus.Thisbookdoesnot.Many
ofthe
opinions
expressed
are
personal.
Whatitowestoscientificmethod is
largely
theawarenessofitslimitations :itdoesnotoffer
proofs
where
nothing
canbe
proved,
nordoesit
pretend
tobescientific
whereitcannot
give
morethanapersonalpoint
ofview. Itdoes
not
tryjaj-eplace
theold
systems
of
philosophyby
anew
system.
iTdoesnot
try
toaddtoallthesevolumes^fille^Twithwisdom,
tothe
metaphysics
of
history
and
destiny,
suchasarefashion-
able
nowadays.
Itrathertriestojhowthatthispropheticjmsdom
isharmful,thatthe
rr^et^hysi^^histgrjr impede
the
applica-
tion~otthe
"piecein<[alj^
sojcjal
reformr^Xn3TItfurtheFlnes toshowhowwemay
becomethe
niaEersofourfatewhenwehaveceasedTo
poseasTtsTprophets.

4
INTRODUCTION
In
tracing
the
development
of
historicism,
Ifoundthatthe
dangerousliabit^ofhutorical
prophecy,
so
widespreadamong
our
intellectualleaders,has
various^
functions. Itis
alwaysflattering
to
belong
totheinnercircleoftheinitiated,andto
possess
the
unusual
power
of
predicting
thecourseof
history. Besides,there
isatraditionthatintellectualleadersare
giftejd
withsuch
powers,
andnotto
possessthem
may~Ieadjtolpss.x>f_a&te. The
danger,
ontheotherhahd7
oftheir
being
unmaskedascharlatans is
very
small,since
they
can
alwayspoint
outthatitis
certainlyper-
missibletomakeless
sweepingpredictions ;andtheboundaries
betweentheseand
augury
arefluid.
Buttherearesometimesfurthermotivesfor
holding
historicist
beliefs.The
prophetswhoannouncethatcertaineventsare
boundto
happen
make
propaganda
forthem,and
help
to
bring
themabout.Their
stcu^^a^emocracy^
is
nqtjq
lastforever
isas
Jtrue,
andaslittletothe
point,
astheassertionthathuman
reasonIsnottolastforever,since
onlydemocracyprovides
an
institutionalframeworkthat
permits
reformwithoutviolence,
andsotheuseofreasonin
political
matters.Buttheir
story
te^ids_tc^discpurage those^whofight
totalitarianism
;
itsmotive
isto
support
the
revolt^against^ivilizatibn.
Afurthermotive,
itseems,can~6efoundifweconsiderthathistoricist
metaphysics
are
apt
torelievemenfromthestrainoftheir
responsibilities.
Ifyouknowthat
things
arebbundto
happen
whatever
youdo,
then
youmay
feelfreeto
giveup
the
fightagainst
them.Th
tendency
ofhistoricismto
support
therevolt
against
civilization
may
beduetothefactthatitisitself
largely
areaction
against
thestrainofour
civilization,anditsdemandfor
personal
responsibility.
Theselastallusionsaresomewhat
vague,
but
they
mustsuffice
foranintroduction.
They
willlaterbesubstantiatedby
historical
material,especially
inthe
chapter
'
TheOpenSociety
andIts
Enemies '.Iwas
tempted
to
place
this
chapter
atthe
beginning
ofthebook
;withits
topicajinterest,
itwould
certainly
have
madeamore
inviting
introduction. ButIfoundthatthefull
weight
ofthishistorical
interpretation
cannotbefeltunless
itis
precededby
thematerialdiscussedearlierinthebook. It
seemsthatonehasfirsttobedisturbed
by
the
identity
ofthe
Platonic
theory
of
justice
withthe
theory,
and
j^rajcticeof.modern
totaHtar^ how
urgent
itisto
interpret
thesematters.

THEOPENSOCIETYANDITSENEMIES
VOL.I
THESPELLOFPLATO
Forthe
OpenSociety(about430B.C.)
:
Althoughonly
afewmayoriginate
a
policy,
weareallableto
judge
it.
PERICLESOFATHENS.
Against
the
OpenSociety(about
80
yearslater)
:
The
greatestprinciple
ofallisthat
nobody,
whethermaleor
female,shouldbewithout
aleader.Norshouldthemindof
anybody
behabituatedto
letting
himdo
anything
at
allonhisowninitiative
;neitheroutofzeal,
noreven
playfully. Butinwaraswellasin
themidstof
peace
tohisleaderheshall
directhis
eyeandfollowhim
faithfully.And
eveninthesmallestmatterheshouldstand
under
leadership.
For
example,
heshould
getup,
ormove,orwash,
ortakehismeals
. .
only
ifhehasbeentoldtodoso ..In
aword,heshouldteachhissoul,bylong
habit,nevertodreamof
actingindependently,
andin
fact,
tobecome
utterlyincapable
ofit.
PLATOOFATHENS.
THEMYTHOFDESTINY
CHAPTER 1:HISTORICISMANDTHEMYTHOF
DESTINY
Itis
widely
believedthata
truly
scientificand
philosophical
attitudetowards
politics,
anda
deeperunderstanding
ofsocial
lifein
general,
mustbebasedupon
a
contemplation
andintei
pretation
ofhuman
history.
Whilethe
ordinarymantakesthe
setting
ofhislifeandthe
importance
of
hi$personalexperiences
and
struggles
for
granted,
itissaidthatthesocialscientistor
philosopher
hasto
surveythings
froma
higherplane.
Hesees
theindividualasa
pawn,
asarather
insignificant
instrumentin

THEMYTHOFDESTINY
the
generaldevelopment
ofmankind.Andthe
reallyimportant!
actorsonthe
Stage
of
History
hemayfind,perhaps,
inth<
GreatNationsandtheirGreatLeaders,or
perhaps
intheGrea
Classes,orintheGreatIdeas.Howeverthismaybe,hewillti
tounderstandthe
meaning
ofthe
play
whichis
performed
on
that
Stage ;hewill
try
tounderstandthelawsofhistorical
development.
Ifhesucceedsin
this,he
will,
of
course,beable
to
predict
future
developments. He
might
then
putpoliticsupon
asolid
basis,and
give
us
practical
advicebytelling
uswhich
political
actionsare
likely
tosucceedor
likely
tofail.
Thisisabrief
description
ofanattitudewhichIcallhistoricism.
Itisanold
idea,orrather,aconnected setofideaswhich
unfortunately
havebecomesomucha
part
ofour
spiritual
atmosphere
that
they
are
usually
takenfor
granted,and
hardly,
ever
questioned.
Ihavetriedelsewhere toshowthat.JJie
historicist
approach
tothesocialsciences
givesgopr
results. I
havealsotriedtooutlineamethodwhich,
I
believe,would
yield
betterresults.
Butifhistoricism isa
faulty
methodthat
produces
worthless
results,thenitmay
beusefultoseehowit
originated,andhow
^succeeded
in
entrenching
itselfso
successfully.Ahistorical
sketchundertakenwiththisaim
can,
atthesame
time,
serveto
analyse
the
variety
ofideaswhichhave
gradually
accumulated
aroundthecentralhistoricistdoctrinethat
history
iscontrolled
bydevelopmental
lawswhose
discovery
wouldenableusto
prophesy
the
destiny
ofman.
Hjstoricism,
whichIhavesofarcharacterized
only
ina
ratherabstract
way,
canbewellillustrated
by
oneofthe
simplest
andoldestofitsforms,thedoctrineofthechosen
people.
This
doctrine isoneofthe
attempts
tomake
history
understandable
by
atheistic
interpretation,
i.e.byrecognizingGodastheauthor
ofthe
playperformed
ontheHistorical
Stage.
The
theory
of
thechosen
people,
more
specifically,
assumesthatGodhas
selectedone
people
tofunctionastheinstrumentofHis
will,
andthatthis
people
willinherittheearth.
Inthisdoctrine,thelawofhistorical
development
islaid
downby
theWillofGod.Thisisthe
specific
differencewhich
distinguishes
thetheisticformfromotherformsofhistoricism.
Anaturalistic
historicism,
forinstance,might
treatthe
develop-
mentaHawasaJawofnature
;a
spiritual
historicismwouldtreat
itasalawof
spiritualdevelopment ;anec
aerain.asalawofeconomic
development.

CHAPTER I:HISTORICISM
7
shareswiththeseotherformsthedoctrinethatthereisa
develop-
mentallawwhichcanbe
discovered,and
upon
which
predictions
regarding
thefutureofmankindcanbebased.
Thereisnodoubtthatthedoctrineofthechosen
peoplegrew
outofthetribalformofsociallife.Tribalism,
i.e.the
emphasis
onthe
supremeimportance
ofthetribewithoutwhichthe
individual is
nothing
at
all,
isanelementwhichweshallfind
inmany
formsofhistoricisttheories.Otherformswhichare
nottribalistmay
stillretaintheelementofcollectivism
l
:
they
may
still
emphasize
the
significance
ofsomecollectiveor
group
withoutwhichtheindividual is
nothing
atall.Another
aspect
ofthedoctrineofthechosen
people
istheremotenessofwhatit
proffers
astheendof
history.
For
although
itmay
describe
thisendwithsome
degree
of
definiteness,wehaveto
go
a
long
way
beforewereach it.Andtheway
isnot
onlylong,
but
winding,leadingup
anddown,right
andleft.
Accordingly,
it
willbe
possible
to
bringevery
conceivablehistoricaleventwell
withintheschemeofthe
interpretation. Nothing
cancontradict
it.
2
Buttothosewhobelievein
it,
it
givescertaintyregarding
theultimateoutcomeofhuman
history.
Acriticismofthetheistic
interpretation
of
history
willbe
attempted
inthelast
chapter
ofthisbook,whereitwillalsobe
shownthatsomeofthe
greatest
Christianthinkershave
repudiated
itas
idolatry.Anattack
upon
thisformofhistoricismshould
thereforenotbe
interpreted
asanattack
uponreligion.
Inthe
presentchapter,
thedoctrineofthechosen
people
serves
only
as
anillustration. Itsvalueassuchcanbeseenfromthefact
thatitschiefcharacteristics
3
aresharedby
thetwomost
important
modern
versionsjDfWs^oricism
whose
analysis
willformthemajor
part
ofthisbookthe
histoxical^^iilosophy
ofracialismor
fascisnTontheone
(theright)
handancTtneMarxianhistorical
philosophy
ontheother
(theleft).
Forthechosen
people
racialismsubstitutesthechosenrace
(of
Gobineau's
choice),
se-
lectedastheinstrumentof
destin^,ultimately
toinherittheearth.
Marx'shistorical
philosophy
substitutesforitthechosen
class,
theinstrumentforthecreationoftheclassless
society,
andatthe
sametime,theclassdestinedtoinherittheearth.Boththeories
basetheirhistoricalforecastsonan
interpretation
of
history
whichleadstothe
discovery
ofalawof
its
development.
In
thecaseof
racialism,
thisis
thought
of*asakindofnaturallaw.
The
biologicalsuperiority
ofthebloodofthechosenrace
explains
thecourse*of
history,past,present,aijd
future
;
itis
nothing

8 THEMYTHOFDESTINY
butthe
struggle
ofracesfor
mastery.
InthecaseofMarx's
philosophy
of
history,
thelawiseconomic
;
all
history
hastobe
interpreted
asa
struggle
ofclassesforeconomic
supremacy.
Thehistoricistcharacterofthesetwomovementsmakesour
investigation topical.Weshallreturntotheminlater
parts
of
thisbook.Eachofthem
goes
back
directly
tothe
philosophy
of
Hegel.Wemust,therefore,dealwiththat
philosophy
aswell.
Andsince
Hegel
inthemainfollowscertainancient
philosophers,
itwillbe
necessary
todiscussthetheoriesofHeraclitus,Plato
andAristotle,before
returning
tothemoremodernformsof
historicism.

CHAPTER2:HERACLITUS
Itisnotuntil
Heraclitus,thatwefindinGreecetheories
whichcouldbe
compared
intheirhistoricistcharacterwiththe
doctrineofthechosen
people.
InHomer'stheistic
interpreta-
tion,history
isthe
product
ofdivinewill.ButtheHomeric
$laydownno
general
lawsforits
development. What
omertriestostressandto
explain
isnotthe
unity
of
history,
butratheritslackof
unity.
Theauthorofthe
play
onthe
Stage
of
History
isnotoneGod
;awhole
variety
of
gods
dabble
init.WhattheHomeric
interpretation
shareswiththe
Jewish
isacertainvaguefeeling
of
destiny,andtheideaof
powers
behindthescene.Buttheultimate
destiny,according
to
Homer,
isnotdisclosedtomen.Unlikethe
Jewish,
itremains
mysterious.
ThefirstGreektointroduceamoremarkedly
historicist
elementwasHesiod,whenhemadeuseoftheideaofa
general
trendor
tendency
inhistorical
development.
His
interpretation
of
history
is
pessimistic.Hebelievesthatmankind,intheir
developmentdownfromthe
goldenage,
aredestinedto
degenerate,
both
physically
and
morally.Theculminationofthevarious
historicistideas
profferedby
the
early
Greek
philosopherscame
with
Plato,whoelaboratedhis
theory
inan
attempt
to
interpret
the
historyandsociallifeoftheGreek
tribes,and
especially
of
theAthenians. Inhishistoricismhewas
strongly
influenced
by
variousforerunners, especiallyby
Hesiod.Butthemost
important
influencecamefromHeraclitus.
Heraclituswasthe
philosopher
whodiscoveredtheideaof
change.Downtohistime,philosophers
viewedtheworldasthe
totality
of
things,
orasa
huge
edificebuilt
up
ofthese
things.
The
questionsthey
askedthemselvesweresuchasthese :
*
What
doestheworldconsistof?
J
orHowisitconstructed,whatis
itstrue
ground-plan
?
'
l
.They
considered
philosophy,
or
physics(the
twowere
indistinguishable
fora
longtime)
asthe
investigation
of
*
nature
',
i.e.ofthe
original
materialoutof
whichthisedifice,theworld,hadbeenbuilt.Asfaras
any
processes
wereconsidered,they
were
thought
ofeitheras
going
onwithintheedifice,orelseas
constricting
ormaintaining it,
disturbing
and
restoring
the
stability
orbalanceofastructure
whichwa$considered tobe
fundamentally
static.This
very

IO THEMYTHOFDESTINY
natural
approach,
naturaleventomany
ofus
to-day,
was
super-
sededby
the
genius
ofHeraclitus.Theviewheintroducedwas
thattherewasnosuchedifice
;thattheworldwasnotamore
orlessstablestructure,butratheronecolossal
process ;thatit
wasnotthesum-totalofall
things,
butratherthe
totality
ofall
events,or
changes,
or
facts.
c
Everything
isinfluxand
nothing
isat
rest',
isthemottoofhis
philosophy.
2
Heraclitus'
discovery
influencedthe
development
ofGreek
philosophy
fora
long
time.The
philosophies
of
Parmenides,
Democritus, Plato,andAristotle,canallbe
appropriately
describedas
attempts
tosolvethe
problems
ofthat
changing
worldwhichHeraclitushaddiscovered.The
greatness
ofthis
discovery
can
hardly
beoverrated. Ithasbeendescribedasa
terrifyingone,anditseffecthasbeen
compared
withthatof
*
an
earthquake,
inwhich
everything
. .seemsto
sway
'
3
.And
Idonotdoubtthatthis
discovery
was
impressedupon
Heraclitus
byterrifyingpersonalexperiences
sufferedasaresultofthe
socialand
political
disturbancesofhis
day.Heraclitus,thefirst
philosopher
todealnot
only
with
'
nature
'
butevenmorewith
ethico-political problems,
livedinan
age
ofsocialrevolution.
ItwasirihistimethattheGreektribalaristocracieswere
beginning
to
yield
tothenewforceof
democracy.
Inordertounderstandtheeffectofthis
revolution,wemust
rememberthe
stability
and
rigidity
ofsociallifeinatribal
aristocracy.
Sociallifeisdeterminedby
socialand
religious
taboos
;everybody
hashis
assignedplace
withinthewholeof
thesocialstructure
;everyone
feelsthathis
place
isthe
proper,
the
c
natural
'
place,assigned
tohim
by
theforceswhichrulethe
world
;everyone
'
knowshis
place
'.
Heraclitus
5
own
place
wasthatofheirtothe
royalfamily
of
priestkings
of
Ephesus,
buthe
resigned
infavourofhisbrother.
In
spite
ofhis
proud
refusaltomixhimself
up
withthe
political
lifeofhis
city,
he
supported
thecauseofthearistocratswho
triedinvaintostemthe
risihg
tideofthenew
revolutionary
forces.These
experiences
inthesocialor
political
fieldare
reflected inthe
remainingfragments
ofhiswork.
4
*
The
Ephesiansought
tohang
themselvesman
byman,
allthe
adults,
andleavethe
city
toberuled
by
infants . .
.',
isoneofhis
outbursts,occasioned,by
the
people's
decision to
expatriate
Hermodorus,anaristocraticfriendofHeraclitus'. His
interpreta-
tionofthe
people's
motivesismost
interesting,
foritshowsthat
thestock-in-tradeof
anti-democraticargument
hasnot
changed

CHAPTER2IHERACLITUS II
sincetheearliest
days
of
democracy.
*
They
held :wedonot
like
anyone
toexcelamong
us
;andifsomeone is
outstanding,
thenlethimbesoelsewhere,andamong
others.' This
hostility
towards
democracy
breaks
througheverywhere
inthe
fragments
:
c
. .themobfilltheirbellieslikethebeasts. . .
They
takethe
bardsand
popular
beliefastheir
guides,unawarethatthemany
aremeanandthat
only
thefewarenoble. . .InPrienelive.d
Bias,sonofTenthamas,whose
opinion
countsmorethanmost.
Hesaid :
"
Mostmenarewicked"...Themobdoesnot
care,notevenaboutthe
thingsthey
stumble
upon ;norcan
theygrasp
alesson
thoughthey
think
they
do.'Inthesame
veinhe
says
:
*
Thelawcandemand,too,thatthewillofOne
Manmustbe
obeyed.'
Another
expression
ofHeraclitus'con-
servativeandanti-democratic outlook
is,incidentally, quite
acceptable
todemocratsinits
wording,though
notinitsintention :
4
A
peopleought
to
fight
forthelawsofthe
city
asif
theywere
itswalls.'
ButHeraclitus'
fight
fortheancientlawsofhis
citywasin
vain,andthetransitorinessofall
thingsimpressed
itself
strongly
upon
him.His
theory
of
changegivesexpression
tothis
feeling
5
:
c
Everything
isinflux
',hesaid
;and
'
Youcannot
step
twice
intothesameriver.' Disillusioned,he
arguedagainst
thebelief
thatthe
existing
socialorderwouldremainforever :
c
Onemust
notactandtalklikethoserearedwiththenarrowoutlook
"
As
ithasbeenhandeddowntous".'
This
emphasis
on
change,
arid
especially
on
change
insocial
life,
isa
noteworthy
characteristicnot
only
ofHeraclitus'
phil-
osophy
butofhistoricismin
general.
That
things,
andeven
kings,change,
isatruthwhichneedstobe
impressedespecially
upon
thosewhotaketheirsocialenvironment toomuchfor
granted.
Somuchistobeadmitted. ButintheHeraclitean
philosophy
oneofthelesscommendable characteristics of
historicism manifests
itself,namely,
an
over-emphasis upon
change,
combinedwiththe
complementary
beliefinaninexorable
law
ofdestiny.Everyprocess
intheworld
developsaccording
toadefinitelaw,
its
c
measure
'
6
.Heraclitusvisualizesthislaw
of
destiny
inan
interestingway.
Itisinexorableandirresistible,
andtothisextentitresemblesourmodern
conception
ofnatural
lawaswellasthe
conception
of
developmental
lawsofmodern
historicists. Butitdiffersfromthese
conceptions
insofarasit
isenforced
bypunishments,just
aslaws
imposedby
thestate.
Thisfailure!to
distinguish
between
legal
lawsornormsonthe

12 THEMYTHOFDESTINY
onehandandnaturallawsor
regularities
ontheotherischaracter-
isticoftribaltabooism :bothkindsoflawalikearetreatedas
magical,
whichmakesarationalcriticismoftheman-made
taboosasinconceivable asan
attempt
to
improveupon
the
regularities
ofthenaturalworld :
7
*
Allevents
proceed
with
the
necessity
offate. ..Thesunwillnot
outstep
themeasure
ofhis
path ;butifhedoes,thenthe
goddesses
of
Fate,the
handmaidsof
Justice,
willknowhowtofindhim. . .Theorder
oftheworld,whichisthesameforall
things,
hasnotbeenmade,
neitherby
a
god
norby
aman. It
alwayswas,is,andwillbe,
an
eternallylivingfire,withalawthatmeasures its
flaringup
andalawthatmeasures its
dying
down. . .Initsadvance,
theFirewill
judge
andconvict
everything.'
Combinedwiththehistoricistideaofarelentless
destinywe
frequently
findanelementof
mysticism.Acritical
analysis
of
mysticism
willbe
given
in
chapter24.
HereIwish
only
to
showtheroleofanti-rationalismand
mysticism
inHeraclitus'
philosophy
8
:
'
Naturelovestohide
',he
writes,and
'
The
Lordwhoownstheoracleof
Delphi
neitherrevealsnor
conceals,
butheshowshis
meaningthroughsigns
'.Heraclitus'
contempt
ofthemore
empirically
mindedscientists is
typical
ofthosewho
adopt
thisattitude :
6
Whoknowsmanythings
neednothave
many
brains
;
forotherwiseHesiodand
Pythagoras
wouldhave
hadmore,andalso
Xenophanes.
..'Along
withthisscornof
scientists
goes
the
mysticaltheory
ofanintuitive
understanding
whichis
given
tothe
chosen,
tothosewhoareawake,whohave
the
power
to
see,hear,and
speak
:
c
Onemustnotactandtalk
asif
asleep.
. .ThosewhoareawakehaveOnecommonworld
;
thosewhoare
asleep,
turntotheir
private
worlds. . .They
are
incapable
bothof
listening
andof
talking.
. .Evenif
they
dohear
they
arelikethedeaf.The
sayingapplies
tothem :
They
are
presentyetthey
arenot
present.
. .One
thing
alone
iswisdom :tounderstandthe
thought
whichsteers
everything
througheverything.'Theworld
experienced
incommonby
thosewhoareawakeisthe
mysticalunity,
theonenessofall
things
:
*
Onemustfollowwhatiscommontoall. . .The
thought
iscommontoall. . .AllbecomesOneandOne
becomesAll. . .TheOnewhichaloneiswisdomwishesand
doesnotwishtobecalled
by
thenameof2eus. . .Itisthe
thunderboltwhichsteer^
everythingthrougheverything.'
Somuchforthemore
general
featuresoftheHeraclitean
philosophy
ofuniversal
change
andhidden
destiny.*
Fromit

CHAPTER2:HERACLITUS
13
springs
a
theory
ofthe
driving
forcebehindall
change ;a
theory
whichexhibitsitshistoricist
character,by
its
emphasisupon
the
importance
ofa
c
social
dynamics
'
as
opposed
toa
*
social
statics'.Heraclitus'
dynamics
ofnaturein
general
and
especially
ofsociallifeconfirmstheviewthathis
philosophy
was
inspired
by
thesocialand
political
disturbanceshehad
experienced. For
hedeclaresthatstrifeorwaristhe
dynamic
aswellasthecreative
principle
ofall
change,and
especially
ofalldifferencesbetween
men.And
being
a
typicalhistoricist,he
accepts
the
judgement
of
history
asamoralone
9
,holding
thattheoutcomeofwaris
alwaysjust
10
:
*
Waristhefatherand
king
ofall
things.
It
proves
sometobe
gods
andotherstobemeremen,byturning
thelatterintoslavesandtheformerintomasters, . .Onemust
knowthatstrifeiscommonto
everything,
andthatwaris
justice,
andthatall
thingsdevelopthrough
strifeandbynecessity/
Butifwaris
just,
if
c
the
goddesses
ofFate
'
areatthesame
time
c
thehandmaidsof
Justice ',
if
history,
ormore
precisely,
if
success,
i.e.successinwar,
isthecriterionofmerit,thenthe
standardofmeritmustitselfbe
c
influx'.Heraclitusmeetsthis
problemby
hisrelativism,andby
hisdoctrineofthe
identity
of
opposites.
This
springs
fromhis
theory
of
change.A
changing
thing
must
giveup
some
property
and
acquire
the
opposite
property.
Itisnotsomucha
thing
asa
process
oftransition
fromonestatetoan
oppositestate,and
thereby
aunificationof
the
opposite
states
ll
:
'
Cold
things
becomewarmandwarm
things
becomecold
;whatismoistbecomes
dry
andwhatis
dry
becomesmoist. . .Diseaseenablesusto
appreciate
health. . .
Lifeanddeath,beingawakeand
beingasleep,youth
andold
age,
allthisisidentical
;
fortheoneturnsintotheotherand
thelatterreturnsintotheformer. . .The
path
thatleads
up
andthe
path
thatleadsdownareidentical. . .The
divergent
agrees
withitself :itisa
harmonyresulting
from
oppositetensions,
asinthebow,orinthe
lyre.
. .The
oppositesbelong
toeach
other,thebestharmony results^
fromdiscord,and
everything
developsby
strife. ..Goodandbadareidentical.'
Buttheethicalrelativism
expressed
inthelast
fragment
does
not
prevent
Heraclitusfrom
developingupon
thebackground
ofhis
theory
ofthe
justiceofwarandtheverdictof
history
a
tribalistandromanticethicofFame,Fate,andthe
superiority
oftheGreatMan,
all
strangelysimilar*
tosome
very
modern
ideas
ia
:
'
Whofalls
fighting
willbe
glorifiedbygods
andby
men. . .,Thegreater
thefallthemore
glorious
thefate. ..

14
THEMYTHOFDESTINY
Thebestseekone
thing
aboveallothers :eternalfame. . .One
manisworthmorethantenthousand,
ifheisGreat.'
Itis
surprising
tofindinthese
earlyfragments,dating
from
about
500B.C.,
somuchthatischaracteristicofmodernanti-
democraticandhistoricisttendencies. But
apart
fromthefact
thatmany
oftheseideashave,through
themediumof
Plato,
become
part
ofthemain
body
of
philosophic tradition,the
similarity
ofdoctrinecan
perhaps
betosomeextent
explained
by
the
similarity
ofsocialconditions atthedifferent
periods
during
whichitarises. Itseemsasifhistoricistideas
easily
become
prominent
intimesof
great
social
change.They
appeared
whenGreektriballifebroke
up,
aswellaswhenthat
oftheJews
wasshattered
by
the
impact
ofthe
Babylonian
conquest
1S
.Therecanbelittledoubt,
I
believe,thatHeraclitus
5
philosophy
isan
expression
ofa
feeling
ofdrift
;a
feeling
which
seemstobea
typical
reactiontothedissolutionoftheancient
tribalformsofsociallife.Inmodern
Europe,
historicistIdeas
wererevived
during
theindustrialrevolution,and
especially
through
the
impact
ofthe
political
revolutionsinAmericaand
France
14
.It
appears
tobemorethanamerecoincidencethat
Hegel,
who
adopted
somuchofHeraclitus'
thought
and
passed
itontoallmodernhistoricistmovements,wasa
mouthpiece
of
thereaction
against
theFrenchRevolution.

CHAPTER3:PLATO'STHEORYOFIDEAS
Platolivedina
period
ofwarsandof
political
strifewhich
was,
forallweknow,evenmoreseverethanthatwhichhad
troubledHeraclitus. Beforehis
time,
thebreakdownofthe
triballifeoftheGreekshadledinAthens,
hisnative
city,
toa
period
of
tyranny,
andlatertotheestablishmentofa
democracy
whichtried
jealously
to
guard
itself
againstanyattempts
to
reintroduceeithera
tyranny
oran
oligarchy,
i.e.aruleofthe
leading
aristocraticfamilies
l
.
During
Plato's
youth,democratic
Athenswasinvolvedina
deadlywar
againstSparta,
the
leading
city-state
ofthe
Peloponnese,
whichhad
preservedmany
ofthe
lawsandcustomsoftheancient tribal
aristocracy.The
Peloponnesianwar
lasted,withan
interruption,
for
twenty-eight
years. (Inchapter 10,wherethehistorical
background
is
reviewedinmore
detail,
itwillbeshownthatthewardidnot
endwiththefallofAthensin
404B.C.,
asissometimesasserted
2
.)
Platowasborn
during
thewar,andhewasabout
twenty-four
whenitended. It
brought
terrible
epidemics,and,
initslast
year,famine,thefallofthe
city
ofAthens,
civilwar,andarule
of
terror,usually
calledtheruleofthe
ThirtyTyrants ;
these
wereled
by
twoofPlato'suncles,whobothlosttheirlivesinthe
courseofthecivilwar.Eventhe
peace
andthere-establishment
ofthe
democracy
meantno
respite
forPlato.Hisbelovedteacher
Socrates,whomhelatermadethemain
speaker
ofmostofhis
dialogues,
wastriedandexecuted. Platohimselfseemstohave
beenin
danger ;together
withother
companions
of
Socrates,
heleftAthens.
Later,onavisitto
Sicily,
Platobecame
entangled
inthe
politicalintrigues
whichwere
spun
atthecourtof
Dionysius I,
tyrant
of
Syracuse,
andevenafterhisreturntoAthensandthe
foundationoftheAcademy,
Platocontinued
along
withsome
ofhis
pupils
totakeanactive
part
inthe
conspiracies
and
revolutions
3
thatconstituted
Syracusanpolitics.
Thisbriefoutlineof
political
eventsmayhelp
to
explainwhy,
Plato,
likeHeraclitus,suffered
deeply
fromthe
instabilityand]
thelackof
security
inthe
political
lifeofhistime.Like
Heraclitus,Platowasof
royal
blood
;at>least,thetradition
claimsthathisfather's
family
traceditfdescentfromCodrus,
thelastofthetribal
kings
ofAttica
4
.Platowas
veryproud
of
'5

16 THEMYTHOF
hismother's
familywhich,
ashe
explains
inoneofhislast
dialogues,
theTimaeus,wasrelatedtothatofSolon,the
lawgiver
ofAthens.Toit
belonged
alsohisuncles,CritiasandCharmides^
the
leadingmenofthe
ThirtyTyrants.
Withsucha
family
tradition,
Platocouldbe
expected
totakea
deep
interestin
public
affairs
;andindeed,mostofhisworks
5
confirmthis
expectation.Hehimselfrelatesthathewas
*
fromthe
beginning
mostanxiousfor
politicalactivity ',butthathewasdeterredby
the
stirringexperiences
ofhis
youth.
'
Seeing
that
everything
swayed
andshiftedwithout
plan,
Ibecame
desperate/
From
the
feeling
that
society,
andindeed
c
everything ',wasin
flux,
arosethefundamental
impulse
ofhis
philosophy
aswellasof
the
philosophy
ofHeraclitus
;andashishistoricist
predecessor
haddone,
soPlatosummedup
hissocial
experiencebyproffering
alawofhistorical
development. According
tothislaw,which
willbemore
fully
discussedinthenext
chapter,
social
change
was
degeneration. Even
though
insomeofPlato'sworksthereisa
suggestion
ofa
cyclicdevelopment,leadingupagain
afterthe
lowest
point
ofextremeevilwas
passed,
themaintrendisoneof
decay.Ourowncosmic
period,
more
particularly,
isfora
long
timetocome
(itslength
is18,000years)
a
period
ofdeterioration,
andthis
period
isthe
only
onethat
playsany
roleinPlato's
philosophy
of
history.Theother
part
ofthe
cycle,
the
period
ofthe
rise,
isnowhere
clearly
referred
to,andthefew
vague
hints
given
arenotsufficienttoshowwhetherPlato
really
believed
init.Inwhat
follows,
Ishallthereforeconfinemyanalysis
to
themaindoctrineofPlato'shistoricism,namely,
tothedoctrine
thatthelawofhistorical
development
isoneof
degeneration
or
decay
6
.
Sofarwehaveseen
only
similaritiesbetweenPlatoand
Heraclitus. Butthereisan
important
difference. Platobelieved
inthe
possibility
of
breakingthrough
thisfatal
circle,andof
putting
anendtothe
process
of
decay.Hebelievedinthe
possibility
of
arresting
all
political change.Accordingly,
this
becomestheaimhestrivesfor*.Hetriestorealize it
by
establishing
astatewhichisfreefromtheevilsofallother
states,
becauseitdoesnot
change.
Itisthe
best,thearrestedstate.
Important
asthisdifference
is,
it
gives
risetoafurther
point
of
similaritybetweenPlatoandHeraclitus. Heraclitushad
generalized
his
experience
ofsocialflux
byextending
ittothe
worldof
*
all
things',and
Plato,
Ihavehinted,didthesame.
ButPlatoalsoextendedhisbeliefina
perfect
state
tlytt
doesnot

CHAPTER
3
:PLATO'STHEORYOFIDEAS
17
decay
totherealmof
*
all
things
'.Hebelievedthatto
every
kindof
ordinary
or
decayingthings,
there
corresponds
alsoa
perfectthing
thatdoesnot
decay.
Thisbeliefin
perfectand
unchangingthings,usually
calledthe
Theoryof
FormsorIdeas
8
,
becamethecentraldoctrineofhis
philosophy.
Plato'sbeliefthatitis
possible
forustobreaktheironlaw
of
destiny
andtoavoid
decaybyarresting
all
change,
showsthat
hishistoricisttendencieshaddefinitelimitations.Aradicaland
fullydeveloped
historicismdoesnotadmitthatman,byany
effort,canalterthelawsofhistorical
destiny
evenafterhehas
discoveredthem.Hecannotwork
againstthem,sinceallhis
plans
andactionsaremeansby
whichtheinexorablelawsof
development
realizehishistorical
destiny,just
as
Oedipus
met
hisfatebecauseofthe
prophecy
andthemeasurestakenby
his
fatherfor
avoidingit,andnotin
spite
ofthem.Inorderto
gain
abetter
understanding
ofthisradicalhistoricist
attitude,andto
analyse
the
oppositetendency
inherentinPlato'sbeliefthathe
couldinfluence
fate,
Ishallcontrasthistoricismwithadiametric-
allyoppositeapproach
whichmay
becalledtheattitudeofsocial
engineering
9
.
Thesocial
engineer
doesnotask
anyquestions
abouthistorical
tendenciesorthe
destiny
ofman.Hebelievesthatmanisthe
masterofhisown
destiny,
andthatinaccordancewithouraims,
wecaninfluenceor
change
the
history
ofman
just
aswehave
changed
thefaceoftheearth.Hedoesnotbelievethatthese
endsare
imposedupon
us
by
ourhistorical
background
orby
thetrendsof
history,
butratherthat
they
are
freely
createdby
ourselves,just
aswecreatenew
thoughts
ornewworksofartor
newhousesornew
machinery.
As
opposed
tothehistoricistwho
believesthat
intelligent political
action is
possibleonly
ifthe
futurecourseof
history
isfirstdetermined,thesocial
engineer!
believesthatthescientificbasisof
politics
wouldbe
very
different
;
itwouldbethefactualinformation
necessary
fortheconstruction
oralterationofsocial
institutions,inaccordancewithourwishes
andaims.Suchasciencewouldhavetotelluswhat
steps
we
musttakeifwewish,
for
instance,
toavoid
depressions,
orelse
to
producedepressions ;orifwewishtomakethedistribution
ofwealthmoreeven,orlesseven.Inotherwords,
thesocial
engineer
conceivesasthescientificbasisof
politicssomething
likeasocial
technology(Plato,
asweshall
see,compares
itwith
thescientific
background
of
medicine),
as
opposed
tothehistoricist
whounderstands itasascienceofimmutablehistoricaltendencies.

18 THEMYTHOFDESTINY
FromwhatIhavesaidabouttheattitudeofthesocial
engineer,
itmustnotbeinferredthatthereareno
important
differenceswithinthe
camp
ofthesocial
engineers.Onesuch
differencebetweenwhatIcall
'
piecemeal
social
engineering
'
and
c
Utopian
social
engineering ',
willbethemainthemeof
chapter9,
whereIshall
givemy
reasons
10
for
advocating
the
formerand
rejecting
thelatter.Butforthetime
being,
Iam
concerned
only
withthe
opposition
betweenhistoricismand
social
engineering.
This
opposition
can
perhaps
befurther
clarifiedifweconsidertheattitudestaken
upby
thehistoricist
andby
thesocial
engineer
towardssocialinstitutions.
Thehistoricist isinclinedtolook
upon
socialinstitutions
mainly
fromthe
point
ofviewoftheir
history,
i.e.their
origin,!
their
development,
andtheir
present
andfuture
significance.!
Hemayperhaps
insistthattheir
origin
isduetoadefinite
plan
or
design
andtothe
pursuit
ofdefiniteends,eitherhumanor
divine
;orhemay
assertthat
they
arenot
designed
toserve
any
clearly
conceivedends,butarerathertheimmediate
expression
ofcertaininstinctsand
passions ;orhemay
assertthat
they
haveonceservedasmeanstodefiniteends,butthat
they
have
lostthischaracter.Thesocial
engineer
and
technologist,
on
theotherhand,
will
hardly
takemuchinterestinthe
origin
of
institutions, orinthe
original
intentionsoftheirfounders.
Rather,hewill
put
his
problem
likethis.Ifsuchandsuchare
our
aims,
isthisinstitutionwell
designed
and
organized
toserve
them?Asan
examplewemay
considertheinstitutionof
insurance.Thesocial
engineer
or
technologist
willnot
worry
muchaboutthe
question
whetherinsurance
originated
asa
profit-seeking
business
;orwhether itshistoricalmission isto
servethecommonweal.Buthemay
offeracriticismofcertain
institutionsofinsurances,showing,perhaps,howtoincreasetheir
profits,or,whichisa
very
different
thing,howtoincreasethe
benefit
they
rendertothe
public ;andhewill
suggestways
in
which
they
couldbemademoreefficientin
serving
theoneend
ortheother.Asanother
example
ofasocial
institution,we
may
considera
police
force.Somehistoricistsmay
describe it
asaninstrument forthe
protection
offreedomand
security,
othersasaninstrumentofclassruleand
oppression.
Thesocial
engineer
or
technologist, however,would
perhaps suggest
measuresthatwouldirfokeitasuitableinstrumentforthe
protec-
tionoffreedomand
security,
andhe
might
alsodevisemeasures
bywhichitcouldbeturnedintoapowerfulweaponforclass

CHAPTER
3
:PLATO'STHEORYOFIDEAS
19
rule.
(In
hisfunctionasacitizenwhohascertainendsin
whichhe
believes,hemaydemandthattheseends,andthe
appropriatemeasures,shouldbe
adopted.
Butasa
technologist,
hewould
carefullydistinguish
betweenthe
question
oftheends
andtheirchoiceand
questionsconcerning
the
facts,
i.e.the
socialeffectsof
any
measurewhich
might
betakenn
.)
Speakingmore
generally,wecan
say
thatthe
engineer
orthe
technologistapproaches
institutions
rationally
asmeansthatservd
certainends,andthatasa
technologist
he
judges
them
wholly
according
totheir
appropriateness, efficiency, simplicity,
etc.
The
historicist,ontheotherhand,wouldrather
attempt
tofind
outthe
*
truerole
'
playedby
theseinstitutionsinthe
develop-
mentof
history,evaluatingthem,forinstance,as
*
willedby
God
',or
c
willed
by
Fate
',or
c
servingimportant
historical
trends
',
etc.
Thetwoattitudes,historicismandsocial
engineering,
occur
sometimes inrather
typical
combinations. Theearliestand
probably
themostinfluential
example
oftheseisthesocialand
politicalphilosophy
ofPlato. Itcombines, asitwere,some
fairly
obvious
technological
elementsinthe
foregrojund^with^
background
dbminatccl
by
an
^labo^e^display of_jypk:ally
InstoricistTfeatures; The""C"ofnBmation is
representativeoTquife
anumberofsocTaland
politicalphilosophers
who
produced
what
havebeenlaterdescribedas
Utopiansystems.
Allthese
systems
recommendsomekindofsocial
engineering,
since
they
demand
the
adoption
ofcertaininstitutionalmeans,though
not
always
very
realisticones,fortheachievementoftheirends.Butwhen
we
proceed
toaconsiderationoftheseends,thenwe
frequently
findthat
they
aredetermined
by
historicism. Plato's
political
ends,especially,depend
toaconsiderableextentonhishistoricist
doctrines.
First,
itishisaimto
escape
theHeraclitean
flux,
manifestedinsocialrevolutionandhistorical
decay. Secondly,
hebelievesthatthiscanbedone
byestablishing
astatewhich
isso
perfect
thatitdoesnot
participate
inthe
general
trendof
historical
development. Thirdly,
hebelievesthatthemodelor
original
ofhis
perfect
statecanbefoundinthedistant
past,
in
thedawnof
history ;foriftheworlddecays
intime,thenwe
mustfind
increasingperfection
thefurtherwego
backinto
the
past.The
perfect
stateis
something
likethefirstancestor,
the
primogenitor,
ofthelater
states,whichare,
asitwere^the
degenerateoffspring
ofthis
perfect,
or
best,or
c
ideal
'
state
ia
;an
idealstatewhichisnotamere
phantasm,
noradream,but

2O THEMYTHOFDESTINY
whichisinits
stabilitymorerealindeedthanallthose
decaying
societieswhicharein
flux,andliableto
passaway
at
any
moment.
ThusevenPlato's
politicalend,
thebest
state,
is
largely
dependent
onhishistoricism
;andwhatistrueofhis
philosophy
ofthestatecanbeextended,
as
alreadyindicated,
tohis
general
philosophy
of
*
all
things
'.
The
things
in
flux,the
degenerate
and
decayingthings,
are
(like
the
state)
the
offspring,
thechildren,asitwere,of
perfect
things.Andlikechildren,they
are
copies
oftheir
original
primogenitors. Thefatheror
original
ofa
thing
influxiswhat
Platocallsits
'
Form
'
orits
'
Pattern
'
orits
c
Idea'.As
before,
wemustinsistthattheFormorIdea,
in
spite
ofitsname,
isno
*
ideainourmind
*
;
itisnota
phantasm,
noradream,buta
real
thing.
It
is,indeed,morerealthanallthe
ordinarythings
whicharein
flux,andwhich,
in
spite
oftheir
apparentsolidity,
aredoomedto
decay ;
fortheFormorIdeaisa
thing
thatis
perfect,
anddoesnot
perish.
TheFormsorIdeasmustnotbe
thought
todwell,
like
perishablethings,
in
space
andtime.They
areoutside
space,
andalsooutsidetime
(becausethey
are
eternal).
But
they
are
incontactwith
space
andtime
;
forsince
they
arethe
primo-
genitors
ofthe
things
which
develop
and
decay
in
space
andtime,
they
musthavebeenincontactwith
space,
atthe
beginning
of
time.Since
they
arenotwithusinour
space
andtime,they
cannotbe
perceivedby
our
senses,
ascanthe
ordinarychanging
things
whichinteractwithoursensesandarethereforecalled
*
sensible
things
*.Thosesensible
things
whichare
copies
or
childrenofthesame
original,
resemblenot
only
this
originalj
theirFormor
Idea,butalsooneanother,
asdochildrenofthe
same
family ;andaschildrenarecalled
by
thenameoftheir
father,
soarethesensible
things,
whichbearthenameoftheir
FormsorIdeas
;
'
They
areallcalledafterthem
',asAristotle
says
1S
.
This
comparison
betweentheFormorIdeaofaclassof
sensible
things
andthefatherofa
family
ofchildreni$developed
by
Platointhe
Timaeus,oneofhislatest
dialogues.
Itisin
close
agreement
14
withmuchofhisearlier
writingJonwhichit
throwsconsiderable
light.
Butinthe
Timaeus,
Plato
goes
one
stepbeyond
hisearlier
teachingwhenhe
represents
thecontact
oftheFormorIdeaWiththeworldof
space
andtime
by
an
extensionofhissimile.Hedescribestheabstract
*
space
'
in
whichthesensiblethingsmove(originallythespaceorgap

CHAPTER
3
:PLATOSTHEORYOFIDEAS 21
betweenheavenand
earth)
asa
receptacle,
and
compares
itwith
themotherof
things,
inwhichatthe
beginning
oftimethe
sensible
things
arecreated
by
theFormswhich
stamp
or
impress
themselvesuponpurespace,and
therebygive
the
offspring
their
shape.
c
Wemustconceive
',writesPlato,
c
threekindsof
things
:
first,thosewhich
undergogeneration ;secondly,
that
inwhich
generation
takes
place,
and
thirdly,
themodelinwhose
likenessthe
generatedthings
areborn.Andwemaycompare
the
receivingprinciple
toamother,andthemodeltoa
father,
andtheir
product
toachild/Andhe
goes
ontodescribefirst
the
fathers,the
unchanging
FormsorIdeas :
*
Thereisfirstthe
unchangingForm,uncreatedand
indestructible,
. .invisibleand
imperceptiblebyanysense,andwhichcanbe
contemplatedonly
bypurethought.'To
anysingle
oneoftheseFormsorIdeas
belongs
its
offspring
orraceofsensible
things,
'
anotherkindof
things,bearing
thenameoftheirFormand
resembling it,but
perceptible
tosense,created,always
in
flux,generated
ina
place
and
againvanishing
fromthat
place,
and
apprehendedbyopinion
based
uponperception
'.Andtheabstract
space
which is
likenedtothemother,
isdescribedthus :
*
Thereisathirdkind,
which is
space,
andis
eternal,andcannotbe
destroyed, arid
which
provides
ahomeforall
generatedthings.
..'
15
Itmay
contributetothe
understanding
ofPlato's
theory
of
FormsorIdeasifwe
compare
itwithcertainGreek
religious
beliefs.Asinmanyprimitivereligions,someatleastofthe
Greek
gods
are
nothing
butidealizedtribal
primogenitors
and
heroes.
Accordingly,
certaintribesandfamiliestracedtheir
ancestry
tooneorotherofthe
gods. (Plato'sown
family
is
reported
tohavetraceditsdescentfromthe
god
Poseidon
ie
.)
Wehave
only
toconsiderthatthese
gods
areimmortaloreternal,
and
perfect(orverynearlyso)
whilemenareinvolvedinthe
fluxofall
things,
and
subject
to
decay(which
indeed isthe
ultimate
destiny
of
everyhuman
individual),
inordertoseethat
these
gods
arerelatedtomenin
tfie
sameway
asPlato'sForms
orIdeasarerelatedtothosesensible
things
whicharetheir
copies
17
(or
his
perfect
statetothevariousstatesnow
existing).
There
is,however,an
important
differencebetweenGreek
mythology
andPlato's
Theory
ofFormsorIdeas.Whilethe
Greekveneratedmanygods
astheancestorsofvarioustribesor
families,theTheory
ofIdeasdemandstfiaethereshouldbe
only
oneFormorIdeaofman
(orperhaps
oneFormorIdeaofthe
Greekman,andoneeachofthevariousBarbarianraces
18
);

22 THEMYTHOFDESTINY
foritisoneofthecentraldoctrinesoftheTheory
ofFormsthat
thereis
only
oneFormof
every
*
race
'
or
c
kind
'
of
things.The
uniqueness
oftheFormwhich
corresponds
tothe
uniqueness
of
the
primogenitor
isdemanded ifthe
theory
isto
perform
oneof
itsmost
importantfunctions,namely,
to
explain
the
similarity
ofsensible
things,byproposing
thatthesimilar
things
are
copies
or
imprints
ofoneForm.Thusifthereweretwo
equal
orsimilar
Forms,their
similarity
wouldforceustoassumethat
they
are
both
copies
ofathird
original,
whichthereforewouldbethe
only
trueand
single
Form.Or,
asPlato
puts
itintheTimaeus :
c
Theresemblancewouldthusbe
explained,
more
precisely,
not
asonebetweenthesetwo
things,
butinreferencetothat
superior
thing
which istheir
prototype.'
10
Inthe
Republic,
which is
earlierthantheTimaeus,Platohad
explained
his
point
even
more
clearly,using
ashis
example
the
j
essentialbed
',
i.e.the
FormorIdeaofabed :
c
God . .hasmadeoneessential
bed,
and
only
one
;twoormorehedidnot
produce,
andneverwill. . .
For . .evenifGodweretomaketwo,andnomore,thenanother
wouldbe
brought
to
light,namely
theFormexhibited
by
those
two
;this,andnotthosetwo,wouldthenbetheessentialbed/
20
This
argument
showsthattheFormsorIdeas
provide
Plato
not
only
withan
origin
or
startingpoint
forall
developments
in
space
andtime
(andespecially
forhuman
history)
butalsowith
an
explanation
ofthesimilaritiesbetweensensible
things
ofthe
samekind. If
things
aresimilarbecauseofsome
property
which
theyshare,
for
instance,
r
whiteness,or
hardness,or
goodness,
thenthis
property
mustbeoneandthesameinallofthem
;
otherwise itwouldnotmakethemsimilar.
According
to
Plato,
they
all
participate
intheoneFormorIdeaof
whiteness,
if
they
arewhite
;ofhardness,
if
they
arehard.Theyparticipate
in
thesenseinwhichchildren
participate
intheirfather's
possessions
and
gifts ;just
asthemanyparticularreproductions
ofan
etching
whichareall
impressions
fromoneandthesame
plate,
and
hencesimilartoone
another^mayparticipate
inthe
beauty
of
the
original.
Thefactthatthis
theory
is
designed
to
explain
thesimilarities
insensible
things
doesnotseematfirst
sight
tobein
anyway
connectedwithhistoricism. Butitis
;andasAristotletells
us,
itwas
just
thisconnectionwhichinducedPlatoto
develop
the
Theory
ofIdeas. I*stallattempt
to
give
anoutlineofthis
development, using
Aristotle'saccount
together
withsome
indicationsinPlato'sown
writings.

CHAPTER
3
:PLATO'STHEORYOFIDEAS
23
Ifall
things
areincontinuous
flux,thenitis
impossible
to
sayanything
definiteaboutthem.Wecanhavenorealknow-
ledge
ofthem,but,atthe
best,vagueanddelusive
'
opinions
'.
This
point,
asweknowfromPlatoandAristotle
21
,worried
many
followersofHeraclitus. Parmenides, oneofPlato's
predecessorswhoinfluencedhim
greatly,
had
taught
thatthe
pureknowledge
of
reason,
as
opposed
tothedelusive
opinion
of
experience,
couldhaveasits
objectonly
aworldwhichdidnot
change,
andthatthe
pureknowledge
ofreasondidinfactreveal
suchaworld.Butthe
unchanging
andundivided
reality
which
Parmenides
thought
hehaddiscoveredbehindtheworldof
perishablethings
22
,was
entirely
unrelatedtothisworldinwhich
weliveanddie. Itwastherefore
incapable
of
explaining
it.
With
this,Platocouldnotbesatisfied.Muchashedisliked
and
despised
this
empirical
worldof
flux,hewas,
atbottom,most
deeply
interestedinit.Hewantedtounveilthesecretofits
decay,
ofitsviolent
changes,
andofits
unhappiness.He
hoped
todiscoverthemeansofitssalvation.Hewasinterestedin
Parmenides'doctrineofan
unchanging, real,and
perfect
world
behindthis
ghostly
worldinwhichhe
suffered,butitdidnot
solvehis
problems
as
long
asitremainedunrelatedtotheworld
ofsensible
things.Whathewas
looking
forwas
knowledge,
not
opinion ;the
pure
rational
knowledge
ofaworldthatdoesnot
change ;but,
atthesame
time,knowledge
thatcouldbeusedto
investigate
this
changingworld,and
especially,
this
changing
society,politicalchange,
withits
strange
historicallaws.Plato
aimedat
discovering
thesecretofthe
royalknowledge
of
politics,
oftheartof
ruling
men.
Butanexactscienceof
politics
seemedas
impossible
as
any
exact
knowledge
ofaworldinflux
;therewerenofixed
objects
inthe
political
field.Howcouldonediscuss
anypolitical
questions
whenthe
meaning
ofwordslike
'
government
'
or
c
state
'
or
*
city
'
changed
with
everynew
phase
inthehistorical
development
?Political
theory
musthaveseemedtoPlatoin
hisHeraclitean
period
tobe
just
as
elusive,fluctuating,
and
unfathomable as
politicalpractice.
InthissituationPlatoobtained,
asAristotletells
us,amost
important
hintfromSocrates. Socrateswasinterestedinethical
matters
;hewasanethicalreformer,amoralistwho
pestered
all
kindsof
people,forcing
themtothink,
to
explain,
andtoaccount
forthe
principles
oftheiractions.Heusedto
question
themand
wasnot
easily
satisfiedby
theiranswers.The
typicalreply,
we

24 THEMYTHOFDESTINY
act
so,becauseitis
'
wise
'
toactinthis,
way(or
'
efficient
',or
*
just',or
c
pious*,etc.)only
incitedhimtocontinuehis
questions
byasking
whatiswisdom
;or
efficiency ;or
justice ;or
piety.
Sohe
discussed,
for
instance,thewisdom
displayed
invarious
tradesand
professions,
inordertofindoutwhatiscommonto
allthesevariousand
changing
c
wise
'
ways
of
behaviour,andso
tofindoutwhat
*
wisdom
'
reallymeans,or
(using
Aristotle's
way
of
putting it)
whatitsessence is.
*
Itwasnatural
',says
Aristotle,
*
thatSocratesshouldsearchfortheessence
'
23
,
i.e.
forthe
real,the
unchanging
oressential
meaning
oftheterms.
'
Inthisconnectionhebecamethefirsttoraisethe
problem
of
universaldefinitions.
3
These
attempts
ofSocrates todiscussethicaltermslike
'justice
'
or
*
modesty
'
or
*
piety
'
havebeen
rightlycompared
withmoderndiscussionson
Liberty(by
Mill
24
,
for
instance),
or
on
Authority,
orontheIndividualand
Society(byCatlin,
for
instance).There isnoneedtoassumethat
Socrates,
inhis
searchforthe
unchanging
oressential
meaning
ofsuch
terms,
personifiedthem,orthathetreatedthemlike
things.
Aristotle's
report
atleast
suggests
thathedidnot,andthatitwasPlato
who
developed
Socrates'methodof
searching
forthe
meaning
oressenceintoamethodof
determining
thereal
nature,the
FormorIdeaofa
thing.
Platoretained
'
theHeraclitean
doctrinesthatallsensible
things
areeverinastateof
flux,and
thatthereisno
knowledge
aboutthem
',butfoundinSocrates'
methodaway
outofthesedifficulties.Though
there
*
couldbe
nodefinitionof
any
sensible
thing,
as
they
were
alwayschanging ',
therecouldbedefinitionsandtrue
knowledge
of
things
ofa
differentkind.
'
If
knowledge
or
thought
weretohavean
object,
therewouldhavetobesome
different,some
unchangingentities,
apart
fromthosewhicharesensible
',says
Aristotle
25
,andhe
reports
ofPlatothat
'
things
ofthisother
sort,then,hecalled
Formsor
Ideas,andthesensible
things,
hesaid,weredistinct
fromthem,andallcalled
^ifterthem.Andthemanythings
whichhavethesamenameasacertainFormorIdeaexist
by
participating
init/
ThisaccountofAristotle's
correspondsexactly
toPlato'sown
argumentsproffered
intheTimaeus
*8
,anditshowsthatPlato's
fundamental
problem
wastofindascientificmethodof
dealing
withsensible
things.Hewantedtoobtain
purely
rational
knowledge,andnot
merelyopinion
;andsince
pureknowledge
ofsensible
things
couldnotbeobtained,he
insisted,asmentioned

CHAPTER
3
:PLATO'STHEORYOFIDEAS
25
before,on
obtaining
atleastsuch
pureknowledge
aswasinsome
wayrelated,and
applicable,
tosensible
things.Knowledge
of
theFormsorIdeasfulfilledthisdemand,
sincetheFormwas
relatedtoitssensible
things
likeafathertohischildrenwhoare
under
age.
TheFormwastheaccountable
representative
ofthe
sensible
things,
andcouldthereforebeconsultedin
important
questionsconcerning
theworldofflux.
According
toour
analysis,
the
theory
ofFormsorIdeashas
atleastthreedifferentfunctionsinPlato's
philosophy, (i)
It
isan
importantmethodological device,foritmakes
possiblepure
scientific
knowledge,
andeven
knowledgewhichcouldbe
applied
totheworldof
changingthings
ofwhichwecannot
immediately
obtainanyknowledge,
but
onlyopinion.Thus itbecomes
possible
to
enquire
intothe
problems
ofa
changingsociety,
and
tobuildup
a
political
science.
(2)
It
provides
thecluetoa
theory
of
changeand
decay,
toa
theory
of
generationandde-
generation,
and
especially,
theclueto
history. (3)
It
opens
a
way,
inthesocialrealm,towardssomekindofsocial
engineering ;
anditmakes
possible
the
forging
ofinstruments for
arresting
socialchange,
sinceit
suggestsdesigning
a
'
beststate
'
whichso
closely
resemblestheFormorIdeaofastatethatitcannot
decay.
Problem
(2),
the
theory
of
change
andof
history,
willbe
dealtwithinthenexttwo
chapters,4and
5,
wherePlato's
descriptivesociology
is
treated,
i.e.his
description
and
explana-
tionofthe
changing
socialworldinwhichhelived.Problem
(3),
the
arresting
ofsocial
change,
willbedealtwithin
chapters
6to
9,treating
Plato's
politicalprogramme.
Problem
(i),
that
ofPlato's
methodology,
haswiththe
help
ofAristotle'saccount
ofthe
history
ofPlato's
theory
been
briefly
outlinedinthe
present
chapter.
Tothis
discussion,
Iwishtoaddhereafewmore
remarks.
Iusethename
methodological
essentiaUsmtocharacterizethe
view,held
by
Platoandmany
ofTns
followers,thatitisthetask
of
pureknowledge
orsciencetodiscoverandtodescribethe
truenatureof
things,
i.e.theirhidden
reality
oressence. It
wasPlato's
peculiar
beliefthattheessenceofsensible
things
can
befoundintheir
primogenitors
orForms.Butmany
ofthe
later
methodological essentialists,forinstance,Aristotle,didnot
altogether
followhimin
this,althoughthey
all
agreed
withhim
in
determining
thetaskof
pureknowledge
'asthe
discovery
of
thehiddennatureorFormoressenceof
things.
Allthese
methodological
essentialistsalso
agreed
withPlatoin
maintaining
O.S.I.E.VOL.i B

26 THEMYTHOFDESTINY
thattheseessencesmay
bediscoveredanddiscernedwiththe
help
ofintellectualintuition
;that
every
essencehasaname
proper
to
it,thenameafterwhichthesensible
things
are
called
;andthatitmay
bedescribedinwords.Anda
descrip-
tionoftheessenceofa
thingthey
allcalledadefinition. Accord-
ing
to
methodological essentialism,therecanbethree
ways
of
knowing
a
thing
:
*
Imeanthatwecanknowits
unchanging
reality
oressence
;andthatwecanknowthedefinitionofthe
essence
;andthatwecanknowitsname.
Accordingly,
two
questionsmay
beformulatedabout
any
real
thing.
. .:A
person
maygive
thenameandaskforthedefinition
;orhemaygive
thedefinitionandaskforthename.'Asan
example
ofthis
method,Platousestheessenceof
c
even
'
(asopposed
to
c
odd
')
:
'
Number . .may
bea
thingcapable
ofdivisioninto
equal
parts.
Ifitisso
divisible,numberisnamed
"
even
"
;andthe
definitionofthename
"
even
"
is"anumberdivisibleinto
equalparts"...Andwhenweare
given
thenameandasked
aboutthe
definition,
.orwhenweare
given
thedefinitionand
askedaboutthename,we
speak,
inbothcases,ofoneandthe
same
essence,whetherwecallitnow
"
even
"
or"anumber
divisibleinto
equalparts
5
VAfterthis
example,
Plato
proceeds
to
apply
thismethodtoa
'
proofconcerning
therealnatureof
the
soul,aboutwhichweshallhearmorelater
27
.
Methodological essentialism,
i.e.the
theory
thatitistheaim
ofsciencetorevealessencesandtodescribethem
by
meansof
definitions,canbebetterunderstoodwhencontrastedwithits
opposite,methodological
nominalism. Insteadof
aiming
at
finding
outwhata
thingreallyis,andat
defining
itstruenature,methodo-
logical
nominalismaimsat
describinghowa
thingbehaves,and
especially,
whetherthereare
anyregularities
initsbehaviour.
Inotherwords,methodologicalnominalismseestheaimofscience
inthe
description
ofthe
thingsandeventsofour
experience,
andinan
*
explanation
'
ofthese
events,
i.e.their
description
withthe
help
ofuniversallaws
28
.Anditseesinour
language,
and
especially
intheruleswhich
distinguishproperly
constructed
sentencesandinferencesfromamere
heap
ofwords,the
great
instrumentofscientific
description
29
;wordsitconsidersrather
as
subsidiary
toolsforthis
task,andnotasnamesofessences.
The
methodological
nominalistwillneverthinkthata
'question
like
'
Whatis
energy
?,
'
or
*
Whatismovement?
'
or
*
Whatis
anatom?
'
isan
importantquestion
for
physics ;buthewill
consider
important
a
question
like :
'
Howcanthe
energy
of

CHAPTER
3
:PLATOSTHEORYOFIDEAS
27
thesunbemadeuseful?
'
or
c
Howdoesa
planetmove?
'
or
c
Underwhatconditiondoesanatomradiate
light
?
'
Andto
those
philosophers
whotellhimthatbefore
having
answered
the
c
what
'
question
hecannot
hope
to
give
exactanswersto
any
ofthe
c
how
'
questions,
hewill
reply,
ifat
all,bypointing
outthathemuch
prefers
thatmodest
degree
ofexactnesswhich
hecanachieve
by
hismethodstothe
pretentiousmuddlewhich
they
haveachieved
by
theirs.
Asindicated
by
our
example,methodological
nominalism is
nowadaysfairlygenerallyaccepted
inthenaturalsciences.The
problems
ofthesocial
sciences,ontheotherhand,arestillfor
themost
part
treated
by
essentialistmethods. This
is,
inmy
opinion,
oneofthemainreasonsfortheirbackwardness. But
manywhohavenoticed thissituation
30
judge
it
differently.
They
believethatthedifferenceinmethodis
necessary,andthat
itreflectsan
6
essential
'
differencebetweenthe
*
natures
'
ofthese
twofieldsofresearch.
The
arguments usually
offeredin
support
ofthisview
emphasize
the
importance
of
change
in
society,
andexhibitother
featuresofhistoricism.The
physicist,
sorunsa
typicalargument,
dealswith
objects
like
energy
oratomswhich,thoughchanging,
retainacertain
degree
of
constancy.Hecandescribethe
changes
encountered
by
these
relativelyunchanging entities,and
doesnothavetoconstructordetectessencesorFormsorsimilar
unchanging
entitiesinordertoobtain
somethingpermanent
of
whichhecanmakedefinite
pronouncements. Thesocial
scientist,however,
isina
very
different
position.
Hiswhole
fieldofinterestis
changing.
Thereareno
permanent
entitiesin
thesocialrealmwhere
everything
isunderthesway
ofhistorical
flux.How,
forinstance,canwe
studygovernment
?Howcould
we
identify
itinthe
diversity
of
governmental institutions,found
indifferentstatesatdifferenthistorical
periods,
without
assuming
that
they
have
something essentially
incommon?Wecallan
institutiona
government
ifwethinkthatitis
essentially
a
govern-
ment,
i.e.ifit
complies
withtheintuitionofwhata
government
is,anintuitionwhichwecanformulateinadefinition.The
samewouldhold
good
forother
sociological entities,suchas
*
civilization '.Wehaveto
grasp
their
essence,andto
lay
it
downintheformofadefinition.
Thesemodern
argumentsare,
I
think,very
similartothose
Deported
abovewhich,according
toAristotle,
ledPlatotohis
doctrineofFormsorIdeas.The
only
difference isthatPlato

28 THEMYTHOFDESTINY
(who
didnot
accept
theatomic
theory
andknew
nothing
about
energy)applied
hisdoctrinetotherealmof
physicsalso,and
thustotheworldasawhole.Wehavehereanindicationofthe
factthatinthesocial
sciences,adiscussionofPlato'smethods
maybe
topical
even
to-day.
Before
proceeding
toPlato's
sociology
andtotheusehemade
ofhis
methodological
essentialisminthat
field,
Iwishtomakeit
quite
clearthatIam
confiningmy
treatmentofPlatotohis
historicism,andtohis
*
beststate'.Imustthereforewarnthe
readernotto
expect
a
representation
ofthewholeofPlato's
philosophy,
orwhatmay
becalleda
c
fairand
just
'
treatment
ofPlatonism.My
attitudetowardshistoricism isoneoffrank
hostility,
based
upon
theconvictionthathistoricism is
futile,and
worsethanthat.Mysurvey
ofthehistoricist featuresin
Platonism istherefore
strongly
critical.
Although
Iadmiremuch
in
Plato,especially
those
parts
whichIbelievetobeSocratic,
Idonotthinkitmy
tasktoaddtothecountlesstributestohis
genius.
Iam,rather,benton
destroying
whatisinmyopinion
mostmischievous inthis
philosophy.
ThisisPlato's
political
totalitarianism, thecriticismofwhichishere,
I
believe,carried
considerably
furtherthanby
thoseotherrecentcritics
31
who
first
pointed
outthe
distinctly
fascistflavourofPlato's
politics.

CHAPTER4:CHANGEANDREST
Platowasoneofthefirstsocialscientistsand
undoubtedly
by
farthemostinfluential. Inthesenseinwhichtheterm
e
sociology
'
wasunderstood
byComte,Mill,and
Spencer,
he
wasa
sociologist ;
thatisto
say,
he
successfullyapplied
his
ideaJisLjnethod toan
Analysis
ofthesociallifeotman,
andTof
thelawsoTits
development
aswellasthelawsandconditions
ofits
stability.
In
spite
ofPlato's
greatinfluence,
thissideof
his
teaching
hasbeenlittlenoticed. Thisseemstobedueto
twofactors. Firstof
all,muchofPlato's
sociology
is
presented
byhiminsuchcloseconnectionwithhisethicaland
political
demandsthatthe
descriptive
elementshavebeen
largely
over-
looked.
Secondly,many
ofhis
thoughtsweresofartakenfor
granted
that
they
were
simply
absorbed
unconsciously
and
therefore
uncritically.
Itis
mainly
inthis
way
thathis
sociological
theoriesbecamesoinfluential.
Plato's
sociology
isan
ingenious
blendof
speculation
with
acuteobservationoffacts. Its
speculativesetting is,ofcourse,
the
theory
ofFormsandofuniversalfluxand
decay,
of
generation
and
degeneration.
ButonthisidealistfoundationPlatocon-
structsan
astonishingly
realistic
theory
of
society,capable
of
explaining
themaintrendsinthehistorical
development
ofthe
Greek
city-states
aswellasthesocialand
political
forcesat
workinhisown
day.
The
speculative
or
metaphysical setting
ofPlato's
theory
of
social
change
has
already
beensketched. Itisthew&rldof
unchanging
FormsorIdeas,ofwhichtheworldof
changing
things
in
space
andtimeisthe
offspring.TheFormsorIdeas
arenot
onlyunchanging, indestructible,and
incorruptible,
but
also
perfect,true,real,and
good ;
in
fact,
e
good
3
isonce,
in
the
Republic
1
,explained
as
c
everything
that
preserves ',and
'
evil
'
as
*
everything
that
destroys
or
corrupts
'.The
perfect
and
goodFormsorIdeasare
prior
tothe
copies,
thesensible
things,
and
they
are
something
like
primogenitors
or
starting
points
2
ofallthe
changes
intheworldofflux.Thisviewis
usedfor
evaluating
the
general
trendandmaindirectionofall
29

30
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
changes
intheworldofsensible
things.
Forifthe
starting
point
ofall
change
is
perfect
and
good,
then
change
can
only
beamovementthatleadsaway
fromthe
perfect
and
good ;
itmustbedirectedtowardsthe
imperfect
andtheevil,towards
corruption.
This
theory
canbe
developed
indetail.Themore
closely
asensible
thing
resembles itsFormorIdea,theless
corruptible
itmustbe,sincetheFormsthemselvesare
incorruptible.
But
sensible
things
arenot
perfectcopies ;indeed,no
copy
canbe
perfect,
sinceitis
only
animitationofthetrue
reality,only
appearance
and
illusion,notthetruth.
Accordingly,
nosensible
things
resembletheirForms
sufficientlyclosely
tobe
unchange-
able.
*
Only
themostdivine
things
remain
unchanged
'
3
,
says
Plato.Asensible
thing,
ifitisa
goodcopy,maychange
onlyvery
littleatfirst.But
everychange,
however
small,must
makeitdifferentfromwhatithasbeen
before,andmustthus
makeitless
perfectbyreducing
itsresemblance toitsForm.
Inthis
way,
the
thing
becomesmore
changeable
with
every
change,andmore
corruptible,
sinceitbecomesfurtherremoved
fromitsForm,whichisits
*
causeof
immobilityandof
being
atrest
',asAristotle
says.
Thuswecanunderstandwhy
Plato
teachesintheLaws,thelastofhis
greatdialogues,
that
c
any
changewhatever,withthe
possibleexception
ofthe
change
of
anevil
thing,
isthemostterrible
danger
thatcanbe
imagined ',
adding
forthesakeof
emphasis
:
'
Andthisistrueofall
things,
except
theevilones,
asmentioned before.' In
brief,Plato
teachesthat
change
is
evil,andrestdivine.
WeseenowthatPlato's
theory
ofFormsorIdeas
implies
acertaintrendinthe
development
oftheworldinflux. It
leadstothelawthatthe
corruptibility
ofall
things
inthatworld
must
continually
increase. Itisnotsomucha
rigid
lawof
universallyincreasingcorruption,
butratheralawof
increasing
corruptibility ;
thatisto
say,
the
danger
orthelikelihoodof
corruptionincreases,but
exceptionaldevelopments
intheother
directionarenotexcluded.Thusitis
possible,
asthelast
quotationindicates,
that
very
evil
things,
forinstancea
very
evil
city,may
be
improvedbychange. (In
orderthatsuch
an
improvement
shouldbeof
anyvalue,wewouldhaveto
try
tomakeit
permanent,
i.e.toarrestallfurther
change.)
Infullaccordancewiththis
generaltheory
isPlato's
story,
intheTimaeus,ofthe
origin
of
species.According
tothis
story,
man,the
highest
of
animals,
is
generatedby
the
god^
;
theother

CHAPTER
4
:CHANGEANDREST
3!
speciesoriginate
fromhimby
a
process
of
corruptionand
degeneration. First,certainmen
degenerate
intowomen.
Later,stepbystep,theydegenerate
intotheloweranimals.
Birds,wehear,cameinto
beingthrough
thetransformation of
harmlessbuttoo
easy-goingpeople
whowouldtrusttheirsenses
toomuch
;
'
landanimalscamefrom'menwhohadnointerest
in
philosophy
'
;and
fishes,including shell-fish,
c
degenerated
fromthemost
foolish,stupid,
and . .
unworthy
'
ofallmen
4
.
Itisclearthatthis
theory
canbe
applied
tohuman
society,
andtoits
history.
Itthen
explains
Hesiod's
5
pessimistic
developmental law,
thelawofhistorical
decay.
Ifweareto
believeAristotle's
report
outlinedinthelast
chapter,
thenthe
theory
ofFormsorIdeaswas
originally
introducedinorderto
meeta
methodologicaldemand,thedemandfor
pure
orrational
knowledge
whichis
impossible
inthecaseofsensible
things
in
flux.Wenowseethatthe
theory
doesmorethanthat.Over
andabove
meeting
these
methodologicaldemands,
it
explains
the
general
directionofthefluxofallsensible
things,and
thereby
thehistorical
tendency
to
degenerate
shown
byman
andhuman
society.(And
itdocsstillmore
;
asweshallsee
in
chapter6,the
theory
ofFormsdeterminesthetrendofPlato's
political
demands
also,andeventhemeansfortheir
realization.)
If,
asI
believe,
the
philosophies
ofPlatoaswellasHeraclitus
sprang
fromtheirsocial
experience,especially
fromthe
experi-
enceofclasswarandfromthe
abjectfeeling
thattheirsocial
worldwas
going
to
pieces,
thenwecanunderstandwhy
the
theory
ofFormscameto
play
suchan
importantpart
inPlato's
philosophy
whenhefoundthatitwas
capable
of
explaining
thetrendtowards
degeneration.Hemusthavewelcomed itas
thesolutionofamost
mystifying
riddle.WhileHeraclitushad
beenunableto
pass
adirectethicalcondemnation
upon
the
trendofthe
politicaldevelopment,
Platofound,inhis
theory
ofForms,thetheoretical basisfora
pessimisticjudgement
in
Hesiod'svein.
ButPlato's
greatness
asa
sociologist
doesnotlieinhis
general
andabstract
speculations
aboutthelawofsocial
decay.
It
liesratherinthewealthanddetailofhisobservations,andin
the
amazing
acutenessofhis
sociological,
intuition.Hesaw
things
whichnot
only
hadnotbeenseenbeforehim,butwhich
wererediscovered
only
inourowntinte.Asan
example
I
may
mentionhis
theory
ofthe
primitivebeginnings
of
society,
oftribalpatriarchy,and,ingeneral,hisattempt
tooutlinethe

32
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
typicalperiods
inthe
development
ofsocial life.Another
example
isPlato's
sociological
andeconomic
historicism,
his
emphasis
ontheeconomic
background
of
political
lifeand
historical
developments ;a
theory
revivedbyMarxunderthe
name
'
historicalmaterialism '.Athird
example
isPlato's
m6st
interesting
lawof
politicalrevolutions,according
towhich
allrevolutions
presuppose
adisunited
ruling
class
;alawwhich
formsthebasisofhis
analysis
ofthemeansof
arrestingpolitical
change
and
creating
social
equilibrium,
andwhichhasbeen
recently
rediscovered
by
thetheoreticians of
totalitarianism,
especiallyby
Pareto.
Ishallnow
proceed
toamoredetaileddiscussionofthese
points,especially
the
third,
the
theory
ofrevolutionandof
equilibrium.
The
dialogues
inwhichPlatodiscussesthese
questionsare,
in
chronological order,the
Republic,
a
dialogue
ofmuchlater
datecalledtheStatesman
(or
the
Politicus),
andtheLaws,the
latestand
longest
ofhisworks.In
spite
ofcertainminor
differences,thereismuch
agreement
betweenthese
dialogues,
whichareinsome
respectsparallel,
inothers
complementary
tooneanother.TheLaws
6
,
forinstance,present
the
story
of
thedeclineandfallofhuman
society
asanaccountofGreek
pre-historymerging
without
any
breakinto
history ;
whilethe
parallelpassages
ofthe
Republicgive,
inamoreabstract
way,
a
systematic
outlineofthe
development
of
government ;the
Statesman,
stillmoreabstract,gives
a
logical
classificationof
types
of
government,
with
only
afewallusionstohistorical
events.
Similarly,
theLawsformulatethehistoricist
aspect
of
the
investigation
more
clearly
than
any
oftheother
dialogue^
'
Whatisthe
archetype
or
origin
ofastate?
'
asksPlatothere,
linking
this
question
withtheother :
*
Cantheevolutionofa
state
change
inbothdirections,towardsthe
good
aswellas
towardstheevil?
'
Butwithinthe
sociological doctrines,the
onlymajor
difference
appears
tobeduetoa
purelyspeculative
difficulty
whichseemstohaveworriedPlato.Assuming
asthe
startingpoint
ofthe
development
a
perfect
andthereforeincor-
ruptiblestate,hefounditdifficultto
explain
thefirst
change,
theFallofMan,
asitwere,whichsets
everythinggoing
7
.We
shallhear,
inthenext
chapter,
ofPlato's
attempt
tosolvethis
problem
;butfirstI$hall
give
a
generalsurvey
ofhis
theory
ofsocial
development.
According
tothe
Republic,the
originalorprimitiveformof

CHAPTER
4
:CHANGEANDREST
33
society,
andatthesametime,theonethatresemblestheForm
orIdeaofastatemost
closely,
the
'
beststate
',
isa
kingship
ofthewisestandmost
godlike
ofmen.Thisidealstateisso
near
perfection
thatitishardtounderstandhowitcanever
change. Still,a
change
doestake
place ;andwithitenters
Heraclitus'
strife,the
driving
forceofallmovement.
According
to
Plato,
internal
strife,
classwar,fomented
by
self-interestandi
especially
materialoreconomic
self-interest,
isthemain
forcqf
of
'
social
dynamics
'.TheMarxianformula
*
The
history
of
allhitherto
existing
societies isa
history
ofclass
struggle
9
8
,
fits
Plato'shistoricism
nearly
aswellasthatofMarx.Thefour
most
conspicuousperiods
or
'
landmarksinthe
history
of
political
degeneration ',and,atthesametime,
'
themost
important
. .
varietiesof
existing
states
'
9
,
aredescribed
by
Platointhe
following
order. Firstafterthe
perfect
statecomes
*
timarchy
'
or
*
timocracy ',theruleofthenoblewhoseekhonourand
fame
;secondly,oligarchy,
theruleoftherichfamilies
;
'
next
in
order,democracy
isborn
',theruleof
liberty
whichmeans
lawlessness,andlastcomes
e
tyranny
. .thefourthandfinal
sicknessofthe
city
'
10
.
Ascanbeseenfromthelastremark,Platolooks
uponhistory,
whichtohimisa
history
ofsocial
decay,
asifitwerethe
history
ofanillness
;the
patient
is
society ;and,
asweshallsee
later,
thestatesman
ought
tobea
physician(and
vice
versa).Just
asthe
description
ofthe
typical
courseofanillnessisnot
always
applicable
to
every
individual
patient,
soisPlato'shistorical
theory
ofsocial
decay
notintendedto
apply
tothe
development
of
every
individual
city.
Butitisintendedtodescribeboththe
original
courseof
developmentby
whichthemainformsof
constitutional
decay
werefirst
generated,
andthe
typical
course
ofsocial
change
11
.WeseethatPlatoaimedat
setting
outa
system
ofhistorical
periodsgovernedbydevelopmental law,
i.e.atahistoricist
theory
of
society ;an
attempt
whichwas
revived
byRousseau,andwasmadefashionable
by
Comteand
Mill,and
byHegel
andMarx.And
considering
thehistorical
evidencethenavailable,
Plato's
system
ofhistorical
periods
was
just
as
good
asthatof
any
ofthesemodernhistoricists.
(The
maindifference liesintheevaluationofthecoursetakenby
history.WhilethearistocratPlatohatedthe
development
he
described,thesemodernauthorsloved
it,*bfelieving
as
they
did
inalawofhistorical
progress.)
Before
discussing
Plato's
perfect
statein
anydetail,
Ishall

34
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
give
abriefsketchoftherole
playedby
economicmotivesand
theclass
struggle
inthe
process
oftransitionbetweenthefour
decaying
formsofthestate.Thefirstformintowhichthe
perfect
state
degenerates,timocracy,
theruleoftheambitious
noblemen,
issaidtobein
nearly
all
respects
similartothe
perfect
stateitself. Itis
important
tonotethatPlatoidentifies
thisbestandoldestamong
the
existing
stateswiththeDorian
constitutionof
Sparta
and
Crete,andthatthesetwotribal
aristocracies didindeed
represent
theoldest
existing
formof
political
lifewithinGreece.MostofPlato'sexcellent
description
oftheirinstitutions is
given
inhis
description
ofthebestor
perfectstate,
towhich
timocracy
issosimilar.Themain
difference isthatthelattercontainsanelementof
instability ;
theonceunited
patriarchalruling
classisnowdisunited,and
itisthis
disunity
whichleadstothenext
step,
toits
degeneration
into
oligarchy.
Disunionis
brought
about
by
ambition.
'
First
',
saysPlato,speaking
ofthe
youngtimocrat,
'
hehearshismother
complaining
thatherhusband isnotoneoftherulers ..'
12
Thushebecomesambitiousand
longs
fordistinction. But
decisivein
bringing
aboutthenext
change
are
competitive
and
acquisitive
socialtendencies.
*
Wemustdescribe
',says
Plato,
*
how
timocracychanges
into
oligarchy
. .Evenablindman
mustseehowit
changes
. .Itisthetreasurehousethatruins
thisconstitution* They
'
(thetimocrats)
'
beginbycreating
opportunities
for
showing
offand
spendingmoney,
andtothis
end
they
twistthelaws,and
they
andtheirwives
disobey
them . .
;and
theytry
tooutrivaloneanother.' InthisWay
arisesthefirstclassconflict
;thatbetweenvirtueandmoney,
orbetweentheold-established
ways
offeudal
simplicity
andthe
new
ways
ofwealth.Thetransitionto
oligarchy
is
completed
whentherichestablishalawthat
c
disqualifies
from
public
officeallthosewhosemeansdonotreachthe
stipulated
amount.
This
change
is
imposedby
forceofarms,shouldthreatsand
blackmailnotsucceed ..'
9
Withtheestablishmentofthe
oligarchy,
astateof
potential
civilwarbetweenthe
oligarchs
andthe
poorer
classesisreached :
'just
asasick
body
. .issometimesatstrifewithitself . .
,
so
isthissick
city.
Itfallsillandmakeswaronitselfonthe
slightestpretext,
whenevertheone
party
ortheother
manages
toobtain
help
from
qutside,
theonefroman
oligarchic city,
ortheotherfroma
democracy.Anddoesnotthissickstate
sometimesbreakintocivilwarevenwithout
any
such
help
from

CHAPTER
4
:CHANGEANDREST
35
outside?
'
13
Thiscivilwar
begetsdemocracy
:
'
Democracy
is^
born . .whenthe
poor
winthe
day,killing
some . .
,
banishingothers,and
sharing
withtherestthe
rights
ofcitizen-
ship
andof
publicoffices,ontermsof
equality
..'
Plato's
description
of
democracy
isavividbut
intensely
hostileand
unjustparody
ofthe
political
lifeof
Athens,andof
thedemocraticcreedwhichPericleshadformulatedinamanner
whichhasneverbeen
surpassed,
aboutthree
years
beforePlato
wasborn.
(Pericles'programme
isdiscussedin
chapter 10,
below
14
.)
Plato's
description
isabrilliant
piece
of
political
propaganda,
andwecan
appreciate
whatharmitmusthave
doneifweconsider,
for
instance,
thatamanlikeAdam,an
excellentscholarandeditorofthe
Republic,
isunabletoresist
therhetoricofPlato'sdenunciationofhisnative
city.
6
Plato's
description
ofthe
genesis
ofthedemocraticman
',Adam
16
writes,
*
isoneofthemost
royal
and
magnificent pieces
of
writing
inthewhole
range
of
literature,whetherancientor
modern.'Andwhenthesamewritercontinues :
'
the
descrip
tionofthedemocraticmanasthechameleonofthehumar
societypaints
him
for
alltime
',thenweseethatPlatohassucceedec
in
turning
onemanatleast
againstdemocracy,andwemay
wonderhowmuchdamage
his
poisonouswriting
hasdone
when
presented,unopposed,
tolesserminds. . .
AsusualwhenPlato's
style,
tousea
phrase
of
Adan^'s
16
,'
becomesa
'
fulltideof
loftythoughts
and
images
andwords
',
itdoessobecausehe
urgently
needsacloaktocovertheintel-
lectualnakednessofhis
arguments,
orrather,thetotalabsence
of
any
rational
thought
whatever.Heusesinvectiveinstead,
identifyingliberty
withlawlessness,freedomwithlicence,and
equality
beforethelawwithdisorder.Democratsaredescribed
as
profligate
and
niggardly,
asinsolent,lawless,andshameless,
asfierceandasterriblebeastsof
prey,
as
gratifyingeverywhim,
as
livingsolely
for
pleasure,
andfor
unnecessary
andunclean
desires.
(
c
They
filltheirbellieslike'thebeasts
',wasHeraclitus'
way
of
putting it.)They
areaccusedof
calling
c
reverencea
folly
. .
;temperance they
callcowardice . .
;moderation
and
orderlyexpenditurethey
callmeannessandboorishness
'
17
,
etc.
c
Andtherearemoretriflesofthiskind
',saysPlato,when
thefloodofhisrhetoricalabuse
begins
toabate,
'
theschool-
masterfearsandflattershis
pupils
. .
,andoldmencondescend
totheyoung
..inordertoavoidthe
appearance
of
being
sourand
despotic.' (It
isPlatotheMasjer
oftheAcademy

36
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
who
puts
thisintothemouthof
Socrates,forgetting
thatthe
latterhadneverbeena
schoolmaster,andthatevenasanold
manhehadnever
appeared
tobesouror
despotic.Hehad
alwaysloved,notto
*
condescend
'
tothe
young,
buttotreat
them,
forinstancethe
youngPlato,
ashis
comrades.)
c
But
the
height
ofallthisabundanceoffreedom . .isreached
',
Platocontinues,
c
when
slaves,maleaswellasfemale,whohave
beenbought
onthemarket,are
every
whitasfreeasthose
whose
propertythey
are. . .Andwhat isthecumulative
effectofallthis?Thatthecitizens'heartsbecomeso
very
tenderthat
they
areirritatedatthemere
sight
of
slavery
and
donotsufferanybody
tosubmitto
it,noteveninitsmildest
forms/Here,
after
all,Plato
payshomage
tohisnative
city,
eventhough
hedoesit
unwittingly.
Itwillforeverremain
oneofthe
greatesttriumphs
ofAthenian
democracy
thatit
treatedslaves
humanely,
andthatin
spite
oftheinhuman
propaganda
of
philosophers
likePlatohimselfandAristotle it
came,ashewitnesses,very
closeto
abolishingslavery.
18
Ofmuch
greatermerit,though
ittoois
inspiredbyhatred,
isPlato's
description
of
tyranny
and
especially
ofthetransition
toit.Heinsiststhathedescribes
things
whichhehasseen
himself
19
;nodoubt,theallusion istohis
experiences
atthe
courtof
Dionysius I,tyrant
of
Syracuse.Thetransitionfrom
democracy
to
tyranny,
Plato
says,
ismost
easilybrought
about
by
a
popular
leaderwhoknowshowto
exploit
theclass
antagonism
betweentherichandthe
poor
withinthedemocratic
state,andwhosucceedsin
buildingup
a
bodyguard
ora
private
army
ofhisown.The
peoplewhohavehailedhimfirstasthe
champion
offreedomaresoonenslaved
;andthen
they
must
fight
forhim,
in
'
onewarafteranotherwhichhemuststir
up
. .inordertomake
people
feeltheneedofa
general
'
20
.
With
tyranny,
themost
abject
stateisreached.
A
very
similar
survey
ofthevariousformsof
government
canbefoundinthe
Statesrtian,wherePlatodiscusses
'
the
origin
ofthe
tyrant
and
king,
of
oligarchiesand
aristocracies,andof
democracies
'
21
.
Againwefindthatthevariousformsof
existinggovernments
are
explained
asdebased
copies
ofthe
truemodelorFormofthe
state,ofthe
perfectstate,thestandard
ofallimitations,>vhich
issaidtohaveexistedintheancient
timesofCronos,fa&erofZeus.Onedifference isthatPlato
here
distinguishes
six
types
ofdebasedstates
;butthisdifference
isunimportant, especially ifwerememberthatPlatosavsin

CHAPTER
4
ICHANGEANDREST
37
the
Republic
22
thatthefour
types
discussedarenot
exhaustive,
andthattherearesomeintermediate
stages.Thesix
types
arearrived
at,
inthe
Statesman,by
first
distinguishing
between
threeformsof
government,
theruleofoneman,ofa
few,and
ofthe
many.Eachoftheseisthensubdividedintotwo
types,
ofwhichoneis
comparativelygood
andtheotherbad,according
towhetherornot
they
imitate
*
the
only
true
original
'
bycopying
and
preserving
itsancientlaws
23
.Inthis
way,
threecon-
servativeorlawfulandthree
utterlydepraved
orlawlessform;
are
distinguished ;monarchy, aristocracy,andaconservative
formof
democracy,
arethelawfulimitations,
inorderofmerit.
But
democracychanges
intoitslawlessform,anddeteriorates
further,througholigarchy,
thelawlessruleofthe
few,
intoa
lawlessruleofthe
one,tyranny,which,just
asPlatohassaid
inthe
Republic,
istheworstofall.
"
v
That
tyranny,
themostevil
statejneednotbetheendof
the
development
isindicatedina
passage
intheLawswhich
partlyrepeats,
and
partly
24
connects
with,the
story
ofthe
Statesman.
'
Givemeastate
governedby
a
youngtyrant',
exclaimsPlato
there,
c
. .whohasthe
good
fortunetobethe
contemporary
ofa
greatlegislator,
andtomeethim
by
some
happy
accident.Whatmorecoulda^od
dofora
city
which
hewantstomake
happy
?
'
Tyranny,
themostevil
state,ma}
bereformedinthis
way. (Thisagrees
withtheremarkinthe
Laws,quotedabove,thatall
change
is
evil,
'
withthe
possible
exception
ofthe
change
ofanevil
thing
'.Thereisnodoubt
that
Plato,when
speaking
ofthe
greatlawgiver
andthe
young
tyrant,
musthavebeen
thinking
ofhimselfandhisvarious ill-
fated
experiments
with
youngtyrants
whichwillbedealtwith
later,and
especially
ofhis
attempts
at
reforming
the
younger
Dionysius'tyranny
over
Syracuse.)
Oneofthemain
objects
ofPlato's
analysis
of
politicaldevelop-
mentsistoascertainthe
driving
forceofallhistorical
change.
IntheLaws,thehistorical
survey
is
explicitly
undertakenwith
thisaiminview :
*
Havenotuncountedthousandsofcities
beenborn
during
thistime . .andhasnoteachofthembeen
undera!kindsof
government
? . .Let
us,
ifwecan,get
hold
ofthecauseofsomuch
change.
I
hope
thatwemay
thus
revealthesecretbothofthebirthofconstitutions,andalsoof
their
changes
orrevolutions.'
25
Asthe
/esult
oftheseinvesti-
gationshediscoversthe
sociological
lawthatinternaldisunion,
classwarfomented
by
the
antagonism
ofeconomicclassinterests,

38 PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
isthe
driving
forceofall
political
revolutions. ButPlato's
formulation ofthisfundamentallaw
goes
evenfurther.He
insiststhat
only
internalseditionwithinthe
ruling
classitself
canweaken itsomuchthatitsrulecanbeoverthrown.
'
Changes
in
any
constitution
originate,
without
exception,
withinthe
ruling
class
itself,and
onlywhenthisclassbecomes
theseatofdisunion
'
26
,
ishisformulainthe
Republic ;andin
theLawshe
says(possiblyreferring
tothis
passage
ofthe
Republic)
:
'
Howcana
kingship,
or
any
otherformof
govern-
ment,everbe
destroyedbyanybody
buttherulersthemselves?
Havewe
forgottenwhatwesaidawhile
ago,
when
dealing
with
this
subject,
aswedidtheother
day
?
'
This
sociologicallaw,
together
withtheobservation thateconomicinterestsarethe
most
likely
causesofdisunion,
isPlato'sclueto
history.But
itismore. Itisalsothecluetohis
analysis
oftheconditions
necessary
fortheestablishmentof
politicalequilibrium,
i.e.for
arrestingpoliticalchange.Heassumesthattheseconditions
wererealizedinthebestor
perfect
stateofancienttimes.
Plato's
description
ofthe
perfect
orbeststatehas
usually
been
interpreted
asthe
Utopianprogramme
ofa
progressivist.
In
spite
ofhis
repeatedassertions,
inthe
Republic,Timaeus,and
Critias,thatheis
describing
thedistant
past,
andin
spite
ofthe
parallelpassages
intheLawswhosehistoricalintention isobvious,
itisassumedthatitwashiswholeintentionto
give
aveiled
description
ofthefuture.ButIthinkthatPlatomeantwhat
he
said,andthatmany
characteristicsofhisbest
state,especially
asdescribedinBooksTwotoFourofthe
Republic,
areintended
(like
hisaccountsof
primitivesociety
intheStatesmanandthe
Laws)
tobehistorical
27
,or
perhapspre-historical.
Itisdifferent
withsomeother
features,especially
withthe
kingship
ofthe
philosophers(described
inBooksFivetoSevenofthe
Republic) ;
featuresofwhichPlatohimself
says
that
theymaybelongonly
tothetimelessworldofFormsorIdeas,
tothe
*
City
inHeaven '.
These
intentionally
unhistoricalfeatureswillbediscussed
later,
together
withPlato's
ethico-political
demands. Itmust,of
course,beadmittedthathedidnotintendeveninhis
descrip-
tionofthe
primitive
orancientconstitutions to
give
anexact
historicalaccount
;he
certainly
knewthathedidnot
possess
the
necessary
datafor
achievinganything
likethat.ButI
believethathemadea
t
serious
attempt
toreconstructtheancient
tribalformsofsociallifeaswellashecould.Thereisnoreason
todoubt
this,especially
sincethe
attemptwas,ina
goodnumber

CHAPTER
4
ICHANGEANDREST
39
ofits
details,very
successful. Itcould
hardly
be
otherwise,
sincePlatoarrivedathis
pictureby
anidealized
description
of
theancientCretanand
Spartan
tribalaristocracies. Withhis
acute
sociological
intuitionhehadseenthattheseformswere
not
onlyold,but
petrified,
arrested
;that
they
wererelicsof
astillolderform.Andheconcludedthatthisstillolderform
hadbeenevenmore
stable,more
securely
arrested. This
very
ancientand
accordinglyverygoodand
very
stablestatehe
triedtoreconstructinsucha
way
astomakeclearhowithad
been
kept
freefromdisunion
;howclasswarhadbeenavoided,
andhoweconomicinterestshadbeenreducedtoaminimum,
and
kept
wellundercontrol.Thesearethemain
problems
of
Plato'sreconstruction ofthebeststate.
HowdoesPlatosolvethe
problem
of
avoiding
classwar?
Hadhebeena
progressivist,
he
might
havehitattheideaof
a
classless,equalitariansociety ;for,
aswecanseeforinstance
fromhisown
parody
ofAthenian
democracy,
therewere
strong
equalitarian
tendenciesatworkinAthens.Buthewasnotout
toconstructastatethat
mightcome,butastatethathad
beenthefatherofthe
Spartanstate,whichwas
certainly
not
aclassless
society.
Itwasaslavestateand
accordingly,
Plato's
beststateisbasedonthemost
rigid
classdistinctions. Itisa
castestate.The
problem
of
avoiding
classwaris
solved,not
byabolishingclasses,butbygiving
the
ruling
classa
superiority
whichis
unchallenged,
andwhichcannotbe
challenged. For,
asin
Sparta,
the
ruling
classaloneis
permitted
to
carryarms,
1
italonehas
anypolitical
orother
rights,
anditalonereceives
education,
i.e.a
specializedtraining
intheartof
keepingdown
itshuman
sheep
oritshumancattle.
(Infact,
its
overwhelming
superiority
disturbsPlatoalittle
;hefearsthat
'
theymay
worry
the
sheep ',insteadof
merelyshearingthem,and
c
actas
wolvesratherthan
dogs
'
28
.This
problem
isconsideredlater
inthe
chapter.)
As
long
asthe
ruling
classisunited,there
canbeno
challenge
oftheir
authority,
and
consequently
no
classwar.
Plato
distinguishes
threeclassesinhisbeststate,the
guardians,^,
theirarmedauxiliariesorwarriors,andthe
working
class.But*
actually
thereare
only
two
castes,thearmedandtrainedrulers
andtheunarmedanduneducatedruled,
forthe
guardians
are
oldandwisewarriorswhohavebeen
promoted
fromtheranks
ofauxiliaries. ThatPlatodivideshis
ruling
casteintotwo
classes,
the
guardians
andtheauxiliaries,without
elaborating

4O
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
similarsubdivisionswithintheworkingclass,
is
largelydueto
thefactthatheisinterested
only
intherulers.Theworkers
donotinteresthimat
all,they
are
onlyhumancattlewhose
solefunction isto
provide
forthematerialneedsofthe
ruling
class
;andPlatoevenforbidshisrulersto
legislate
forthem
andtheir
pettyproblems.
Forthis
reason,ourinformation
abouttheworkers is
extremelyscanty ;butPlato'ssilence is
not
whollyuninterrupted.
'
Aretherenot
drudges ',heasks
once,
c
who
possess
nota
spark
of
intelligence
andare
unworthy
tobeadmittedintothe
community,
butwhohave
strong
bodies
forhardlabour?
'
29
Sincethis
nasty
remarkhas
given
riseto
thecomfortingcommentthatPlatodoesnotadmitslavesinto
his
city,
Imay
here
point
outthatthisviewismistaken. It
istruethatPlatodoesnotstate
explicitly
thatthereareslaves
inhisbest
city.
Butinhis
description
of
timocracy,
thesecond
beststate,andtheone
directlyfollowing
the
best,he
says
of
thetimocraticman :
c
Hewillbeinclinedtotreatslaves
cruelly,
forhedoesnot
despise
themasmuchasawell-educatedman
would.'Butsince
only
inthebest
city
caneducationbefound
whichis
superior
tothatof
timocracy,weareboundtoconclude
thatthereareslavesinPlato'sbest
city,andthat
they
are
properly
despised.
Plato's
righteouscontempt
forthemis
probably
the
reasonwhy
hedoesnotelaboratethe
point.
Thisconclusion
is
fully
corroboratedby
theLaws,andthemostinhumanattitude
towardsslaves
adopted
there.
Sincethe
ruling
classalonehas
politicalpower,including
the
power
of
keeping
thenumberofthehumancattlewithin
suchlimitsasto
prevent
themfrom
becoming
a
danger,
the
wholeproblem
of
preserving
thestateisreducedtothatof
preserving
theinternal
unity
ofthemasterclass.Howisthis
unity
oftherulers
preserved
?
Bytraining
andother
psycho-
logicalinfluences,butotherwise
mainlyby
theeliminationof
economicinterestswhichmay
leadtodisunion. Thiseconomic
abstinence isachievedandtcontrolled
by
theintroduction of
communism,
i.e.
by
theabolitionof
privateproperty,especially
in
preciousmetals,whichwereforbiddenin
Sparta
too.
(This
communism isconfinedtothe
rulingclass,whichalonemust
be
kept
freefromdisunion
;quarrelsamong
theruledarenot
worthy
of
consideration.)
Since all
property
iscommon
property,
theremustalsobeacommon
ownership
ofwomen
andchildren.Nomemberofthe
ruling
classmustbeableto
identify
hischildren,orhis
parents.
The
family
mustbe

CHAPTER
4
:CHANGEANDREST
41
destroyed,
orrather,extendedtocoverthewholewarriorclass.
Familyloyaltiesmight
otherwisebecomea
possible
sourceof
disunion
;
therefore
'
eachshouldlook
upon
allasif
belonging
toone
family
9
30
.
(That
this
suggestionwasneithersonovel
norso
revolutionary
asitsounds isclearifwe
consider,
Vfor
instance,the
Spartan
restrictionsonthe
privacy
of
familylife,
suchascommonmeals,etc.,constantly
referredto
byPlatp.)
Buteventhiscommon
ownership
ofwomenandchildren isriot
quite
sufficientto
guard
the
ruling
classfromalleconomic
dangers.
Itis
important
toavoid
prosperity
aswellas
poverty.
Bothare
dangers
to
unity ;poverty,
because itdrives
people
to
adoptdesperate
meansto
satisfy
theirneeds
;prosperity,
becausemost
change
hasarisenfromabundance,froman
accumulation ofwealthwhichmakes
dangerousexperiments
possible.Only
acommunist
system
whichhasroomneither
for
great
wantnorfor
great
wealthcanreduceeconomicinterests
toaminimum,and
guarantee
the
unity
ofthe
ruling
class.
Thecommunismofthe
ruling
castecanthusbederived
fromPlato'sfundamental
sociological
lawof
change ;
itisa
necessary
conditionofthe
politicalstability
ofhisclassstate.
But
although
an
importantcondition,
itisnotasufficientone.
Inorderthatthe
ruling
classmay
feel
reallyunited,thatit
shouldfeellikeone
tribe,
i.e.likeone
bigfamily,pressure
from
withouttheclassisas
necessary
asarethetiesbetweenthe
membersoftheclass.This
pressure
canbesecured
byempha-
sizing
and
widening
the
gulf
betweentherulersandtheruled.
/The
stronger
the
feeling
thattheruledareadifferentandan
altogether
inferiorrace,the
stronger
willbethesenseof
unity
among
therulers.Wearriveinthisway
atthefundamental
principle,
announced
only
aftersome
hesitation,thattheremust
beno
mingling
betweentheclasses
31
:
*
Anymeddling
or
changing
overfromoneclasstoanother
*,saysPlato,
c
isa
great
crime
against
the
city
andmayrightly
bedenounced asthe
basestwickedness.' Butsucha
rigid
divisionoftheclasses
mustbe
justified,
andan
attempt
to
justify
itcan
only
bebased
ontheclaimthattherulersaremuch
superior
totheruled.
Accordingly,
Platotriesto
justify
hisclassdivision
by
thethree-
foldclaimthattherulersare
vastlysuperior
inthree
respects
inrace,ineducation,andintheirscaleofvalues. Plato's
moralvaluations,whichare,ofcourse,identicalwiththoseof
therulersofhisbest
state,
willbediscussedin
chapters
6to8
;
I
may
thereforeconfine
myself
hereto
describing
someofhis

42
PLATOSSOCIOLOGY
ideas
concerning
the
origin,
the
breeding,
andtheeducationof
his
ruling
class.
(Beforeproceeding
tothis
description,
Iwish
to
expressmyantagonism
tothe
opinion
thatany
kindof
superiority,
whetherracialoreducational ormoral,would
establishaclaimto
politicalprerogatives,
evenifsuch
superiority
couldbeascertained. Most
people
incivilizedcountriesnowa-
days
admitracial
superiority
tobeamyth ;butevenifitwere
anestablished
fact,
itshouldnotcreate
specialpoliticalrights,
though
it
might
create
special
moVal
responsibilities
forthe
superiorpersons.Analogousdemandsshouldbemadeofthose
whoare
educationallyand
morallysuperior ;andIthinkthat
the
opposite
claimsofcertainintellectualistsandmoralists
only
showhow
utterly
unsuccessful theireducationhasbeen,since
ithasnotevenmadethemawareoftheirownlimitations,and
oftheir
Pharisaism.)
Ifwewanttounderstand Plato'sviewsaboutthe
origin,
breeding,
andeducation,ofhis
rulingclass,wemustnotlose
sight
ofthetwomain
points
ofour
analysis.Wemust
keep
inmind,
firstof
all,thatPlatois
considering
a
city
ofthe
past,
although
oneconnectedwiththe
present
insuchaway
that
certainofitsfeaturesarestilldiscerniblein
existingstates,for
instance,in
Sparta ;and
secondly,
thatheis
reconstructing
his
city
with
special
carefortheconditionsofits
stability,and
thatheseeksthe
guarantees
forthis
stabilitysolely
withinthe
ruling
class
itself,andmore
especially,
inits
unityand
strength.]
Regarding
the
origin
ofthe
rulingclass,
itmay
bementioned
thatPlato
speaks
intheStatesmanofatime,prior
eventothat
ofhisbest
state,when
e
Godhimselfwasthe
shepherd
ofmen,
ruling
overthem
just
asman . .stillrulesoverthebeasts.
Therewas . .no
ownership
ofwomenandchildren
'
32
.This
isnot
merely
thesimileofthe
goodshepherd ;
inthe
light
of
whatPlato
says
intheLaws,
itmustbe
interpreted
more
literally
thanthat.Fortherewearetoldthatthis
primitivesociety,
whichis
prior
eventothefcrstandbest
city,
isoneofnomad
hill
shepherds
undera
patriarch
:
c
Government
originated'^
says
Platothereofthe
periodprior
tothefirstsettlement,
c
. .
as^
theruleoftheeldestwhoinherits
authority
fromhisfatheror
mother
;
alltheothersfollowedhimlikeaflockofbirds,thus
forming
one
troop
ruled
by
a
patriarchalauthority,
whichis
themost
just
ofall"claimsto
royalpower.'
Thesenomad
tribes,wehear,settledinthecitiesofthe
Peloponnese,especially
in
Sparta,
underthenameof
c
Dorians
f
.Howthis
happened

CHAPTER4
:CHANGEANDREST
43
isnot
veryclearlyexplained,
butweunderstandPlato'sreluctance
whenwe
get
ahintthatthe
*
settlement
'
wasinfactaviolent
subjugation.
Sincethis
is,forallweknow,thetrue
story
of
theDoriansettlementinthe
Peloponnese,wehave
every
reason
toconsiderthatPlatointendedhis
story
asaserious
description
of
prehistoric
events
;describing
not
only
the
origin
ofthe
Dorianmasterracebutalsothe
origin
oftheirhuman
cattle,
i.e.the
original
inhabitants. Ina
parallelpassage
inthe
Republic,
Plato
gives
usa
mythologicalyetverypointeddescrip-
tionofthe
conquest itself,when
dealingwiththe
origin
ofthe
*
earthborn
',the
ruling
classofthebest
city.(TheMyth
of
theEarthbornwillbediscussedfromadifferent
point
ofview
in
chapter8.)
Theirvictoriousmarchintothe
city,previously
founded
by
theworkers,
isdescribedasfollows :
e
After
having
armedandtrainedtheearthborn,
letusmakethemadvance,
underthecommandofthe
guardians,
till
they
arriveinthe
city.Thenletthemlookroundtofindoutfortheircamp
the
spot
thatismostsuitablefor
keepingdowntheinhabitants,
should
anyone
show
unwillingness
to
obey
thelaw,andfor
holding
backexternalenemies,whomaycomedownlikewolves
onthefold.
5
Thisshortbut
triumphant
taleofthe
subjugation
ofa
sedentarypopulationby
a
conquering
warhorde
(who
are
identified,
inthe
Statesman,withthenomadhill
shepherds
of
the
period
beforethe
settlement)
mustbe
kept
inmindwhen
we
interpret
Plato'sreiteratedinsistencethat
goodrulers,whether
gods
or
demigods
or
guardians,
are
patriarchshepherds
ofmen,
andthatthetrue
politicalart,theartof
ruling,
isakindof
herdsmanship,
i.e.theartof
managing
and
keepingdownthe
humancattle.Anditisinthis
light
thatwemustconsiderhis
description
ofthe
breeding
and
training
of
c
theauxiliarieswho
are
subject
totherulerslike
sheep-dogs
tothe
shepherds
of
thestate*.
The
breeding
andtheeducationofthe
auxiliaries,
i.e.ofthe
ruling
classofPlato'sbest
state, is,
liketheir
carrying
ofarms,
aclass
symbol
andthereforeaclass
prerogative
33
.Andlike
arms,breeding
andeducationarenot
emptysymbols,
but
instrumentsofclass
rule,and
necessary
conditionsofthe
stability
ofthisrule.They
aretreated
by
Plato
solely
fromthis
point
ofview,
i.e.as
powerfulpoliticalweapons,
asmeansforthe
herding
ofthehumancattleaswellasfoytheunificationofthe'
ruling
class.
Tothisend,
itis
important
thatthemasterclassshouldfeel

44
PLATOSSOCIOLOGY
asone
superior
masterrace.
*
Theraceoftheguardiansjnast
be
keptpure
'
34
,says
Plato
(in
defenceof
infanticide),when
developing
theracialist
argument
thatwebreedanimalswith
great
carewhile
neglecting
ourown
race,an
argument
which
hasbeen
repeated
eversince.
(Infanticide
wasnotanAthenian
institution
;Plato,seeing
thatitwas
practised
at
Sparta
for
eugenicreasons,concludedthatitmustbeancientandthere-
fore
good.)Hedemandsthatthesame
principles
be
applied
tothe
breeding
ofthemasterraceasan
experienced
breeder
applies
to
dogs,horses,orbirds.
*
If
you
didnotbreedthem
inthis
way,
don't
you
thinkthattheraceof
your
birdsor
dogs
would
quicklydegenerate
?
9
argues
Plato
;andhedrawsthe
conclusionthat
c
thesame
principlesapply
totheraceofmen'.
Theracial
qualities
demandedfromthe
guardian
oran
auxiliary
are,more
specifically,
thoseofa
sheep-dog.
*
Ourwarrior-
athletes . .mustbe
vigilant
like
watch-dogs\demandsPlato,
andheasks :
'
Isthere
anydifference,
sofarastheirnatural
fitnessfor
keepingguard
isconcerned,betweena
gallantyouth
andawell-bred
dog
?
'
Inhisenthusiasmandadmirationfor
the
dog,
Plato
goes
sofarastodiscerninhima
fi
genuine
philosophical
nature
'
;
for
'
isnottheloveof
learning
identical
withthe
philosophical
attitude?
'
Themain
difficulty
whichbesetsPlatoisthat
guardians
and
auxiliariesmustbeendowedwithacharacterthatisfierceand
gentle
atthesametime. Itisclearthat
they
mustbebredto
be
fierce,since
theymust
c
meetanydanger
inafearlessand
unconquerable spirit
'.Yet
c
iftheirnatureistobelike
that,
howare
they
tobe
kept
from
being
violent
against
oneanother,
or
against
therestofthecitizens?
'
35
Indeed,
itwouldbe
*
simply
monstrous ifthe
shepherds
should
keepdogs
. .who
would
worry
the
sheep,behaving
likewolvesratherthan
dogs
\
The
problem
is
important
fromthe
point
ofviewofthe
political
equilibrium,
orrather,
ofthe
stability
ofthe
state,
forPlato
doesnot
rely
onan
equilibrium
oftheforcesofthevarious
classes,
sincethatwouldbeunstable.Acontrolofthemaster
classandits
arbitrarypowersthrough
the
opposing
forceofthe
ruledisoutof
question,
forthe
superiority
ofthemasterclass
mustremain
unchallenged. The
only
admissiblecontrolofthe
masterclassisthereforeself-control.
Just
asthe
ruling
class
mustexerciseeconomic*abstinence,
i.e.refrainfromanexcessive
economic
exploitation
oftheruled,
soitmustalsobeableto
refrainfromtoogreat
fiercenessinits
dealingswiththeruled.

CHAPTER4
:CHANGEANDREST
45
Butthiscan
only
beachievedifthefiercenessofitsnatureis
balanced
by
its
gentleness.
Platofindsthisa
very
serious
problem,
since
*
thefiercenature istheexact
opposite
ofthe
gentle
nature '.His
speaker,Socrates,reports
thatheis
per-
plexed,
untilheremembersthedogagain.
c
Well-bred
dogs
are
by
naturemost
gentle
totheirfriendsand
acquaintances,
but
the
veryopposite
to
strangers ',he
says.
Itistherefore
proved
c
thatthecharacterwe
try
to
give
our
guardians
isnot
contrary
tonature '.Theaimof
breeding
themasterraceisthus
established,andshowntobeattainable. Ithasbeenderived
froman
analysis
oftheconditionswhichare
necessary
for
keeping
thestatestable.
Plato'seducationalaimis
exactly
thesame. Itisthe
purely
political
aimof
stabilizing
thestatebyblending
afierceanda
gentle
elementinthecharacteroftherulers.Thetwo
disciplines
inwhichchildrenoftheGreek
upper
classwereeducated,
gymnastics
andmusic
(thelatter,
inthewidersenseoftheword,
included all
literarystudies),
arecorrelatedby
Platowiththe
twoelementsofcharacter,
fiercenessand
gentleness.
'
Have
you
notobserved
',
asksPlato
36
,
'
howthecharacter isaffected
by
anexclusive
training
in
gymnastics
withoutmusic,andhowit
isaffectedby
the
oppositetraining
? . .Exclusive
preoccupa-
tionwith
gymnasticsproducesmenwhoarefiercerthan
they
ought
tobe,whilean
analogouspreoccupation
withmusicmakes
themtoosoft . .Butwemaintainthatour
guardiansmust
combinebothofthesenatures . .Thisiswhy
I
say
thatsome
godmusthave
givenmanthesetwoarts,musicand
gymnastics ;
andtheir
purpose
isnotsomuchtoservesoulandbody
respectively,
butrathertotune
properly
thetwomain
strings',
i.e.thetwoelementsofthesoul,gentleness
andfierceness.
4
Thesearetheoutlinesofour
system
ofeducationand
training ',
Platoconcludeshis
analysis.
In
spite
ofthefactthatPlatoidentifiesthe
gentle
element
ofthesoulwithher
philosophicdisposition,
andin
spite
ofthe
factthat
philosophy
is
going
to
play
suchadominantrolein
thelater
parts
ofthe
Republic,
heisnotatallbiasedinfavour
ofthe
gentle
elementofthesoul,orof
musical,
i.e.
literary,
education. His
impartiality
in
balancing
thetwoelements is
themoreremarkableasitleadshimto
impose
themostsevere
restrictionson
literaryeducation,compared
withwhatwascus-
tomary
intheAthensofhis
day.This,ofcourse,
is
onlypart
ofhis
generaltendency
to
preferSpartan
customstothoseof

46
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
Athens.
(Crete,
hisothermodel,wasevenmoreanti-musical
than
Sparta
37
.)
Plato's
politicalprinciples
of
literaryeducation
arebased
upon
a
simplecomparison. Sparta,
hesaw,treated
itshumancattle
just
alittletoo
harshly ;
thisisa
symptom
or
evenanadmissionofa
feeling
ofweakness
38
,andthereforea
symptom
ofthe
incipientdegeneration
ofthemaster class.
Athens,ontheotherhand,was
altogether
tooliberalandslack
inhertreatmentofslaves. Platotookthisas
proof
that
Sparta
insisted
just
alittletoomuchon
gymnastics,andAthens,of
course,
fartoomuchonmusic.This
simple
estimateenabled
him
readily
toreconstructwhatinhis
opinion
musthavebeen
thetruemeasureorthetrueblendofthetwoelementsinthe
educationofthebest
state,andto
laydownthe
principles
of
hiseducational
policy.Judged
fromtheAthenian
viewpoint,
itis
nothing
butthedemandthatall
literary
educationbe
strangled
39
by
acloseadherencetothe
example
of
Sparta
with
itsstrictstatecontrolofall
literary
matters.Not
onlypoetry
butevenmusicinthe
ordinary
senseofthetermaretobecon-
trolled
by
a
rigidcensorship
and
they
aretobedevoted
entirely
to
increasing
the
stability
ofthestate
bymaking
the
young
moreconsciousofclass
discipline
40
,andthusmore
ready
to
serveclassinterests. Platoeven
forgets
thatitisthefunction
ofmusictomakethe
young
more
gentle,
forhedemandssuch
formsofmusicaswillmakethembraver,
i.e.fiercer.
(Con-
sidering
thatPlatowasanAthenian,
his
argumentsconcerning
music
properappear
tomealmostintolerableintheir
reactionary
and
superstitiousintolerance,especially
if
compared
withamore
enlightenedcontemporary
criticism
41
.Butevennowhehas
many
musiciansonhis
side,possibly
because
they
areflattered
by
his
highopinion
ofthe
importance
ofmusic,
i.e.ofits
political
power.
Thesameistrueofeducationists,andevenmoreof
philosophers,
sincePlatodemandsthat
they
shouldrule
;a
demandwhichwillbediscussedin
chapter8.)
The
politicalprinciple
thatdeterminestheeducationofthe
soul,namely,
the
preservation
ofthe
stability
ofthe
state,
determines alsothatofthe
body.Theaimis
simply
thatof
Sparta.
WhiletheAtheniancitizenwaseducatedtoa
general
versatility,
Platodemandsthatthe
ruling
classshallbetrained
asaclassof
professionalwarriors,ready
tostrike
against
enemies
fromwithoutorfromWithinthestate.Childrenofboth
sexes,
wearetoldtwice,
'
mustbetakenonhorsebackwithinthe
sight
ofactualwar
;and
provided
itcanbedone
safely,they

CHAPTER4
:CHANGEANDREST
47
mustbe
brought
into
battle,andmadetotasteblood
;just
as
onedoeswith
young
hounds
'
42
.The
description
ofamodern
writerwhocharacterizes
contemporary
totalitarianeducation
as
*
anintensifiedandcontinualformofmobilization
',
fits
Plato'swhole
system
ofeducation
very
wellindeed.
ThisisanoutlineofPlato's
theory
ofthebestormostancient
state,
inwhichthehumancattleweretreated
just
asawise
buthardened
shepherd
treatshis
sheep
;nottoo
cruelly,
but
withthe
propercontempt.
. .Asan
analysis
bothof
Spartan
socialinstitutionsandoftheconditionsoftheir
stabilityand
instability,
andasan
attempt
at
reconstructingmore
rigid
and
primitive
formsoftribal
life,
this
description
isexcellentindeed.
(Only
the
descriptiveaspect
isdealtwithinthis
chapter.
The
ethical
aspects
willbediscussed
later.)
Ibelievethatmuch
inPlato's
writings
thathasbeen
usually
considered asmere
mythological
or
Utopianspeculation
caninthisway
beinter-
preted
as
sociologicaldescription
and
analysis.
Ifwelook,for
instance,athis
myth
ofthe
triumphant
warhordes
subjugating
asettled
population,
thenwemustadmitthatfromthe
point
ofviewof
descriptivesociology
itismostsuccessful. In
fact,
itcouldevenclaimtobean
anticipation
ofan
interesting
(thoughpossibly
too
sweeping)
modern
theory
ofthe
origin
of
the
state,according
towhichcentralizedand
organizedpolitical
powergenerally
hasits
origin
insucha
conquest
43
.There
may
bemore
descriptions
ofthiskindinPlato's
writings
than
wecanat
present
estimate.
Tosum
up.
Inan
attempt
tounderstandandto
interpret
the
changing
socialworldashe
experienced it,Platowasled
to
develop
a
systematic
historicist
sociology
in
great
detail.He
thought
of
existing
statesas
decayingcopies
ofan
unchanging
FormorIdea.Hetriedtoreconstruct thisFormorIdeaof
a
state,oratleasttodescribea
society
whichresembled itas
closely
as
possible.Along
withancienttraditions,heusedas
materialforhisreconstruction
thg
resultsofhis
analysis
of
Spartan
andCretansocial
institutions,themostancientforms
ofsociallifehecouldfindin
Greece,whichhe
acutelyrecognized
asarrestedformsofevenoldertribalsocieties. Butinorder
tomakea
proper
useofthismaterial,heneededa
principle
for
distinguishing
betweenthe
good
or
original
orancient
featuresof
existinginstitutions,andtheir,symptoms
of
decay.
This
principle
hefoundinhislawof
politicalrevolutions,
according
towhichdisunioninthe
rulingclass,andtheir
pre*

48
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
occupation
witheconomic
affairs,arethe
origin
ofallsocial
change.
Hisbeststatewasthereforetobereconstructed in
suchaway
astoeliminateallthe
germs
andelementsofdisunion
and
decay
as
radically
asthiscouldbedone
;
thatisto
say,
itwastobeconstructedoutofthe
Spartan
statewithan
eye
totheconditions
necessary
fortheunbroken
unity
ofthemaster
class,guaranteedby
itseconomicabstinence,
its
breeding,
and
its
training.
>J
Interpretingexisting
societiesasdecadent
copies
ofanideal
state,PlatofurnishedHesiod'ssomewhatcrudeviewsofhuman
history
atoncewithatheoretical
background
andwithawealth
of
practicalapplication.He
developed
a
remarkably
realistic
historicist
theory
whichfoundthecauseofsocial
change
in
Heraclitus'disunion,andinthestrifeofclassesinwhichhe
recognized
the
driving
aswellasthe
corrupting
forcesof
history.
He
applied
thesehistoricist
principles
tothe
story
oftheDecline
andFalloftheGreek
city-states,and
especially
toacriticism
of
democracywhichhedescribedaseffeminateand
degenerate.
Andwemayaddthatlater,intheLaws
44
,he
applied
them
alsotoa
story
oftheDeclineandFallofthePersian
Empire,
thus
making
the
beginning
ofa
long
seriesofDecline-and-Fall
dramatizations ofthehistoriesof
empires
andcivilizations.
(O.Spengler's
notoriousDeclineof
theWestis
perhaps
theworst
butnotthelast
45
of
them.)
All
this,
Ithink,canbe
interpreted
asan
attempt,andamost
impressiveone,to
explain,
andto
rationalize,
his
experience
ofthebreakdownofthetribal
society ;
an
experienceanalogous
tothatwhichhadledHeraclitus'to
develop
thefirst
philosophy
of
change.
Butour
analysis
ofPlato's
descriptivesociology
isstillincom-
plete.
HisstoriesoftheDeclineand
Fall,andwithit
nearly
allthelaterstories,exhibitatleasttwofeatureswhichwehave
notdiscussedsofar.Heconceivedthese
declining
societiesas
somekindof
organism,andthedeclineasa
process
similarto
ageing.Andhebelievedthatthedeclineiswelldeserved,in
thesensethatmoral
decay,
afallanddeclineofthe
soul,precedes
thatofthesocial
body.
This
aspect
ofPlato's
sociologyplays
an
important
roleinhis
theory
ofthefirst
change,
inthe
Story
oftheNumberandoftheFallofMan.This
theory,andits
connectionwiththedoctrineofFormsorIdeas,willbediscussed
inthenext
chapter.

CHAPTER5:NATUREANDCONVENTION
Platowasnotthefirstto
approach
social
phenomena
inthe
spirit
of
investigation. The
beginning
ofsocialscience
goes
backatleasttothe
generation
of
Protagoras,
thefirstofthe
great
thinkerswhocalledthemselves
*
Sophists
'. Itismarked
by
thedistinctionbetweentwodifferentelementsinman's
environment hisnaturalenvironmentandhissocialenviron-
ment.Thisisadistinctionwhichisdifficulttomakeandto
grasp,
ascanbeinferredfromthefactthatevennowitisnot
clearly
establishedinourminds. Ithasbeen
questioned
ever
sincethetimeof
Protagoras. Mostof
us,
itseems,havea
strong
inclinationto
accept
the
peculiarities
ofoursocialenvironment
asif
theywere
'
natural '.
Itisoneofthecharacteristicfeaturesofthe
magical
attitude
ofa
primitive
tribalor
'
closed
'
society
thatitlivesinacharmed
circle
x
ofunchangingtaboos,oflawsandcustomswhichare
felttobeasinevitableasthe
rising
ofthesun,orthe
cycle
of
theseasons,orsimilarobvious
regularities
ofnature.Andit
is
only
afterthis
magical
6
closed
society
'
has
actually
broken
downthatatheoretical
understanding
ofthedifferencebetween
*
nature
'
and
*
society
'
can
develop.An
analysis
ofthis
developmentpresupposes
aclear
grasp
ofthedistinctionbetween
(a)
naturallaws,orlawsofnature,or
positivelaws,suchasthe
lawsofthe
apparent
motionofthesun,orthelawof
gravity ;
and
(b)
normativelaws,orstandards,ornorms,
i.e.rulesthat
forbidordemandcertainjnodesofconduct,orcertain
pro-
cedures
;examples
arethelawsoftheAthenianConstitution,
ortherules
pertaining
totheelectionofMembersofParliament,
ortheTenCommandments. Ibelievethatthedistinction
betweennaturalandnormativelawsisfundamental,andI
thinkthatthevariouseffortsto
bridge
the
gap
havebeen
entirely
unsuccessful. ButIamnot
going
toassumethiswithoutdis-
cussion.Forinstance,
Ishalllaterdiscusstheclaimthatcertain
normsare
c
natural
'
insomesenseorother.Butinorderto
discusssuchaclaimat
all,
itis
necessary
firstto
distinguish
as
clearly
as
possible
betweenlawsinthesenseof
(a)
andlawsin
thesenseof
(i),
andnottoconfusetheissue
1
by
abad
terminology.
Thusweshallreservetheterm
'
naturallaws
*
exclusively
for
lawsof
type(a),
andweshallrefusetodoashasoftenbeen
49

5O
PLATOSSOCIOLOGY
doneand
apply
thistermto
any
normswhichhavebeenclaimed
tobe
c
natural '.Theconfusion is
quiteunnecessary
sinceitis
easy
to
speak
of
c
natural
rights
'
orof
c
naturalnorms
'
when
lawsof
type(V)
aremeant.
Ibelievethatitis
necessary
forthe
understanding
ofPlato's
sociology
toconsiderhowthedifferencebetweennaturaland
normativelaws
developed.
Ishallfirst
distinguish
the
starting
point
andthelast
step
ofthe
development,
andlaterthree
intermediate
steps,
whichall
play
a
part
inPlato's
theory.
The
startingpoint
canbedescribedasanaivemonism. Itmay
besaidtobecharacteristicofthe
'
closed
society
'.Thelast
step,
whichIdescribeascriticaldualism
(or
criticalconventional-
ism),
ischaracteristicofthe
'
opensociety
'.Thefactthatthere
arestillmanywho
try
toavoid
making
this
stepmay
betaken
asanindicationthatwearestillinthemidstofthetransition
fromtheclosedtothe
opensociety. (With
all
this,compare
chapter10.)
The
startingpoint
whichIhavecalled
'
naivemonism
'
is
the
stage
atwhichthedistinctionbetweennaturalandnormative
lawsisnot
yet
made.
Unpleasantexperiences
arethemeans
by
whichmanlearnsto
adjust
himselftohisenvironment.No
distinction ismadebetweensanctions
imposedby
othermen,
ifanormativetaboo is
broken,and
unpleasantexperiences
sufferedinthenaturalenvironment. Withinthis
stage,wemay
further
distinguish
betweentwo
possibilities.
Theonecanbe
describedasanaivenaturalism.Atthis
stageregularities,
whether
naturalorconventional, arefelttobebeyond
the
possibility
of
any
alterationwhatever. ButIbelievethatthis
stage
is
only
anabstract
possibility,
whichwe
probably
neverrealized.More
important
isa
stage
whichwecandescribeasanaiveconventional-
ism,atwhichbothnaturalandnormative
regularities
are
experienced
as
expressions of,andas
dependentupon,
the
decisionsofman-like
gods
ordemons.Atthis
stage
eventhe
natural
laws,undercertain
exceptionalcircumstances,seemto
be
open
tomodifications,an^
withthe
help
of
magicalpractices
manmay
sometimesinfluencethem
;andnatural
regularities
appear
tobe
upheldbysanctions,asif
they
werenormative.
This
point
iswellillustratedby
Heraclitus'
saying
:
'
Thesun
willnot
outstep
themeasureofhis
path ;butifhe
does,then
the
goddesses
ofFate?thehandmaidsof
Justice,
willknowhow
tofindhim.'
2
Thebreakdownof
magic
tribalism is
closely
connectedwith

CHAPTER
5
INATUREANDCONVENTION
51
therealizationthattaboosaredifferentinvarious
tribes,that
they
are
imposed
andenforced
byman,andthat
theymay
be
brokenwithout
unpleasantrepercussions
ifonecan
onlyescape
thesanctions
imposedby
one'sfellow-men. Thisrealization is
quickenedwhenitisobservedthatlawsarealteredandmade
byhuman
lawgivers.
Ithinknot
only
ofsuch
lawgivers
as
Solon,butalsoofthelawswhichweremadeandenforced
by
thecommon
people
ofdemocratic cities.These
experiences
may
leadtoaconsciousdifferentiationbetweentheman-enforced
normativelawsor
conventions,andthenatural
regularities
whichare
beyond
his
power.Whenthisdifferentiation is
clearlyunderstood,thenwecandescribethe
position
reached
asacritical
dualism,orcriticalconventionalism. Inthe
develop-
mentofGreek
philosophy
thisdualismoffactsandnorms
announces itselfintermsofthe
opposition
betweennatureand
convention.
3
In
spite
ofthefactthatthis
position
wasreacheda
long
time
agoby
the
SophistProtagoras,
anolder
contemporary
of
Socrates,
itisstillsolittleunderstoodthatitseems
necessary
to
explain
itinsomedetail.
First,wemustnotthinkthatcriticaldualism
implies
a
theory
ofthehistorical
origin
ofnorms. Ithas
nothing
todowiththehistoricalassertionthatnormsinthefirst
place
were
consciously
madeorintroduced
byman,
insteadof
having
beenfound
by
himtobe
simply
there
(whenever
hewasfirst
abletofind
anything
ofthis
kind).
Itthereforehas
nothing
to
dowiththeassertionthatnorms
originate
withman,andnot
withGod,nordoesitunderratethe
importance
ofnormative
laws.Leastofallhasit
anything
todowiththeassertionthat
norms,since
they
are
conventional,
i.e.man-made,aretherefore
'
merelyarbitrary
'.Criticaldualism
merely
assertsthatnorms
andnormativelawscanbemadeand
changedbyman,more
especiallyby
adecisionorconvention toobservethemorto
alterthem,andthatitisthereforemanwhois
morallyresponsible
forthem
;not
perhaps
forthenownswhichhefindstoexist
in
societywhenhefirst
begins
toreflect
uponthem,butforthe
normswhichheis
prepared
totolerateoncehehasfoundout
thathecando
something
toalterthem.Normsareman-made
inthesensethatwemustblame
nobody
butourselvesforthem
;
neither
nature,norGod. Itisourbusinessto
improve
them
asmuchaswecan.Thislastremark
implies
that
bydescribing
normsas
conventional,
Idonotmeanthat
they
mustbe
arbitrary,
orthatonesetofnormativelawswilldo
just
aswell

52 PLAT0
5
SSOCIOLOGY
asanother.Bysaying
thatsome
systems
oflawscanbe
improved,
thatsomelawsmay
bebetterthan
others,
Irather
imply
that
wecan
compare
the
existing
normativelaws
(or
social
institutions)
withsomestandardnormswhichwehavedecidedare
worthy
toberealized.Buteventhesestandardsareofour
making
in
thesensethatourdecisioninfavourofthemisourown
decision,
andthatwealone
carry
the
responsibility
for
adopting
them.
Thestandardsarenottobefoundinnature.Natureconsists
offactsandof
regularities,
andisinitselfneithermoralnor
immoral. Itiswewho
impose
ourstandards
uponnature,
andwhointroduceinthisway
moralsintothenaturalworld
4
,
in
spite
ofthefactthatweare
part
ofthisworld.Weare
products
of
nature,butnaturehasmadeus
together
withour
power
of
altering
theworld,of
foreseeingandof
planning
for
the
future,andof
makingfar-reaching
decisionsforwhichwe
are
morallyresponsible.
Yet
responsibility, decisions,enterthe
worldofnature
only
withus.
Itis
important
forthe
understanding
ofthisattitudeto
realizethatthesedecisionscanneverbederivedfromfacts
(or
statementsof
facts),althoughtheypertain
tofacts.The
decision,
for
instance,to
opposeslavery,
doesnot
dependupon
thefact
thatallmenarebornfreeand
equal,
andthatnomanisborn
inchains.Forevenifallmenwereborn
free,some
might
perhapstry
to
put
theminchains.Andevenif
they
were
borninchains,many
ofus
mightdemandtheremovalofthese
chains.Inthis
way,practically
allfactsofsociallife
permit
many
differentdecisions
;forinstance,thatweleave
things
as
theyare,orthatwealterthem.
Criticaldualismthus
emphasizes
the
impossibility
of
reducing
decisionsornormstofacts
;
itcanthereforebedescribedasa
dualism
offacts
anddecisions.Butthisdualismseemstobe
open
toattack. Decisionsare
facts,
itmaybesaid. Ifwedecideto
adopt
acertainnorm,thenthisdecisionisitselfa
psychological
or
sociological fact,anditwouldbeabsurdto
say
thatthere
is
nothing
incommonbetweensuchfactsandotherfacts.Since
itcannotbedoubtedthatourdecisionsaboutnorms,
i.e.the
normswe
adopt,clearlydependupon
certain
psychological
facts,suchastheinfluenceofour
upbringing,
itseemstobe
absurdto
postulate
adualismoffactsanddecisions,orto
say
thatdecisionscannotibederivedfromfacts.This
objection,
I
believe,mustbe
analysedand
dispelled
beforewecan
say
that
weunderstand criticaldualism.

CHAPTER
5
:NATUREANDCONVENTION
53
Wecan
speak
of
'
decisions
'
intwodifferentsenses.In
ordertomakethesetwosensesclear,
Imaypoint
outan
analogous
situation,inthefieldof
descriptive
statement. Letusconsider
thestatement :
'
Napoleon
diedonSt.Helena '.Itwillbe
usefulto
distinguish
thisstatementfromthefactwhich it
describes.Nowahistorian,say
Mr.A,when
writing
the
biography
of
Napoleon,maymakethestatementmentioned.
In
doingso,heis
describing
afact.Butthereisalsoasecond
fact,whichis
very
differentfrom
that,namely
thefactthathe
madethestatement
;andanotherhistorian,Mr.B,when
writing
the
biography
ofMr.A,may
describethissecondfact
bysaying
:
c
Mr.Astatedthat
Napoleon
diedonSt.Helena '.
Thesecondfactdescribedinthis
way,happens
tobeitselfa
description.
Butitisa
description
inasenseofthewordthat
mustbe
distinguished
fromthesenseinwhichwecalledthe
statement
*
Napoleon
diedonSt.Helena
'
a
description.The
making
ofa
description,
ofastatement,
isa
sociological
or
psychological
fact.Butthe
description
madeistobe
distinguishedfrom
the
fact
thatithasbeenmade. Itcannotevenbederivedfrom
thisfact
;
forthatwouldmeanthatwecandeduce
'
Napoleon
diedonSt.Helena
',from
*
Mr.Astatedthat
Napoleon
died
onSt.Helena
',whichis
obviously
not
possible.
Inthefieldofdecisions,thesituation is
analogous.The
making
ofadecision,the
adoption
ofastandard,
isafact.But
thenormwhichhasbeen
adopted,
isnot.Thatmost
people
agree
withthenorm
*
Thoushaltnotsteal
*
isa
sociological
fact.Butthenorm
'
Thoushaltnotsteal
'
isnotafact
;and
itcanneverbeinferredfromsentences
describing
facts.This
willbeseenmost
clearlywhenwerememberthatthereare
always
variousandeven
opposite
decisions
possible
with
respect
toacertainrelevantfact.Forinstance,infaceofthe
sociological
factthatmost
peopleadopt
thenorm
*
Thoushaltnotsteal
',
itisstill
possible
todecideto
adopt
eitherthisnorm,orits
opposite
;anditis
possible
to
encourage
thosewhohave
adopted
thenormtoholdfastto
it,orto
discouragethem,andto
persuade
themto
adopt
anothernorm. Itis
impossible
toderiveasentence
stating
anormoradecision
from
asentence
stating
a
fact ;
thisis
only
anotherway
of
saying
thatitis
impossible
toderivenormsor
decisionsfromfacts.
6
Thestatementthatnormsareman-made
(in
thesensethat
the
responsibility
forthemis
entirelyours)
hasoftenbeenmis-
understood.
Nearly
all
misunderstandings
canbetracedback

54
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
toonefundamental
misapprehension, namely,
tothebelief
that
'
convention
*
implies
'
arbitrariness
'
;thatifwearefree
tochoose
anysystem
ofnormswe
like,thenone
system
is
just
as
good
as
any
other. Itmust,ofcourse,beadmittedthatthe
viewthatnormsareconventionalorartificialindicatesthatthere
willbeacertainelementofarbitrarinessinvolved,
i.e.thatthere
may
bedifferent
systems
ofnormsbetweenwhichthereisnot
muchtochoose
(a
factthathasbeen
dulyemphasizedby
Prota-
goras).
But
artificialityby
nomeans
implies
fullarbitrariness.
Mathematical
calculi,
forinstance,or
symphonies,
or
plays,
are
highlyartificial,yet
itdoesnotfollowthatonecalculusor
symphony
or
play
is
just
as
good
asany
other.Manhascreated
newworlds ofmusic,of
poetry,
of
science,andthemost
important
oftheseistheworldofthemoraldemandsfor
equality,
forfreedom,andfor
helping
theweak
6
.When
comparing
the
fieldofmoralswiththefieldofmusicorofmathematics,
Ido
notwishto
imply
thatthesesimilaritiesreach
very
far.There
is,more
especially,
a
great
differencebetweenmoraldecisions
anddecisionsinthefieldofart.Manymoraldecisionsinvolve
thelifeanddeathofothermen.Decisionsinthefieldofart
aremuchless
urgent
and
important.
Itisthereforemost
misleading
to
say
thatamandecides
againstslavery
ashe
may
decide
against
certainformsofmusicandliterature,andthat
moraldecisionsare
purely
mattersoftaste.Norare
theymerely
decisionsabouthowtomaketheworldmorebeautiful,orabout
otherluxuriesofthiskind
;they
aredecisionsofmuch
greater
urgency. (With
all
this,cp.
also
chapter9.)Our
comparison
is
only
intendedtoshowthattheviewthatmoraldecisionsrest
withusdoesnot
imply
that
they
are
entirelyarbitrary.
Theviewthatnormsareman-made is
also,strangelyenough,
contested
by
somewhoseeinthisattitudeanattackon
religion.
Itmustbeadmitted,ofcourse,thatthisviewisanattackon
certainformsof
religion,namely,
onthe
religion
ofblind
authority,
on
magic
and
tafyooism. ButIdonotthinkthatit
isin
anywayopposed
toa
religion
built
upon
theideaof
personal
responsibility
andfreedomofconscience. Ihavein
mind,of
course,especiallyChristianity,
atleastasitis
usually
inter-
preted
indemocraticcountries
;Christianitywhich,
as
against
alltabooism,preaches,
'
Yehaveheardthatitwassaid
by
themofoldtime. . .ButI
say
unto
you
..'
;opposing
in
every
casethevoiceofconscience tomereformalobedience
andthefulfilmentofthelaw.

CHAPTER
5
:NATUREANDCONVENTION
55
Iwouldnotadmitthattothinkofethicallawsas
being
man-madeinthissenseis
incompatible
withthe
religiousview
that
they
are
given
tous
by
God.
Historically,
allethics
undoubtedlybegins
with
religion ;butIdonotnowdealwith
historical
questions.
Idonotaskwhowasthefirstethical
lawgiver.
I
only
maintainthatitis
we,andwealone,whoare
responsible
for
adopting
or
rejecting
some
suggested
morallaws
;
itiswewhomust
distinguishbetweenthetrue
prophets
and
thefalse
prophets.
Allkindsofnormshavebeenclaimedto
be
God-given.
If
youaccept
the
c
Christian
5
ethicsof
equality
andtolerationandfreedomofconscience
only
becauseofits
claimtorest
upon
divine
authority,
then
you
buildonaweak
basis
;
forithasbeen
only
toooftenclaimedthat
inequality
is
willed
byGod,andthatwemustnotbetolerantwithunbelievers.
If,however,youaccept
theChristianethicsnotbecauseyou
arecommanded todosobutbecauseof
your
convictionthat
itisthe
right
decisionto
take,thenitis
youwhohavedecided.
My
insistencethatwemakethedecisionsand
carry
the
responsi-
bility
mustnotbetakento
imply
thatwecannot,ormust
not,
be
helpedbyfaith,and
inspiredbytradition,
or
bygreat
examples.
Nordoesit
imply
thatthecreationofmoraldecisions
is
merely
a
*
natural
'
process,
i.e.oftheorderof
physico-chemical
processes.
In
fact,Protagoras,
thefirstcritical
dualist,taught
thatnaturedoesnotknownorms,andthattheintroductionof
normsisduetoman,andthemost
important
ofhumanachieve-
ments.Hethus
c
heldtheinstitutionsandconventionswere
whatraisedmenabovethebrutes
',asBurnet
7
puts
it.But
in
spite
ofhisinsistencethatmancreatesnorms,thatitisman
whoisthemeasureofall
things,
hebelievedthatmancould
achievethecreationofnorms
only
with
supernatural help.
Norms,he
taught,
are
superimposedupon
the
original
ornatural
stateofaffairs
byman,butwiththe
help
ofZeus.Theway
inwhichthefirstclearstatementofcriticaldualismmakes
roomfora
religiousinterpretation
ofoursenseof
responsibility
showshowlittlecriticaldualismis
opposed
toa
religious
attitude.
Asimilar
approach
canbediscerned,
I
believe,
inthehistorical
Socrates
(seechapter10)whofelt
compelled,by
hisconscience
aswellas
by
his
religiousbeliefs,
to
question
all
authority,
and
whosearchedforthenormsinwhose
justice
hecouldtrust.
Thedoctrineofthe
autonomy
ofethics
i^independent
ofthe
problem
of
religion,
but
compatible with,or
perhaps
even
necessaryfor,anyreligion
which
respects
individualconscience.

56
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
Somuch
concerning
thedualismoffactsanddecisions,or
thedoctrineofthe
autonomy
of
ethics,
firstadvocated
by
Protagoras
andSocrates
8
.It
is,
I
believe,indispensable
fora
reasonable
understanding
ofoursocialenvironment. Butof
coursethisdoesnotmeanthatall
c
sociallaws
',
i.e.all
regularities
ofoursocial
life,arenormativeandman
imposed.Onthe
contrary,
thereare
important
naturallawsofsociallifealso.
For
these,theterm
sociological
lawsseems
appropriate.
Itis
just
thefactthatinsociallifewemeetwithbothkindsof
laws,
naturalandnormative,whichmakes itso
important
todis-
tinguish
them
clearly.
Byspeaking
of
sociological
lawsornaturallawsofsocial
life,
Idonotthinksomuchofthebroad
developmental
laws
inwhich
historicists,Platofor
instance,are
interested,although
ifthereare
any
such
developmental regularities,
theirformula-
tionswould
certainly
fallunderthe
category
of
sociological
laws.
NordoIthinksomuchofthelawsof
*
humannature
',
i.e.of
psychological
and
socio-psychological regularities
ofhuman
behaviour. Ihaveinmind,rather,suchlawsasareformulated
by
moderneconomic
theories,
for
instance,the
theory
ofinter-
national
trade,
orthe
theory
ofthetrade
cycle.
Butthereare
other
importantsociologicallaws,connectedwiththe
functioning
ofsocialinstitutions.
(Cp.chapters
2and
9.)
Theselaws
play
aroleinoursociallife
corresponding
totherole
played
in
mechanical
engineering by,say,
the
principle
ofthelever.
For
institutions,
like
levers,areneededifwewanttoachieve
anything
which
goesbeyond
the
power
ofourmuscles. Like
machines,
institutions
multiply
our
power
for
good
andevil.
Likemachines,they
need
intelligentsupervisionby
someone
whounderstands theirway
of
functioningand,mostof
all,
their
purpose,
sincewecannotbuildthemsothat
they
work
entirelyautomatically. Furthermore,
theirconstructionneeds
some
knowledge
ofsocial
regularities
which
impose
limitations
upon
whatcanbeachieved
by
institutions
9
.
(These
limitations
aresomewhat
analogous,
for
instance,
tothelawofconservation
of
energy,
whichamountstothestatementthatwecannot
builda
perpetual
motion
machine.)
But
fundamentally,
insti-
tutionsare
alwaysmadebyestablishing
theobservance of
certainnorms,designed
withacertainaiminmind.
(Even
mechanical
engines
aremade,
asitwere,not
only
of
iron,but
bycombining
ironandnorms
;
i.e.bytransforming physical
things,
but
according
tocertainnormativerules,namely
their

CHAPTER
5
INATUREANDCONVENTION
57
plan
or
design.)
In
institutions,normativelawsandsocio-
logical,
i.e.naturallawsare
closelyinterwoven,anditisthere-
fore
impossible
tounderstand the
functioning
ofinstitutions
without
being
ableto
distinguish
betweenthesetwo.
Asindicated
before,
therearemany
intermediate
steps
in
the
development
fromanaiveor
magicalmonismtoacritical
dualismwhich
clearly
realizesthedistinctionbetweennorms
andnaturallaws.Mostoftheseintermediate
positions
arise
fromthe
misapprehension
thatifanorm isconventional or
artificial,
itmustbe
whollyarbitrary.Tounderstand Plato's
position,
whichcombinesfeaturesofthem
all,
itis
necessary
tomakea
survey
ofthethreemost
important
oftheseinter-
mediate
positions.They
are
(i)biologicalnaturalism, (2)
ethical
or
juridicalpositivism,
and
(3)psychological
or
spiritual
natural-
ism. Itis
interesting
thateachofthese
positions
hasbeenused
for
defendingquiteopposite
ethicalviews
;more
especially,
for
defending
the
worship
of
power,
andfor
defending
the
rights
of
theweak.
(i)Biologicalnaturalism,
ormore
precisely,
the
biological
formofethicalnaturalism,
isthe
theory
thatin
spite
ofthefact
thatmoralsandthelawsofstatesare
arbitrary,
therearesome
eternal
unchanging
laws
v
ofnaturefromwhichwecanderive
norms.Food
habits,
i.e.thenumberofmeals,andthekindof
foodtaken,arean
example
ofthearbitrarinessofconventions,
the
biological
naturalistmayargue ;yet
thereare
undoubtedly
certainnaturallawsinthisfield.Forinstance,amanwilldie
ifhetakeseitherinsufficientortoomuchfood.Thusitseems
that
just
astherearerealitiesbehind
appearances,
sobehind
our
arbitrary
conventions therearesome
unchanging
natural
lawsand
especially
thelawsof
biology.
Biological
naturalismhasbeenusedtodefend
equalitarianism
aswellasthe
anti-equalitarian
doctrineoftheruleofthe
strong.
Oneofthefirstto
put
forwardthisnaturalismwasthe
poet
Pindar,whouseditto
support
the
thfeory
thatthe
strong
should
rule.Heclaimedthatitisalaw,valid
throughoutnature,
thatthe
stronger
doeswiththeweakerwhateverhelikes.Thus
lawswhich
protect
theweakarenot
merelyarbitrary
butartificial
distortionsofthetruenaturallawthatthe
strong
shouldbe
freeandtheweakshouldbehisslave.Theviewisdiscussed
a
good
deal
10
by
Plato
;
itisattackedinthe
Gorgias,
a
dialogue
whichisstillmuchinfluencedby
Socrates
;inthe
Republic,
it
is
put
inthemouthof
Thrasymachus,
andidentifiedwithethical
O.S.I.E.VOL.j c

58
individualism
(see
thenext
chapter) ;
intheLaws,Platoisless
antagonistic
toPindar'sview
;buthestillcontrasts itwiththe
ruleofthewisest,which,he
says,
isabetter
principle,
and
just
asmuchinaccordancewithnature
(see
alsothe
quotation
later
inthis
chapter).
Thefirstto
put
forwardahumanitarian or
equalitarian
versionof
biological
naturalismwasthe
SophistAntiphon.To
himisduealsotheidentificationofnaturewithtruth,andof
conventionwith
opinion(or
'delusive
opinion'
ll
).Antiphon
isaradicalnaturalist.Hebelievesthatmostnormsarenot
merelyarbitrary 3but
directlycontrary
tonature.Norms,he
says,
are
imposed
from
outside,whiletherulesofnatureare
inevitable. Itis
disadvantageous
andeven
dangerous
tobreak
man-imposed
normsifthebreach isobservedby
thosewho
impose
them
;butthereisnoinner
necessity
attachedtothem,
and
nobody
needtobeashamedof
breaking
them
;shameand
punishment
are
only
sanctions
arbitrarilyimposed
fromoutside.
Onthiscriticismofconventional morals,Antiphon
basesa
utilitarianethics.
*
Oftheactionsherementioned,onewould
findmany
tobe
contrary
tonature.For
they
involvemore
suffering
wherethereshouldbe
less,andless
pleasure
where
therecouldbemore,and
injury
whereitis
unnecessary.'
12
At
thesametime,he
taught
theneedforself-control. His
equali-
tarianismheformulatesasfollows :
'
The
nobly
bornwerevere
andadore
;butnotthe
lowly
born.Thesearecoarsehabits.
Ournatural
gifts
arethesamefor
all,onall
points,
whetherwe
arenowGreeksorbarbarians. . .Weallbreathetheair
through
ourmouthandnostrils.'
Asimilar
equalitarianism
wasvoiced
by
the
SophistHippias,
whomPlato
represents
as
addressing
hisaudience :
*
Gentlemen,
Ibelievethatweareallkinsmenandfriendsandfellow-citizens
;
ifnot
by
conventional law,then
by
nature.For
bynature,
likenessisan
expression
of
kinship ;butthelaw,the
tyrant
of
mankind,compels
usto
fdomuchthat is
against
nature.'
13
This
spirit
wasbound
up
withtheAthenianmovement
against
slavery(mentioned
in
chapter4)
towhich
Euripidesgaveexpres-
sion :
*
Thenamealone
brings
shame
upon
theslavewhocan
beexcellentin
everyway
and
trulyequal
tothefreebornman.'
Elsewhere,he
says
:
'
Man'slawofnature is
equality.'
And
Alcidamas,a
disciple
of
Gorgias
anda
contemporary
ofPlato,
wrote :
'
Godhasmadeallmenfree
;nomanisaslaveby
nature.
5
Similarviewsarealso
expressedbyLycophron,
another

CHAPTER
5
:NATUREANDCONVENTION
59
memberof
Gorgias
5
school :
'
Nobility
ofbirthishollow. Its
prerogatives
areunfoundedandits
splendour
isbased
upon
a
name/
Against
this
great
humanitarianmovement,themovement
ofthe
'
GreatGeneration
',asIshallcallitlater
(chapter10),
Plato,andhis
discipleAristotle,advancedthe
theory
ofthe
biological
andmoral
inequality
ofman.Greeksandbarbarians
are
unequalby
nature
;the
opposition
betweenthemcorre-
sponds
tothatbetweennaturalmastersandnaturalslaves.The
natural
inequality
ofmenisoneofthereasonsfortheir
living
together,
fortheirnatural
gifts
are
complementary.
Sociallife
begins
withnatural
inequality,
anditmustcontinue
upon
that
foundation. Ishalldiscussthesedoctrineslaterinmoredetail.
At
present,theymay
servetoshowhow
biological
naturalism
canbeusedto
support
themost
divergent
ethicaldoctrines. In
the
light
ofour
previousanalysis
ofthe
impossibility
of
basing
norms
upon
factsthisresultisnot
unexpected.
Suchconsiderations, however,are
perhaps
notsufficientto
defeata
theory
as
popular
as
biological
naturalism
;
Itherefore
proffer
twomoredirectcriticisms. Firstof
all,
itmustbe
admittedthatcertainformsofbehaviourmay
bedescribedas
more
c
natural
'
thanotherforms
;
forinstance,going
naked
or
eatingonly
rawfood
;andsome
people
thinkthatthisin
itself
justifies
thechoiceoftheseforms.Butinthissenseitis
alsomostunnaturaltobeinterestedin
art,or
science,oreven
in
arguments
infavourofnaturalism. Thustochoosecon-
formity
with
'
nature
'
asa
supreme
standardleads
ultimately
to
consequences
whichfewwillbe
prepared
toface
;
itdoes
notleadtoamorenaturalformof
civilization,buttobeastli-
ness
14
.Thesecondcriticismismore
important.
The
biological
naturalistassumesthathecanderivehisnormsfromthenatural
lawswhichdeterminetheconditionsofhealth,etc.,
ifhedoes
not
naively
believethatweneed
adopt
nonormswhateverbut
simply
live
according
tothe
c
lawsofnature '.Heoverlooks
thefactthathemakesachoice,adecision
;thatitis
possible
thatsomeother
people
cherishcertain
things
morethantheir
health
(forinstance,themanywhohave
consciously
riskedtheir
lives,perhaps
formedical
research).Andheisthereforemis-
takenifhebelievesthathehasnotmadeaconventionaldecision,
orhasderivedhisnormsfrom
biologicall#ws.
(2)
Ethical
positivism
shareswiththe
biological
formof
ethicalnaturalismthebeliefthatwemust
try
toreducenorms

6o PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
tofacts.Butthefactsarethistime
sociological facts,namely,
theactual
existing
norms. Positivismmaintainsthatthereare
noothernormsbutthelawswhichhave
actually
beenset
up
(or
'
posited')
andwhichhavethereforea
positive
existence.
Otherstandardsareconsidered asunreal
imaginations. The
existing
lawsarethe
onlypossible
standardsof
goodness
:what
is,
is
good.(Might
is
right.)According
tosomeformsofthis
theory,
itisa
grossmisunderstanding
tobelievethattheindi-
vidualcan
judge
thenormsof
society ;rather,
itis
society
which
provides
thecode
by
whichtheindividualmustbe
judged.
Historically,
ethical
(ormoral,or
juridical)positivism
has
usually
beenconservative, orevenauthoritarian
;andithas
ofteninvokedthe
authority
ofGod. Its
argumentsdepend,
I
believe,upon
thearbitrarinessofnorms.Wemustbelievein
existingnorms,
itclaims,becausetherearenobetternorms
whichwemay
findforourselves. In
reply
tothisit
might
be
asked :Whataboutthisnorm
c
Wemustbelieve etc.'?If
thisis
only
an
existingnorm,thenitdoesnotcountasan
argu-
mentinfavourofthesenorms
;butifitisan
appeal
toour
insight,
thenitadmitsthatwecan,after
all,
findnormsour-
selves.Andifwearetoldto
accept
normson
authority
because
wecannot
judgethem,thenneithercanwe
judge
whetherthe
claimsofthe
authority
are
justified,
orwhetherwemay
not
followafalse
prophet.Andifitisheldthattherearenofalse
prophets
becauselawsare
arbitraryanyhow,
sothatthemain
thing
istohavesomelaws,thenwemay
askourselveswhy
it
shouldbeso
important
tohavelawsatall
;
forifthereareno
furtherstandards,why
thenshouldwenotchoosetohaveno
laws?
(These
remarksmayperhaps
indicatethereasonsfor
my
beliefthatauthoritarian orconservative
principles
are
usually
an
expression
ofethicalnihilism
;
thatisto
say,
ofanextreme
scepticism,
ofadistrustofman,andofhis
possibilities.)
Whilethe
theory
ofnatural
rightshas,inthecourseof
history,
oftenbeen
proffered
in
support
of
equalitarianand
humanitarian
ideas,the
positivist
schoolwas
usually
inthe
oppositecamp.Butthisisnotmuchmorethananaccident
;
ashasbeen
shown,
ethicalnaturalismmay
beusedwith
very
differentintentions.
w(It
has
recently
beenusedfor
confusing
the^
wholeissue
byadvertising
certain
reactionary,
and
allegedly
*
natural
'
rights
as
*
naturallaws
'.)Conversely,
therearealso

CHAPTER
5
:NATUREANDCONVENTION 61
humanitarianand
progressive positivists.
Forifallnormsare
arbitrary,why
notbetolerant? Thisisa
typicalattempt
to
justify
ahumanitarian attitude
alongpositivist
lines.
(3)Psychological
or
spiritual
naturalism isina
way
acom-
binationofthetwo
previousviews,anditcanbestbe
explained
by
meansofan
argumentagainst
theone-sidedness ofthese
views.Theethical
positivist
is
right,
this
argumentruns,
ifhe
emphasizes
thatallnormsareconventional,
i.e.a
product
of
man,andofhuman
society ;butheoverlooksthefactthat
they
arethereforean
expression
ofthe
psychological
or
spiritual
natureofman,andofthenatureofhuman
society.The
biological
naturalist is
right
in
assuming
thattherearecertain
naturalaimsorends,fromwhichwecanderivenaturalnorms
;
butheoverlooksthefactthatournaturalaimsarenotneces-
sarilysuch,aimsashealth,pleasure,
or
food,
shelteror
propaga-
tion.Humannatureissuchthatman,oratleastsomemen,
donotwanttolive
by
breadalone,
that
they
seek
higheraims,
spiritual
aims.Wemay
thusderiveman'struenaturalaims
fromhisowntruenature,whichis
spiritual,
andsocial.And
we
may,further,derivethenaturalnormsoflifefromhis
naturalends.
This
plausiblepositionwas,
I
believe,
firstformulated
by
Plato,whowashereundertheinfluenceoftheSocraticdoctrine
ofthe
soul,
i.e.ofSocrates'
teaching,
thatthe
spirit
mattersmore
thantheflesh
15
.Its
appeal
tooursentiments is
undoubtedly
verymuch
stronger
thanthatoftheothertwo
positions.
It
canhoweverbecombined,
like
these,with
any
ethicaldecision
;
withahumanitarian attitudeaswellaswiththe
worship
of
power.
Forwecan,
for
instance,decidetotreatallmenas
participating
inthis
spiritualhumannature
;orwecan
insist,
likeHeraclitus,thatthemany
c
filltheirbellieslikethebeasts
',
andarethereforeofaninferiornature,andthat
only
afew
electonesare
worthy
ofthe
spiritualcommunity
ofmen.
Accordingly, spiritual
naturalism Ifasbeenmuchused,and
especiallybyPlato,
to
justify
thenatural
prerogatives
ofthe
'
noble
'
or
'
elect
'
or
*
wise
'
orofthe
'
naturalleader'.
(Plato's
attitude isdiscussedinthe
followingchapters.)On
theotherhand,
ithasbeenusedby
Christianandother
16
humanitarian formsof
ethics,
forinstance
by
Paineand
by
Kant,
todemandthe
recognition
ofthe?
c
natural
rights
'
of
everyhumanindividual. In
fact,
itisclearthat
spiritual
naturalismcanbeusedtodefendanything,and
especiallyany

6a PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
*
positive ',
i.e.
existing,
norms.Foritcan
always
be
argued
thatthesenormswouldnotbeinforceif
they
didnot
express
sometraitsofhumannature.Inthis
way,spiritual
naturalism
can,in
practicalproblems,
becomeonewith
positivism,
in
spite
oftheirtraditional
opposition. (Infact,
thisformofnaturalism
issowideandso
vague
thatitmay
beusedtodefend
anything.
Thereis
nothing
thathaseveroccurredtomanwhichcould
notbeclaimedtobe
c
natural
'
;
forifitwerenotinhisnature,
howcouldithaveoccurredtohim
?)
Looking
backatthisbrief
survey,we
perhapsmay
discern
twomaintendencieswhichstandintheway
of
adopting
a
criticaldualism.The first isa
generaltendency
towards
monism
17
,thatisto
say,
towardsthereductionofnormsto
facts.Thesecondlies
deeper,
andit
possibly
formstheback-
ground
ofthefirst. Itisbased
upon
ourfearof
admitting
to
ourselvesthatthe
responsibility
forourethicaldecisions is
entirely
oursandcanbeshiftedonto
nobody
else
;
neitherto
God,nortonature,norto
society,
norto
history.
Allthese
ethicaltheories
attempt
tofind
somebody,
or
perhaps
some
argument,
totakethe.burdenfromus
18
.Butwecannotshirk
this
responsibility. Whatever
authoritywemayaccept,
itiswe
who
accept
it.We
only
deceiveourselvesifwedonotrealize
this
simplepoint.
Wenowturntoamoredetailed
analysis
ofPlato'snaturalism
anditsrelationtohishistoricism. Plato,ofcourse,doesnot
always
usetheterm
'
nature
'
inthesamesense.Themost
importantmeaning
whichheattachestoit
is,
I
believe,prac-
tically
identicalwiththatwhichheattachestotheterm
*
essence '.
Thisway
of
using
theterm
c
nature
'
stillsurvivesamong
essen-
tialistseveninourday;they
still
speak,
forinstance,ofthe
natureofmathematics,orofthenatureofinductiveinference,
orofthe
c
natureof
happiness
and
misery
'
19
.Whenusedby
Platointhis
way,
c
nature
'
means
nearly
thesameas
'
Form
J
or
c
Idea
'
;
fortheFormorIdeaofa
thing,
asshownabove,
isalsoitsessence.Themaindifferencebetweennaturesand
FormsorIdeasseemstobethis.TheFormorIdeaofasensible
thingis,aswehaveseen,notinthat
thing,
but
separated
from
it
;
itisits
forefather,
its
primogenitor ;butthisFormorfather
passessomething
ontothesensible
things
whichareits
offspring
or
race,namely,
theinnature.The
'
nature
'
isthustheinborn
or
originalquality
ofa
thing,
andinso
far,
itsinherentessence
;
itisthe
originalpower
or
disposition
ofa
thing,
anditdeter-

CHAPTER
5
:NATUREANDCONVENTION
63
minesthoseofits
properties
whicharethebasisofitsresemblance
to,orofitsinnate
participation in,theFormorIdea.
'
Natural
'
is,accordingly,
what isinnateor
original
or
divineina
thing,
while
*
artificial
'
isthatwhichhasbeenlater
changedbymanoraddedor
imposedbyhim,through
external
compulsion.
Plato
frequently
insiststhatall
products
ofhuman
*
art
*
attheirbestare
onlycopies
of
'
natural
'
sensible
things.
Butsincetheseinturnare
onlycopies
ofthedivineFormsor
Ideas,the
products
ofartare
onlycopies
of
copies,
twiceremoved
from
reality,
andthereforeless
good,
less
real,andlesstrue
20
thaneventhe
(natural)things
influx . .Weseefromthis
thatPlato
agrees
with
Antiphon
21
inatleastone
point,namely
in
assuming
thatthe
opposition
betweennatureandconvention
orart
corresponds
tothatbetweentruthandfalsehood,between
reality
and
appearance,
between
primary
or
original
and
secondary
orman-made
things,
andtothatbetweenthe
objects
ofrational
knowledge
andthoseofdelusive
opinion.
The
oppositioncorresponds also,according
toPlato,
tothatbetween
'
the
offspring
ofdivine
workmanship
'
or
4
the
products
of
divineart
',and
*
whatmanmakesoutofthem,
i.e.the
products
ofhumanart'.
22
Allthose
things
whoseintrinsicvaluePlato
wishesto
emphasize
hethereforeclaimstobenaturalas
opposed
toartificial.ThusheinsistsintheLawsthatthesoulhasto
beconsidered
prior
toallmaterial
things,
andthatitmust
thereforebesaidtoexist
by
nature :
*
Nearlyeverybody
. .is
ignorant
ofthe
power
ofthe
soul,and
especially
ofher
origin.
They
donotknowthatsheisamong
thefirstof
things,and
prior
toallbodies. . .In
using
theword
"
nature
"
onewants
todescribethe
things
thatwerecreatedfirst
;butifitturnsout
thatitisthesoulwhichis
prior
toother
things(andnot,perhaps,
fireor
air),
. .thenthe
soul,beyond
allothers,may
beasserted
toexistbynature,
inthetruestsenseoftheword.
5
23
(Plato
herereaffirmshisold
theory
thatthesoulismore
closely
akin
totheFormsorIdeasthanthe
body ;a
theory
whichisalso
thebasisofhisdoctrineof
immortality).
ButPlatonot
only
teachesthatthesoulis
prior
toother
thingsandtherefore exists
'
by
nature
*
;heusestheterm
c
nature
',
if
applied
toman,frequently
alsoasanamefor
spiritualpowers
or
gifts
ornaturaltalents,
sothatwecan
say
thataman's
'
nature
'
ismuchthesame*ashis
'
soul
'
;
itis
thedivine
principleby
whichhe
participates
intheFormor
Idea,
inthedivine
primogenitor
ofhisrace.Andtheterm

64
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
c
race
J
,again,
is
frequently
usedina
very
similarsense. Since
a
*
race
'
isunitedbybeing
the
offspring
ofthesame
primo-
genitor,
itmustalsobeunited
by
acommonnature.Thus
theterms
'
nature
'
and
'
race
'
are
frequently
usedby
Platoas
synonyms,
forinstance,whenhe
speaks
ofthe
'
raceof
philoso-
phers
'
andofthosewhohave
'
philosophic
natures
'
;
sothat
boththesetermsare
closely
akintotheterms
*
essence
'
and
'
soul'.
Plato's
theory
of
'
nature
'
opens
another
approach
tohis
historicist
methodology.
Sinceitseemstobethetaskofscience
in
general
toexaminethetruenatureofits
objects,
itisthe
taskofasocialor
political
sciencetoexaminethenatureof
human
society,
andofthestate.Butthenatureofa
thing,
according
to
Plato,
isits
origin ;oratleastitisdetermined
by
its
origin.
Thusthemethodof
any
sciencewillbethe
investigation
ofthe
origin
of
things(of
their
*
causes
').
This
principle,
when
applied
tothescienceof
societyandof
politics,
leadstothedemandthatthe
origin
of
societyandofthestate
mustbeexamined.
History
therefore isnotstudiedforitsown
sakebutservesasthemethodofthesocialsciences. Thisisthe
historicist
methodology.
Whatisthenatureofhuman
society,
ofthestate?Accord-
ing
tohistoricistmethods,
thisfundamental
question
of
sociology
mustbereformulatedinthisway
:whatisthe
origin
of
society
andofthestate?The
replygivenby
Platointhe
Republic
as
wellasintheLaws
*4
,agrees
withthe
position
describedabove
as
spiritual
naturalism.The
origin
of
society
isaconvention,
asocialcontract.Butitisnot
only
that
;
it
is,rather,anatural
convention,
i.e.aconventionwhich isbased
uponhuman
nature,andmore
precisely,upon
thesocialnatureofman.
Thissocialnatureofmanhasits
origin
inthe
imperfection
of
thehumanindividual. In
opposition
toSocrates
25
,Plato
teachesthatthehumanindividualcannotbe
self-sufficient,
owing
tothelimitations
inherent
inhumannature.
Although
Platoinsiststhatthereare
very
different
degrees
ofhuman
perfection,
itturnsoutthateventhe
very
few
comparatively
perfectmenstill
dependupon
others
(who
areless
perfect) ;
iffor
nothingelse,thenfor
having
the
dirtywork,themanual
work,done
bythem
2G
.Inthis
way,
eventhe
'
rareand
uncommon natures
\who
approachperfectiondependupon
society,upon
thestate.They
canreach
perfectiononlythrough
thestateandinthestate
;theperfectstatemustofferthemthe

CHAPTER
5
:NATUREANDCONVENTION
65
proper
c
socialhabitat
',withoutwhich
they
mustgrowcorrupt
and
degenerate.Thestatethereforemustbe
placedhigher
thantheindividualsince
only
thestatecanbeautarch,
self-
sufficient,perfect,
andabletomake
good
the
necessaryimper-
fectionoftheindividual.
Society
andtheindividualarethus
interdependent.
The
oneowesitsexistencetotheother.
Society
owesitsexistence
tohumannature,and
especially
toitslackof
self-sufficiency ;
andtheindividualoweshisexistenceto
society,
sinceheisnot
self-sufficient. Butwithinthis
relationship
of
interdependence,
the
superiority
ofthestateovertheindividualmanifests itself
invariousways ;forinstance,
inthefactthattheseedofthe
decay
anddisunionofa
perfect
statedoesnot
springup
inthe
state
itself,butratherinitsindividuals
;
itisrootedinthe
imperfection
ofthehuman
soul,
ofhumannature
;ormore
precisely,
inthefactthattheraceofmenisliableto
degenerate.
Tothis
point,
the
origin
of
politicaldecay,
andits
dependence
upon
the
degeneration
ofhumannature,
Ishallreturn
presently ;
butIwishfirsttomakeafewcommentsonsomeofthecharac-
teristicsofPlato's
sociology,especiallyupon
hisversionofthe
theory
ofthesocialcontract,and
upon
hisviewofthestate
asa
super-individual,
i.e.hisversionofthe
biological
or
organic
theory
ofthestate.
Whether
Protagorasproffered
a
theory
thatlaws
originate
withasocialcontract,orwhether
Lycophron(whosetheory
willbediscussedinthenext
chapter)
wasthefirsttodo
so,
is
notcertain. In
anycase,theideais
closely
relatedtoProta-
goras'
conventionalism. ThefactthatPlato
consciously
com-
binedsomeconventionalist ideas,andevenaversionofthe
contract
theory,
withhisnaturalism,
isinitselfanindication
thatconventionalism inits
original
formdidnotmaintainthat
lawsare
whollyarbitrary ;andPlato'sremarkson
Protagoras
confirmthis
27
.HowconsciousPlatowasofaconventionalist
elementinhisversionofnaturalism*canbeseenfroma
passage
intheLaws. Platothere
gives
alistofthevarious
principles
upon
which
politicalauthoritymight
bebased,mentioning
Pindar's
biological
naturalism
(seeabove),
i.e.
'
the
principle
thatthe
stronger
shallruleandtheweakerberuled
',which
hedescribesasa
principle
'
according
tonature,
astheTheban
poet
Pindaroncestated '.Platocontractsthis
principle
with
anotherwhichherecommendsbyshowing
thatitcombines
conventionalismwithnaturalism :
c
Butthereisalsoa . .claim

66 PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
whichisthe
greatestprinciple
of
all,namely,
thatthewiseshall
commandandlead,andthatthe
ignorant
shallfollow
;and
this,
OPindar,wisestof
poets,
is
surely
not
contrary
tonature,but
according
tonature
;
forwhatitdemands isnotexternalcom-
pulsion
butthe
truly
natural
sovereignty
ofalawwhich is
based
upon
mutualconsent.'
28
Inthe
Republic
wefindelementsoftheconventionalist con-
tract
theory
inasimilar
way
combinedwithelementsofnatural-
ism.
'
The
cityoriginates ',wehear
there,
'
becausewearenot
self-sufficient
;
. .oristhereanother
origin
ofsettlement in
cities? . .Men
gather
intoonesettlement
many
. .
helpers,
since
they
needmanythings.
. .Andwhen
they
sharetheir
goods
withoneanother,theone
giving,
theother
partaking,
doesnot
every
one
expect
inthisway
tofurtherhisown
interest?
'
29
Thustheinhabitants
gather
inorderthateach
may
furtherhisowninterest
;whichisanelementofthecontract
theory.
Butbehindthisstandsthefactthat
they
arenotself-
sufficient,afactofhumannature
;which isanelementof
naturalism.Andthiselementis
developed
further.
*
Bynature,
notwoofusare
exactly
alike.Eachhashis
peculiarnature,
some
being
fitforonekindofworkandsomeforanother. . .
Isitbetterthatamanshouldworkinmany
craftsorthathe
shouldworkinone
only
? . .
Surely,morewillbe
produced
andbetterandmore
easily
ifeachmanworksinone
occupation
only,according
tohisnatural
gifts.'
Inthis
way,
theeconomic
principle
ofthedivisionoflabour
isintroduced
(reminding
usofthe
affinity
betweenPlato's
historicismandthematerialist
interpretation
of
history)
.Butthis
principle
isbasedhere
upon
anelementof
biologicalnaturalism,
namely,upon
thenatural
inequality
ofmen.At
first,
thisideais
introduced
inconspicuously and,
asit
were,
rather
innocently.
Butweshallseeinthenext
chapter
thatithas
far-reaching
consequences ;indeed,the
onlyreallyimportant
divisionof
labourturnsouttobethatbetweenrulersandruled,claimed
tobebased
upon
thenatural
inequality
ofmastersand
slaves,
ofwiseand
ignorant.
Wehaveseenthatthereisaconsiderableelementofcon-
ventionalism aswellasof
biological
naturalisminPlato's
posi-
tion
;anobservationwhichisnot
surprising
whenweconsider
thatthis
position is,onthewhole,thatof
spiritual
naturalism
which,becauseofits
vagueness,easily
allowsforallsuchcom-
binations. This
spiritual
versionofnaturalism is
perhaps
best

CHAPTER
5
:NATUREANDCONVENTION
6j
formulated intheLaws.
*
Men
say',saysPlato,
c
thatthe
greatest
andmostbeautiful
things
arenatural . .andthelesser
things
artificial.' Sofarhe
agrees ;buthethenattacksthe
materialistswho
say
'
thatfireandwater,andearthand
air,
allexist
by
nature . .andthatallnormativelawsare
altogether
unnaturalandartificialandbased
uponsuperstitions
whichare
nottrue.'
Against
thisview,heshows
first,thatitisnotbodies
norelements,butthesoulwhich
truly
*
existsby
nature
'
30
(I
have
quoted
this
passageabove) ;andfromthisheconcludes
that
order,andlaw,mustalsobe
bynature,since
theyspring
fromthesoul :
*
Ifthesoulis
prior
tothe
body,
then
things
dependentupon
thesoul
'
(i.e.spiritualmatters)
c
arealso
prior
tothose
dependentuponbody.
. .Andthesoulordersand
directsall
things.'
This
supplies
thetheoretical
background
for
thedoctrinethat
'
lawsand
purposeful
institutions exist
by
nature,andnotbyanything
lowerthan
nature,since
they
are
bornofreasonandtrue
thought.'
Thisisaclearstatementof
spiritual
naturalism
;anditiscombinedaswellwith
positivist
beliefsofaconservativekind :
c
Thoughtful
and
prudentlegisla-
tionwillfindamost
powerfulhelp
becausethelawswillremain
unchanged
once
they
havebeenlaiddownin
writing.'
Fromallthisitcanbeseenthat
arguments
derivedfrom
Plato's
spiritual
naturalismare
quiteincapable
of
helping
to
answer
anyquestion
whichmay
arise
concerning
the
'just'
or
*
natural
'
characterof
anyparticular
law.
Spiritual
naturalism
ismuchtoo
vague
tobe
applied
to
anypracticalproblem.
It
cannotdomuch
beyondproviding
some
generalarguments
in
favourofconservativism. In
practice,everything
islefttothe
wisdomofthe
greatlawgiver (agodlikephilosopher,
whose
picture,especially
intheLaws,
is
undoubtedly
a
self-portrait ;
seealso
chapter8).
As
opposed
tohis
spiritualnaturalism,
however,
Plato's
theory
ofthe
interdependence
of
society
and
theindividualfurnishesmoreconcreteresults
;andsodoes
his
anti-equalitarian biological
naturalism.
Ithasbeenindicatedabovethatbecauseofits
self-sufficiency,
theidealstate
appears
toPlatoasthe
perfectindividual,and
theindividualcitizen,accordingly,
asan
imperfectcopy
ofthe
state.Thisviewwhichmakesofthestateakindof
super-
organism
orLeviathan isthe
beginning
oftheso-called
organic
or
biologicaltheory
ofthestate.The
principle
ofthis
theory
willbecriticizedlater
31
.HereIwishfirsttodrawattention
tothefactthatPlatodoesnotdefendthe
theory,
andindeed

68 PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
hardly
formulates it
explicitly.
Butitis
clearlyenoughimplied ;
in
fact,thefundamental
analogy
betweenthestateandthe
humanindividual isoneofthestandard
topics
ofthe
Republic.
Itisworth
mentioning,
inthisconnection, thatthe
analogy
servesasa
help
inthe
analysis
oftheindividualratherthan
ofthestate.Onecould
perhaps
defendtheviewthatPlato
proffers
notsomucha
biologicaltheory
ofthestateasa
political
theory
ofthehumanindividual
32
.Thisview,
I
think,
isin
fullaccordancewithhisdoctrinethattheindividual islower
thanthestateandisakindof
imperfectcopy
ofit.Inthe
veryplace
inwhichPlatointroduceshisfundamental
analogy
itisusedinthis
way,
thatisto
say,
asamethodof
explaining
and
elucidating
theindividual.The
city,
itis
said,
is
greater
thantheindividual,andthereforeeasiertoexamine. Plato
gives
thisashisreasonfor
suggesting
that
'
weshould
begin
our
inquiry
'
(namely,
intothenatureof
justice)
*
inthe
city,
andcontinue itafterwardsintheindividual,alwayswatching
for
points
of
similarity.
. .Maywenot
expect
inthisway
more
easily
todiscernwhatweare
looking
for?
*
Fromthisway
of
introducing
itwecanseethatPlatotakes
theexistenceofhisfundamental
analogy
for
granted.
This
fact,
I
believe,
isan
expression
ofhis
longing
foraunifiedandhar-
monious,foran
*
organic
'
state,
fora
society
ofamore
primitive
kind.
(Seechapter 10.)Thestatemustbe
small,he
says,
andmaygrowonly
as
long
asitsincreasedoesnot
endanger
its
unity.Thewhole
city
mustby
itsnaturebecomeone,and
not
many.
33
Platothus
emphasizes
the
c
oneness
'
orindividu-
ality
ofhis
city.
Buthealso
emphasizes
the
*
manyness
'
of
thehumanindividual. Inhis
analysis
oftheindividual
soul,
andofitsdivisionintothree
parts,reason,energy,
andanimal
instincts,corresponding
tothethreeclassesofhis
state,the
guardians, warriors,andworkers
(who
stillcontinueto
'
fill
theirbellieslikethebeasts
',
asHeraclitushad
said),
Plato
goes
sofarasto
oppose
these
parts
tooneanotherasif
theywere
c
distinctand
conflictingpersons
'
34
.
c
Wearethustold
',says
Grote,
'
that
thoughmanis
apparentlyOne,heisin
reality
Many
. .
though
the
perfect
Commonwealth is
apparently
Many,
itisin
reality
One.' Itisclearthatthis
corresponds
totheIdealcharacterofthestateofwhichtheindividual is
akindof
imperfect
t,copy.
Suchan
emphasisupon
oneness
andwholenessofthestatemay
bedescribed as
*
holism '.
Plato'sholism,
I
believe,
is
closely
relatedtothetribalcollectivism

CHAPTER
5
INATUREANDCONVENTION
69
mentionedinearlier
chapters.
Platowas
longing
forthelost
unity
oftriballife.Alifeof
change,
inthemidstofasocial
revolution,appeared
tohimunreal.
Only
astablewhole,the
permanent collective,has
reality,
notthe
passing
individuals.
Itis
*
natural
'
fortheindividualtosubservethewhole,which
isnomere
assembly
of
individuals,buta
c
natural
'
unitofa
higher
order.
Plato
givesmany
excellent
sociological descriptions
ofthis
c
natural
',
i.e.tribalandcollectivist,modeofsociallife :
*
The
law
',hewritesinthe
Republic,
*
is
designed
to
bring
aboutthe
welfareofthestateasawhole,fitting
thecitizensintoone
unit,
bymeansofboth
persuasion
andforce. Itmakesthemshare
mutually
in
any
contributionwhicheachis
capable
of
rendering
tothe
community.Anditis
actually
thelawwhichcreatesin
thestatetherighttype
ofmen
;notforthe
purpose
of
letting
them
loose,sothat
everybody
can
go
hisown
way,
butinorder
toutilizethemallfor
welding
the
citytogether.'
35
Thatthere
isinthisholismanemotional
aestheticism,a
longing
for
beauty,
canbe
seen,
forinstance,fromaremarkintheLaws :
'
Every
artist . .executesthe
part
forthesakeofthewhole,andnot
thewholeforthesakeofthe
part.'
Atthesame
place,
wealso
finda
truly
classicalformulationof
political
holism :
c
Youare
createdforthesakeofthe
whole,andnotthewholeforthe
sakeof
you.'
Withinthiswhole,thedifferentindividuals,and
groups
ofindividuals, withtheirnatural
inequalities,
must
rendertheir
specific
and
veryunequal
services. Allthiswould
besufficientfor
characterizing
Plato's
theory
asaformofthe
organictheory
ofthe
state,evenifhehadnotsometimes
spoken
ofthestateasan
organism.
Butsincehedid
this,therecanbe
nodoubtleftthathemustbedescribedasan
exponent,
or
rather,
asthe
originator
ofthis
theory.
Hisversionofthis
theorymay
becharacterized asa
personalist
or
psychological
one,sincehedescribesthestatenotina
generalway
assimilar
tosome
organism
or
other,butas
analogous
tothehuman
individual,andmore
specifically
tothehumansoul.
Especially
thediseaseofthe
state,thedissolutionofits
unity,corresponds
tothediseaseofthehuman
soul,ofhumannature. In
fact,
thediseaseofthestateisnot
only
correlatedwith,butis
directly
producedby
the
corruption
ofhumannature,more
especially,
ofthemembersofthe
ruling
class.Ev^rysingle
oneofthe
typicalstages
inthe
degeneration
ofthestateis
brought
about
by
a
corresponding stage
inthe
degeneration
ofthehuman

70
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
soul,ofhumannature,ofthehumanrace.Andsincethis
moral
degeneration
is
interpreted
asbased
upon
racial
degenera-
tion,we
mightsay
thatthe
biological
element inPlato's
naturalismturnsout,intheend,tohavethemost
important
part
inthefoundationofhishistoricism. Forthe
history
of
thedownfallofthefirstor
perfect
stateis
nothing
butthe
history
ofthe
biologicaldegeneration
oftheraceofmen.
Itwasmentionedinthelast
chapter
thatthe
problem
ofthe
beginning
of
change
and
decay
isoneofthe
major
difficulties
ofPlato'shistoricist
theory
of
society.The
first,thenatural
and
perfectcity-state
cannotbe
supposed
to
carry
withinitself
the
germ
ofdissolution,
*
fora
city
whichcarrieswithinitself
the
germ
ofdissolution isforthat
very
reason
imperfect
'
36
.
Platotriesto
get
overthe
difficultybylaying
theblameonhis
universally
validhistorical,biological,
and
perhaps
evencosmo-
logical,developmental
lawof
degeneration,
ratherthanonthe
particular
constitutionofthefirstor
perfectcity
37
:
c
Every-
thing
thathasbeen
generated
must
decay.'
Butthis
general
theory
doesnot
provide
a
fullysatisfactorysolution,
foritdoes
not
explainwhy
evena
sufficientlyperfect
statecannot
escape
thelawof
decay.Andindeed,Platohintsthathistorical
decay
mighthavebeenavoided
38
,hadtherulersofthefirstornatural
statebeentrained
philosophers.
But
they
werenot.They
were
nottrained
(as
hedemandsthattherulersofhis
heavenlycity
should
be)
inmathematicsanddialectics
;andinorderto
avoid
degeneration,they
wouldhaveneededtobeinitiatedinto
the
highermysteries
of
eugenics,
ofthescienceof
'
keepingpure
theraceofthe
guardians ',andof
avoiding
themixtureofthe
noblemetalsintheirveinswiththebasemetalsoftheworkers.
Butthese
highermysteries
aredifficulttoreveal. Platodis-
tinguishessharply,
inthefieldsofmathematics, acoustics,and
astronomy,betweenmere
(delusive)opinion
whichistainted
by
experience,
andwhichcannotreachexactness,andis
altogether
onalow
level,and
pure
rational
knowledge,
whichisfreefrom
sensual
experienceandexact.Thisdistinctionhe
applies
also
tothefieldof
eugenics.A
merelyempirical
artof
breeding
cannotbe
precise,
i.e.itcannot
keep
therace
perfectlypure.
This
explains
thedownfallofthe
originalcity
whichisso
good,
i.e.sosimilartoitsFormorIdea,
that
'
a
city
thusconstituted
can
hardly
beshaken '.
'
Butthis
',Platocontinues,
c
isthe
way
itdissolves
',andhe
proceeds
tooutlinehis
theory
of
breeding,
oftheNumber,andoftheFallofMan.

CHAPTER
5
INATUREANDCONVENTION
71
All
plants
andanimals,hetells
us,mustbebred
according
todefinite
periods
of
time,
ifbarrennessandotherformsof
degeneration
aretobeavoided.Some
knowledge
ofthese
periods,
whichareconnectedwiththe
length
ofthelifeofthe
race,
willbeavailabletotherulersofthebest
state,and
they
will
apply
ittothe
breeding
ofthemasterrace. Itwillnot,
however,be
rational,but
empirical
;
itwillbe
'
calculation
basedon
perception
'
(cp.
thenext
quotation).
Butasweknow,
experience
canneverbeexactand
reliable,
sinceits
objects
arenotthe
pure
FormsorIdeas,buttheworldof
things
in
flux
;andsincethe
guardians
havenobetter
knowledge,
the
breedcannotbe
keptpure,
andracial
degeneration
must
creep
in.ThisishowPlato
explains
thematter :
*
Concerningyour
ownrace
J
(i.e.
theraceofmen,
as
opposed
to
animals),
*
the
rulersofthe
citywhom
youhavetrainedmay
bewise
enough ;
butsince
they
are
usingonly
calculationaided
byperception,
they
willnot
hit,accidentally,upon
theway
of
getting
either
goodoffspring,
ornoneatall.
5
39
Lacking
a
purely
rational
method,
'
they
willblunder,andsomedaythey
will
beget
childreninthe
wrong
manner '.Inwhatfollowsnext,Plato
hints,rather
mysteriously,
thatthereisnowaway
toavoid
this
through
the
discovery
ofa
purely
rationalandmathe-
maticalsciencewhich
possesses
intheformofthe
mysterious
c
PlatonicNumber
'
(which
determinestheTruePeriodofthe
human
race)
the
key
tothemasterlawof
highereugenics.
But
sincethe
guardians
ofoldtimeswere
ignorant
of
Pythagorean
number-mysticism,
andwith
it,ofthis
higherknowledge
of
breeding,
theotherwise
perfect
naturalstatecouldnot
escape
decay.
After
partiallyrevealing
thesecretofhisNumber,
Platocontinues :
c
This . .number ismasteroverbetteror
worsebirths
;andwheneverthe
guardians,ignorant(you
must
remember)
ofthesematters,unitebrideand
bridegroom
atthe
wrong
time
40
,thechildrenwillhaveneither
good
naturesnor
good
luck.Eventhebestofthem . .will
proveunworthy
when
succeeding
tothe
power
oftheirfathers
;andassoonas
they
are
guardians,they
willnotlistentous
any
more
'
that
is,
inmattersofmusicaland
gymnasticeducation,and,
as
Plato
especiallyemphasizes,
inthe
supervision
of
breeding.
'
Hencerulerswillbe
appointed
whoare
altogether
unfitfortheir
taskas
guardians ;namely
towatch,andto
test,themetals
intheraces
(which
areHesiod.'sracesaswellas
yours),gold
andsilverandbronzeandiron.Soironwill
mingle
with

72
PLATO'SSOCIOLOGY
silverandbronzewith
gold
andfromthismixture,variation
willbebornandabsurd
irregularity ;andwhenevertheseare
born
they
will
begetstruggle
and
hostility.Andthisishow
wemustdescribethe
ancestry
or
origin
ofdisunion,wherever
shearises.'
ThisisPlato's
story
oftheNumberandoftheFallofMan.
Itisthebasisofhishistoricist
sociology,especially
ofhisfunda-
mentallawofsocialrevolutionsdiscussedinthelast
chapter
41
.
Forracial
degeneration explains
the
origin
ofdisunioninthe
rulingclass,andwith
it,the
origin
ofallhistorical
development.
Theinternaldisunionofhumannature,theschismofthe
soul,
leadstotheschismofthe
ruling
class.AndaswithHeraclitus,
war,
classwar,
isthefatherand
promoter
ofall
change,
andof
the
history
ofman,which is
nothing
butthe
history
ofthe
breakdownof
society.WeseethatPlato'sidealisthistoricism
ultimately
restsnot
upon
a
spiritual,
but
upon
a
biological
basis
;
itrests
upon
akindof
meta-biology
42
oftheraceofmen.
Platowasnot
only
anaturalistwho
proffered
a
biologicaltheory
ofthestate,hewasalsothefirstto
proffer
a
biological
and
racial
theory
ofsocial
dynamics,
of
politicalhistory.
c
The
PlatonicNumber
',saysAdam
43
,
*
isthusthe
setting
inwhich
Plato's
"
Philosophy
of
History
"
isframed.'
It
is,
I
think,appropriate
toconcludethissketchofPlato's
descriptivesociology
witha
summary
andanevaluation.
Platosucceeded in
giving
an
amazingly true,though
of
coursesomewhat idealized,reconstruction ofan
early
Greek
tribalandcollectivist
society
similartothatof
Sparta.An
analysis
ofthe
forces,especially
theeconomic
forces,which
threatenthe
stability
ofsucha
society,
enableshimtodescribe
the
generalpolicy
aswellasthesocialinstitutionswhichare
necessary
for
arresting
it.Andhe
gives,furthermore,arational
reconstruction oftheeconomicandhistorical
development
of
theGreek
city-states.
Theseachievementsare
/mpairedby
hishatredofthe
society
inwhichhewas
living,
and
by
hisromanticlovefortheold
tribalformofsociallife. Itisthisattitudewhichledhimto
formulateanuntenablelawofhistorical
development,namely,
thelawofuniversal
degeneration
or
decay.
Andthesame
attitude isalso
responsible
fortheirrational, fantastic,and
romanticelements
of,
hisotherwiseexcellent
analysis.Onthe
otherhand,
itwas
just
his
personal
interestandhis
partiality
which
sharpened
his
eye
andsomadehisachievements
possible.

CHAPTER
5
:NATUREANDCONVENTION
73
Hederivedhishistoricist
theory
fromthefantastic
philosophical
doctrinethatthe
changing
visibleworldis
only
a
decayingcopy
ofan
unchanging
invisibleworld.Butthis
ingeniousattempt
tocombineahistoricist
pessimism
withan
ontologicaloptimism
leads,whenelaborated,
todifficulties. Thesedifficultiesforced
upon
himthe
adoption
ofa
biologicalnaturalism, leading
(together
with
c
psychologism
'
44
,
i.e.the
theory
that
society
depends
onthe
*
humannature
'
ofits
members)
to
mysticism
and
superstition, culminating
ina
pseudo-rational
mathe-
matical
theory
of
breeding.They
even
endangered
the
impres-
sive
unity
ofhistheoretical edifice.
Looking
backatthis
edifice,wemaybriefly
consider its
ground-plan
45
.This
ground-plan,
conceivedby
a
great
archi-
tect,exhibitsafundamental
metaphysical
dualisminPlato's
thought.
Inthefieldof
logic,
thisdualism
presents
itselfasthe
opposition:
betweentheuniversalandthe
particular.
Inthe
fieldofmathematical
speculation,
it
presents
itselfasthe
opposi-
tionbetweentheOneandthe
Many.
Inthefieldof
epistemology,
itisthe
opposition
betweenrational
knowledge
basedon
pure
thought,
and
opinion
basedon
particularexperiences.
Inthe
fieldof
ontology,
itisthe
opposition
betweentheone,original,
invariable,andtrue,reality,andthe
many,varying,and
delusive,appearances
;between
purebeingand
becoming,
or
more
precisely,changing.
Inthefieldof
cosmology,
itisthe
opposition
betweenthatwhich
generates
andthatwhich is
generated,
andwhichmust
decay.
In
ethics,
itisthe
opposition
betweenthe
good,
i.e.thatwhich
preserves,
andtheevil,
i.e.
thatwhich
corrupts.
In
politics,
itisthe
opposition
between
theonecollective,the
state,whichmay
attain
perfection
and
autarchy,
andthemanyindividuals,the
particularmenwho
mustremain
imperfect
and
dependent,
andwhose
particularity
istobe
suppressed
forthesakeofthe
unity
ofthestate
(see
the
next
chapter).
Andthiswholedualist
philosophyoriginated,
asIbelieve,
inthe
sociological cjomain,fromthecontrasts
betweenastable
society,
anda
society
inthe
process
ofrevolution.

PLATOSPOLITICALPROGRAMME
CHAPTER6:TOTALITARIANJUSTICE
The
analysis
ofPlato's
sociology
makes it
easy
to
present
his
politicalprogramme.
Hisfundamentaldemandscanbe
expressed
ineitheroftwoformulae,thefirst
corresponding
tohis
idealist
theory
of
change
and
rest,thesecondtohisnaturalism.
Theidealistformula is:Arrestall
politicalchange
!Change
is
evil,
restdivine
x
.All
change
canbearrestedifthestateismade
anexact
copy
ofits
original,
i.e.oftheFormorIdeaofthe
city.
Shoulditbeaskedhowthisis
practicable,wecan
reply
withthe
naturalistformula :Backtonature!Backtothe
original
state
ofourforefathers,
the
primitive
statefoundedinaccordancewith
humannature,andthereforestable
;backtothetribal
patriarchy
ofthetimebeforethe
Fall,tothenaturalclassruleofthewise
fewoverthe
ignorantmany,
Ibelievethat
practically
allthefeaturesofPlato's
political
programme
canbederivedfromthesedemands.Theyare,
in
turn,basedupon
hishistoricism
;and
they
havetobecombined
withhis
sociological
doctrines
concerning
theconditionsforthe
stability
ofclassrule.ThemainfeaturesIhaveinmindare :
(A)
Thestrictdivisionoftheclasses
;
i.e.the
rulingclass
consisting
ofherdsmenand
watch-dogs
mustbe
strictlyseparated
fromthehumancattle.
(E)Theidentificationofthefateofthestatewiththatof
the
ruling
class
;
theexclusiveinterestinthis
class,andinits
unity ;andsubservienttothis
unity,
the
rigid
rulesfor
breeding
and
educating
this
class,andthestrict
supervisionandcollectiviza-
tionoftheinterestsofitsmembers.
Fromthese
principalfeatures,many
otherfeaturescanbe
derived,forinstance :
(C)The
ruling
classhasa
monopoly
of
things
like
military
virtuesand
training,andofthe
right
to
carry
armsandtoreceive
educationof
any
kind
;butitisexcludedfrom
anyparticipation
ineconomic
activities,and
especially
from
earningmoney.
(D)
Theremustbea
censorship
ofallintellectual activities
ofthe
rulingclass,andacontinual
propagandaaiming
atmould-
ingand
unifying
theirminds.
74

CHAPTER6:TOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 75
silverandbronzewith
gold
andfromthismixture,variation
willbebornandabsurd
irregularity ;andwhenevertheseare
born
they
will
begetstruggle
and
hostility.Andthisishow
wemustdescribethe
ancestry
or
origin
ofdisunion,wherever
shearises.'
ThisisPlato's
story
oftheNumberandoftheFallofMan.
Itisthebasisofhishistoricist
sociology,especially
ofhisfunda-
mentallawofsocialrevolutionsdiscussedinthelast
chapter
41
.
Forracial
degeneration explains
the
origin
ofdisunioninthe
rulingclass,andwith
it,the
origin
ofallhistorical
development.
Theinternaldisunionofhumannature,theschismofthesoul,
leadstotheschismofthe
ruling
class.AndaswithHeraclitus,
war,
classwar,
isthefatherand
promoter
ofall
change,
andof
the
history
ofman,which is
nothing
butthe
history
ofthe
breakdownof
society.WeseethatPlato'sidealisthistoricism
ultimately
restsnot
upon
a
spiritual,
but
upon
a
biological
basis
;
itrests
upon
akindof
meta-biology
42
oftheraceofmen.
Platowasnot
only
anaturalistwho
proffered
a
biologicaltheory
ofthestate,hewasalsothefirstto
proffer
a
biological
and
racial
theory
ofsocial
dynamics,
of
politicalhistory.
c
The
PlatonicNumber
',saysAdam
43
,
*
isthusthe
setting
inwhich
Plato's
"
Philosophy
of
History
"
isframed.'
It
is,
I
think,appropriate
toconcludethissketchofPlato's
descriptivesociology
witha
summary
andanevaluation.
Platosucceeded in
giving
an
amazingly true,though
of
coursesomewhat idealized,reconstruction ofan
early
Greek
tribalandcollectivist
society
similartothatof
Sparta.An
analysis
ofthe
forces,especially
theeconomic
forces,which
threatenthe
stability
ofsucha
society,
enableshimtodescribe
the
generalpolicy
aswellasthesocialinstitutionswhichare
necessary
for
arresting
it.Andhe
gives,furthermore,arational
reconstruction oftheeconomicandhistorical
development
of
theGreek
city-states.
Theseachievementsare
/unpairedby
hishatredofthe
society
inwhichhewas
living,
and
by
hisromanticlovefortheold
tribalformofsociallife. Itisthisattitudewhichledhimto
formulateanuntenablelawofhistorical
development,namely,
thelawofuniversal
degeneration
or
decay.
Andthesame
attitude isalso
responsible
fortheirrational, fantastic,and
romanticelements
of,
hisotherwiseexcellent
analysis.Onthe
otherhand,
itwas
just
his
personal
interestandhis
partiality
which
sharpened
his
eye
andsomadehisachievements
possible.

76
PLATO'SPOLITICS
persist
forsucha
long
timein
spite
ofthefactthatGroteand
Gomperz
had
pointed
outthe
reactionary
characterofsome
doctrinesofthe
Republic
andtheLaws.Buteven
they
didnot
seeallthe
implications
ofthesedoctrines
;they
neverdoubted
thatPlatowas,fundamentally,
ahumanitarian. Andtheir
adversecriticismwas
ignored,
or
interpreted
asafailureto
understandandto
appreciate Plato,whowasby
Christians
considereda
*
ChristianbeforeChrist
',andby
revolutionariesa
revolutionary.
Thiskindof
complete
faithinPlatois
undoubtedy
stilldominant,and
Field,
forinstance,
findsit
necessary
towarn
hisreadersthat
*
weshallmisunderstand Plato
entirely
ifwe
thinkofhimasa
revolutionary
thinker '.This
is,ofcourse,
very
true
;anditwould
clearly
be
pointless
ifthe
tendency
to
makeofPlatoa
revolutionarythinker,oratleasta
progressivist,
werenot
fairlywidespread.
ButFieldhimselfhasthesame
kindoffaithinPlato
;
forwhenhe
goes
onto
say
thatPlato
was
*
in
strongopposition
tothenewandsubversivetendencies
'
ofhistime,then
surely
he
accepts
too
readily
Plato's
testimony
forthesubversiveness ofthesetendencies.Theenemiesof
freedomhave
alwayscharged
itsdefenderswithsubversion.
And
nearlyalwaysthey
havesucceeded in
persuading
the
guilelessand
well-meaning.
Theidealizationofthe
great
idealist
permeates
not
only
the
interpretations
ofPlato's
writings,
butalsothetranslations.
DrasticremarksofPlato'swhichdonotfitthetranslator'sviews
ofwhatahumanitarianshould
say
are
frequently
eithertoned
downormisunderstood. This
tendencybegins
withthetransla-
tionofthe
very
titleofPlato'sso-called
c
Republic
'.What
comesfirsttoourmindwhen
hearing
thistitleisthattheauthor
mustbea
liberal,
ifnota
revolutionary.
Butthetitle
'
Republic
'
is,quitesimply,
the
English
formoftheLatin
rendering
ofa
Greekwordthathadnoassociationsofthiskind,andwhose
properEnglish
translationwouldbe
c
TheConstitution
'
or
'
The
City
State
'
or
c
TheState'.Thetraditionaltranslation
*
Republic
'
has
undoubtedly
contributedtothe
general
convic-
tionthatPlatocouldnothavebeena
reactionary.
InviewofallthatPlato
says
aboutGoodnessand
Justice
and
theotherIdeasmentioned,my
thesisthathis
political
demands
are
purely
totalitarianandanti-humanitarian needstobe
defended. Inordertoundertakethisdefence,
I
shall,
forthe
nextfour
chapters,
breakoffthe
analysis
ofhistoricism,and
concentrate
upon
acriticalexamination oftheethicalIdeas

CHAPTER6 :TOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 77
mentioned;andoftheir
part
inPlato's
political
demands. In
the
presentchapter,
IshallexaminetheIdeaof
Justice ;
in
thethree
followingchapters,
thedoctrinethatthewisestandbest
should
rule,andtheIdeasofTruth,Wisdom,Goodness,and
Beauty.
Whatdowe
reallymeanwhenwe
speak
of
c
Justice
'
?Ido
notthinkthatverbal
problems
ofthiskindare
particularly
important,
orthatitis
possible
to
give
adefinite
reply
tothem,
sincesuchtermsare
always
usedinvarioussenses.However,
Ithinkthatmostof
us,especially
thosewhose
general
outlookis
humanitarian,mean
something
likethis :
(a)
an
equal
distribu-
tionoftheburdenof
citizenship,
i.e.ofthoselimitationsoffreedom
whichare
necessary
insociallife
4
;(b)equal
treatmentofthe
citizensbeforethelaw,provided,
ofcourse,that
(c)
thelaws
themselvesneitherfavournordisfavourindividual citizensor
groups
orclasses
;(d)impartiality
ofthecourtsof
justice ;and
(e)
an
equal
shareinthe
advantages(and
not
only
inthe
burden)
whichtheirmembership
ofthestatemay
offertothecitizen.
IfPlatohadmeantby
'
justice
*
anything
ofthiskind,thenmy
claimthathis
programme
is
purely
totalitarianwould
certainly
bewrong
andallthosewouldbe
rightwhobelievethatPlato's
politics
rested
upon
an
acceptable
humanitarian basis.Butthe
factisthathemeant
by'justice'somethingentirely
different.
WhatdidPlatomeanby'justice
'
?Imaintainthatinthe
Republic
heusedtheterm
'
just
'
asa
synonym
for
c
thatwhich
isintheinterestofthebeststate'.Andwhatistheinterestof
thisbeststate?Thearrestof
change,by
themaintenanceofa
rigid
classdivisionandclassrule. IfIam
right
inthis
interpreta-
tion,thenweshouldhaveto
say
thatPlato'sdemandfor
justice
leaveshis
politicalprogramme
attheleveloftotalitarianism
;
andweshouldhavetoconcludethatwemust
guardagainst
the
danger
of
beingimpressedby
merewords,
^-'justice
isthecentral
topic
ofthe
Republic ;
in
fact,
*
On
Justice
'
isitstraditionalsub-title. 1$his
enquiry
intothenature
of
justice,
Platomakesuseofthemethodmentioned
5
inthelast
chapter
;hefirsttriestosearchforthisIdeainthe
state,and
then
attempts
to
apply
theresulttotheindividual.Onecannot
say
thatPlato's
question
c
Whatis
justice
?
'
quickly
findsan
answer,
foritis
given
intheFourthBook,andthen
only
after
muchhesitation.Theconsiderationswhichlead
up
toitwill
be
analysedmore
fully
latermthis
chapter. Briefly,they
are
these.

78
PLATO'SPOLITICS
The
city
isfounded
uponhuman
nature,
itsneeds,andits
limitations
6
.
c
Wehavestated,and,you
willremember,
repeated
overandover
again
thateachmaninour
city
should
doonework
only ;namely,
thatworkforwhichhisnatureis
naturally
bestfitted.
5
FromthisPlatoconcludesthat
everyone
shouldmindhisownbusiness
;
thatthe
carpenter
shouldconfine
himselfto
carpentering,
theshoemakerto
making
shoes.Not
muchharmisdone,however,
iftwoworkers
change
theirnatural
places.
c
Butshouldanyonewhois
by
natureaworker
(or
else
amemberofthe
money-earning class)
. .
manage
to
get
into
thewarriorclass
;orshouldawarrior
get
intothe
guardians'
class,without
beingworthy
ofit
;
. .thenthiskindof
change
andofunderhand
plotting
wouldmeanthedownfallofthe
city.'
Fromthis
argument,
Platodrawshisfinalconclusionthat
any
changing
or
intermeddling
withinthethreeclassesmustbe
injustice,
andthatthe
opposite,therefore,
is
justice
:
'
When
eachclassinthe
city
attendstoitsown
business,
the
money-
earning
classaswellastheauxiliariesandthe
guardians,
then
thiswillbe
justice.'
Thisconclusion isreaffirmedandsummed
up
alittlelater :
*
The
city
is
just
. .ifeachofitsthreeclasses
attendstoitsownwork.
5
ThismeansthatPlatoidentifies
justice
withthe
principle
ofclassruleandofclass
privilege.
Forthe
principle
that
every
classshouldattendtoitsownbusinessmeans,
briefly
and
bluntly,
thatthestateis
just
iftheruler
rules,
ifthe
workerworks,and
7
iftheslaveslaves.
ItwillbeseenthatPlato's
concept
of
justice
is
fundamentally
differentfromour
ordinary
viewas
analysed
above. Platocalls
class
privilege
c
just',whilewe
usuallymean
byjustice
ratherthe
disregard
ofsuch
privilege.
Butthedifference
goes
furtherthan
that.Wemeanbyjustice
somekindof
equality
inthetreatment
of
individuals,whilePlatoconsiders
justice
notasa
relationship
betweenindividuals,butasa
property
ofthewhole
state,based
upon
a
relationship
betweenitsclasses.Thestateis
just
ifitis
healthy,strong,
united sfable.
ButwasPlato
perhapsright
?Does
c
justice
'
perhapsmean
whathe
says
?Idonotintendtodiscusssucha
question.
If
anyone
shouldmaintainthat
'justice'meansthe
unchallenged
ruleofone
class,thenIshould
simplyreply
thatIamallfor
injustice.
Inotherwords,
Ibelievethat
nothingdependsupon
words,and
everythingupon
our
practical
demandsordecisions.
BehindPlato'sdefinitionof
justicestands,fundamentally,
hisde-
mandforatotalitarianclass
rule,andhisdecisionto
bring
itabout.

CHAPTER6ITOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 79
Butwashenot
right
inadifferentsense?Didhisideaof
justiceperhapscorrespond
totheGreekway
of
using
thisword?
DidtheGreeks
perhapsmean,by'justice ',something holistic,
likethe
*
healthofthestate
',andisitnot
utterly
unfairand
unhistorical to
expect
ofPlatoan
anticipation
ofourmodern
ideaof
justice
as
equality
ofthecitizensbeforethelaw?This
question,indeed,hasbeenansweredinthe
affirmative,andthe
claimhasbeenmadethatPlato'sholisticideaof
'
social
justice
'
ischaracteristicofthetraditionalGreek
outlook,ofthe
'
Greek
genius
'
which
*
was
not,
liketheRoman,specifically legal',
butrather
*
specifically metaphysical
'
8
.Butthisclaim is
untenable. Asamatterof
fact,theGreek
way
of
using
theword
'justice
'
wasindeed
amazingly
similartoourownindividualistic
and
equalitarianusage.
Inordertoshow
this,
I
may
first
quoteAristotle,another
opponent
of
equalitarianism,who,undertheinfluenceofPlato's
naturalism,elaborated
among
other
things
the
theory
thatsome
menare
by
natureborntoslave
9
.
Nobody
couldbeless
interested in
spreading
an
equalitarian
andindividualistic
interpretation
oftheterm
'justice
'.Butwhen
speaking
ofthe
judge,whomhedescribesas
c
a
personification
ofthatwhichis
just',Aristotlemaintainsthatitisthetaskofthe
judge
to
c
restore
equality
'.Hetellsusthat
'
allmenthink
justice
tobeakind
of
equality ',an
equality,namely,
which
*
pertains
to
persons
'.
Heeventhinks
(but
hereheis
wrong)
thattheGreekwordfor
'justice
'
istobederivedfromarootthatmeans
'
equal
division '.
Andwhen
discussing
the
principles
of
democracy,
he
says
that
'
democratic
justice
isthe
application
ofthe
principle
ofnumerical
equality(as
distinctfrom
proportionate equality)
'.Allthisis
certainly
not
merely
his
personalimpression
ofthe
meaning
of
justice,
norisit
perhapsonly
a
description
ofthe
way
inwhich
thewordwasusedafterPlato
;
itisratherthe
expression
ofa
universalandancientaswellas
popular
useoftheword
'justice
'.
10
Inviewofthis
evidence,we
mui|tsay,
I
think,thatPlato's
holisticand
anti-equalitarian interpretation
of
justice
wasan
innovation
;andthatPlato
attempted
to
present
histotalitarian
classruleas
'just'
while
peoplegenerallymeant
by'justice'
theexact
opposite.
Thisresultis
startling,and
opensup
anumberof
questions.
Why
didPlatoclaimthat
justicemeant
inequality if,in
general
usage,
itmeant
equality
?Tomethe
onlylikelyreply
seemsto
bethathewantedtomake
propaganda
forhistotalitarianstate

8O PLATO'SPOLITICS
bypersuading
the
people
thatitwasthe
'just
'
state*Butwas
suchan
attempt
worthhis
while,considering
thatitisnotwords
butwhatwemean
by
themthatmatters?Ofcourseitwas
worthwhile
;
thiscanbeseenfromthefactthathe
fully
succeeded
in
persuading
hisreaders,downtoourown
day,
thathewas
candidlyadvocatingjustice,
i.e.that
justicethey
were
striving
for.Anditisafactthathe
therebyspread
doubtandconfusion
amongequalitarians
andindividualistswho,undertheinfluence
ofhis
authority,began
toaskthemselveswhetherhisideaof
justice
wasnottruerandbetterthantheirs. Sincetheword
'
justice
'
symbolizes
tousanaimofsuch
importance,
andsincesomany
are
prepared
toendure
anything
for
it,andtodoallintheir
power
forits
realization,theenlistmentofthese
forces,orat
least,the
paralysing
of
equalitarianism,
was
certainly
anaim
worth
beingpursuedby
abelieverintotalitarianism. Butwas
Platoawarethat
justice
meantsomuchtomen?Hewas
;
for
hewritesinthe
Republic
:
*
Whenamanhascommittedan
injus-
tice,
. .isitnottruethathis
courage
refusestobestirred? . .
Butwhenhebelievesthathehassuffered
injustice,
doesnothis
vigour
andhiswrathflare
up
atonce?Andisitnot
equally
truethatwhen
fighting
onthesideofwhathebelievestobe
just,
hecanendure
hungerand
cold,and
any
kindof
hardship
?
Anddoeshenotholdonuntilhe
conquers,persisting
inthisstate
ofexaltationuntilhehaseitherachievedhisaim,or
perished
?
'n
Readingthis,wecannotdoubtthatPlatoknewthepower
of
faith,and,above
all,ofafaithin
justice.Norcanwedoubt
thatthe
Republic
musttendto
pervert
this
faith,andto
replace
it
by
a
directlyopposite
faith.Andinthe
light
oftheavailable
evidence,
itseemstomemost
probable
thatPlatoknew
very
wellwhathewas
doing. Equalitarianism
washis
arch-enemy,
andhewasoutto
destroy
it
;nodoubt,
inthesincerebeliefthat
itwasa
great
evilanda
greatdanger.
Buthisattack
upon
equalitarianism
wasnotanhonestattack. Platodidnotdareto
facethe
enemyopenly.
I
proceed
to
present
theevidencein
support
ofthiscontention.
The
Republic
is
probably
themostelaboratemonograph
on
justice
everwritten. Itexaminesa
variety
ofviewsabout
justice,
anditdoesthisinaway
whichleadsustobelievethatPlato
omittednoneofthemore
important
theoriesknowntohim.In
fact,Plato
clearlyimplies
12
thatbecauseofhisvain
attempts
to
trackitdownamong
thecurrentviews,anewsearchfor
justice
is
necessary.
Yetinhis
survey
ofthecurrenttheories,hedoesnot

CHAPTER6:TOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE
81
evenmentiontheviewthat
justice
is
equality
beforethelaw.
Thisomissioncanbe
explainedonly
intwo
ways.
Eitherhe
musthaveoverlookedthe
equalitariantheory
13
,orhemusthave
purposely
avoided it.Thefirst
possibility
atonceseems
very
unlikely
ifweconsiderthecarewithwhichthe
Republic
iscom-
posed,
andthe
necessity
forPlatoto
analyse
thetheoriesofhis
opponents
ifhewastomakeaforceful
presentation
ofhisown.
Butthis
possibilityappears
evenmore
improbable
ifweconsider
thewide
popularity
ofthe
equalitariantheory.Weneednot,
however,relyuponmerelyprobablearguments
sinceitcanbe
easily
shownthat,when
writing
the
Republic,
Platowasnot
only
acquainted
withthe
equalitariantheory
butwellawareofits
importance.Weshallseelaterinthis
chapter
that
equali-
tarianism
played
aconsiderableroleinthe
Gorgias,
writtenearlier
thanthe
Republic ;andin
spite
ofthefactthathedoesnotdiscuss
equalitarianism
inthe
Republic,
hedidnot
change
hismind
regarding
itsinfluence,
forthe
Republicclearly
testifiestoits
popularity.
Itismentionedasa
verypopular
democratic
belief,
tobetreated
only
withscorn
;andallwehearaboutitarea
fewsneersand
pin-pricking
remarks
u
,wellmatchedwiththe
abusiveattack
upon
Athenian
democracy.The
possibility
that
the
equalitariantheory
of
justice
wasoverlookedbyPlato,
is
thereforeruled
out,andsoisthe
possibility
thathedidnotsee
thatadiscussionofaninfluential
theorydiametricallyopposed
tohisownwasmost
important.
Thefactthathissilenceinthe
Republic
isbroken
onlyby
afew
jocular
remarks
(apparently
he
thought
themtoogood
tobe
suppressed
15
)
canbe
explainedonly
asaconsciousrefusaltodiscussit.Inviewofall
that,
Idonot
seehowPlato'smethodof
impressingupon
hisreadersthebelief
thatall
important
theorieshavebeenexaminedcanbereconciled
withthestandardsofintellectual
honesty ;thoughwemust
addthathisfailureis
undoubtedly
duetohis
complete
devotion
toacauseinwhose
goodness
he
firmly
believed.
Inorderto
appreciate
thefull
implications
ofPlato's
practic-
ally
unbrokensilenceonthisissue,wemustfirstsee
clearly
that
the
equalitarianmovementasPlatoknewit
represented
allhe
hated,andthathisown
theory,
inthe
Republic
andinalllater
works,was
largely
a
reply
tothe
powerfulchallenge
ofthenew
equalitarianism
andhumanitarianism. Inordertoshow
this,
I
shallnowdiscussthemain
principles
ofthehumanitarianmove-
ment,andcontrastthemwiththe
corresponding principles
of
Platonictotalitarianism.

82 PLATO'SPOLITICS
Thehumanitarian
theory
of
justice
makesthreemaindemands,
namely(i)
the
equalitarianprincipleproper,
i.e.theexclusionof
*
natural
'
privileges,(2)
the
principle
ofindividualismin
general,
and
(3)
the
principle
thatitistheendofthestateto
protect
the
freedomofitscitizens.Toeachofthese
political
demandsthere
corresponds
a
directlyoppositeprinciple
ofPlatonism,namely
(i)
the
principle
ofnatural
privilege, (2)
the
principle
ofholism
orcollectivismin
general,
and
(3)
the
principle
thatitistheend
oftheindividualtomaintain,andto
strengthen,
the
stability
of
thestate. Ishalldiscussthese
points
inorder.
(i)Equalitarianismproper
isthedemandthatthecitizensof
thestateshouldbetreated
impartially.
Itisthedemandthat
birth,familyconnection,orwealthmustnotinfluencethosewho
administerthelawtothecitizens. Inotherwords,
itdoesnot
recognizeany
'
natural
'
privileges,although
certain
privileges
may
beconferred
by
thecitizens
upon
those
they
trust.
This
equalitarianprinciple
hadbeen
admirably
formulated
by
Periclesafew
years
beforePlato'sbirth,inanorationwhichhas
been
preservedbyThucydides
18
.Itwillbe
quoted
more
fully
in
chapter10,buttwoofitssentencesmay
be
given
here :
*
Our
laws
',saidPericles,
*
afford
equaljustice
toallalikeintheir
privatedisputes,
butwedonot
ignore
theclaimsofexcellence.
Whenacitizen
distinguisheshimself,thenheis
preferred
tothe
publicservice,notasamatterof
privilege,
butasarewardfor
merit
;and
poverty
isnotabar. ..'Thesesentences
express
someofthefundamentalaimsofthe
greatequalitarian
move-
mentwhich,aswehaveseen,didnotevenshrinkfromattack-
ingslavery.
InPericles'own
generation,
thismovementwas
representedbyEuripides,Antiphon,
and
Hippias,
whohaveall
been
quoted
inthelast
chapter,
andalsobyHerodotus
17
.
InPlato's
generation,
itwas
representedby
Alcidamasand
Lycophron,
both
quoted
above
;another
supporter
was
Antisthenes,whohadbeenoneofSocrates'closestfriends.
Plato's
principle
of
justicewas,ofcourse,diametrically
opposed
toallthis.Hedemanded
jiatuml_griyikge^<^
the
natural leaders..Buthowdidhecontestthe
equalitarian
principle
?Andhowdidheestablishhisowndemands?
Itwillberememberedfromthelast
chapter
thatsomeof
thebest-knownformulationsofthe
equalitarian
demandswere
couchedinthe
impressive
but
questionablelanguage
of
*
natural
rights',andthatsomeoftheir
representativesargued
infavour
ofthesedemands
bypointing
outthe
*
natural
',
i.e.
biological,

CHAPTER6 ITOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 83
equality
ofmen.Wehaveseenthattheargument
israther
irrelevant
;
thatmenare
equal
insome
importantrespects,
but
unequal
inothers
;andthatnormativedemandscannotbe
derivedfromthisfact. Itistherefore
interesting
tonotethatthe
naturalistargument
wasnotused
by
all
equalitarians,
andthat
Pericles,
forone,didnotevenalludetoit
18
.
Plato
quickly
foundthatnaturalismwasaratherweak
spot
withinthe
equalitariandoctrine,andhetookthefullest
advantage
ofthisweakness.Totellmenthat
they
are
equal
hasacertain
sentimental
appeal.
Butthis
appeal
issmall
compared
with
thatmade
by
a
propaganda
thattellsthemthat
they
are
superior
toothers,andthatothersareinferiortothem.Are
younaturally
equal
to
yourservants,
to
yourslaves,
tothemanualworkerwho
isriotbetterthanananimal?The
veryquestion
isridiculous !
Platoseemstohavebeenthefirstto
appreciate
the
possibilities
ofthisreaction,andto
opposecontempt,scorn,andridiculeto
theclaimtonatural
equality.
This
explainswhy
hewasanxious
to
impute
thenaturalistic
argument
eventothoseofhis
opponents
whodidnotuseit
;
intheMenexenus,a
parody
ofPericles'
oration,hetherefore insistson
linkingtogether
theclaimsto
equal
lawsandtonatural
equality
:
c
Thebasisofourcon-
stitution is
equality
ofbirth
',he
saysironically.
*
Weareall
brethren,andareallchildrenofonemother
;
. .andthenatural
equality
ofbirthinducesustostrivefor
equality
beforethelaw.'
19
Later,
intheLaws,Platosummarizes his
reply
to
equali-
tarianismintheformula :
c
Equal
treatmentof
unequals
must
produceinequity
'
20
;andthiswas
developedby
Aristotleinto
theformula
'
Equality
for
equals,inequality
for
unequals
'.
Thisformulaindicateswhatmay
betermedthestandard
objection
to
equalitarianism
;the
objection
that
equality
wouldbeexcellent
if
onlymenwere
equal,
butthatitis
manifestlyimpossible
since
they
arenot
equal,
andsince
they
cannotbemade
equal.
This
apparentlyvery
realistic
objection is,
in
fact,mostunrealistic,
for
politicalprivileges
haveneverbeenfounded
upon
natural
differencesofcharacter.Andindeed,Platodoesnotseemto
havehadmuchconfidenceinthis
objection
when
writing
the
Republic,
foritisusedthere
only
inoneofhissneersat
democracy
whenhe
says
thatit
*
distributes
equality
to
equals
and
unequals
alike'.
21
Apart
fromthisremark,he
prefers
notto
argue
againstequalitarianism,
butto
forget
it.
Summingup,
itcanbesaidthatPlatoneverunderratedthe
significance
ofthe
equalitariantheory,supported
asitwasby
a

84
PLATO'SPOLITICS
manlike
Pericles,butthat,inthe
Republic,
hedidnottreatit
atall
;heattacked
it,butnot
squarely
and
openly.
Buthowdidhe
try
toestablishhisown
anti-equalitarianism,
his
principle
ofnatural
privilege
?Inthe
Republic,
he
proffered
threedifferent
arguments,though
twoofthem
hardly
deserve
thename.Thefirst
22
isthe
surprising
remark
that,
sinceall
othervirtuesofthestatehavebeenexamined,the
remainingone,
thatof
'
minding
one'sownbusiness
',mustbe
'justice
'. Iam
reluctanttobelievethatthiswasmeantasan
argument ;but
itmust
be,
forPlato's
leadingspeaker,
'
Socrates
',introduces it
byasking
:
*
Do
youknowhowIdeducethis?
'
Thesecond
argument
ismore
interesting,
foritisan
attempt
toshowthat
his
anti-equalitarianism
canbederivedfromthe
ordinary (i.e.
equalitarian)
viewthat
justice
is
impartiality.
I
quote
the
passage
infull.Remarking
thattherulersofthe
city
willalso
beits
judges,
*
Socrates
'
says
23
:
6
Andwillitnotbetheaimof
their
jurisdiction
thatnomanshalltakewhat
belongs
toanother,
andshallbe
deprived
ofwhatishisown?
' c
Yes
',
isthe
reply
of
'
Glaucon
',theinterlocutor,
c
thatwillbetheirintention.'
c
Becausethatwouldbe
just
?
' '
Yes.'
*
Accordingly,
to
keep
andto
practise
what
belongs
tousandisourownwillbe
generally
agreedupon
tobe
justice.'
Thusitisestablishedthat
'
to
keep
andto
practise
whatisone'sown
'
isthe
principle
of
justjurisdic-
tion,according
toour
ordinary
ideasof
justice.
Herethesecond
argumentends,givingway
tothethird
(to
be
analysedbelow)
whichleadstotheconclusionthatitis
justice
to
keep
toone's
ownstation
(or
todoone'sown
business),
i.e.thestation
(or
the
business)
ofone'sownclassorcaste.
Thesole
purpose
ofthissecond
argument
isto
impressupon
thereaderthat
*
justice',inthe
ordinary
senseoftheword,
requires
usto
keep
toour
stations,
sinceweshould
alwayskeep
what
belongs
tous.Thatisto
say,
Platowisheshisreadersto
drawtheinference :
*
Itis
just
to
keep
andto
practise
whatis
one'sown.Myplace(orrnybusiness)
ismy
own.Thusitis
just
formeto
keep
tomyplace(or
to
practisemybusiness).'
Thisisaboutassoundasthe
argument
:
c
Itis
just
to
keep
and
to
practise
whatisone'sown.This
plan
of
stealingyourmoney
ismy
own.Thusitis
just
formeto
keep
tomyplan,
andto
put
itinto
practise,
i.e.tosteal
yourmoney.'
Itisclearthatthe
inferencewhichPlatowishesustodrawis
nothing
butacrude
juggle
withthe
meaning
oftheterm
c
one'sown'.
(For
the
problem
iswhether
justice
demandsthat
everything
whichisin

CHAPTER6ITOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 85
somesense
'
ourown
',e.g.
'
ourown
'
class,shouldthereforebe
treated,not
only
asour
possession,
butasourinalienable
posses-
sion.)
Thiscrude
juggle
isPlato'sway
of
establishingwhat
Adamcalls
'
a
point
ofcontactbetweenhisownviewof
Justice
andthe
popular
. .
meaning
oftheword'.Thisishowthe
greatestphilosopher
ofalltimestriestoconvinceusthathehas
discoveredthetruenatureof
justice.
Thethirdandlast
argument
whichPlatooffersismuchmore
serious. Itisan
appeal
tothe
principle
ofholismor
collectivism,
andisconnectedwiththe
principle
thatitistheendofthe
individualtomaintainthe
stability
ofthestate. Itwilltherefore
bediscussed,inthis
analysis,
under
(2)
and
(3).
Butbefore
proceeding
tothese
points,
Iwishtodrawattention
tothe
'
preface
'
whichPlato
places
beforehis
description
ofthe
6
discovery
'
whichwearehere
examining.
Itmustbecon-
sideredinthe
light
oftheobservationswehavemadesofar.
Viewedinthis
light,
the
c
lengthypreface
'
thisishowPlato
himselfdescribesit
appears
asan
ingeniousattempt
to
prepare
thereaderforthe
'
discovery
of
justice
'
bymakinghimbelieve
thatthereisan
argumentgoing
onwhenin
reality
heis
only
facedwitha
display
ofdramaticdevices,designed
tosoothehis
criticalfaculties.
Having
discoveredwisdomasthevirtue
proper
tothe
guardians
and
courage
asthat
proper
tothe
auxiliaries,
*
Socrates
'
announces hisintentionof
making
afinalefforttodiscover
justice.
*
Two
things
areleft
'
24
,he
says,
6
whichweshallhave
todiscoverinthe
city
:
temperance,
and
finally
thatother
thing
whichisthemain
object
ofallour
investigations,namelyjustice.'
c
Exactly,'says
Glaucon. Socratesnow
suggests
thattem-
perance
shallbe
dropped.
ButGlaucon
protests
andSocrates
givesin,saying
that
*
itwouldbedishonestifIweretorefuse
J
.
Thislittle
disputeprepares
thereaderforthere-introductionof
justice,suggests
tohimthatSocrates
possesses
themeansforits
'
discovery ',andreassureshimthatGlauconis
carefullywatching
Plato'sintellectual
honesty
in
conducting
the
argument,
which
he,thereaderhimself,neednotthereforewatchatall
25
.
Socratesnext
proceeds
todiscuss
temperance,
whichhe
discoverstobethe
only
virtue
proper
totheworkers.
(Tem-
perance,by
the
way,
canbe
clearlydistinguished
from
justice.
Justice
meansto
keep
one's
place ;.temperance
meanstobe
satisfiedwithit.Whatothervirtuecouldbe
proper
tothe
workerswhofilltheirbellieslikethebeasts
?)When
temperance

86 PLATO'SPOLITICS
hasbeendiscovered,Socratesasks :
'
Andwhataboutthelast
principle
?
Obviously
itwillbe
justice.'
'
Obviously,
5
replies
Glaucon.
*
Now,my
dearGlaucon
',saysSocrates,
c
wemust,
likehunters,surroundhercoverand
keep
aclosewatch,andwe
mustnotallowherto
escape,
andto
getaway ;
for
surely,justice
mustbesomewherenearthis
spot.Youhadbetterlookoutand
searchthe
place.Andif
you
arethefirsttoseeher,then
give
meashout !
'
Glaucon,
likethereader,
isofcourseunableto
do
anything
ofthe
sort,and
implores
Socratestotakethelead.
*
Thenoffer
yourprayers
withme
',saysSocrates,
'
andfollow
me.
5
ButevenSocratesfindsthe
ground
c
hardtotraverse,
sinceitiscoveredwithunderwood
;
itis
dark,anddifficultto
explore
. .But
'
,he
says,
*
wemust
go
onwithit'.And
insteadof
protesting
c
Goonwithwhat?Withour
exploration,
i.e.withour
argument
?Butwehavenotevenstarted.There
hasnotbeenashimmerofsenseinwhatyou
havesaidsofar
',
Glaucon,andthenaivereaderwithhim
repliesmeekly
:
'
Yes,
wemust
go
on.'NowSocrates
reports
thathehas
'
got
a
glimpse
'
(we
have
not),
and
gets
excited.
'
Hurray
!
Hurray
!
*
he
cries,
c
Glaucon !Thereseemstobeatrack !Ithinknow
thatthe
quarry
willnot
escape
us!
' c
Thatis
good
news
',
replies
Glaucon.
'
Uponmy
word
',saysSocrates,
c
wehave
madeutterfoolsofourselves.Whatwewere
looking
forata
distance,hasbeen
lying
atour
very
feetallthistime !Andwe
neversawit!
'
Withexclamationsand
repeated
assertionsof
thiskind,Socratescontinuesforagoodwhile,interruptedby
Glaucon,whosefunction itisto
giveexpression
tothereader's
feelings,
andwhoasksSocrateswhathehasfound.Butwhen
Socrates
saysonly
'
Wehavebeen
talking
ofitallthe
time,
without
realizing
thatwewere
actuallydescribing
it
',Glaucon
expresses
thereader's
impatience
and
says
:
'
This
prefacegets
a
bit
lengthy ;rememberthatIwanttohearwhatitisallabout.'
And
only
thendoesPlato
proceed
to
proffer
thetwo
c
arguments
'
whichIhaveoutlined.
AsGlaucon'slastremarkshows,Platowas
fully
consciousof
whathewas
doing
inthis
c
lengthypreface
'. Icannot
interpret
itas
anything
butasuccessful
attempt
tolullthereader'scritical
faculties,and,by
meansofadramatic
display
ofverbal
fireworks,
todiverthisattentionfromtheintellectual
poverty
ofthis
masterlypiece
of
dialogue.
Platoknewitsweakness,andhow
tohideit.
(2)
The
problem
ofindividualismandcollectivism is
closely

CHAPTER6 ITOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 87
relatedtothatof
equality
and
inequality.
Before
going
onto
discuss
it,afew
terminological
remarksseemtobe
necessary.
Theterm
*
individualism
'
canbeused
(according
tothe
OxfordDictionary)
intwodifferentways
:
(a)
in
opposition
to
collectivism,and
(b)
in
opposition
toaltruism.There isno
otherwordto
express
theformer
meaning,
butseveral
synonyms
forthelatter,for
example
c
egoism
'
or
*
selfishness '.Thisis
why
inwhatfollowsIshallusetheterm
'
individualism
'
exclusively
insense
(a),using
termslike
'
egoism
'
or
'
selfishness
'
ifsense
(b)
isintended.Alittletablemay
beuseful :
(a)
Individualism is
opposed
to
(a'}
Collectivism.
(b)Egoism
is
opposed
to
(b'}
Altruism
Nowthesefourtermsdescribecertain
attitudes,ordemands,
or
decisions,orcodesofnormativelaws.
Thoughnecessarily
vague,theycan,
Ibelieve,be
easily
illustrated
byexamples
and
sobeusedwitha
precision
sufficientforour
presentpurpose.
Letus
begin
withcollectivism
26
,
sincethisattitude is
already
familiartousfromourdiscussionofPlato'sholism. Hisdemand
thattheindividualshouldobservetheinterestsofthewhole,
whetherthisbethe
city,
the
tribe,therace,or
any
othercollective
body,
wasillustratedinthelast
chapterby
afew
passages.To
quote
oneofthese
again,
butmore
fully
27
:
'
The
part
existsfor
thesakeofthewhole,butthewholedoesnotexistforthesake
ofthe
part
. .Youarecreatedforthesakeofthewholeand
notthewholeforthesakeof
you.'
This
quotation
not
only
illustrates collectivism, butalso
conveys
its
strong
emotional
appeal.
The
appeal
istovarious
feelings,e.g.
the
longing
to
belong
toa
group
oratribe
;andonefactorinitisthemoral
appeal
foraltruismand
against
selfishness. Plato
suggests
that
if
you
cannotsacrifice
your
interestsforthesakeofthewhole,
then
you
areselfish.
V\
Nowa
glance
atourlittletablewillshowthatthisisnotso.
Collectivism isnot
opposed
to
egoism,
norisitidenticalwith
altruismorunselfishness. Collectiveor
groupegoism,
forinstance
class
egoism,
isa
verycommon
thing(Platoknew
28
this
very
well),
andthisshows
clearlyenough
thatcollectivismassuchis
not
opposed
toselfishness.Ontheotherhand,an
anti-collectivist,
i.e.an
individualist, can,
atthesame
time,beanaltruist
;he
canbe
ready
tomakesacrificesinorderto
help
otherindividuals.
Oneofthebest
examples
ofthisattitudeis
perhaps
Dickens. It
wouldbedifficultto
say
whichisthe
stronger,
his
passionate
hatredofselfishnessorhis
passionate
interestinindividualswith

PLATO'SPOLITICS
alltheirhumanweaknesses
;andthisattitudeiscombinedwith
a
dislike,not
only
ofwhatwenowcallcollectivebodiesor
collectives
a9
,butevenofa
genuinely
devotedaltruism,
ifdirected
towardsanonymousgroups
ratherthanconcreteindividuals.
(I
remindthereaderofMrs.
Jellyby
inBleakHouse,
*
a
lady
devoted
to
public
duties
'.)
These
illustrations,
I
think,explain
suffi-
cientlyclearly
the
meaning
ofourfourterms
;and
theyshow
that
any
ofthetermsinourtablecanbecombinedwitheither
ofthetwotermsthatstandintheotherline
(whichgives
four
possiblecombinations).
Nowitis
interesting
thatforPlato,andformost
Platonists,
analtruisticindividualism
(as
forinstancethatof
Dickens)
cannot
exist.
According
to
Plato,the
only
alternativetocollectivism
is
egoism ;he
simply
identifiesallaltruismwith
collectivism,
andallindividualism with
egoism.
Thisisnotamatterof
terminology,
ofmerewords,forinsteadoffour
possibilities,
Plato
recognized only
two.Thishascreatedconsiderable
confusionin
speculation
onethicalmatters,evendowntoour
own
day.
Plato'sidentificationofindividualismwith
egoism
furnishes
himwitha
powerfulweapon
forhisdefenceofcollectivismas
wellasforhisattack
upon
individualism. In
defending
collectivism,hecan
appeal
toourhumanitarian
feeling
of
unselfishness
;
inhis
attack,hecanbrandallindividualists as
selfish,
as
incapable
ofdevotionto
anything
butthemselves.
Thisattack,although
aimed
by
Plato
against
individualism in
oursense,
i.e.
against
the
rights
ofhumanindividuals,reachesof
course
only
a
very
different
target,egoism.
Butthisdifference
is
constantlyignoredby
PlatoandthePlatonists.
Why
didPlato
try
toattackindividualism ?Ithinkheknew
very
wellwhathewasdoingwhenhetrainedhis
gunsupon
this
position,
forindividualism, perhaps
evenmorethan
equali-
tarianism,wasa
strongpoint
inthedefencesofthenewhumani-
tariancreed.The
emancipation
oftheindividualwasindeed
the
greatspiritual
revolutionwhichhadledtothebreakdown
oftribalismandtotheriseof
democracy.
Plato's
uncanny
sociological
intuitionshowsitself
by
theway
inwhichhe
invariably
discernedthe
enemy
whereverhemethim.
Individualismwas
part
oftheoldintuitiveideaof
justice.
That
justice
isnot,asPlatowouldhave
it,thehealthandharmony
ofthestate,butratheracertainway
of
treatingindividuals,
is
emphasizedbyAristotle,whenhe
says'justice
is
something
that

CHAPTER6:TOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 89
pertains
to
persons
'
30
.Thisindividualistic elementhadbeen
emphasizedby
the
generation
ofPericles. Pericleshimself
madeitclearthatthelawsmust
guaranteeequaljustice
'
to
allalikeintheir
privatedisputes
'
;buthewentfurther.
*
Wedonotfeelcalled
upon',he
said,
'
to
nag
atour
neighbour
ifhechoosesto
go
hisown
way.
1
(Compare
this
withPlato'sremark
31
thatthestatedoesnot
producemen
e
for
the
purpose
of
letting
them
loose,eachto
go
hisownway
. .
'.)
Pericles insiststhatthisindividualism mustbelinkedwith
altruism :
*
Weare
taught
. .neverto
forget
thatwemust
protect
the
injured
'
;andhis
speech
culminatesina
description
oftheyoung
Athenianwho
growsup
'
toa
happyversatility,
and
toself-reliance.
5
Thisindividualism, unitedwithaltruism,hasbecomethe
basisofourwesterncivilization. Itisthecentraldoctrineof
Christianity ('
love
yourneighbour ',saysChristianity,
not
'
love
your
tribe
');anditisthecoreofallethicaldoctrineswhich
havegrown
fromourcivilizationandstimulated it. Itis
also,
forinstance,Kant'scentral
practical
doctrine
(*alwaysrecognize
thathumanindividualsareends,anddonotusethemasmere
meansto
yourends').
Thereisnoother
thought
whichhas
beenso
powerful
inthemoral
development
ofman.
ThusPlatowas
right
whenhesawinthisdoctrinethe
enemy
ofhiscastestate
;andhehateditmorethan
any
otherofthe
*
subversive
'
doctrinesofhistime.Inordertoshowthiseven
more
clearly,
Ishall
quote
two
passages
fromtheLaws
32
whose
trulyastonishinghostility
towardstheindividual
is,
I
think,too
little
appreciated. Thefirstofthemisfamousasareferenceto
the
Republic,
whose
c
community
ofwomenandchildrenand
property
'
itdiscusses. Platodescribesheretheconstitutionof
the
Republic
as
c
the
highest
formofthestate
'
;andinthis
higheststate,hetellsus,
*
everythingpossible
hasbeenachieved
inthedirectionof
utterlyeradicatingeverythingfrpmourlife
thatis
private
andindividual '.'Andhecontinuestooutlinethe
principles
ofsuchastate :
'
Sofarasitcanbedone,eventhose
things
whichnatureherselfhasmade
private
andindividual
shouldsomehowbecomethecommon
property
ofall.Our
very
eyes
andearsandhandsshould
see,hear,and
act,
asif
they
belonged
nottoindividualsbuttothecommunity.
Allmen
shouldbemouldedto
praise
andtoblamethesame
things,and
atthesametime.Andallthelawsofsuchastatemustbe
designed
for
unifying
the
city
totheutmost.' Plato
goes
onto
O.S.I.E.VOL.i
'
D

9O PLATOSPOLITICS
say
that
6
nomancanfindabettercriterionofthe
highest
excellenceofastate
'
thanthe
principlesjustexpounded ;andhe
describessuchastateas
c
divine
',andasthe
'
model
*
or
'
pattern
'
or
*
original
'
ofthe
state,
i.e.asitsFormorIdea.ThisisPlato's
ownviewofthe
Republic,expressed
atatimewhenhehad
given
uphope
of
realizing
his
political
idealinallits
glory.
Thesecond
passage,
alsofromtheLaws,is,
if
possible,
even
more
outspoken.
Itmustbeadmittedthatitdeals
mainly
with
militarydiscipline,
butPlatoleavesnodoubtthatthesesame
militarist
principles
shouldbeadheredtoin
peace
aswellasin
war,andthatheaimedata
permanent
andtotalmobilization
83
ofallmembersofhisstate :
'
The
greatestprinciple
isthat
nobody,
whethermaleorfemale,shouldeverbewithoutaleader.
Norshouldthemindof
anybody
behabituated to
letting
him
do
anything
atallonhisown
initiative,neitheroutof
zeal,nor
even
playfully.
Butinwaraswellasinthemidstof
peace
tohisleaderheshalldirecthis
eye,
andfollowhim
faithfully.
Andeveninthesmallestmattersheshouldstandunderleader-
ship.
For
example,
heshould
getup,
ormove,orwash,ortake
hismeals
34
. .
only
ifhehasbeentoldtodoso. . .Ina
word,heshouldteachhis
soul,bylonghabit,nevertodreamof
actingindependently,
andinfacttobecome
utterlyincapable
ofit.
9
Theseare
strong
words.Neverwasamanmoreinearnest
inhis
hostility
towardstheindividual.Andthishatredis
deeply
rootedinthefundamentaldualismofPlato's
philosophy ;he
hatedtheindividualandhisfreedom
just
ashehatedthe
varying
particularexperiences,
the
variety
ofthe
changing
worldof
sensible
things.
Inthefieldof
politics,
theindividual isto
PlatotheEvilOnehimself.
Itis
amazing
thatthis
attitude,anti-humanitarian and
anti-Christian asit
is,
hasbeen
consistently
idealized. Ithas
been
interpreted
ashumane,asunselfish,
as
altruistic,andas
Christian. E.B.
England,
for
instance,
calls
35
thefirstofthese
two
passages
fromtheLaws
c
a
vigorous
denunciationofselfish-
ness'.SimilarwordsareusedbyBarker,when
discussing
Plato's
theory
of
justice.He
says
thatPlato'saimwas
*
to
replace
selfishnessandcivildiscordbyharmony ',andthat
*
theold
harmony
oftheinterestsoftheStateandtheindividual . .isthus
restoredinthe
teachings
ofPlato
;butrestoredonanewand
higherlevel,becauseithasbeenelevatedintoaconscioussense
ofharmony
',Suchstatementsandcountlesssimilaronescan

CHAPTER6ITOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE QI
be
easilyexplained
ifweremember Plato'sidentification of
individualismwith
egoism ;
forallthesePlatonistsbelievethat
anti-individualism isthesameasselflessness. Thisillustratesmy
contentionthatthisidentificationhadtheeffectofasuccessful
piece
ofanti-humanitarian
propaganda,
andthatithasconfused
speculation
onethicalmattersdowntoourowntime.Butwe
mustalsorealizethatthosewho,deceived
by
theidentification
and
byhigh-soundingwords,exaltPlato's
reputation
asateacher
ofmoralsandannouncetotheworldthathisethicsisthenearest
approach
to
Christianity
beforeChrist,are
preparing
the
way
for
totalitarianismand
especially
fora
totalitarian, anti-Christian
interpretation
of
Christianity.Andthisisa
dangerousthing,
fortherehavebeentimeswhen
Christianitywasdominated
by
totalitarian ideas.Therewasan
inquisition ;and,inanother
form,
itmaycome
again.
Itmay
thereforebeworthwhiletomentionsomefurther
reasonswhyguilelesspeople
have
persuaded
themselvesofthe
humanenessofPlato'sintentions.Oneisthatwhen
preparing
the
ground
forhiscollectivistdoctrines,Plato
usuallybeginsby
quoting
aGreek
proverb
:
c
Friendsshouldsharewhatever
they
possess.'
36
This
is,undoubtedly,
an
unselfish,high-minded
and
excellentsentiment.Whocould
suspect
thatan
argument
starting
fromsuchacommendable
assumption
wouldarriveata
wholly
anti-humanitarian conclusion?Anotherand
important
point
isthattherearemanygenuinely
humanitariansentiments
expressed
inPlato's
dialogues,particularly
inthosewrittenbefore
the
RepublicwhenhewasstillundertheinfluenceofSocrates. I
mention
especially
Socrates'doctrineinthe
Gorgias,
thatitis
worsetodo
injustice
thantosufferit.Thisdoctrineisnot
only
altruistic,but
certainly
alsoindividualistic
;
forinacollectivist
theory
of
justice
likethatofthe
Republic,injustice
isanact
against
the
state,not
against
a
particularman,and
though
amanmay
commitanactof
injustice,only
thecollectivecansufferfromit.
Butinthe
Gorgiaswefind
nothing
ofthekind.The
theory
of
justice
isa
perfectly
normalone,andthe
examples
of
injustice
givenby
*
Socrates
'
(who
hashere
probably
a
good
dealofthe
realSocratesin
him)
aresuchas
boxing
aman's
ears,injuring,
or
killing
him. Socrates'
teaching
thatitisbettertosuffersuch
actsthantodothemisindeed
very
similartoChristian
teaching,
andhisdoctrineof
justice
fitsin
excellently
withthe
spirit
of
Pericles.
(Anattempt
to
interpret
thiswillbemadein
chapter10.)

92
PLATO'SPOLITICS
Nowthe
Republicdevelops
anewdoctrineof
justicewhichis
not
onlyincompatible
withsuchanindividualism, but
utterly
hostiletowards it.Butthereader
easily
believesthatPlatois
still
holding
fasttothedoctrineofthe
Gorgias.Forinthe
Republic,
Plato
frequently
alludestothedoctrinethatitisbetter
tosufferthantocommit
injustice,
in
spite
ofthefactthatthisis
simply
nonsensefromthe
point
ofviewofthecollectivist
theory
of
justiceproffered
inthiswork.Furthermore,wehearinthe
Republic
the
opponents
of
c
Socrates
'
giving
voicetothe
opposite
theory,
thatitis
good
and
pleasant
toinflict
injustice,andbadto
suffer it.Ofcourse,every
humanitarian is
repelledby
such
cynicism,
andwhenPlatoformulateshisaims
through
themouth
ofSocrates :
'
IfeartocommitasinifI
permit
sucheviltalk
about
justice
inmypresence,
without
doingmy
utmosttodefend
her
'
37
,thenthe
trusting
reader isconvincedofPlato's
good
intentions,and
ready
tofollowhimwhereverhe
goes.
TheeffectofthisassuranceofPlato'sismuchenhanced
by
thefactthatitfollows,andiscontrastedwith,the
cynicaland
selfish
speeches
38
of
Thrasymachus,
whois
depicted
asa
political
desperado
oftheworstkind.Atthesametime,thereaderis
ledto
identify
individualismwiththeviewsof
Thrasymachus,and
tothinkthatPlato,
inhis
fightagainstit,
is
fightingagainst
all
thesubversiveandnihilistictendenciesofhistime.Butwe
shouldnotallowourselvestobe
frightenedby
such
bogies
as
Thrasymachus (there
isa
greatsimilaritybetweenhis
portrait
andthemodern
bogy
of
'
bolshevism
')
into
accepting
another
morerealandmore
dangerous
because lessobviousformof
barbarism. ForPlato
replacesThrasymachus
5
doctrinethatthe
individual'smight
is
rightby
thenotlessbarbaricdoctrinethat
right
is
everything
thatfurthersthe
might
ofthestate.
Tosum
up,
becauseofhisradicalcollectivismPlatoisnot
eveninterestedinthose
problems
whichmen
usually
callthe
problems
of
justice,
inthe
impartialweighing
ofthe
contesting
claimsofindividuals. Norisheinterestedin
adjusting
the
individual'sclaimstothoseofthestate.Fortheindividual is
altogether
inferior.
*
I
legislate
withaviewtothewhole
',
saysPlato,
*
. .forI
rightly
holdtheindividual's
feelings
tobe
onan
altogether
inferiorlevelofvalue*!.
39
Heisinterested
solely
inthecollectivewholeassuch,and
justice,
tohim,
is
nothingbut,
thehealth,unity,and
stability
ofthecollective
body.
(3)
So
far,wehaveseenthathumanitarianethicsdemandsan
equalitarian
andindividualistic
interpretation
of
justice ;butwe

CHAPTER6ITOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 93
havenot
yet
outlinedthehumanitarianviewofthestateassuch.
Ontheotherhand,wehaveseenthatPlato's
theory
ofthestate
istotalitarian
;butwehavenot
yetexplained
the
application
ofthis
theory
totheethicsoftheindividual. Boththesetasks
willbeundertakennow,thesecondfirst
;andIshall
beginby
analysing
thethirdofPlato's
arguments
inhis
'
discovery
'
of
justice,an
argument
whichhassofarbeensketched
onlyvery
roughly.
HereisPlato'sthird
argument
40
:
*
Nowseewhether
youagree
withme,'says
Socrates.
*
Do
you
thinkitwoulddomuchharmtothe
city
ifa
carpenter
started
making
shoesandashoemaker
carpentering
?
' '
Not
very
much.'
'
Butshouldonewhois
by
natureaworker,ora
memberofthe
money-earning
class . .manage
to
get
intothe
warriorclass
;orshouldawarrior
get
intothe
guardians'
class
without
beingworthy
ofit
;thenthiskindof
changeandof
underhand
plotting
wouldmeanthedownfallofthe
city
?
'
c
Most
definitely
itwould.'
'
Wehavethreeclassesinour
city,
andItakeitthat
any
such
plotting
or
changing
fromoneclass
toanotherisa
great
crime
against
the
city,
andmayrightly
be
denouncedastheutmostwickedness?
' '
Assuredly.'
c
But
you
will
certainly
declarethatutmostwickednesstowardsone'sown
city
is
injustice
?
' *
Certainly.'
c
Thenthisis
injustice.And
conversely,weshall
say
thatwheneachclassinthe
city
attendsto
itsown
business,the
money-earning
classaswellastheauxiliaries
andthe
guardians,
thenthiswillbe
justice.'
Nowifwelookatthis
argument,
wefind
(a)
the
sociological
assumption
thatanyrelaxing
ofthe
rigid
caste
system
mustlead
tothedownfallofthe
city;(b)
theconstantreiterationofthe
one
argument
thatwhatharmsthe
city
is
injustice ;and
(c)
the
inferencethatthe
opposite
is
justice.Nowwemaygrant
here
the
sociologicalassumption (a)
sinceitisPlato'sidealtoarrest
social
change,
andsincehemeans
by
c
harm
'
anything
thatmay
leadtochange ;anditis
probablyquite
truethatthe
arresting
ofallsocial
change
can
only
beachieved
by
themost
rigid
caste
system.Andwemay
further
grant
theinference
(c)
thatthe
opposite
of
injustice
is
justice.Of
greaterinterest,however,
is
(b) ;a
glance
atPlato's
argument
willshowthathiswholetrend
of
thought
isdominated
by
the
question
:doesthis
thing
harm
the
city
?Doesitdomuchharmorlittleharm?He
constantly
reiteratesthatwhatthreatenstoharmthe
city
is
morally
wicked
and
unjust.
WeseeherethatPlato
recognizesonly
oneultimatestandard,

94
PLATO'SPOLITICS
theinterestofthestate.
Everything
thatfurthersitis
good
and
virtuousand
just ;everything
thatthreatensitisbadandwicked
and
unjust.
Actionsthatserve itaremoral
;
actionsthat
endanger it,immoral. Inotherwords,Plato'smoralcodeis
strictly
utilitarian
;
itisacodeofcollectivistor
political
utilitari-
anism. Thecriterion
ofmorality
istheinterest
of
thestate.
Morality
is
nothing
but
politicalhygiene.
Thisisthe
collectivist,the
tribal,thetotalitarian
theory
of
morality
:
c
Goodiswhatisintheinterestofmygroup ;ormy
tribe
;ormy
state.' Itis
easy
toseewhatthis
moralityimplied
forinternational relations :thatthestateitselfcanneverbe
wrong
in
any
ofitsactions,
as
long
asitis
strong ;thatthestate
hasthe
right,
not
only
todoviolencetoits
citizens,shouldthat
leadtoanincreaseof
strength,
butalsotoattackother
states,
provided
itdoessowithout
weakening
itself.
(Thisinference,
the
explicitrecognition
ofthe
amorality
ofthe
state,andcon-
sequently
thedefenceofmoralnihilismininternationalrelations,
wasdrawnbyHegel.)
Fromthe
point
ofviewoftotalitarian
ethics,fromthe
point
of
viewofcollective
utility,
Plato's
theory
of
justice
is
perfectly
correct.To
keep
one's
place
isavirtue. Itisthatcivilvirtue
which
correspondsexactly
tothe
military
virtueof
discipline.
Andthisvirtue
playsexactly
thatrolewhich
'justice
'
plays
in
Plato's
system
ofvirtues.Forthe
cogs
inthe
great
clockwork
ofthestatecanshowvirtueintwo
ways. First,they
mustbefit
fortheirtask,bybeing
ofthe
rightsize,shape,strength,
etc.
;
and
secondly,they
mustbefittedeachintoits
rightplace
andmust
retainthat
place.Thefirst
type
ofvirtues,
fitnessfora
specific
task,willleadtoa
differentiation, inaccordancewiththe
specific
taskofthe
cog.
Certain
cogs
willbevirtuous,
i.e.
fit,only
if
they
are
large ;
othersif
they
are
strong ;andothersif
they
are
smooth.Butthevirtueof
keeping
toone's
place
willbecommon
toallofthem
;anditwillatthesametimebeavirtueofthe
whole :thatof
beingproperly
fitted
together
of
being
in
harmony.TothisuniversalvirtuePlato
gives
thename
'
justice
'.
This
procedure
is
perfectly
consistentanditis
fullyjustifiedfrom
the
point
ofviewoftotalitarian
morality.
Iftheindividual is
nothing
buta
cog,
thenethicsis
nothing
butthe
study
ofhow
tofithimintothewhole.
IwishtomakeitclearthatIbelieveinthe
sincerity
ofPlato's
totalitarianism. Hisdemandforthe
unchallengeddominationof
oneclassovertherestwas
uncompromising,
buthisidealwasnot

CHAPTER6:TOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 95
themaximum
exploitation
ofthe
working
classesby
the
upper
class
;
itwasthe
stability
ofthewhole.Butthereasonhe
gives
forthe
necessity
of
keeping
the
exploitation
within
limits,
is
againpurely
utilitarian. Itistheinterestof
stabilizing
theclass
rule.Shouldthe
guardianstry
to
get
toomuch,he
argues,
then
they
willintheendhave
nothing
atall.
c
If
they
arenotsatisfied
withalifeof
stability
and
security,
. .andare
tempted,by
their
power,
to
appropriate
forthemselves allthewealthofthe
city,
then
surelythey
areboundtofindouthowwiseHesiodwas
whenhe
said,
"
thehalfismorethanthewhole".'
41
Butwe
mustrealizethateventhis
tendency
torestrictthe
exploitation
of
class
privileges
isa
typical
featureoftotalitarianism. Totali-
tarianism isnot
simply
amoral. Itisthe
morality
ofthe
group,
orthetribe
;
itisnotindividualbutcollectiveselfishness.^
Considering
thatPlato'sthird
argument
is
straightforward
and
consistent,the
questionmay
beaskedwhy
heneededthe
*
lengthypreface
'
aswellasthetwo
precedingarguments
?
Why
allthisuneasiness?
(Platonists
willofcourse
reply
thatthis
uneasinessexists
only
inmyimagination. Thatmay
beso.But
theirrationalcharacterofthe
passages
can
hardly
be
explained
away.)Theanswertothis
question is,
I
believe,thatPlato's
collectiveclockworkwould
hardly
have
appealed
tohisreaders
ifithadbeen
presented
totheminallitsbarrennessandmeaning-
lessness. Platowas
uneasy
becauseheknewandfeared
the)
strength
andthemoral
appeal
oftheforceshetriedtobreak.!
Hedidnotdareto
challengethem,buttriedtowinthemover
forhisown
purposes.
WhetherwewitnessinPlato's
writings
a
cynical
andconscious
attempt
to
employ
themoralsentiments
ofthenewhumanitarianism forhisown
purposes,
orwhetherwe
witnessrathera
tragicattempt
to
persuade
hisownbetter
conscienceoftheevilsofindividualism,weshallneverknow.
Mypersonalimpression
isthatthelatteristhecase,andthatthis
innerconflict isthemainsecretofPlato'sfascination. Ithink
thatPlatowasmovedtothe
depths
ofhissoul
by
thenewideas,
and
especiallyby
the
great
individualist Socratesandhis
martyrdom.AndIthinkthathe
foughtagainst
thisinfluence
upon
himselfaswellas
upon
otherswithallthe
might
ofhis
unequalledintelligence,though
not
alwaysopenly.
This
explains
alsowhy
fromtimeto
time,amidallhistotalitarianism,wefind
somehumanitarian ideas.Andit
explainswhy
itwas
possible
for
philosophers
to
represent
Platoasahumanitarian.
A
strongargument
in
support
ofthis
interpretation
istheway

96 PLATO'SPOLITICS
inwhichPlatotreated,orrather,maltreated,thehumanitarian
andrational
theory
ofthe
state,a
theorywhichhadbeen
developed
forthefirsttimeinhis
generation.
Inaclear
presentation
ofthis
theory,
the
language
of
political
demandsshouldbeused
;thatisto
say,weshouldnot
try
to
answertheessentialist
question
:Whatisthe
state,whatisits
true
nature,
itsreal
meaning
?Norshouldwe
try
toanswerthe
historicist
question
:Howdidthestate
originate,
andwhatis
the
origin
of
politicalobligation
?Weshouldrather
put
our
question
inthis
way
:Whatdowedemandfromastate?Andin
ordertofindoutourfundamentaldemands,wecanask :Why
dowe
preferliving
inawell-ordered stateto
living
withouta
state,
i.e.in
anarchy
?This
way
of
asking
our
question
isthe
only
rationalone. Itisthe
question
whicha
technologist
must
put
beforehecan
proceed
totheconstructionorreconstruction
of
anypolitical
institution. For
only
ifheknowswhathewants
canhedecidewhetheracertaininstitution isorisnotwell
adapted
toitsfunction.
Nowifweaskour
question
inthis
way,
the
reply
ofthe
humanitarian willbe :WhatIdemandfromthestateis
protec-
tion
;not
only
for
myself,
butforotherstoo. Idemand
protection
formyownfreedomandforother
people's.
Ido
notwishtoliveatthe
mercy
of
anybodywhohasthe
larger
fists
orthe
biggerguns.
Inotherwords,
Iwishtobe
protected
againstaggression
fromothermen. Iwantthedifference
between
aggression
anddefencetobe
recognized,
anddefenceto
be
supportedby
the
organizedpower
ofthestate. Iam
perfectly
ready
toseemyownfreedomofactionsomewhatcurtailed
by
thestateifIcanobtain
protection
ofwhatremains,
sinceIknow
thatsomelimitationsofmy
freedomare
necessary ;
forinstance,
Imust
giveupmy
'
freedom
'
toattack,
ifIwantthestateto
support
defence
againstany
attack.ButIdemandthatthe
fundamental
purpose
ofthestateshouldnotbelost
sight
of
;
I
mean,the
protection
ofthatfreedomwhichdoesnotharmother
citizens.ThusIdemandthatthestatemustlimitthefreedom
ofthecitizensas
equally
as
possible,
andnot
beyondnecessity.
Something
likethiswillbethedemandofthehumanitarian,
ofthe
equalitarian,
oftheindividualist. Itisademandwhich
permits
thesocial
technologist
to
approachpoliticalproblems
rationally,
i.e.fromthe
point
ofviewofa
fairly
clearanddefinite
aim.
Against
theclaimthatanaimlikethiscanbeformulated

CHAPTER6:TOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 97
sufficiently clearlyand
definitely,manyobjections
havebeen
raised. Ithasbeensaidthatonceitis
recognized
thatfreedom
mustbe
limited,
thewhole
principle
offreedombreaksdown,
andthe
question
whatlimitationsare
necessary
andwhatare
wantoncannotbedecided
rationally,
but
onlybyauthority.
Butthis
objection
isduetoamuddle. Itmixes
up
thefunda-
mental
question
ofwhatwewantfromastatewithcertain
importanttechnological
difficultiesintheway
oftherealization
ofouraims. Itis
certainly
difficulttodetermine
exactly
the
degree
offreedomthatcanbelefttothecitizenswithout
endanger-
ing
thatfreedomwhose
protection
isthetaskofthestate.But
that
something
likean
approximate
determinationofthat
degree
is
possible,
is
provedbyexperience,
i.e.
by
theexistenceof
democraticstates.In
fact,
this
process
of
approximate
determina-
tionisoneofthemaintasksof
legislation
indemocracies. It
isadifficult
process,
butitsdifficultiesare
certainly
notsuchasto
force
upon
usa
change
inourfundamentaldemands.They
are
stated
briefly,
thatthestateshouldbeconsideredasa
society
forthe
prevention
of
crime,
i.e.
aggression.Andthewhole
objection
thatitishardtoknowwherefreedomendsandcrime
begins
isanswered,in
principle,by
thefamous
story
ofthe
hooliganwho
protestedthat,being
afreecitizen,hecouldmove
hisfistin
any
directionheliked
;whereupon
the
judgewisely
replied
:
*
Thefreedomofthemovementof
your
fistsislimited
by
the
position
of
yourneighbour's
nose.'
TheviewofthestatewhichIhavesketchedheremay
be
called
'
jjrotectioni^gi/
.Theterm
'
protectionism
'
hasoften
beenusedtodescribetendencieswhichare
opposed
tofreedom.
Thustheeconomistmeans
byprotectionism
the
policy
of
protect-
ing
certainindustrial interests
againstcompetition ;andthe
moralistmeans
by
itthedemandthatofficersofthestateshall
establishamoral
tutelage
overthe
population. Although
the
politicaltheory
whichIcall
protectionism
isnotconnectedwith
any
ofthesetendencies,and
although
itis
fundamentally
a
liberal
theory,
Ithinkthatthenamemay
beusedtoindicate
that,thoughliberal,
ithas
nothing
todowiththe
policy
of
laissezfaire.
Liberalismandstate-interference arenot
opposed
toeachother.Onthe
contrary,any
kindoffreedomis
clearly
impossible
unlessitis
guaranteedby
thestate.Acertainamount
ofstatecontrolineducation
42
,
forinstance,
is
necessary,
ifthe
young
aretobe
protected
froma
neglect
whichwouldmake
themunabletodefendtheirfreedom,andthestateshouldsee

98
PLATO'SPOLITICS
thatalleducationalfacilitiesareavailableto
everybody.
Buttoo
muchstatecontrolineducationalmatters isafatal
danger
to
freedom,
since itmustleadtoindoctrination. As
already
indicated,the
important
anddifficult
question
ofthelimitations
offreedomcannotbesolvedby
acutanddriedformula.And
thefactthattherewill
always
beborderline casesmustbe
welcomed,
forwithoutthestimulusof
politicalstruggles
ofthis
kind,thecitizens'readinessto
fight
fortheirfreedomwouldsoon
disappear,
andwith
it,
theirfreedom.
(Viewed
inthis
light,
the
alleged
clashbetweenfreedomand
security,
that
is,a
security
guaranteedby
the
state,turnsouttobeachimera. Forthereis
nofreedomifitisnotsecured
by
thestate
;and
conversely,
only
astatewhichiscontrolled
by
freecitizenscanofferthem
any
reasonable
security
at
all.)
Statedinthis
way,
the
protectionisttheory
ofthestateisfree
from
any
elementsofhistoricismoresscntialism. Itdoesnot
Dimply
thatthestate
originated
asanassociationofindividuals
witha
protectionist
aim
;nordoesit
imply
that
any
actual
statein
history
wasever
consciously
ruledinaccordancewiththis
aim. It
saysnothing
aboutthetruenatureofthe
state,nor
aboutthenatural
right
tofreedom.Nordoesitmaintain
anything
abouttheway
inwhichstates
actually
function. It
formulatesa
political
demand. I
suspect,however,thatmany
conventionalistswhohavedescribedthestateas
originatedfrom
anassociation forthe
protection
ofitsmembers,intendedto
express
this
verydemand,thoughthey
diditina
clumsy
and
misleadingway.Asimilar
misleadingway
of
expressing
this
demandistoassertthatitis
essentially
thefunctionofthestate
to
protect
itsmembers
;ortoassertthatthestateistobedefined
asanassociationformutual
protection.
Allthesetheoriesmust
betranslated,asitwere,intothe
language
ofdemandsfor
political
actionsbefore
they
canbe
seriously
discussed. Otherwise,
endlessdiscussionsofa
merely
verbalcharacterareunavoidable.
An
example
ofsuchatranslationmay
be
given.Acertain
typical
criticismofwhatIcall
protectionism,
hasbeen
proffered
by
Aristotle
43
,and
repeatedbyBurke,andbymanymodern
Platonists. Thiscriticismmaintainsthat
protectionism
takestoo
meanaviewofthetasksofthestatewhichis
(using
Burke's
words)
*
tobelooked
upon
withotherreverence,because itisnota
partnership
in
things
subservient
only
tothe
gross
animalexistence
ofa
temporary
and
perishable
nature '.Inotherwords,the
stateis
somethinghigher
ornoblerthananassociationwith

CHAPTER6 ITOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 99
rationalends
;
itisan
object
of
worship.
Ithas
higher
tasks
thanthe
protection
ofhuman
beings
andtheir
rights.
Ithas
moraltasks.
c
Totakecareofvirtueisthebusinessofastate
which
truly
deservesthisname
',says
Aristotle. Ifwenow
try
totranslatethiscriticismintothe
language
of
politicaldemands,
thenwefindthatthese
people
wanttwo
things. First,they
wishtomakethestatean
object
of
worship.Fromour
point
of
view,thereis
nothing
to
sayagainst
thiswish. Itisa
religious
problem,
andthe
state-worshippers
mustsolveforthemselveshow
they
canreconciletheircreedwiththeFirstCommandment.
Theseconddemandis
political.
In
practice,
thisdemandwould
simply
meanthatofficersofthestateshouldbeconcernedwith
the
morality
ofthe
citizens,andthat
they
shouldusetheir
power
notsomuchforthe
protection
ofthe
people
asforthecontrol
oftheirmorallife.Inotherwords,
itisthedemandthattherealm
of
legality,
i.e.ofstate-enforcednorms,shouldbeincreasedat
the
expense
oftherealmof
moralityproper,
i.e.ofnormsenforced
not
by
thestatebutby
ourownmoraldecisions. Butthosewho
raisesuchdemands
apparently
donotseethatthiswouldbethe
endoftheindividual'smoral
responsibility,
andthatitwould
not
improve
but
destroy
all
morality.
Itwould
replacepersonal
responsibilityby
tribalistictaboosand
by
thetotalitarian irre-
sponsibility
oftheindividual.
Against
thiswhole
attitude,the
individualistmustmaintainthatthe
morality
ofstates
(if
there
is
any
such
thing)
tendstobe
considerably
lowerthanthatof
the
averagecitizen,sothatitismuchmoredesirablethatthe
morality
ofthestateshouldbecontrolled
by
thecitizensthanthe
opposite.
Whatweneedandwhatwewant istomoralize
politics,
andnotto
politicizemorajs.
*
Itshouldbementionedthatlromthe
protectionistpoint
of
view,the
existing
democratic
states,though
farfrom
perfect,
represent
a
very
considerableachievementinsocial
engineering
ofthe
right
kind.Many
formsofcrime,ofattackonthe
rights
ofhumanindividualsby
otherindividuals,havebeen
practically
suppressed
or
veryconsiderablyreduced,andcourtsoflaw
administer
justicefairlysuccessfully
indifficultconflictsofinterest.
Therearemanywhothinkthattheextensionofthesemethods
44
tointernationalcrimeandinternationalconflictis
only
a
Utopian
dream
;butitisnotso
long
sincetheinstitutionofaneffective
executivefor
upholding
civil
peaceappearedUtopian
tothose
whosufferedunderthethreatsof
criminals,
incountrieswhere
at
present
civil
peace
is
quitesuccessfully
maintained.AndI

IOO PLATOSPOLITICS
thinkthatthe
engineeringproblems
ofthecontrolofinternational
crimeare
really
notso
difficult,once
they
are
squarelyand
rationally
faced. Ifthematteris
presentedclearly,
itwillnot
behardto
getpeople
to
agree
that
protective
institutionsare
necessary,
bothona
regional
andonaworld-wide scale.Let
the
state-worshippers
continueto
worship
the
state,butdemand
thattheinstitutional
technologists
beallowednot
only
to
improve
itsinternal
machinery,
butalsotobuild
up
an
organization
for
the
prevention
ofinternational crime.
Returningnowtothe
history
ofthesemovements,
itseemsthat
the
protectionisttheory
ofthestatewasfirst
profferedby
the
SophistLycophron,
a
pupil
of
Gorgias.
Ithas
already
been
mentionedthathewas
(likeAlcidamas,
alsoa
pupil
of
Gorgias)
oneofthefirsttoattackthe
theory
ofnaturalprivilege.That
heheldthe
theory
Icall
protectionism
isrecorded
byAristotle,
who
speaks
abouthiminamannerwhichmakesit
verylikely
thathe
originated
it.Fromthesamesourcewelearnthathe
formulated itwitha
clarity
whichhas
hardly
beenattained
by
any
ofhissuccessors.
Aristotletellsusthat
Lycophron
consideredthelawofthe
stateasa
*
covenantby
whichmenassureoneanotherof
justice
'
(and
thatithasnotthe
power
tomakecitizens
good
or
just).
Hetellsusfurthermore
45
that
Lycophron
looked
upon
thestate
asaninstrumentforthe
protection
ofitscitizens
against
actsof
injustice(and
for
permitting
them
peacefulintercourse,especially
exchange),demanding
thatthestateshouldbea
c
co-operative
associationforthe
prevention
ofcrime'.Itis
interesting
that
thereisnoindicationinAristotle'saccountthat
Lycophron
expressed
his
theory
inahistoricistform,
i.e.asa
theory
concern-
ing
thehistorical
origin
ofthestateinasocialcontract.Onthe
contrary,
it
emergesclearly
fromAristotle'scontext
(for
he
argues
thatitisrathertheessentialendofthestatetomakeitscitizens
virtuous)
that
Lycophron'stheory
was
solely
concernedwiththe
endofthestate.Andweseethathe
interpreted
thisend
rationally,
froma
technological point
ofview,adopting
the
demandsof
equalitarianism, individualism,-and
protectionism.
Inthisform,Lycophron'stheory
is
completely
securefrom
the
objections
towhichthetraditional historicist
theory
ofthe
socialcontract is
exposed.
Ithasbeenoftenmaintained, for
instanceby
Barker
46
,thatthecontract
theory
*
hasbeenmet
by
modernthinkers
pointbypoint
'.Thatmay
beso
;buta
survevofBarker'spointswillshowthatthevcertainlydonot

CHAPTER6tTOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE
IOI
meetthe
theory
of
Lycophron,
inwhomBarkerlike
myself
sees
the
probable
founderoftheearliestformofa
theory
whichhas
laterbeencalledthecontract
theory.
Barker's
pointscanbe
setdownasfollows :
(a)
Therewas,historically,
neveracontract
;
(b)
thestatewas,historically,
neverinstituted
;(c)
lawsarenot
conventional,butariseoutof
tradition,superiorforce,perhaps
instinct,
etc.
;they
arecustomsbefore
they
becomecodes
;
(d)
the
strength
oflawsdoesnotlieinthe
sanctions,inthe
protectivepower
ofthestatewhichenforcesthem,butinthe
individual'sreadinessto
obeythem,
i.e.intheindividual'smoral
will.
Itwillbeseenatoncethat
objections (a),(b),
and
(^),
although
inthemselves
quitetrue,concernthe
theoryonly
inits
historicistformandareirrelevantto
Lycophron's
version.We
thereforeneednotconsiderthematall.
Objection (rf),however,
deservescloserconsideration. Whatcanbemeant
by
it?The
theory
attackedstressesthe
'
will
',orbetterthedecisionofthe
individual,morethan
any
other
theory ;
in
fact,theword
'
contract
'
suggests
an
agreementby
c
freewill'.The
only
explanation
ofBarker's
objection
seemstomethathedoesnot
thinkthecontractto
spring
fromthe
*
moralwill
'
ofthe
individual,butratherfromaselfishwill
;andthis
interpretation
isthemore
likely
asitisin
keeping
withPlato'scriticism.But
oneneednotbeselfishtobea
protectionist.
Protectionneed
notmean
self-protection ;manypeople
insuretheirliveswiththe
aimof
protecting
othersandnotthemselves,andinthesameway
theymaydemandstate
protectionmainly
for
others,andtoa
lesser
degree
forthemselves.Thefundamentalideaof
protec-
tionismis:
protect
theweakfrom
being
bullied
by
the
strong.
Thisdemandhasbeenraisednot
onlyby
theweak,butoften
by
the
strong
also. It
is,
to
say
theleastof
it,misleading
to
suggest
thatitisaselfishoranimmoraldemand.
Lycophron'sprotectionism is,
Ithink,
freeofallthese
objec-
tions. Itisthemost
fittingexpression
ofthehumanitarianand
equalitarianmovementofthePericlean
age.And
yet,wehave
beenrobbedofit. Ithasbeenhandeddowntolater
generations
only
inadistortedform
;asthehistoricist
theory
ofthe
origin
ofthestateinasocialcontract
;orasanessentialisttheory
claiming
thatthetruenatureofthestateisthatofaconvention
;
andasa
theory
of
selfishness,basedonthe
assumption
ofthe
fundamentallyimmoralnatureofman. Allthisisduetothe
overwhelming
influenceofPlato's
authority.

102 PLATOSPOLITICS
TherecanbelittledoubtthatPlatoknew
Lycophron'stheory
well,
forhewas
(in
all
likelihood)Lycophron'syounger
contem-
porary.And,indeed,
this
theory
canbe
easily
identifiedwith
onewhichismentionedfirstinthe
Gorgias
andlaterinthe
Republic.
(In
neither
place
doesPlatomention itsauthor
;a
procedure
often
adoptedby
himwhenhis
opponent
was
alive.)
Inthe
Gorgias,
the
theory
is
expoundedbyCallicles,anethicalnihilist
likethe
Thrasymachus
ofthe
Republic.
Inthe
Republic,
itis
expoundedby
Glaucon. Inneithercasedoesthe
speaker
identify
himselfwiththe
theory
he
presents.
Thetwo
passages
areinmanyrespectsparallel.
Both
present
the
theory
inahistoricistform,
i.e.asa
theory
ofthe
origin
of
*
justice'.
Both
present
itasifits
logicalpremises
wereneces-
sarily
selfishandevennihilistic
;
i.e.asifthe
protectionist
view
ofthestatewouldbemaintained
onlyby
thosewhowouldlike
toinflict
injustice,
butaretooweaktodo
so,andwho
therefore
demandthatthe
strong
shouldnotdosoeither
;
a
presentation
whichis
certainly
not
fair,sincethe
onlynecessarypremise
ofthe
theory
isthedemandthatcrime,or
injustice,
shouldbe
suppressed.
So
far,thetwo
passages
inthe
Gorgias
andinthe
Republic
run
parallel,
a
parallelism
whichhasoftenbeencommented
upon.
Butthereisatremendousdifferencebetweenthemwhichhas,
sofarasIknow,beenoverlooked
by
commentators. Itisthis.
Inthe
Gorgias,
the
theory
is
presentedby
Calliclesasonewhich
he
opposes ;andsincehealso
opposesSocrates,
the
protec
jomst
theory is,byimplication,
notattackedbutratherdefendedby
Plato.And,indeed,acloserviewshowsthatSocrates
upholds
severalofitsfeatures
against
thenihilistCallicles. Butinthe
Republic,
thesame
theory
is
presentedby
Glauconasanelabora-
tionand
development
oftheviewsof
Thrasymachus,
i.e.ofthe
nihilistwhotakesherethe
place
ofCallicles
;
inotherwords,
the
theory
is
presented
as
nihilist,andSocratesastheherowho
victoriouslydestroys
thisdevilishdoctrineofselfishness.
Thusthe
passages
inwhichmostcommentators finda
similaritybetweenthetendenciesofthe
Gorgias
andthe
Republic
reveal,
in
fact,a
completechange
offront.In
spite
ofCallicles'
hostile
presentation,
the
tendency
ofthe
Gorgias
isratherfavourable
to
protectionism ;butthe
Republic
is
violentlyagainst
it.
HereisanextractfromCallicles'
speech
inthe
Gorgias
*7
:
*
Thelawsaremade
by
themultitude,whichconsistsoftheweak
men.And
theymakethelaws . .inorderto
protect
them-
selvesandtheirinterests.Thus
they
deterthe
strongermen . .

CHAPTER6 ITOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE 103
and
generally
thosewhomightget
thebetterofthem,from
doing
so
;
. .and
theymeanby
theword
"
injustice
"
the
attempt
of
amanto
get
thebetterofhis
neighbours ;and
beingawareof
their
inferiority,theyare,
Ishould
say,only
too
glad
if
they
can
obtain
equality.
5
Ifwelookatthisaccountandeliminatewhat
isduetoCallicles'
open
scornand
hostility,
thenwefindallthe
elementsof
Lycophron'stheory
:
equalitarianism, individualism,
and
protection againstinjustice.
Eventhereference tothe
'
strong
'
andtothe
'
weak
'
whoareawareoftheir
inferiority
fitsthe
protectionist
view
very
wellindeed,provided
theelement
ofcaricature isallowedfor. Itisnotatall
unlikely
that
Lyco-
phron's
doctrine
explicitly
raisedthedemandthatthestate
should
protect
theweak,ademandwhich
is,of
course,anything
but
ignoble. (Thehope
thatthisdemand willone
day
be
fulfilledis
expressedby
theChristian
teaching
:
e
Themeekshall
inheritthe
earth.')
Callicleshimselfdoesnotlike
protectionism ;heisinfavour
ofthe
'
natural
'
rights
ofthe
stronger.
Itis
verysignificant
that
Socrates,
inhis
argumentagainstCallicles,comestotherescue
ofthe
protectionist theory,
andthatheevenidentifies itwith
liisown
theory
thatitisbettertosuffer
injustice
thantoinflict
it.He
says,
forinstance
48
:
'
Arenotthemany
ofthe
opinion,
as
youwere
latelysaying,
that
justice
is
equality
?Andalso
thatitismore
disgraceful
toinflictthantosufferit?
'
And
later :
c
Thennature
itself,andnot
onlyconvention, affirms
thattoinflict
injustice
ismore
disgraceful
thantosuffer
it,and
that
justice
is
equality.' (Inspite
ofitsindividualisticand
equalitarian
and
protectionisttendencies,the
Gorgias
has
strongly
anti-democratic featurestoo.The
explanationmay
bethatPlato
when
writing
the
Gorgias
hadnot
yetdeveloped
histotalitarian
theories
;although
his
sympathies
were
alreadyanti-democratic,
hewasstillunderSocrates'influence.How
anybody
canthink
thatthe
Gorgiasandthe
Republic
canbebothatthesametime
trueaccountsofSocrates'
opinions,
Ifailto
understand.)
Letusnowturntothe
Republic,
whereGlaucon
presents
protectionism
asa
logically
more
stringentbut
ethically
un-
changed
versionof
Thrasymachus'
nihilism.
'
My
theme
',says
Glaucon
49
,
c
isthe
origin
of
justice,andwhatsortof
thing
it
really
is.
According
tosome,
toinflict
injusticeupon
othersis
by
natureanexcellent
thing,
andtosuffer
injustice
isbad.But
thebadnessof
sufferinginjusticemuchexceedsthe
desirability
of
inflicting
it.Foratime,then,menwillinflict
injusticeon

104
PLATO'SPOLITICS
oneanother,andofcoursesuffer
it,and
they
will
get
a
good
tasteofboth.But
ultimately,
thosewhoarenot
strongenough
to
repelit,orto
enjoyinflictingit,decidethatitismore
profitable
forthemto
join
inacontract,mutuallyassuring
oneanotherthat
nooneshouldinflict
injustice,
orsufferit.Thisisthe
way
in
whichlawswereestablished . .Andthisisthenatureand
the
origin
of
justice,according
tothat
theory.'
Asfarasitsrationalcontent
goes,
thisis
clearly
thesame
theory ;andtheway
inwhichitis
represented
alsoresemblesin
detail
50
Callicles'
speech
inthe
Gorgias.And
yet,
Platohasmade
a
completechange
offront.The
protectionisttheory
isnowno
longer
defended
against
the
allegation
thatitisbasedon
cynical
egoism ;onthe
contrary.Ourhumanitarian
sentiments,our
moral
indignation,already
aroused
byThrasymachus
5
nihilism,
areutilizedfor
turning
usintoenemiesof
protectionism.
This
theorywhosehumanitariancharacterhasbeenindicatedinthe
Gorgias,
isnowmadeby
Platoto
appear
asanti-humanitarian,
andindeed,
astheoutcomeofthe
repulsive
and
unplausible
doctrinethat
injustice
isa
verygoodthing
forthosewhocan
getaway
withit.Andhedoesnothesitatetorubthis
point
in.Inanextensivecontinuationofthe
passagequoted,
Glaucon
elaboratesinmuchdetailthe
allegedpremises
of
protectionism,
showing
thatitassumes,
for
instance,
thatthe
inflicting
of
injustice
is
c
thebestofall
things
'
51
;andthat
justice
isestablished
only
becausemanymenaretooweaktocommit
crimes,andthatto
theindividual
citizen,alifeofcrimewouldbemost
profitable.
And
'
Socrates
',
i.e.Plato,vouches
explicitly
52
fortheauthen-
ticity
ofGlaucon's
interpretation
ofthe
theorypresented.By
thismethod,Platoseemstohavesucceededin
persuading
most
ofhisreaders,andat
any
rateall
Platonists,thatthe
protectionist
theory
here
developed
isidenticalwiththeruthlessand
cynical
selfishnessof
Thrasymachus
63
;and,-whatismore
important,
thatallformsofindividualismamounttothesame,namely,
selfishness. Butitwasnot
only
hisadmirershe
persuaded ;he
evensucceededin
persuading
his
opponents,
and
especially
all
theadherentsofthecontract
theory.FromCarneades
54
to
Hobbes,theynot
onlyadopted
hisfatalhistoricist
presentation,
butalsoPlato'sassurancesthatthebasisoftheir
theory
isan
ethicalnihilism.
Nowitmustberealizedthattheelaborationofits
allegedly
selfishbasisisthewholeofPlato's
argumentagainstprotectionism
;
and
considering
the
space
takenupby
thiselaboration,wemay

CHAPTER6:TOTALITARIAN
JUSTICE
1
05
safely
assumethatitwasnothisreticencewhichmadehim
proffer
nobetter
argument,
butthefactthathehadnone.Thus
protectionism
hadtobedismissed
simply
asanaffront
against
theideaof
justice,and
against
our
feelings
of
decency.
ThisisPlato'smethodof
dealing
witha
theory
whichwasnot
only
a
dangerous
rivalofhisowndoctrinebuta
representative
ofthenewhumanitarianandindividualistic creed,
i.e.thearch-
enemy
of
everything
thatwasdeartoPlato.Themethod is
clever
;
its
astonishing
success
proves
it.ButIshouldnotbe
fairifIdidnot
frankly
admitthatPlato'smethod
appears
tome
dishonest. Forthe
theory
attackeddoesnotneed
anyassumption
moreimmoralthanthat
injustice
is
evil,
i.e.thatitshouldbe
avoided,and
brought
undercontrol.AndPlatoknew
quite
well
thatthe
theory
wasnotbasedon
selfishness,forinthe
Gorgiashe
had
presented
itnotasidenticalwiththenihilistic
theory
from
whichitis
e
derived
'
inthe
Republic,
butas
opposed
toit.
Summingup,
wecan
say
thatPlato's
theory
of
justice,
as
presented
inthe
Republic
andlaterworks,
isaconscious
attempt
to
get
thebetterofthe
equalitarian, individualistic,and
pro-
tectionisttendenciesofhis
time,andtore-establishtheclaimsof
tribalism
bydeveloping
atotalitarianmoral
theory.
Atthe
same
time,hewas
stronglyimpressedby
thenewhumanitarian
morality ;butinsteadof
combatingequalitarianism,
heavoided
even
discussing
it.Andhe
successfully
enlistedthehumanitarian
sentiments,whose
strength
heknewso
well,
inthecauseofthe
totalitarian classruleofa
naturallysuperior
masterrace.
Theseclass
prerogatives,
heclaimed,are
necessary
for
uphold-
ing
the
stability
ofthestate.They
constitutethereforetheessence
of
justice. Ultimately,
thisclaimisbased
upon
the
argument
that
justice
isusefultothe
might,health,and
stability
ofthe
state
;an
argument
whichis
only
toosimilartothemodern
totalitariandefinition :
right
iswhatever isusefultothe
might
ofmy
nation.
Butthisisnot
yet
thewhole
story.By
its
emphasis
onclass
prerogative,
Plato's
theory
of
justiceputs
the
problem
'
Who
shouldrule?
'
inthecentreof
politicaltheory.
His
reply
to
this
question
wasthatthe
wisest,andthe
best,shouldrule.Does
this
reply
notmodify
thecharacterofhis
theory
?

CHAPTER7:THEPRINCIPLEOFLEADERSHIP
Certain
objections
1
toour
interpretation
ofPlato's
political
programme
as
purely
totalitarianandbasedon
historicism,have
forcedusintoan
investigation
ofthe
partplayed,
withinthis
programme,by
suchmoralideasas
Justice,Goodness,Beauty,
Wisdom,Truth,and
Happiness.
The
present
andthenext
chapters
aretodeal
mainly
withthe
politicalpartplayedby
theseideasinPlato's
philosophy,
the
presentmainly
withWisdom.
WehaveseenthatPlato'sideaof
justicedemands,funda-
mentally,
thatthenaturalrulersshouldruleandthenatural
slavesshouldslave.Thisis
part
ofthehistoricistdemandthat
thestate,inordertoarrestall
change,
should
copy
itsIdea,or
true
*
nature '.This
theory
of
justice
indicates
veryclearly
that
Platosawthefundamental
problem
of
politics
inthe
question
:
Whoshallrulethestate?
Itismy
convictionthatbyexpressing
the
problem
of
politics
intheform
c
Whoshouldrule?
'
or
'
Whosewillshouldbe
supreme
?
',etc.,Platocreateda
lasting
confusionin
political
philosophy.
Itisindeed
analogous
totheconfusionhecreated
inthefieldofmoral
philosophyby
his
identification,discussedin
thelast
chapter,
ofcollectivismandaltruism. Itisclearthat
oncethe
question
'
Whoshouldrule?
'
is
asked,
itishardto
avoidsomesuch
reply
as
'
thebest
'
or
'
thewisest
'
or
*
theborn
rulers
'
(or,perhaps,
*
The
People
'
or
c
TheGeneralWill
'
or
*
TheMasterRace
'
or
*
TheIndustrialWorkers
').Butsucha
reply,convincing
asitmay
sound forwhowouldadvocatethe
ruleof
'
theworst
'
or
'
the
stupid
'
or
*
thebornslave
'
?
is,
as
Ishall
try
toshow,quite
useless.
Firstof
all,sucha
reply
isliableto
persuade
usthatsome
fundamental
problem
of
politicaltheory
hasbeensolved.But
ifwe
approachpoliticaltheory
fromadifferent
angle,
thenwe
findthatfarfrom
solvingany
fundamental
problems,wehave
merelyskipped
overthem,byassuming
thatthe
question
c
Who
shouldrule?
'
isfundamental. Foreventhosewhosharethis
assumption
ofPlato'sadmitthat
political
rulersarenot
always
sufficiently
c
good
'
or
*
wise
'
(we
neednot
worry
aboutthe
precisemeaning
ofthese
terms),
andthatitisnotatall
easy
to
get
a
government
onwhose
goodness
andwisdomonecan
implicitly rely.
Ifthatis
granted,
thenwemustaskwhether
106

CHAPTER
7
:LEADERSHIP
107
politicalthought
shouldnotfacefromthe
beginning
the
possibility
ofbad
government ;whetherweshouldnot
prepare
forthe
worst
leaders,and
hope
forthebest.Butthisleadstoanew
approach
tothe
problem
of
politics,
foritforcesusto
replace
the
question
:Whoshouldrule?
by
thenew
2
question
:Howcan
we
organizepolitical
institutionssothatbador
incompetent
rulerscanbe
preventedfromdoing
toomuch
damage?
Thosewhobelievethattheolder
question
isfundamental,
tacitly
assumethat
politicalpower
is
'
essentially
'
unchecked.
They
assumethatsomeonehasthe
power
eitheranindividual
oracollective
body,
suchasaclass.And
they
assumethathe
whohasthe
powercan,verynearly,
dowhathe
wills,and
especially
thathecan
strengthen
his
power,
and
therebyapproxi-
mateitfurthertoanunlimitedorunchecked
power.They
assumethat
politicalpower is,essentially, sovereign.
Ifthis
assumption
ismade,then,indeed,the
question
*
Whoistobe
the
sovereign
?
'
isthe
onlyimportantquestion
left.
Ishallcallthis
assumption
the
theory
of
sovereignty,using
this
expression
notfor
anyparticular
oneofthevarioustheories
of
sovereignty, proffered
more
especiallyby
suchwritersas
Bodin,Rousseau,or
Hegel,
butforthemore
generalassumption
that
politicalpower
is
practicallyunchecked,orforthedemand
thatit
ought
tobeso
;together
withthe
implication
thatthe
main
question
leftisto
get
this
power
intothebesthands.This
theory
of
sovereignty
is
tacitly
assumedinPlato's
approach,
and
has
played
itsroleeversince. Itisalso
implicitlyassumed,
for
instance,by
thosemodernwriterswhobelievethatthemain
problem
is :Whoshoulddictate?The
capitalists
ortheworkers?
Without
entering
intoadetailed
criticism,
Iwishto
point
out
thatthereareserious
objectionsagainst
arashand
implicit
acceptance
ofthis
theory.
Whatever its
speculative
meritsmay
appear
to
be,
itis
certainly
a
very
unrealistic
assumption.No
politicalpower
haseverbeenunchecked,andas
long
asmen
remainhuman
(aslong
asthe
'
BraveNewWorld
'
hasnot
materialized),
therecanbenoabsoluteandunrestrained
political
power.
So
long
asonemancannotaccumulate
enoughphysical
power
inhishandstodominate allothers,just
so
long
must
he
dependupon
his
helpers.
Eventhemost
powerfultyrant
dependsupon
hissecret
police,
hishenchmenandhis
hangmen.
This
dependence
meansthathis
power,great
asitmaybe,
is
notunchecked,andthathehastomake
concessions,playing
one
group
off
against
another. Itmeansthatthereareother

io8 PLATO'SPOLITICS
politicalforces,other
powers
besideshisown,andthathecan
exerthisrule
onlyJayutilizing
and
pacifying
them.Thisshows
thateventheextremecasesof
sovereignty
arenevercasesof
pure
sovereignty. They
arenevercasesinwhichthewillorthe
interestofoneman
(or,
ifthereweresucha
thing,
thewillor
theinterestofone
group)
canachievehisaim
directly,
without
givingup
someofitinordertoenlist
powers
whichhecannot
conquer.Andinan
overwhelming
numberof
cases,thelimita-
tionsof
politicalpowergomuchfurtherthanthis.
Ihavestressedthese
empiricalpoints,
notbecauseIwishto
usethemasan
argument,
but
merely
inordertoavoid
objections.
My
claimisthat
everytheory
of
sovereignty
omitstofaceamore
fundamental
question
the
question,namely,
whetherweshould
notstrivetowardsinstitutionalcontroloftherulersbybalancing
their
powersagainst
other
powers.
Thisbalance
theory
canat
leastclaimcarefulconsideration. The
onlyobjections
tothis
claim,
asfarasIcan
see,
are
(a)
thatsuchacontrolis
practically
impossible,
or
(b)
thatitis
essentially
inconceivablesince
political
power
is
essentiallysovereign
3
.These
dogmaticobjectionsare,
I
believe,
refuted
by
thefacts
(and
withthem,forinstance,the
theory
thatthe
only
alternativetothe
dictatorship
ofoneclass
isthatofanother
class).
Inordertoraisethe
question
ofinstitutionalcontrolofthe
rulers,weneednotassumemorethanthat
governments
arenot
alwaysgood
orwise.ButsinceIhavesaid
something
about
historical
facts,
IthinkIshouldconfessthatIfeelinclinedto
go
a
little
beyond
this
assumption.
Iaminclinedtothinkthatrulers
have
rarely
beenabovethe
average,
eithermorally
orintel-
lectually,andoftenbelowit.AndIthinkthatitisreasonable
to
adopt,
in
politics,
the
principle
of
preparing
aswellaswecan
fortheworst,thoughweshould,of
course,
atthesametime
try
to
get
thebest. It
appears
tomemadnesstobaseallour
political
efforts
upon
thefaint
hope
thatweshallbesuccessfulin
obtaining
excellent,oreven
competent
rulers.
Strongly
asIfeelinthese
matters,
Imust
insist,however,thatmy
criticismofthe
theory
of
sovereignty
doesnot
depend
onthesemore
personalopinions.
Apart
fromthese
empiricalargumentsagainst
the
general
theory
of
sovereignty,
thereisalsoakindof
logicalargument
whichcanbeusedtoshowthe
inconsistency
of
any
ofthe
partic-
ularformsofthe
theory
of
sovereignty ;more
precisely,
the
logicalargument
canbe
given
differentbut
analogous
formsto
combatthe
theory
thatthewisestshould
rule,
orelsethetheories

CHAPTER
7
!LEADERSHIP
109
thattherulershouldbethe
best,orthelaw,orthe
majority,
etc.
One
particular
formofthis
logicalargument
thatisdirected
against
atoonaiveversionof
liberalism,of
democracy,andof
the
principle
thatthe
majority
should
rule,
issomewhatsimilar
tothewell-known
'
paradox
offreedom '.Ithasbeenused
first,
andwithsuccess,by
Plato.Inhiscriticismof
democracy,
and
inhis
story
oftheriseofthe
tyrant,
Platoraises
implicitly
the
followingquestion
:Whatifitisthewillofthe
people
that
they
shouldnotrule,buta
tyrant
instead?Thefreeman,Plato
suggests,may
exercisehisabsolutefreedom,
first
bydefying
the
lawsand
ultimatelybydefying
freedom
itself,and
byclamouring
fora
tyrant
4
.Thisisnot
just
afar-fetched
possibility ;
ithas
happened
anumberoftimes
;and
every
timeit
happens,
it
puts
thosedemocratswho
adopt
the
principle
of
majority
rule
orasimilarformofthe
principle
of
sovereignty
astheultimate
basisoftheir
political
creedina
hopeless
intellectual
position.
Ontheonehand,
their
principle
inducesthemto
opposeany
butthe
majorityrule,andthereforethenew
tyranny ;onthe
otherhand,thesame
principle
inducesthemto
acceptany
decisionofthe
majority,
andthustheruleofthenew
tyrant.The
inconsistency
oftheir
theorymust,ofcourse,paralyse
their
actions.
6Wedemocratswhodemandtheinstitutionalcontrol
oftherulers
by
the
public,including
the
right
of
dismissing
the
governmentbymajorityvote,mustthereforebasethesedemands
upon
better
grounds
thana
self-contradictorytheory
of
sovereignty.
(And,indeed,
itisnotdifficulttoformulateaconsistent
theory
ofdemocratic
control.)
Butinan
exactlyanalogousway,
itcanbeshownthat
any
other
particular
formofthe
theory
of
sovereigntymay
also
give
risetosimilarinconsistencies. Alltheories
ofsovereignty
are
para-
doxical.
,Forinstance,wemay
haveselected
c
thewisest
'
or
'
the
best
'
asaruler.But
'
thewisest
'
may
findinhiswisdomthat
nothe,but
'
thebest
'
should
rule,and
'
thebest
'
mayperhaps
decideinhis
goodness
that
c
the
majority
'
shouldrule
6
.Itis
important
tonoticethateventhatformofthe
theory
of
sovereignty
whichdemandsthe
'
Kingship
oftheLaw
'
is
open
tothesame
objection.
In
fact,
thishasbeenseen
veryearly,
asHeraclitus'
remark
7
shows :
'
Thelawcandemand,too,thatthewillof
OneManmustbe
obeyed.'
In
summingup
thisbriefcriticism,onecan,
I
believe,
assert
thatthe
theory
of
sovereignty
isboth
empirically
and
logically
in
aratherweak
position.
Thelegistthatcanbedemanded isthat

IIO PLATOSPOLITICS
itmustnotbe
adopted
withoutcarefulconsiderationofother
arguments.
Returning
to
Plato,wefindthat
by
his
emphasisupon
the
problem
*
whoshouldrule
',he
implicitly
assumedthe
general
theory
of
sovereignty.
The
question
ofaninstitutionalcontrol
ofthe
rulers,andofaninstitutional
balancing
oftheir
powers,
is
thereby
eliminatedwithoutever
having
beenraised.The
interestisshiftedfrominstitutionsto
questions
of
personnel,and
themost
urgentproblems
becomestheselectionofnaturalleaders,
andtheir
training
for
leadership.
Inviewofthisfactsome
people
thinkthatinPlato's
theory
thewelfareofthestateis
ultimately
anethicaland
spiritual
matter,depending
on
persons
and
personalresponsibility
rather
thanontheconstructionof
impersonal
institutions. Ibelieve
thatthisviewofPlatonism is
superficial.
All
long-termpolitics
is
institutional.
_
Thereisno
escape
fromthat,notevenforPlato.
The
principle
of
leadership
doesnot
replace
theinstitutional
problemsbyproblems
of
personnel,
it
only
createsnewinstitu-
tional
problems.
Asweshall
see,
itevenburdenstheinstitutions
withataskwhich
goesbeyond
whatcanbe
reasonablydemanded
fromamereinstitution,namely,
withthetask
ofselecting
the
future
leaders. Itwouldbethereforeamistaketothinkthatthe
opposition
betweenthebalance
theory
andthe
theory
of
sovereigntycorresponds
tothatbetweeninstitutionalism and
personalism.AndPlato's
principle
of
leadership
isfarremoved
froma
purepersonalism
sinceitinvolvesthe
working
ofinstitu-
tions.Indeed,
itmaybe
saidthata
purepersonalism
is
impossible.
Butitmustbesaidthata
pure
institutionalism is
impossible
too.
Not
only
doestheconstructionofinstitutionsinvolve
important
moraldecisions,butthe
functioning
ofeventhebestinstitutions
will
alwaysdepend,
toaconsiderable
degree,
onits
personnel.
Institutionsarelikefortresses.They
mustbewell
designed
and
manned.
Thisisoftenmisunderstood
by
thecriticsof
democracy.
Democracyprovides
theinstitutionalframeworkforthereform
of
political
institutions
(other
thanthis
framework).
Itmakes
possible
thereformofinstitutionswithout
usingviolence,and
thereby
theuseofreasoninthe
designing
ofnewinstitutionsand
the
adjusting
ofoldones. Itcannot
provide
reason.The
question
oftheintellectualandmoralstandardofitscitizensis
toa
largedegree
a
personalproblem. (The
ideathatthis
problem
canbe
tackled,in
turn,by
aninstitutional
eugenic
andeduca-

CHAPTER
7
:LEADERSHIP 111
tionalcontrol
is,
I
believe,mistaken
;somereasonsformy
beliefwillbe
givenbelow.)
Itis
quitewrong
toblame
democracy
forthe
politicalshortcomings
ofademocratic state.Weshould
ratherblameourselves. Inanon-democratic
state,
the
only
way
toachievereasonablereforms is
by
theviolentoverthrow
ofthe
government,
andtheintroductionofademocraticframe-
work.Thosewhocriticize
democracy
onany
'
moral
'
grounds
failto
distinguish
between
personal
andinstitutional
problems.
Itrestswithusto
improve
matters.Thedemocraticinstitutions
cannot
improve
themselves.The
problem
of
improving
themis
always
a
problem
of
persons
ratherthanofinstitutions. But
ifwewant
improvements,
wemustmakeclearwhichinstitutions
wewantto
improve.
There isanotherdistinctionwithinthefieldof
political
problems
,corresponding
tothatbetween
persons
andinstitutions.
Thereis
always
the
problem
ofthe
day
andthe
problem
ofthe
future.Whilethe
problems
ofthe
day
are
largelypersonal,
the
building
ofthefuturemust
necessarily
beinstitutional. Ifthe
politicalproblem
is
approachedbyasking
c
Whoshouldrule
',
andifPlato's
leader-principle
is
adopted,
thatisto
say,
the
principle
thatthebestshouldrule,thenthe
problem
ofthe
futuremusttaketheformof
designing
institutions forthe
selectionoffutureleaders.
Thisisoneofthemost
importantproblems
inPlato's
theory
ofeducation. In
approaching
itIdonothesitateto
say
that
Plato
utterlycorrupted
andconfusedthe
theory
and
practice
of
education
bylinking
it
up
withhis
theory
of
leadership.
The
damage
done
is,
if
possible,
even
greater
thanthatinflictedupon
ethics
by
theidentificationofcollectivismwithaltruism,and
upon
politicaltheoryby
theintroductionofthe
principle
of
sovereignty.
Plato's
assumption
thatitshouldbethetaskofeducation
(or
more
precisely,
oftheeducational
institutions)
toselectthefuture
leaders,andtotrainthemfor
leadership,
isstill
largely
takenfor
granted.Byburdening
theseinstitutionswithataskwhich
must
gobeyond
the
scope
of
anyinstitution,Plato is
partly
responsible
fortheir
deplorable
state.Butbefore
entering
intoa
general
discussionofhisviewofthetaskofeducation,
Iwishto
develop,
inmore
detail,
his
theory
of
leadership,
the
leadership
ofthewise.
Ithinkitmost
likely
thatthis
theory
ofPlato'sowesanumber
offeaturestotheinfluenceofSocrates.Oneofthefundamental
tenetsofSocrateswas,
I
believe,
hismoralintellectualism. By

ii2 PLATO'SPOLITICS
thisIunderstand
(a)
hisidentificationof
goodness
andwisdom,
his
theory
that
nobody
acts
against
hisbetter
knowledge,andthat
lackof
knowledge
is
responsible
forallmoralmistakes
;(b)
his
theory
thatmoralexcellencecanbe
taught,
andthatitdoesnot
presupposeanyparticular
moral
faculties,apart
fromthe
universalhuman
intelligence.
Socrateswasamoralistandan
enthusiast.Hewasthe
type
ofmanwhowouldcriticize
any
formof
government
forits
shortcomings (andindeed,such
criticismwouldbe
necessary
andusefulfor
anygovernment,
although
itis
possibleonly
undera
democracy)
buthe
recognized
the
importance
of
beingloyal
tothelawsofthestate.Asit
happened,
he
spent
hislife
largely
underademocraticformof
government,andasa
good
democrathefoundithis
duty
to
expose
the
incompetence
and
windbaggery
ofsomeofthe
democraticleadersofhistime.Atthesametime,he
opposed
any
formof
tyranny ;andifweconsiderhis
courageous
behaviour
underthe
ThirtyTyrants
8
,thenwehavenoreasontoassume
thathiscriticismofdemocraticleaderswas
inspiredby
anti-
democratic
leanings.He
only
demandedthatthemorallevel
bothofthecitizensandoftheirleadersshouldbe
improvedby
educationand
enlightenment.
Itisnot
unlikely
thathealso
demanded
(likePlato)
thatthebestshould
rule,whichwould
havemeant,
inhisview,the
wisest,orthosewhoknewsome-
thing
about
justice.
Butwemustrememberthat
byjustice
he
meant
equalitarianjustice(as
indicated
by
the
passages
fromthe
Gorgiasquoted
inthelast
chapter),
andthathewasnot
only
an
equalitarian
butalsoanindividualist
perhaps
the
greatest
apostle
ofanindividualistic ethicsofalltimes.Andwemust
alsobeclearthatifhedemandedthatthewisestshould
rule,he
clearly
stressedthathedidnotmeanthelearnedmen
;
in
fact,
hewas
sceptical
ofall
professionallearnedness,whether itwas
thatofthe
philosophers
ofthe
past
orofthelearnedmenofhis
own
generation,
the
Sophists.Thewisdomhemeantwasofa
differentkind. Itwas
simply
therealization :howlittledoI
know !Thosewhodonotknow
this,he
taught,
know
nothing
atall.
(This
isthetruescientific
spirit.
Some
people
still
think,
asPlatodidwhenhehadestablishedhimselfasalearned
Pythagorean
9
,thatSocrates'
agnostic
attitudemustbe
explained
by
thelackofsuccessofthescienceofhis
day.
Butthis
only
showsthat
they
donotunderstand this
spirit,
andthat
they
arestill
possessedby
the
pre-Socraticmagical
attitudetowards
science,andtowardsthescientist,whomtheyconsiderasa

CHAPTER
7
:LEADERSHIP
113
somewhat
glorifiedshaman,
as
wise,learned,initiated.They
judge
him
by
theamountof
knowledge
inhis
possession,
insteadof
taking,
withSocrates,hisawarenessofwhathedoesnotknow
asameasureofhisscientificlevelaswellasofhisintellectual
honesty.)
Itis
important
toseethatthisSocraticintellectualism is
decidedlyequalitarian.
Socratesbelievedthat
everyone
canbe
taught ;
intheMeno,weseehim
teaching
a
young
slavea
version
10
ofthenowso-calledtheoremof
Pythagoras,
inan
attempt
to
prove
that
any
uneducatedslavehasthe
capacity
to
grasp
evenabstractmatters.Andhisintellectualism isalso
anti-authoritarian. Whilea
technique,
forinstancerhetoric,
mayperhaps
be
dogmaticallytaughtby
an
expert,
realknow-
ledge,wisdom,andalsovirtue,canbe
taughtonlyby
amethod
describedby
Socratesasaformof
midwifery.
Those
eager
to
learnmay
be
helped
tofreethemselvesfromtheir
prejudice ;
thus
theymay
learn
self-criticism,andthattruthisnot
easily
attained. But
theymay
alsolearntomake
up
theirmind,and
to
rely,critically,
ontheirdecisions,andontheir
insight.
In
viewofsuch
teaching,
itisclearhowmuchtheSocraticdemand
(if
heeverraisedthis
demand)
thatthe
best,
i.e.the
intellectually
honest,should
rule,
differsfromtheauthoritariandemandthat
themostlearned,orfromthearistocraticdemandthatthebest,
i.e.themostnoble,shouldrule.
(Socrates'
beliefthateven
courage
iswisdomcan,
I
think,be
interpreted
asadirectcriticism
ofthearistocraticdoctrineofthe
nobly
born
hero.)
Butthismoralintellectualism ofSocrates isa
two-edged
sword. Ithasits
equalitarian
anddemocratic
aspect,
which
waslater
developedby
Antisthenes. Butithasalsoan
aspect
whichmaygive
riseto
strongly
anti-democratic tendencies. Its
stress
upon
theneedfor
enlightenment,
foreducation,might
easily
be
misinterpreted
asademandforauthoritarianism. This
isconnectedwitha
question
whichseemstohave
puzzled
Socratesa
great
deal :thatthosewhoarenot
sufficiently
educated,andthusnotwise
enough
toknowtheirdeficiencies,
are
just
thosewhoareinthe
greatest
needofeducation. Readi-
nesstolearninitself
proves
the
possession
ofwisdom,infactall
thewisdomclaimed
by
Socratesforhimself
;
forhewhois
ready
tolearnknowshowlittleheknows.Theuneducatedseemsthus
tobeinneedofan
authority
towakehim
up,
sincehecannot
be
expected
tobeself-critical. Butthisoneelementofauthori-
tarianismwas
wonderfully
balancedinSocrates'
teachingby
the

ii4
PLATO'SPOLITICS
emphasis
thatthe
authority
mustnotclaimmorethanthat.
Thetrueteachercan
prove
himself
onlybyexhibiting
thatself-
criticismwhichtheuneducated lacks.
'
Whatever
authority
I
may
haverests
solelyuponmyknowinghowlittleIknow
3
:
thisistheway
inwhichSocrates
might
have
justified
hismission
tostir
up
the
people
fromtheir
dogmatic
slumber. This
educationalmissionhebelievedtobealsoa
political
mission.
Hefeltthattheway
to
improve
the
political
lifeofthe
city
was
toeducatethecitizenstoself-criticism. Inthissenseheclaimed
tobe
'
the
onlypolitician
ofhis
day
'
11
>
in
opposition
tothose
otherswhoflatterthe
people
insteadof
furthering
theirtrue
interests.
ThisSocraticidentificationofhiseducationaland
political
activity
could
easily
bedistortedintothePlatonicandAristotelian
demandthatthestateshouldlookafterthemorallifeofits
citizens.Anditcan
easily
beusedfora
dangerouslyconvincing
proof
thatalldemocraticcontrolisvicious.Forhowcanthose
whosetaskitistoeducatebe
judgedby
theuneducated?How
canthebetterbecontrolledby
theless
good
?Butthis
argument
is,of
course,entirely
un-Socratic. Itassumesan
authority
of
thewiseandlearnedman,and
goes
far
beyond
Socrates'modest
ideaoftheteacher's
authority
asfounded
solely
onhiscon-
sciousness ofhisownlimitations.
State-authority
inthese
mattersisliableto
achieve,
in
fact,theexact
opposite
ofSocrates'
aim. Itisliableto
producedogmatic
self-satisfaction and
massiveintellectual
complacency,
insteadofcriticaldissatisfaction
and
eagerness
for
improvement.
Idonotthinkthatitis
unnecessary
tostressthis
danger
whichisseldom
clearly
realized.
EvenanauthorlikeGrossman,oneofthefew,
I
believe,who
understoodthetrueSocratic
spirit,agrees
12
withPlatoinwhat
hecallsPlato'sthirdcriticismofAthens :
*
Education,whichshould
bethe
majorresponsibilityof
the
State,hadbeenlefttoindividual
caprice
. .Here
againwasataskwhichshouldbeentrusted
only
tothemanof
provenprobity.
Thefutureof
any
State
depends
onthe
youngergeneration,anditisthereforemadness
toallowthemindsofchildrentobemouldedby
individualtaste
andforceofcircumstances.
Equally
disastroushadbeenthe
State'slaissezfairepolicy
with
regard
toteachersandschool-
mastersand
sophist-lecturers.'
13
In
reply,
I
mayperhaps
emphasize,
firstof
all,that,as
long
asitlasted,theAthenian
state's laissezfairepolicy,
criticized
byGrossman,hadthe
invaluableresultof
enabling
certain
sophist-lecturers
toteach,

CHAPTER
7
ILEADERSHIP
115
and
especially
the
greatest
ofthem
all,Socrates.Andwhenthis
policy
was
dropped
lateron,theresultwasSocrates'death.
Thisshouldbeaclear
warning
thatstatecontrolinsuchmatters
is
dangerous,
andthatthe
cry
forthe
'
manof
provenprobity
'
mayeasily
leadtothe
suppression
ofthebest.
(Bertrand
Russell's
recent
suppression
isacasein
point.)
Butasfarasbasic
principles
areconcerned,wehavehereaninstanceofthe
deeply
rooted
prejudice
thatthe
only
alternative tolaissezfaire
isfull
state
responsibility.
Ibelieveitis
certainly
the
responsibility
of
thestateto
give
itscitizensaneducationwhichenablesthemto
cope
withthedemandsof
life,andfurthermore,
to
proceed
to
ascientific
training(should
thisbe
desirable) ;andthestate
should
certainly
alsosee
(as
Grossman
rightlystresses)
thatthe
lackof
c
theindividual's
capacity
to
pay
'
shouldnotdebarhim
from
higher
studies. This,
I
believe,belongs
tothestate's
protective
functions.To
say,however,that
'
thefutureofthe
state
depends
ontheyoungergeneration,
andthatitistherefore
madnesstoallowthemindsofchildrentobemouldedby
individualtaste
*,appears
tometo
open
widethedoortototali-
tarianism. Stateinterestmustnotbe
lightly
invokedtodefend
measureswhichmayendanger
themost
precious
ofallforms
offreedom,namely,
intellectual freedom.And
although
I
amfarfromrecommending
*
laissezfaire
with
regard
toteachers
andschoolmasters
',
Ibelievethatthis
policy
is
infinitelysuperior
toanauthoritative
policy
that
gives
officersofthestatefull
powers
tomouldtheminds,andtocontrolthe
teaching
of
science,
therebybacking
thedubious
authority
ofthe
expertby
thatof
the
state,ruining
science
by
the
customarypractice
of
teaching
itasanauthoritative doctrine,and
destroying
thescientific
spirit
of
inquiry,
the
spirit
ofthesearchfortruth,
as
opposed
to
possession.
IhavetriedtoshowthatSocrates'intellectualism isfunda-
mentallyequalitarian
andindividualistic,andthattheelement
ofauthoritarianismwhichitinvolvedwasreducedtoaminimum
by
Socrates'intellectual
modesty
andhisscientificattitude.Very
differentfromthisistheintellectualismofPlato.ThePlatonic
*
Socrates
'
ofthe
Republic
14
istheembodimentofan
unmitigated'
authoritarianism.. (Even
his
self-deprecating
remarksarenot
Based
upon
awarenessofhislimitations,butareratheranironical
way
of
asserting
his
superiority.)
Hiseducationalaimisnot
the
awakening
ofself-criticismandofcriticalthought
in
general.
It
is,rather,indoctrination,
the
moulding
ofmindswhichare

ii6 PLATO'SPOLITICS
(torepeat
a
quotation
fromtheLaws
15
)
*
bylong
habit . .to
become
utterlyincapable
of
doinganything
atall
independently
'.
AndSocrates'
greatequalitarian
and
liberating
ideathatitis
possible
toreasonwitha
slave,andthatthereisanintellectual
linkbetweenmanandman,amediumofuniversal
understanding,
namely,
*
reason
',
thisideais
replacedby
ademandforan
educational
monopoly
ofthe
rulingclass,coupled
withthe
strictest
censorship,
evenoforaldebates.
Socrateshadstressedthathewasnotwise
;thathewasnot
inthe
possession
oftruthorwisdom,butthathewasasearcher,
an
inquirer,
aloveroftruthandwisdom. This,he
explained,
is
expressedby
theword
*
philosopher
'
as
opposed
to
c
Sophist
'
(i.e.
the
professionally
wise
man).Wheneverheclaimedthat
statesmenshouldbe
philosophers,
hemeant
that,burdenedwith
anexcessive
responsibility, they
shouldbesearchersfor
truth,
consciousoftheirlimitations.
HowdidPlatoconvertthisdoctrine?Atfirst
sight,
it
might
appear
thathedidnotalteritat
all,when
demanding
thatthe
sovereignty
ofthestateshouldbeinvestedinthe
philosophers
;
especiallysince,
likeSocrates,hedefined
philosophers
asloversof
truth.Butthe
changemade
by
Platoisindeedtremendous.
Hisloverisno
longer
themodest
pecker,heisthe
proudpossessor
oftruth.Atraineddialectician,heis
capable
ofintellectual
intuition,
i.e.of
seeing
the
eternal,the
heavenly
FormsorIdeas.
Placed
high
aboveall
ordinarymen,heis
c
god-like,
ifnot . .
divine'
ie
,bothinhiswisdomandinTils
power.
Theideal
philosopherapproaches
bothtoomniscienceandto
omnipotence.
Heisthe
Philosopher-King.
Itishard,
I
think,
toconceivea
greater
contrastthanthatbetweentheSocraticandthePlatonic
idealofa
philosopher.
Itisthecontrastbetweentwoworlds
theworldsofthemodest,
rationalindividualistandofthe
totalitarian
demi-god.
Plato'sdemandthatthewisemanshouldrule,the
possessor
of
truth,the
*
fullyqualifiedphilosopher
'
17
,raises,ofcourse,the
problem
of
selecting
and
educating
therulers.Ina
purely
personalist
(as^opposed
toan
institutional) theory,
this
problem
might
besolved
simplybydeclaring
thatthewiserulerwillin
hiswisdombewiseenough
todeterminethebestsuccessor. But
thisisnota
verysatisfactoryapproach
tothe
problem.Too
muchwould
depend
onuncontrolledcircumstances
;anaccident
maydestroy
thefuture
stability
ofthestate.Butthe
attempt
to
controlcircumstances, toforeseewhat
mighthappen
andto

CHAPTER
7:
LEADERSHIP
Iiy
provide
for
it,mustleadhere,
as
everywhere,
tothe
replacement
ofa
purelypersonalist
solutionby
aninstitutional one.As
mentionedabove,the
attempt
to
plan
forthefuturemust
always
leadtoinstitutionalism.
Theinstitutionwhich
according
toPlatohastolookafter
thefutureleaderscanbedescribedastheeducational
department
ofthestate. It
is,froma
purelypoliticalpoint
of
view,by
far
themost
important
institutionwithinPlato's
society.
Itholds
the
keys
to
power.
Forthisreasonaloneitshouldbeclear
thatatleastthe
highergrades
ofeducationaretobe
directly
controlled
by
therulers.Buttherearesomeadditionalreasons
forthis.Themost
important
isthat
only
*
the
expertand . .the
manof
provenprobity ',
asGrossman
putsit,whichinPlato's
viewmeans
only
the
very
wisest
adepts,
thatisto
say,
therulers
themselves,canbeentrustedwiththefinalinitiationofthe
future
sages
intothe
highermysteries
ofwisdom. This
holds,
above
all,
for
dialectics,
i.e.theartofintellectual
intuition,of
visualizing
thedivine
originals,
theFormsor
Ideas,of
unveiling
theGreat
Mystery
behindthecommonman's
everydayworldof
appearances.
WhatarePlato'sinstitutionaldemands
regarding
this
highest
formofeducation?They
areratherremarkable.Hedemands
that
only
thosewhoare
past
their
prime
oflifeshouldbeadmitted.
'
Whentheir
bodilystrengthbegins
to
fail,andwhen
they
are
past
the
age
of
public
and
militaryduties,then,and
onlythen,
should
they
be
permitted
toenteratwillthesacredfield. ..'
18
namely,
thefieldofdialecticalstudies. Plato'sreasonforthis
amazing
ruleisclear
enough.Heisafraidofthe
power
of
thought.
'
All
greatthings
are
dangerous
'
19
istheremark
by
whichheintroducestheconfessionthatheisafraidoftheeffect
which
philosophicthoughtmay
have
upon
brainswhicharenot
yet
onthe
verge
ofold
age. (All
thishe
puts
intothemouth
ofSocrates,whodiedindefenceofhis
right
offreediscussion
withthe
young.)
Butthisis
exactlywhatweshould
expect
if
werememberPlato'sfundamentalinterest,namely
thearrestment
of
politicalchange.
Intheir
youth,
themembersofthe
upper
classshall
fight.When
they
aretoooldto
think,they
shall
become
dogmatic
studentstobeimbuedwithwisdomand
authority
inordertobecome
sages
themselvesandtohandon
theirwisdom,thedoctrineofcollectivismand
authoritarianism,
tofuture
generations.
Itis
interesting
thatinalaterandmoreelaborate
passage

n8 PLATO'SPOLITICS
which
attempts
to
paint
therulersinthe
brightestcolours,Plato
modifiedhis
suggestion.Now
20
heallowsthefuture
sages
to
begin
theirdialecticalstudiesatthe
age
of
thirty,stressing,
of
course,
that
c
thosetowhomtheuseof
argumentsmaybe
permitted
must
possessdisciplined
andwell-balancednatures
'
21
.
Thisalteration
certainlyhelps
to
brighten
the
picture,
butthe
fundamentaltendency
isthesame.
Itisclear
enough
thatPlatodoesnotwishhisleaderstohave
originality
orinitiative.Hehates
change
anddoesnotwant
toseethat
re-adjustmentsmay
become
necessary.
Butthis
explanation
ofPlato'sattitudedoesnot
godeepenough.
In
fact,wearefacedherewithafundamental
difficulty
ofthe
leader
principle.
The
very
ideaof
selecting
or
educating
future
leaders is
self-contradictory. Youmay
solvethe
problem,
perhaps,
tosome
degree
inthefieldof
bodily
excellence.
Physical
initiativeand
bodilycourage
are
perhaps
notsohardtoascertain.
Butthesecretofintellectualexcellence isthe
spirit
ofcriticism
;
itisintellectual
independence. Andthisleadstodifficulties
whichmust
prove
insurmountable for
any
kindofauthori-
tarianism.Theauthoritarian willselectin
general
thosewho
obey,
who
believe,who
respond
tohisinfluence. Butin
doing
so,heselectsmediocrities. Forheexcludesthosewho
revolt,
whodoubt,whodaretoresisthisinfluence. Nevercanan
authority
admitthatthe
intellectuallycourageous,
i.e.thosewho
dareto
defy
his
authority,may
bethemostvaluable
type.Of
course,theauthorities will
always
remainconvincedoftheir
ability
todetectinitiative. Butwhat
theymeanby
thisis
only
a
quickgrasp
oftheir
intentions,and
they
willremainforever
incapable
of
seeing
thedifference.
(Herewemayperhaps
penetrate
thesecretofthe
particulardifficulty
of
selectingcapable
military
leaders.Thedemandsof
militarydiscipline
enhance
thedifficultiesdiscussed,andthemethodsof
military
advance-
mentaresuchthatthosewhododaretothinkforthemselvesare
usually
eliminated.
Nothing
islesstrue,asfarasintellectual
initiative is
concerned,thantheideathatthosewhoare
good
in
obeying
willalsobe
good
in
commanding. Very
similar
difficultiesarisein
politicalparties
:the
c
Man
Friday
'
ofthe
party
leaderisseldoma
capablesuccessor.)
Weareledhere,
I
believe,
toaresultofsome
importance,
whichcanbe
generalized.
Institutionsfortheselectionofthe
outstanding
can
hardly
bedevised. Institutionalselectionmay
work
quite
wellforsuch
purposes
asPlatohadinmind,namely

CHAPTER
7:
LEADERSHIP
Iig
forthearrestmentof
change
22
.Butitwillneverworkwellif
wedemandmorethanthat,foritwill
always
tendtoeliminate
initiativeand
originality.
Thisisnotacriticismof
political
institutionalism. It
only
re-affirmswhathasbeensaid
before,
thatweshould
alwaysprepare
fortheworst
leaders,althoughwe
should
try,
ofcourse,
to
get
thebest.Butitisacriticismofthe
tendency
toburdeninstitutions, especially
educational institu-
tions,withthe
impossible
taskof
selecting
thebest.Thisshould
neverbemadetheirtask.This
tendency
transformsoureduca-
tional
system
intoarace-course,andturnsthecourseofstudies
intoahurdle-race. Insteadof
encouraging
thestudenttodevote
himselftohisstudiesforthesakeof
studying,
insteadof
encourag-
ing
inhimarealloveforhis
subject
andfor
inquiry
23
,the
studentis
encouraged
to
study
forthesakeofhis
personal
career
;
heisledto
Acquireonly
such
knowledge
asisserviceablein
getting
himoverthehurdleswhichhemustclearforthesakeofhis
advancement. Inotherwords,eveninthefieldof
science,our
methodsofselectionarebasedupon
an
appeal
to
personal
ambition.
(It
isanaturalreactiontothis
appeal
ifthe
eager
studentislooked
upon
with
suspicionby
his
colleagues.) The
impossibledemandforaninstitutionalselectionoftheintellectual
leaders
endangers
the
very
lifenot
only
of
science,butof
intelligence.
Ithasbeen
said,only
too
truly,
thatPlatowastheinventor
ofbothour
secondary
schoolsandouruniversities. Idonot
knowabetterargument
foran
optimistic
viewofmankind,no
better
proof
oftheirindestructiblelovefortruthand
decency,
of
their
originality
andstubbornnessand
health,thanthefactthat
this
devastatingsystem
ofeducationhasnot
utterly
ruinedthem.
In
spite
ofthe
treachery
ofsomany
oftheirleaders,thereare
quite
anumber,oldaswellas
young,whoaredecent,and
intelligent,
anddevotedtotheirtask.
'
Isometimeswonderhow
itwasthatthemischiefdonewasnotmore
clearlyperceptible,
9
says
SamuelButler
24
,
'
andthattheyoungmenandwomen
grewup
assensibleand
goodly
as
theydid,
in
spite
ofthe
attempts
almost
deliberatelymadeto
warp
andstunttheir
growth.Some
doubtlessreceived
damage,
fromwhich
they
sufferedtotheir
life'send
;butmanyseemedlittleornonetheworse,andsome
almostthebetter.Thereasonwouldseemtobethatthenatural
instinctoftheladsinmostcasesso
absolutely
rebelled
against
their
training,
thatdowhattheteachersmightthey
couldnever
get
themto
pay
seriousheedtoit.'

120 PLATO'SPOLITICS
Itmay
bementionedherethatPlato
proved
abadselector
ofleaders. Ihaveinmindnotsomuchthe
disappointing
outcomeofhis
experiment
with
DionysiusII,tyrant
of
Syracuse,
butratherthe
participation
ofPlato'sAcademy
inDio'ssuccessful
expeditionagainstDionysius.
Platoselectedcertainmembersof
theAcademy
to
support
hisfamousfriendDio.Oneofthose
selectedwas
Callipus,
whobecameDio'smosttrustedcomrade.
Callipus
murderedDio
(who
hadmadehimself
tyrant
of
Syracuse)
and
usurped
the
tyranny,
whichhelostafterthirteenmonths.
Butthiseventwasnotthe
only
oneofitskindinPlato'scareer
asateacher. Clearchus,oneofPlato's
(and
of
Isocrates')
disciples,madehimself
tyrant
ofHeracleaafter
havingposed
asa
democraticleader.Hewasmurderedby
his
relation,Chion,
anothermemberofPlato's
Academy.(We
cannotknowhow
Chion,whomsome
represent
asan
idealist,wouldhave
developed,
sincehetoowas
killed.)
These
experiences
ofPlato's
25
throw
light
ontheadditionaldifficultiesoftheselectionofmenwhoare
tobeinvestedwithabsolute
power.
Therearefewwhose
character isnot
corruptedby
it.AsLordActon
says
:all
powercorrupts,
andabsolute
powercorruptsabsolutely.
Tosum
up.
Plato's
politicalprogramme
wasmuchmore
institutionalthan
personalist
;he
hoped
toarrest
politicalchange
by
theinstitutional controlofsuccessionin
leadership.The
controlwastobeeducational,based
upon
anauthoritarianview
of
learning,
and
upon
the
authority
ofthelearned
expert.
This
iswhatPlatomadeofSocrates'demandthata
responsible
politician
shouldlovetruth,andthatheshouldknowhis
limitations.

CHAPTER8:THEPHILOSOPHERKING
ThecontrastbetweenthePlatonicandtheSocraticcreedis
even
greater
thanIhaveshownsofar.Plato,Ihave
said,
followedSocratesinhisdefinitionofthe
philosopher.
*
Whom
do
you
calltrue
philosophers
?Thosewholovetruth
',weread
inthe
Republic
*.Buthehimselfisnottruthfulwhenhemakes
thisstatement.Hedoesnot
really
believein
it,forhedeclares
inother
places
rather
bluntly
thatitisoneofthe
royalprivileges,
ofthe
sovereign
tomakefulluseofliesanddeceit :
'
Itisthd
businessoftherulersofthe
city,
ifitis
anybody's,
totelllies!
deceiving
bothitsenemiesanditsowncitizensforthebenefit
ofthe
city;andnooneelsemusttouchthis
privilege.
5
2
*
Forthebenefitofthe
city',says
Plato.
Againwefindthat
the
appeal
tothe
principle
ofcollective
utility
istheultimate
ethicalconsideration. Totalitarian
morality
overrules
every-
thing,
eventhe
definition,theIdea,ofthe
philosopher.
Itneed
hardly
bementioned that,by
thesame
principle
of
political
expediency,
theruledaretobeforcedtotellthetruth.
c
Ifthe
rulercatches
anyone
elseinalie . .thenhewill
punishhimfor
introducing
a
practice
which
injures
and
endangers
the
city.
..'
3
.
Only
inthis
slightlyunexpected
senseisPlato's
philosopherking
aloveroftruth.
Platoillustratesthis
application
ofhis
principle
ofcollective
utility
tothe
problem
oftruthfulnessby
the
example
ofthe
physician.The
example
iswellchosen,
sincePlatolikesto
visualizehis
political
missionasoneof
healing
thesickbody
of
society.Apart
from
this,therolewhichhe
assigns
tomedicine
throws
lightupon
thetotalitariancharacterofPlato's
city
where
stateinterestdominatesthelifeofthecitizenfromthemating
ofhis
parents
tohis
grave.
Plato
interprets
medicineasaform
of
politicsor,
ashe
puts
it
himself,he
*
regardsAesculapius,
the
god
ofmedicine,
asa
politician
'
*.Medical
art,he
explains,
mustnotconsiderthe
prolongation
oflifeasits
aim,but
only
the
fnterestofthestate.
c
Inall
properly
ruledcommunities,each
manhashis
particular
workinthestate
assigned
tohim.This
hemustdo,andnoonehastimeto
spend
hislifein
being
ill
and
being
cured.'
Accordingly,
the
physician
has
*
no
right
to
treatamanwhocannot
carry
outhis
ordinaryduties,
forsucha
manisuselesstohimselfandtothestate
J
;quiteapart
fromthe
O.S.I.E.VOL.i 121 E

122 PLATOSPOLITICS
considerationthathe
might
have
'
childrenwhowould
probably
beassick'astheir
father,andbecomeaburdentothestate.
(In
hisold
age,
Platodiscussedmedicine,
in
spite
ofhisincreased
hatredof
individualism,
inamuchmore
personal
vein.He
complains
ofthedoctorwhotreatsevenfreecitizensasif
they
were
slaves,
'
issuing
hisorderslikea
tyrant
whosewillislaw,
andthen
rushing
offtothenext
slave-patient
'
5
,andhe
pleads
formore
gentlenessand
patience
inmedicaltreatment,
atleast
forthosewhoarenot
slaves.)Concerning
theuseofliesand
deceit,
Plato
urges
thattheseare
c
useful
only
asamedicine
'
6
;
buttherulerofthe
state,Plato
insists,mustnotbehavelikesome
ofthose
'
ordinary
doctors
'
whohavenotthe
courage
toadminister
strong
medicines.The
philosopherking,
aloveroftruthasa
philosopher,
mustbe,
asa
king,
'
amore
courageousman
'
since
hemustbedetermined
*
toadministera
greatmany
liesand
deceptions
'
forthebenefitoftheruled,Platohastensto*add.
Whichmeans,
aswe
alreadyknow,andaswelearnhere
again
fromPlato'sreferencetomedicine,
forthebenefitofthestate.
(Kant
remarkedonceina
very
different
spirit
thatthesentence
'
Truthfulness isthebest
policy
'
might
indeedbe
questionable,
whilstthesentence
'
Truthfulness isbetterthan
policy
'
is
beyond
dispute
7
.)
WhatkindoflieshasPlatoinmindwhenheexhortshisrulers
touse
strong
medicine?Grossman
rightlyemphasizes
that
Platomeans
'
propaganda,
the
technique
of
controlling
the
behaviourof . .thebulkoftheruled
majority
'
8
.
Certainly,
Platohadthesefirstinhismind
;butwhenGrossman
suggests
thatthe
propaganda
lieswere
only
intendedforthe
consumption
oftheruled,whiletherulersshouldbea
fullyenlightened
in-
telligentsia,
thenIcannot
agree.
Ithink,rather,thatPlato's
complete
breakwith
anythingresembling
Socrates'intellectualism
isnowheremoreobviousthaninthe
place
wherehetwice
expresses
his
hope
thateventherulers
themselves,atleastafterafew
genera-
tions,might
beinducedtobelievehis
greatestpropaganda
lie
;
Imeanhis
racialism,
hisMyth
ofBloodand
Soil,usually
referred
toastheMyth
oftheEarthborn. HereweseethatPlato's
utilitarianandtotalitarian
principles
overrule
everything,
even
theruler's
privilege
of
knowing,
andof
demanding
tobe
told,
thetruth.ThemotiveofPlato'swishthattherulersthemselves
shouldbelieveinthe
propaganda
lieishis
hope
of
increasing
its
wholesome
effect,
i.e.of
strengthening
theruleofthemasterrace,
and
ultimately,
of
arresting
all
politicalchange.

CHAPTER8 :THEPHILOSOPHERKING
123
PlatointroduceshisMyth
ofBloodandSoilrather
cynically
:
c
Wellthen
',says
theSocratesofthe
Republic,
'
couldwe
perhaps
fabricateoneofthose
veryhandy
lieswhichindeedwementioned
justrecently
?Withthe
help
ofone
singleinspired
whitelie
wemay,
ifweare
lucky,persuade
eventherulersthemselves but
at
any
ratetherestofthe
city.'
9
Itis
interesting
tonotetheuse
oftheterm
c
persuade
'.To
persuadesomebody
tobelievea
liemeans,more
precisely,
tomisleadortohoaxhim
;andit
wouldbemoreintunewiththefrank
cynicism
ofthe
passage
totranslate
*
wemay,
ifweare
lucky,hoaxeventherulers
themselves '.ButPlatousestheterm
*
persuasion
'
very
frequently,
anditsoccurrenceherethrowssome
light
onother
passages.
Itmay
betakenasa
warning
thatinsimilar
passages,
hemayhave
propaganda
liesinhismind
;more
especiallywhere
headvocatesthatthestatesmanshouldrule
c
by
meansofboth
persuasion
andforce
'
10
.
After
announcing
his
c
inspired
lie
',Plato,insteadof
pro-
ceedingdirectly
tothe
Myth,
first
develops
a
lengthypreface,
rathersimilartothe
lengthypreface
which
precedes
his
discovery
of
justice ;an
indication,
I
think,ofhisuneasiness. Itseems
thathedidnot
expect
the
proposal
whichfollowstofindmuch
favourwithhisreaders. TheMyth
itselfintroducestwo
ideas.Thefirstisthedefenceofthemother
country.
Thisis
certainly
notthereasonforPlato'shesitation
(although
theword-
ing
ofthe
dialoguecleverlysuggests it).
Thesecond
idea,
however,
'
therestofthe
story',
isthemyth
ofracialism :
*
God
. .has
putgold
intothosewhoare
capable
of
ruling,
silverinto
the
auxiliaries,andironand
copper
intothe
peasantsandthe
other
producing
classes.'
ll
Thesemetalsare
hereditary,they
areracialcharacteristics. Inthis
passage,
inwhich
Plato,
hesitatingly,
firstintroduceshis
racialism,heallowsforthe
possi-
bility
thatchildrenmay
bebornwithanadmixtureofanother
metalthanthoseoftheir
parents ;anditmustbeadmittedthat
hehereannouncesthe
following
rule :ifinoneofthelower
classes
*
childrenarebornwithanadmixtureof
gold
and
silver,
they
shall . .be
appointedguardians,
and ..auxiliaries '.But
thisconcession isrescindedinlater
passages,especially
inthe
story
oftheFallofManandoftheNumber
12
,partiallyquoted
in
chapter5
above.Fromthis
passage
welearnthat
any
admixtureofalowermetalmustbeexcludedfromthe
higher
classes.The
possibility
ofadmixturesand
correspondingchanges
instatusmeansthereforeonly
thatthe
degenerate
childrenfrom

124
PLATO'SPOLITICS
the
upper
classesaretobe
pusheddown,notthatthoseofthe
lowerclassesmay
belifted
up.Theway
inwhich
anymixing
ofmetalsmustleadtodestruction,
isdescribedinthe
concluding
passage
ofthe
story
oftheFallofMan :
4
Ironwill
mingle
with
silverandbronzewith
gold,
andfromthismixturevariationwill
bebornandabsurd
irregularity ;andwhenevertheseareborn
they
will
begetstruggle
and
hostility.Andthisishowwemust
describethe
origin
ofdisunion. ..'
13
.Itisinthis
light
thatwe
mustconsiderthattheMyth
oftheEarthbornconcludeswith
the
cynical
fabricationofa
prophecyby
afictitiousoracle
c
that
the
city
must
perish
when
guardedby
ironand
copper
*
14
.
Plato'sreluctanceto
proffer
hisracialismatonceinitsmore
radicalformindicates,
I
suppose,
thatheknewhowmuchitwas
against
thedemocraticandhumanitariantendenciesofhistime.
IfweconsiderPlato'sbluntadmissionthathisMyth
ofBlood
andSoilisa
propaganda lie,thentheattitudeofthecommentators
towardstheMyth
issomewhat
puzzling.Adam,
for
instance,
writes :
c
Without
it,the
present
sketchofastatewouldbe
incomplete.We
require
some
guarantee
forthe
permanence
of
the
city
. .
;and
nothing
couldbemorein
keeping
withthe
prevailing
moraland
religiousspirit
ofPlato's . .educationthan
thatheshouldfindthat
guarantee
in
faith
ratherthaninreason.'
16
I
agree(though
thisisnot
quitewhatAdam
meant)
that
nothing
ismorein
keeping
withPlato'stotalitarian
morality
thanhis
advocacy
of
propaganda
lies.ButIdonotunderstandhowthe
idealisticcommentator,byimplication,
candeclarethat
religion
andfaithareonthelevelofan
opportunist
lie.Asamatterof
fact,Adam'scommentisreminiscentofHobbes'conventionalism,
oftheattitudethat
religion,although
not
true,
isamost
expedient
and
indispensablepolitical
device.Andthisconsiderationshows
usthat
Plato,
after
all,wasmoreofaconventionalistthanone
might
think.Hedoesnoteven
stop
shortof
establishing
a
religious
faith
*
by
convention
'
(we
mustcredithimwiththe
franknessofhisadmissionthatitis
only
a
fabrication),
while
theconventionalist
Protagoras
atleastbelievedthatthe
laws,
whichareour
making,
aremadewiththe
help
ofdivine
inspira-
tion. Itishardtounderstandwhy
thosecommentators
16
on
Platowho
praise
himfor
fightingagainst
thesubversivecon-
ventionalismofthe
Sophists
andfor
establishing
a
spiritual
naturalism
ultimately
basedon
religion,
failtocensurehimfor
making
a
convention,orratheraninvention,theultimatebasis
of
religion.
In
fact,
Plato'sattitudetowards
religion
asrevealed

CHAPTER8tTHEPHILOSOPHERKINO
125
by
his
c
inspired
lie
'
is
practically
identicalwiththatofCritias,
hisbeloveduncle,thebrilliantleaderoftheThirtyTyrantswho
establishedan
ingloriousblood-regime
inAthens afterthe
Peloponnesian
war. Critias,a
poet,
wasthefirstto
glorify
propaganda
lieswhoseinventionhedescribedin
cynical
verses
eulogizing
thatwiseandcunningmanwhofabricated
religion,
in
orderto
c
persuade
'
the
people,
i.e.tothreatentheminto
submission :
c
. .Thencame,
Ithink,
thatwiseandcunningman,
Whofabricated
myths,
and
piety.
. .
Heknewthe
ways
of
daunting
heartandsoul. . .
Andlawlessnessturnedintolawandorder.
3
17
InCritias
9
view,religion
is
only
the
inspired
lieofa
great
andcleverstatesman. Plato'sviewsare
strikinglysimilar,both
inthe
cynical
introductionoftheMyth
inthe
Republic,
andin
theLawswherehe
says
thattheinstallationofritesandof
gods
is
c
amatterfora
great
thinker
'
18
.Butisthisthewholetruth
aboutPlato's
religious
attitude?WasPlato
only
an
opportunist
inthesematters,andwasthe
very
different
spirit
ofhisearlier
works
merely
Socratic?Thereisofcoursenoway
of
deciding
this
question
with
certainty,though
I
feel,intuitively,
thatthere
may
sometimesbeamore
genuinereligiousfeelingexpressed
eveninthelaterworks.ButIbelievethatwhereverPlato
considers
religious
mattersintheirrelationto
politics,
his
political
opportunismsweepseverything
aside.ThusPlatodemands,
in
theLarfs,theseverest
punishment
evenforhonestandhonourable
people
19
iftheir
opinionconcerning
the
gods
deviatesfromthose
held
by
thestate.Theirsoulsaretobetreatedby
aNocturnal
Councilof
inquisitors
20
,andif
they
donotrecantorif
they
repeat
theoffence,thecharge
of
impiety
meansdeath.Has
he
forgotten
Socrateswhohadfallenavictimtothat
very
charge
?
Thatitis
mainly
stateinterestwhich
inspires
thesedemands
ratherthaninterestinthe
religious
faithassuch,canbegauged
by
Plato'scentral
religious
doctrine.The
gods,
heteachesin
theLaws,punishseverely
allthoseonthewrong
sideinthe
conflictbetweengood
and
evil,aconflictwhichis
explained
as
thatbetweencollectivismandindividualism
21
.Andthe
gods,
he
insists,takeanactiveinterestinmen,they
arenotmerely
spectators.
Itis
impossible
to
appease
them.Neitherthrough
prayersnorthrough
sacrificescantheybemovedtoabstainfrom

126 PLATO'SPOLITICS
punishment
22
,The
political
interestbehindthis
teaching
is
clear,andmadeevenclearer
by
Plato'sdemandthatthestate
must
suppress
doubtof
anypart
ofthis
politico-religiousdogma,
and
especially
ofthedoctrinethatthe
gods
neverabstainfrom
punishment.
Plato's
opportunism
andhis
theory
ofliesmakes
it,ofcourse,
difficultto
interpret
whathe
says.Howfardidhebelieveinhis
theory
of
justice?Howfardidhebelieveinthetruthofthe
religious
doctrineshe
preached
?Washe
perhaps
himselfan
atheist,
in
spite
ofhisdemandforthe
punishment
ofother
(lesser)
atheists?
Althoughwecannot
hope
toanswer
any
ofthese
questionsdefinitely,
it
is,
I
believe,difficult,and
methodologically
unsound,notto
give
Platoatleastthebenefitofthedoubt.
Andthefundamental
sincerity
ofhisbeliefintheneedfor
arresting
change
can
hardly,
I
think,be
questioned. (I
shallreturnto
thisin
chapter10.)Ontheotherhand,wecannotdoubtthat
Plato
subjects
theSocraticloveoftruthtothemorefundamental
principle
thattheruleofthemasterclassmustbe
strengthened.
Itis
interesting,however,
tonotethatPlato's
theory
oftruth
is
slightly
lessradicalthanhis
theory
of
justice. Justice,wehave
seen,
isdefined,practically,
asthatwhichservestheinterestof
histotalitarianstate. Itwouldhavebeen
possible,
ofcourse,
to
definethe
concept
oftruthinthesameutilitarianfashion.The
Myth
is
true,Platocouldhave
said,since
anything
thatserves
theinterestofmy
statemustbebelievedandthereforemustbe
called
*
true
'
;andtheremustbenoothercriterionoftruth.
In
theory,
an
analogousstep
has
actually
beentakenby
the
pragmatist
successorsof
Hegel ;
in
practice,
ithasbeentakenby
Hegel
himselfandhisracialistsuccessors. ButPlatoretained
enough
oftheSocratic
spirit
toadmit
candidly
thathewas
lying.
The
step
taken
by
theschoolof
Hegel
wasonethatcouldnever
haveoccurred,
I
think,
to
anycompanion
ofSocrates
23
.
Somuchfortherole
playedby
theIdeaofTruthinPlato's
beststate.But
apart
from
JusticeandTruth,wehavestillto
considersomefurtherIdeas,suchasGoodness,Beauty,
and
Happiness,
ifwewishtoremovethe
objections,
raisedin
chapter6,
against
our
interpretation
ofPlato's
politicalprogramme
asa
puretotalitarianism,basedonhistoricism.An
approach
tothe
discussionoftheseIdeas,andalsotothatofWisdom,whichhas
been
partly
discussedinthelast
chapter,
canbemade
by
con-
sidering
thesomewhat
negative
resultreachedby
ourdiscussion
oftheIdeaofTruth.Forthisresultraisesanew
problem
:

CHAPTER8ITHEPHILOSOPHERKING
127
Why
doesPlatodemandthatthe
philosophers
shouldbe
kings
orthe
kingsphilosophers,
ifhedefinesthe
philosopher
asalover
oftruth,insisting,
ontheotherhand,thatthe
king
mustbe
/more
courageous',
anduselies?
The
onlyreply
tothis
question is,ofcourse,thatPlato
has,
in
fact,somethingvery
differentinmindwhenheusestheterm
*
philosopher
'.Andindeed,wehaveseeninthelast
chapter
thatjiisphilosopher
isnotsomuchtheseeker
for,
asthe
possessor
of^wisdpm.Heisalearnedman,a
sage.WhatPlatodemands,
therefore,
istheruleoflearnedness
sophocracy,
ifImaysay
so.
Inordertounderstand thisdemand,wemust
try
tofindwhat
kindoffunctionsmakeitdesirablethattherulerofPlato'sstate
shouldbea
possessor
of
knowledge,
a
c
fullyqualifiedphilosopher ',
asPlato
says.Thefunctionstobeconsideredcanbedividedinto
twomain
groups,namely
thoseconnectedwiththe
foundation
of
the
state,andthoseconnectedwithits
preservation.
Thefirstandthemost
important
functionofthe
philosopher
kmgjisj
thatofthe
city's
founderand
lawgiver.
Forthis
purpose,
a
philosopher
is
clearly
needed. Ifthestateistobestable,then
itmustbeatrue
copy
ofthedivineFormorIdeaoftheState.
But
only
a
philosopherwhois
fullyproficient
inthe
highest
of
sciences,in
dialectics,
isableto
see,andto
copy,
the
heavenly
Original.
This
point
receivesmuch
emphasis
inthe
part
ofthe
Republic
inwhichPlato
develops
his
arguments
forthe
sovereignty
ofthe
philosophers
24
.
Philosophers
c
lovetosecthetruth
',
andareallover
always
lovestoseethewhole,not
merely
the
parts.
Thushedoesnotlove,
as
ordinarypeopledo,
sensible
thingsandtheir
'
beautifulsoundsandcoloursand
shapes',but
hewants
c
to
see,andtoadmiretherealnatureof
beauty
'
the
FormorIdeaof
Beauty.
Inthis
way,
Plato
gives
theterm
philosopher
anew
meaning,
thatofaloverandaseerofthedivineworldof
FormsorIdeas.As
such,the
philosopher
isthemanwhomay
becomethefounderofavirtuous
city
25
:
c
The
philosopherwho
hascommunionwiththedivine
'
may
be
*
overwhelmedby
the
urge
torealize . .his
heavenly
vision
',oftheideal
city
andof
itsidealcitizens.Heislikea
draughtsman
ora
painterwhohas
'
thedivineashismodel '.
Onlyjruephilosophers
can
*
sketch
the
ground-plan
ofthe
city',
for
they
alonecanseethe
original,
andcan
copy
it,by
*
letting
their
eyeswandertoand
fro,fromthe
modeltothe
picture,
andbackfromthe
picture
tothemodel'.
As
*
a
j^nter
ofconstitutions
*
2e
,the
philosopher
must
J)e
helpedby
the
light
of
goodness
andofwisdom.Afewremarks

128 PLATO'SPOLITICS
willbeadded
concerning
thesetwoideas,andtheir
significance
for
the
philosopher
inhisfunctionasafounderofthe
city.
Plato'sIdea
of
theGoodisthe
highest
inthe
hierarchy
ofForms.
ItisthesunofthedivineworldofFormsor
Ideas,whichnot
only
throws
light
onalltheothermembers,butisthesourceoftheir
existence
27
.Itisalsothesourceorcauseofall
knowledgeand
alltruth
28
.The
power
of
seeing,
of
appreciating,
of
knowing
theGoodisthus
indispensable
29
tothedialectician. Sinceitis
thesunandthesourceof
light
intheworldofForms,
itenables
the
philosopher-painter
todiscernhis
objects.
Itsfunction is
thereforeofthe
greatestimportance
forthefounderofthe
city.
Butthis
purely
formalinformation isallwe
get.
Plato'sIdeaof
theGoodnowhere
plays
amoredirectethicalor
political
role
;
neverdowehearwhichdeedsare
good,
or
producegood,apart
fromthewell-known collectivistmoralcodewhose
precepts
are
introducedwithoutrecoursetotheIdeaofGood.Remarksthat
theGoodistheaim,
thatitisdesired
byeveryman
30
,donot
enrichourinformation. This
empty
formalism isstillmore
markedinthe
Philebus,wheretheGoodisidentified
31
withthe
Ideaof
*
measure
'
or
'
mean'.AndwhenIreadthe
report
that
Plato,
inhisfamouslecture
e
OntheGood
',disappointed
anuneducatedaudiencebydefining^theGoodas
*
theclassof
thedeterminateconceived asa
unity',thenmysympathy
is
withtheaudience. Inthe
Republic,
Plato
saysfrankly
32
thathe
cannot
explain
whathemeans
by
*
theGood'.The
only
practicalsuggestionwe
get
isthatmentionedatthe
beginning
of
chapter4
:thatGoodisthatwhich
preserves,
whichdoesnot
decay ;
itisthe
unchangeable,
thearrestedstateofa
thing.
In
viewofall
this,the
argument
thathebelievedinanAbsolute
Good
is,
I
believe,novalid
objectionagainst
the
interpretation
ofhis
politicaltheory
astotalitarian,andas
opportunist.
The
analysis
ofPlato'sIdea
of
Wisdomleadsto
equally
dis-
appointing
results.Wisdom,
aswehaveseen,doesnotmeanto
PlatotheSocratic
insight
intoone'sownlimitations
;nordoesit
meanwhatmostofuswould
expect,
awarminterest
in,anda
helpfulunderstanding of,humanity
andhumanaffairs. Plato's
wisemen,highlypreoccupied
withthe
problems
ofa
superior
world
33
,
'
havenotimetolookdownattheaffairsofmen . .
;
they
look
upon,
andholdfast
to,theorderedandthemeasured *.
Itisthe
right
kindof
learning
thatmakesamanwise :
c
Philo-
sophic
naturesareloversofthatkindof
learning
whichreveals
tothema
realitywhichexistsforeveranddoesnotdriftfrom

CHAPTER8:THEPHILOSOPHERKING
I2Q
generation
to
degeneration.'
ItdoesnotseemthatPlato's
treatmentofwisdomcan
carry
us
beyond
theidealof
arresting
change.
Although
this
analysis
ofthefunctionsofthe
city's
founder
hasnotrevealed
anynewethicalelementsinPlato'sdoctrine,
it
hasshownthatthereisadefinitereasonwhy
thefounderofthe
city
mustbea
philosopher.
Butthisdoesnot
fullyjustify
the
demandforthe
permanentsovereignty
ofthe
philosopher.
It
would
onlyjustify
the
philosopher
asthefirst
lawgiver,
notasthe
permanentruler,especially
sincenoneofthelaterrulersmust
introduce
anychange.
Forafull
justification
ofthedemand
thatthe
philosophers
should
rule,wemusttherefore
proceed
to
analyse
thetasksconnectedwiththe
city'spreservation.
WeknowfromPlato's
sociological
theoriesthatthe
state,
once
established,
willcontinuetobestableas
long
asthereis
no
split
inthe
unity
ofthemasterclass.The
bringingup
of
thatclass
is,therefore,
the
greatpreserving
functionofthe
sovereign,andafunctionwhichmustcontinueas
long
asthe
stateexists.Howfardoesit
justify
thedemandthata
philosopher
mustrule?Toanswerthis
question,
we
distinguish again,
within;~thisfunction,betweentwodifferent activities :the
supervision
ofeducation,andthe
supervision
of
breeding.
Why
shouldthedirectorofeducationbea
philosopher?
Why
isitnot
sufficient,
oncethestateanditseducational
system
are
established,
to
put
an
experiencedgeneral,
a
soldier-king,
in
charge
ofit?Theanswerthattheeducational
system
must
provide
not
only
soldiersbut
philosophers,
andthereforeneeds
philosophers
aswellassoldiersas
supervisors,
is
obviously
unsatisfactory ;
forifno
philosophers
wereneededasdirectorsof
educationand
rulers,thentherewouldbenoneedforthe
educational
system
to
produce
newones..The
requirements
of
theeducational
system
cannotassuch
justify
theneedfor
philosophers
inPlato's
state,
orthe
postulate
thattherulersmust
be
philosophers.
Thiswouldbe
different,of
course,
ifPlato's
educationhadanindividualisticaim,apart
fromitsaimtoserve
theinterestofthe
state,namely,
theaimto
developphilosophical
facultiesfortheirownsake.Butwhenwe
see,
aswedidinthe
last
chapters,how
frightened
Platowasof
permittinganything
like
independentthought,
thenwerealizethatthiscannotbethe
explanation.Andthis
impression
is
strengthened
ifweremember
chapter4,wherewehaveseenthatPlatoalsodemandedrestric-

130
PLATO'SPOLITICS
whichPlatoattachestoa
philosophical
educationoftherulers
mustbe
explainedby
otherreasonswhichare
purelypolitical.
ThemainreasonIcanseeistheneedfor
increasing
tothe
utmostthe
authority
oftherulers. Iftheeducationofthe
auxiliariesfunctions
properly,
therewillbe
plenty
of
good
soldiers.
Outstandingmilitary
facultiesmay
thereforebeinsuffi-
cienttoestablishan
unchallenged
and
unchallengeable authority.
Thismustbebasedon
higher
claims. Platobasesit
upon
the
claimsof
supernatural,mysticalpowers
whichhe
develops
inhis
leaders.They
arenotlikeothermen.Theybelong
toanother
world,theycommunicatewiththedivine.Thusthe
philosopher
king
seemstobe,partly,
a
copy
ofatribal
priest-king,
aninstitu-
tionwhichwehavementionedinconnectionwithHeraclitus.
(The
institutionoftribal
priest-kings
ormedicine-menorshamans
seemsalsotohaveinfluencedtheold
Pythagorean sect,with
their
amazingly
naivetribaltaboos.Mostofthesehad
apparently
been
dropped
evenbeforePlato.Buttheclaimtoa
super-
natural basisoftheir
authority remained.)
Thus Plato's
philosophical
educationhasadefinite
political
function.
Itjrtamps
the_rulers
?
anditestablishesabarrierbetweentherulersandtherulecL
(This
hasremaineda
major
functionof
c
higher
'
educationdown
toourown
time.)
Platonicwisdom is
acquiredlargely
forthe
sakeof
establishing
a
permanentpolitical
classrule. Itcanbe
describee!as
political
*
medicine
',givingmysticpowers
toits
possessors,
themedicine-men.^
4
.
Butthiscannotbethefullanswertoour
question
ofthe
functionsofthe
philosopher
inthestate. Itmeans,rather,that
the
questionwhy
a
philosopher
isneededhas
only
been
shifted,
andthatwewouldhavenowtoraisethe
analogousquestion
of
the
practicalpolitical
functionsoftheshamanorthemedicine-
man. Platomusthavehadsomedefiniteaimwhenhedevised
his
specialized philosophic training.Wemustlookfora
permanent
functionofthe
ruler,analogous
tothe
temporary
functionofthe
lawgiver.The
onlyhope
of
discovering
sucha
functionseemstobeinthefieldoF
Breeding
themasterrace.
jRacialmnthustakes
upa_more
central
part
inPlato's
political
programmen^iTblie
;would
^expect
atfirst
sight.Just
asthe
Platonicracialor
nuptial
number
is,
asweknow,theculmination
ofhis
descriptivesociology,
*
the
setting
inwhichPlato'sPhilo-
sophy
of
History
isframed
'
(Adam),
soitisthe
setting
ofPlato's
practical
demandforthe
sovereignty
ofthe
philosophers.
After
whathasbeensaidin
chapter4
aboutthenomadic
background

CHAPTER8 ITHEPHILOSOPHERKING
131
ofPlato's
state,
itis
perhaps
notso
unexpected
tofindthathis
king
isabreeder
king.
Butitmayperhapssurprise
somethat
his
philosopher
turnsouttobea
philosophic
breeder.Theneed
for
scientific,tormathematico-dialectical and
philosophical
breeding
isnottheleastofthe
arguments
behindtheclaimfor
the
sovereignty
ofthe
philosophers.
.
Ithasbeenshownin
chapter4howthe
problem
of
obtaining
a
pure
breedofhuman
watch-dogs
is
emphasized
andelaborated
intheearlier
parts
ofthe
Republic.
Butsofarwehavenotmet
with
any
reasonwhyonly
a
genuineand
fullyqualifiedphilo-
sopher
shouldbea
proficient
andsuccessful
political
breeder.
And
yet,
as
every
breederof
dogs
orhorsesorbirdsknows,
rational
breeding
is
impossible
withouta
pattern,
anaimto
guide
himinhis
efforts,anidealwhichhe
maytry
to
approachby
the
methodsof
mating
andof
selecting.
Withoutsuchastandard,
hecouldneverdecidewhich
offspring
is
*
goodenough
'
;he
couldnever
speak
ofthedifferencebetween
'
goodoffspring
'
and
*
bad
offspring
'.Butthisstandard
correspondsexactly
to
aPlatonicIdeaoftheracewhichheintendstobreed.
Just
as
only
thetrue
philosopher,
thedialectician,can
see,
according
to
Plato,thedivine
original
ofthe
city,
soitis
only
thedialecticianwhocanseethatotherdivine
original
theForm
orIdeaofMan.
Only
heis
capable
of
copying
thismodel,of
calling
itdownfromHeaventoEarth
35
,andof
realizing
ithere.
Itisa
kinglyIdea,
thisIdeaofMan. Itdoes
not,
assomehave
thought,represent
whatiscommontoallmen
;
itisnotthe
universal
concept
'
man'.It
is,rather,the
godlikeoriginal
of
man,an
unchangingsuperman
;
itisa
super-Greek,
anda
super-master. The
philosopher
must
try
torealizeonearth
what.PlatodescribeTastheraceof
1
themostconstant,themost
virile,and,withinthelimitsof
possibilities,
themost
beautifully
formedmen . .:
noblyborn,andof
awe-inspiring
character
'
36
.
Itistobearaceofmenandwomenwhoare
c
godlike
ifnot
divine . .
sculptured
in
perfectbeauty
'
37
a
lordly race,
destinedby
natureto
kingship
and
mastery.
Weseethatthetwofundamentalfunctionsofthe
philosopher
king
are
analogous
:hehasto
copy
thedivine
original
ofthe
city,
andhehasto
copy
thedivine
original
ofman.Heisthe
only
onewhois
able,andwhohasthe
urge,
'
torealize,
intheindividual
aswellasinthe
city,
his
heavenly
vision
'
38
.
Nowwecanunderstandwhy
Plato
drops
hisfirsthintthata
morethan
ordinary
excellence isneededinhisrulersatthesame

132
PLATO'SPOLITICS
place
wherehefirstclaimsthatthe
principles
ofanimal
breeding
mustbe
applied
totheraceofmen.Weare,he
says,most
carefulin
breeding
animals.
'
If
you
didnotbreedtheminthis
way,
don'tyou
thinkthattheraceof
your
birdsor
yourdogs
would
quicklydegenerate
?
'
When
inferringfromthisthatman
mustbebredinthesamecareful
wa)y/
Socrates
'
exclaims :
c
Goodheavens ! . .What
surpassing
excellenceweshallhave
todemandfromour
rulers,
ifthesame
principlesapply
tothe
raceofmen !
'
z9
Thisexclamation is
significant ;
itisoneof
thefirsthintsthattherulersmay
constituteaclassof
*
surpassing
excellence
'
withstatusand
training
oftheirown
;anditthus
prepares
usforthedemandthat
theyought
tobe
philosophers.
Butthe
passage
isevenmore
significant
insofarasit
directly
leadstoPlato'sdemandthatitmustbethe
duty
ofthe
rulers,
asdoctorsoftheraceofmen,toadminister liesand
deception.
Liesare
necessary,
Platomaintains,
'
if
your
herdistoreach
highestperfection
'
;
forthisneeds
'
arrangements
thatmust
be
kept
secretfromallbuttherulers,
ifwewishto
keep
theherd
of
guardiansreally
freefromdisunion '.Indeed,the
appeal
(quotedabove)
totherulersformore
courage
in
administering
liesasamedicine,
ismadeinthisconnection
;
it
prepares
the
readerforthenextdemand,consideredby
Platoas
particularly
important.Hewishes
40
thattherulersshould
fabricate,
for
the
purpose
of
mating
the
youngauxiliaries,
'
an
ingenioussystem
of
balloting,
sothatthe
persons
whohavebeen
disappointed
. .
may
blametheirbad
luck,andnottherulers
',who
are,secretly,
to
engineer
theballot.And
immediately
afterthis
despicable
advicefor
dodging
theadmissionof
responsibility (byputting
itintothemouthofSocrates,Platolibelshis
greatteacher),
'
Socrates
'
makesa
suggestion
41
whichissoontaken
up
and
elaborated
by
Glauconandwhichwemay
thereforecallthe
GlauconicEdict. Imeanthebrutallawwhich
imposes
on
every-
body
ofeithersexthe
duty
of
submitting,
forthedurationofa
war,
tothewishesofthebrave :
4a
*
As
long
asthewar
lasts,
. .
nobodymaysay
"
No
"
tohim.
Accordingly,
ifasoldierwishes
tomakeloveto
anybody,
whethermaleorfemale,
thislawwill
makehimmore
eager
to
carry
offthe
price
ofvalour.'The
state,
itis
carefullypointedout,
will
thereby
obtaintwodistinct
benefits :moreheroes,owing
totheincitement,and
againmore
heroes,owing
tothe
increasingnumberofchildrenfromheroes.
(The
latter
benefit,
asthemost
important
fromthe
point
ofview
ofa
long-term
racial
policy,
is
put
intothemouthof
*
Socrates
'.)

CHAPTER8:THEPHILOSOPHERKINO
133
No
specialphilosophicaltraining
is
required
forthiskindof
breeding. Philosophicalbreeding,however,plays
itsmain
part
in
counteracting
the
dangers
of
degeneration.
Inorderto
fight
these
dangers,
a
fullyqualifiedphilosopher
isneeded,
i.e.one
whoistrainedin
pure
mathematics
(including
solid
geometry),
pureastronomy,pureharmonics,and,the
crowning
achievement
of
all,
indialectics.
Only
hewhoknowsthesecretsofmathe-
matical
eugenics,
ofthePlatonicNumber,can
bring
backto
man,and
preserve
forhim,the
happinessenjoyed
beforethe
Fall
43
.Allthisshouldbeborneinmindwhen,afterthe
announcement oftheGlauconicEdict
(and
afteraninterlude
dealing
withthenatural distinctionbetweenGreeksand
Barbarians,corresponding, according
to
Plato,
tothatbetween
mastersand
slaves),
thedoctrine isenunciatedwhichPlato
carefully
marksashiscentralandmostsensational
political
demand the
sovereignty
ofthe
philosopherking.
Thisdemand
alone,heteaches,can
put
anendtotheevilsofsociallife
;
to
theevil
rampant
in
states,
i.e.
politicalinstability,
aswellastoits
morehiddencause,theevil
rampant
inthemembersoftherace
'
ofmen,
i.e.racial
degeneration.
Thisisthe
passage
:
c
Well
',saysSocrates,
'
Iamnowabouttodiveintothat
topic
whichI
compared
beforetothe
greatest
waveofall.Yet
speak
outImust,although
Iforeseethatthiswill
bringuponmea
deluge
of
laughter. Indeed,
Icanseeitnow,
this
verywave,
breaking
overmy
headintoan
uproar
of
laughter
anddefama-
tion . ..'
'
Outwiththe
story
!
'
says
Glaucon.
*
Unless
',says
Socrates,
c
unless,
inthe
cities,philosophers
areinvestedwith
the
might
of
kings,
orthosenowcalled
kings
and
oligarchs
become
genuine
and
fullyqualifiedphilosophers,
andunlessthese
two,politicalmight
and
philosophy,
aremerged(while
themany
who
nowadays
followtheirnaturalinclinationforone,but
only
foroneofthesetwo,are
suppressedbyforce),
unlessthis
happens,
my
dearGlaucon,
therewillbeno
respite,
andevilswillnotcease
tobe
rampant
inthecitiesnor,
I
believe,
intheraceofmen.'
44
(To
whichKant
wiselyreplied
:
'
That
kings
shouldbecome
philosophers,
or
philosophers kings,
isnot
likely
to
happen ;
norwoulditbe
desirable,
sincethe
possession
of
power
invari-
ably
debasesthefree
judgement
ofreason. It
is,however,
indis-
pensable
thata
king,
ora
kingly,
i.e.
self-rulingpeople,
should
not
suppressphilosophers
butleavethemthe
right
of
public
utterance.'
45
)
ThelastwordsofthisPlatonicpassage,whichhasbeenquite

134
PLATO'SPOLITICS
appropriately
describedasthe
key
tothewholework,
'
nor,
I
believe,
intheraceofmen
',are,
I
think,an
afterthought
of
comparatively
minor
importance
inthis
place.
It
is,however,
necessary
tocommentuponthem,
sincetheidealizationofPlato
hasledtothe
interpretation
46
thatPlato
speaks
hereabout
*
humanity ',extending
his
promise
ofsalvationfromthe
scope
ofthecitiestothatof
*
mankindasawhole'.Itmustbe
said,
inthis
connection,
thattheethical
category
of
*
humanity
'
as
something
thattranscendsthedistinctionof
nations,races,and
classes,
is
entirelyforeign
toPlato.In
fact,wehavesufficient
evidenceofPlato's
hostility
towardsthe
equalitarian creed,
a
hostility
which isseeninhisattitudetowardsAntisthenes
47
,
anold
disciple
andfriendofSocrates. Antisthenesalso
belonged
totheschoolof
Gorgias,
likeAlcidamasand
Lycophron,
whose
equalitarian
theoriesheseemstohaveextendedintothedoctrine
ofthebrotherhoodofallmen,andoftheuniversal
empire
of
men.
48
Thiscreedisattackedinthe
Republicbycorrelating
the
natural
inequality
ofGreeksandBarbarianstothatofmasters
andslaves
49
;anditso
happens
thatthisattackislaunched
immediately
beforethe
key-passage
wearehere
considering.
For
theseandotherreasons
50
,
itseemssafet8assumethat
Plato,
when
speaking
oftheevils
rampant
intheraceofmen,alludedto
a
theory
withwhichhisreaderswouldbe
sufficientlyacquainted
atthis
place,namely,
tohis
theory
thatthewelfareofthestate
depends,ultimately,upon
the
'
nature
'
oftheindividualmembers
ofthe
ruling
class
;andthattheirnature,andthenatureoftheir
race,or
offspring,
isthreatened,
inturn,by
theevilsofanindivi-'
dualistic
education,and,more
important still,by
racial
degenera-
tion.Theremark isthusanallusionwhichforeshadows also
the
story
oftheNumberandtheFallofMan
61
.
Itis
veryappropriate
thatPlatoshouldalludetohisracialism
intheenunciationofhismost
importantpolitical
demand. For
withoutthe
*
genuine
and
fullyqualifiedphilosopher
',trained
inallthosescienceswhichare
prerequisite
to
eugenics,
thestate
islost.Inhis
story
oftheNumberandtheFallofMan,Plato
tellsusthatoneofthefirstandfatalsinsofomissioncommitted
by
the
degenerateguardians
willbetheirlossofinterestin
eugenics,
in
watching
and
testing
the
purity
oftherace :
c
Hence
rulerswillbeordainedwhoare
altogether
unfitfortheirtaskas
guardians ;namely,
towatch,andto
test,themetalsintheraces
(which
areHesiod'sracesaswellas
yours),gold
andsilverand
bronzeandiron.'
62

CHAPTER8ITHEPHILOSOPHERKING
135
Itis
ignorance
ofthe
mysteriousnuptialNumberwhichleads
toallthat.ButtheNumberwas
undoubtedly
Plato'sown
invention.
(Itpresupposes pure
harmonicswhichinturn
presuppose
solid
geometry,
anewscienceatthetimewhenthe
Republic
was
written.)
Thusweseethat
nobody
butPlatohim-
selfheldthe
key
totrue
guardianship. Butthiscanmean
only
one
thing.
The
philosopherking
isPlato
himself,andthe
Republic
isPlato'sownclaimfor
kinglypower.
Oncethisconclusionhasbeenreached,manythingswhich
otherwisewouldremainunrelatedbecomeconnectedandclear.
Itcan
hardly
bedoubted,
for
instance,thatPlato'swork,
fullof
allusionsasitisto
contemporaryproblems
and
characters,was
meantby
itsauthornotsomuchasatheoretical
treatise,butasa
topicalpolitical
manifesto.
'
WedoPlatothe
gravestof
wrongs ',
says
A.E.
Taylor,
'
ifwe
forget
thatthe
Republic
isnomere
collectionoftheoreticaldiscussionsaboutgovernment
. .buta
serious
project
of
practical
reform
put
forward
by
anAthenian
. .
,
seton
fire,
like
Shelley,
witha
"
passion
for
reforming
the
world'V
53
This is
undoubtedly true,andwecouldhave
concludedfromthisconsideration alonethatinhis
portrait
of
the
PhilosopherKing,
Platomusthavehadsome
contemporary
inmind.Butinthe
dayswhenthe
Republicwas
written,
there
wereinAthensonly
three
outstandingmenwho
might
have
claimedtobe
philosophers
:
Antisthenes, Isocrates,andPlato
himself. Ifwe
approach
the
Republic
withthisinmind,wefind
atoncethatthereisa
lengthypassage,
inthediscussionofthe
characteristicsofthe
philosopherking,whichis
clearlymarked
out
by
Platoas
containingpersonal
allusions. It
begins
54
with
anunmistakable reference toa
popularcharacter,namely
Alcibiades,andendsbyopenlymentioning
aname
(that
of
Theages),
andwithareferenceof
'
Socrates
'
tohimself
55
.Its
upshot
isthat
onlyvery
fewcanbedescribedastrue
philosophers,
eligible
forthe
post
of
philosopher king.The
nobly
born
Alcibiadeswhowasofthe
righttype,
deserted
philosophy,
in
spite
ofSocrates'
attempts
tosavehim.Desertedand
defenceless,
philosophy
wasclaimedbyunworthy
suitors.
Ultimately,
c
there
isleft
only
ahandfulofmenwhoareworthy
of
being
associated
with
philosophy
'.Fromthe
point
ofviewwehavereached,
wewouldhaveto
expect
thatthe
e
unworthy
suitors
'
"are
AntisthenesandIsocratesandtheirschool
(and
that
they
are
thesame
peoplewhomPlatodemandstohave
'
suppressedby
force',ashe
says
inthe
key-passage
ofthe
philosopherking).

136
PLATO'SPOLITICS
And,indeed,thereissome
independent
evidence
corroborating
this
expectation
56
.
Similarly,weshould
expect
thatthe
c
handful
ofmenwhoare
worthy
'
includesPlatoandhisfriends,and,indeed,
acontinuation ofthis
passage
leaveslittledoubtthatPlato
speaks
hereofhimself :
'
Thosewho
belong
tothissmallband . .
canallseethemadnessofthemany,andthe
generalcorruption
ofall
political
affairs.The
philosopher
. .islikeamanina
cage
ofwildbeasts.Hewillnotsharethe
injustice
ofthe
many,
buthis
power
doesnotsufficefor
continuing
his
fightalone,
surroundedasheis
by
aworldof
savages.Hewouldbekilled
beforehecoulddo
anygood,
tohis
city
orhisfriends. . .
Having
duly
considered allthese
points,
hewillholdhis
peace,
and
confinehiseffortstohisownwork ..'
57
.The
strong
resent-
ment
expressed
inthesesourandmostun-Socratic
58
words
marksthem
clearly
asPlato'sown.Forafull
appreciation,
however,ofthis
personalconfession,
itmustbe
compared
with
the
following
:
*
Itisnotinaccordancewithnaturethatthe
skilled
navigator
should
beg
theunskilledsailorsto
accept
his
command
;nor,thatthewisemanshouldwaitatthedoorsof
therich. . .Butthetrueandnatural
procedure
isthatthe
sick,whetherrichor
poor,
shouldhastentothedoctor'sdoor.
Likewiseshouldthosewhoneedtoberuled
besiege
thedoorof
himwhocanrule
;andnevershouldaruler
begthemto
accept
his
rule,
ifheis
anygood
atall.'
59Whocanmissthesoundof
animmense
personalpride
inthis
passage
?Heream
I,says
Plato,your
natural
ruler,the
philosopherkingwhoknowshow
torule. If
you
wantme,you
mustcometome,andif
you
insist,
Imay
become
your
ruler.ButIshallnotcome
begging
to
you.
Didhebelievethat
they
wouldcome?Likemanygreat
worksof
literature,the
Republic
showstracesthatitsauthor
experienced exhilarating
and
extravagant hopes
of
success,
alternating
with
periods
of
despair. Sometimes,
at
least,Plato
hoped
that
they
wouldcome
;thatthesuccessofhiswork,the
fameofhiswisdom,would
bringthem
along.Then
again,he
feltthat
they
would
only
beincitedtofuriousattacks
;thatall
hewould
bringupon
himselfwas
c
awaveof
laughterand
defamation
'
perhaps
evendeath.
Washeambitious?Hewas
reaching
forthestarsfor
god-likeness.
Isometimeswonderwhether
part
oftheenthusiasm
forPlatoisnotduetothefactthathe
gaveexpression
tomany
secretdreams
80
.Evenwherehe
arguesagainstambition,we

CHAPTER8:THEPHILOSOPHERKING
137
cannotbutfeelthatheis
inspiredby
it.The
philosopher,
he
assuresus
61
,
isnotambitious
;although
c
destinedto
rule,he
istheleast
eager
forit'.Butthereason
given
isthathisstatus
istoo
high.Hewhohashadcommunionwiththedivinemay
descendfromhis
heights
tothemortals
below,sacrificing
himself
forthesakeoftheinterestofthestate.Butasanaturalruler
heis
ready
tocome.The
poor
mortalsneedhim.Without
himthestatemust
perish,
for
only
heknowsthesecretof
arresting
degeneration.
. .
Ithinkwemustfacethefactthatbehindthe
sovereignty
of
the
philosopherking
standsthe
quest
for
power.Thebeautiful
portrait
ofthe
sovereign
isa
self-portrait.Whenwehave
recoveredfromtheshockofthis
revelation,wemay
lookanew
atthe
awe-inspiringportrait,
andifwecan
fortify
ourselveswith
asmalldoseofSocrates'
irony,
thenwemay
ceasetofindit
so
terrifying.Wemaybegin
todiscernitshuman,indeed,
its
only
toohumanfeatures.Wemay
even
begin
tofeelalittle
sorry
forPlatowhohadtobesatisfiedwith
establishing
thefirst
professorship,
insteadofthefirst
kingship,
of
philosophy ;who
couldneverrealizehisdream,the
kingly
Ideawhichhehad
formedafterhisown
image.
Fortifiedby
ourdoseof
irony,we
may
evenfind,inPlato's
story,
a
melancholy
resemblance to
thatinnocent littlesatireonPlatonism,the
story
ofthe
Ugly
Dachshund,ofTono,theGreatDane,whoformshis
kingly
Idea
of
c
GreatDog
'
afterhisown
image(buthappily
findsinthe
endthatheisGreatDoghimself)
62
.
Whatamonumentofhumansmallness isthisideaofthe
philosopher king.Howfarremoved itisfromthe
simple
humaneness ofSocrates,fromtheSocraticdemandthatthe
responsible
statesmanshouldnotbedazzled
by
hisownexcellence,
power,
orwisdom,butthatheshouldknowwhatmattersmost :
thatweareallfrailhuman
beings.Whatadistancefromthis
worldof
irony
andtruthfulnessandreason,
toPlato'skingdom
ofthe
sage,whose
magicalpowers
raisehim
high
above
ordinary
men
;butnot
highenough
to
forgo
theuseof
lies,norto
neglect
the
sorrygame
ofallshamans,thesaleoftaboosofbreeding
taboos for
power
overhis
fellow-men.,

CHAPTER9:AESTHETICISM,RADICALISM,
UTOPIANISM
InherentinPlato'sprogramme
thereisacertain
approach
towards
politics
which
is,
I
believe,most
dangerous.
Its
analysis
isof
greatpracticalimportance
fromthe
point
ofviewofrational
social
engineering.ThePlatonic
approach
Ihaveinmindcan
becalled
Utopianengineering,
as
opposed
tothatkindofsocial
engineering
whichaloneIconsideras
rational,andwhichmay
bedescribed
by
thenameof
piecemealengineering.The
Utopian
approach
isthemore
dangerous
asitmayseemtobetheobvious
alternativetoaradicalhistoricismwhich
implies
thatwecannot
alterthecourseof
history ;
atthesametime,
it
appears
tobea
necessarycomplement
toalessradical
historicism, likethatof
Plato,which
permitshumaninterference.
The
Utopianapproachmay
bedescribedasfollows.Any
rationalactionmusthaveacertainaim. Itisrationalinthe
same
degree
asit
pursues
itsaim
consciouslyand
consistently,
andasitdetermines itsmeans
according
tothisend.Tochoose
theendisthereforethefirst
thingwehavetodoifwewishtoact
rationally ;andwemustbecarefultodetermineourrealor
ultimateends,fromwhichwemust
distinguish clearly
those
intermediateor
partial
endswhich
actually
are
onlymeans,or
steps
onthe
way,
totheultimateend. Ifwe
neglect
thisdis-
tinction,thenwemustalso
neglect
toaskwhetherthese
partial
endsare
likely
to
promote
theultimateend,and
accordingly,
wemustfailtoact
rationally.
These
principles,
if
applied
tothe
realmof
politicalactivity,demandthatwemustdetermineour
ultimate
politicalaim,ortheIdeal
State,before
takingany
practical
action.
Onlywhenthisultimateaimis
determined,
in
rough
outlinesat
least,only
whenweareinthe
possession
of
something
likea
blueprint
ofthe
society
atwhichweaim,only
thencanwe
begin
toconsiderthebest
ways
andmeansofits
realization,andtodraw
up
a
plan
for
practical
action.These
arethe
necessarypreliminaries
of
anypracticalpoliticalmove
thatcanbecalled
rational,and
especially
ofsocial
engineering.
This
is,in
brief,the
methodologicalapproach
whichIcall
Utopianengineering
1
.Itis
convincing
andattractive. In
fact,
itis
just
thekindof
methodologicalapproach
toattractallthose
whoareeitherunaffected
byhistoricist
prejudices
or
reacting
138

CHAPTER
9
:RADICALISM
139
against
them.Thismakesit
only
themore
dangerous,
andits
criticismthemore
imperative.
Before
proceeding
tocriticize
Utopianengineering
in
detail,
I
wishtooutlineanother
approach
tosocial
engineering,namely,
thatof
piecemealengineering.
Itisthe
approach
whichIthink
tobe
methodologically
sound.The
politicianwho
adopts
this
methodmay
ormay
nothavea
blueprint
of
society
beforehis
mind,hemay
ormay
not
hope
thatmankindwillone
day
realizeanideal
state,andachieve
happiness
and
perfection
on
earth.Buthewillbeawarethat
perfection,
ifatall
attainable,
isfar
distant,andthat
everygeneration
ofmen,andtherefore
alsothe
living,
haveaclaim
;perhaps
notsomuchaclaimtobe
made
happy,
fortherearenoinstitutionalmeansofmaking
a
man
happy,
butaclaimnottobemade
unhappy,
whereitcan
beavoided.
They
haveaclaimtobe
given
all
possiblehelp,
if
they
suffer.The
piecemealengineer will,accordingly,adopt
themethodof
searchingfor,and
fightingagainst,
the
greatest
andmost
urgent
evilsof
society,
ratherthan
searchingfor,and
fightingfor,
its
greatest
ultimate
good
2
.Thisdifference isfar
from
beingmerely
verbal. In
fact,
itismost
important.
Itis
thedifferencebetweenareasonablemethodof
improving
the
lotofman,andamethodwhich,
if
reallytried,mayeasily
leadto
anintolerableincreaseinhuman
suffering.
Itisthedifference
betweenamethodwhichcanbe
applied
at
anymoment,anda
methodwhose
advocacymayeasilybecomeameansof
continually
postponing
actionuntilalaterdate,whenconditionsaremore
favourable.And itisalsothedifferencebetweenthe
only
methodof
improving
matterswhichhassofarbeen
really
success-
ful,
at
anytime,andin
anyplace(Russiaincluded,
aswillbe
seen)
andamethodwhich,wherever ithasbeen
tried,hasled
only
totheuseofviolencein
place
ofreason,andifnottoits
ownabandonment,
at
any
ratetothatofits
originalblueprint.
Infavourofhismethod,the
piecemealengineer
canclaimthat
a
systematicfightagainstsuffering
and
injustice
andwarismore
likely
tobe
supportedby
the
approval
and
agreement
ofa
great
numberof
people
thanthe
fight
fortheestablishmentofsome
ideal.Theexistenceofsocial
evils,thatisto
say,
ofsocial
conditionsunderwhichmanymenwere
suffering,
canbe
comparatively
wellestablished. Thosewhosuffercan
judge
for
themselves,andtheotherscan
hardlydeny
that
they
wouldnot
liketo
changeplaces.
Itis
infinitelymoredifficulttoreason
aboutanideal
society.
Sociallifeisso
complicated
thatfew

140
PLATO'SPOLITICS
men,ornoneat
all,could
judge
a
blueprint
forsocial
engineering
onthe
grand
scale
;whether itbe
practicable ;whether it
wouldresultinareal
improvement
;whatkindof
suffering
it
may
involve
;andwhatmay
bethemeansforitsrealization.
As
opposed
to
this,blueprints
for
piecemealengineering
are
comparativelysimple.They
are
blueprints
for
singleinstitutions,
forhealthand
unemployedinsurance,
forinstance,orarbitration
courts,or
anti-depressionbudgeting
3
oreducationalreform. If
theygowrong,
thedamage
isnot
verygreat,anda
re-adjustment
not
very
difficult.They
areless
risky,andforthis
very
reason
lesscontroversial. Butifitiseasiertoreachareasonable
agree-
mentabout
existing
evilsandthemeansof
combating
themthan
itisaboutanideal
goodandthemeansofits
realization,then
thereisalsomore
hope
that
byusing
the
piecemeal
methodwe
mayget
overthe
verygreatestpracticaldifficulty
ofallreasonable
politicalreform,namely,
theuseof
reason,insteadof
passion
and
violence,
in
executing
the
programme.
Therewillbea
possibility
of
reaching
areasonable
compromise
andthereforeof
achieving
the
improvementby
democraticmethods.
(
c
Com-
promise
*
isan
uglyword,butitis
important
forustolearnits
proper
use. Institutionsare
inevitably
theresultofa
compromise
with
circumstances, interests, etc.,though
as
personsweshould
resistinfluencesofthis
kind.)
As
opposed
to
that,the
Utopianattempt
torealizeanideal
state,using
a
blueprint
of
society
asawhole,
isonewhichdemands
a
strong
centralizedruleofafew,andwhichtherefore is
likely
toleadtoa
dictatorship
4
.ThisIconsideracriticismofthe
Utopianapproach,havingshown,inthe
chapter
onthe
Principle
of
Leadership,
thatanauthoritarianruleisamost
objectionable
formof
government. Some
points
nottouched
upon
inthat
chapter
furnishuswithevenmoredirect
argumentsagainst
the
Utopianapproach.Oneofthedifficultiesfacedby
abenevolent
dictatoristofindwhethertheeffectsofhismeasures
agree
with
his
good
intentions.The
difficulty
arisesoutofthefactthat
authoritarianism must
discourage
criticism
;accordingly,
the
benevolentdictatorwillnot
easily
hearof
complaintsregarding
themeasureshehastaken.Butwithoutsomesuch
check,he
can
hardly
findwhetherhismeasuresachievethedesired
benevolentaim.Thesituationmustbecomeevenworseforthe
Utopianengineer.Thereconstructionof
society
isa
big
under-
taking
whichmustcauseconsiderableinconvenience to
many,
andforaconsiderablespanoftime.Accordingly,
the
Utopian

CHAPTER
9
IRADICALISM
14!
engineer
willhavetobedeaftomanycomplaints ;in
fact,
it
willbe
part
ofhisbusinessto
suppress
unreasonable
objections.
Butwith
it,hemust
invariablysuppress
reasonablecriticismalso.
Another
difficulty
of
Utopianengineering
isconnectedwiththe
problem
ofthedictator's successor. In
chapter 7
Ihave
mentionedcertain
aspects
ofthis
problem. Utopianengineering
raisesa
difficultyanalogous
tobutevenmoreseriousthanthat
whichfacesthebenevolent
tyrantwhotriestofindan
equally
benevolent successor
5
.The
verysweep
ofsucha
Utopian
undertaking
makes it
improbable
thatitwillrealize itsends
during
thelifetimeofonesocial
engineer,
or
group
of
engineers.
Andifthesuccessorsdonot
pursue
thesame
ideal,thenallthe
sufferings
ofthe
people
forthesakeoftheidealmay
beinvain.
A
generalization
ofthis
argument
leadstoafurthercriticism
ofthe
Utopianapproach.
This
approach,
itis
clear,canbeof
practical
value
only
ifweassumethatthe
originalblueprint,
perhaps
withcertain
adjustments,
remainsthebasisofthework
untilitis
completed.
Butthatwilltakesometime. Itwillbe
atimeofrevolutions,both
political
and
spiritual.
Itistherefore
tobe
expected
thatideasandidealswill
change.Whathad
appeared
theidealstatetothe
people
whomadethe
original
blueprint,may
not
appear
sototheirsuccessors. Ifthatis
granted,
thenthewhole
approach
breaksdown.Themethodof
first
establishing
anultimate
political
aimandthen
beginning
to
movetowardsitisfutileifweadmitthattheaimmay
becon-
siderablychangedduring
the
process
ofitsrealization. Itmay
at
anymomentturnoutthatthe
steps
sofartaken
actually
lead
away
fromtherealizationofthenewaim.Andifwe
change
ourdirection
according
tothenewaim,thenwe
expose
ourselves
tothesamerisk
again.
In
spite
ofallthesacrificesmade,we
may
never
getanywhere
atall.Thosewho
prefer
one
step
towardsadistantidealtotherealizationofa
piecemeal
com-
promise
should
always
rememberthatiftheidealis
verydistant,
itbecomesdifficultto
say
whetherthe
step
takenwastowards
oraway
fromit.Thisis
especially
soifthecourseshould
proceed
byzigzagsteps,or,in
Hegel'sjargon,
'
dialectically ',orifitis
not
clearlyplanned
atall.
(This
bears
upon
theoldandsome-
whatchildish
question
ofhowfartheendcan
justify
themeans.
Apart
from
claiming
thatnoendcouldever
justify
allmeans,
I
thinkthata
fairly
concreteandrealizableendmayjustify
temporary
measuresasamoredistantidealnevercould
8
.)
Weseenowthatthe
Utopianapproach
canbesaved
onlyby

142
PLATO'SPOLITICS
thePlatonicbeliefinoneabsoluteand
unchangingideal,together
withtwofurther
assumptions,namely(a)
thattherearerational
methodstodetermineonceandforeverwhatthisideal
is,and
(b)
whatthebestmeansofitsrealizationare.Only
suchfar-
reachingassumptions
could
prevent
usfrom
declaring
the
Utopianmethodology
tobe
utterly
futile.ButevenPlatohim-
selfandthemostardentPlatonistswouldadmitthat
(a)
is
certainly
nottrue
;
thatthereisnorationalmethodfor
determining
the
ultimateaim,but,
if
anything,only
somekindofintuition.Any
differenceof
opinion
between
Utopianengineersmusttherefore
lead,
intheabsenceofrationalmethods,totheuseof
power
insteadofreason,
i.e.toviolence. If
anyprogress
in
any
definite
direction ismadeat
all,thenitismadein
spite
ofthemethod
adopted,
notbecauseofit.Thesuccessmay
bedue,
for
instance,
totheexcellenceoftheleaders
;butwemustnever
forget
that
excellentleaderscannotbe
producedby
rationalmethods,but
onlyby
luck.
Itis
important
tounderstandthiscriticism
properly ;
Idonot
criticizetheideal
byclaiming
thatanidealcanneverbe
realized,
thatitmust
always
remaina
Utopia.
Thiswouldnotbeavalid
criticism,
formanythings
havebeenrealizedwhichhaveonce
been
dogmatically
declaredtobe
unrealizable,
for
instance,the
establishmentofinstitutionsfor
securing
civil
peace,
i.e.forthe
prevention
ofcrimewithinthestate
;andIthink
that,
for
instance,
theestablishmentof
corresponding
institutionsforthe
prevention
ofinternationalcrime,
i.e.armed
aggression
or
blackmail,though
oftenbrandedas
Utopian,
isnotevena
very
difficult
problem
7
.
WhatIcriticizeunderthename
Utopianengineeringrecommends
thereconstructionof
society
asa
whole,
i.e.
verysweepingchanges
whose
practicalconsequences
arehardto
calculate,owing
to
ourlimited
experiences.
Itclaimsto
planrationally
forthe
wholeof
society,althoughwedonot
possessanything
likethe
factual
knowledge
whichwouldbe
necessary
tomake
good
such
anambitiousclaim.Wecannot
possess
such
knowledge
sincewe
haveinsufficient
practicalexperience
inthiskindof
planning,
and
knowledge
offactsmustbebased
uponexperience.
At
present,
the
sociologicalknowledgenecessary
for
large-scaleengineering
is
simply
non-existent.
Inviewofthis
criticism,the
Utopianengineer
is
likely
to
grant
theneedfor
practicalexperience,andforasocial
technology
based
uponpracticalexperiences.
Buthewill
argue
thatwe
shallneverknowmoreaboutthesemattersifwerecoilfrom

CHAPTER
Q
:RADICALISM
143
making
social
experiments
whichalonecanfurnishuswiththe
practicalexperience
needed.Andhe
might
addthat
Utopian
engineering
is
nothing
butthe
application
ofthe
experimental
methodto
society.Experiments
cannotbecarriedoutwithout
involvingsweepingchanges.They
mustbeona
largescale,
owing
tothe
peculiar
characterofmodern
society
withits
great
massesof
people.An
experiment
in
socialism,
for
instance,
if
confinedtoa
factory,
ortoa
village,
oreventoa
district,would
never
give
usthekindofrealisticinformationmost
urgently
needed.
Such
arguments
infavourof
Utopianengineering
exhibita
prejudice
whichisas
widely
heldasitisuntenable,namely,
the
prejudice
thatsocial
experiments
mustbeona
*
large
scale
',
that
they
mustinvolvethewholeof
society
if
they
aretobecarried
outunderrealisticconditions. But
piecemeal
social
experiments
canbecarriedoutunderrealisticconditions,
inthemidstof
society,
in
spite
of
being
ona
*
smallscale
',thatisto
say,
without
revolutionizing
thewholeof
society.
In
fact,wearemaking
such
experiments
allthetime.Theintroductionofanewkindof
life-insurance,ofanewkindoftaxation,ofanew
penal
reformJ
areallsocial
experiments
whichhavetheir
repercussionsthrough
thewholeof
society
without
remodelling society
asawhole.
Evenamanwho
opens
anew
shop,
orwhoreservesaticketforthe
theatre,
is
carrying
outakindofsocial
experiment
onasmall
scale
;andallour
knowledge
ofsocialconditions isbasedon
experiencegainedbymakingexperiments
ofthiskind.The
Utopianengineerweare
combating
is
rightwhenhestressesthat
an
experiment
insocialismwouldbeoflittlevalueifcarriedout
under
laboratoryconditions,
forinstance,
inanisolated
village,
sincewhatwewanttoknowishow
things
workoutin
society
undernormalsocialconditions. Butthis
veryexample
shows
wherethe
prejudice
ofthe
Utopianengineer
lies.Heiscon-
vincedthatwemustrecastthewholestructureof
society,
whenwe
experiment
withit
;andhecanthereforeconceiveamore
modest
experimentonly
asonethatrecaststhewholestructureof
asmall
society.
Butthekindof
experiment
fromwhichwecan
learnmostisthealterationofonesocialinstitutionatatime.
For
only
inthisway
canwelearnhowtofitinstitutionsintothe
frameworkofother
institutions,andhowto
adjust
themsothat
theywork
according
toourintentions.And
only
inthisway
canwemakemistakes,andlearnfromourmistakes,without
riskingrepercussionsofagravitythatmustendangerthewillto

144
PLATO'SPOLITICS
futurereforms. Furthermore,the
Utopian
methodmustleadto
a
dangerousdogmatic
attachmenttoa
blueprint
forwhichcount-
lesssacrificeshavebeenmade.Powerfulinterestsmustbecome
linked
up
withthesuccessofthe
experiment.
Allthisdoesnot
contributetothe
rationality,
ortothescientificvalue,ofthe
experiment.
Butthe
piecemeal
method
permitsrepeatedexperi-
mentsandcontinuous
readjustments. (Infact,
it
might
leadto
the
happy
situationwhere
politiciansbegin
tolookoutfortheir
ownmistakesinsteadof
trying
to
explain
themawayandto
prove
that
they
have
always
been
right.
Thiswouldmeanthe
introductionofscientificmethodinto
politics,
sincethewhole
secretofscientificmethodisareadinesstolearnfrommistakes
8
.)
Theseviewscanbecorroborated,
I
believe,bycomparing
socialand,
for
instance,mechanical
engineering.
The
Utopian
engineer
willofcourseclaimthatthemechanical
engineerplans
even
verycomplicatedmachinery
asawhole,andthathisblue-
printsmaycover,and
planbeforehand,not
only
acertainkind
of
machinery,
buteventhewhole
factory
which
produces
this
machinery.Myreply
wouldbethathecandoallthisbecause
hehassufficient
experience,
i.e.becausehehasmadeallkindsof
mistakes
already.
This
experience
hehas
gainedbyapplying
a
piecemeal
method. Hisnew
machinery
istheresultofa
great
many
small
improvements.
Hehashadamodel
first,and
only
aftera
great
numberof
piecemealadjustments
toitsvarious
parts
didhe
proceed
toa
stage
wherehecoulddraw
up
hisfinal
plans
forthe
production. Similarly,
his
plan
forthe
production
ofhis
machine
incorporates
a
greatnumberof
experiences,namely,
of
piecemealimprovements
madeinolderfactories.Thewhole-
saleor
large-scale
methodworks
only
wherethe
piecemeal
method
hasfirstfurnisheduswitha
greatnumberofdetailed
experiences,
andeventhen
only
withintherealmofthese
experiences.No
manufacturer will
proceed
tothe
production
ofanew
engine
on
thebasisofa
blueprintalone,evenifitweredrawn
upby
the
greatestexpert,
withoutfirst
making
amodeland
'
developing
'
itby
little
adjustments
asfaras
possible.
Itis
perhaps
usefultocontrastthiscriticismofPlatonic
Idealismin
politics
withMarx'scriticismofwhathecalled
*
Utopianism
'.WhatiscommontoMarx'scriticismandmine
isthatbothdemandmorerealism.Buttherearemany
differences. In
arguingagainstUtopianism,
Marxcondemns
allsocial
engineering.Hedenouncesthe
hope
inarational
planning
ofsocialinstitutions as
altogether unrealistic, since

CHAPTER
9
.*RADICALISM
145
society
must
growaccording
tothelawsof
history
andnot
according
toourrational
plans.
Allwecan
do,hemaintains,
istolessenthe
birthpangs
ofthehistorical
processes.
Inother
words,he
opposes
aradicalhistoricismtoallsocial
engineering.
Butthereisoneelementwithin
Utopianism, characteristic, for
instance,ofPlato's
approach,
whichMarxdoesnot
oppose,
although
itisoneoftheelementswhichIhaveattackedas
unrealistic. Thisisits
sweep,
its
attempt
todealwith
society
as
awhole
;
forhe
expects
that
history
will
bring
usarevolution
whichwill
completely
re-modelthewhole
'
social
system
'.
This
sweep,
thisradicalismofthePlatonic
approach(and
of
theMarxianas
well)is,
I
believe,connectedwithits
aestheticism,
i.e.withthedesiretobuildaworldwhichisnot
only
alittle
betterandmorerationalthan
ours,butwhichisfreefromallits
ugliness
:nota
crazyquilt,
anold
garmentbadlypatched,
but
an
entirelynewcoat,a
really
beautifulnewworld.This
aestheticism isa
very
understandable attitude
;
in
fact,
Ibelieve
mostofussufferfromitalittle
(some
reasonswhywedosomay
emerge
fromthenext
chapter).
Butthisaestheticenthusiasm
becomesvaluable
only
ifitisbridledbyreason,by
a
feeling
of
responsibility,
and
by
ahumanitarian
urge
to
help.
Otherwise
itisa
dangerousenthusiasm, liableto
develop
intoaformof
neurosisor
hysteria.
Nowheredowefindthisaestheticismmore
stronglyexpressed
thaninPlato. Platowasanartist
;andlikemany
ofthebest
artists,hetriedtovisualizeamodel,thedivine
original
ofhis
work,andto
copy
it
faithfully
9
.A
goodnumberofthe
quotations
given
inthelast
chapter
illustrate this
point.WhatPlato
describesasdialectics
is,
inthemain,
theintellectualintuitionof
theworldof
purebeauty.
Histrained
philosophers
aremen
who
*
haveseenthetruthofwhatisbeautifuland
just,and
good
'
10
,andcan
bring
itdownfromheaventoearth.
Politics,
toPlato,
isanartnotina
metaphorical
senseinwhichwemay
speak
abouttheartof
treatingmen,ortheartof
gettingthings
done,butinamoreliteralsenseoftheword. Itisanartof
composition,
likemusic,painting,
orarchitecture. ThePlatonic
politiciancomposes cities,for
beauty's
sake.
ButhereImust
protest.
Idonotbdievethathumanlives
may
bemadethemeansfor
satisfying
anartist'sdesireforself-
expression.Wemustdemand,rather,that
everymanshouldbe
given,
ifhewishes,the
right
tomodelhislifehimself,
asfaras
thisdoesnotinterferetoomuchwithothers.MuchasImay

146
PLATO'SPOLITICS
sympathize
withtheaesthetic
impulse,
I
suggest
thattheartist
might
seek
expression
inanothermaterial.
Politics,wedemand,
must
upholdequalitarian
andindividualistic
principles ;dreamsof
beauty
havetosubmittothe
necessity
of
helpingmenin
distress,
andmenwhosuffer
injustice ;andtothe
necessity
ofcon-
structing
institutionstoservesuch
purposes
".
Itis
interesting
toobservetheclose
relationship
between
Plato'sradicalism,thedemandfor
sweepingmeasures,andhis
aestheticism. The
followingpassages
aremostcharacteristic.
Plato,speaking
about
*
the
philosopherwhohascommunionwith
thedivine
'
12
,mentionsfirstthathewillbe
*
overwhelmed
by
the
urge
. .torealizehis
heavenly
visioninindividualsaswellas
inthe
city',a
city
which
'
willneverknow
happiness
unlessits
draughtsmen
arcartistswhohavethedivineastheirmodel '.
Askedaboutthedetailsoftheir
draughtsmenship,
Plato's
'
Socrates
'
gives
the
followingstrikingreply
:
c
They
willtakeas
theircanvasa
cityandthecharactersofmen,and
theywill,
first
of
all,maketheircanvasclean
by
nomeansan
easy
matter.But
thisis
just
the
point,youknow,where
they
willdifferfromall
others.They
willnotstartworkona
city
noronanindividual
(nor
will
theydraw
uplaws)
unless
they
are
given
acleancanvas,
orhavecleaned itthemselves.'
The
artist-politician
hasfirsttomakehiscanvas
clean,
to
destroyexistinginstitutions, to
purify,
to
purge.
Thisisan
excellent
description
ofall
politicalradicalism,ofthesestheticist's
refusalto
compromise. Theviewthat
society
shouldbebeautiful
likeaworkofartleads
only
too
easily
toviolentmeasures.Andall
thisradicalismandviolenceisbothunrealisticandfutile.
(This
hasbeenshownby
the
example
ofRussia's
development.
After
theeconomicbreakdowntowhichthecanvas
cleaning
oftheso-
called
'
warcommunism
'
had
led,Leninintroducedhisso-called
*
NewEconomic
Policy',
infactakindof
piecemealengineering,
though
withouttheconsciousformulationofits
principles
orofa
technology.Hestarted
byrestoring
mostofthefeaturesofthe
picture
whichhadbeeneradicatedwithsomuchhuman
suffering.
Money,markets,differentiationofincome,and
privateproperty
foratimeeven
privateenterprise
in
production
were
reintroduced,and
only
afterthisbasiswasre-establishedbegan
a
new
period
ofreform
13
.)
Inordertocriticizethefoundations ofPlato'saesthetic
radicalism,wemaydistinguish
twodifferent
points.
(i)A
picturepaintedonacanvaswhichhastobe
wiped

CHAPTER
9
:RADICALISM
147
cleanbeforeonecan
paint
anewone thisiswhat
people
havein
mind
nowadayswhen
theyspeak
ofoursocial
'
system
'.But
therearesome
great
differences.Oneofthemisthatthe
painter
andthosewho
co-operate
withhimaswellastheinstitutions
whichmaketheirlife
possible,
areall
part
ofthesocial
system,
i.e.ofthe
picture
tobe
wiped
out. If
they
were
really
toclean
the
canvas,theywouldhaveto
destroythemselves,andalltheir
plans
foranewworld.(Andwhatfollowsthenwould
probably
notbeabeautiful
copy
ofaPlatonicidealbut
chaos.)The
political
artistclamours,
likeArchimedes,fora
place
outsidethe
socialworldonwhichhecantakehisstand,
inordertolever
itoffits
hinges.
Butsucha
place
doesnotexist
;andthesocial
worldmustcontinuetofunction
duringany
reconstruction. This
isthe
simple
reasonwhywemustreformitsinstitutions little
by
little,
untilwehavemore
experience
insocial
engineering.
(2)
Thisleadsustoamore
importantpoint,
totheirration-
alismwhichisinherentinradicalism. Inallmatters,wecan
only
learn
by
trialand
error,bymaking
mistakesand
improve-
ments
;wecannever
rely
on
inspiration,althoughinspirations
may
bemostvaluableas
long
as
they
canbechecked
byexperi-
ence.
Accordingly,
itisnotreasonable toassumethata
complete
reconstruction
of
oursocialworldwouldleadatoncetoaworkable
system.
Ratherweshould
expectthat,owing
tolackof
experience,many
mistakeswouldbemade,whichcouldbe
only
eliminatedby
a
longandlaborious
process
of
improvement ;
inotherwords,by
thatrationalmethodof
piecemealengineering
whose
application
weadvocate. Butthosewhodislikethismethodas
insufficiently
radicalwouldhave
again
to
wipe
outtheir
freshly
constructed
society,
inordertostartanewwithacleancanvas
;andsince
thenew
start,
forthesamereasons,wouldnotleadto
perfection
either,theywouldhaveto
repeat
this
process
withoutever
reachinganything.
Thosewhoadmitthisandare
prepared
to
adopt
ourmoremodestmethodof
piecemealimprovements,
but
only
afterthefirstcanvas
cleaning,
can
hardlyescape
thecriti-
cismthattheirfirst
sweeping
andviolentmeasureswere
quite
unnecessary.
Aestheticismandradicalismmustleadusto
jettisonreason,
andto
replace
it
by
3,desperatehope
for
political
miracles. This
irrational attitudewhich
springs
fromanintoxication with
dreamsofabeautifulworldiswhatIcallRomanticism
14
.It
may
seekits
heavenlycity
inthe
past
orinthefuture
;
itmay
preach
c
backtonature
'
or
c
forwardtoaworldofloveand

148
PLATO'SPOLITICS
beauty
'
;butits
appeal
is
always
toouremotionsratherthanto
reason.Evenwiththebestintentionsof
realizing
heavenon
earthit
only
succeedsin
realizing
hellthathellwhichmanalone
prepares
forhisfellows.

PLATOATTACKS
CHAPTER10 :THEOPENSOCIETYANDITSENEMIES
There isstill
somethingmissing
fromour
analysis.The
contentionthatPlato's
politicalprogramme
is
purely
totalitarian
andthe
objections
toitraisedin
chapter
6haveledustoexamine
therole
played,
withinthis
programme,by
suchmoralideasas
Justice,Wisdom,Truth,and
Beauty.Theresultofthisexamina-
tionwas
always
thesame.Wefoundthattheroleoftheseideas
is
important,
butthat
they
donotleadPlatobeyond
totali-
tarianismandracialism. Butoneoftheseideaswehavestillto
examine :thatof
Happiness.
Itmay
berememberedthatwe
quoted
Grossman
(andJoad)
inconnectionwiththebeliefthat
Plato's
politicalprogramme
is
fundamentally
a
*
plan
forthe
building
ofa
perfect
stateinwhich
every
citizenis
reallyhappy',
andthatIdescribed thisbeliefasarelicofthe
tendency
to
idealizePlato. Ifcalled
upon
to
justifymyopinion,
Ishould
nothavemuch
difficulty
in
pointing
outthatPlato'streatment
of
happiness
is
exactlyanalogous
tohistreatmentof
justice ;and
especially,
that
jtjy^ha&ed^up.Qn^
is
'
l^naturc
'
dividedintoclassesorcastes.
(jYuehappiness *,
Plato
insists,
isachieved
onlybyjustice,
i.e.bykeeping
toone's
place.Therulermustfind
happiness
in
ruling,
thewarriorin
warring ;and,wemayinfer,theslavein
slaving.Apart
from
that,Plato
saysfrequently
thatwhatheis
aiming
atisneither
the
happiness
ofindividualsnorthatof
anyparticular
classin
the
state,but
only
the
happiness
ofthewhole,and
this,he
maintains,
is
nothing
but.theoutcomeofthatruleof
justice
which(l
haveshownto
be)
totalitarianincharacter. That
only
this
justice
canleadto
any
true
happiness
isoneofthemain
thesesofthe
Republic.)
Inviewofall
this,
itseemstobeaconsistentand
hardly
refutable
interpretation
ofthematerialto
present
Platoasa
totalitarian
party-politician,
unsuccessfulinhisimmediateand
practicalundertakings,
butinthe
long
run
only
toosuccessful
2
inhis
propaganda
forthearrestandoverthrowofacivilization
whichhehated.Butonehas
only
toformulatethis
interpretation
inthisbluntfashioninordertofeelthatthereis
something
amiss

I5O
PLATOATTACKS
withit.At
anyrate,
soI
felt,whenIhadformulated it. Ifelt
perhaps
notsomuchthatitwasuntrue,butthatitwasdefective.
Itherefore
began
tosearchforevidencewhichwouldrefutethis
interpretation
3
.However,
in
everypoint
butone,
this
attempt
torefutethe
interpretation
was
quite
unsuccessful. Thenew
materialmadethe
identity
betweenPlatonismandtotalitarianism
only
themoremanifest.
Theone
point
inwhichIfeltthatmy
searchforarefutation
hadsucceededconcernedPlato'shatredof
tyranny.Ofcourse,
therewas
always
the
possibility
of
explaining
this
away.
It
wouldhavebeen
easy
to
say
thathisindictmentof
tyranny
was
mere
propaganda.
Totalitarianism
alwaysprofesses
alovefor
c
true
'
freedom,andPlato's
praise
offreedomas
opposed
to
tyranny
sounds
exactly
likethis
professed
love.In
spite
of
this,
Ifeltthatcertainofhisobservationson
tyranny
4
,whichwillbe
mentioned laterinthis
chapter,
weresincere.Of
course,the
factthat
*
tyranny
'
usually
meantinPlato's
day
aformofrule
basedonthe
support
ofthe
masses,wouldmakeit
possible
to
claimthatPlato'shatredwasconsistentwithmyoriginal
inter-
pretation.
ButIfeltthatthisdidnotremovetheneedfor
modify-
ing
the
interpretation.
Ialsofeltthatthemere
emphasis
on
Plato'sfundamental
sincerity
was
quite
insufficientto
accomplish
thismodification.Noamountof
emphasis
couldoffsetthe
generalimpression
ofthe
picture.Anew
picture
wasneeded
whichwouldhav$toincludePlato'ssincerebeliefinhismission
ashealerofthesicksocial
body,
aswellasthefactthathehad
seenmore
clearly
than
anybody
elsebeforeorafterhimwhatwas
happening
toGreek
society.
Sincethe
attempt
to
reject
the
identity
ofPlatonismandtotalitarianismhadnot
improved
the
picture,
Iwas
ultimately
forcedto
modifymyinterpretation
of
totalitarianism itself.Inotherwords,myattempt
tounderstand
Platobyanalogy
withmoderntotalitarianism
led,
tomyown
surprise,
toanewviewoftotalitarianism.
Inthe
light
ofthe
interpretation,
it
appears
tomethatPlato's
declarationofhiswishtomakethestateanditscitizens
happy
is
not
merelypropaganda.
I
grant
hisfundamentalbenevolence
6
.
Ialso
grant
thathewas
right,
toalimited
extent,
inthe
sociological
analysis
onwhichhebasedhis
promise
of
happiness.
To
put
this
point
more
precisely
:IbelievethatPlato,with
deepsociological
insight,
foundthathis
contemporaries
were
suffering
undera
severe
strain,andthatthisstrainwasduetothesocialrevolution
whichhad
begun
withtheriseof
democracyandindividualism.

CHAPTER10 :THEOPENSOCIETY
151
Forreasonsdiscussedlaterinthis
chapter,
Ibelievethatthe
medico-political
treatmentwhichherecommended, thearrestof
change
andthereturnto
tribalism,was
hopelesslywrong.But
therecommendation, though
not
practicable,
showsan
amazing
power
of
diagnosis.
Platoknewwhatwasamiss,heunderstood
the
strain,the
unhappiness,
underwhichthe
people
werelabour-
ing,although
heerredinhisfundamentalclaimthat
byleading
thembacktotribalismhecouldrestoretheir
happiness,
and
lessenthestrain.
Itismy
intentionto
give
inthis
chapter
abrief
survey
of
thehistoricalmaterialwhichinducedmetoholdsuch
opinions.
Afewremarksonthemethod
adopted,
thatofhistoricalinter-
pretation,
willbefoundinthelast
chapter
ofthebook. Itwill
therefore
sufficehereifI
say
thatIdonotclaimscientificstatus
forthismethod,sincethe
testing
ofan
interpretation
cannever
beas
thorough
asthatofan
ordinaryhypothesis.Theinter-
pretation
is
mainly
a
pointofview,whosevalueliesinits
fertility,
inits
power
tothrow
lightupon
thehistoricalmaterial,
tolead
ustofindnewmaterial,andto
help
ustorationalizeandto
unify
it.WhatIam
going
to
say
hereisthereforenotasserted
dogmatically
however
boldly
Imayperhaps
sometimes
express
myopinions.
Ourwesterncivilization
originated
withtheGreeks.They
madejhestepfrpijLtribalismJohumanitarianism. Letus
considerwhatthatmeans.
The
early
Greektribal
society
resemblesin
manyrespects
thatof
peoples
likethe
Polynesians,
theMaoris,forinstance.
Smallbandsofwarriors,usuallyliving
infortifiedsettlements,
wereruled
by
tribalchiefsor
kings,
or
by
aristocraticfamilies,
who
waged
wars
against
oneanotheronseaaswellasonland.
Therewere,ofcourse,many
differencesbetweentheGreekand
the
Polynesianways
of
life,
forthere
is,admittedly,
no
uniformity
intribalism. There isnostandardized
*
tribalway
oflife'.
Itseemstome,however,thatthereisone
distinguishing
feature
which iscommontomost,
ifnot
all,ofthesetribalsocieties.
Imeantheir
magical
orirrationalattitudetowardsthecustoms
ofsocial
life,andthe
corresponding rigidity
ofthesecustoms.
WhenI
speak
ofthe
rigidity
oftribalismIdonotmeanthat
no
changes
canoccurinthetribal
ways
oflife. Irathermean
thatthe
comparatively infrequentchanges
havethecharacter

152
PLATOATTACKS
of
religiousconversions,oroftheintroductionofnew
magical
taboos.They
arenotbased
upon
a
fully
rational
attempt
to
improve
socialconditions.
Apart
fromsuchrare
changes,
taboos
rigidlyregulate
anddominate all
aspects
oflife.They
donot
leavemanyloop-holes.
Therearefew
problems
inthisformof
life,and
nothingreallyequivalent
tomoral
problems.
Ido
notmeanthatitdoesnotsometimesneedmuchheroismfora
memberofatribetoactinaccordancewiththetaboos.WhatI
meanisthathewillneverfindhimselfinthe
position
of
doubting
howhe
ought
toact.The
rightway
is
alwaysdetermined,
though
difficultiesmustbeovercome in
following
it. Itis
determined
bytaboos,bymagical
tribalinstitutionswhichcan
neverbecome
objects
ofcriticalconsideration. Notevena
Heraclitus
distinguishesclearly
betweentheinstitutionallawsof
triballifeandthelawsofnature
;botharetakentobeofthe
same
magical
character. Based
upon
thecollective tribal
tradition,institutionsleavenoroomfor
personalresponsibility.
Thetaboosthatestablishsomeformof
group-responsibilitymay
betheforerunnerofwhatwecall
personalresponsibility,
but
they
are
fundamentally
differentfromit.They
arenotbased
upon
a
principle
ofreasonable
accountability,
but
upon
a
magical
idea
of
appeasing
the
powers
offate.
Itiswellknownhowmuchofthisstillsurvives.Ourown
ways
oflifearestillbesetwithtaboos,foodtaboos,taboosof
politeness,
andmany
others.And
yet,
therearesome
important
differences. Inourownway
oflifethere
is,betweenthelawsof
thestateontheonehand,andontheotherthetabooswehabitu-
allyobserve,an
ever-widening
fieldof
personaldecisions,with
its
problems
and
responsibilities
;andweknowthe
importance
ofthisfield.Personaldecisionsmay
leadtothealterationof
taboos,andevenof
political
lawswhichareno
longer
taboos.
The
great
difference isthe
possibility
ofrationalreflection
upon
thesematters.Wemakerational
decisions,
thatisto
say,
decisionsbased
upon
anestimateoftheir
consequences,
and
upon
aconscious
preference
forcertain
consequences
toothers.We
recognize
rational
personalresponsibility.
Inwhatfollows,themagical
ortribalorcollectivist
society
willalsobecalledtheclosed
society,andthe
society
inwhich
individuals areconfrontedwith
personal decisions,the
open
society.*
Theclosed
society
atitsbestcanbe
justlycompared
toan
organism.
Theso-called
organic
or
biologicaltheory
ofthe

CHAPTERIOITHEOPENSOCIETY
153
stateistoacertainextent
applicablehere,sincetheclosed
society
lacksthosefeaturesofthe
opensociety
whichmustdefeat
every
attempt
to
apply
this
theory.
ThefeaturesIhaveinmindare
thoseconnectedwiththefactthat,inthe
opensociety,many
membersstrivetotakethe
place
ofothermembers. Thismay
expressitself,
for
instance,
insuchan
importantphenomenon
as
class
struggle.Wecannotfind
anything
likeclass
struggle
inan
organism.Thecellsortissuesofan
organismwhicharesome-
timessaidto
correspond
tothemembersofa
state,mayperhaps
compete
forfood
;butthereisnoinherent
tendency
onthe
part
ofthe
legs
tobecomethe
brain,orofothermembersof
the
body
tobecomethe
belly.
Sincethereis
nothing
inthe
organism
to
correspond
tooneofthemost
important
features
ofthe
opensociety,competition
forstatusamong
itsmembers,
theso-called
organictheory
ofthestateisbasedonafalse
analogy.
Theclosed
society,
ontheotherhand,doesnotknowmuchofsuch
tendencies. Its
institutions,including
its
castes,aresacrosanct
taboo.The
organictheory
doesnotfitso
badly
here. Itis
thereforenot
surprising
tofindthatmost
attempts
to
apply
the
organictheory
toour
society
areveiledformsof
propaganda
for
areturntotribalism
7
.
Thuswhenwe
say
thatourwesterncivilizationcomesfrom
theGreeks,we
ought
tobeclearwhatthatmeans. Itmeans
thattheGreek
began
that
greatest
ofall
revolutions,arevolution
whichstarted
justyesterday,
asitwere,
forwearestillin
itsinitial
stage
thetransitionfromtheclosedtothe
open
society.
Of
course,
thisrevolutionwasnotmade
consciously.
The
breakdownoftribalismmay
betracedbacktothetimewhen
populationgrowthbegan
tomakeitselffelt
among
the
ruling
classoflanded
proprietors.
Thismeanttheendof
'
organic
'
tribalism. Foritcreatedsocialtensionwithintheclosed
society
ofthe
ruling
class.At
first,there
appeared
tobe
something
likean
'
organic
'
solutionofthis
problem,
thecreationof
daughter
cities.Thecharacterofthissolution isshownby
the
magical
procedure
inthe
sending
outofcolonists. Butthisritualof
colonization
onlypostponed
thebreakdown. Itevencreated
new
dangerspots
wherever itledtoculturalcontacts
;and
these,
in
turn,createdtheworst
danger,commerce,andanew
class
engaged
intradeand
seafaring.By
thesixth
centuryB.C.,
this
developmenthadledtothe
partial
dissolutionoftheold
ways
of
life,andeventoaseriesof
political
revolutionsand
O.S.I.E.VOL.i F

154 PLATOATTACKS
reactions.Andithadlednot
only
to
attempts
toretainandto
arresttribalism
byforce,
asin
Sparta,
butalsotothat
great
spiritualrevolution, theinventionof
thought
thatwasfree
from
magical
obsessions.Atthesametimewefindthefirst
symptoms
ofanewuneasiness. Thestrain
ofcivilizationwas
beginning
tobe
felt.
This
strain,oruneasiness,
isadirect
consequence
oftheshock
duetothebreakdownoftheclosed
society ;
ashockwhichIdo
notdoubthasnotbeen
forgotten
eveninour
day.
Itisthestrain
ofthedemandthatweshouldbe
rational,lookafter
ourselves,
andtakeimmense
responsibilities.
Itisthe
pricewehaveto
pay
for
beinghuman.
Thestrain ismost
closely
relatedtothe
problem
ofthe
tensionbetweentheclasseswhichisraisedforthefirsttime
by
thebreakdownoftheclosed
society.
Theclosed
society
itself
doesnotknowthis
problem.
Atleasttoits
rulingmembers,
slavery,caste,andclassruleare
*
natural
'
inthesenseof
being
unquestionable.
Butwiththebreakdownoftheclosed
society,
this
certaintydisappears,
andwithitall
feeling
of
security.The
tribal
community,
the
*
city',
isthe
place
of
security
forthe
memberofthetribe.Surrounded
by
enemiesand
bydangerous
orevenhostile
magicalforces,he
experiences
thetribal
community
asachild
experiences
his
family
andhishome,inwhichhe
plays
hisdefinite
part ;
a
part
heknowswell,and
plays
well.
Thebreakdownoftheclosed
society
andthe
openingup
of
the
problems
ofclassandother
problems
ofstatusmusthavethe
sameeffect
upon
thecitizensasaserious
familyquarrel
andthe
breakingup
ofthe
familyhomemusthaveonchildren
8
.Of
course,
thiskindofstrainmustbefelt
by
the
privilegedclasses,
nowthat
they
arethreatened,more
strongly
than
by
thosewho
had
formerly
been
suppressed
;buteventhelatterfelt
uneasy.
They
alsowere
frightenedby
thebreakdownoftheir
c
natural
'
world.And
thoughthey
continuedto
fight
their
struggle,they
wereoftenreluctantto
exploit
theirvictoriesovertheirclass
enemies,whohad
tradition,thestatus
quo,
a
higher
levelofeduca-
tion,andthe
feeling
ofnatural
authority,
ontheirside.
Inthis
light
wemust
try
tounderstandthe
history
of
Sparta
whichhadarrestedthese
developments,
andofAthens,the
leading
democracy.
Perhaps
themost
powerful
causeofthebreakdownofthe
closed
society
isthe
development
ofsea-communications and
commerce. Closecontactwithothertribesisliabletoundermine

CHAPTERIO :THEOPENSOCIETY
155
the
feeling
of
necessity
withwhichtribalinstitutionsareviewed
;
and
trade,commercial
initiative,appears
tobeoneofthefew
formsinwhichindividual initiative
9
and
independencecan
assert
itself,evenina
society
inwhichtribalism still
prevails.
Thesetwo,seafaring
andcommerce,werethe
outstanding
featuresofAthenian
imperialism,
asit
developed
inthefifth
century
B.C.Andindeed
they
were
recognized
asthemost
dangerousdevelopmentsby
the
oligarchs,
themembersofthe
privileged,
orofthe
formerlyprivileged,
classesofAthens. It
becamecleartothemthatthetradeofAthens,
its
monetary
commercialism,
itsnaval
policy,
anditsdemocratic
tendencies,
werea
singlelargemovement,andthatitwas
impossible
to
defeat
democracy
without
going
thewhole
way,
i.e.
destroying
the
naval
policy
andthe
empire.
Butthenaval
policy
ofAthens
wasbased
upon
itsharbour,thePiraeus
;and
strategically,upon
thewallsthatfortifiedAthens,andlater,upon
the
Long
Walls
whichlinkedittotheharboursofthePiraeusandPhalerum.We
find,accordingly,
thatformorethana
century
the
empire,
the
fleet,theharbour,andthewalls,werehatedby
the
oligarchic
parties
ofAthensasthe
strongpointsandthe
symbols
ofthe
Atheniandemocratic
power
which
theyhoped
one
day
to
destroy.
Muchevidenceofthis
development
canbefoundin
Thucydides'
Historyof
the
PeloponnesianWar,orrather,ofthetwo
great
warsof
431-421
and
419-403B.C.,betweenAthenian
democracy
and
thearrested
oligarchic
tribalismof
Sparta.When
reading
Thucydideswemustnever
forget
thathisheartwasnotwith
Athens,
hisnative
city.Although
he
apparently
didnot
belong
totheextreme
wing
oftheAthenian
oligarchic
clubswho
conspiredthroughout
thewarwiththe
enemy,
hewas
certainly
a
memberofthe
oligarchicparty,
andafriendneitherofthe
Athenian
people,
thedemos,whohadexiledhim,
norofits
imperialistpolicy. (I
donotintendtobelittle
Thucydides,
the
greatest historian, perhaps,
whoeverlived.Buthowever
successfulhewasin
making
sureofthefactsherecords,andin
spite
ofhissincereeffortstobe
impartial,
hiscommentsand
moral
judgementsrepresent
an
interpretation,
a
point
ofview
;
andinthisweneednot
agree
with
him.)
I
quote
firsta
passage
onThemistocles*
policy
in
482B.C.,
halfa
century
beforethe
Peloponnesian
war :
*
Themistoclesalso
persuaded
theAthenians
tofinishthePiraeus. . .SincetheAthenianshadnowtaken
tothesea
3he
thought
that
they
hada
greatopportunity
for

156
PLATOATTACKS
building
an
empire.Hewasthefirstwhodaredto
say
that
they
shouldmaketheseatheirdomain. ..'
10
Twenty-five years
later,
'
theAthenians
began
tobuildtheirLong
Wallstothesea,
onetotheharbourofPhalerum,theothertothePiraeus.'
ll
Butthistime,twenty-sixyears
beforetheoutbreakofthe
Peloponnesianwar,
the
oligarchicparty
was
fully
awareofthe
meaning
ofthese
developments.Wehearfrom
Thucydides
that
they
didnotshrinkevenfromthemostblatant
treachery.
As
sometimes
happens
with
oligarchs,
classinterest
superseded
their
patriotism.
An
opportunity
offereditselfintheformofahostile
Spartanexpeditionary
force
operating
inthenorthofAthens,
and
they
determinedto
conspire
with
Spartaagainst
theirown
country. Thucydides
writes :
*
CertainAthenianswere
privately
making
overturestothem
'
(i.e.
tothe
Spartans)
'
inthe
hope
that
they
would
put
anendtothe
democracy,
andtothe
building
ofthe
Long
Walls.ButtheotherAthenians . .
suspected
their
design
againstdemocracy.
5
The
loyal
Atheniancitizensthereforewent
outtomeetthe
Spartans,
butweredefeated. It
appears,
how-
ever,that
they
hadweakenedthe
enemysufficiently
to
prevent
himfrom
joining
forceswiththefifthcolumnistswithintheirown
city.Somemonths
later,the
Long
Wallswere
completed,
whichmeantthattheAthenian
democracy
could
enjoysecurity
as
long
asit
upheld
itsnaval
supremacy.
Thisincidentthrows
light
onthetensenessoftheclass
situationinAthens,even
twenty-sixyears
beforetheoutbreak
ofthe
Peloponnesian war,during
whichthesituationbecame
evenworse. Italsothrows
light
onthemethods
employedby
thesubversiveand
pro-Spartan oligarchicparty.Thucydides,
onemustnote,mentionstheir
treacheryonly
in
passing,
andhe
doesnotcensurethem,although
inother
places
he
speaks
most
stronglyagainst
class
struggleand
partyspirit.Thenext
passages
quoted,
writtenasa
general
reflectiononthe
Gorcyraean
Revo-
lutionof
427B.C.,are
interesting,
firstasanexcellent
picture
oftheclasssituation
;secondly,
asanillustrationofthe
strong
words
Thucydides
couldfindwhenhewantedtodescribe
analogous
tendenciesonthesideofthedemocratsof
Corcyra.
(In
orderto
judge
his
apparentimpartialitywemustremember
thatinthe
beginning
ofthewar
Corcyra
hadbeenoneofAthens
3
democratic
allies,andthattherevolthadbeenstarted
by
the
oligarchs.) Moreover,the
passage
isanexcellent
expression
of
the
feeling
ofa
general
socialbreakdown :
c
Nearly
thewhole
Hellenicworld
',writes
Thucydides,
c
wasincommotion. In

CHAPTERIO :THEOPENSOCIETY
157
everycity,
theleadersofthedemocraticandofthe
oligarchic
parties
were
tryinghard,theoneto
bring
intheAthenians,the
othertheLacedaemonians. . .Thetieof
party
was
stronger
thanthetieofblood. . .Theleadersoneithersideused
specious
names,theone
partyprofessing
to
uphold
theconstitutional
equality
ofthe
many,
theotherthewisdomofan
aristocracy ;
in
realitytheymadethe
public
interesttheir
price,professing,
of
course,
theirdevotiontoit.
They
used
any
conceivablemeans
for
getting
thebetterofone
another,andcommittedthemost
monstrouscrimes. . .Thisrevolution
gave
birthto
every
form
ofwickednessinHellas. . .
Everywhereprevailed
anattitude
of
perfidiousantagonism.
Therewasnoword
bindingenough,
nooathterrible
enough,
toreconcileenemies.Eachmanwas
strongonly
intheconvictionthat
nothingwassecure.'
12
Thefull
significance
ofthe
attempt
oftheAthenian
oligarchs
to
accept
the
help
of
Sparta
and
stop
the
building
oftheLong
Wallscanbe
gaugedwhenwerealizethatthistreacherous
attitudehadnot
changed
whenAristotlewrotehis
Politics,more
thana
century
later.Wehearthereaboutan
oligarchicoath,
which,Aristotle
said,
e
isnowin
vogue
'.Thisishowitruns :
*
I
promise
tobean
enemy
ofthe
people,
andtodomy
bestto
givethembadadvice !
'
13
Itisclearthatwecannotunderstand
this
period
without
keeping
suchhatredinmind.
Imentionedabovethat
Thucydides
himselfwasananti-
democrat. Thisbecomesclearwhenweconsiderhis
description
oftheAthenian
empire,
andtheway
itwashated
by
thevarious
Greekstates.Athens'ruleoverits
empire,
hetellsus,wasfelt
tobenobetterthana
tyranny,
andalltheGreektribeswere
afraidofher.In
describingpublicopinion
attheoutbreakof
the
Peloponnesianwar,heis
mildly
criticalof
Sparta
and
very
criticalofAthenian
imperialism.
*
The
generalfeeling
ofthe
peoples
was
strongly
onthesideoftheLacedaemonians
;
for
they
maintainedthat
they
weretheliberatorsofHellas. Cities
andindividualswere
eager
toassistthem . .
,andthe
general
indignation against
theAthenianswasintense.Somewere
longing
tobeliberatedfromAthens,othersfearfulof
falling
under
its
sway.'
14
Itismost
interesting
thatthis
judgement
ofthe
Athenian
empire
hasbecome,moreor
less,theofficialjudgement
of
*
History ',
i.e.'ofmostofthehistorians.
Just
asthe
philo-
sophers
findithardtofreethemselvesfromPlato's
point
ofview,
soarethehistoriansboundtothatof
Thucydides.
Asan
example
ImayquoteMeyer,who
simplyrepeatsThucydides
whenhe

158
PLATOATTACKS
says
:
'
The
sympathies
oftheeducatedworldofGreecewere . .
turnedaway
fromAthens.'
16
Butsuchstatementsare
onlyexpressions
oftheanti-democratic
point
ofview.Many
factsrecorded
byThucydides,
for
instance,
the
passagequoted
ontheattitudeofthedemocraticand
oligarchicpartyleaders,showthat
Sparta
was
c
popular
'
not
among
the
peoples
ofGreecebut
onlyamong
the
oligarchs
the
c
educated
',
as
Meyerputs
itso
nicely.
EvenMeyer
admits
that
'
the
democratically
mindedmasses
hoped
in
manyplaces
forher
victory
'
ie
,
i.e.forthe
victory
ofAthens
;and
Thucydides'
narrativecontainsmany
instanceswhich
prove
Athens'
popularity
among
thedemocratsandthe
suppressed.
Butwhocaresfor
the
opinion
oftheuneducatedmasses?If
Thucydidesandthe
'
educated
'
maintainedthatAthenswasa
tyrant,
thenshewas
a
tyrant.
Itismost
interesting
thatthesamehistorianswhohailRome
forherachievement, thefoundation ofauniversal
empire,
condemnAthensforher
attempt
toachieve
something
better.
ThefactthatRomesucceededwhereAthensfailed isnota
sufficient
explanation
ofthisattitude.They
donot
really
censure
Athensforher
failure,since
they
loathethe
very
ideathather
attemptmight
havebeensuccessful. Athens,theybelieve,wasa
ruthless
democracy,
a
place
ruledby
theuneducated,who
simply
hatedand
suppressed
theeducated,andwerehated
by
themin
turn.Butthisisofcourse
purenonsense,
asshown
by
the
amazingspiritualproductivity
ofAthensinthis
particularperiod.
Even
Meyer
mustadmitthis
productivity.
*
WhatAthens
produced
inthisdecade
',he
saysmodestly,
fi
ranks
equal
with
oneofthe
mightiest
decadesofGermanliterature.'
17
Pericles,
whowasthedemocraticleaderofAthensatthistime,wasmore
than
justifiedwhenhecalledhertheSchoolofHellas.
Iamfarfrom
defendingeverything
thatAthensdidin
building
up
her
empire,
andIdonotdefendwantonattacks
(if
suchhave
occurred),
oractsof
brutality ;nordoI
forget
thatAthenian
democracy
wasstillbasedon
slavery
18
.Butitis
necessary,
I
believe,toseethattribalistexclusivenessand
self-sufficiency
couldbe
supersededonlyby
someformof
imperialism.Andit
mustbesaidthatcertainofthe
imperialist
measuresintroduced
by
Athenswereratherliberal.One
veryinteresting
instanceis
thefactthatAthens
offered,
in
405B.C.,
toher
ally,
theIonian
islandSamos,
*
thattheSamiansshouldbeAtheniansfromnow
on
;andthatbothcitiesshouldbeonestate
;andthatthe

CHAPTERIO ITHEOPENSOCIETY
159
Samiansshouldordertheirinternalaffairsas
theychose,and
retaintheirlaws.
5
19
Anotherinstance isAthens'methodof
taxing
her
empire.Muchhasbeensaidaboutthesetaxeswhich
havebeendescribed,veryunjustly,
I
believe,asashamelessand
tyrannicalway
of
exploiting
thesmallercities.Inan
attempt
toevaluatethe
significance
ofthese
taxes,wemust,of
course,
compare
themwiththevolumeofthetrade
protectedby
the
Athenianfleetinreturn.The
necessary
information is
givenby
Thucydides,
fromwhomwelearnthattheAthenians
imposed
upon
their
allies,
in
4
1
3B.C.,
'
insteadofa
tribute,a
duty
of
5per
cent,onall
thingsimported
and
exportedby
sea
;and
they
thought
thatthiswould
yieldmore
'
20
.Thismeasure,adopted
underseverestrainofwar,comparesfavourably,
I
believe,with
theRomanmethodsofcentralization. TheAthenians,by
this
methodoftaxation,became
'
interestedinthe
development
of
alliedtrade,andsointheinitiativeand
independence
ofthe
variousmembersoftheir
empire. Originally,
theAthenian
empire
had
developed
outofa
league
of
equals.
In
spite
ofthe
temporary
dominationofAthens,herinterestinthe
development
oftrade
might
have
led,
in
time,
tosomekindoffederalcon-
stitution.At
least,weknow
nothing
oftheRomanmethodof
'
transferring
'
thecultural
possessions
fromthe
empire
tothe
dominant
city,
i.e.of
looting.Andwhateverone
mightsay
againstplutocracy,
itis
preferable
toaruleoflooters
21
.
ThisfavourableviewofAthenian
imperialism
canbe
supportedbycomparing
itwiththe
Spartan
methodsin
foreign
affairs.Theseweredeterminedby
theultimateaimofall
Spartanpolitics,
thearrestof
change,
thereturntotribalism
;
their
principles
were :
(i)
Tribalismandarrestment
proper
:
shutoutall
foreign
influenceswhich
mightendanger
the
rigidity
oftribaltaboos.
(2)Anti-humanitarianism :shutout,more
especially,
all
equalitarian, democratic, andindividualistic
ideologies. (3)Autarchy
:be
independent
oftrade.
(4)
Anti-
universalismor
particularism
:
uphold
thedifferentiationbetween
your
tribeandallothers
;donotmixwithinferiors.
(5)
Mastery
:dominateandenslave
yourneighbours. (6)
Butdo
notbecometoo
large
:
'
The
city
shouldgrowonly
as
long
asit
candosowithout
impairing
its
unity
'
22
,and
especially,
without
risking
theintroduction ofuniversalistic tendencies. Ifwe
compare
thesesix
principal
tendencieswiththoseofmodern
totalitarianism,thenweseethat
theyagreefundamentally,
with
thesole
exception
ofthelast.Thedifferencecanbedescribed

l6o PLATOATTACKS
bysaying
thatmoderntotalitarianism
appears
tohave
imperialist
tendencies. Butthis
imperialism
hasnoelementofatolerant
universalism, andtheworld-wide ambitionsofthemodern
totalitariansare
imposeduponthem,
asitwere,against
their
will.Twofactorsare
responsible
forthis :a
generaltendency
ofall
tyrannies
to
justify
theirexistence
bysaving
thestatefrom
itsenemies,and
perhaps
more
important,
thedifficulties in
carrying
out
points(2)
and
(5)
oftheabove
programme
inour
modernworld.Humanitarian tendencieshavebecome so
universalthathumanitarianism canbeshutout
only
ifitis
destroyed
allovertheworld. Besides,
thisworldhasbecomeso
smallthat
everybody
isnowa
neighbour,
andmustthereforebe
enslaved. Butinancienttimes,nothing
couldhave
appeared
more
dangerous
tothosewho
adopted
a
particularism
like
Sparta's,
thanAthenian
imperialism,
with its
possibility
of
developing
iivtoauniversal
empire
ofman.
Summingup
our
analysis
so
far,wecan
say
thatthe
political
and
spiritual
revolutionwhichhad
begun
withthebreakdown
ofGreektribalismreached itsclimaxinthefifth
century,
with
theoutbreakofthe
Peloponnesian
war. Ithad
developed
into
aviolentclasswar,and,
atthesametime,intoawarbetweenthe
two
leading
citiesofGreece.
Buthowcanwe
explain
thefactthat
outstanding
Athenians
like
Thucydides
stoodonthesideofreaction?Classinterestmay
play
itsrolehere,butit
is,
I
believe,aninsufficient
explanation.
Themain
point
seemstobethat
although
the
opensociety
was
already
in
existence,although
ithad,in
practice,begun
to
developnewvalues,new
equalitarian
standardsof
life,therewas
still
somethingmissingespecially
forthe
c
educated '.Thenew
faithofthe
opensociety,
its
onlypossiblefaith,humanitarianism,
was
beginning
toassert
itself,butwasnot
yet
formulated. For
thetime
being,
onecouldnotseemuchmorethanclasswar,the
democrats'fearofthe
oligarchicreaction,andthethreatoffurther
revolutionarydevelopments.
The
reaction,therefore,hadmuch
onits
side,tradition,thecallfor
defending
oldvirtues,andthe
old
religion.
Thesetendencies
appealed
tothe
feelings
ofmost
men,andtheir
popularitygave
risetoamovementtowhich,
although
itwasledandusedfortheirownendsby
the
Spartans
andtheir
oligarchic friends,manyupright
menmusthave
belonged,
evenatAthens.Fromthe
slogan
ofthemovement,
*
Backtothestateofourforefathers
',or
*
Backtotheold
paternal
state
',
derivestheterm
'
patriot
'.Itis
hardlynecessaryto

CHAPTERIO :THEOPENSOCIETY l6l
insistthatthebeliefs
popularamong
thosewho
supported
this
'
patriotic
'
movementwere
grossly
misused
by
those
oligarchs
whodidnotshrinkfrom
handing
overtheirown
city
tothe
enemy,
inthe
hope
of
gainingsupportagainst
thedemocrats.
Thucydides
wasoneofthe
representative
leadersofthismove-
mentforthe
'
paternal
state
'
23
,and
though
he
probably
did
not
support
thetreacherousactsoftheextremeanti-democrats,
hecouldnot
disguise
his
sympathies
withtheirfundamental
purpose
:toarrest
change,andto
fight
theuniversalistic
imperialism
oftheAthenian
democracyandtheinstrumentsand
symbols
ofits
power,
the
navy,
the
walls,andcommerce.
(In
viewofPlato'sdoctrinesaboutcommerce,
itmay
be
interesting
tonotehow
great
thefearofcommercialism was.Whenafter
his
victory
overAthensin
404
B.C.the
Spartanking,Lysander,
returnedwith
greatbooty,
the
Spartan
*
patriots ',
i.e.the
membersofthemovement forthe
c
paternal
state
',
triedto
prevent
the
import
of
gold ;and
though
itwas
ultimately
admitted,
its
possession
waslimitedtothe
state,and
capital
punishment
was
imposed
on
any
citizenfoundin
possession
of
precious
metals.
24
)
Although
the
*
patriotic
3
movementwas
partly
the
expression
ofthe
longing
toreturntomorestableformsof
life,to
religion,
decency,
lawandorder,
itwasitself
morally
rotten. Itsancient
faithwaslost,andwas
largelyreplacedby
a
hypocritical
and
even
cynicalexploitation
of
religious
sentiments.
25
Nihilism,
as
paintedby
Platointhe
portraits
ofCalliclcsand
Thrasymachus,
couldbefoundif
anywhereamong
the
young
'
patriotic
'
aristo-
cratswho,
if
given
the
opportunity,
becameleadersofthedemo-
cratic
party.
Theclearest
example
ofthisnihilism is
perhaps
the
oligarchic
leaderwho
helped
todealthedeath-blowatAthens,
Plato'suncleCritias,theleaderofthe
ThirtyTyrants.
26
Butatthistime,
inthesame
generation
towhich
Thucydides
belonged,
thereroseanewfaithinreason,freedomandthe
brotherhoodofallmenthenew
faith,and,
asI
believe,the
onlypossiblefaith,
ofthe
opensociety.
This
generation
whichmarksa
turningpoint
inthe
history
of
mankind,
IwouldliketocalltheGreatGeneration
;
itisthe
generation
whichlivedinAthens
during
the
Peloponnesian
war.
Therewere
great
conservativesamongthem,
like
Sophocles
27
,
or
Thucydides.
Thereweremenamongthemwho
represent
the
period
oftransition
;whowere
wavering,
like
Euripides,
or
sceptical,
like
Aristophanes.
Buttherewasalsothe
great

I62 PLATOATTACKS
leaderof
democracy, Pericles,whoformulatedthe
principle
of
equality
beforethelaw,andof
politicalindividualism, and
Herodotus,welcomedandhailedinPericles'
city
astheauthor
ofaworkthat
glorified
these
principles. Protagoras,
anative
ofAbderawhobecameinfluentialinAthens,andhis
country-
manDemocritus,mustalsobecountedamong
theGreatGener-
ation.They
formulatedthedoctrinethathumaninstitutions
of
language,custom,andlawarenottaboosbutman-made,not
naturalbut
conventional, insisting,
atthesametime,thatwe
are
responsible
forthem.Thentherewastheschoolof
Gorgias
Alcidamas,Lycophron,
and
Antisthenes,who
developed
the
fundamental tenetsof
anti-slavery,
andof
anti-nationalism,
i.e.
thecreedoftheuniversal
empire
ofmen.Andtherewas,
perhaps
the
greatest
of
all,Socrates,who
taught
thelessonthat
wemusthavefaithinhumanreason,butbewareof
dogmatism ;
thatwemust
keepaway
bothfrom
misology
28
,thedistrustof
theory
andof
reason,andfromthe
magical
attitudeofmaking
anidolofwisdom
;who
taught,
inother
words,
thatthe
spirit
ofscience iscriticism.
SinceIhavenotsofarsaidmuchabout
Pericles,and
nothing
atallaboutDemocritus,
Imay
usesomeoftheirownwordsin
ordertoillustratethenewfaith. FirstDemocritus :
*
Notout
offearbutoutofa
feeling
ofwhatis
right
shouldweabstain
from
doingwrong.
. .Virtue isbased,mostof
all,upon
respecting
theotherman. . .
Everymanisalittleworldofhis
own. . .We
ought
todoourutmostto
help
thosewhohave
suffered
injustice.
. .Tobe
good
meanstodono
wrong ;and
also,nottowanttodo
wrong.
. .Itisthe
good
deedthat
counts,nottheword ! . . .The
poverty
ofa
democracy
is
betterthanthe
prosperity
which
allegedlygoes
with
aristocracy
or
monarchy,just
as
liberty
isbetterthan
slavery.
. .Thewise
man
belongs
toallcountries,forthehomeofa
great
soulisthe
wholeworld.
5
Tohimisduealsothatremarkofatruescientist :
;<
Iwouldratherfinda
single
causallawthanbethe
king
of
Persia !
'
29
Intheirhumanitariananduniversalistic
emphasis
someof
these
fragments
ofDemocritussound,althoughthey
areofearlier
date,
as
jf^fyg^sd iSSfli^BSLui.^^^
'^esame
impression
is
conveyeofomymuch more
strongly,by
Pericles'famousfuneral
oration,deliveredatleasthalfa
century
beforethe
Republic
was
written. Ihave
already
in
chapter
6
quoted
twosentencesfrom
thisoration,
inconnectionwith
equalitarianism
30
,butafew

CHAPTERIO :THEOPENSOCIETY
163
passagesmay
be
quoted
heremore
fully
inorderto
give
aclearer
impression
ofits
spirit
:
c
Our
politicalsystem
doesnot
compete
withinstitutionswhichareelsewhereinforce.Wedonot
copy
our
neighbours,
but
try
tobean
example.Ouradministration
favoursthemany
insteadofthefew:thisiswhy
itiscalleda
democracy. t
Thelawsafford
equaljustice
toallalikeintheir
privatedisputes,
butwedonot
ignore
theclaimsofexcellence.
Whenacitizen
distinguisheshimself,thenheis
preferred
tothe
publicservice,notasamatterof
privilege,
butasarewardof
merit
;and
poverty
isnobar. . .Thefreedomwe
enjoy
extendsalsoto
ordinary
life
;wearenot
suspicious
ofoneanother,
anddonotfeelcalled
upon
to
nag
our
neighbour
ifhechooses
to
go
hisown
way.
. .Butthisfreedomdoesnotmakeus
lawless.Weare
taught
to
respect
the
magistrates
andthelaws,
andneverto
forget
thatwemust
protect
the
injured.Andwe
arealso
taught
toobservethoseunwrittenlawswhosesanction
lies
only
intheuniversal
feeling
ofwhatis
right.
. .
'
Our
city
isthrown
open
totheworld
;wenever
expel
a
foreigner.
. .Wearcfreetolive
exactly
aswe
please,
and
yet
are
alwaysready
toface
anydanger.
. .Welove
beauty
withoutbecomingextravagant,
andwecultivatetheintellect
without
lessening
ourresolution. . .Toadmitone's
poverty
is
no
disgrace
withus
;butweconsiderit
disgraceful
nottomake
anefforttoavoid it.AnAtheniancitizendoesnot
neglect
public
affairswhen
attending
tohis
private
business. . .We
consideramanwhotakesnointerestinthestatenotasharmless,
butasuseless
;and
althoughjonly^
af
ewm
^Joriginate
a
policy,
we
areallableto
judge
it.Wedonotlook
upon
discussionas~a
stumbling
blockintheway
of
politicalaction,butasanindis-
pensablepreliminary
to
any
wiseactionatall. . .Webelieve
that
happiness
isthefruitoffreedomandfreedomofvalour,
andwedonotshrinkfromthe
danger
ofwar. . .Tosum
up,
IclaimthatAthensistheSchoolofHellas,andthattheindividual
Athenian
growsup
toa
happyversatilityandtoareadinessfor
varied
emergencies
toself-reliance.'
31
Thesewordsarenot
only
a
eulogy
onAthens
;theyexpress
thetrue
spirit
oftheGreatGeneration. They
formulatethe
politicalprogramme
ofa
greatequalitarian individualist,ofa
democratwhowellunderstands that
democracy
cannotbe
exhaustedby
the
meaninglessprinciple
that
*
the
people
should
rule
',butthatitmustbebasedonhumanitarianism. Atthe
sametime,they
arean
expression
oftrue
patriotism,
of
just

164
PLATOATTACKS
pride
ina
city
whichhadmadeititstasktosetan
example ;
whichbecamethe
school,not
only
ofHellas,but,asweknow,
ofmankind,
formillennia
past
and
yet
tocome.
Pericles*
speech
isnot
only
a
programme.
Itisalsoa
defence,
and
perhaps
evenanattack. It
reads,
asIhave
alreadyhinted,
likeadirectattackonPlato. Idonotdoubtthat
itjwasdirected,
not
onlyagainst
thearrestedtribalismof
Sparta,
butalso
against
thetotalitarian
ring
or
{
link
'
athome
;against
themovement
forthe
paternalstate,theAthenian
'
Society
oftheFriendsof
Laconia
9
(as
Th.Gomperz
calledthemin
1902
32
).The
speech
istheearliest
83
andatthesametime
perhaps
the
strongest
statementevermadein
opposition
tothiskindofmovement. Its
importance
wasfelt
byPlato,whocaricatured Pericles*oration
halfa
century
laterinthe
passages
ofthe
Republic
34
inwhich
he,
opposesdemocracy,
aswellasinanother
parody,
the
dialogue
Menexenus
36
.ButthefriendsofLaconiawhomPericlesattacked
retaliated
long
beforePlato.Only
fiveorsix
years
afterPericles'
oration,a
pamphlet
ontheConstitution
of
Athens
36
was
published
by
anunknownauthor,possiblyGritias,whois
frequently
called
the
c
Old
Oligarch
'.This
ingeniouspamphlet,
theoldestextant
treatiseon
politicaltheory, is,
atthesame
time,theoldest
monumentofthedesertionofmankind
by
itsintellectualleaders.
Itisaruthlessattack
uponAthens,writtennodoubtbyoneof
herbestbrains. Itscentralidea,anideawhichbecamean
articleoffaithwithThucydides
and
Plato,
isthecloseconnection
betweennaval
imperialism
and
democracy ;andittriestoshow
thattherecanbeno
compromise
inaconflictbetweentwo
worlds
37
,theworldsofdemocracyandof
oligarchy.Only
the
useofruthlessviolence,oftotalmeasures,including
the
acquisi-
tionofalliesfromoutside
(theSpartans),
can
put
anendtothe
unholy
ruleoffreedom. Thisremarkable
pamphletwasto
becomethefirstofa
practically
infiniteseriesofworkson
political
philosophy
whichwere,openly
or
covertly,
to
repeat
thesame
themedowntoourown
day.Unwilling
andunableto
help
mankind
along
theirdifficult
path
intoanunknownfuturewhich
they
havetocreateforthemselves,the
*
educated
'
triedtomake
themturnbackintothe
past.Incapable
of
leading
anew
way,
theyonly
couldmakethemselvesleaders-ofthe
perennial
revolt
againstfreedom.Andtoasserttheir
superioritybyfightingagainst
equality
becamethemore
necessary
forthemsince
they
were
unableto
prove
their
superioritybyhelping
thecauseofhuman
freedom.Harshasthis
judgementmaysound,
itis
fair,
I

CHAPTERIO :THEOPENSOCIETY
165
believe,
ifitis
applied
tothoseintellectualleadersoftherevolt
against
freedomwhocameaftertheGreat
Generation,and
especially
afterSocrates.Wecannow
try
toseethem
against
the
background
ofourhistorical
interpretation,
Theinventionof
philosophy
itselfcanbe
interpreted,
Ithink,
asareactiontothebreakdownoftheclosed
society
andits
magical
beliefs. Itisan
attempt
to
replace
thelost
magical
faith
by
arationalfaith.
(Asignificantpoint
isthatthis
attempt
coincideswiththe
spread
oftheso-called
Orphic
sectswhose
memberstriedto
replace
thelost
feeling
of
unityby
anew
mysticalreligion.)Theearliest
philosophers,
thethree
great
loniansand
Pythagoras,were
probablyquite
unawareofthe
stimulustowhich
theywere
reacting!)They
weretheunconscious
antagonists
aswellasthe
representatives
ofasocialrevolution.
The
very
factthat
theyfoundedschoolsorsectsor
orders,
i.e.new
social
institutions,modelled
largely
afterthoseofanidealized
tribe
38
,proves
that
they
werereformersinthesocial
field,and
therefore,
that
they
were
reacting
tocertainsocialneeds.That
they
reactedtotheseneedsandtotheirownsenseof
drift,notby
imitating
Hesiodin
inventingahistoricistmyth
of
destinyand
decay
39
,butbyinventing
theartof
thinkingrationally,
isone
ofthe
inexplicable
factswhichstandatthe
beginning
ofour
civilization. Buteventheserationalistsreactedtothelossof
the
unity
oftribalismina
largely
emotional
way.
Their
reasoning
givesexpression
totheir
feeling
of
drift,
tothestrainofa
develop-
mentwhichwasabouttocreateourindividualistic civiliza-
tion.Oneoftheoldest
expressions
ofthisstrain isdueto
Anaximander
40
,thesecondoftheIonian
philosophers.
Indi-
vidualexistence
appeared
tohimas
injustice,
asa
wrongful
act
of
usurpation,
forwhichindividualsmust
suffer,anddo
penance.
Thefirsttobecomeconsciousofthesocialrevolutionandthe
struggle
ofclasseswasHeraclitus.Howherationalized his
feeling
ofdrift
bydeveloping
thefirstanti-democratic
ideology
andthefirsthistoricist
philosophy
of
changeand
destiny,
hasbeen
describedinthesecond
chapter
ofthisbook. Heraclituswasthe
firstconscious
antagonist
ofthe
opensociety.
Nearly
allthese
early
thinkerswere
labouring
undera
tragic
and
desperate
strain.
41
The
onlyexception
is
perhaps
the
monotheist
Xenophanes
42
,whocarriedhisburden
courageously.
Wecannotblamethemfortheir
reactionarytendenciesiuthe
same
way
aswe
may
blametheirsuccessors.Thenew.faithof
the
opensociety,
thefaithinman,in
equalitarianjustice,and

166 PLATOATTACKS
inhumanreason,was
perhapsbeginning
totake
shape,
butit
wasnot
yet
formulated.
The
greatest
contribution tothisfaithwastobemade
by
Socrates,whodiedforit.SocrateswasnotaleaderofAthenian
democracy,
like
Pericles,oratheoristofthe
opensociety,
like
Protagoras.Hewas,rather,acriticofAthensandofher
democratic
institutions,andinthishemay
havebornea
super-
ficialTresemblance tosomeoftheleadersofthereaction.But
thereisnoneedforamanwhocriticizes
democracy
anddemo-
craticinstitutionstobetheir
engmy,although
boththedemocrats
he
criticizes,andthetotalitarianswho
hope
to
profit
from
any
disunioninthedemocratic
camp,
are
likely
tobrandhimassuch.
{
Thereisafundamentaldifferencebetweenademocraticanda
totalitarian criticismof
democracy.
Socrates'criticismwasa
democraticone,andindeedofthekindthatisthe
very
lifeof
democracy. (Democratswhodonotseethedifferencebetween
a
friendly
andahostilecriticismof
democracy
arethemselves
imbuedwiththetotalitarian
spirit.
Totalitarianism
certainly
cannotconsider
any
criticismas
friendly,
since
every
criticismof
suchan
authoritymust
challenge
the
principle
of
authority
itself.)
Ihave
alreadymentionedsomefeaturesofSocrates'
teaching ;
his
intellectualism,
i.e.his
equalilariantheory
ofhumanreason
asauniversalmediumofcommunication
;
hisstressonintel-
lectual
honesty
andself-criticism
;
his
equalitarian theory
of
justice,
andhisdoctrinethatitisbettertobeavictimof
injustice
thantoinflictit
upon
others. Ithinkitisthislastdoctrinewhich
can
help
usbestto
understand
thecoreofhis
teaching,
hiscreed
of
individualism,
hisbeliefinthehumanindividualasanendin
himself.
Theclosed
society
andwithititscreedthatthetribeis
everythingandtheindividual
nothing,
hadbrokendown.
Individual initiativeandself-assertionhadbecomeafact.
Interestinthehumanindividualasindividual,andnot
only
as
tribalheroand
saviour,hadbeenaroused
43
.Butthe
philosophy
ofman
beganonly
with
Protagoras ;andthecreedthatthereis
nothingmore
important
inourlifethanotherindividualmen,
the
appeal
tomento
respect
one
another,and
themselves,
is
duetoSocrates.
Burnethasstressed
44
thatitwasSocrateswhocreatedthe
conception
ofthe
soul,a
conception
whichhadsuchanimmense
influence
upon
ourcivilization. Ibelievethatthisviewis
largely

CHAPTERIO:THEOPENSOCIETY
167
right,although
Ifeelthatitsformulationmay
be
misleading,
especially
theuseoftheterm
*
soul
'
;forSocratesseemstohave
keptaway
from
metaphysical
theoriesasmuchashecould.His
appeal
wasamoral
appeal,
andhis
theory
of
individuality (or
ofthe
c
soul
',
ifthiswordis
preferred) is,
I
think,amoraland
nota
metaphysical
doctrine.Withthisdoctrinehe
fought,
as
always,against
self-satisfactionand
complacency.Hedemanded
thatindividualism shouldnotbe
merely
thedissolutionof
tribalism,butthattheindividualshould
proveworthy
ofhis
liberation. Thisis
why
heinsistedthatmanisnot
merely
a
piece
offlesha
body.
Thereismoreinman,
adivine
spark,
reason
;andaloveof
truth,ofkindness,humaneness,aloveof
beauty
andof
goodness.
Itisthesethatmakeaman'slifeworth
while.ButifIamnot
merely
'
body',whatam
I,then?You
are,
firstof
all,intelligence,
wasSocrates'
reply.
Itis
your
reasonthatmakesyouhuman
;
thatenables
you
tobemore
thanamerebundleofdesiresandwishes
;thatmakes
you
a
self-sufficientindividualandentitles
you
toclaimthat
you
are
anendin
yourself.
Socrates'
saying
c
carefor
your
souls
'
is
largely
an
appeal
forintellectual
honesty,just
asthe
saying
*
know
thyself
isusedbyhimtoremindusofourintellectuallimitations.
These,Socrates
insisted,arethe
things
thatmatter.And
whathecriticizedin
democracy
anddemocraticstatesmenwas
their
inadequate
realizationofthese
things.Hecriticizedthem
rightly
fortheirlackofintellectual
honesty,andfortheirobsession
with
power-politics
45
.Withhis
emphasisupon
thehumanside
ofthe
politicalproblem,
hecouldnottakemuchinterestin
institutionalreform. Itwastheimmediate,
the
personalaspect
ofthe
opensociety
inwhichhewasinterested.Hewaswrong
whenheconsideredhimselfa
politician ;hewasateacher.
ButifSocrateswas,fundamentally,
a
protagonist
ofthe
open
society,
andafriendof
democracy,why,
itmay
beasked,didhe
mixwithanti-democrats ?Forweknowthatamong
hiscom-
panions
werenot
onlyAlcibiades,whoforatimewentoverto
thesideof
Sparta,
butalsotwoofPlato'suncles,Critiaswho
laterbecametheruthlessleaderofthe
ThirtyTyrants,
and
Charmideswhobecamehislieutenant.
Thereismorethanone
reply
tothis
question.
Firstweare
toldby
PlatothatSocrates'attack
upon
thedemocratic
politicians
ofhistimewascarriedout
partly
withthe
purpose
of
exposing
theselfishnessandlustfor
power
ofthe
hypocritical
flatterersof
the
people,
more
particularly,
oftheyoung
aristocratswho
posed

I68 PLATOATTACKS
asdemocrats,butwholooked
upon
the
people
asmereinstruments
oftheirlustfor
power
46
.This
activitymadehim,ontheone
hand,
attractivetosomeatleastoftheenemiesof
democracy ;
ontheotherhandit
broughthimintocontactwiththat
very
type
ofambitious aristocrat.Andhereentersasecondcon-
sideration. Socrates,themoralistandindividualist,wouldnever
merely
attackthesemen.Hewould,rather,takearealinterest
inthem,andhewould
hardlygive
them
up
without
making
a
serious
attempt
toconvertthem.Therearemany
allusionsto
such
attempts
inPlato's
dialogues.Wehave
reason,andthis
isathirdconsideration, tobelievethatSocrates,theteacher-
politician,
evenwentoutofhisway
toattract
youngmenand
to
gain
influenceoverthem,especially
whenheconsideredthem
open
toconversion,and
thought
thatsome
daytheymightpossibly
holdofficesof
responsibility
intheir
city.The
outstanding
example is,ofcourse,Alcibiades, singledoutfromhis
very
childhood asthe
great
futureleaderoftheAthenian
empire.
AndCritias'
brilliancy,
ambitionand
courage,madehimone
ofthefew
likelycompetitors
ofAlcibiades,
(Heco-operated
withAlcibiadesfora
time,butlaterturned
against
him. Itis
notatall
improbable
thatthe
temporaryco-operation
wasdue
toSocrates'
influence.)FromallweknowaboutPlato'sown
early
andlater
politicalaspirations,
itismorethan
likely
that
hisrelationswithSocrateswereofasimilarkind
47
.
Socrates,
though
oneofthe
leadingspirits
ofthe
opensociety,wasnota
party
man.Hewouldhaveworkedin
any
circlewherehiswork
might
havebenefitedhis
city.
Ifhetookinterestina
promising
youth
hewasnottobedeterredbyoligarchicfamily
connections.
Buttheseconnectionsweretocausehisdeath.Whenthe
greatwarwas
lost,Socrateswasaccusedof
having
educatedthe
menwhohad
betrayeddemocracy
and
conspired
withthe
enemy
to
bring
aboutthedownfallofAthens.
The
history
ofthe
Peloponnesian
warandthefallofAthensis
stilloften
told,undertheinfluenceof
Thucydides' authority,
in
suchaway
thatthedefeatofAthens
appears
astheultimate
proof
ofthe
dangerous
weaknessesofthedemocratic
system.
But
thisviewis
merely
atendentiousdistortion,andthewell-known
factstella
very
different
story.Themain
responsibility
forthe
lostwarrestswiththetreacherous
oligarchswho
continuously
conspired
with
Sparta.
Prominentamong
thesewerethree
former
disciples
of
Socrates,Alcibiades,Gritias,andGharmides.
AfterthefallofAthensin
404
B.C.thetwolatterbecamethe

CHAPTERIO :THEOPENSOCIETY 1
69
leadersofthe
ThirtyTyrants,
whowerenomorethana
puppet
government
under
Spartanprotection.ThefallofAthens,and
thedestructionofthe
walls,areoften
presented
asthefinal
resultsofthe
greatwarwhichhadstartedin
431
B.C.Butin
this
presentation
liesthemain
distortion,
forthedemocrats
fought
on.Atfirst
onlyseventystrong,theyprepared
undertheleader-
ship
of
Thrasybulus
and
Anytus
theliberationofAthens,where
Critiaswasmeanwhile
killing
scoresofcitizens
;for
during
the
eight
monthsofhis
reign
ofterrorthedeath-rolecontained
*
nearly
a
greaternumberofAtheniansthanthe
Peloponnesians
hadkilled
during
thelastten
years
ofwar
'
48
.Butafter
eight
months
(in403B.C.)
Critiasandthe
Spartangarrison
were
attackedanddefeated
by
thedemocracieswhoestablishedthem-
selvesinthePiraeus,andbothofPlato'suncleslosttheirlives
inthebattle.Their
oligarchic
followerscontinuedforatime
the
reign
ofterrorinthe
city
ofAthens
itself,buttheirforces
wereinastateofconfusionanddissolution.
Havingproved
themselves
incapable
of
ruling,they
were
ultimatelyabandoned
by
their
Spartanprotectors,whoconcludeda
treaty
withthe
democrats.The
peace
re-established the
democracy
inAthens.
Thusthedemocraticformof
governmenthad
proved
its
superiorstrength
underthemostsevere
trials,aridevenitsenemies
began
tothinkitinvincible.
(Nineyearslater,
afterthebattle
ofCnidus,theAthenianscouldre-erecttheirwalls.Thedefeat
of
democracy
hadturnedinto
victory.)
Assoonastherestored
democracy
hadre-establishednormal
legal
conditions
49
,acasewas
broughtagainst
Socrates. Its
meaningwasclear
enough ;hewasaccusedof
having
educated
themost
pernicious
enemiesofthe
state,Alcibiades,Critias,and
Charmides. Certaindifficultiesforthe
prosecution
werecreated
by
an
amnesty
forall
political
crimescommittedbeforethe
re-establishment ofthe
democracy.The
charge
couldnot
therefore
openly
refertothe
past.Andthe
prosecutorsprobably
sought
notsomuchto
punish
Socratesfortheunfortunate
political
eventsofthe
pastwhich,
as
theyknew
well,had
happenedagainst
hisintentions
;
theiraimwas,rather,
to
prevent
himfrom
continuing
his
teaching,which,inviewofits
effects,they
could
hardlyregard
otherwisethanas
dangerous
tothestate.Forall
thesereasons,the
chargewas
given
thevagueandrather
meaning-
lessformthatSocrateswas
corrupting
the
youth,
thathewas
impious,
andthathehad
attempted
tointroducenovel
religious
practices
intothestate.
(The
lattertwo
chargesundoubtedly

I7O
PLATOATTACKS
expressed,
however
clumsily,
thecorrect
feeling
thatinthe
ethico-religious
fieldhewasa
revolutionary.)
Becauseofthe
amnesty,
the
t
corruptedyouth
'
couldnotbemore
precisely
named,but
everybodyknew,of
course,whowasmeant.
50
Inhisdefence,Socratesinsistedthathehadno
sympathy
with
the
policy
ofthe
Thirty,
andthathehad
actually
riskedhislife
bydefying
their
attempt
to
implicatehiminoneoftheircrimes
51
.
Itisnow
usuallyrecognized
that
Anytus,
thedemocratic
leaderwhobackedthe
prosecution,
didnotintendtomakea
martyr
ofSocrates.Theaimwastoexilehim.Butthis
plan
wasdefeatedby
Socrates'refusalto
compromise
his
principles.
T^hat
hewantedto
die,
orthathe
enjoyed
theroleof
martyr,
I
donotbelieve
52
.He
simplyfought
forwhathebelievedtobe
right,
andforhislife'swork.Hehadneverintendedtounder-
mine
democracy.
In
fact,hehadtriedto
give
itthefaithit
needed. Thishadbeentheworkofhislife. Itwas,he
felt,
seriously
threatened.The
betrayal
ofhisformer
companions
lethisworkandhimself
appear
ina
light
whichmusthave
disturbedhim
deeply.Hemay
havewelcomedthetrialasan
opportunity
to
prove
thathis
loyalty
tohis
city
wasunbounded.
Socrates
explained
thisattitudemost
carefullywhenhewas
given
an
opportunity
to
escape.
Hadheseized
it,andbecome
an
exile,everybody
wouldhave
thought
himan
opponent
of
democracy.
Sohe
stayed,
andstatedhisreasons. This
explana-
tion,
hislast
will,canbefoundinPlato'sCrito
53
.Itis
simple.
IfI
go,
saidSocrates,
Iviolatethelawsofthestate.Suchan
actwould
putmein
opposition
tothelaws,and
provemy
disloyalty.
Itwoulddoharmtothestate.Only
ifI
stay
can
I
putbeyond
doubtmyloyalty
tothe
state,
aswellasto
democracy,
and
prove
thatIhaveneverbeenits
enemy.
Therecanbeno
better
proof
ofmyloyalty
thanmywillingness
todieforit.
*
Socrates'deathistheultimate
proof
ofhis
sincerity.
His
fearlessness,
his
simplicity,
his
modesty,
hissenseof
proportion,
hishumourneverdesertedhim.
'
Iamthat
gadfly
whichGod
hasattachedtothe
city',hesaidinhis
Apology,
'
andall
day
long
andinall
places
Iam
alwaysfasteninguponyou,arousing
and
persuading
and
reproachingyou.Youwouldnot
readily
findanotherlikeme,andthereforeIshouldadvise
you
to
spare
me . .If
you
strikeatme,
as
Anytus
advises
you,and
rashly
putmeto
death,then
you
willremain
asleep
fortherestof
your
lives,unlessGodinhiscaresends
you
another
gadfly
'
54
.He
showedthatamancould
die,not
only
forfateandfameandother

CHAPTER10 :THEOPENSOCIETY
171
grandthings
ofthis
kind,butalsoforthefreedomofcritical
thought,andfora
self-respect
whichhas
nothing
todowith
self-importance
or
sentimentality.
Socrateshad
only
one
worthysuccessor,
hisoldfriend
Antisthenes,
thelastoftheGreatGeneration.
Plato,
hismost
gifteddisciple,
wassoonto
prove
theleastfaithful.He
betrayed
Socrates,just
ashisuncleshaddone.These,
besides
betraying
Socrates,hadalsotriedto
implicate
himintheirterrorist
acts,
but
they
didnotsucceed,
sinceheresisted. Platotriedto
implicate
Socratesinhis
grandioseattempt
toconstructthe
theory
ofthearrested
society ;andhehadno
difficulty
in
succeeding,
forSocrateswasdead.
Iknowofcoursethatthis
judgement
willseem
outrageously
harsh,eventothosewhoarccriticalofPlato
55
.Butifwelook
upon
the
Apology
andtheCritoasSocrates'last
will,andifwe
compare
thesetestamentsofhisold
age
withPlato'stestament,
the
Laws,thenitisdifficultto
judge
otherwise. Socrateshadbeen
condemned,buthisdeathwasnotintended
by
theinitiatorsof
thetrial. Plato'sLaws
remedy
thislackofintention.
Coolly
and
carefullythey
elaboratethe
theory
of
inquisition.
Free
thought,
criticismof
politicalinstitutions,teachingnewideasto
the
young,attempts
tointroducenew
religiouspractices
oreven
opinions,
areall
pronounced capital
crimes.InPlato's
state,
Socrateswouldneverhavebeen
given
the
opportunity
ofdefend-
ing
himself
publicly ;hewouldhavebeenhandedovertothe
secretNocturnalCouncilforthe
c
treatment
',and
finally
forthe
punishment,
ofhisdiseasedsoul.
IcannotdoubtthefactofPlato's
betrayal,
northathisuse
ofSocratesasthemain
speaker
ofthe
Republic
wasthemost
successful
attempt
to
implicate
him.Butitisanother
question
whetherthis
attempt
wasconscious.
InordertounderstandPlatowemustvisualizethewhole
contemporary
situation. Afterthe
Peloponnesianwar,thestrain
ofcivilizationwasfeltas
strongly
asever.Theold
oligarchic
hopes
werestill
alive,andthedefeatofAthenshadeventended
to
encourage
them.Theclass
struggle
continued. YetCritias'
attempt
to
destroydemocracybycarrying
outthe
programme
of
theOld
Oligarch
hadfailed. IthadnotfailedtiaroughJbck-of
determinajdon ;themostruthlessuseofviolencehadbeen
unsuccessful,
in
spite
offavourablecircumstances inthe
shape
of
powerfulsupport
fromvictorious
Sparta.
Platofeltthata
complete
reconstruction oftheprogramme
wasneeded.The

172
PLATOATTACKS
Thirty
hadbeenbeatenintherealmof
powerpoliticslargely
because
they
hadoffendedthecitizens*senseof
justice.The
defeathadbeen
largely
amoraldefeat.ThefaithoftheGreat
Generationhad
proved
its
strength.
The
Thirty
had
nothing
ofthiskindtooffer
;they
weremoralnihilists.Theprogramme
oftheOld
Oligarch,
Plato
felt,couldnotberevivedwithout
basing
it
upon
another
faith,upon
a
persuasion
whichre-affirmed
theoldvaluesof
tribalism,opposing
themtothefaithofthe
opensociety.Menmustbe
taught
that
justice
is
inequality,
andthat
the
tribe,the
collective,stands
higher
thantheindividual.
66
ButsinceSocrates'faithwastoo
strong
tobe
challengedopenly,
Plato
attempted
to
re-interpret
itasafaithintheclosed
society.
Thiswasdifficult
;butitwasnot
impossible.
Forhadnot
Socratesbeenkilled
by
the
democracy
?Hadnot
democracy
lost
anyright
toclaimhim?AndhadnotSocrates
always
criticizedthe
anonymous
multitudeaswellasitsleadersfortheir
lackofwisdom?Itwasnotdifficult,moreover,
to
re-interpret
Socratesas
havingrecommended theruleofthe
c
educated
',
thelearned
philosophers.
Inthis
interpretation,
Platowasmuch
encouragedwhenhediscoveredthatitwasalso
part
ofthe
ancient
Pythagorean
creed
;andmostof
all,whenhefound,
in
Archytas
ofTarentum,a
Pythagoreansage
aswellasa
great
andsuccessfulstatesman. Here,he
felt,wasthesolutionofthe
riddle.HadnotSocrateshimself
encouraged
his
disciples
tc
participate
in
politics
?Didthisnotmeanthathewantedthe
enlightened,
the
wise,
torule?Whatadifferencebetweenthe
crudity
ofthe
rulingmobofAthensandthe
dignity
ofan
Archytas
!
Surely,
Socrateswhohadneverstatedhissolutionol
theconstitutional
problem
musthavehad
Pythagoreanism
inmind,
Inthisway
Platomay
havefoundthatitwas
possible
to
give
bydegrees
anew
meaning
tothe
teaching
ofthemostinfluential
memberoftheGreatGeneration,andtomakeuseofan
opponent
whose
overwhelming strength
hewouldneverhavedaredtc
attack
directly. This,Ibelieve,
isthe
simplestinterpretation
ol
thefactthatPlatoretainedSocratesashismain
speaker
even
afterhehad
departed
so
widely
fromhis
teaching
thathecould
no
longer
deceivehimselfaboutthisdeviation
57
.Butitisnot
thewhole
story.He
felt,
I
believe,
inthe
depth
ofhis
soul,
that
Socrates'
teachingwas
very
differentindeedfromthis
presenta-
tion,andthathewas
betraying
Socrates.AndIthinkthat
Plato'scontinuous effortstomakeSocrates
re-interpret
himseli
areatthesametimePlato'seffortsto
quiet
hisownbadcon-

PLATOATTACKS
science.Bytryingagain
and
again
to
prove
thathis
teaching
was
only
the
logicaldevelopment
ofthetrueSocratic
doctrine,
hetriedto
persuade
himselfthathewasnotatraitor.
In
reading
Platowe
are,
I
feel,witnessesofaninner
conflict,
ofa
truly
titanic
struggle
inPlato'smind.Evenhisfamous
6
fastidiousreserve,the
suppression
ofhisown
personality
'
58
,or
rather,the
attemptedsuppression
foritisnotatalldifficultto
readbetweenthelines isan
expression
ofthis
struggle.And
IbelievethatPlato'sinfluencecan
partly
be
explainedby
the
fascinationofthisconflictbetweentwoworldsinone
soul,a
struggle
whose
powerfulrepercussionsupon
Platocanbefelt
underthatsurfaceoffastidiousreserve. This
struggle
touches
our
feelings,
foritisstill
going
onwithinourselves. Platowas
thechildofatimewhichisstillourown.(We
mustnot
forget
thatit
is,after
all,only
a
century
sincetheabolitionof
slavery
intheUnitedStates,andevenlesssincetheabolitionofserfdom
inCentral
Europe.)
Nowheredoesthisinner
struggle
reveal
itselfmore
clearly
thaninPlato's
theory
ofthesoul.That
Plato,
withhis
longing
for
unity
and
harmony,
visualizedthestructure
ofthehumansoulas
analogous
tothatofaclass-divided
society
69
,
showshow
deeply
hemusthavesuffered.
Plato's
greatest
conflictarisesfromthe
deepimpressionmade
upon
him
by
the
example
ofSocrates,buthisown
oligarchic
inclinations strive
only
too
successfullyagainst
it.Inthefield
ofrational
argument,
the
struggle
isconductedbyusing
the
argument
ofSocrates'humanitarianism
against
itself.The
earliest
example
ofthiskindcanbefoundinthe
Euthyphro
80
.I
amnot
going
tobelike
Euthyphro,
Platoassureshimself
;
Ishall
nevertakeit
uponmyself
toaccusemyownfather,myown
venerated ancestors,of
having
sinned
against
alawanda
humanitarian
morality
whichis
only
onthelevelof
vulgarpiety.
Evenif
they
tookhuman
life,
itwas,
after
all,only
thelivesof
theirown
serfs,whoarenobetterthancriminals
;anditisnot
my
tasktojudge
them.DidnotSocratesshowhowharditis
toknowwhatis
right
and
wrong,pious
and
impious
?And
washenothimself
prosecuted
for
impietyby
theseso-called
humanitarians ?OthertracesofPlato's
strugglecan,
I
believe,
befoundin
nearlyeveryplace
whereheturns
againsthumani-
tarianideas,especially
inthe
Republic.
Hisevasivenessandhis
resorttoscornin
combating
the
equalitariantheory
of
justice,
hishesitant
preface
tohisdefenceof
lying,
tohisintroductionof
racialism,andtohisdefinitionof
justice,
haveallbeenmentioned

174
PLATOATTACKS
in
previouschapters.
But
perhaps
theclearest
expression
ofthe
conflictcanbefoundintheMenexenus,that
sneeringreply
to
Pericles'funeraloration. Here,
I
feel,Plato
gives
himself
away.
In
spite
ofhis
attempt
tohidehis
feelings
behind
irony
andscorn,
hecannotbutshowhow
deeply
hewas
impressedby
Pericles'
sentiments. ThisishowPlatomakeshis
c
Socrates
'
maliciously
describethe
impression
made
upon
him
by
Pericles'oration :
4
A
feeling
ofexultation
stays
withmeformorethanthree
days ;
notuntilthefourthorfifth
day,
andnotwithoutan
effort,do
Icometomy
sensesandrealizewhereIam.'
61Whocandoubt
thatPlatorevealsherehow
seriously
hewas
impressedby
the
creedofthe
opensociety,
andhowhardhehadto
struggle
to
cometohissensesandtorealizewherehewas
namely,
inthe
camp
ofits
antagonists.
Plato's
strongestargument
inthis
strugglewas,
I
believe,
sincere :According
tothehumanitarian creed,he
argued,we
shouldbe
ready
to
help
our
neighbours.
The
people
need
help
badly,they
are
unhappy,they
labourunderasevere
strain,a
senseofdrift.Thereisno
certainty,
no
security
62
in
life,when
everything
isinflux. Iam
ready
to
help
them.ButIcannot
makethem
happy
without
going
totherootoftheevil.
Andhefoundtherootoftheevil. Itisthe
c
FallofMan
',
thebreakdownoftheclosed
society.
This
discovery
convinced
himthattheOld
Oligarchandhisfollowershadbeenfunda-
mentallyright
in
favouringSpartaagainstAthens,andin
aping
the
Spartanprogramme
of
arrestingchange.
But
they
hadnot
gone
far
enough ;
their
analysis
hadnotbeencarried
sufficiently
deep.They
hadnotbeenawareofthe
fact,orhadnotcared
for
it,thateven
Sparta
showed
signs
of
decay,
in
spite
ofits
heroicefforttoarrestall
change ;thateven
Sparta
hadbeen
half-hearted inher
attempts
at
controllingbreeding
inorderto
eliminatethecausesofthe
Fall,the
*
variations
'
and
*
irregu-
larities
*
inthenumberaswellasthe
quality
ofthe
ruling
race.
63
(Plato
sawthat
population
increasewasoneofthecausesofthe
Fall.) Also,
theOld
Oligarch
andhisfollowershad
thought,
intheir
superficiality,
thatwiththe
help
ofa
tyranny,
suchas
thatofthe
Thirty,they
wouldbeabletorestorethe
good
old
days.
Platoknewbetter.The
greatsociologist
saw
clearly
thatthese
tyrannies
were
entirely
based
upon,
andwerethem-
selves
kindling,
themodern
revolutionary spirit
;that
they
were
forcedtomakeconcessions tothe
equalitariancravings
ofthe
people ;andthat
they
hadindeed
played
an
importantpart
in.

CHAPTERIO :THEOPENSOCIETY
175
thebreakdownoftribalism. Platohated
tyranny.Only
hatred
canseeas
sharply
ashedidinhisfamous
description
ofthe
tyrant.
Only
a
genuineenemy
of
tyranny
could
say
that
tyrantsmust
c
stir
up
onewarafteranotherinordertomakethe
people
feel
theneedofa
general
'
,ofasaviourfromextreme
danger.
Tyranny,
Plato
insisted,wasnotthe
solution,nor
any
ofthe
current
oligarchies. Although
itis
imperative
to
keep
the
people
intheir
place,
their
suppression
isnotanendinitself.
Theendmustbethe
complete
returnto
nature,a
complete
cleaning
ofthecanvas.
ThedifferencebetweenPlato's
theory
ontheonehand,and
thatoftheOld
Oligarch
andthe
Thirty
onthe
other,
isdueto
theinfluenceoftheGreatGeneration. Individualism, equali-
tarianism,
faithinreasonandloveoffreedomwerenew,powerful,
and,fromthe
point
ofviewofthe
antagonists
ofthe
opensociety,
dangerous
sentimentsthathadtobe
fought.
Platohadhimself
felttheir
influence,and,within
himself,hehad
fought
them.
HisanswertotheGreatGenerationwasa
trulygreat
effort.
Itwasanefforttoclosethedoorwhichhadbeen
opened,
and
toarrest
societybycastingupon
itthe
spell
ofan
alluring
philosophy,unequalled
in
depth
andrichness. Inthe
political
fieldheaddedbutlittletotheold
oligarchicprogrammeagainst
whichPericleshadonce
argued
64
.Buthediscovered, per-
hapsunconsciously,
the
great
secretoftherevolt
againstfreedom,
formulatedinourowndayby
Pareto
66
:
c
Totake
advantage
ofsentiments,
not
wasting
one's
energies
in
futileefforts
to
destroy
them'.
Insteadof
showing
his
hostility
toreason,he
capturedby
his
brilliance all
intellectuals, flattering
and
thrillingthemby
hisdemandthatthelearnedshouldrule.Insteadof
arguing
againstjustice
heconvinced all
righteousmenthathewas
fighting
forit.Noteventohimselfdidhe
fully
admitthat
hewascondemning
Socratesandfreedomof
thought ;and
bymaking
Socrateshis
champion
he
persuaded
allothersthat
hewas
fighting
forit.Platothusbecamethe
pioneer
ofthe
manypropagandists
who
developed
the
technique
of
appealing
tomoral,humanitarian sentiments,
foranti-humanitarian,
immoral
purposes.
Andheachievedthesomewhat
surprising
effectof
convincing
even
great
humanitariansofthe
immorality
andselfishnessoftheircreed
6e
.Idonotdoubtthathesucceeded
in
persuading
himself.He
transfigured
hishatredofindividual
initiative,andhiswishtoarrestall
change,
intoaloveof
justice
and
temperance,
ofabeautifulstateinwhicheverybody
issatisfied

176
PLATOATTACKS
and
happy
andinwhichthe
crudity
of
money-grabbing
67
is
replacedby
lawsof
generosity
and
friendship.
Thisdreamof
unity
and
beauty
and
perfection,
thisaestheticismandholismand
collectivism,
isthe
product
aswellasthesymptom
ofthelost
groupspirit
oftribalism
68
.Itisthe
expressionof,andanardent
appealto,
thesentimentsofthosewhosufferfromthestrainof
civilization.
(It
is
part
ofthestrainthatweare
becoming
more
andmore
painfully
awareofthe
grossimperfections
inour
life,
of
personal
aswellasofinstitutional
imperfection ;
ofwasteand
unnecessaryugliness ;andatthesametimeofthefactthatitis
not
impossible
forustodo
something
aboutall
this,butthat
such
improvementswouldbe
just
ashardtoachieveas
they
arc
important.
Thisawareness increasesthestrainof
personal
responsibility,
of
carrying
thecrossof
beinghuman.)
Socrateshadrefusedto
compromise
his
personalintegrity.
Plato,withallhis
uncompromising
canvas
cleaning,
wasled
along
a
path
onwhichhe
compromised
his
integrity
with
every
step
hetook.Hewasforcedtocombatfree
thought,
andthe
pursuit
oftruth.Hewasledtodefend
lying,politicalmiracles,
tabooistic
superstition,
the
suppression
oftruth,and
ultimately,
brutalviolence. In
spite
ofSocrates'
warningagainst
mis-
anthropy,
hewasledtodistrustman.In
spite
ofhisownhatred
of
tyranny,
hewasledtolooktoa
tyrant
for
help,
andtodefend
themost
tyrannical
measures.Theinternal
logic
ofhisanti-
humanitarianaim,theinternal
logic
of
power,
ledhimunawares
tothesame
point
towhichoncethe
Thirty
hadbeen
led,and
atwhich,later,
hisfriendDioarrived,andhisother
tyrant-
disciples
60
.Hedidnotsucceedin
arrestingsociety. (Only
much
later,
inthedark
ages,wasitarrestedby
the
spellof
essentialism). Instead,hesucceeded in
bindinghimself,by
hisown
spell,
to
powers
whichoncehehadhated.
ThelessonwhichwethusshouldlearnfromPlatoisthe
exact
opposite
ofwhathetriestoteachus. Itisalessonwhich
mustnotbe
forgotten.
ExcellentasPlato's
sociologicaldiagnosis
was,
hisown
development
ofit
proves
thatthe
therapy
he
recommended isworsethantheevilhetriedtocombat.
Arresting
politicalchange
isnotthe
remedy ;
itcannot
bringhappiness.
Wecanneverreturntothe
alleged
innocenceand
beauty
of
theclosed
society.Ourdreamofheavencannotberealizedon
earth.Oncewe
begin
to
relyupon
ourreason,andtouseour
powers
of
criticism,oncewefeelthecallof
personalresponsibilities,
andwith
it,the
responsibility
of
helping
toadvanceknowledge,

CHAPTER10:THEOPENSOCIETY
177
wecannotreturntoastateof
implicit
submissiontotribal
magic.
Forthosewhohaveeatenfromthetreeof
knowledge,paradise
islost
70
.Themorewe
try
toreturntotribalheroism,themore
surely
dowearriveatthe
Inquisition,
attheSecret
Police,and
ataromanticized
gangsterism. Beginning
withthe
suppression
ofreasonand
truth,wemustendwiththemostbrutalandviolent
destructionofallthatishuman. Thereisnoreturntoaharmonious
state
of
nature.
If
weturn
back,
thenwemust
go
thewhole
way
we
mustreturntothebeasts.
Itisanissuewhichwemustface
squarely,
hard
though
it
may
beforustodoso.Ifwedreamofareturntoourchild-
hood,
ifweare
tempted
to
rely
onothersandsobe
happy,
if
weturnbackfromthetaskof
carrying
our
cross,thecrossof
humaneness,ofreason,of
responsibility,
ifwelose
courage
and
flinchfromthe
strain,thenwemust
try
to
fortify
ourselveswith
aclear
understanding
ofthe
simple
decisionbeforeus.Wecan
returntothebeasts.Butifwewishtoremainhuman,then
thereis
only
one
way,
theway
intothe
opensociety.Wemust
go
onintotheunknown,courageously, using
whatreasonwe
have,
to
plan
for
security
andfreedom.

NOTES
GENERALREMARKS.Thetextofthebookisself-containedandmay
be
readwithouttheseNotes.However,aconsiderableamountofmaterial
whichis
likely
tointerestallreadersofthebookwillbefoundhere,aswell
assomereferencesandcontroversieswhichmay
notbeof
general
interest.
ReaderswhowishtoconsulttheNotesforthesakeofthismaterialmay
find
itconvenient firsttoreadwithout
interruptionthrough
thetextofa
chapter,
andthentoturntotheNotes.
Iwishto
apologize
forthe
perhaps
excessivenumberofcrossreferences
whichhavebeenincludedforthebenefitofthosereaderswhotakea
special
interestinoneortheotherofthesideissuestouchedupon(such
asPlato's
preoccupation
with
racialism,
ortheSocratic
Problem).Knowing
thatwar
conditionswouldmakeit
impossible
formetoreadthe
proofs,
Idecided
torefernotto
pages
buttonotenumbers.
Accordingly,
referencestothe
texthavebeenindicatedby
notessuchas:
*
cp.
texttonote24
to
chapter3',
etc.Warconditionsalsorestricted
libraryfacilities,making
it
impossible
for
metoobtainanumberofbooks,somerecentandsome
not,whichwould
havebeenconsultedinnormalcircumstances.
NOTETOTHEINTRODUCTION
Theterms
*
opensociety
'
and
'
closed
society
'
werefirstused,tomyknow-
ledge,byHenri
Bergson,
inTwoSources
ofMoralityand
Religion(Engl.cd.,
I
935)-
In
spite
ofaconsiderable difference
(due
toafundamentally
differentapproach
to
nearlyeveryproblem
of
philosophy)between
Bergson's
way
ofusingthesetermsandmine,thereisacertain
similarityalso,which
Iwishtoacknowledge. (Cp.Bergsoii's
characterization oftheclosed
society,
op.cit.,p,229,
as
*
human
society
freshfromthehandsofnature
'.)The
maindifference,however,
isthis.My
termsindicate,asitwere,an
intellectualist distinction
;theclosed
society
ischaracterizedbythebeliefin
magicaltaboos,whilethe
opensociety
isoneinwhichmenhavelearnedto
betosomeextentcriticalof
taboos,andtobasedecisionsonthe
authority
of
theirown
intelligence. Bergson,ontheotherhand,hasakindof
religious
distinctioninmind.This
explainswhyhecanlookupon
hisopensociety
as
the
product
ofa
mysticalintuition,whileI
suggest(inchapters
10and
24)
that
mysticismmaybe
interpreted
asan
expression
ofthe
longing
forthelost
unityoftheclosed
society,andthereforeasareaction
against
therationalism
ofthe
opensociety.Fromthewaymy
term
c
TheOpenSociety
'
isusedin
chapter10,
itmay
beseenthatthereissomeresemblancetoGrahamWallas'
term
*
TheGreat
Society
J
;butmytermmaycovera
'
small
society
'
too,
asitwere,likethatofPericleanAthens,whileitis
perhaps
conceivablethata
'
Great
Society
'
maybearrestedandthereby
closed.Thereis
also,perhaps,
a
similaritybetweenmy
'
opensociety
'
andthetermusedby
Walter
Lipp-
mannasthetitleofhismostadmirablebook,TheGood
Society(1937). See
alsonotes59(2)
to
chapter
10andnotes
29,32,and58
to
chapter24,and
text.
NOTESTOCHAPTER 1
1
Iusetheterm
'
collectivism
'
only
foradoctrinewhich
emphasizes
the
significance
ofsomecollectiveor
group,
for
instance,
*
thestate
'
(or
acertain
state
;oranation
;ora
class)
as
against
thatoftheindividual.The
problem
collectivismversusindividualism is
explainedmore
fully
in
chapter6,below
;
see
especially
notes26to28tothat
chapter,andtext.
Concerning
*
tribalism,*
178

CHAPTER
2/NOTES
1-2
179
cp.chapter10,and
especiallynote38
tothat
chapter (listof
Pythagorean
tribal
taboos).
2
Thismeansthatthe
interpretation
doesnot
conveyanyempirical
information, asshowninmyLogik
der
Forschung(1935).
3
Oneofthefeatureswhichthedoctrinesofthechosen
people,
thechosen
race,andthechosenclasshaveincommonisthat
theyoriginated,andbecame
important,
asreactions
againstsomekindof
oppression.Thedoctrineofthe
chosen
people
became
important
atthetimeofthefoundationofthe
Jewish
church,
i.e.duringthe
Babyloniancaptivity ;CountGobineau's
theory
of
theAryan
masterracewasareactionofthearistocratic
emigrant
tothe
claimthattheFrenchRevolutionhad
successfullyexpelled
theTeutonic
masters. Marx's
prophecy
ofthe
victory
ofthe
proletariat
isthe
reply
to
oneofthemostsinister
periods
of
oppression
and
exploitation
inmodem
history.Compare
withthesematters
chapter10,especially
note
39,
and
chapter17,especially
notes
13-15,
andtext.
NOTESTOCHAPTER 2
1
The
question
*
Whatistheworldmadeofismoreorless
generally
accepted
asthefundamentalproblem
ofthe
earlyIonian
philosophers.
If
weassumethat
theyviewedtheworldasan
edifice,the
question
ofthe
ground-plan
oftheworldwouldbe
complementary
tothatofits
building
material.Andindeed,wehearthatThaleswasnotonly
interestedinthe
stufftheworldismade
of,butalsoin
descriptiveastronomyand
geography,
andthatAnaximanderwasthefirsttodrawup
a
ground-plan,
i.e.amap
oftheearth.SomefurtherremarksontheIonianschool(andespecially
onAnaximander as
predecessor
of
Heraclitus)
willbefoundin
chapter
io
;
cp.
notes
38-40
tothat
chapter,especially
note
39.
2
Cp.Plato,Cralylus,40id,4O2a/b.Myinterpretation
oftheteaching
ofHeraclitus is
perhaps
differentfromthatcommonlyassumedat
present,
forinstancefromthatofBurnet.Thosewhomay
feeldoubtfulwhether it
isatall
tenable,arereferredtomynotes,especially
the
present
noteand
notes
6,7,and11
,inwhichIam
dealing
withHeraclitus'natural
philosophy,
having
confinedmy
texttoa
presentation
ofthehistoricist
aspect
ofHeraclitus'
teachingandtohissocial
philosophy.
Ifurtherreferthemtotheevidenceof
chapters4
to
9,and
especially
of
chapter10,inwhose
light
Heraclitus'
philosophy,
asIsee
it,willappear
asarather
typical
reactiontothesocial
revolutionwhichhewitnessed.
Cp.
alsothenotes
39
and
59
tothat
chapter
(andtext),
andthe
general
criticismofBurnet'sand
Taylor's
methodsin
note
56.
Asindicatedinthe
text,
Ihold
(withmanyothers,forinstance,with
Zellerand
Grote)
thatthedoctrineofuniversalfluxisthecentraldoctrineof
Heraclitus. As
opposed
to
this,Burnetholdsthatthis
'
is
hardly
thecentral
point
inthe
system
'
ofHeraclitus
(cp.Early
Greek
Philosophy
',2nded.,163).
Butaclose
inspection
ofhis
arguments(158f.)
leavesme
quiteunconvinced
thatHeraclitus'fundamental
discoverywastheabstract
metaphysical
doctrine
*
thatwisdomisnottheknowledge
ofmanythings,butthe
perception
ofthe
underlyingunity
of
warringopposites ',
asBurnet
puts
it.The
unity
of
opposites
is
certainly
an
importantpart
ofHeraclitus'
teaching,
butitcan
bederived
(as
farassuch
thingscanbederived
;cp.
note11tothis
chapter,
andthe
corresponding text)fromthemoreconcreteand
intuitively
under-
standable
theory
offlux
;andthesamecanbesaidofHeraclitus'doctrine
ofthefire
(cp.
note
7
tothis
chapter).
Thosewho
suggest,
withBurnet,thatthedoctrineofuniversalfluxwas
notnew,but
anticipatedby
theearlierlonians,are,
I
feel,unconscious
witnessestoHeraclitus'
originality ;
for
they
failnow,
after
2,400years,
to

l8o CHAPTER2/NOTE3
grasp
hismain
point.Theydonotseethedifferencebetweenafluxor
circulationwithinavesseloranedificeoracosmicframework,
i.e.withina
totalityofthings(part
oftheHeraclitean
theory
canindeedbeunderstoodin
this
way,
but
only
that
part
ofitwhichisnot
veryoriginal ;see
below),
andauniversalfluxwhichembraces
everything,eventhe
vessel,theframework
itself,andwhichisdescribedby
Heraclitus'denialoftheexistenceofany
fixed
thingwhatever.
(In
a
way,Anaximanderhadmadea
beginningby
dissolving
theframework,buttherewasstilla
longwayfromthistothe
theory
ofuniversalflux.
Cp.
alsonote
15(4)
to
chapter3.)
ThedoctrineofuniversalfluxforcesHeraclitusto
attemptanexplanation
ofthe
apparent stability
ofthe
things
inthis
world,andofother
typical
regularities.
This
attempt
leadshimtothe
development
of
subsidiarytheories,
especially
tohisdoctrineoffire
(cp.
note
7
tothis
chapter)andofnatural
laws
(cp.
note
6).
Itisinthis
explanation
ofthe
apparentstability
ofthe
worldthathemakesmuchuseofthetheoriesofhis
predecessorsbydeveloping
their
theory
ofrarefactionandcondensation,together
withtheirdoctrineof
therevolutionoftheheavens,intoa
generaltheory
ofthecirculationofmatter,
andof
periodicity. Butthis
part
ofhisteaching,
Ihold,
isnotcentralto
it,
but
subsidiary.
It
is,
soto
speak,apologetic,
forit
attempts
toreconcilethe
newand
revolutionary
doctrineoffluxwithcommon
experience
aswellas
withthe
teaching
ofhis
predecessors.
Ibelieve,therefore,thatheisnota
mechanical materialistwhoteaches
something
liketheconservationand
circulationofmatterandof
energy ;
thisviewseemstometobeexcludedby
his
magicalattitudetowardslawsaswellasby
his
theory
ofthe
unity
of
oppositeswhich
emphasizes
his
mysticism.
Mycontentionthattheuniversalfluxisthecentral
theory
ofHeraclitus
is,I
believe,corroboratedby
Plato.Theoverwhelming majority
ofhis
explicit
referencestoHeraclitus
(Crat.,40id,4O2a/b,411,437ff.,440;Theaet.,
J
53c/d,i6od,i77c,i7gdf.,i8aa
ff.,i83aff.,cp.
also
Syrnp.,2O7d,Phil.,
43a;cp.
alsoAristotle's
Metaphysics,987333,1010313,1078^3)
witnessto
thetremendous
impressionmade
by
thiscentraldoctrineupon
thethinkers
ofthat
period. These
straightforward andcleartestimonies aremuch
strongerthanthe
admittedly interestingpassage
whichdoesnotmention
Heraclitus'name
(Soph.,242df.,quotedalready,
inconnectionwithHeraclitus,
byUeberwegand
Zeller),onwhichBurnetattempts
tobasehis
interpretation.
(His
otherwitness,Philo
Judaeus,
cannotcountmuchas
against
theevidence
ofPlatoand
Aristotle.)
Buteventhis
passageagreesentirely
withour
interpretation. (Withregard
toBurnet'ssomewhatwaveringjudgement
concerning
thevalueofthis
passage,cp.
note56(7)
to
chapter
i
o.)
Heraclitus'
discovery
thattheworldisnotthe
totality
of
thingsbutofeventsor
facts
isnot
atalltrivial
;
thiscanbe
perhapsgaugedby
thefactthat
Wittgenstein
has
foundit
necessary
toreaffirm it
quiterecently
:
'
Theworldisthe
totality
of
facts,not
ofthings.
9
(Cp.
Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, 1921/22,
sentence
i.i
;
italics
mine.)
Tosum
up.
Iconsiderthedoctrineofuniversalfluxasfundamental,and
as
emergingfromtherealmofHeraclitus' social
experiences.
Allother
doctrinesofhisareinawaysubsidiary
toit.Thedoctrineoffire
(cp.
Aristotle's
Metaphysics,98437,io67a2 ;
also
98932,99639,1001315)
Iconsider
tobehiscentraldoctrineinthefieldofnatural
philosophy ;
itisan3ttempt
toreconcilethedoctrineoffluxwithour
experience
ofstable
things,
alink
withtheoldertheoriesofcirculation,anditleadstoatheory
oflaws.And
thedoctrineofthe
unity
of
opposites
Iconsiderassomething
lesscentral
andmore
abstract,asaforerunnerof3kindof
Iogic3l
ormethodological
theory(as
suchit
inspired
Aristotletoformulatehislawof
contradiction),
andaslinkedtohis
mysticism.
8
W.
Nestle,DieVorsokratiker
(1905),35.

CHAPTER2/NOTES4-7
l8l
4
Inordertofacilitatetheidentificationofthe
fragmentsquoted,
I
give
thenumbersofBywater's
edition
(adopted,
inhis
English
translationofthe
fragments,byBurnet,Early
Greek
Philosophy),andalsothenumbersofDiels'
edition
(Diels,
Vorsokratiker
;
Iam
quotingfromthe2nd
edition).
Ofthe
eightpassagesquoted
inthe
presentparagraph, (i)and
(2)
are
fromthe
fragmentsB
114(=Bywater,and
Burnet),D
2
121
( Diels, .
2ndedition).Theothersarefromthefragments: (3)Bin,D
a
29;
cp.
Plato's
Republic,5&*6a/b
. . .
(4)
:Bin,D
a
104
. ..
(5)
:B
112,
D
2
39
. . .
(6)
:B
5,D
a
17
.. .
(7)
:Bno,D
2
33...
(8)
:B
100,
D
2
44.
5
Thethree
passagesquoted
inthis
paragraph
arefromthe
fragments
:
(i)
and
(2)
:
cp.B
41,D
2
91;
for
(i)cp.
alsonote2tothis
chapter. (3)
:
D
2
74.
6
ForHeraclitus'
'
measures
*
(orlaws,or
periods),cp.B20,21,23,29;
D
2
30,31,94.
Thisideaoflawiscorrelativetothatofchange
or
flux,
since
only
lawsor
regularities
withinthefluxcan
explain
the
apparentstability
oftheworld.
Themost
typicalregularitieswithinthe
changing
worldknowntomanare
thenatural
periods
:the
day,
themoon-month,andtheyear(theseasons).
Heraclitus'theory
oflaw
is,
Ibelieve,logically
intermediatebetweenthe
comparativelymodernviewsof
'
causallaws
*
(heldbyLeucippusand
especiallybyDemocritus)andAnaximander'sdark
powers
offate.Heraclitus'
lawsarestill
'
magical ',
i.e.hehasnot
yetdistinguishedbetweenabstract
causal
regularitiesandlawsenforced,
liketaboos,bysanctions(withthis,
cp.chapter5,note
2).
It
appears
thathis
theory
offatewasconnectedwith
a
theory
ofa
'
GreatYear
J
or
'
GreatCycle
*
of18,000or
36,000ordinary
years. (Cp.
forinstance
J.Adam'seditionofThe
RepublicofPlato,vol.II,
303.)
I
certainlydonotthinkthatthis
theory
isanindicationthatHeraclitus
didnot
really
believeinauniversalflux,butonly
invariouscirculationswhich
always
re-establishedthe
stability
oftheframework
;butIthinkit
possible
thathehaddifficultiesin
conceiving
alawof
change,andevenof
fate,other
thanone
involving
acertainamountof
periodicity. (Cp.
alsonote6to
chapter3.)
7
Thefour
passagesquoted
inthis
paragraph
arefromthe
fragments,
(i)
:D
a
58,
8.
(Cp.Diog.Laert.,IX.,7)
.. .
(2)
:B
29,D
2
94(cp.note
2to
chapter5)...
(3)
:B
20,D
2
30...
(4)
:B26,D
2
66.
Fire
plays
acentralrdleinHeraclitus'philosophy
ofnature.Theflame
istheobvioussymbol
ofafluxor
process
which
appears
inmanyrespects
asa
thing.
Itthus
explains
the
experience
ofstable
things,andreconcilesthis
experience
withthedoctrineofflux.Thisideacanbe
easilyextendedto
living
bodies
whicharelikeflames,onlyburningmore
slowly.
Heraclitusteachesthatall
things
arein
flux,
allarelikefire
;theirfluxhas
only
different
'
measures
'
orlawsofmotion.The
'
bowl
*
or
'
trough
*
inwhichthefireburnswillbe
inamuchslowerfluxthanthe
fire,butitwillbeinfluxnevertheless. It
changes,
ithasitsfateanditslaws,
itmustbeburnedintoby
the
fire,and
consumed,evenifittakesa
longer
timebeforeitsfateisfulfilled. Thus,
'
initsadvance,thefirewill
judgeandconvicteverything
'.
Accordingly,
thefireisthesymbolandthe
explanation
ofthe
apparent
restof
things
in
spite
oftheirrealstateofflux.Butitisalsoasymbolofthe
transmutationofmatterfromone
stage(fuel)
intoanother. Itthus
provides
thelinkbetweenHeraclitus' intuitivetheory
ofnatureandthetheoriesof
rarefactionandcondensation etc.,ofhis
predecessors. Butits
flaringupand
dyingdown,
inaccordancewiththemeasureoffuel
provided,
isalsoan
instanceofalaw. Ifthisiscombinedwithsomeformof
periodicity,
thenit
canbeusedto
explain
the
regularities
ofnatural
periods,
suchas
days
or
years.
(This
trendof
thought
rendersit
unlikely
thatBurnetis
right
in
disbelieving

182 CHAPTER2
/NOTES8-14
thetraditional
reports
ofHeraclitus' beliefina
periodicalconflagration,
whichwas
probably
connectedwithhisGreat
Year.)
8
Thethirteen
passagesquoted
inthis
paragraph
arefromthe
fragments.
(1)
:B
10,D
2
123...
(2)
:Bu,D
2
93
. . .
(3)
:B
16,D
2
40
. . .
(4)
:
B
94,D
2
73
. . .
(5)
:B
95,D
2
89...with
(4)
and
(5),cp.
Plato's
Republic,
47
6c
f.,and
5
2oc . . .
(6)
:B
6,D
2
19
. . .
(7)
:B
3,D
2
34
. . .
(8)
:
B
19,D
2
41...
(9)
:B
92,D
2
2...
(10)
:B
gia,D
2
113...
(n)
:
B
59,D
3
10...
(12)
:B
65,D
2
32...
(13)
:B
28,D
2
64.
9
Moreconsistentthanmostmoral
historicists,Heraclitus isalsoanethical
and
juridicalpositivist(for
this
term,cp.chapter5)
:
'
All
thingsare,toGod,
fairandgoodand
right ;men,however,holdthatsomeare
wrongandsome
right.'(D
2
102,B
61.)
Thathewasthefirst
juridicalpositivist
isattested
by
Plato
(TheaeL,lyjc/d).Onmoraland
juridicalpositivism
in
general,
cp.chapter5(text
tonotes
14-18)and
chapter
22.
10
Thetwo
passagesquoted
inthis
paragraph
are:
(i)
:B
44,D
2
53
...
(2)
:B
62,D
2
80.
11
Theseven
passagesquoted
inthis
paragraph
are :
(i)
:B
39,D
2
126...
(2)
:B
104,D
2
in...
(3)
:B
78,D
2
88...
(4)
:B
69,D
2
60...
(5)
:B
45,D
2
51
. . .
(6)
:D
2
8 . . .
(7)
:B
57,D
2
58.
Fluxor
change
mustbethetransitionfromone
stage
or
property
or
position
toanother. Insofarasflux
presupposessomething
that
changes,
this
something
mustremain
identically
thesame,even
though
itassumesan
oppositestage
or
property
or
position.
Thislinksthe
theory
offluxtothat
ofthe
unity
of
opposites(cp.Aristotle,Metaphysics,ioo5b25,iO24a24and
34,
io62a32,io63a25)
aswellasthedoctrineoftheonenessofall
things ;they
areall
only
different
phases
or
appearances
oftheone
changingsomething
(offire).
Whether'the
path
thatleadsup
'
and
*
the
path
thatleadsdown
'
were
originally
conceivedasan
ordinarypathleading
firstup
amountain,and
laterdown
again(orperhaps
:
leadingupfromthe
point
ofviewoftheman
whoisdown,anddownfromthatofthemanwhois
up),
andwhetherthis
metaphorwas
only
later
applied
tothe
processes
ofcirculation,tothe
path
thatleadsup
fromearth
through
water
(perhapsliquid
fuelinabowl
?)
to
the
fire,andclown
againfromthefire
through
thewater
(rain?)
toearth
;
orwhetherHeraclitus'
pathupanddownwas
originallyappliedbyhimto
this
process
ofcirculationofmatter
;
allthiscanofcoursenotbedecided.
(But
Ithinkthatthefirstalternative ismore
likely
inviewofthe
greatnumber
ofsimilarideasinHeraclitus'
fragments
:
cp.
the
text.)
12
Thefour
passages
are :
(i)
:B102,D
2
24
. . .
(2)
:Bioi,D
2
25
(3)
:Bin,D
2
29(part
ofthecontinuation is
quoted
above
;
see
passage
(3)
innote
4)...
(4)
:B
113,D
2
49.
13
Itseems
veryprobable(cp.Meyer's
Gesch.d.
Altertums,esp.
vol.
I)
that
suchcharacteristic
teachings
asthatofthechosen
peopleoriginated
inthis
period,
which
produced
severalother
religions
ofsalvationbesidesthe
Jewish.
14
Comte,whoinFrance
developed
ahistoricist
philosophy
not
very
dissimilarfrom
Hegel's
Prussianversion,tried,
like
Hegel,
tostemtherevolu-
tionary
tide.
(Cp.
F.A.von
Hayek,
TheCounter-Revolution
ofScience,Economica,
N.S.vol.VIII,1941,pp.ngff.,
281
ff.)
Itis
interesting
to
note,
inthis
connection,the
parallelism
betweenthe
history
ofhistoricistandof
evolutionary
ideas.Theyoriginated
inGreecewiththesemi-Heraclitean
Empedocles
(for
Plato's
version,seenote ito
chaptern),
and
they
were
revived,
in
England
aswellasin
France,
inthetimeoftheFrenchRevolution.

CHAPTER
3/NOTES
1-6
183
NOTESTOCHAPTER3
1
Withthis
explanation
oftheterm
oligarchy,cp.
alsotheendofnotes
44
and
57
to
chapter
8.
2
Cp.especially
note
48
to
chapter
10.
3
Cp.
theendof
chapter7,esp.
note
25,and
chapter10,esp.
note
69.
4
Concerning
Plato's
familyconnections,and
especially
the
alleged
descent
ofhisfather's
family
fromCodrus,
'
andevenfromtheGodPoseidon
',see
G.Grote,Platoandother
Companionsof
Socrates
(ed.1875),
vol.
I,114. (See,
however,thesimilarremarkonCritias'
family,
i.e.onthatofPlato'smother,
inE.
Meyer,
GeschichtedesAltertums,
vol.V,1922,p.66.)
5
Thetwo
autobiographical quotations
whichfollowinthis
paragraph
are
fromtheSeventhLetter
(325).
SincePlato's
authorship
oftheLettershasbeen
questionedbysomeeminentscholars
(probably
withoutsufficientfoundation
;
IthinkField'streatmentofthis
problemveryconvincing ;cp.
note
57
to
chapter10),
Ihavetakencaretobasemyinterpretation
ofPlatonismmainly
onsomeofthemostfamous
dialogues ;
it
is,however,in
generalagreement
withtheLetters.Forthereader'sconvenience,alistofthosePlatonic
dialogues
whichare
frequentlymentionedinthetextmay
be
givenhere,
inwhatis
their
probable
historicalorder
;cp.
note
56(8)
toch.10. Crito
Apology
Eutyphro; ProtagorasMeno
Gorgias; Cratylus
Menexenus Phaedo
;Re-
public
Theaetetus
;Sophist
Politicus Philebus
;Timaeus Critias
;Laws.
6
(
i
)
Thathistorical
developmentsmayhavea
cyclic
character isnowhere
clearly
statedby
Plato. It
is,however,alludedtoinatleastthree
dialogues,
namely
inthePhaedo,inthe
Republic,andintheStatesman
(orPoliticus).
Inall
these
places,
Plato's
theorymaypossibly
alludetoHeraclitus'GreatYear
(cp.
note6to
chapter2).
Itmaybe,however,thattheallusionisnotto
Heraclitus
directly,butratherto
Empedocles,whose
theory(cp.
also
Aristotle,
Met.,1000325 f.)
Platoconsidered as
merely
a
'
milder
'
versionofthe
Heraclitean
theory
ofthe
unity
ofallflux.He
expresses
thisinafamous
passage
ofthe
Sophist(2426f.)According
tothis
passage,
andtoAristotle
(De
Gen.Corr.
9B,6.,334a6)
thereisahistorical
cycleembracing
a
period
in
whichlove
rules,anda
period
inwhichHeraclitus'striferules
;
orasAristotle
putsit,the
presentperiod
is
according
to
Empedocles
'
a
period
of
Strife,
as
itwas
formerlyoneofLove'.Thisinsistencethatthefluxofourowncosmic
period
isakindof
strife,andthereforebad,
isincloseaccordancebothwith
Plato'stheoriesandwithhis
experiences.
(2)The
passage
inthePhaedomentionedunder
(i)
alludesfirsttothe
Heraclitean
theory
of
changeleadingfromonestatetoits
oppositestate,or
fromone
opposite
totheother :
'
thatwhichbecomeslessmustoncehave
been
greater
. ..'
(706/71a).
Itthen
proceeds
toindicatea
cyclic
lawof
development
:
*
Aretherenottwo
processeswhichareevergoingon,from
oneextremetoits
opposite,
andback
again
. .?
'
(loc.cit.}.Andalittlelater
(72a/b)
the
argument
is
put
likethis :
'
Ifthe
development
wereina
straight
line
only,andtherewereno
compensation
or
cycle
innature,
. .then,
in
theend,
all
thingswouldtakeonthesame
properties
. .andtherewouldbe
nofurther
development.'
Itmustbesaidthatthe
generaltendency
ofthe
Phaedoismuchmore
optimistic(and
showsmuchmorefaithinmanandin
human
reason)thanthelater
dialogues,
buttherearenodirectreferencesto
humanhistorical
development.
(3)Suchreferences
are,however,madeinthe
Republic,
whereinBooks
VIIIandIXwefindanelaborate
description
ofhistoricaldecay(treated
herein
chapter4).
This
description
isintroducedby
Plato's
Story
oftheFall
ofManandtheNumber,whichwillherebediscussedmore
fully
in
chapters
5and8.
J.Adam,
inhiseditionofThe
Republicof
Plato
(1902,1921)rightly
callsthis
story
*
the
setting
inwhichPlato's
"
Philosophy
of
History
"
is

184 CHAPTER
3/NOTES7-8
framed
'
(vol.II,210).
This
storydoesnotcontainanyexplicitstatementon
the
cyclic
characterof
history,butitcontainsafewrather
mysterious
hints
which,according
toAristotle's
(andAdam's) interesting
butuncertain
interpretation,
are
possibly
allusionstotheHeracliteanGreatYear,
i.e.to
the
cyclicdevelopment. (Gp.note6to
chapter2,andAdam,op.cit.,vol.
H>33>tneremarkon
Empedoclesmadethere,303f.,needscorrection
;
see
(i)
inthis
note,above).
(4)
There
is,furthermore,themyth
inthePoliticus
(2686-2746).
Accord-
ing
tothismyth,Godhimselfsteerstheworldforhalfa
cycle
ofthe
grdat
world
period.Whenhelets
go,thentheworld,whichsofarhasmoved
forward,begins
torollback
again.
Thuswehavetwo
half-periods
orhalf-
cycles
inthefull
cycle,
aforwardmovementledbyGod
constituting
thegood
period
withoutwaror
strife,andabackwardmovementwhenGodabandons
theworld,whichisa
period
of
increasingdisorganization
andstrife. It
is,
ofcourse,the
period
inwhichwelive.At
last,thingsbecomesobadthat
Godtakesthewheel
again,andreversesthemotion,
inordertosavetheworld
fromutterdestruction.
Thismyth
shows
great
resemblances to
Empedocles'myth
mentioned
in
(i)above,and
probably
alsotoHeraclitus*GreatYear.Adam
(op.
cit.
9
vol.
II,296f.)
also
points
outthesimilaritieswithHesiod's
story.
(5)When,however,laterinthePoliticus(3O2bff.)
thesixformsof
imperfect
government
areordered
according
totheir
degree
of
imperfection,
thereisno
indicationanylonger
tobefoundofa
cyclictheory
of
history. Rather,the
sixforms,whichareall
degeneratecopies
ofthe
perfect
orbeststate
(cp.
Pol.
293d/c;297C;3O3b),appear
allas
steps
inthe
process
of
degeneration ;
i.e.
whereitcomestomoreconcretehistorical
problems,
Platoconfineshimself
tothe
part
ofthe
cyclewhichis
retrogressive
or
leading
to
decay.
(6)Apart
fromthese
scantyallusions,thereis
hardlyanything
toindicate
thatPlatotooktheupward
orforward
part
ofthe
cycleseriously.
Butthere
aremanyremarks,apartfromtheelaborate
description
inthe
Republicand
that
quoted
in
(5),whichshowthathebelieved
veryseriously
inthedownward
movement,inthe
decay
of
history.Wemust
consider,especially,
theTimaeus,
andtheLaws.
(7)
IntheTimaeus
(42bf.,goeff.,and
especially9
idf.
;cp.
alsothePhaedrus,
248d),
Platodescribeswhatmaybecalledthe
origin
of
speciesbydegeneration
(cp.
texttonote4
to
chapter4,andnote11to
chapter
1
1)
:Man
degenerates
intowoman,andlaterintoloweranimals.
(8)
InBookIIIoftheLaws
(cp.
alsoBookIV,7133
ff.
;seehoweverthe
shortallusiontoa
cycle
in
676b/c)wehavearatherelaboratetheory
of
historical
decay,largelyanalogous
tothatinthe
Republic ;
seealsothenext
chapter,esp.
notes
3,6,7,27,31,
and
44.
7Asimilar
opinion
ofPlato's
political
aimsis
expressedby
G.G.Field,
PlatoandHis
Contemporaries(1930),p.91
:
'
ThechiefaimofPlato's
philosophy
maybe
regarded
asthe
attempt
tore-establishstandardsofthoughtand
conductforacivilizationthatseemedonthe
verge
ofdissolution.' Seealso
note
3
to
chapter6,andtext.
8
Ifollowthe
majority
oftheolderandagoodnumberof
contemporary
authorities
(e.g.
G.G.
Field,
F.M.Cornford,A.K.
Rogers)
in
believing,
againstJohnBurnetandA.E.
Taylor,
thatthe
theory
ofFormsorIdeasis
nearlyentirelyPlato's,andnot
Socrates',
in
spite
ofthefactthatPlato
puts
itintothemouthofSocratesashismain
speaker.Though
Plato's
dialogues
are
ouronly
first-ratesourceforSocrates'
teaching,
it
is,
I
believe,possible
to
distinguish
inthembetween
'
Socratic
',
i.e.historicallytrue,and
'
Platonic
'
featuresofPlato's
speaker
'
Socrates '.Theso-calledSocraticProblem is
furtherdiscussedin
chapters6,7,8,and10
;cp.especially
note56
to
chapter
10.

CHAPTER
3/NOTES9-15 185
9
Fortheterm
'
social
engineering ',cp.M.Eastman,Marxism :isit
Science?
(1940).
IreadEastman'sbookafterthetextofmyownbookwas
written
;myterm
*
social
engineering
'
is,accordingly,
usedwithoutany
intentionof
alluding
toEastman's
terminology. AsfarasIcansee,he
advocatesthe
approach
whichIcriticizein
chapter9
underthename
*
Utopian
social
engineering
'
;cp.
note itothat
chapter.
Seealsonote18
(3)
to
chapter5.
Theterm
'
social
technology
'
hasbeen
suggested
tomeby
G.G.F.
Simkin. Iwishtomakeitclearthatin
discussingmethod,mymainemphasis
is
upongainingpractical
institutional
experience. Gp.chapter9,esp.
text
tonote8tothat
chapter. Foramoredetailedanalysis
oftheproblems
of
methodconnectedwithsocial
engineeringandsocial
technology,
seethe
critical
partofmyPovertyofHistoricism,Economica,1944/45.
10
Cp.
thelastnotetothis
chapter,andnote ito
chapter9.
11
Ibelieveinadualismoffactsanddecisionsordemands
(or
of
'
is
'
and
'
ought');inotherwords,
Ibelieveinthe
impossibility
ofreducing
decisionsordemandsto
facts,althoughtheycan,ofcourse,betreatedas
facts.Moreonthis
point
willbesaidin
chapters5(text
tonotes
4-5),22,
and
24.
12
Evidencein
support
ofthis
interpretation
ofPlato's
theory
ofthebest
statewillbe
supplied
inthenextthree
chapters ;
Imayrefer,
inthemean-
while,to
Politicus,293d/e ;2970 ;Laws,Ji^b/c ;7390!/e.
13
Gp.
Aristotle'sfamous
report,partlyquoted
laterinthis
chapter(see
especially
note
25,andthe
text).
14
ThisisshowninGrote'sPlato,
vol.
Ill,noteuon
p.267
f.
15
The
quotations
arefromtheTimaeus,5oc/dand
5ie~52b.Thesimile
whichdescribestheFormsorIdeasasthefathers,andSpace
asthemother,
ofthesensible
things,
is
importantandhas
far-reaching
connections.
Gp.
alsonotes
17and
19
tothis
chapter,andnote59
tochapter
10.
(1)
ItresemblesHesiod's
mythofchaos,theyawninggap(space ;receptacle)
which
corresponds
tothemother,andtheGodEros,who
corresponds
tothe
fatherortotheIdeas.Chaosisthe
origin,andthe
question
ofthecausal
explanation(chaos
=
cause)
remainsfora
long
timeoneof
origin(arche)
or
birthor
generation.
(2)Themotheror
spacecorresponds
totheindefiniteorboundlessof
AnaximanderandofthePythagoreans. TheIdeawhich ismale,must
therefore
correspond
tothedefinite
(orlimited)
ofthe
Pythagoreans.
For
the
definite,
as
opposed
totheboundless,themale,as
opposed
tothefemale,
the
light
as
opposed
tothedark,andthegood
as
opposed
tothebad,
all
belong
tothesamesideinthe
Pythagorean
table
ofopposites. (Gp.
Aristotle's
Metaphysics,986a22f.)Wealsocantherefore
expect
toseetheIdeasassociated
with
lightand
goodness. (Gp.
endofnote
32
to
chapter8.)
(3)TheIdeasareboundariesor
limits,they
aredefinite,asopposed
to
indefinite
Space,
and
impress
or
imprint(cp.
note
17(2)
tothis
chapter)
themselves like
rubber-stamps,
orbetter,likemoulds,uponSpace(which
isnot
onlyspace
butatthesametimeAnaximander'sunformedmatter
stuffwithout
property),
thus
generating
sensible
things.
(4)
In
consequence
oftheactof
generation,Space,
i.e.the
receptacle,
begins
tolabour,sothatall
things
aresetinmotion,inaHeracliteanor
Empedoclean
fluxwhichis
really
universalinsofarasthemovementorflux
extendseventotheframework,
i.e.
(boundless)space
itself.
(For
thelate
Heracliteanideaofthe
receptacle,cp.
the
Cratylus,4i2d.)
(5)
This
description
isalsoreminiscentofParmenides*
*
Way
ofDelusive
Opinion ',
inwhichtheworldof
experienceandoffluxiscreatedby
the
mingling
oftwo
opposites,
the
light(or
hotor
fire)andthedark
(or
coldor
earth).
ItisclearthatPlato'sFormsorIdeaswouldcorrespond
tothe
O.s.i.E.VOL. I G

186 CHAPTER
3/NOTE15
former,and
space
orwhatisboundlesstothelatter
;especially
ifweconsider
thatPlato'spurespace
ialsoindeterminate matter.
(6)The
oppositionbetweenthedeterminateandindeterminateseemsalso
to
correspond,especially
afterthe
discovery
ofthe
irrationality
ofthe
square
rootoftwo,
tothe
opposition
betweentherationalandtheirrational. But
sinceParmenides identifiestherationalwith
being,
thiswouldleadtoan
interpretation
of
space
ortheirrationalas
non-being.
Inotherwords,the
Pythagorean
tableof
opposites
istobeextendedtocover
rationality,
as
opposed
to
irrationality,
and
being,
as
opposed
to
non-being. (Thiswould
explain
Aristotle'sremarkin
Metaphysics,g86b27 ;anditwould
perhaps
notbenecessary
toassume,asF.M.Cornforddoesinhisexcellentarticle
'
Parmenides'TwoWays',
Class.
Quart.,XVII,1933,p.108,thatPar-
menides,
fr.8,53/54,
*
hasbeen
misinterpretedby
AristotleandTheo-
phrastus
'
;
forifweexpand
thetableof
opposites
inthis
way,
Cornford's
mostconvincinginterpretation
ofthecrucial
passage
offr.8becomescom-
patible
withAristotle'sremark.)
(7)
Cornfordhas
explained (op.cit.,100)
thattherearethree
'
ways
'
in
Parmenides,theway
ofTruth,theway
of
Not-being,andtheway
ofSeeming
(or,
ifImay
callit
so,ofdelusive
opinion).Heshows
(101)
that
they
cor-
respond
tothree
regions
discussedinthe
Republic,
the
perfectly
realandrational
worldoftheIdeas,the
perfectlyunreal,andtheworldof
opinion(basedon
the
perceptionofthings
in
flux).Hehasalsoshown
(102)
thatinthe
Sophist,
Platomodifieshis
position.To
this,somecommentsmaybeaddedfromthe
point
ofviewofthe
passages
intheTimaeustowhichthisnoteis
appended.
(8)ThemaindifferencebetweentheFormsorIdeasofthe
Republicand
thoseoftheTimaeus isthatintheformer,theForms
(and
alsoGod
;cp.
Rep.,38od)
are
petrified,
soto
speak,
whileinthe
latter,they
aredeified. In
theformer,theybearamuchcloserresemblance totheParmenideanOne
(cp.Adam'snoteto
Rep.,38od28,31),
thaninthelatter.This
development
leadstotheLaws,wheretheIdeasare
largelyreplacedby
souls.Thedecisive
difference isthattheIdeasbecomemoreandmorethe
startingpoints,
oreven
causes,ofmotion,orastheTimaeus
putsit,fathersofthemovingthings.The
greatest
contrast is
perhaps
betweenthePhaedo,796
:
'
Thesoulis
infinitely
morelikethe
unchangeable
;eventhemost
stupidpersonwouldnotdeny
that
'
(cp.
also
Rep.,585^6oo,bf.)andtheLaws,8956/8g6a(cp.Phaedrus,
245Cff.)
:
'
Whatisthedefinitionofthatwhichisnamed
"
soul
"
?Canwe
imagineany
otherdefinitionthan . .
"
Themotionthatmovesitself"?
'
(Cp.
alsonote
7
tochapter4.)
(9)
Inthis
development
ofPlato's
thought,
a
developmentwhose
driving
forceisto
explain
theworldoffluxwiththe
help
oftheIdeas,
i.e.tomake
thebreakbetweentheworldofreasonandtheworldof
opinion
atleast
understandable, eventhough
itcannotbe
bridged,
the
Sophist
seemsto
play
adecisiverole.Apart
frommakingroom,
asCornfordmentions
(op.
cit.
9
102),
forthe
plurality
of
Ideas,
it
presentsthem,
inan
argumentagainst
Plato'sownearlier
position(248aff.)(a)
asactivecauses,whichmayinteract,
for
example,
withmind
;(b)
asunchanging
in
spite
ofthat
;(c)
as
capable
of
mingling
withoneanother. Itfurtherintroduces
'
Not-being ',identified
intheTimaeuswith
Space(cp.Cornford,Plato
9
s
TheoryofKnowledge,1935,
noteto
247),andthusmakesit
possible
fortheIdeasto
mingle
withit
(cp.
alsoPhilolaus,fragm.2,3,5,
Diels
a
),andto
produce
theworldoffluxwith
itscharacteristicintermediate
position
betweenthe
being
ofIdeasandthe
not-being
of
Space
ormatter.
(10)Ultimately,
Iwishtodefendmy
contentioninthetextthatthe
Ideasarenot
only
outside
space,
butalsooutsidetime,thoughtheyarein
contactwiththeworldatthe
beginning
oftime.This,
I
believe,makesit
qasiertounderstandhowthey
actwithoutbeing
inmotion
;forallmotionor

CHAPTER
3/NOTES
16-22
187
fluxisin
spaceandtime. Plato,
Ibelieve,assumesthattimehasa
beginning.
Ithinkthatthisisthemostdirect
interpretationofLaws,72
ic :
*
therace
ofmanistwin-bornwithalltime
',considering
themany
indicationsthat
Platobelievedmantobecreatedasoneofthefirstcreatures.
(In
this
point,
I
disagreeslightly
withCornford,
Plato
9
s
Cosmology,1937,p.145,and
pp.
26
f.)
(n)Tosum
up,
Ibelievethatthe
passagesquoted
fromtheTimaeusare
amatureformulationofthe
theory
ofIdeas,freedfromcertaindifficultiesof
itsearlierform
(e.g.
fromthe
argument
ofthe
'
ThirdMan
'),
but
retaining
itscharacteristicfeatures
;theIdeasareearlierandbetterthantheir
changing
and
decayingcopies,andarethemselvesnotinflux.
16
Gp.
note4
tothis
chapter.
17
(i)Theroleofthegods
intheTimaeusissimilartotheonedescribed
inthetext.
Just
astheIdeasstamp
out
things,
sothe
godsformthebodies
ofmen.Only
thehumansouliscreatedby
theDemiurgehimself,thecreator
ofworld,gods,
andIdeas.
(For
anotherhintthatthe
gods
are
patriarchs,
seeLaws,7i3c/d.)Men,theweak,degenerate
childrenof
gods,
arethen
liabletofurther
degeneration ;cp.
note6
(7)
tothis
chapter,and
37-41
to
chapter5.
(2)
Inan
interestingpassage
oftheLaws
(68
ib
;cp.
alsonote
32(i,a)
to
chapter4)wefindanotherallusiontothe
parallelism
betweentherelation
Idea
thingsandtherelation
parent
children. Inthis
passage,
the
origin
of
lawis
explainedby
theinfluenceof
tradition,andmore
especially,bythe
transmissionofa
rigid
orderfromthe
parents
tothechildren
;andthe
following
remarkismade :
'
Andthey(theparents)wouldbesureto
imprint
upon
theirchildren,andupon
theirchildren'schildren,theirownwayof
thinking.'
18
Cp.
note
49,especially(3),
to
chapter
8.
19
Cp.Timaeus,31
a.ThetermwhichIhave
freely
translatedby
'
superior
thingwhichistheir
prototype
'
isatermoftenusedlaterbyAristotlewith
themeaning
'
universal
'
or
'
generic
term'.Itmeansa
'
thingwhichis
general
'
or
'
surpassing
'
or
*
embracing
'
;andI
suspect
thatit
originally
means
'
embracing
'
or
*
covering
'
inthesenseinwhichamouldembraces
orcoverswhatitmoulds.
20
Cp.Republic,597c.
Seealso
596a(andAdam'ssecondnoteto
596a5)
:
'
Forweareinthehabit,you
willremember,of
postulating
afrormorIdea
oneforeachgroup
ofmanyparticularthings
towhichwe
apply
thesame
name.'
21
Thereareinnumerable
passages
inPlato
;
Imention
only
thePhaedo
(e.g.79a),
the
Republic,544%,
theTheaetetus
(249b/c),
theTimaeus
(28b/c,
29C/d,5id,f.).
Aristotlementions itforinstancein
Metaphysics,98^32 ;
999
a
25~999bio ;ioioa6-i5 ;iO78bi5 ;
seealsonotes
23and25
tothis
chapter.
22
Parmenides
taught,
asBurnet
puts
it
(Early
Greek
Philosophy
2
,208)
that
*
whatis . .is
finite,spherical,motionless,corporeal ',
i.e.thattheworld
isafull
globe,
awholewithoutanyparts,
andthat
'
thereis
nothingbeyond
it'.Iam
quoting
Burnetbecause
(a)
his
description
isexcellentand
(b)
it
destroys
hisown
interpretation (E.G.P.,
208-1
1)
ofwhatParmenidescallsthe
'
Opinion
oftheMortals
'
(or
theWay
ofDelusive
Opinion).
ForBurnet
dismissesthereallthe
interpretations
ofAristotle,Theophrastus, Simplicius,
Gomperz,
and
Meyer,
as
c
anachronisms
'
or
'
palpable
anachronisms
',
etc.
Nowthe
interpretationdismissedby
Burnetis
practically
thesameastheone
proffered
hereinthetext
;namely,
thatParmenidesbelievedinaworldof
realitybehindthisworldof
appearance.
Suchadualism,whichwouldallow
Parmenides'
description
oftheworldof
appearance
toclaimatleastsome
kindof
adequacy,
isdismissedby
Burnetas
hopelessly
anachronistic. I

l88 CHAPTER
3/NOTES-23-26
suggest,however,thatifParmenideshadbelieved
solely
inhis
unmovingworld,
andnotatallinthe
changingworld,thenhewouldhavebeen
reallymad
(asEmpedocleshints)
.Butinfactthereisanindicationofasimilardualism
already
inXenophanes, fragm.23-6,
ifconfrontedwith
fragm.34(csp.
'
Butallmayhavetheirfancyopinions '),sothatwecanhardlyspeakof
ananachronism. Asindicatedinnote1
5(6-7),
IfollowGornford's
interpreta-
tionofParmenides. (See
alsonote
41
to
chapter10.)
23
Cp.
Aristotle's
Metaphysics,loySbas 5tnenext
quotation
is:
op.cit.,
24
Thisvaluablecomparison
isduetoG.G.
Field,PlatoandHisContem-
poraries
,211.
25
The
precedingquotation
isfrom
Aristotle,Metaphysics,1078^5 ;the
nextfrom
op.cit.,g87b7.
28
InAristotle's
analysis(inMetaphysics,g87a3O-bi8)
ofthe
arguments
whichledtothetheory
ofIdeas
(cp.
alsonote56(6)
to
chapter10),wecan
distinguish
thefollowingsteps
:
(a)
Heraclitus' flux,(b)
the
impossibility
of
trueknowledge
of
things
in
flux,(c)
theinfluenceofSocrates'ethicalessences,
(d)
theIdeasas
objects
oftrueknowledge, (e)
theinfluenceofthe
Pythagoreans,
(/)
the
*
mathematical
'
asintermediate
objects. ((e)and
(/)
Ihavenot
mentionedinthetext,whereIhavementionedinstead
(g)
theParmenidean
influence.)
Itmay
beworthwhiletoshowhowthese
stepscanbeidentifiedinPlato's
ownwork,wherehe
expounds
his
theory ;especially
inthePhaedoandinthe
Republic,
intheTheactetusandinthe
Sophist,andintheTimaeus.
(
i
)
InthePhaedo,wefindindicationsofallthe
pointsup
toand
including
(e).
In
65a-66a,
the
steps(d)and
(c)
are
prominent,
withanallusionto
(b).
In
706step(a),
Heraclitus'
theoryappears,combinedwithanelementof
Pythagoreanism (e).Thisleadsto
743ff.,andtoastatementof
step(d).
99-100
isanapproach
to
(d)through (c),
etc.For
(a)
to
(d),cp.
alsothe
Cratylus,43gc
ff.
Inthe
Republic,
itisofcourse
especiallyBookVIthat
correspondsclosely
toAristotle's
report, (a)
Inthe
beginning
ofBookVI,485a/b
theHeraclitean
fluxisreferredto(andcontrastedwiththe
unchangingworldof
Forms).
Platothere
speaks
of
'
a
reality
whichexistsforeveranddoesnot
driftfrom
generation
to
degeneration.
9
(Gp.
note2
(2)
to
chapter4andnote
33
to
chapter8,
and
text.)The
steps(b),(d)and
especially(/)play
aratherobviousrolein
thefamousSimileof
theLine
(Rep.,509^5ne
;cp.Adam'snotes,andhis
appendix
ItoBookVII) ;Socrates'ethical
influence,
i.e.
step(c),
isofcourse
alludedto
throughout
the
Republic.
It
playsan
important
r61ewithinthe
SimileoftheLineand
especiallyimmediatelybefore,
i.e.in
5o8bff.,where
theroleofthe
good
is
emphasized ;seein
particular5o8b/c
:
'
Thisiswhat
Imaintainregarding
the
offspring
ofthe
good.Whatthe
good
has
begotten
initsownlikeness
is,
inthe
intelligibleworld,
relatedtoreason
(and
its
objects)
inthesamewayas,
inthevisibleworld
',thatwhichisthe
offspring
ofthe
sun,
'
isrelatedto
sight(and
its
objects).' Step(e)
is
implied
in
(/),
butmore
fullydeveloped
inBookVII,inthefamousCurriculum
(cp.esp.523a~527c),
whichis
largely
basedontheSimileoftheLineinBookVI.
(2)
Inthe
Theaetetus, (a)and
(b)
aretreated
extensively ;(c)
ismentioned
in
i74band
I75C.
Inthe
Sophist,
allthe
steps,including(g),
arementioned,
only(e)and
(/)being
leftout
;
see
especially274a(stepc);249C(stepb);
253d/e(stepd).
(3)
IntheTimaeus,
allthe
steps
mentionedby
Aristotleareindicated,
withthe
possibleexception
of
(c),
whichisalludedtoonlyindirectly
inthe
introductoryrecapitulationofthecontentsofthe
Republic,andin
2gd.Step
(e)is,asitwere,alludedtothroughout,
since
'
Timaeus
'
isa
'
western
"
philosopher
and
strongly
influencedbyPythagoreanism. Theother
steps

CHAPTER
3/NOTES27-28
1
89
occurtwiceinaformalmost
completelyparellel
toAristotle'saccount
;
first
briefly
in
28a-2gd,andlater,withmoreelaboration,
in
486-550. Immediately
after
(a),
i.e.aHeracliteandescription(4ga
If.
;cp.Cornford,
Plato's
Cosmology,
178)
oftheworldin
flux,theargument(b)
israised
(5ic-c)
thatifwearc
right
in
distinguishing
betweenreason
(or
trueknowledge)
andmere
opinion,we
mustadmittheexistenceoftheunchangeableForms
;theseare
(in516f.)
introducednextinaccordancewith
step(d).TheHeraclitean fluxthen
comesagain(aslabouringspace),
butthistimeitis
explained,
asa
consequence
oftheactof
generation.Andasanext
step(/)appears,
in
53C.
(4)
Itseemsthatthis
parallelism
betweentheTimaeusandAristotle's
report
hasnotbeen
sufficientlyemphasized
sofar
;
at
least,
itisnotusedby
G.C.IJieldinhisexcellentandconvincing analysis
ofAristotle'sreport
(Plato
andHis
Contemporaries,
202
ff.).
Butitwouldhavestrengthened
Field's
arguments(arguments,however,whichhardlyneed
strengthening,
since
they
are
practicallyconclusive)against
Burnet'sand
Taylor's
viewsthattheTheory
ofIdeasisSocratic
(cp.
note56
to
chapter10).
ForintheTimaeus,
Platodoes
not
put
this
theory
intothemouthofSocrates,afactwhichaccording
to
Burnet'sand
Taylor'sprinciples
shouldprove
thatitwasnotSocrates'
theory.
(They
avoidthisinferencebyclaiming
that
*
Timaeus
'
isa
Pythagorean,
and
thathe
develops
notPlato'sphilosophy
buthisown.ButAristotleknew
Plato
personally
for
twentyyearsandshouldhavebeenableto
judge
these
matters
;andhewrotehis
Metaphysics
atatimewhenmembersoftheAcademy
couldhavecontradicted his
presentation
ofPlatonism.)
(5)
Burnetwrites,
inGreek
Philosophy, I,155(cp.
also
p.
xlivofhisedition
ofthePhaedo,1911)
:
'
thetheory
offormsinthesenseinwhichitismaintained
inthePhaedoand
Republic
is
wholly
absentfromwhatwemayfairlyregard
the
most
distinctively
Platonicofthe
dialogues,those,namely,
inwhichSocrates
isno
longer
thechief
speaker.
Inthatsenseitisneverevenmentionedin
anydialogue
laterthantheParmenides . .withthe
singleexception
ofthe
Timaeus
(sic),
wherethe
speaker
isa
Pythagorean.'
Butifitismaintainedin
theTimaeusinthesenseinwhichitismaintainedinthe
Republic,
thenitis
certainly
somaintainedinthe
Sophist253d/e ;andinthePoliticus,26gc/d ;
286a
;2g7b/c,andc/d ;301
aande
;3026 ;and3O3b ;andintheLaws,
yi3b,73gd/e,g62c,and,most
important,g65b/c ;seealsothenextnote.
(Burnet
believesinthe
genuineness
oftheLetters,especially
theSeventh
;but
the
theory
ofIdeasismaintainedtherein
342a
ft.
;
seealsonote56(5,d)
to
chapter10.)
27
Cp.Laws,8g5d-e.
Idonot
agree
withEngland's
note
(in
hisedition
oftheLaws,
vol.
II,472)
that
'
theword
"
essence
"
willnothelp
us'.True,
ifwemeantby
'
essence
'
someimportant
sensible
part
ofthesensible
thing
(whichmightperhaps
be
purified
and
producedby
some
distillation),
then
'
essence
'
wouldbemisleading.
Buttheword
*
essential
'
iswidelyusedin
away
whichcorrespondsvery
wellindeedwithwhatwewishto
express
here:
somethingopposed
totheaccidentalorunimportant
orchangingempirical
aspect
ofthe
thing,whetheritisconceivedasdwelling
inthat
thing,
orina
metaphysical
worldofIdeas.
Iam
using
theterm
'
essentialism
'
in
opposition
to
*
nominalism
',
inorder
toavoid,andto
replace,
themisleading
traditionalterm
*
realism
',wherever
itisopposed(not
to
*
idealism
'
but)
to
'
nominalism '.
(See
alsonote26ff.
to
chaptern,andtext,and
especially
note
38.)
OnPlato's
application
ofhisessentialistmethod,
forinstance,
asmentioned
inthetext,tothetheory
ofthe
soul,
seeLaws,8gsef.,quoted
innote15(8)
tothis
chapter,
andchapter5,especially
note
23.
Seealso,
forinstance,
Meno,86d/e,and
Symposium,iggc/d.
28Onthe
theory
ofcausal
explanation, cp.myLogik
derForschung,csp.
chapter12,pp.
26ff.

1
90 CHAPTER
4/NOTES
1-2
29
The
theory
of
languagehereindicated isthatofSemantics,as
developed
especiallyby
A.TarskiandR.
Carnap. Gp.Carnap,
Introduction to
Semantics,
1942,andnote23
to
chapter
8.
30
The
theory
thatwhilethe
physical
sciencesarebasedona
methodological
nominalism,thesocialsciencesmust
adopt
essentialist
('
realistic
')methods,
hasbeenmadecleartomebyK.
Polanyi(in1925) ;he
pointedout,
atthat
time,thatareformofthe
methodology
ofthesocialsciencesmightconceivably
beachievedbyabandoning
this
theory.The
theory
isheld,tosomeextent,
bymost
sociologists, esp.byJ.
S.Mill
(forinstance,Logic,VI,ch.VI,2
;
seealsohishistoricistformulations, e.g.
inVI,ch.X,2,
last
paragraph
:
'
The
fundamental
problem
. .ofthesocialscienceistofindthelaws
according
towhichany
stateof
societyproduces
thestatewhichsucceedsit .
.'),K.Marx
(seebelow) ;M.Weber
(cp.,
for
example,
hisdefinitionsinthe
beginning
of
Methodische
Grundlagen
der
Soziologie,
in
Wirtschqftund
Gesellschaft, I,andin
Ges.
AufsaetzezurWissenschaftslehre)
.G.Simmel,A.Vierkandt,R.M.Maclver,
andmanymore.The
philosophical expressionofallthesetendencies is
E.HusserFs
'
Phaenomenology ',a
systematicrevivalofthemethodological
essentialismofPlatoandAristotle.
(See
also
chaptern,esp.
note
44.)
The
opposite,
thenominalistattitudein
sociology,canbe
developed,
I
think,only
asa
technologicaltheory
ofsocialinstitutions.
Inthis
context,
ImaymentionhowIcametotracehistoricismbackto
PlatoandHeraclitus. In
analysinghistoricism,
Ifoundthatitneedswhat
Icallnow
methodological
essentialism
;
i.e.Isawthatthe
typicalarguments
infavourofessentialismareboundupwithhistoricism
(cp.myPovertyof
Historicism). Thisledmetoconsiderthe*
history
ofessentialism. Iwasstruck
by
the
parallelismbetweenAristotle's
reportandthe
analysiswhichIhad
carriedout
originallywithout
any
referencetoPlatonism. Inthisway,
I
wasremindedoftherolesofbothHeraclitusandPlatointhis
development.
31
Iam
alludingmainly
toR.H.S.Grossman,Plato
To-day(1937),
the
firstbookIhavefoundtocontaina
politicalinterpretation
ofPlatowhich
is
partly
similartomyown.Seealsonotes
2-3
to
chapter6,andtext.
NOTESTOCHAPTER4
1
Cp.Republic,6o8e.Seealsonote2
(2)
tothis
chapter.
2
(i)WiththePlatonic
theory,
Aristotlecontrastshisown,according
to
whichthe
'
good
'
thing
isnotthe
startingpoint,butrathertheendoraimof
change,
since
'
good
'
meansa
thingaimedatthe
final
cause
ofchange.Thus
he
says
ofthe
Platonists,
i.e.of*thosewhobelieveinForms
',that
they
'
donot
speak
asif
anythingcameto
passfor
thesake
of
these
*
(i.e.
of
thingswhichare
*
good')
*
butasifallmovementstartedfrom
them'.Andhe
points
outthat
*
good
'
meansthereforetothePlatonistsnot
'
acause
quagood',i.e.anaim,
butthat
*
itis
onlyincidentally
agood
'.
Cp.Metaphysics,gSSbiand8ff.
(This
criticismsoundsasifAristotlehadsometimesheldviewssimilartothose
of
Speusippus,whichisindeedZeller's
opinion ;
seenotento
chapter
11.
(2)Concerning
themovementtowards
corruption,mentionedinthetextin
this
paragraph,andits
generalsignificance
inthePlatonic
philosophy,we
must
keep
inmindthe
generaloppositionbetweentheworldof
unchanging
things
or
Ideas,andtheworldofsensible
things
influx.Platooften
expresses
this
opposition
asonebetweentheworldof
unchangingthingsandtheworld
of
corruptiblethings,
orbetween
things
thatare
generatedandthosethat
degenerate,
etc.
;see,for
instance,Republic,485a/b,quoted
innote26
(i)
to
chapter3
andintexttonote
33
to
chapter
8
;and
Republic,5463,quoted
intexttonote
37
to
chapter5
:
*
All
things
thathavebeen
generatedmust
degenerate
'
(ordecay).Thatthis
problem
ofthe
generationand
corruption
oftheworldof
things
influxwasan
importantpart
ofthePlatonicSchooltraditionisindicated

CHAPTER
4/NOTES3-7 IQI
by
thefactthatAristotledevoteda
separate
treatisetothis
problem. Another
interesting
indication istheway
inwhichAristotletalkedaboutthesematters
intheintroduction tohis
Politics,containedinthe
concluding
sentencesof
theNicomachianEthics
(ii8ib/i5)
:
*
Weshall
try
to...findwhatitisthat
preserves
or
corrupts
thecities . ..'This
passage
is
significant
not
only
asa
general
formulationofwhatAristotleconsideredthemainproblemofhis
Politics,butalsobecauseofits
strikingsimilarity
withan
importantpassage
intheLaws,
viz.
GyGa,and676b/cquotedbelowintexttonotes6and
25
to
this
chapter. (See
alsonotes
i,3,and
24/25
tothis
chapter ;
seenote
32
to
chapter8,and:he
passage
fromtheLawsquoted
innote
59
to
chapter8.)
8
This
quotation
isfromthe
Statesman,sGgc/d. (See
alsonote
23
tothis
chapter.)
Forthe
theory
that
perfectthings(divine
'
natures
'
;cp.
the
next
chapter)
can
onlybecomeless
perfectwhen
theychange,
see
esp.Republic,
38ia-c.The
quotation
fromAristotle isfromthe
Metaphysics, g88b3.
Thelasttwo
quotations
inthis
paragraph
arefromPlato'sLaws,797d,
f.
Seealsonote24
tothis
chapter,andtext.
(It
is
possible
to
interpret
the
remarkabouttheevil
objects
asanotherallusiontoa
cyclicdevelopment,
asdiscussedinnote6to
chapter2,
i.e.asanallusiontothebeliefthatthe
trendofthedevelopment
must
reverse,andthat
thingsmust
begin
to
improve
oncetheworldhasreachedthelowest
depth
ofevilness.
4
Cp.Timaeus,Qid-gab/c.
Seealsonote6
(7)
to
chapter3andnoten
to
chapter
11.
6
Seethe
beginning
of
chapter
2above,andnote6
(i)
to
chapter3.
It
isnotamereaccidentthatPlatomentionsHesiod's
story
of
'
metals
'
when
discussing
hisowntheory
ofhistoricaldecay(Rep.,546e/547a,esp.
notes
39
and40
tochapter5);he
clearlywishestoindicatehowwellhis
theory
fits
inwith,and
explains,
thatofHesiod.
6
Thehistorical
part
oftheLawsisinBooksThreeandFour
;thetwo
quotations
inthetextarefromthe
beginning
ofthis
part,
i.e.Laws,676a.
Forthe
parallelpassagesmentioned,see
Republic,36gb,
f.
('The
birthofa
city
. .
.')
and
545d ('Howwillour
city
be
changed
.
.').
ItisoftensaidthattheLaws(and
the
Statesman)
arelesshostiletowards
democracy
thanthe
Republic,anditmustbeadmittedthatPlato's
general
toneisinfactlesshostile
(this
is
perhapsduetothe
increasing
inner
strength
ofdemocracy ;see
chapter
10andthe
beginning
of
chapter
11
).
Butthe
only
practical
concessionmadetodemocracy
intheLawsisthat
political
officers
aretobeelectedby
themembersofthe
ruling
class.Butsinceall
important
changes
inthelawsofthestateareforbiddenanyway(cp.,
forinstance,the
quotations
inthetexttonote
3
ofthis
chapter),
thisdoesnotmean
verymuch.
Thefundamentaltendencyremains
pro-Spartan,
andthistendencywas,as
canbeseenfromAristotle's
Politics,u,6,17(1265^,compatible
witha
so-called
*
mixed
'
constitution. In
fact,PlatointheLaws
is,
if
anything,more
hostiletowardsthe
spirit
of
democracy,
i.e.towardstheideaofthefreedomof
theindividual,thanheisinthe
Republic ;cp.especially
thetexttonotes
32
and
33
to
chapter
6
(i.e.Laws,739C,ff.,and
942a,f.)andtonotes
19-22
to
chapter
8
(i.e.Laws,gc^c-goga).
Seealsonextnote.
7
Itseems
likely
thatitwas
largely
thisdifficultyof
explaining
thefirst
change(or
theFallofMan)
thatledPlatototransformhis
theoryofIdeas,
asmentionedinnote15(8)
to
chapter3;viz.,
totransformtheIdeasinto
active
powers,andthusinto
something
like
gods,
oreveninto
gods,
as
opposed
tothe
Republicwhich
(cp.38od)petrifies
eventhe
gods
intounmovingand
unmovedParmenidean
beings.(Animportantturningpointis,apparently,
the
Sophist,2480-249^Thetransformationseemstosolveatthesametimethe
difficulty
oftheso-called
*
thirdman
'
;foriftheForms
are,asintheTimaeus,
fathers,thenthereisno
'
thirdman
*
necessary
to
explain
their
similarity
to
their
offspring.)

IQ2
CHAPTER4/NOTES
8-11
Regarding
therelationofthe
Republic
totheStatesmanandtotheLaws,
IthinkthatPlato's
attempt
inthetwolatter
dialogues
totracethe
origin
of
human
society
furtherandfurtherback,
islikewiseconnectedwiththe
difficultiesinherentinthe
problem
ofthefirst
change.
Thatitisdifficultto
conceiveofa
changeovertaking
a
perfectcity
is
clearly
statedin
Republic,
5463 ;Plato'sattempt
inthe
Republic
tosolve
it,
willbediscussedinthenext
chapter(cp.
texttonotes
37-40
to
chapter5).
IntheStatesman,Plato
adopts
thetheory
ofacosmic
catastrophewhichleadstothechangefromthe
(Empedoclean)
half-circleoflovetothe
presentperiod,
thehalf-circleofstrife.
Thisideaseemstohavebeendropped
inthe
Timaeus,
inordertobe
replaced
by
a
theory(retained
inthe
Laws)
ofmorelimited
catastrophes,
suchasfloods,
whichmaydestroycivilizations,but
apparentlydonotaffectthecourseof
theuniverse.
(It
is
possible
thatthissolutionofthe
problem
was
suggested
toPlatoby
thefactthatin
373-372B.C.,theancient
city
ofHelicewas
destroyed
byearthquakeand
flood.)Theearliestformof
society,removedinthe
Republiconlybyone
singlestepfromthestill
existingSpartan
stateisthrust
backtoamoreandmoredistant
past.Although
Platocontinuestobelieve
thatthefirstsettlementmustbethebest
city,
henowdiscussessocieties
prior
tothefirstsettlement,
i.e.nomadsocieties,
'
hill
shepherds
'.
(Cp.esp.
note
33
tothis
chapter.)
8
The
quotation
isfrom
Marx-Engcls,
TheCommunist
Manifesto ;cp.
AHandbook
ofMarxism
(editedby
E.Burns,1935),
22.
9
The
quotation
isfromAdam'scommentsonbookVIIIofthe
Republic ;
seehisedition,
vol.II,198,
noteto
544a3.
10
Cp.Republic,5440.
11
(i)
As
opposed
tomy
contention thatPlato,
likemanymodern
sociologists
sinceComte,
triestooutlinethe
typicalstages
ofsocial
develop-
ment,mostcriticstakePlato's
storymerely
asasomewhatdramatic
presenta-
tionofa
purelylogical
classificationofconstitutions. Butthisnot
only
contradictswhatPlato
says(cp.
Adam'snoteto
Rep.,54409,op.cit.,vol.II,
i99)>butitisalso
againstthewhole
spirit
ofPlato's
logic,according
towhich
theessenceofa
thing
istobeunderstoodby
itsnature,
i.e.by
itshistorical
origin.Andwemustnot
forget
thatheusesthesameword,
'
genus',to
meanaclassinthe
logical
senseandaraceinthe
biological
sense.The
logical
*
genus
'
isstillidenticalwiththe
'
race
',
inthesenseof
'
offspring
of
thesame
parent
'.
(Withthis,cp.
notes
15
to20to
chapter3,andtext,as
wellasnotes
23-24
to
chapter5,and
text,wherethe
equation
nature~
origin
=
raceis
discussed.) Accordingly,
thereis
every
reasonfor
takingwhatPlato
says
atitsfacevalue
;
forevenifAdamwere
rightwhenhe
says(loc.cit.)
that
Platointendsto
give
a
*
logical
order
',
thisorderwouldforhimbeatthesame
timethatofa
typical
historical
development.
Adam'sremark
(loc.cit.)
thattheorder
'
is
primarily
determinedbypsychologicalandnotby
historical
considerations
'
turns,
Ibelieve,against
him.Forhehimself
points
out
(for
instance,op.cit.,vol.
II,195,
noteto
5433,ff.)
thatPlato
'
retains
throughout
. .the
analogy
betweentheSoulandthe
City
'.According
toPlato's
politicaltheory
ofthesoul
(which
willbediscussedinthenext
chapter),
the
psychologicalhistory
mustrun
parallel
tothesocial
history,andthe
alleged
opposition
between
psychological
andhistoricalconsiderations
disappears,
turning
intoanotherargument
infavourofour
interpretation.
(2)Exactly
thesame
reply
couldbemadeifsomebodyshouldargue
thatPlato'sorderoftheconstitution
is,fundamentally, nota
logicalbutan
ethicalone
;
fortheethicalorder
(and
theaestheticorderas
well)is,inPlato's
philosophy,indistinguishablefromthehistoricalorder. Inthisconnection,
itmayberemarkedthatthishistoricistview
provides
Platowithatheoretical
background
forSocrates'eudemonism,
i.e.ofthe
theory
that
goodnessand
happiness
areidentical. This
theory
is
developed,
inthe
Republic(cp.especially

CHAPTER
4/NOTES
12-18
193
58ob),
intheformofthedoctrinethat
goodnessand
happiness,
orbadness
and
unhappiness,
are
proportional ;andso
theymustbe,
ifthedegree
of
the
goodness
aswellasofthe
happiness
ofamanistobemeasuredby
the
degree
inwhichheresemblesthe
perfectIdeaofman.
(The
factthatPlato's
theoryleads,inthis
point,
toatheoretical
justificationofan
apparently
paradoxical
Socraticdoctrinemay
wellhave
helped
Platotoconvincehimself
thathewas
onlyexpounding
thetrueSocraticcreed
;seetexttonotes56/57
to
chapter
10.
(3)RousseautookoverPlato'sclassificationofinstitutions
(SocialContract,
Book
II,ch.VII,Book
III,ch.Ill
ff.,cp.
alsoch.
X).Buthewas
probably
mainlyindirectly
influencedby
PlatowhenherevivedthePlatonicIdeaofa
primitivesociety(cp.,however,notes ito
chapter
6and
14
to
chapter9);
butadirectproduct
ofthePlatonicRenaissance in
ItalywasSanazzaro's
mostinfluentialbookArcadia,withitsrevivalofPlato'sideaofablessed
primitivesociety
ofGreek
(Porian)
hill
shepherds. (For
thisideaofPlato's,
cp.
texttonote
32
tothis
chapter.)ThusRomanticism
(cp.
also
chapter9)
is
historically
indeedan
offspring
ofPlatonism.
(4)HowfarthemodernhistoricismofComteandMill,andofHegeland
Marx,
isinfluencedby
thetheistichistoricismofGiambattista Vico'sNew
Science
(1725)
is
very
hardto
say
:Vicohimselfwasundoubtedly
influenced
byPlato,aswellasby
St.
Augustine'sDeCivitateDeiandMachiavelli'sDis-
courseson
Livy.
LikePlato
(cp.
ch.
5),Vicoidentifiedthe
*
nature
'
ofa
thing
withits
'
origin
'
(cp.,Opere,
Ferrari'ssecond
ed.,1852-4,
vol.V,p.99);
andhebelievedthatallnationsmust
passthrough
thesamecourseof
develop-
ment,according
tooneuniversallaw.His
*
nations
'
(likeHegel's)may
thus
besaidtobeoneofthelinksbetweenPlato's
'
Cities
'
andToynbee's
'
Civilizations '.
12
Cp.Republic,549c/d ;thenext
quotations
are
op.cit.,55od-e,and
later,
op.cit.,55ia/b.
13
Cp.op.cit.,5566. (Thispassage
shouldbecompared
with
Thucydides,
III,82-4,quoted
in
chapter10,texttonote
12.)
Thenext
quotation
is
op.cit.,5573.
14
ForPericles'democraticprogramme,
seetexttonote
31,chapter
10
;
note
17
to
chapter6,andnote34
to
chapter
10.
15
Adam,inhiseditionofThe
RepublicofPlato,
vol.
II,240,
noteto
55^22.
(The
italicsinthesecond
quotation
are
mine.)Adamadmitsthat
*
the
picture
isdoubtlesssomewhat
exaggerated
'
;butheleaveslittledoubtthathethinks
it
is,fundamentally,
true
'
foralltime'.
18
Adam,
loc.cit.
17
This
quotation
isfrom
Republic,56od(for
thisandthenext
quotation,
cp.Lindsay'stranslation) ;thenexttwo
quotations
arefromthesamework,
563a-b,andd.
(See
alsoAdam'snoteto
563d25.)
Itis
significant
that
Plato,whoin
general
isnotadefenderof
privateproperty,
defendsthis
institution,whenthe
propertybought
isa
slave,byappealing
tothelawful
right
ofthe
buyer.
Anotherattackupondemocracy
isthat
*
it
tramples
underfoot
'
the
educational
principle
that
'
noonecangrowup
tobeagoodmanunlesshis
earliest
years
were
given
tonoble
games
'.
(Rep.,558b ;see
Lindsay's
translation; cp.
note68to
chapter10.)Seealsotheattacksuponequali-
tarianismquoted
innote
14
to
chapter
6.
18
Slavery(see
^thelast
note)andtheAthenianmovement
against
itwill
befurtherdiscussedin
chapters5(notes13and
text),10,andn
;
seealso
note
29
tothe
presentchapter.
LikePlato,
Aristotle
(e.g.
in
Pol.,1313^1,
I3i9b20 ;andinhisConstitution
ofAthens,59,5),
testifiestoAthens'
liberality
towardsslaves
;andsodoesthePseudo-Xenophon (cp.
hisConst,
ofAthens*
I,10,f.)

CHAPTER4/NOTES19-26
19
Gp.Republic,577a,
f.
;seeAdam'snotesto577a5andbi2
(op.cit.,
vol.
II,332f.).
20
Republic,5666 ;cp.
note63
to
chapter
10.
21
Cp.
Statesman
(Politicus),3Oic/d.Although
Plato
distinguishes
six
types
ofdebased
states,hedoesnotintroduceanynewterms
;thenames
*
monarchy
'
(or
'
kingship ')and
'
aristocracy
'
areusedinthe
Republic(445d)
ofthebest
state
itself,andnotofthe
relatively
bestformsofdebased
states,
asinthe
Statesman.
22
Gp.Republic,544d.
23
Gp.Statesman,297c/d
:
c
Ifthegovernment
Ihavementioned isthe
only
true
original,
thentheothers
'
(which
are
'
onlycopies
ofthis
'
;cp.2g7b/c)
'
mustuseitslaws,andwritethemdown
;
thisisthe
onlyway
inwhich
they
canbe
preserved
'.
(Gp.
note
3
tothis
chapter,andnote18to
chapter7.)
'
Andany
violationofthelawsshouldbe
punished
withdeath,andthemost
severe
punishments ;andthisis
veryjustand
good,although,
ofcourse,only
thesecondbest
thing.' (For
the
origin
ofthe
laws,cp.
note
32(i,a)
tothis
chapter,andnote
17(2)
tochapter3.)Andin
3006/3013, f.,weread :
*
Thenearest
approach
oftheselowerformsofgovernment
tothetrue
govern-
ment . .istofollowthesewrittenlawsandcustoms. . .Whentherich
ruleandimitatethetrueForm,thenthe
government
iscalled
aristocracy ;
andwhen
theydonotheedthe
(ancient)laws,oligarchy,'
etc. Itis
important
tonotethatnotlawfulnessorlawlessnessinthe
abstract,butthe
preservation
of
theancientinstitutionsofthe
original
or
perfect
stateisthecriterionofthe
classification.
(This
isincontrasttoAristotle's
Politics,I2g2a,wherethe
maindistinction iswhetherornot
'
thelawis
supreme ',or,
for
instance,
the
mob.)
24
The
passage,Laws,7096-7143,
containsseveralallusionstotheStates-
man
;
forinstance,710d-e,whichintroduces,followingHerodotus
III,80-82,
thenumber
of
rulersasthe
principle
ofclassification
;theenumerationsofthe
formsof
government
in
7126andd
;and
7i3b, flf.,
i.e.themyth
ofthe
perfect
stateintheday
ofCronos,
'
ofwhichthebestofour
present
statesareimita-
tions'.Inviewofthese
allusions,
IlittledoubtthatPlatointendedhis
theory
ofthefitnessof
tyranny
for
Utopianexperiments
tobeunderstoodasakindof
continuationofthe
storyoftheStatesman(and
thusalsoofthe
Republic).The
quotations
inthis
paragraph
arefromtheLaws,7096,
and
7ioc/d ;
the
'
re-
markfromtheLawsquotedabove
'
is
797d,quoted
inthetexttonote
3,
inthis
chapter. (IagreewithE.B.
England's
notetothis
passage,
inhiseditionof
TheLaws
ofPlato,1921,
vol.II,258,
thatitisPlato's
principle
that
'
change
is
detrimentaltothepower...of
anything ',andthereforealsotothepower
of
evil
;butIdonot
agree
withhim
*
that
changefrombad
',viz.,
to
good,
istoo
self-evidenttobementionedasan
exception ;
itisnotself-evidentfromthe
point
ofviewofPlato'sdoctrineoftheevilnatureof
change.
Seealsonext
note)
.
26
Cp.Laws,676b/c(cp.6763,quoted
inthetexttonote
6).
In
spite
ofPlato'sdoctrinethat
'
change
isdetrimental
'
(cp.
theendofthelast
note),
E.B.Englandinterprets
these
passageson
changeandrevolutionbygiving
theman
optimistic
or
progressivemeaning.He
suggests
thatthe
object
of
Plato'ssearch iswhat
'
wemight
call
"
thesecretof
politicalvitality
".'
(Gp.op.cit.,
vol.
I,344.)Andhe
interprets
this
passageonthesearchfor
thetruecauseof
(detrimental)change
as
dealingwithasearchfor
'
thecause
andnatureofthetrue
developmentofastate,
i.e.ofits
progress
towards
perfection
'.
(Italics
his
;cp.
vol.
I,345.)
Thisshowshowmuchthetendency
toidealize
Platoandto
representhimasa
progressivist
blindsevensuchanexcellent
critic
against
hisown
finding,namely,
thatPlatobelievedchange
tobe
detrimental.
86
Gp.Republic,545d(see
alsothe
parallelpassage465^.Thenext

CHAPTER
4/NOTE2? 195
quotation
isfromtheLaws,6836.(Adam
inhiseditionofthe
Republic,
vol.
II,203,
noteto
545dai,
referstothis
passage
inthe
Laws.)England,
inhiseditionoftheLaws,vol.
I,360f.,noteto
68365,mentions
Republic,
6oga,
butneither
545d
nor
4650,and
supposes
thatthereference is
'
toa
previousdiscussion,oronerecordedinalost
dialogue
'.Idonotseewhy
Platoshouldnotbe
alluding
tothe
Republic,byusing
thefictionthatsomeof
its
topics
havebeendiscussedby
the
present
interlocutors. AsGornford
says,
inPlato'slast
group
of
dialogues
thereis
'
nomotiveto
keepup
the
illusionthattheconversationshad
reallytaken
place
'
;andheisalso
right
whenhe
says
thatPlato
*
wasnottheslaveofhisownfictions '.
(Cp.Cornford,
Plato's
Cosmology,pp.5and
4.)
Plato'slawofrevolutionswasrediscovered,
withoutreferencetoPlato,byV.Pareto
;cp.
hisTreatiseonGeneral
Sociology,
2054,2057,2058. (At
theendof
2055,
thereisalsoa
theory
of
arresting
history.)
Rousseaualsorediscoveredthelaws.
(SocialContract,BookIII,
ch.
X.)
27
(i)
Itmay
beworth
noting
thatthe
intentionally
non-historicalfeatures
ofthebest
state,especially
theruleofthe
philosophers,
arenotmentioned
by
Platointhesummary
atthe
beginning
oftheTimaeus,andthatinBook
VIIIofthe
Republicheassumesthattherulersofthebeststatearenotversed
in
Pythagoreannumber-mysticism ;cp.Republic,546c/d,wheretherulers
arcsaidtobe
ignorantofthesematters.
(Cp.
alsotheremark,Rep.,543d/544a,
according
towhichthebeststateofBookVIIIcanstillbe
surpassed,namely,
asAdam
says,by
the
city
ofBooksV-VII theideal
city
in
heaven.)
Inhisbook,Plato's
Cosmology,pp.
6
ff.,Cornfordreconstructstheoutlines
andcontentsofPlato'sunfinished
trilogy,
Timaeus Critias Hermocrates,and
showshow
they
arerelatedtothehistorical
parts
oftheLaws
(BookIII).
Thisreconstruction
is,
Ithink,avaluablecorroborationofmytheory
that
Plato'sviewoftheworldwasfundamentally historical,andthathisinterest
in
*
howit
generated
'
(andhowit
decays)
islinkedwithhistheoryofIdeas,
andindeedbasedonit.Butifthatis
so,thenthereisnoreasonwhywe
shouldassumethatthelaterbooksofthe
Republic
'
startedfromthe
question
howit
'
(i.e.
the
city)
*
mightberealizedinthe
futureandsketchedits
possible
decline
through
lowerformsof
polities'(Cornford,op.cit.,6
;
italics
mine) ;but
weshould,especially
inviewoftheclose
parallelismbetweenthethirdbook
oftheLawsandthe
eighth
bookofthe
Republic,
consider itasa
simplified
historicalsketchoftheactualdeclineoftheideal
city
ofthe
past,andasan
explanation
ofthe
origin
ofthe
existingstates,analogous
tothe
greater
task
setby
PlatoforhimselfintheTimaeus,
intheunfinished
trilogy,andinthe
Laws.
(sj)
Inconnectionwithmyremark,
laterinthe
paragraph,
thatPlato
*
certainlyknewthathedidnot
possess
the
necessarydata
',
seeforinstance
Laws,683d,and
England's
noteto
683d2.
(3)Tpmy
remarkfurtheronintheparagraph,
thatPlatorecognized
theCretanand
Spartan
societiesas
petrified
orarrested(and
totheremark
inthenext
paragraph
thatPlato'sbeststateisnotonly
aclassstatebuta
caste
state)
the
followingmay
beadded.
(Cp.
alsonote20tothis
chapter,
and
24
to
chapter10.)
InLaws,79yd(in
theintroduction tothe
'
importantpronouncement ',
asEngland
calls
it,quoted
inthetexttonote
3
tothis
chapter)
Platomakesit
perfectly
clearthathisCretanand
Spartan
interlocutorsareawareofthe
*
arrested
'
characteroftheirsocialinstitutions
;Clenias,theCretaninter-
locutor,emphasizes
thatheisanxioustolistentoany
defenceofthearchaic
characterofastate.Alittlelater
(799a),
andinthesamecontext,adirect
reference ismadetothe
Egyptianmethodof
arresting
the
development
of
institutions
;surely
aclearindicationthatPlato
recognized
atendency
in
Creteand
Spartaparallel
tothatof
Egypt,namely,
toarrestallsocialchange.

196
CHAPTER
4/NOTES28-3!
Inthiscontext,a
passage
intheTimaeus
(seeespecially24a-b)seems
important. Inthis
passage,
Platotriestoshow
(a)
thataclassdivisionvery
similartothatofthe
Republic
wasestablishedinAthensatavery
ancient
period
ofits
pre-historicaldevelopment,and
(b)
thattheseinstitutionswere
closelyakintothecastesystemofEgypt(whose
arrestedcasteinstitutions
heassumestohavederivedfromhisancientAthenian
state).ThusPlato
himself
acknowledgesbyimplication
thattheidealancientand
perfect
state
ofthe
Republic
isacastestate. Itis
interesting
thatGrantor,
firstcommentator
ontheTimaeus,reports,onlytwo
generations
afterPlato,thatPlatohadbeen
accusedof
deserting
theAthenian
tradition,andofbecoming
a
disciple
ofthe
Egyptians. (Cp.Gomperz,
Greek
Thinkers,Germ,ed.,II,476.)
Seealso
Isocrates*Busiris,quoted
innote
3
to
chapter13.
Fortheproblem
ofthecastesinthe
Republic,
seefurthermorenotes
3
1and
32(i,d)
tothis
chapter,
note
40
to
chapter6,andnotes 1
1-14
to
chapter
8.
A.E.
Taylor,
Plato:TheManandHisWork,pp.269f.,forcefully
denounces
theviewthatPlatofavouredacastestate.
28
Cp.Republic,4i6a.The
problem
isconsideredmore
fully
inthis
chapter,
texttonote
35.(For
the
problem
of
caste,mentionedinthenext
paragraph,
seenotes27(3)and
31
tothis
chapter.)
29
Cp.Republic,37id/e.Adamcomments
(op.cit.,
vol.
I,97,
noteto
371032)
:
'
Platodoesnotadmitslavelabourinhis
city,
unless
perhaps
in
the
persons
ofbarbarians.' I
agree
thatPlatointhe
Republic^Ggb-c)
opposed
theenslavementofGreek
prisoners
ofwar
;butheencouraged
that
ofbarbarians.
(This
isalsothe
opinionofTarn
;cp.
note1
3(2)
tochapter
15.)AndPlato
violently
attackedtheAthenianmovement
againstslavery,
andinsistedonthe
legalrights
of
propertywhenthe
property
wasaslave
(cp.
texttonotes
17and18tothis
chapter).Andasisshownby
thenext
quotation(fromRep.,5480/549a)
intheparagraph
towhichthisnote is
appended,
hedidnotabolish
slavery
inhisbest
city.(See
also
Rep.,59oc/d,
wherehedefendsthedemandthattheworkersshouldbetheslavesofthe
bestman.)
A.E.
Taylor
isthereforewrongwhenhemaintainstwice
(in
his
Plato,1908and
1914,pp.197and
118)thatPlato
implies
*
thatthereisno
classofslavesinthecommunity
'.Forsimilarviewsin
Taylor's
Plato:The
ManandHisWork
(1926),cp.endofnote
27
tothis
chapter.
ForPlato'streatmentof
slavery
intheLaws,see
especially
G.&.Morrow,
'
Platoand'GreekSlavery'(Mind,N.S.,vol.
48,186-201
;seealso
p.402),
anarticlewhich
givesanexcellentandcritical
survey
ofthe
subject,and
reachesa
veryjustconclusion,although
theauthor
is,inmyopinion,
stilla
littlebiasedinfavourofPlato.
(The
articledoesnot
perhapssufficiently
stressthefactthatinPlato's
day,an
anti-slaverymovementwaswellonthe
way;cp.
note
13
to
chapter5.)Seealsothe
Statesman,3093.
ForPlato'sadvice
againstlegislating
forthecommon
people
withtheir
'
vulgarmarket
quarrels ',etc.,see
Republic,425c/d~427a ;esp.425d-eand
427a.These
passages,
ofcourse,attackAtheniandemocracy (and
all
'
piecemeal
'
legislation
inthesenseof
chapter9).
30
The
quotation
isfromPlato'ssummary
ofthe
Republic
intheTimaeus
(i8c/d).Withtheremark
concerning
thelackof
novelty
ofthe
suggested
community
ofwomenandchildren,compareAdam'seditionofThe
Republic
ofPlato,
vol.
I,p.292(note
to
457b,ff.)and
p.308(note
to463^),
aswell
as
pp.345-55,esp.354;withthePythagoreanelementinPlato'scommunism,
cp.op.cit.,p.199,
noteto
4i6d22. (For
the
preciousmetals,cp.
note
24
to
chapter10.)
81
The
passagequoted
isfrom
Republic,434b/c.
In
demanding
acaste
state,Platohesitatesfora
long
time.Thisis
quiteapartfromthe
'
lengthy
preface
'
tothe
passage
in
question(which
willbediscussedin
chapter
6
;
cp.
notes
24
and40
tothat
chapter) ;
forwhenfirst
speakingaboutthese

CHAPTER4/NOTE32 197
matters,
in
4153,fT.,he
speaks
asthough
arisefromthelowertothe
upper
classeswere
permissible,provided
thatinthelowerclasses
*
childrenwere
bornwithanadmixtureof
goldandsilver
'
(4i5c),
i.e.of
upper
classblood
andvirtue.Butin434b/c,and,evenmore
clearly,
in
547a,thispermission
iswithdrawn
;andin
547aanyadmixtureofthemetalsisdeclaredan
impurity
whichmustbefataltothestate.Seealsotexttonotes
11-14
to
chapter
8
(andnote27(3)
tothe
presentchapter).
32
Gp.
theStatesman,2716.The
passages
intheLawsaboutthe
primitive
nomadic
shepherdsandtheir
patriarchs
are
6776-6806.The
passagequoted
isLaws,68oe.The
passagequoted
nextisfromtheMyth
oftheEarthborn,
Republic ',4i5d/e.The
concludingquotation
ofthe
paragraph
isfrom
Republic,
44od.
Itmaybe
necessary
toaddsomecommentsoncertainremarksinthe
paragraph
towhichthisnoteis
appended.
(i)
Itisstatedinthetextthatitisnot
veryclearlyexplainedhowthe
*
settlement
'
cameabout.BothintheLawsandinthe
Republicwefirst
hear
(see(a)
and
(c),below)
ofakindof
agreement
orsocialcontract
(for
the
social
contract,cp.
note
29
to
chapter5andnotes
43
to
54
to
chapter6,and
text),
andlater
(see(b)
and
(c),below)
ofaforceful
subjugation.
(a)
IntheLaws,thevarioustribesofhill
shepherds
settleinthe
plains
after
havingjoinedtogether
toform
largerwarbandswhoselawsarearrivedat
byanagreement
orcontract,madeby
arbitersvestedwith
royalpowers
(68
1bandc/d ;
forthe
origin
ofthelawsdescribedin68
ib,cp.
note
17(2)
to
chapter3).
ButnowPlatobecomesevasive. Insteadof
describinghow
thesebandssettleinGreece,andhowtheGreekcitieswerefounded,Plato
switchesovertoHomer's
story
ofthefoundationofTroy,andtotheTrojan
war.Fromthere,Plato
says,theAchaeansreturnedunderthenameof
Dorians,and
'
therestofthe
story
. .is
part
ofLacedaemonian
history
'
(682e)
'
forwehavereachedthesettlementofLacedaemon
'
(682e/683a).
Sofarwehaveheard
nothing
aboutthemannerofthis
settlement,andthere
followsatonceafurther
digression(Plato
himself
speaks
aboutthe
*
roundabout
trackofthe
argument ')
untilwe
getultimately (in683c/d)
the
*
hint
'
mentionedinthetext
;
see
(b).
(b)Thestatementinthetextthatwe
get
ahintthattheDorian
*
settle-
ment
'
inthe
Peloponnesewasinfactaviolent
subjugation,
referstotheLaws
(683c/d),
wherePlatointroduceswhatare
actually
hisfirsthistoricalremarks
on
Sparta.He
says
thathe
begins
atthetimewhenthewholeofthe
Pelopon-
nesewas
*
practicallysubjugated
'
by
theDorians. IntheMenexenus
(whose
genuineness
can
hardly
bedoubted
;cp.
note
35
to
chapter10)
thereisin
245Canallusiontothefactthatthe
Peloponnesians
were
'
immigrantsfrom
abroad
'
(as
Grote
puts
it:
cp.
his
Plato,III,p.5).
(c)
Inthe
Republic(369^
the
city
isfoundedby
workerswithaviewto
the
advantages
ofadivisionoflabourandof
co-operation,
inaccordancewith
thecontract
theory.
(d)
Butlater
(inRep.,4i5d/e ;
seethe
quotation
inthetext,tothis
paragraph)we
get
a
description
ofthetriumphant
invasionofawarriorclass
ofsomewhat
mysteriousorigin
the
'
earthborn '.Thedecisive
passage
of
this
description
statesthattheearthbornmustlookroundtofindfortheir
camp
themostsuitable
spot(literally)
'
for
keepingdownthosewithin
',
i.e.,
for
keepingdownthose
alreadyliving
inthe
city,i.e.,
for
keeping
downthe
inhabitants.
(e)
IntheStatesman
(2713,f.)
these
'
earthborn'areidentifiedwiththe
veryearlynomadhill
shepherds
ofthe
pre-settlement period.
(/)
Tosumup
itseemsthatPlatohada
fairly
clearideaoftheDorian
conquest,
whichhe
preferred,
forobviousreasons,
toveilin
mystery.
Italso
seemsthattherewasatraditionthattheconqueringwarhordeswereof
nomaddescent.

198
CHAPTER
4/NOTE33
(2)Withtheremarklaterinthetextinthis
paragraphregarding
Plato's
'
continuousemphasis
'
onthefactthat
ruling
is
shepherding,cp.,
forinstance,
the
followingpassages
:
Republic,3430,wheretheideaisintroduced
;345Cf.,
where,
informofthesimileofthegoodshepherd,
itbecomesoneofthecentral
topics
ofthe
investigation ;375a~376b,4043,44od,4510-6,45ga~46oc,and
466c-d(quoted
innote
30
to
chapter5),
wheretheauxiliariesarelikenedto
sheep-dogsandwheretheirbreedingandeducation isdiscussed
accordingly ;
4i6a, ff.,wherethe
problem
ofthewolveswithoutandwithinthestateis
introduced
;cp.furthermore,theStatesman,wheretheideaiscontinuedover
manypages,esp.26id-276d. With
regard
totheLaws,
Imay
refertothe
passage(6946),
wherePlato
says
ofCyrus
thathehad
acquired
forhissons
'
cattleand
sheepandmany
herdsofmenandotheranimals '.
(Cp.
also
Laws,735,
and
Theaet.,i74d.)
(3)Withall
this,cp.
alsoA.
J.Toynbee,A
StudyofHistory,esp.
vol.Ill,
pp.32(n.i),
whereA.H.
Lybyer,
TheGovernment
of
theOttoman
Empire,etc.,
is
quoted,33(n.2),50-100 ;
seemore
especially
hisremarkonthe
conquering
nomads
(p.22)who
*
dealwith . . .men
',andonPlato'shumanwatch-
dogs'(p.94,
n.
2).
IhavebeenmuchstimulatedbyToynbee's
brilliantideas
andmuchencouragedbymany
ofhisremarkswhichItakeas
corroborating
myinterpretations,andwhichIcanvaluethemore
highly
themore
Toynbee's
andmyfundamentalassumptions
seemto
disagree.
IalsoowetoToynbee
a
numberoftermsusedinmytext,especially
'
humancattle
',
*
humanherd
'
and
'
humanwatch-dog
'.
Toynbee'sStudyofHistoryis,frommypoint
ofview,amodelofwhatI
callhistoricism
;
Ineednot
saymuchmoreto
expressmyfundamental
disagreement
withit
;andanumberof
specialpoints
of
disagreement
will
bediscussedatvarious
places(cp.
notes
43and
45(2)
tothis
chapter,
notes
7and8tochapter10,andchapter24).Butitcontainsawealthof
interesting
and
stimulating
ideas.RegardingPlato,Toynbeeemphasizes
anumberof
points
inwhichIcanfollowhim,especially
thatPlato'sbeststateis
inspired
by
his
experience
ofsocialrevolutionandby
hiswishtoarrestall
change,
andthatitisakindofarrestedSparta(which
itselfwasalso
arrested).
Toynbee
alsostressestheideasofthe
shepherd
ofmen,ofthehuman
sheep-dog,
andthehumancattle.In
spite
ofthese
points
of
agreement,
thereiseven
inthe
interpretation
ofPlatoafundamentaldisagreementbetweenToynbee's
viewsandmy
own.Toynbeeregards
Plato'sbeststateasa
typical(reac-
tionary)Utopia,
whileI
interpret
its
majorpart,
inconnectionwithwhatI
considerasPlato's
generaltheory
of
change,
asan
attempt
toreconstructa
primitiveformof
society.NordoIthinkthat
Toynbee
would
agree
with
myinterpretation
ofPlato's
story
ofthe
periodprior
tothe
settlement,andof
thesettlement
itself,outlinedinthisnoteandthetext
;
forToynbeesays
(op.cit.,vol.Ill,80)
that
'
the
Spartansocietywasnotofnomadic
origin
*.
Toynbeestronglyemphasize^ (op.cit.,Ill,50ff.)
the
peculiar
characterof
Spartansociety,which,he
says,wasarrestedinits
developmentowing
toa
superhuman
effortto
keepdowntheir
*
humancattle'.ButIthinkthatthis
emphasis
onthe
peculiar
situationof
Spartamakesitdifficulttounderstand
thesimilaritiesbetweentheinstitutionsof
SpartaandCretewhichPlatofound
so
striking(Rep.,544C ;Laws,683a).These,
I
believe,canbe
explainedonly
asarrestedformsofveryancienttribal
institutions,whichmustbe
considerably
olderthantheeffortofthe
Spartans
inthesecondMessenianwar
(about
650-620
B.C.
;cp.Toynbee, op.cit.,Ill,53).
Sincetheconditionsofthe
survivaloftheseinstitutionswereso
very
differentinthetwo
localities,their
similarity
isa
strongargument
infavouroftheir
beingprimitiveand
against
an
explanation
oftheirarrestmentby
afactorwhichaffects
onlyoneofthem.
33
Thefactthateducation isinPlato'sstateaclass
prerogative
hasbeen
overlookedby
someenthusiasticeducationistswhocreditPlatowiththeidea

CHAPTER
4/NOTEs34-39
1
99
ofmakingeducationindependent
offinancialmeans
;theydonotseethat
theevilistheclass
prerogative
assuch,andthatitis
comparativelyunimportant
whetherthis
prerogative
isbasedupon
the
possession
ofmoneyoruponany
othercriterionby
whichmembership
ofthe
ruling
classisdetermined. Cp.
notes12and
13
to
chapter7,andtext.
34
Cp.Republic,46oc. (See
alsonote
31
tothis
chapter.) Regarding
Plato'srecommendation ofinfanticide,seeAdam,op.cit.,vol.
I,p.299,
note
to
46oci8,
and
pp.357
ff.AlthoughAdam
rightly
insiststhatPlatowasin
favourofinfanticide,andalthoughhe
rejects
as
'
irrelevant
'
all
attempts
'
to
acquit
Platoof
sanctioning
'
suchadreadful
practice,hetriestoexcusePlato
bypointing
out
'
thatthe
practicewaswidelyprevalent
inancientGreece'.
ButitwasnotsoinAthens. Platochoosesthroughout
to
prefer
theancient
Spartan
barbarismandracialismtothe
enlightenment
ofPericles'Athens
;
andforthischoicehemustbeheld
responsible.
Fora
hypothesisexplaining
the
Spartanpractice,
seenote
7
to
chapter
10
(andtext) ;seealsothecross
referencesgiven
there.
Thelater
quotations
inthis
paragraph
whichfavour
applying
the
principles
ofanimal
breeding
tomanarefrom
Republic,459b(cp.
note
39
to
chapter8,
and
text) ;
thoseonthe
analogybetweendogsand
warriors,etc.,fromthe
Republic, 4.043, ;375a ;376a/b ;and
376b.
35
Thetwo
quotations
beforethenote-number arebothfrom
Republic,
375b.Thenext
followingquotation
isfrom
4i6a(cp.note28tothis
chapter) ;
theremaining
onesarcfrom
3750-0.Theproblemof
blendingopposite
'
natures
'
(or
evenForms
;cp.
notes18-20,chapter5,andtextandnote
39
to
chapter8)
isoneofPlato'sfavourite
topics.(WithAristotle,
it
merges
intothedoctrineofthe
mean.)
38
The
quotations
arefrom
Republic,4
toe
;4iod ;4106;4116/41
2aand
4i2b.
87
IntheLaws(68ob,ff.)
PlatohimselftreatsCretewithsome
ironybecause
ofitsbarbarous
ignorance
ofliterature. This
ignorance
extendsevento
Homer,whomtheCretaninterlocutordoesnotknow,andofwhomhe
says
:
'
foreignpoets
are
very
littlereadby
Cretans '.
('
But
they
arereadin
Sparta',
rejoins
the
Spartaninterlocutor.)
88
ForPlato'sviewon
Sparta'streatmentofthehumancattle,seenote
29
tothis
chapter,Republic,548e/54ga,
wherethetimocraticmaniscompared
withPlato'sbrotherGlaucon :
'
Hewouldbeharder
'
(thanGlaucon)
'
and
lessmusical
'
;thecontinuationofthis
passage
is
quoted
inthetexttonote
29.
Thucydidesreports(IV,80)
thetreacherousmurderofthe2,000helots
;
thebesthelotswereselectedfordeathby
a
promise
offreedom. Itisalmost
certainthatPlatoknewThucydides well,andwecanbesurethathehad
moredirectsourcesofinformationaswell.
ForPlato'sviewsonAthens'slacktreatmentofslaves,seenote18tothis
chapter.
89
Considering
thedecidedlyanti-Athenianandtherefore
anti-literary
tendency
ofthe
Republic,
itisalittledifficultto
explainwhy
somany
educa-
tionistsaresoenthusiasticaboutPlato'seducationaltheories. Icanseeonly
three
likelyexplanations.
Either
theydonotunderstandthe
Republic,
in
spite
ofitsmost
outspokenhostility
towardsthethen
existingAthenian
literary
education
;orthey
are
simply
flatteredby
Plato'srhetorical
emphasisupon
the
politicalpower
ofeducation,just
assomanyphilosophers are,andeven
somemusicians
(see
texttonote
41);
orboth.
ItisalsodifficulttoseehowloversofGreekartandliteraturecanfind
encouragement
in
Plato,who,especially
intheTenthBookofthe
Republic,
launchedamostviolentattack
against
all
poets
and
tragedians,and
especially
againstHomer
(and
even
Hesiod).
See
Republic,6ooa,whereHomeris
put
belowthelevelofagood
technicianormechanic(whowouldbe
generally

2OO CHAPTER
4/NOTES40-41
despisedby
Platoasbanausicanddepraved ;cp.Rep.,4956and
5900and
note
4
to
chapter
11
);Republic,6ooc,whereHomeris
putbelowthelevel
ofthe
SophistsProtagorasandProdicus
(see
alsoGomperz,
GreekThinkers,
German
ed.,II,401) ;and
Republic,6o5a/b,
where
poets
are
bluntly
forbidden
toenterintoanywell-governed city.
Theseclear
expressions
ofPlato's
attitude,however,are
usuallypassed
over
by
thecommentatorswhodwell,ontheotherhand,onremarkslikethe
onemadeby
Platoin
preparing
hisattackonHomer
('
. .
though
loveand
admirationforHomerhardly
allowmeto
saywhatIhaveto
say
'
;Rep.,
595b).Adamcommentsonthis
(note
to595bn)bysaying
that'Plato
speakswithreal
feeling
'
;butIthinkthatPlato'sremark
only
illustratesa
method
fairlygenerallyadopted
inthe
Republic,namely,
thatofmakingsome
concessiontothereader'ssentiments
(cp.chapter10,esp.
texttonote
65)
beforethemainattackupon
humanitarian ideasislaunched.
40
Onthe
rigidcensorshipaimedatclass
discipline,
see
Republic,377e,ff.,
and
especially378c
:
'
Thosewhoaretobethe
guardians
ofour
cityought
toconsideritthemost
pernicious
crimeto
quarreleasilywithoneanother.*
Itis
interesting
thatPlatodoesnotslatethis
politicalprinciple
atonce,when
introducing
his
theory
of
censorship
in
3760,-ff.,butthathe
speaks
firstonly
oftruth,beauty,
etc.The
censorship
isfurther
tightenedup
in
595a, ff.,
esp.6o5a/b(see
the
foregoingnote,andnotes18to22to
chapter7,and
text).
OnPlato's
forgctfulness
ofhis
principle(Rep.,4ioc~4i2b,
secnote
36
tothis
chapter)
thatmusichasto
strengthen
the
gentle
elementinmanas
opposed
tothefierce,see
especially3993, f.,wheremodesofmusicare
demandedwhichdonotmakemen
soft,butare
*
fitformenwhoarcwarriors '.
Cp.
alsothenext
note,(2).
ItmustbemadeclearthatPlatohasnot
*
forgotten
'
a
previouslyannounced
principle,
but
only
that
principle
towhich
hisdiscussion is
going
tolead
up.
*
41
(i)OnPlato'sattitudetowardsmusic,especiallymusic
proper,see,for
instance,Republic,397b,
ff.
;3986,
ff.
;4Ood,
ff.
;4iob,424^ f.,546d.
Laws,6576,
ff.
;673a,7oob, ff.,798d,ff,8oid,ff,8o2b, ff.,8i6c.The
attitude
is,fundamentally,
thatonemust
'
bewareof
changing
toanewmode
ofmusic
',since
'
Anychange
inthemodeofmusicis
alwaysfollowedbya
change
inthe . .state.So
saysDamon,andIbelievehim.'
(Rep.,424C.)
Plato,asusual,followsthe
Spartanexample.Adam
(op.cit.,vol.
I,p.216,
noteto
424C2O ;
italicsmine
;cp.
alsohis
references)says
that
*
theconnection
between musicaland
politicalchanges
. .was
recognized universally
throughoutGreece,and
particularly
at
Sparta,where . .Timotheushadhis
lyre
confiscatedfor
adding
toitfournew
strings
'.That
Sparta'sprocedure
inspired
Platocannotbedoubted
;
itsuniversalrecognitionthroughout
Greece,and
especially
inPcricleanAthens,
ismost
improbable. (Gp.(2)
of
this
note.)
(2)
InthetextIhavecalledPlato'sattitudetowardsmusic
(cp.esp.
Rep>398e,ff.)superstitiousandbackwardif
comparedwith
*
amore
enlightened
contemporary
criticism '.Thecriticism Ihaveinmind isthatofthe
anonymous writer,probably
amusicianofthefifth
(or
the
earlyfourth)
century,
theauthorofwhatisnowknownasthethirteenth
piece
ofGrenfell-
Hunt,TheHibeh
Papyri,1906,p.45
ff. Itseems
possible
thatthewriteris
oneof
*
thevariousmusicianswhocriticizeSocrates
'
(i.e.
the
'
Socrates
'
of
Plato's
Republic),mentionedby
Aristotle
(in
his
equallyreactionary Politics,
1
342b);butthecriticismoftheanonymouswriter
goesmuchfurtherthan
Aristotleindicates. Plato
(andAristotle)
believedthatcertainmusicalmodes,
forinstance,the
'
slack
'
IonianandLydianmodes,made
people
softand
effeminate,whileothers,especially
theDorianmode,madethembrave.
Thisviewisattackedby
theanonymous
writer.
'
Theysay',he
writes,
*
that
somemodes
producetemperate
andothers
justmen
;others,again,heroes.

CHAPTER
4/NOTES42-43
2OI
andotherscowards.'He
proceeds
toshowthatthisviewis
silly,
sincesome
ofthemostwar-likeoftheGreektribesusemodes
reputed
toproducecowards,
whilecertain
professional (opera)singershabituallysing
inthe
*
heroic
'
modewithouteverbecoming
heroes. Thiscriticism
mighthavebeendirected
againsttheAthenianmusicianDamos,quotedby
Platoasan
authority,a
friendofPericles(whowasliberalenough
totoleratea
pro-Spartan
attitude
inthefieldofartistic
criticism). Butitmighteasilyhavebeendirected
against
Platohimself.
(3)
InviewofthefactthatIam
attacking
a
'
reactionary
'
attitude
towardsmusic,
Imayperhaps
remarkthatmy
attackisinnowayinspired
by
a
personalsympathy
for
'
progress
'
inmusic.In
fact,
I
happen
tolike
oldmusic
(the
olderthe
better)andtodislikemodernmusic
intensely(especi-
allynearlyeverything
writtensincethedaywhenWagnerbegan
towrite
music).
Iam
altogetheragainst
*
futurism
',whetherinthefieldofartor
ofmorals
(cp.chapter22).
ButIamalso
againstimposing
one'slikesand
dislikesuponothers,and
againstcensorship
insuchmatters.Wecanlove
andhate,especially
in
art,withoutfavouringlegalmeasuresfor
suppressing
whatwehate,orfor
canonizing
whatwelove.
42
Gp.Republic,5373;and
4666-4676.
Thecharacterizationofmoderntotalitarianeducation isduetoA.Kolnai,
TheWar
against
theWest
(1938),p.318.
43
Plato'sremarkabletheory
thatthestate,
i.e.centralizedand
organized
politicalpower,originatesthrough
a
conquest(thesubjugation
ofa
sedentary
agriculturalpopulationbynomadsor
hunters)was,asfarasIknow,
first
re-discovered
(ifwediscountsomeremarksbyMachiavelli)byHumeinhis
criticismofthehistoricalversionofthecontract
theory(cp.
hisPoliticalDis-
courses,1752,
the
chapterOf
the
OriginalContract)
:
'
Almostallthegovern-
ments
',Humewrites,
*
whichexistat
present,
orofwhichthereremainsany
recordin
history,
havebeenfounded
originallyon
usurpation
or
conquest,
orboth . ..'The
theorywasnextrevivedbyRenan,inWhatisaNation?
(1882),andbyNietzscheinhis
Genealogyof
Morals
(1887) ;
secthethird
Germaneditionof
1894,P-9&Thelatterwritesofthe
origin
ofthe
*
state
'
:
'
Somehordeofblondebeasts,a
conquering
masterracewithawar-like
organization
. .
lay
their
terrifyingpawsheavilyupon
a
populationwhich
is
perhapsimmenselysuperior
innumbers. . .Thisistheway
inwhich
the
"
state
"
originatesupon
earth
;
Ithinkthatthesentimentalitywhich
letsit
originate
witha
"
contract",
isdead.'This
theoryappeals
toNietzsche
becausehelikestheseblondebeasts.Butithasbeenalsomore
recently
profferedby
F.Oppenheimer (TheState,
transl.Gitterman, 1914,p.68);
by
aMarxist,K.Kautsky (in
hisbookonTheMaterialist
Interpretationof
History] ;andbyW.G.Macleod
(TheOrigin
and
HistoryofPolitics,1931).
Ithinkit
verylikely
that
something
ofthekinddescribedbyPlato,Hume,
andNietzschehashappened
in
many,
ifnotin
all,
cases. Iam
speakingonly
about
'
states
'
inthesenseof
organizedandevencentralized
politicalpower.
Imay
mentionthatToynbee
hasavery
different
theory.Butbefore
discussing it,
Iwishfirsttomakeitclearthatfromtheanti-historicist
point
ofview,the
question
isofno
greatimportance.
Itis
perhapsinteresting
in
itselftoconsiderhow
*
states
'
originated,
butithasnobearingwhateverupon
the
sociology
ofstates,
asIunderstand
it,
i.e.uponpoliticaltechnology(see
chapters3,9,and
25).
Toynbee'stheory
doesnotconfineitselfto
'
states
'
inthesenseof
organized
andcentralized
politicalpower.Hediscusses,rather,the
'
origin
ofciviliza-
tions'.Buthere
begins
the
difficulty ;
forwhathecalls
*
civilizations
'
are,
in
part,
'
states
'
(as
here
described),
in
part
societieslikethatoftheEskimos,
whicharenotstates
;andifitis
questionable
whether
'
states
'
originate
according
toone
singlescheme,thenitmustbeevenmoredoubtfulwhenwe

2O2 CHAPTER
4/NOTES44-45
consideraclassofsuchdiversesocialphenomena
asthe
earlyEgyptianand
Mesopotamian
statesandtheirinstitutionsand
techniqueontheone
side,
andtheEskimoway
of
livingontheother.
Butwemay
concentrateon
Toynbee'sdescription(AStudyofHistory,
vol.
I,305ff.)
ofthe
origin
ofthe
EgyptianandMesopotamian
'
civilizations '.
His
theory
isthatthe
challenge
ofadifficultjungleenvironmentrousesa
response
from
ingenious
and
enterprising
leaders
;they
leadtheirfollowers
intothe
valleyswhichtheybegin
tocultivate,andfoundstates.This
(Hegelian
and
Bergsonian)theory
ofthecreative
genius
asaculturaland
political
leader
appears
tomemostromantic. Ifwetake
Egypt,
thenwe
mustlook,
firstof
all,
forthe
origin
ofthecaste
system. This,
I
believe,
is
most
likely
theresultof
conquests,just
asinIndiawhere
everynewwaveof
conquerorsimposed
anewcasteupon
theoldones.Butthereareother
arguments. Toynbee
himselffavoursa
theorywhich is
probablycorrect,
namely,
thatanimalbreedingand
especiallyanimal
training
isa
later,a
moreadvancedandamoredifficult
stageofdevelopment
thanmere
agri-
culture,andthatthisadvanced
step
istakenby
thenomadsofthe
steppe.
ButinEgyptwefindboth
agricultureandanimal
breeding,andthesame
holdsformostofthe
early
*
states
'
(though
notforalltheAmericanones,
I
gather).
Thisseemstobea
sign
thatthesestatescontainanomadicelement
;
anditseemsonly
naturaltoventurethe
hypothesis
thatthiselementisdueto
nomadinvaders
imposing
their
rule,acasterule,upon
the
originalagri-
cultural
population.
This
theorydisagrees
with
Toynbee's
contention
(op.
cit.
9Ill,^3f.)
thatnomad-built states
usually
witherawayveryquickly.
Butthefactthatmany
ofthe
early
castestates
go
inforthe
breeding
ofanimals
hastobe
explained
somehow.
Theideathatnomadsorevenhuntersconstitutedthe
originalupper
classiscorroboratedby
the
age-oldandstill
survivingupper-class
traditions
according
towhichwar,hunting,and
horses,
arethe
symbols
oftheleisured
classes
;atraditionwhichformedthebasisofAristotle'sethicsand
politics,
andisstill
alive,asVeblen
(TheTheoryof
theLeisure
Class)andToynbee
himselfhaveshown
;andtothesetraditionswecanperhapsaddtheanimal
breeder'sbeliefinracialism,and
especially
intheracial
superiority
ofthe
upper
class.Thelatterbeliefwhichisso
pronounced
incastestatesandinPlato
andinAristotle isheldbyToynbee
tobe
*
oneofthe . .sinsofour . .
modernage
'
and
'
something
alienfromtheHellenic
genius
'
(op.cit.,Ill,
93).
But
althoughmany
Greeksmayhave
developedbeyondracialism,
it
seems
likely
thatPlato'sandAristotle'stheoriesarebasedonoldtraditions
;
especially
inviewofthefactthatracialideas
played
sucharolein
Sparta.
44
Cp.Laws,6943-6983.
45
(i)Spengler's
Decline
of
theWest isnotinmyopinion
tobetaken
seriously. Butitisasymptom ;
itisthetheory
ofonewhobelievesinan
upper
classwhichis
facing
defeat. LikePlato,Spengler
triestoshowthat
'
theworld
*
istobeblamed,withits
general
lawofdeclineanddeath.And
likePlato,hedemands
(in
his
sequel,
Prussianismand
Socialism)
anew
order,
a
desperateexperiment
tostemtheforcesof
history,
a
regeneration
ofthe
Prussian
ruling
classbytheadoption
ofa
'
socialism
'
orcommunism,andof
economicabstinence. ConcerningSpengler,
I
largelyagree
withL.
Nelson,
whopublished
hiscriticismundera
long
ironicaltitlewhose
beginningmay
betranslated :
'
Witchcraft :
Being
anInitiationintotheSecretsofOswald
Spengler's
ArtofFortune
Telling,andaMostEvidentProofoftheIrrefutable
TruthofHis
Soothsaying ',
etc. Ithinkthatthisisa
just
characterization of
Spengler. Nelson,
Imayadd,wasoneofthefirstto
opposewhatIcall
historicism
(following
hereKantinhiscriticismofHerder
;cp.chapter12,
note
56).
(2)My
remarkthat
Spengler's
isnotthelastDeclineandFallismeant

CHAPTER
5/NOTE
I
2O3
especially
asanallusionto
Toynbee. Toynbee'sworkisso
superior
to
Spengler'sthatIhesitatetomentionitinthesamecontext
;butthe
superiority
isdue
mainly
to
Toynbee'swealthofideasandtohis
superiorknowledge
(whichmanifests itselfinthefactthathedocsnotdeal,as
Spenglerdoes,
with
everythingunderthesunattheone
time).
Buttheaimandmethod
ofthe
investigation
issimilar. Itismost
decidedly
historicist.Andit
is,
fundamentally, Hegelian(although
IdonotseethatToynbee
isawareof
that).
His
*
criterionofthegrowth
ofcivilizations
'
which is
*
progress
towardsself-determination
'
showsthis
clearlyenough ;for
Hegel'slawof
progresstowards
'
self-consciousness
'
and
*
freedom
'
canbe
onlytoo
easily
recognized. (Toynbee'sHegelianism
seemstocomesomehow
through
Bradley,
asmaybe
seen,for
instance,by
hisremarksonrelations,op.cit.,Ill,
223
:
'
The
veryconcept
of
"
relations
"
between
"
things
"
or
"
beings
"
involves
'
a
'
logical
contradiction. . .How isthiscontradiction tobe
transcended?
'
(Icannotenterhereintoadiscussionofthe
problem
of
relations. ButImay
state
dogmatically
thatall
problemsconcerning
relations
canbe
reduced,by
certain
simplemethodsofmodern
logic,
to
problems
concerningproperties,orclasses
;
inotherwords,peculiarphilosophical difficulties
concerning
relationsdonotexist.Themethodmentioned isduetoN.Wienerand
K.Kuratowski
;see
Quine,A
SystemofLogistic,1934,p.
16ff.
1
).NowIdo
notbelievethatto
classify
aworkas
belonging
toacertainschoolistodismiss
it
;butinthecaseof
Hegelian
historicismIthinkthatitis
so,
forreasonsto
bediscussedinthesecondvolumeofthisbook.
ConcerningToynbee'shistoricism,
Iwishtomakeit
especially
clearthat
Idoubt
verymuchindeedwhethercivilizationsareborn,grow,breakdown,
anddie. Iam
obliged
tostressthis
pointbecauseI
myselfusetwoofthe
termsusedbyToynbee,
insofarasI
speak
ofthe
c
breakdown
'
andofthe
*
arresting
'
ofsocieties. ButIwishtomakeitclearthatmyterm
'
break-
down
'
refersnottoallkindsofcivilizationsbuttoone
particularkind :the
magical
ortribal
*
closed
society
'.
Accordingly,
Idonotbelieve,asToynbee
does,thatGreek
society
sufferedits
'
breakdown
'
inthe
period
ofthe
Pelopon-
nesianwar
;andIfindthesymptoms
ofthebreakdownwhichToynbee
describesmuchearlier.
(Gp.
withthisnotes6and8to
chapter10,and
text.)
And
regarding
6
arrested
'
societies,I
apply
thisterm,exclusively,
eitherto
societiesthat
cling
totheir
magical
formsbyclosing
themselves
up,byforce,
againsttheinfluenceof
opensocieties,ortosocietiesthatreturntothetribal
cage.
AlsoIdonotthinkthatourWesternGivilization is
justonememberofa
species.
Ithinkthattherearemany
closedsocietieswhomay
sufferallkindsof
fates
;butan
*
opensociety
'
can
onlygoon,orbearrestedandforcedback
intothe
cage,
i.e.tothebeasts.
(Cp.
also
chapter10,esp.
thelast
note.)
(3)Regarding
theDeclineandFall
stories,
Imaymentionthat
nearly
allofthemstandundertheinfluenceofHeraclitus'remark :
*
They
filltheir
bellieslikethebeasts
',andofPlato's
theory
ofthelowanimalinstincts. I
meantosaythatthey
all
try
toshowthatthedeclineisduetoan
adoption
(by
the
rulingclass)
ofthese
*
lower
'
standardswhichare
allegedly
natural
tothe
working
classes.Inother
words,and
putting
thematter
crudely
but
bluntly,
the
theory
isthat
civilizations,
likethePersianandtheRoman
empires,decline
owing
to
overfeeding. (Gp.note
19
to
chapter10.)
NOTES-TOCHAPTER5
1
The
'
charmedcircle
'
isa
quotationfromBurnet,Greek
Philosophy, I,
1
06,wheresimilar
problemsaretreated. Idonot,however,agree
with
Burnetthat
*
in
earlydays
the
regularity
ofhumanlifehadbeenfarmore
clearlyapprehendedthantheevencourseofnature'.This
presupposes
the

204
CHAPTER
5/NOTES2~5
establishmentofadifferentiationwhich,
Ibelieve,
ischaracteristicofalater
period,
i.e.the
period
ofthedissolutionofthe
*
charmedcircleoflawand
custom *.Moreover,natural
periods(theseasons,
etc.
;cp.
note6to
chapter
2,andPlato
(?),Epinomis,978d,ff.)
musthavebeen
apprehended
in
very
earlydays.Forthedistinctionbetweennaturalandnormative
laws,
see
esp.
note18
(4)
tothis
chapter.
2
Heraclitus,B
29,D
2
94;cp.
note
7(2)
to
chapter
2
;
alsonote6to
that
chapter,andtext.SeealsoBurnet,
loc.cit.
ywho
gives
adifferent
interpretation ;hethinksthat
'
whentheregularcourseofnaturebegan
to
be
observed,nobetternamecouldbefoundforitthan
Right
or
Justice
. .
which
properlymeanttheunchangingcustomthat
guidedhumanlife.' I
donotbelievethatthetermmeantfirst
something
socialandwasthenextended,
butIthinkthatbothsocialandnatural
regularities ('order
')were
originally
undifferentiated,and
interpreted
as
magical.
8
The
opposition
is
expressed
sometimesasonebetween
'
nature
'
and
*
law
'
(or
'
norm
'
or
*
convention
*),
sometimesasonebetween
'
nature
'
andthe
'
positing
'
or
'
layingdown
'
(viz.,
ofnormative
laws),andsometimes
asonebetween
'
nature
'
and
'
art
',or
'
natural
'
and
'
artificial '.
Theantithesisbetweennatureandconvention isoftensaid
(on
the
authorityof
Diogenes
Laertius
9II,16and4;Doxogr.,564^
tohavebeen
introducedbyArchelaus,whoissaidtohavebeentheteacherofSocrates.
ButIthinkthatPlatomakesitclearenough
thatheconsiders
*
theTheban
poetPindar
*
tobethe
originatoroftheantithesis
(cp.
notes10and28tothis
chapter). ApartfromPindar's
fragments(quotedby
Plato
;
seealso
Herodotus, III,38),andsomeremarksbyHerodotus
(loc.cit.),oneofthe
earliest
original
sources
preserved
isthe
SophistAntiphon'sfragmentsOn
Truth
(see
notes11and12tothis
chapter)
.According
toPlato's
Protagoras
',
the
SophistHippias
seemstohavebeena
pioneer
ofsimilarviews
(see
note1
3
tothis
chapter).
Butthemostinfluential
early
treatmentoftheproblem
seemstohavebeenthatof
Protagorashimself,although
hemaypossibly
haveusedadifferent
terminology. (ItmaybementionedthatDemocritus
dealtwiththeantithesiswhichhe
applied
alsotosuchsocial
*
institutions
'
as
language ;andPlatodidthesameinthe
Cratylus,e.g.3846.)
4A
very
similar
point
ofviewcanbefoundinRussell's
*
AFreeMan's
Worship
'
(inMysticismand
Logic) ;andinthelast
chapter
of
Sherrington's
ManonHisNature.
6
(i)
Positivistswill
reply,
of
course,
thatthereasonwhy
normscannotbe
derivedfromfactual
propositions
isthatnormsare
meaningless ;butthis
indicates
only
that
(withWittgenstein's Tractatus)they
define
'
meaning
'
arbitrarily
insuchaway
that
only
factual
propositions
arecalled
*
meaningful
'.
(For
this
point,
seealsomyLogik
der
Forschung,pp.
8
ff.,and
21.)Thefollowers
of
'
psychologism ',ontheotherhand,will
try
to
explain
normsashabits,
andstandardsas
points
ofview.But
although
thehabitnottosteal
certainly
isa
fact,
itis
necessary,
as
explained
inthe
text,'to
distinguish
thisfactfrom
the
correspondingnorm.Onthe
question
ofnorms,
I
fullyagree
withmost
oftheviews
expressedbyK.
Menger.Heisthe
first,
Ibelieve,
to
develop
thefoundationsofa
logicof
norms
(in
hisbook,Moral,Willeund
Weltgestaltung,
1935).
Imayperhapsexpress
heremyopinion
thatthereluctancetoadmit
thatnormsare
somethingimportantandirreducible isoneofthemainsources
oftheintellectualandotherweaknessesofthemore
progressive
circlesinour
present
time.
(2)Concerningmycontentionthatitis
impossible
toderiveasentence
stating
anormordecisionfromasentence
stating
a
fact,the
followingmay
beadded.In
analysingtherelationsbetweensentencesand
facts,weare
moving
inthatfieldof
logicalinquiry
whichA.TarskihascalledSemantics
(cp.
note29
to
chapter3andnote
23
to
chapter8).Oneofthefundamental

CHAPTER
5/NOTES6-J 205
concepts
ofsemanticsisthe
concept
oftruth.Asshown
byTarski,
itis
possible
(withinwhatCarnap
callsasemantical
system)
toderivea
descriptive
state-
mentlike
'
NapoleondiedonSt.Helena
'
fromthestatement
'
Mr.Asaidthat
Napoleon
diedonSt.Helena
',
in
conjunction
withthefurtherstatementthat
whatMr.Asaidwastrue.(And
ifweusetheterm
'
fact
'
insuchawide
sensethatwenot
onlyspeakaboutthefactdescribedby
asentencebutalso
aboutthe
fact
thatthissentenceis
true,thenwecouldeven
say
thatitis
possible
toderive
t
Napoleon
diedonSt.Helena
'
fromthetwo
'
facts
'
thatMr.A
said
it,andthathe
spoke
the
truth.)Nowthereisnoreasonwhyweshould
not
proceed
inan
exactlyanalogous
fashionintherealmofnorms.We
might
thenintroduce,
in
correspondence
tothe
concept
of
truth,the
concept
ofthe
validity
ofanorm.ThiswouldmeanthatacertainnormJVcouldbe
derived
(in
akindofsemanticof
norms)fromasentence
stating
thatjVisvalid.
(Andagain,
ifweusetheterm
'
fact
'
insuchawidesensethatwespeakabout
the
fact
thatanormis
valid,thenwecouldevenderivenormsfromfacts.This,
however,doesnot
impair
thecorrectnessofourconsiderations inthetext
whichareconcerned
solelywiththe
impossibilityof
derivingnormsfrom
psychological
or
sociological
or
similar,
i.e.non-semantic
facts.)
6
Cp.
alsothelastnote
(70)
to
chapter
10.
Althoughmyown
position is,
Ibelieve,clearlyenoughimplied
inthe
text,
Imayperhapsbrieflyformulatewhatseemstomethemost
important
principles
ofhumanitarianand
equalitarian
ethics.
1i)
Tolerancetowardsallwhoarenotintolerantandwhodonot
propagate
intolerance. (For
this
exception,cp.whatissaidinnotes4and6to
chapter
7.)
This
implies,especially,
thatthemoralderisionsofothersshouldbe
treatedwith
respect,
as
long
assuchdecisionsdonotconflictwiththe
principle
oftolerance.
(2)The
recognition
thatallmoralurgency
hasitsbasisinthe
urgency
of
suffering
or
pain.
It
is,
Ibelieve,the
greatest
mistakeofutilitarianism
(and
otherformsof
hedonism)
thatitdoesnot
recognize
thatfromthemoral
point
ofview
suffering
and
happiness
mustnotbetreatedas
symmetrical ;
thatisto
say,
thepromotion
of
happiness
isin
any
casemuchless
urgent
thantherendering
of
help
tothosewho
suffer,andthe
attempt
to
prevent
suffering.(The
lattertaskhaslittletodowith
*
mattersoftaste
',theformer
much.) Cp.
alsonote2to
chapter9.
7
Cp.Burnet,Greek
Philosophy, I,117.Protagoras'
doctrinereferredto
inthis
paragraph
istobefoundinPlato's
dialogueProtagoras,322a,
ff.
;cp.
alsothe
Theaetetus,esp.I72b(see
alsonote
27
tothis
chapter).
ThedifferencebetweenPlatonismand
Protagoreanismcan
perhaps
be
brieflyexpressed
asfollows :
(Platonism :)
There isaninherent
(
natural
'
orderof
justice
inthe
world,
i.e.the
original
orfirstorderinwhichnaturewascreated.Thusthe
past
is
good,
and
anydevelopmentleading
tonewnormsisbad.
(Protagoreanism :)Manisthemoralbeing
inthisworld. Nature is
neithermoralnorimmoral.Thusitis
possible
formanalsoto
improve
things.
Itisnotunlikely
that
ProtagoraswasinfluencedbyXenophanes,
oneofthefirsttoexpress
theattitudeoftheopensociety,andtocriticize
Hesiod'shistorical
pessimism
:
'
Inthe
beginning,
theGodsdidnotshow
tomanallhewaswanting ;butinthecourseoftime,hemay
searchforthe
better,andfindit.'
(Cp.
Diels
2
18.)
ItseemsthatPlato'snephew
and
successorSpeusippus
returnedtothis
progressive
view
(cp.
Aristotle'sMeta-
physics,io72b30andnote11to
chapter11)andthattheAcademyadopted
withhimamoreliberalattitudeinthefieldof
politics
also.
Concerning
theielationofthedoctrineof
Protagoras
tothetenetsof
religion,
itmayberemarkedthathebelievedGodtoworkthroughman. Idonot
seehowthis
position
cancontradictthatof
Christianity. Compare
with

2O6 CHAPTER
5/NOTES8-13
itforinstanceK.Barth'sstatement
(Credo,1936,p.188)
:'TheBibleis
humandocument*
(i.e.manisGod'sinstrument).
8
Socrates'advocacy
oftheautonomy
ofethics
(closely
relatedwithhi:
insistencethat
problems
ofnaturedonot
matter)
is
expressedespecially
ir
hisdoctrineofthe
self-sufficiency
orautarchyofthe
*
virtuous
'
individual
Thatthistheory
contrastsstronglywithPlato'sviewsoftheindividualwil
beseenlater
;cp.especially
notes
25
tothis
chapter
and
36
tothenext,anc
text.
(Cp.
alsonote
56
to
chapter10.)
Wecannot,
forinstance,constructinstitutionswhichwork
independently
ofhowthey
are
being
*
manned '.Withthese
problems, cp.chapter
(text
tonotes
7-8,22-23),and
especiallychapter9.
10
ForPlato'sdiscussionofPindar'snaturalism, see
esp.Gorgias,484^
488b;Laws,6gob(quoted
belowinthis
chapter ;cp.
note
28);7*4e
Sgoa/b. (See
alsoAdam'snoteto
Rep.,35gc2O.)
11
Antiphon
usesthetermwhich,
inconnectionwithParmenidesanc
Plato,
Ihavetranslatedaboveby
'
delusive
opinion
'
(cp.
note1
5
to
chaptei
3) ;andhelikewise
opposes
itto
'
truth'.
Cp.
alsoBarker'stranslation ir
GreekPolitical
Theory,
IPlatoandHisPredecessors
(1918),83.
12
SeeAntiphon,OnTruth
;cp.BarkeV,op.cit.,83-5.
Seealsonexl
note,(2).
13
Hippias
isquoted
inPlato's
Protagoras,33ye.
Forthenextfour
quota-
tions,cp.(i)EuripidesIon,854
ft'.
;and
(2)
his
Phoenissae,538;cp.
alsc
Gomperz,
GreekThinkers(Germaned.,I,325) ;andBarker,op.cit.,75
;
cp.
alsoPlato'sviolentattackuponEuripides
in
Republic,568a-d.
Further-
more
(3)AlcidamasinSchol.toAristotle'sRhet.,I,13,I373bi8. (4)Lycophror
inAristotle's
Fragm.,91(Rose) ;(cp.
alsothePseudoPlutarch,DeNobil.,
18.2).
FortheAthenianmovement
againstslavery,cp.
texttonote18tc
chapter4,andnote29(with
further
references)
tothesamechapter ;alsc
note 18tochapter
10.
(1)
Itisworth
noting
thatmostPlatonistsshowlittle
sympathy
with
this
equalitarianmovement. Barker,
forinstance,discusses itunderthe
heading
'
GeneralIconoclasm
'
;cp.op.cit.,75.(See
alsothesecond
quotation
fromField'sPlatoquoted
intexttonote
3,chapter6.)
Thislacfc
ofsympathy
is
due,undoubtedly,
toPlato'sinfluence.
(2)
ForPlato'sandAristotle's
anti-equalitarianism
mentioned inthe
text,next
paragraph,cp.
also
especially
note
49(andtext)
to
chapter8,and
notes
3
to4(andtext)
to
chaptern.
This
anti-equalitarianism andits
devastating
effectshasbeen
clearly
describedbyW.W.Tarninhisexcellent
paper
'
AlexandertheGreatand
the
Unity
ofMankind'
(Proc.of
theBritishAcad.,XIX,1933,p.123ff.),
Tarn
recognizes
thatinthefifth
century,
theremayhavebeenamovemenl
towards
'
something
betterthanthehard-and-fast divisionofGreeksand
barbarians
;but
*,he
says,
4
thishadno
importance
for
history,
becaust
anythingof
thesortwas
strangledby
theidealist
philosophies.
PlatoandAristotle
leftnodoubtabouttheirviews. Platosaidthatallbarbarianswereenemies
by
nature
;
itwas
proper
towagewaruponthem,eventothe
point
of
enslaving
. .them. Aristotlesaidthatallbarbarianswereslavesbynature ..'
(p.124,
italics
mine).
I
fullyagree
withTarn's
appraisal
ofthe
pernicious
anti-humanitarian influenceoftheidealist
philosophers,
i.e.ofPlatoand
Aristotle. Ialso
agree
withTarn's
emphasisupon
theimmense
significance
of
equalitarianism,
oftheideaofthe
unity
ofmankind
(cp.op.cit.,p.147).
Theonlypoint
inwhichIcannot
fullyagree
isTarn'sestimateofthefifth-
centuryequalitarianmovement,andofthe
earlycynics.
I
suppose
thathe
is
right
in
holding
thatthehistoricalinfluenceofthesemovementswassmall
in
comparison
withthatofAlexander. ButIbelievethathewouldhave
ratedthesemovementsmore
highly
ifhehad
only
followedup
the
parallelism

CHAPTER
5/NOTES14-18 2OJ
betweenthe
cosmopolitanandthe
anti-slaverymovement.The
parallelism
betweentherelationsGreeks:barbariansandfreemen:slavesis
clearlyenough
shownbyTarninthe
passageherequoted ;andifweconsiderthe
unquestion-
able
strength
ofthemovement
againstslavery(seeesp.
note 18to
chapter4)
thenthescatteredremarks
against
thedistinctionbetweenGreeksand
barbarians
gainmuchin
significance. Gp.
alsoAristotle, Politics,III,5,7
(i278a) ;IV
(VI),4,
16
(isigb)andIII,2,2
(i275b).
Seealsonote48
to
chapter
8.
14
Forthetheme
'
returntothebeasts
',cp.chapter10,note
70,andtext.
15
ForSocrates'doctrineofthe
soul,
seetexttonote
44
to
chapter
10.
16
Theterm
*
natural
right
'
inan
equalitarian
sensecametoRome
through
theStoics
(there
istheinfluenceofAntisthenestobeconsidered
;
cp.note
48
to
chapter8)andwas
popularizedbyRomanLaw
(cp.
Institu-
tiones,II,1,2;I,2,2).
ItisusedbyThomas
Aquinas,
also
(Summa,II,91,2).
The
confusing
useoftheterm
'
naturallaw
'
insteadof
'
natural
right
'
by
modernThomists istobe
regretted,
aswellasthesmall
emphasistheyput
uponequalitarianism.
17
Themonistictendencywhichfirstledtothe
attempt
to
interpretnorms
asnaturalhas
recently
ledtothe
oppositeattempt,namely,
to
interpret
naturallawsasconventional. This
(physical)type
ofconventionalismhasbeen
based,byPoincare",onthe
recognition
oftheconventionalorverbalcharacter
ofdefinitions. Poincare,andmore
recentlyEddington,point
outthatwe
definenaturalentitiesby
thelaws
theyobey.Fromthistheconclusion is
drawnthattheselaws,
i.e.thelawsofnature,are
definitions,
i.e.verbal
conventions.
Cp.Eddington's
letterinNature148(1941),141
:
*
The
elements
'
(ofphysicaltheory)
*
. .can
onlybedefined . .
by
thelaws
theyobey;sothatwefindourselves
chasing
ourowntailsina
purely
formal
system.'An
analysisandacriticismofthisformofconventionalismcanbe
foundinmyLogik
der
Forschung,esp.pp.40
fF.
18
(i)Thehope
of
gettingsome
argument
or
theory
toshareour
responsibility is,
I
believe,oneofthebasicmotivesof
*
scientific
'
ethics.
*
Scientific
'
ethicsisinitsabsolutebarrennessoneofthemostamazingof
socialphenomena.Whatdoesitaimat?At
telling
uswhatweought
to
do,
i.e.at
constructing
acodeofnormsupon
ascientific
basis,
sothatwe
need
only
lookup
theindexofthecodeifwearefacedwithadifficultmoral
decision?Thiswould
clearlybeabsurd
;quiteapart
fromthefactthat
ifitcouldbeachieved,
itwould
destroy
all
personalresponsibility
andtherefore
allethics.Orwouldit
give
scientificcriteriaofthetruthand
falsity
ofmoral
judgements,
i.e.of
judgementsinvolving
suchtermsas
'
good
'
or
*
bad
'
?
Butitisclearthatmoral
judgements
arc
absolutely
irrelevant. Only
ascandal-
monger
isinterestedin
judgingpeople
ortheiractions
;
'
judge
not
'
appears
tosomeofusoneofthefundamentalandmuchtoolittle
appreciated
laws
ofhumanitarian ethics.(Wemayhavetodisarmandto
imprison
acriminal
inorderto
preventhimfrom
repeating
hiscrimes,buttoomuchofmoral
judgementand
especially
ofmoral
indignation
isAlways
a
sign
of
hypocrisy
and
pharisaism.)
Thusanethicsofmoral
judgements
wouldbenot
only
irrelevantbutindeedanimmoral affair.The
all-importance
ofmoral
problemsrests,ofcourse,onthefactthatwecanactwith
intelligentforesight,
andthatwecanaskourselveswhatouraims
ought
tobe,
i.e.howweought
toact.
Nearly
allmoral
philosopherswhohavedealtwiththeproblem
ofhow
weought
toact
(with
the
possibleexception
of
Kant)
havetriedtoanswerit
eitherby
referenceto
'
humannature
'
(as
didevenKant,whenhereferred
tohuman
reason)
ortothenatureof
*
thegood
'.Thefirstoftheseways
leadsnowhere,sinceallactions
possible
tousarefoundedupon
'
human
nature
',
sothatthe
problem
ofethicscouldalsobe
putbyasking
which

20)8 CHAPTER
5/NOTE
18
elementsinhumannatureI
ought
tofollowandto
develop,andwhichsides
I
ought
to
suppress
ortocontrol.Butthesecondoftheseways
alsoleadsno-
where
;
for
givenan
analysis
of
'
thegood
'
informofasentencelike :
'
The
good
issuchandsuch
'
(or
'
suchandsuchisgood'),wewould
alwayshave
toask:Whataboutit?Why
shouldthisconcernme?Only
iftheword
'
good
*
isusedinanethicalsense,
i.e.
only
ifitisusedtomean
*
thatwhich
I
ought
todo
',couldIderivefromtheinformation
'
xisgood
'
theconclusion
thatI
ought
todox.Inotherwords,
ifthewordgood
istohaveany
ethical
significance
at
all,
itmustbedefinedas
'
thatwhichI
(orwe)ought
todo
(or
to
promote)
'.Butifitissodefined,thenitswholemeaning
isexhausted
by
the
definingphrase,anditcanin
every
contextbe
replacedby
this
phrase,
i.e.theintroductionoftheterm
*
good
'
cannot
materially
contributetoour
problem. (Cp.
alsonote
49(3),
to
chapter11.)
Allthediscussionsaboutthedefinitionofthe
good,
oraboutthe
possibility
of
definingit,aretherefore
quite
useless.Theyonlyshowhowfar
'
scientific
'
ethicsisremovedfromthe
urgentproblems
ofmorallife.And
they
thus
indicatethat
'
scientific
'
ethicsisaformof
escape,and
escape
fromthe
realitiesofmoral
life,
i.e.fromourmoral
responsibilities. (Inviewofthese
considerations itisnot
surprising
tofindthatthe
beginning
of
*
scientific
'
ethics,
intheformofethicalnaturalism,coincideswithwhatmay
becalled
the
discovery
of
personalresponsibility. Gp.whatissaidinchapter10,text
tonotes
27-38and
55-7,
ontheopensocietyandtheGreatGeneration.)
(2)
Itmay
be
fitting
inthisconnectiontorefertoa
particular
formof
the
escapefromthe
responsibility
discussedhere,
asexhibited
especiallyby
the
juridicalpositivism
ofthe
Hegelianschool,
aswellasby
a
closely
allied
spiritual
naturalism. Thatthe
problem
isstill
significantmaybeseenfrom
thefactthatanauthoroftheexcellenceofCatlinremainsinthis
important
point(as
inanumberof
others)dependentuponHegel ;andmyanalysis
willtaketheformofacriticismofGatlin'sarguments
infavourof
spiritual
naturalism,and
against
thedistinctionbetweenlawsofnatureandnormative
laws
(cp.
G.E.G.Gatlin,A
Studyof
the
PrinciplesofPolitics,1930,pp.96-
99).
Catlin
beginsbymaking
acleardistinctionbetweenthelawsofnature
and
'
laws . .whichhuman
legislatorsmake
'
;andheadmits
that,
atfirst
sight
the
phrase
*
naturallaw
',
if
applied
tonorms,
'
appears
tobe
patently
unscientific,
sinceitseemstofailtomakeadistinctionbetweenthathuman
lawwhich
requires
enforcementandthe
physicallawswhichare
incapable
ofbreach '.Buthetriestoshowthatit
onlyappears
tobe
so,andthat
'
our
criticism
'
ofthisway
of
using
theterm
*
naturallaw
'
was
'
too
hasty
'.And
he
proceeds
toaclearstatementof
spiritualnaturalism,
i.e.toadistinction
between
'
soundlaw
'
whichis
'
according
tonature
',andotherlaw :
c
Sound
law,then,involvesaformulationofhumantendencies,or,
in
brief,
isa
copy
ofthe
"
natural
"
lawtobe
"
found
"
bypolitical
science.Soundlawis
inthissense
emphatically
foundandnotmade. Itisa
copy
ofnaturalsocial
law
'
(i.e.ofwhatIcalled
'
sociologicallaws
'
;cp.
texttonote8tothis
chapter).Andheconcludesbyinsisting
thatinsofarasthe
legalsystem
becomesmore
rational,
itsrules
*
ceasetoassumethecharacterof
arbitrary
commandsandbecomemeredeductionsdrawnfromthe
primary
sociallaws
'
(i.e.
fromwhatIshouldcall
*
sociologicallaws
').
(3)
Thisisa
verystrong
statementof
spiritual
naturalism. Itscriticism
isthemore
important
asGatlincombineshisdoctrinewitha
theory
of
'
social
engineering
'
whichmayperhaps
atfirst
sightappear
similartotheone
advocatedhere
(cp.
texttonote
9
to
chapter3andtexttonotes
1-3and8-11
to
chapter9).
Before
discussing it,
Iwishto
explainwhy
IconsiderCatlin's
viewtobedependenton
Hegel'spositivism. Suchan
explanation
is
necessary,
becauseGatlinuseshisnaturalisminordertodistinguishbetween
'
sound
*

CHAPTER
5/NOTE
18
2OQ
andotherlaw
;
inotherwords,heusesitinorderto
distinguishbetween
*
just
'
and
'
unjust
'
law
;andthisdistinction
certainlydoesnotlooklike
positivism,
i.e.the
recognition
ofthe
existinglawasthesolestandardof
justice.
In
spite
ofallthat,
IbelievethatCatlin'sviewsare
very
closeto
positivism ;
my
reasonbeing
thathebelievesthat
only
*
sound
'
lawcanbeeffective,and
insofar
'
existent
'
in
preciselyHegel's
sense.ForCatlin
says
thatwhenour
legal
codeisnot
*
sound
',
i.e.notinaccordancewiththelawsofhuman
nature,then
'
ourstatuteremains
paper
'.Thisstatementis
purestpositivism ;
foritallowsustodeducefromthefactthatacertaincodeisnotonly
c
paper
'
but
successfullyenforced,thatitis
*
sound
',orinotherwords,
all
legislation
whichdoesnotturnouttobe
merelypaper
isa
copy
ofhumannatureand
therefore
just.
(4)
Inow
proceed
toabriefcriticismoftheargumentprofferedby
Catlin
against
thedistinctionbetween
(a)
lawsofnaturewhichcannotbebroken,
and
(b)
normativelaws,whichareman-made,
i.e.enforcedby
sanctions
;
adistinctionwhichhehimselfmakesso
veryclearly
atfirst. Catlin's
argument
isatwofoldone.Heshows
(a)
thatlawsofnaturealsoareman-made,in
acertainsense,andthat
theycan,
ina
sense,bebroken
;and
(b)
thatina
certainsensenormativelawscannotbebroken. I
begin
with
(a)
'
The
naturallawsofthe
physicist ',writesCatlin,
'
arenotbrute
facts,they
are
rationalizations ofthe
physicalworld,whether
superimposedbymanor
justified
becausetheworld is
inherently
rationaland
orderly.'Andhe
proceeds
toshowthatnaturallaws
l
canbenullified
'
when
*
freshfacts
'
compel
ustorecastthelaw.Myreply
tothisargument
isthis.Astatement
intendedasaformulationofalawofnatureis
certainlyman-made.We
makethe
hypothesis
thatthereisacertaininvariable
regularity,
i.e.wedescribe
the
supposedregularity
withthe
help
ofastatement,thenaturallaw.But
as
scientists,weare
prepared
tolearn,fromnature,thatwehavebeenwrong ;
weare
prepared
torecastthelawiffreshfactswhichcontradictour
hypothesis
showthatour
supposed
lawwasno
law,
sinceithasbeenbroken. Inotherwords,
byaccepting
nature's
nullification,thescientistshowsthathe
accepts
a
hypo-
thesisonly
as
long
asithasnotbeenfalsified
;whichisthesameasto
say
thathe
regards
alawofnatureasarulewhichcannotbebroken,sincehe
accepts
the
breaking
ofhisruleas
proof
thathisruledidnotformulatealaw
ofnature.Furthermore :
although
the
hypothesis
isman-made,wecan
donothing
to
prevent
itsfalsification. Thisshows
that,bymaking
thehypo-
thesis,wehavenotcreatedthe
regularitywhichitisintendedtodescribe.
(b)
'
Itisnottrue
',saysCatlin,
*
thatthecriminal
"
breaks
"
thelawwhen
hedoestheforbiddenact . .thestatutedoesnot
say
:
"
Thoucanstnot
"
;
it
says,
"
Thoushaltnot,orthispunishment
willbeinflicted."Ascommand
',
Catlincontinues,
*
itmaybebroken,butaslaw,
inavery
realsense,
itis
only
brokenwhenthepunishment
isnotinflicted. . .Sofarasthelawis
perfected
anditssanctionsexecuted,
. .it
approximates
to
physical
law.'The
reply
tothisis
simple.
Inwhicheversensewe
speak
of
'
breaking
'
thelaw,the
juridical
lawcanbebroken
;noverbal
adjustment
canalterthat.Letus
accept
Catlin'sviewthatacriminalcannot
'
break
'
thelaw,andthatitis
only
'
broken
'
ifthecriminaldocsnotreceivethe
punishmentprescribedby
thelaw.Butevenfromthis
point
ofview,thelawcanbebroken
;forinstance,
by
officersofthestatewhorefuseto
punish
thecriminal.Andevenina
statewhereallsanctionsare,
in
fact,executed,theofficers
could,
if
theychose,
prevent
suchexecution,andso
'
break
'
thelawinCatlin'ssense.
(Thatthey
wouldthereby
'
break
'
thelawinthe
ordinary
sense
also,
i.e.that
they
wouldbecome
criminals,andthat
theymightultimatelyperhaps
be
punished,
is
quite
another
question.)
Inotherwords :Anormativelawisalways
enforced
bymenandby
their
sanctions,anditisthereforefundamentally
differentfroma
hypothesis.The
position
is
really
as
simple
asitcanbe.

2IO CHAPTER
5/NOTES
I
Q-26
Legally,wecanenforcethe
suppression
ofmurder,orofactsofkindness
;
of
falsity,oroftruth
;of
justiceorof
injustice. Butwecannotforcethesun
toalteritscourse.Noamountofargumentcan
bridge
this
gap.
19
The
'
natureof
happiness
and
misery
'
isreferredtointheTheaetetus,
1
75c.Fortheclose
relationshipbetween
*
nature
'
and
'
Form
'
or
*
Idea
',
cp.especiallyRepublic,597a~d,
wherePlatofirstdiscussestheFormorIdea
ofabed,andthenreferstoitas
'
thebedwhichexistsbynature,andwhich
wasmadebyGod
'
(597b).
Inthesame
place,he
proffers
thecorresponding
distinctionbetweenthe
*
artificial
'
(or
the
'
fabricated
'
thing,whichisan
'
imitation
')and
'
truth'.
Cp.
alsoAdam'snoteto
Republic,597bio(with
the
quotation
fromBurnet
giventhere)
andthenotesto
476^13,5Oibg,
525CI5 ;furthermore Theaetetus,i74b(and
Cornford'snote ito
p.85
inhis
Plata's
TheoryofKnowledge).
SeealsoAristotle's
Metaphysics,ioi5ai4.
20
ForPlato'sattackuponart,seethelastbookofthe
Republic,and
especially
the
passagesRepublic6ooa-6o5bmentionedinnote
39
to
chapter4.
21
Cp.
notes11,12and1
3
tothis
chapter,andtext.My
contentionthat
Plato
agrees
atleast
partly
with
Antiphon's
naturalisttheories
(althoughhe
docsnot,ofcourse,agree
with
Antiphon's equalitarianism)
will
appear
strange
tomany,especially
tothereadersofBarker,op.
cit.Anditmay
surprisethemevenmoretohearthe
opinion
thatthemaindisagreementwas
notsomuchatheoreticalone,butratheroneofmoral
practice,andthat
AntiphonandnotPlatowas
morally
inthe
right,
asfarasthe
practical
issue
of
equalitarianism
isconcerned.
(For
Plato'sagreement
withAntiphon's
principle
thatnatureistrueand
right,
seealsotexttonotes23and
28,and
note30
tothis
chapter.)
22
These
quotations
arefrom
Sophist,266band
2656.
Butthe
passage
alsocontains
(265^
acriticism
(similar
toLaws,quoted
intexttonotes23
and
30
inthis
chapter)
ofwhatmay
bedescribedasamaterialist
interpreta-
tionofnaturalismsuchas
perhaps
heldbyAntiphon'stype,namely
*
the
belief . .that'nature . .
generates
without
intelligence
'.
23
Cp.Laws,8923
andc.Forthedoctrineofthe
affinity
ofthesoulto
theIdeas,seealsonotes
15(8)and23
tochapter3.Forthe
affinityof
'
natures
'
and
'
souls
',cp.
Aristotle's
Metaphysics,ioi5ai4
withthe
passages
oftheLaws
quoted,
andwith
8g6d/e
:
'
thesouldwellsinall
things
that
move ..'
Compare
further
especially
the
followingpassages
inwhich
'
natures
'
and
*
souls
'
areusedinaway
thatis
obviouslysynonymous
:
Republic,4853/b,
485e/486a
andd,486b(*
nature
');486b
andd
('
soul
'),4906/4913(both),
49
1b
(both),andmany
other
places(cp.
alsoAdam'snoteto
37oa7).The
affinity
is
directly
statedin
49ob(io).
Forthe
affinitybetween
'
nature
f
and
*
soul
'
and
*
race
',cp.5016wherethe
phrase
'
philosophic
natures
'
or
'
souls
'
foundin
analogouspassages
is
replacedby
'
raceof
philosophers
'.
Thereisalsoan
affinitybetween
'
soul
'
or
'
nature
'
andthesocialclass
orcaste
;
seeforinstance
Republic,435b.Theconnectionbetweencaste
andraceisfundamental, forfromthe
beginning(4153),
casteisidentified
withrace.
24
Cp.
the
passagesquoted
innote
32(i),(a)
and
(c),
to
chapter4.
25
TheSocraticdoctrineofautarchy
ismentionedin
Republic,387d/c
(cp.Apology,4ic,ff.,andAdam'snoteto
Rep.,387d25).
Thisis
only
one
ofthefewscattered
passages
reminiscentofSocraticteaching ;butitisin
directcontradiction tothemaindoctrineofthe
Republic,
asitisexpounded
inthetext
(see
alsonote36
to
chapter6,and
text) ;
thismay
beseen
bycontrasting
the
quotedpassage
with
369^ ff.,and
verymany
similar
passages.
26
Cp.
forinstancethe
passagequoted
inthetexttonote
29
to
chapter4.
Forthe
'
rareanduncommonnatures
',cp.Republic,^gia/b,
andmany
other

CHAPTER
5/NOTES27-34
211
passages,
forinstanceTimaeus,516
:
'
reason issharedby
the
gods
with
veryfewmen'.Forthe
'
socialhabitat',see
49
id
(cp.
also
chapter23).
WhilePlato
(and
Aristotle
;cp.esp.
note4
to
chapter
11
,and
text)
insistedthatmanualworkis
degrading,
Socratesseemstohaveadopted
a
very
different attitude.
(Cp.Xenophon, Memorabilia, II,7;7-10;
Xenophon's story is,tosomeextent,corroboratedby
Antisthenes*and
Diogenes'
attitudetowardsmanualwork
;cp.
alsonote56
tochapter10.)
27
See
especiallyTheaetetus,i72b(cp.
alsoCornford'scommentsonthis
passage
inPlato
9
s
TheoryofKnowledge)
.Sooalsonote
7
tothis
chapter.The
featuresofconventionalism inPlato's
teachingmayperhapsexplainwhy
the
Republicwas
said,bysomewhostill
possessedProtagoras' writings,
to
resemblethese.
(Gp.DiogenesLaertius,III,37.)
For
Lycophron's
contract
theory,
seenotes
43
to
54
to
chapter
6
(esp.
note
46)andtext.
28
Cp.Laws,6gob/c ;seenote10tothis
chapter.
PlatomentionsPindar's
naturalismalsoin
Gorgias,484^48Sb ;Laws,7i4c,Sgoa.
Forthe
opposition
between
fc
external
compulsion
'
ontheonehand,and
(a)
*
freeaction
',
(b)
'
nature
',onthe
other,cp.
also
Republic,6o3c
andTimaeus,64d.(Cp.
also
Rep.,466c-d,quoted
innote30
tothis
chapter.)
29
Cp.Republic,36gb-c.
Thisis
part
ofthecontract
theory.Thenext
quotation,
whichisthefirststatementofthenaturalist
principle
inthe
perfect
state,
is
37oa/b-c. (Naturalism
isinthe
Republic
firstmentionedby
Glaucon
in
3586,
ff.
;butthis
is,ofcourse,notPlato'sowndoctrineofnaturalism.
Forthefurtherdevelopment
ofthenaturalistic
principle
ofthedivision
oflabourandthe
partplayedby
this
principle
inPlato's
theory
of
justice,
cp.especially
texttonotes
6,23and
40
to
chapter
6.
Foramodernradicalversionofthenaturalistic
principle,
seeMarx's
formulaofthecommunist
society
:
'
Fromeachaccording
tohis
ability
:
toeach
according
tohisneeds !
'
(Cp.
forinstanceAHandbook
ofMarxism,
E.
Burns,1935 ;p.752;andnote8to
chapter13).
Secalsonote
3
to
chapter13.
30
Seenote
23,andtext.The
quotations
inthe
presentparagraph
are
allfromtheLaws
;(i)889,
a-d
(cp.
the
very
similar
passage
intheTheaetetus,
I72b).(2)8960-0; (3)8906/891
a.
Forthenext
paragraph
inthetext
(i.e.
formy
contentionthatPlato's
naturalism is
incapable
of
solvingpracticalproblems)
the
followingmay
serveasanillustration.Many
naturalistshavecontendedthatmenand
womenare
'
by
nature
'
different,both
physically
and
spiritually,
andthat
they
shouldthereforefulfildifferentfunctionsinsociallife. Plato,however,
usesthesamenaturalisticargument
to
prove
the
opposite ;for,he
argues,
arenotdogs
ofbothsexesusefulforwatching
aswellas
hunting
?
'
Doyou
agree',hewrites
(Rep.,466c-d),
'
thatwomen . .must
participatewithmen
in
guarding
aswellasin
hunting,
asitiswithdogs ;
. .andthatinso
doing,
they
willbe
acting
inthemostdesirablemanner,sincethiswillbenot
contrary
to
nature,butinaccordancewiththenaturalrelationsofthesexes?
'
(See
alsotexttonote28tothischapter ;forthe
dog
asidealguardian,cp.chapter4,
especially
note
32(a),
and
text.)
31
Forabriefcriticismofthe
biologicaltheory
ofthe
state,
seenote
7
to
chapter10,andtext.
32
Forsome
applications
ofPlato's
politicaltheory
ofthe
soul,andforthe
inferencesdrawnfrom
it,seenotes58-9
tochapter10,andtext.Forthe
fundamentalmethodological analogy
between
cityand
individual,cp.esp.
'Republic,3686,445^577c.
38
Cp.Republic,423,
bandd.
84
This
Quotation
asweirasthenextisfromG.Grote,PlatoandtheOther
Companionsof
Socrates
(1875),
vol.
Ill,124.Themain
passages
ofthe
Republic
are
439C,
f.
(thestory
ofLeontius) ;57ic,
f.
(the
bestial
part
versusthereason-

CHAPTER
5/NOTES35~39
ingpart) ;5880(theApocalyptic
Monster
;cp.
the
'
Beast
'
which
possesses
aPlatonicNumber,intheRevelation
13,17and
18) ;6030!and
604!)(man
at
warwithhimself). SeealsoLaws,68ga-b,andnotes58-9
to
chapter
10.
36
Cp.Republic,5196,
f.
(cp.
alsonote10to
chapter8);thenexttwo
quotations
arebothfromtheLaws,9O3C.Thefirstoftheseisashorterversion
of
Republic,420!-42
ic
;thesecondof
Republic,52ob,
ff.Further
passages
on
holismorcollectivismare :
Republic,4242.,449e,462^Laws,7i5b,739C,875a,f.,
903bj9230,942a,
f.
(See
alsonotes
31/32
to
chapter6.)
Fortheremark
inthisparagraph
thatPlato
spoke
ofthestateasanorganism,cp.Republic,
4620,andLaws,9646,wherethestateisevencompared
withthehuman
body.
88
Cp.Adaminhiseditionofthe
Republic,
vol.
II,303;
seealsonote
3
to
chapter4,andtext.
37
This
point
is
emphasizedbyAdam,op.cit.,note
546a,b7
and
pp.
288
and
307.Thenext
quotation
inthisparagraph
is
Republic,546a ;cp.Republic,
485a/bquoted
innote26
(i)
to
chapter3andintexttonote
33
to
chapter
8.
38
Thisisthemain
point
inwhichImustdeviatefromAdam's
interpreta-
tion. IbelievePlatotoindicatethatthe
philosopherking
ofBooksVIVII,
whosemaininterestisinthe
things
thatarenotgeneratedanddonot
decay
(Rep.,4-85b ;
seethelastnoteandthe
passages
therereferred
to),
obtains
withhismathematicalanddialectical
training
theknowledge
ofthePlatonic
Numberandwithitthemeansof
arresting
socialdegenerationandthereby
thedecay
ofthestate.See
especially
thetexttonote
39.
The
quotations
thatfollowinthis
paragraph
are :
*
keepingpure
the
raceofthe
guardians
'
;cp.Republic,46oc,andtexttonote34
to
chapter4.
*
A
city
thusconstituted,
etc.' :
546a.
ThereferencetoPlato'sdistinction,
inthefieldofmathematics, acoustics,
and
astronomy,betweenrationalknowledgeanddelusive
opinion
based
uponexperience
or
perception
isto
Republic,523a, ff.,525d, ff.,527d, ff.,
53
1
a,
ff.(down
to5343and
537d) ;
seealso
5O9d~5iie.
39
Inmyinterpretation
ofthe
Story
oftheFallandtheNumber,
Ihave
carefully
avoidedthe
difficult,undecided,and
perhaps
undecidableproblem
ofthecomputation
oftheNumber itself.
(Itmay
beundecidable since
Platomay
nothaverevealedhissecretin
full.)
Iconfinemyinterpretation
entirely
tothe
passagesimmediately
beforeandaftertheonethatdescribes
theNumber
itself;
these
passagesare,
1believe,
clear
enough.
In
spite
ofthat,myinterpretation deviates,
asfarasIknow,frorn
previousattempts.
(i)ThecrucialstatementonwhichIbasemyinterpretation
is
(A)
that
the
guardians
workby
'
calculationaided
byperception
'.Nextto
this,
Iam
using
thestatements
(B)
that
they
willnot
*
accidentally
hitupon(the
correctwayof)
obtaininggoodoffspring
'
;(C)
that
they
will
'
blunder,and
beget
children
inthewrongway
'
;(D)
that
they
are
'
ignorant
'
ofsuchmatters
(as
the
Number).
Regarding (4),
itshouldbeclearto
every
carefulreaderofPlatothat
suchareferenceto
perception
isintendedto
express
acriticismofthemethod
in
question.
Thisviewofthe
passage
underconsideration
(546a, f.)
is
supportedbythefactthatitcomessosoonafterthe
passages523a~537d
(see
theendofthelast
note),
inwhichtheopposition
between
pure
rational
knowledgeand
opinionbasedon
perception
isoneofthemain
themes,and
inwhich,more
especially,
theterm
'
perception
'
(see
also
5iic/d)
is
given
a
definitetechnicaland
deprecatory
sense.
(Cp.also,
forinstance,Plutarch's
wording
inhisdiscussionofthis
opposition
:inhis
LifeofMarcellus,306.)
Iamthereforeofthe
opinion,andthis
opinion
isenforcedby
thecontext,
especiallyby(B),(C),(D),
thatPlato'sremark
(A)implies(a)
that
*
calcula-
tionbaseduponperception
'
isa
poormethod,and
(b)
thattherearebetter
methods,namely
themethodsofmathematicsand
dialectics,which
yield
pure
rationalknowledge ;andthis
opinion
isstrengthenedby
thecontext,

CHAPTER
5/NOTE39 213
especiallyby(B),(C),
and
(D).
This
pointis,indeed,so
plain,
thatIshould
nothave
emphasized
itsomuchifitwerenotforthefactthatevenAdam
hasmissedit.Inhisnoteto
5463,by,he
interprets
'
calculation
'
asareference
totherulers'taskofdetermining
thenumberof
marriagesthey
should
permit,
and
'
perception
'
asthemeansbywhich
they
*
decidewhat
couples
shouldbe
joined,whatchildrenbereared,etc.'Thatisto
say,AdamtakesPlato'sremark
tobea
simpledescriptionandnotasa
polemicagainsttheweaknessofthe
empirical
method.
Accordingly,herelatesneitherthestatement
(C)
that
therulerswill
*
blunder
'
northeremark
(D)
that
they
are
'
ignorant
'
to
thefactthat
they
use
empirical
methods.
(The
remark
(B)
that
they
will
not
'
hit
'
upon
the
rightmethod
'
byaccident
',would
simply
beleftuntrans-
lated,
ifwefollowAdam's
suggestion.)
In
interpreting
our
passagewemust
keep
itinmindthatinBookVIII,
immediately
beforethe
passage
in
question,
Platoreturnstothe
question
of
thefirst
city
ofBooks'IItoIV.
(SeeAdam'snotesto
4493,
ff.and
543a,ff.)
Butthe
guardians
ofthis
city
areneithermathematiciansnordialecticians.
Thustheyhavenoideaofthe
purely
rationalmethodsemphasized
somuch
inBookVII,525-534.
Inthisconnection,the
import
oftheremarkson
perception,
i.e.onthe
poverty
of
empiricalmethods,andonthe
resulting
ignorance
ofthe
guardians,
isunmistakable.
Thestatement
(B)
thattherulerswillnot
'
hit
accidentallyupon
'
(the
correctwayof)
'
obtaininggoodoffspring,
ornoneatall
',
is
perfectly
clear
inmyinterpretation.
Sincetherulershave
merelyempirical
methodsat
their
disposal,
itwouldbe
only
a
lucky
accidentif
theydidhitupon
amethod
whosedeterminationneedsmathematicalorotherrationalmethods.Adam
suggests(note
to
546a,by)
thetranslation :
'
nonethemorewill
theyby
calcula-
tiontogetherwith
perception
obtaingoodoffspring
'
;and
only
inbrackets,
headds :
*
lit.hitthe
obtaining
of. Ithinkthathisfailuretomakeany
senseofthe
'
hit
'
isa
consequence
ofhisfailuretoseethe
implications
of
(A).
The
interpretation
here
suggestedmakes
(C)and
(D)perfectly
under-
standable
;andPlato'sremarkthathisNumber is
c
masteroverbetteror
worsebirth
',
fitsin
perfectly.
ItmayberemarkedthatAdamdoesnot
commenton
(D),
i.e.the
ignorance,although
suchacommentwouldbe
most
necessary
inviewofhis
theory(note
to
54.66.22)
that
*
thenumber is
nota
nuptial
. .number
',andthatithasnotechnical
eugenicmeaning.
Thatthemeaning
oftheNumber isindeedtechnicaland
eugenic is,
I
think,clear,
ifweconsiderthatthe
passagecontaining
theNumberisenclosed
in
passagescontaining
referencesto
eugenicknowledge,
orrather,lackof
eugenicknowledge. Immediately
beforetheNumber,(A),(B),(C),occur,
andimmediatelyafterwards, (/)),
aswellasthe
story
ofthebrideandbride-
groomandtheir
degenerateoffspring. Besides,(C)
beforetheNumberand
(D)
aftertheNumberrefertoeachother
;for
(C),
the
'
blunder
',
isconnected
withareferenceto
c
begetting
inthewrongmanner
',and
(Z>),
the
(
ignorance ',
isconnectedwithan
exactlyanalogousreference, viz.,
'
uniting
brideand
bridegroom
inthewrongway
'.
(See
alsonext
note.)
Thelast
point
inwhichImustdefendmyinterpretation
ismy
contention
thatthosewhoknowtheNumberthereby
obtainthepower
toinfluence
'
better
orworsebirth'.ThisdoesnotofcoursefollowfromPlato'sstatementthat
theNumberitselfhassuchpower ;forifAdam's
interpretation
is
right,
then
theNumber
regulates
thebirthsbecauseitdeterminesanunalterable
period
afterwhich
degeneration
isboundtosetin.ButImaintainthatPlato's
referencesto
'
perception ',
to
'
blunder
'
andto
'
ignorance
'
astheimmediate
causeofthe
eugenic
mistakeswouldbe
pointless
ifhedidnotmeanthatwith
theknowledge
of
appropriate
mathematicaland
purely
rationalmethods,
the
guardians
wouldnothaveblundered. Butthismakesinevitablethe
inferencethattheNumberhasatechnical
eugenicmeaning,
andthatits

214
CHAPTER5/NOTE39
knowledgegivespower
toarrest
degeneration. (This
inferencealsoseems
tomethe
onlyonecompatible
withallweknowaboutthis
type
of
superstition ;
all
astrology,
forinstance,includestheapparentlysomewhatcontradictory
conception
thattheknowledge
ofourfatemayhelp
ustounfluencethis
fate.)
Ithinkthattheattempts
to
explain
theNumberas
anythingbutasecret
breeding
tabooarisefromthereluctancetocreditPlatowithsuchcrude
ideas,eventhough
he
clearlyexpresses
them.Inotherwords,they
arise
fromthetendency
toidealizePlato.
(2)
Inthisconnection,
Imustrefertoanarticleby
A.E.
Taylor,
'
The
DeclineandFallofTheStatein
Republic,VIII
*
(Mind,N.S.
48,1939,pp.
23ff.).
Inthisarticle,Taylor
attacksAdam
(inmyopinionnot
justly),and
maintains
againsthim :
'
Itistrue,ofcourse,thatthedecay
oftheideal
Stateis
expressly
saidin
546b
to
beginwhenthe
ruling
class
"
beget
children
outofdueseason"...Butthisneednotmean,andinmyopinion
does
notmean,thatPlatoisconcerning
himselfherewith
problems
ofthe
hygiene
of
reproduction.
Themain
thought
isthe
simpleonethat
if,
like
everything
ofman'smaking,
theStatecarriestheseedsofitsowndissolutionwithin
it,
thismust,ofcourse,meanthatsoonerorlaterthe
personswieldingsupreme
power
willbeinferiortothosewho
precededthem
'
(pp.25f.).Nowthis
interpretation
seemstomenot
onlyuntenable,
inviewofPlato's
fairly
definite
statements,butalsoa
typicalexample
ofthe
attempt
toeliminatefromPlato's
writingsuchembarrassing elementsasracialismor
superstition.Adam
beganbydenying
thattheNumberhastechnical
eugenicimportance,andby
maintaining
thatitisnota
*
nuptialnumber
',but
merely
a
cosmological
period.Taylornowcontinuesbydenying
thatPlatoishereatallinterested
in
'
problems
ofthehygiene
ofthe
reproduction
'.ButPlato's
passage
is
thronged
withallusionstothese
problems,andTaylor
himselfadmitstwo
pages
before
(p.23)
thatitis
'
nowhere
suggested
'
thattheNumber
'
isa
determinantofanything
butthe
"
betterandworsebirths
"
'.Besides,not
only
the
passage
in
question
butthewhole
Republic
is
simply
fullof
emphasis
upon
the
'
problems
ofthe
hygiene
of
reproduction
'.
Taylor'stheory
that
Plato,when
speaking
ofthe
*
humancreature
'
(or,
as
Taylorputsit,ofa
'
thing
ofhumangeneration '),meansthe
state,andthatPlatowishestoallude
tothefactthatthestateisthecreationofahuman
lawgiver,seemstome
withoutsupport
inPlato'stext.Thewhole
passagebegins
withareference
tothethings
ofthesensibleworldin
flux,tothe
things
thatare
generatedand
thatdecay(see
notes
37and
38
tothis
chapter),andmore
especially,
to
living
things,plants
aswellasanimals,andtotheirracial
problems. Besides,a
thing
'
ofman'smaking
'
would,
if
emphasizedby
Platoinsuchacontext,
meanan
'
artificial
'
thingwhichisinferiorbecause itis
'
twiceremoved
'
from
reality. (Cp.
texttonotes20-23
tothis
chapter,andthewholeTenth
Bookofthe
Republicdowntotheendof
6o8b.)
Platowouldnever
expect
anybody
to
interpret
the
phrase
'
a
thing
ofman'smaking
'
asmeaning
the
perfect,
the
*
natural
'
state
;ratherhewould
expectthemtothinkofsome-
thingvery
inferior
(likepoetry ;cp.
note
39
to
chapter4).The
phrase
whichTaylor
translates
'
thing
ofhumangeneration
'
is
usuallysimply
translatedby
*
humancreature
',andthisremovesalldifficulties.
(3)Assuming
thatmyinterpretation
ofthe
passage
in
question
iscorrect,
a
suggestionmay
bemadewiththeintentionof
connecting
Plato'sbelief
inthe
significance
ofracial
degeneration
withhis
repeated
advicethatthe
numberofthemembersofthe
ruling
classshouldbe
kept
constant
(advice
thatshowsthatthe
sociologist
Platounderstoodthe
unsettling
effectof
popu-
lation
increase)
.Plato'sway
of
thinking,
describedattheendofthe
present
chapter(cp.
texttonote
45;andnote
37
to
chapter8),especially
theway
he
opposesTheOnemonarch,TheFewtimocrats,toTheManywhoare
nothing
butamob,may
have
suggested
tohimthebeliefthatanincreasein

CHAPTER6/NOTE
I
215
numbersis
equivalent
toadeclinein
quality.
Ifthis
hypothesis
is
correct,thenhe
mayeasilyhaveconcludedthat
population
increaseis
interdependentwith,or
perhaps
evencaused
by,
racial
degeneration. Since
population
increasewasinfactthe
maincauseofthe
instabilityanddissolutionofthe
earlyGreektribalsocieties
(cp.
notes6,7,and63
to
chapter10,and
text),
this
hypothesiswould
explain
why
Platobelievedthatthe
'
real
'
causewasracialdegeneration (inkeeping
withhis
generaltheoriesof
*
nature
',andof
*
change').
40
Adaminsists
(note
to
546ds2)
thatwemustnottranslate
*
atthewrong
time
*
but
'
inopportunely
'. Imayremarkthatmyinterpretation
is
quite
independentofthis
question ;
itis
fullycompatiblewith
'
inopportunely
'
or
'
wrongly
'
or
*
inthe
wrongway
'.(Thephrase
in
questionmeans,
originally,something
like
'
contraiy
tothe
proper
measure
'
;usually
itmeans
'
atthe
wrong
time
'.)
41
ForPlato'slawofsocialrevolutions,see
esp.
note26to
chapter4,
and
text.
42
Theterm
meta-biology
isusedby
G.B.Shawinthis
sense,
i.e.as
denoting
akindof
religion. (Cp.
the
preface
toBacktoMethuselah
;seealso
note66to
chapter12.)
43
Cp.Adam'snoteto
Republic,547a3.
44
ForacriticismofwhatIcall
'
psychologism
'
inthemethodof
sociology,
cp.
texttonote
19
to
chapter13and
chapter14,whereMill'sstill
popular
methodological psychologism
isdiscussed.
45
IthasoftenbeensaidthatPlato's
thought
mustnotbe
squeezed
into
a
'
system
'
;accordingly,myattempts
inthis
paragraph(and
not
only
in
this
paragraph)
toshowthe
systematicunity
ofPlato'sthought,whichis
obviouslybasedonthe
Pythagorean
tableof
opposites,
will
probably
arouse
criticism. ButIbelievethatsucha
systematization
isa
necessary
testofany
interpretation. Thosewhobelievethat
theydonotneedan
interpretation,
andthat
they
can
*
know
'
a
philosopher
orhiswork,andtakehim
just
'
as
hewas
*,
orhiswork
just
'
asitwas
',aremistaken.Theycannotbut
interpret
boththemanandhiswork
;butsince
they
arenotawareofthefactthat
they
interpret(that
theirviewiscolouredbytradition,temperament, etc.),
their
interpretationmust
necessarilybenaiveanduncritical.
(Cp.
alsochapter
10
(notes
ito
5and
56),and
chapter25.)Acritical
interpretation,however,
musttaketheformofarational
reconstruction,andmustbe
systematic ;
it
must
try
toreconstructthe
philosopher'sthought
asaconsistentedifice.Cp.
alsowhatA.C.
Ewingsays
ofKant
(A
ShortCommentary
onKant's
Critiqueof
Pure
Reason,1938,p.4)
:
'
. .we
ought
tostartwiththe
assumption
thata
greatphilosopher
isnot
likely
tobe
alwayscontradicting himself,andcon-
sequently,wherevertherearetwo
interpretations,oneofwhichwillmake
Kantconsistentandtheother
inconsistent,prefer
theformertothe
latter,
if
reasonablypossible.*
This
surelyapplies
alsotoPlato,andevento
interpreta-
tionin
general.
NOTESTOCHAPTER6
1
Cp.note
3
to
chapter4andtext,especially
theendofthat
paragraph.
Furthermore,note2
(2)
tothat
chapter. Concerning
theformulaBackto
Nature,
IwishtodrawattentiontothefactthatRousseauwas
greatly
influenced
by
Plato. Indeed,a
glance
attheSocialContractwillrevealawealthof
analogiesespecially
withthosePlatonic
passagesonnaturalismwhichhave
beencommentedupon
inthelast
chapter. Cp.especiallynote
14
tochapter
9.Thereisalsoan
interestingsimilaritybetween
Republic,591a,
ff.
(and
Gorgias,472e,ff.,whereasimilarideaoccursinanindividualist
context)and
Rousseau's
(andHegel's)
famous
theory
of
punishment. (Barker,
Greek

2l6 CHAPTER6/NOTES2~6
Political
Theory,I,388ff.,rightlyemphasizes
Plato'sinfluenceuponRousseau.
Buthedoesnotseethe
strongelementofromanticism inPlato
;anditis
not
generallyappreciated
thattheruralromanticismwhichinfluencedboth
Franceand
Shakespeare'sEnglandthrough
themediumofSanazzaro's
Arcadia,hasits
origin
inPlato'sDorian
shepherds ;cp.
notes 11
(3),26,and
32
to
chapter4,andnote
14
to
chapter9.)
2
Cp.
R.H.S.Grossman,PlatoTo-Day(1937),132;thenext
quotation
is
from
p.in.This
interestingbook
(like
theworksofGroteandT.
Gomperz)
has
greatlyencouragedmeto
developmy
ratherunorthodoxviewsonPlato,
andtofollowthemup
totheirrather
unpleasant
conclusions. Forthe
quotations
fromG.E.M.
Joad,cp.
hisGuidetothe
Philosophyof
Moralsand
Politics
(1938),
66
1,and660. Imay
alsoreferheretothe
veryinteresting
remarksonPlato'sviewson
justiceby
G.L.Stevenson,inhisarticle
'
Persuasive
Definitions'
(Mind,N.S.,
vol.
47,1938,pp.331ff.)
8
Cp.Grossman, op.cit.,132
f.Thenexttwo
quotations
are:
Field,
Plato
,etc.,91;cp.
similarremarksinBarker,GreekPolitical
Theory,
etc.
(see
note
13
to
chapter5).
TheidealizationofPlatohas
played
aconsiderable
part
inthedebates
onthe
genuinenessofthevariousworkstransmittedunderhisname.Many
ofthemhavebeen
rejectedbysomeofthecritics
simply
because
they
contained
passageswhichdidnotfitinwithanidealizedviewofPlato.Arathernaive
aswellas
typicalexpression
ofthisattitudecanbefoundinDavies'and
Vaughan's
*
IntroductoryNotice
'
(cp.
theGoldenTreasury
editionofthe
Republic,p.vi)
:
'
Mr.Grote,
inhiszealtotakePlatodownfromhis
super-
human
pedestal,maybesomewhattoo
ready
toattributetohimthe
composi-
tionswhichhavebeen
judgedunworthy
ofsodivinea
philosopher.'
Itdoes
notseemtooccurtothewritersthattheir
judgement
onPlatoshould
depend
onwhathewrote,andnotviceversa
;andthatifthesecompositions
are
genuine
aswellas
unworthy,
thenPlatowas
simply
not
quite
sodivinea
philosopher
as
they
assume.
4
Theformulationof
(a)
emulatesoneofKant'swhodescribesa
just
constitutionas
'
aconstitutionthatachievesthe
greatestpossiblefreedomofhuman
individualsbyframing
thelawsinsuchaway
thatthe
freedomof
eachcan
co-existwiththat
of
allothers'.
(Critiqueof
PureReason
a
,373) ;
seealsohis
TheoryofRight,wherehe
says
:
*
Right(orjustice)
isthesumtotalofthe
conditionswhichare
necessary
for
everybody's
freechoicetoco-existwith
thatofeverybody else,
inaccordancewitha
generallawof
liberty.'Kant
believedthatthiswastheaim
pursuedby
Platointhe
Republic ;fromwhich
wemay
seethatKantwasoneofthemanyphilosopherswhowereeither
deceivedby
Platoorwhoidealizedhimbyimputing
tohimtheirownhumani-
tarianideas. Imayremark,
inthisconnection,thatKant'sardentliberalism
is
very
little
appreciated
in
English
andAmerican
writingson
political
philosophy (inspite
ofHastie'sKant's
PrinciplesofPolitics).Heis
only
too
often
regarded
asaforerunnerof
Hegel,
in
spite
ofthefactthathe
recognized
intheromanticismofbothHerderandFichteadoctrinediametricallyopposed
tohisown
;hewouldhave
strongly
resentedtheclaimofthe
Hegelian
school
thathewasaforerunnerof
Hegel.Butthetremendous influenceof
Hegelianism
ledtoawideacceptance
ofthisviewwhich
is,
I
believe,com-
pletely
mistaken.
8
Cp.
texttonotes32/33
tochapter5.
Cp.
texttonotes
25
to
29,chapter5.The
quotations
inthe
present
paragraph
are:
(i)Republic,4333 ;(2)Republic,434a/b ;(3)Republic,44
id.
ForPlato'sstatement,
inthefirst
quotation,
'
wehave
repeatedoverand
again*,cp.
also
esp.Republic,397e,
wherethetheory
of
justice
is
carefully
prepared,and,of
course,Republic,369b-c,quoted
intexttonote
29,chapter5.
Seealsonotes
23and
40
tothe
presentchapter.

CHAPTER6/NOTES7-14 217
7
As
pointed
outin
chapter4(note
18and
text,andnote
29),
Platodoes
not
saymuchaboutslavesinthe
Republic,althoughwhathe
says
is
significant
enough ;buthe
dispels
alldoubtsabouthisattitudeintheLaws
(cp.especially
G.R.Morrow'sarticleinMind,referredtoinnote
29
to
chapter4).
8
The
quotations
arefromBarker,GreekPolitical
Theory,I,p.
180.Barker
states
(p.176f.)
that
*
Platonic
Justice
'
is
*
social
justice',and
correctly
emphasizes
itsholisticnature.Hementions
(178f,)
the
possible
criticism
thatthisformuladoes
'
not . .touchtheessenceofwhatmen
generallymean
byjustice *,
i.e.
'
a
principle
for
dealing
withtheclashofwills
',
i.e.
justice
as
pertaining
toindividuals. Buthethinksthat
'
suchan
objection
isbeside
the
point*,andthatPlato'sideais
'
notamatteroflaw
'
but
*
a
conception
ofsocialmorality
'
(i79);andhe
goesontoassertthatthistreatmentof
justice
corresponded,
inaway,
tothecurrentGreekideasof
justice
:
"
NorwasPlato,
in
conceivingjustice
inthissense,very
farremovedfromthecurrentideas
inGreece '.Hedoesnotevenmentionthatthereexistssomeevidencetothe
contrary.
9
ForAristotle's
theory
of
slavery,
seenote
3
to
chapter
11andtext.The
quotations
fromAristotleinthisparagraph
are :
(i)and
(2)Nicom.Ethics,
V,4,7,and8
;(3)Politics,III,12,
i
(i282b ;
seealsonote30
tothis
chapter.
The
passagecontainsareferencetotheNicom.
Eth.) ;(4)Nicom.Ethics,V,4,9.
(5)Politics,IV
(VI),2,
r
(i3i7b).
IntheNicom.Ethics,V,3,7(cp.
also
Pol.,Ill,9,
i
;I28oa),
Aristotlealsomentionsthatthemeaning
of
'justice
'
variesindemocratic, oligarchic,andaristocratic states,according
totheir
differentideasof
'
merit'.
10
Thewell-known
representation
ofThemisasblindfolded, i.e.,dis-
regarding
the
suppliant'sstation,andas
carryingscales,i.e.,as
distributing
equality
oras
balancing
theclaimsandinterestsofthe
contestingindividuals,
isasymbolicrepresentation
oftheequalitarian
ideaof
justice.
This
repre-
sentationcannot,however,beusedhereasanargument ;for,asDr.
E.Gombrichkindlyinformsme,itdatesfromtheRenaissance, going
backtoa
passage
inPlutarch'sDehideand
Osiride,butnottoclassical
Greece.
11
Republic,44oc-d.The
passageconcludeswithacharacteristicsheep-dog
metaphor
:
*
Or
else,untilhehasbeencalledback,andcalmeddown,by
thevoiceofhisownreason,
likea
dogby
his
shepherd
?
'
Gp.
note
32(2)
tochapter4.
12
Plato,in
fact,implies
thiswhenhetwice
presents
Socratesasrather
doubtfulwhereheshouldnowlookoutfor
justice. (Cp.368b,ff.,432b,ff.)
13Adam
(under
theinfluenceof
Plato)obviously
overlooksthe
equalitarian
theory
inhisnoteto
Republic,33le,ff.,wherehe,probablycorrectly,says
that
'
theviewthat
Justice
consistsin
doinggood
tofriendsandharmto
enemies,
isafaithfulreflectionof
prevalent
Greek
morality
'.Butheis
wrong
whenheaddsthatthiswas
'
anallbutuniversalview
'
;forhe
forgets
hisown
evidence
(note
to
561628),
whichshowsthat
equality
beforethelaws
('isdnomy ')
"
wasthe
proud
claimofdemocracy
'.
14A
passing
referenceto
equality(similar
tothatinthe
Gorgias,483c/d ;
seealsothis
note,below,andnote
47
tothis
chapter)
ismadeinGlaucon's
speech
in
Republic,359C ;buttheissueisnottaken
up.(For
this
passage
cp.
note
50
tothis
chapter.)
InPlato'sabusiveattackupondemocracy(see
texttonotes
14-18,chapter
4),
threescornfuljocular
referencesto
equalitarianism
occur.The
first
isa
remarktotheeffectthatdemocracy
*
distributes
equality
to
equals
andto
unequajs
alike
'
(558c ;cp.Adam'snoteto558ci6 ;seealsonote21tothis
chapter) ;
thisisintendedasanironicalcriticism.
(Equality
hasbeencon-
nectedwithdemocracy before,
viz.inthe
description
ofthedemocratic
revolution
;cp.Rep.,557a,quoted
inthetexttonote
13,chapter4.)The
O.S.I.&.VOL.I H

2l8 CHAPTER6/NOTES15-19
secondcharacterizesthe
'
democraticman
'
as
gratifying
allhisdesires
'
equally,'
whethertheymay
be
good
orbad
;heisthereforecalledan
'
equalitarianist
*
('
isonomist
'),
a
punning
allusiontotheideaof
equal
lawsforall
}
or
'
equality
beforethelaw
'
('Isonomy
'
;cp.
note
17
tothis
chapter).
Thispun
occurs
in
Republic,5616.Theway
foritiswell
paved,
sincetheword
*
equal
'
has
already
beenusedthreetimes
(Rep.,56
iband
c)
tocharacterizeanattitude
ofthemantowhomalldesiresandwhimsare
*
equal
'.Thethirdofthese
cheap
cracksisan
appeal
tothereader's
imagination,typical
evennowadays
ofthiskindof
propaganda
:
'
I
nearlyforgot
tomentionthe
great
r6le
played
by
thesefamous
"
equal
laws
",andby
thisfamous
"
liberty",
intheinter-
relationsbetweenmenandwomen ..'
Rep.,563^)
Besidestheevidenceofthe
importance
of
equalitarianism
mentioned
here
(and
inthetexttonotes
9
to10tothis
chapter),wemustconsider
especially
Plato'sown
testimony
in
(i)
the
Gorgias,wherehewrites(4886/4893 ;
seealsonotes
47,48,and
50
tothe
presentchapter)
:
'
Doesnotthemultitude
(i.e.
here :the
majorityofthe
people)
believe . .that
justice
is
equality
?
*
(2)TheMenexenus
(238e-239a ;seenote
19
tothis
chapter,and
text).The
passages
intheLawson
equality
arelaterthanthe
Republic,andcannotbe
usedastestimony
forPlato'sawarenessoftheissuewhen
writing
the
Republic ;
butseetexttonotes20and21tothis
chapter.
16
Platohimself
says,
inconnectionwiththethirdremark(^6^b ;cp.
the
last
note)
:
'
Shallweutterwhateverrisestoour
lips
?
;by
whichhe
appar-
ently
wishestoindicatethathedoesnotseeanyreasonto
suppress
the
joke.
18
Ibelievethat
Thucydides' (II,37ff.)
versionofPericles'orationcan
betakenas
practically
authentic. Inall
likelihood,hewas
presentwhen
Pericles
spoke ;andin
any
casehewouldhavereconstructed itas
faithfully
as
possible.Thereismuchreasontobelievethatinthosetimesitwasnot
extraordinary
foramantolearnanother'sorationevenby
heart
(cp.
Plato's
Phaedrus),andafaithfulreconstructionofa
speech
ofthiskindisindeednot
asdifficultasonemight
think. Platoknewtheoration,takingeither
Thucydides'
versionoranothersource,whichmusthavebeen
extremely
similarto
it,
asauthentic. Cp.
alsonote
31and
34/35
tochapter
10.
(It
may
bementionedherethat
early
inhis
career,
Pericleshadmaderather
dubiousconcessionstothe
popular
tribalinstinctsandtothe
equallypopular
groupegoism
ofthe
people ;
Ihaveinmindthe
legislationconcerning
citizenship
in
451
B.C.Butlaterherevisedhisattitudetowardsthese
matters,
probably
undertheinfluenceofsuchmenas
Protagoras.)
17
Cp.Herodotus,III,80,and
especially
the
eulogyon
*
isonomy ',i.e.,
equality
beforethelaw
(III,80,6);
seealsonote
14
tothis
chapter.The
passage
fromHerodotus,whichinfluencedPlatoinother
ways
also
(cp.
note
24
tochapter4),
isonewhichPlatoridiculesinthe
Republicjust
asheridicules
Pericles'oration
;rp.
note
14
to
chapter4and
34
to
chapter
10.
18
EventhenaturalistAristotledoesnotalways
refertothisnaturalistic
versionof
equalitarianism ;forinstance,
hisformulationofthe
principlesof
democracy
in
Politics,
i^ijb
(cp.
note
9
tothis
chapter,and
text)
is
quite
independent
ofit.Butitis
perhaps
evenmore
interesting
thatinthe
Gorgias
inwhichthe
opposition
ofnatureandconvention
plays
suchan
important
role,
Plato
presentsequalitarianism
withoutburdening
itwiththedubious
theory
ofthenatural
equality
ofallmen
(see4886/48ga,quoted
innote
14
to
this
chapter,and
483d,4843,and
5083).
19
Cp.Menexenus,238e/23ga.The
passageimmediately
followsaclear
allusiontoPericles'oration
(viz.,
tothesecondsentencequoted
inthetextto
note
17,
inthis
chapter).
Itseemsnot
improbable
thatthereiterationofthe
term
'
equal
birth
'
inthat
passage
ismeantasascornfulallusiontothe
'
low
*
birthofPericles'and
Aspasia'ssons,whowererecognized
asAtheniancitizens

CHAPTER6/NOTE2O
2ig
onlybyspeciallegislation
in
429
B.C.
(Cp.
E.Meyer,
Gesch.d.
Altertums,
vol.IV,p.14,notetoNo.
392,and
p.323,No.
558.)
(Ithasbeenheld
(evenbyGrote
;cp.
his
Plato,III,p.
1
1)
thatPlatoin
theMenexenus,
'
inhisownrhetoricaldiscourse,
. .
drops
theironicalvein
',
i.e.thatthemiddle
part
oftheMenexenus,fromwhichthe
quotation
inthe
textistaken,
isnotmeant
ironically. Butinviewofthe
quotedpassage
on
equality,andinviewofPlato'sopen
scorninthe
Republicwhenhedeals
withthis
point(cp.
note
14
tothis
chapter),
this
opinion
seemstomeuntenable.
Andit
appears
tome
equallyimpossible
todoubttheironicalcharacterof
the
passageimmediatelypreceding
theone
quoted
inthetextwherePlato
saysofAthens
(cp.238c/d)
:
'
Inthistimeaswellasat
present
. .our
govern-
mentwasalwaysan
aristocracy
. .
;though
itissometimescalleda
democracy,
itis
reallyan
aristocracy,
thatisto
say,
aruleofthe
best,withthe
approval
ofthemany
..'InviewofPlato'shatredof
democracy,
this
description
needsnofurthercomment. Forthe
genuineness
oftheMenexenus,cp.
also
note
35
to
chapter
10.
20
Laws,757a ;cp.
thewhole
passage7573-0.
(1)
ForwhatIcallthestandard
objectionagainstcqualitarianism, cp.
alsoLaws,744b,
ff.'Itwouldbeexcellentif
everybodycould . .haveall
thingsequal ;butsincethisis
impossible
.
.',
etc.The
passage
is
especially
interesting
inviewofthefactthatPlatoisoftendescribedasanenemy
of
plutocracybymany
writerswhojudgehim
onlyby
the
Republic. Butinthis
importantpassage
oftheLaws
(i.e.744b,ff.)
Platodemandsthat
*
political
offices,andcontributions, aswellasdistributionsof
bounties,shouldbe
proportional
tothevalueofacitizen'swealth.And
theyshoulddepend
not
onlyonhisvirtueorthatofhisancestorsoronthesizeandattractivenessof
his
body,
buta4so
upon
hiswealthorhis
poverty.
Inthisway,
amanwill
receivehonoursandofficesas
equitably
as
possible,
i.e.in
proportion
tohis
wealth,althoughaccording
toa
principle
ofunequal
distribution.' The
basicideaofthisattitude,viz.
,thatitis
unjust
totreat
unequalsequally,
can
befound,
ina
passingremark,
as
early
asthe
Protagoras(337a) ;butPlatodid
notmakemuchuseoftheideabeforewriting
theLaws.
(2)ForAristotle'selaborationoftheseideas,cp.esp.
his
Politics,III,
9,i,i28oa
(see
alsoIII,12-13,12820-1284^,wherehewrites :
*
Allmen
cling
to
justice
ofsomekind,buttheir
conceptions
are
imperfect,anddonot
embracethewholeIdea.For
example,justice
is
thought(bydemocrats)
to
be
equality ;andsoit
is,although
itisnot
equality
for
all,butonly
for
equals.
And
justice
is
thought(byoligarchs)
tobe
inequality ;andsoit
is,although
itisnot
inequality
for
all,but
only
for
unequals.'
(3)Against
allthis
anti-equalitarianism,
Imaintain,withKant,thatit
mustbethe
principle
ofall
morality
thatnomanshouldconsiderhimself
morevaluablethan
any
other
person.AndImaintainthatthis
principle
isthe
only
one
acceptable,considering
thenotorious
impossibility
of
judging
oneself
impartially.
Iamthereforeatalosstounderstandthe
following
remarkofanexcellentwriterlikeGatlin
(Principles,314)
:
*
Thereissome-
thingprofoundly
immoralinthe
morality
ofKantwhichendeavourstoroll
all
personalities
level . .andwhich
ignores
theAristotelian
precept
torender
equals
to
equals
and
unequals
to
unequals.Onemanhasnot
socially
the
same
rights
asanother . .The
presentwriterwouldbynomeansbe
prepared
todeny
that . .thereis
something
in
"
blood".'NowIask :Iftherewere
something
in
*
blood
',orin
inequality
oftalents,etc.
;andevenifitwere
worthwhiletowasteone'stimein
assessing
thesedifferences
;andeven
ifonecouldassessthem
;why,then,shouldtheybemadethegroundof
greaterrightsandnotonly
ofheavierduties?
(Cp.
texttonotes
31/32
to
chapter4.)
Ifailtoseethe
profoundimmorality
ofKant's
equalitarianism.
AndIfailtoseeonwhatCatlinbaseshismoraljudgement,
sinceheconsiders

22O CHAPTER6/NOTES21-25
moralstobeamatteroftaste.WhyshouldKant's
*
taste
'
be
profoundly
immoral?
(It
isalsotheChristian
'
taste
'.)Theonlyreply
tothis
question
thatIcanthinkofisthatCatlin
judges
fromhis
positivisticpoint
ofview
(cp.
note18
(2)
to
chapter5),
andthathethinkstheChristianandKantian
demandimmoralbecauseitcontradictsthe
positivelyenforcedmoralvaluations
ofourcontemporary society.
(4)Oneofthebestanswersevergiven
toallthese
anti-equalitarianists
is
duetoRousseau. I
say
thisin
spite
ofmyopinion
thathisromanticism
(cp.
note itothis
chapter)wasoneofthemost
pernicious
influencesinthe
history
ofsocialphilosophy.
Buthewasalsoonepfthefew
really
brilliant
writersinthisfield. I
quote
oneofhisexcellentremarksfromthe
Originof
Inequality(see,
forinstance,theEveryman
EditionoftheSocial
Contract)p.
1
74
;
theitalicsare
mine) ;andIwishtodrawthereader'sattentiontothe
dignified
formulationofthelastsentenceofthis
passage.
*
Iconceivethatthereare
twokindsof
inequalityamong
thehuman
species ;one,whichIcallnatural
or
physical
becauseitisestablishedbynature,andconsistsinadifferenceof
age,health,bodilystrength,andthe
qualities
ofthemindorofthesoul
;
andanother,whichmay
becalledmoralor
politicalinequality,
because it
depends
onakindofconvention,andisestablished,oratleastauthorized,
by
theconsentofmen.Thislatterconsistsofthedifferent
privileges,which
somemenenjoy
. .
;suchasthatof
beingmorerich,morehonoured,or
more
powerful,
. . .Itisuselesstoaskwhatisthesourceofnatural
inequality,
becausethat
question
isansweredby
the
simple
definitionoftheword.
Again,
itisstillmoreuselessto
inquire
whetherthereis
any
essentialconnectionbetweenthetwo
inequalities ;
forthiswouldbeonlyasking,
inotherwords,whetherthose
whocommandare
necessarily
betterthanthosewhoobey,andwhether
strength
ofbody
orofmind,orwisdom,or
virtue,
are
alwaysfound . .in
proportion
tothepower
orwealthofaman
;a
questionfitperhaps
tobediscussed
by
slavesinthe
hearingof
theirmasters,
but
highlyunbecoming
toreasonableand
free
meninsearchof
thetruth.
9
21
Republic,558c;cp.
note
14
tothis
chapter(the
first
passage
intheattack
ondemocracy).
22
Republic,433b.Adamwhoalso
recognizesthatthe
passage
isintended
asan
argument
triestoreconstructthe
argument(note
to
433611) ;buthe
confessesthat
'
Platoseldomleavessomuchtobe
mentallysupplied
inhis
reasoning
'.
28
Republic,4336/4343.
Foracontinuationofthe
passage,cp.
textto
note40
tothis
chapter ;
forthe
preparation
foritinearlier
parts
ofthe
Republic,
seenote6tothis
chapter.Adamcommentsonthepassagewhich
Icallthe
'
secondargument
*
asfollows
(note
to
433635)
:
*
Platois
looking
fora
point
ofcontactbetweenhisownviewof
Justiceandthe
popularjudicial
meaning
oftheword ..'
(See
the
passagequoted
inthenext
paragraph
in
the
text.)AdamtriestodefendPlato'sargumentagainst
acritic(Krohn)
whosaw,though
not
veryclearly,
thattherewas
somethingwrong
with
it.
24
The
quotations
inthis
paragraph
arefrom
Republic,43od,
ff.
25
Thisdeviceseemstohavebeensuccessfulevenwithakeencriticsuchas
Gomperz,who,
inhisbriefcriticism
(GreekThinkers,RookV,II,10
;Germ.ed.,
vol.II,pp.378/379),
failstomentiontheweaknessesofthe
argument ;and
heeven
says,commentingupon
thefirsttwobooks
(V,II,5;p.368)
:
'
An
exposition
followswhichmight
bedescribedasamiracleof
clarity,precision,
andgenuine
scientificcharacter .
.',adding
thatPlato'sinterlocutorsGlaucon
andAdeimantus,
*
drivenby
their
burning
enthusiasm . .dismissand
forestallall
superficial
solutions '.
Formyremarkson
temperance,
inthenextparagraphofthe
text,see
the
followingpassage
fromDavies'and
Vaughan's
*
Analysis
'
(cp.
theGolden

CHAPTER6/NOTES26-33
221
Treasury
editionofthe
Republic,p.
xviii
;
italics
mine)
:
*
Theessenceof
temperance
isrestraint.Theessenceof
politicaltemperance
liesin
recognizing
the
rightof
the
governingbody
tothe
allegianceandobedience
of
the
governed.
9
This
mayshowthatmyinterpretation
ofPlato'sideaof
temperance
isshared
(thoughexpressed
inadifferent
terminology)by
followersofPlato. Imay
addthat
*
temperance ',
i.e.being
satisfiedwithone's
place,
isavirtuein
whichallthreeclasses
share,although
itistheonly
virtueinwhichtheworkers
mayparticipate. Thusthevirtueattainableby
theworkersor
money-earners
istemperance ;
thevirtuesattainableby
theauxiliariesare
temperanceand
courage ;by
the
guardians,temperance,courage,andwisdom.
The
*
lengthypreface ',also
quoted
inthenext
paragraph,
isfrom
Republic,
432b,
ff.
26Ontheterm
'
collectivism
',a
terminologicalcommentmay
bemade
here.WhatH.G.Wellscalls
*
collectivism
'
has
nothing
todowithwhat
Icallby
thatname.Wellsisanindividualist
(inmy
senseofthe
word),
asisshown
especiallyby
his
RightsofManandhisCommonSense
ofWarand
Peace,whichcontain
veryacceptable
formulations ofthedemandsofan
equalitarian
individualism. Buthealso
believes,rightly,
intherational
planning
of
politicalinstitutions,withtheaimof
furthering
thefreedomand
thewelfareofindividualhuman
beings.Thishecalls
'
collectivism
'
;
to
describewhatIbelievetobethesame
thing
ashis
*
collectivism
',
Ishould
usean
expression
like :
'
rationalinstitutional
planning
forfreedom '.This
expressionmay
be
longand
clumsy,
butitavoidsthedanger
that
'
collectivism
'
may
be
interpreted
intheanti-individualistic senseinwhichitisoftenused,
not
only
inthe
presentbook.
27
Laws,903c ;cp.
texttonote
35,chapter5.
28
Thereareinnumerable
places
inthe
Republic
andintheLawswhere
Plato
gives
a
warningagainst
unbridledgroupegoism ;cp.,
forinstance,
Republic,5196,andthe
passages
referredtoinnote
41
tothis
chapter.
Regarding
the
identity
often
alleged
toexistbetweencollectivismand
altruism,
Imayrefer,inthisconnection,tothe
verypertinentquestion
of
Sherrington,whoasksinManOnHisNature
(p.388)
:
*
Hastheshoaland
theherdaltruism?
'
29
ForDickens'mistakencontempt
ofParliament, cp.
alsonote
23
to
chapter7.
30
Aristotle's
Politics,III,12,
i
(i282b) ;cp.
texttonote
9,
tothis
chapter.
(Gp.
alsoAristotle'sremarkin
Pol.,Ill,9,3,ia8oa,totheeffectthat
justice
pertains
to
persons
aswellasto
things.)Withthe
quotation
fromPericles
laterinthis
paragraph,cp.
texttonote16tothis
chapter,
andtonote
31
to
chapter
10.
31
Thisremarkisfroma
passage(Rep.,5196,f.)quoted
inthetexttonote
35
to
chapter5.
32
The
importantpassages
fromtheLawsquoted(i)
inthe
present
and
(2)
inthenext
paragraph
are:
(1)Laws,739C,
ff.Platorefersheretothe
Republic,and
apparently
especially
to
Republic,4623, ff.,4243,
and
4496.(A
listof
passageson
collectivismandholismcanbefoundinnote
35
to
chapter5.)
(2)Laws,942a,
f.Boththese
passages
arereferredtoasanti-individualistic
byGomperz (op.cit.,
vol.II,406).
33
Cpnote
42,chapter4,andtext.The
quotation
whichfollowsinthe
presentp.aragraph
isLaws
9423,
f.
(see
thelast
note).
Itis
interesting
thatBarker,whohatesmilitarism,believesthatPlato
heldsimilarviews.
(Greek
Political
Theory,298-301).
ItistruethatPlato
didnot
eulogizewar,andthatheeven
spokeagainst
war.Butmany
militarists
havetalked
peaceand
practisedwar
;andPlato'sstateisruledby
the
military
caste.

222 CHAPTER6/NOTES34-45
84
Strictest
legislation
aboutmealsandalsoabout
drinking
habits
plays
a
considerable
part
inPlato
;cp.,
forinstance,Republic,4i6e,458c ;Laws,
6256,762b,780-783,
8o6c.Plato
alwaysemphasizes
the
importance
of
commonmeals,
inaccordancewithCretanand
Spartan
customs.
Interesting
alsoisthe
preoccupation
ofPlato'suncleGritiaswiththesematters.
(Cp.
Diels
2
,Critias,
fr.
33.)
36
Cp.
E.B.
England's
editionoftheLaws,
vol.
I,p.514,
noteto
73gb8
ff.
The
quotations
fromBarker, op.cit.,are :
pp.149and
148.
Countless
similar
passages
canbefoundinthe
writings
ofmostPlatonists. Seehowever
Sherrington'sremark
(cp.
note28tothis
chapter)
thatitis
hardly
correct
to
say
thatashoaloraherdis
inspiredby
altruism.Herdinstinctandtribal
egoism,andthe
appeal
tothese
instincts,shouldnotbemixed
up
with
unselfishness.
86
Cp.Republic,424a,44gc ;Laws,
73pc.
(Cp.
also
Lysis,2O7c.)
Regarding
theindividualistic
theory
of
justiceand
injustice
ofthe
Gorgias,
cp.
forinstancethe
examplesgiven
inthe
Gorgias,468b,fF.,5o8d/e.These
passagesprobably
stillshowSocraticinfluence
(cp.
note
56
to
chapter10).
Socrates*individualism ismost
clearlyexpressed
inhisfamousdoctrineofthe
self-sufficiency
ofthegoodman
;adoctrinewhichismentionedby
Platoin
the
Republic(387d/e)
in
spite
ofthefactthatit
flatly
contradictsoneofthe
mainthesesofthe
Republic,viz.,thatthestatealonecanbeself-sufficient.
(Cp.
note
25,andthetexttothisandtothe
followingnotes,
to
chapter
50
87
Republic,368b/c.
~
38
Cp.especiallyRepublic,344a,
fF.
39
Cp.Laws,923b.
40
Republic,434a-c. (Cp.
alsotexttonote6andnote23
tothis
chapter,
andnotes
27(3)
and
31
to
chapter4.)
41
Republic,466b/c. Cp.
alsotheLaws,ji$b/c,
andmany
other
passages
against
theanti-holisticmisuseofclass
prerogatives. Seealsonote28tothis
chapter,andnote
25(4)
to
chapter7.
42
Fortheproblem
ofstatecontrolineducation,cp.
note
13
to
chapter7.
43
Cp.Aristotle,Politics,III,9,6fF.
(i28oa). Cp.Burke,
FrenchRevolu-
tion
(ed.1815 ;
vol.V,184;
the
passage
is
aptlyquotedbyJowett
inhis
notestothe
passage
ofAristotle's
;seehiseditionofAristotle's
Politics,
vol.
II,
126).
The
quotation
fromAristotlelaterinthe
paragraph
is
op.cit.,Ill,9,8,
(i28ob).
Field,
for
instance,proffers
asimilarcriticism
(in
hisPlatoandHisCon-
temporaries,117):
*
Thereisno
question
ofthe
cityanditslaws
exercisingany
educativeeffectonthemoralcharacterofitscitizen.'However,Greenhas
clearlyshown
(in
hisLecturesonPolitical
Obligation)
thatitis
impossible
forthe
statetoenforce
moralityby
law.Hewould
certainlyhaveagreedwiththe
formula :
*
Wewanttomoralize
politics,andnotto
politicize
morals.'
(See
endofthis
paragraph
inthe
text.)
Green'sviewisforeshadowedbySpinoza
(Tract.
Theol.
Pol.,chapter20)
:
*
Hewhoseeksto
regulateeverythingby
law
ismore
likely
to
encourage
vicethantosmotherit.'
44
Iconsiderthe
analogy
betweencivil
peaceandinternational
peace,
andbetween
ordinarycrimeandinternational crime,
asfundamental for
anyattempt
to
get
internationalcrimeundercontrol.Forthisanalogy
anditslimitationsaswellasforthe
poverty
ofthehistoricistmethodinsuch
problems,cp.note
7
to
chapter9.
45
The
quotation
isfromAristotle's
Politics,III,9,8,(1280).
(i)
I
say
inthetext'furthermore* becauseIbelievethatthe
passages
alludedtointhetext,
i.e.
Politics,III,9,6,and
III,9,12,are
likely
to
representLycophron's
viewsalso.My
reasonsfor
believing
thisarethe

CHAPTER6/NOTES46-48 223
following.
From
III,9,6,
to
III,9,12,
Aristotleis
engaged
inacriticismof
thedoctrineIhavecalledprotectionism.
InIII,9,8,quoted
inthetext,
he
directly
attributestoLycophron
aconciseand
perfectly
clearformulation
ofthisdoctrine.FromAristotle'sotherreferencestoLycophron (see(2)
in
this
note),
itis
probable
that
Lycophron'sage
wassuchthathemusthave
been,
ifnotthe
first,
atleastoneofthefirsttoformulate
protectionism. Thus
itseemsreasonabletoassume
(although
itisanythingbut
certain)
thatthe
wholeattackuponprotectionism,
i.e.
Ill,9,6,to
III,9,12,
isdirected
against
Lycophron,andthatthevariousbutindeed
fullyequivalent
formulationsare
allhis.
Aristotle's
objections
areallintendedtoshowthatthe
protectionisttheory
isunabletoaccountforthelocalaswellastheinternal
unity
ofthestate.
It
overlooks,heholds
(III,9,6),
thefactthatthestateexistsforthesakeof
thegood
lifeinwhichneitherslavesnorbeastscanhaveashare
(i.e.
forthe
good
lifeofthevirtuouslanded
proprietor,
foreverybodywhoearnsmoney
isby
his
*
banausic*
occupationprevented
from
citizenship).
Italsoover-
looksthetribal
unity
ofthe
*
true
*
statewhichis
(III,9,12)'acommunity
of
well-being
in
families,andan
aggregationof"families,
forthesakeofa
complete
andself-sufficient life . .establishedamongmenwholiveinthesame
place,
andwho
intermarry
'.
(2)For
Lycophron'sequalitarianism,
seenote
13
to
chapter5.Jowett
(in
Aristotle*j
Politics,II,126)
describesLycophron
as
"
anobscurerhetorician
'
;
butAristotlemusthavethoughtotherwise,
sinceinhisextant
writings
he
mentions
Lycophron
atleastsixtimes.
(InPol.,Rhet.,Fragm.,Atetaph.,
Phyr.,Soph.El.)
Itis
unlikely
thatLycophron
wasmuchyounger
than
Alcidamas,
his
colleague
in
Gorgias'school,sincehis
equalitarianism
would
hardlyhave
attractedsomuchattention ifithadbecomeknownafterAlcidamashad
succeeded
Gorgias
astheheadoftheschool.Lycophron'sepistemological
interests
(mentionedby
Aristotlein
Metaphysics,io45b9,and
Physics,i85b27)
arealsoacasein
point,
sincetheymakeit
probable
thathewasa
pupil
of
Gorgias'
earlier
period,
i.e.beforeGorgias
confinedhimself
practically
exclusively
torhetoric.Ofcourse,anyopinion
on
Lycophronmustbe
highly
speculative,owing
tothe
scanty
informationwehave.
46
Barker,GreekPolitical
Theory,I,p.
160.ConcerningBarker'sfurther
contention
(p.161)
thatPlato's
justice,
asopposed
tothatofthecontract
theory,
isnot
'
something
external
',butrather,internaltothesoul,
Imay
remindthereaderofPlato's
frequent
recommendations ofmostsevere
sanctionsbywhich
justicemaybeachieved
;healwaysrecommendstheuse
of
persuasionand
force
'
(cp.
notes
5,
10and18to
chapter8).Ontheother
hand,somemoderndemocratic stateshaveshownthatitis
possible
tobe
liberalandlenientwithout
increasingcriminality.
WithmyremarkthatBarkerseesinLycophron (as
I
do)
the
originator
ofthecontract
theory,cp.Barker,opcit.,p.63
:
'
Protagoras
didnot
anticipate
the
SophistLycophron
in
founding
thedoctrineofContract.'
(Cp.
withthis
thetexttonote
27
to
chapter5.)
47
Cp.Gorgias,483^
f.
48
Cp.Gorgias,4880,
ff.
Fromtheway
inwhichSocrates
replies
hereto
Callicles,
itseems
possible
thatthehistoricalSocrates
(cp.
note
56
tochapter10)may
havecounteredthe
arguments
in
support
ofa
biological
naturalismofPindar's
typebyarguing
likethis :Ifitisnaturalthatthe
strongershould
rule,thenitisalsonatural
that
equalityshould
rule,sincethemultitudewhichshowsits
strengthby
thefactthatitrulesdemands
equality.
Inotherwords,hemayhaveshown
the
empty,ambiguouscharacterofthenaturalisticdemand.Andhissuccess
mighthave
inspired
Platoto
proffer
hisownversionofnaturalism.

224 CHAPTER6/NOTES49-52
Idonotseeany
reasonwhy
Socrates'laterremark
(soSa)on
'
geometrical
equality
'
shouldbe
interpreted
as
anti-equalitarian,
i.e.why
itshouldmean
thesameasthe
*
proportionateequity
'
oftheLaws,744:0,ff.,and
757a-e
(cp.
note20
(i)
tothis
chapter).
ThisiswhatAdam
suggests
inhissecond
noteto
Republic,55805.The
*
geometrical
'
equality
ofthe
Gorgias,5o8a,
seems,however,toindicatePythagorean
influence
(cp.
note
56(6)
to
chapter
10
;
seealsotheremarksinthatnoteonthe
Cratylus).
49
Republic,3586.Glaucondisclaimsthe
authorship.
In
reading
this
passage,
thereader'sattention is
easily
distractedby
theissue
'
natureversus
convention%which
plays
a
major
roleinthis
passage
aswellasinGallicles'
speech
inthe
Gorgias.However,Plato'smajorconcerninthe
Republic
isnot
todefeatconventionalism,buttodenouncetherational
protectionistapproach
asselfish.(That
theconventionalist contract
theory
wasnotPlato'smain
enemyemerges
fromnotes
27-28
to
chapter5,and
text.)
60
Ifwecompare
Plato's
presentation
of
protectionism
inthe
Republic
withthatinthe
Gorgias,
thenwefindthatitisindeedthesame
theory,
although
inthe
Republicmuchless
emphasis
islaidon
equality.Buteven
equality
ismentioned,althoughonly
in
passing, viz.,in
Republic,359C
:
'
Nature . .
,by
conventionallaw,
istwistedroundand
compelledby
force
tohonour
equality.'
Thisremarkincreasesthe
similarity
withCallicles'
speech. (SeeGorgias,esp.483c/d.)
Butas
opposed
tothe
Gorgias,
Plato
dropsequality
atonce
(orrather,hedoesnoteventaketheissue
up)
andneverreturnstoit
;whichmakesit
only
themoreobviousthathewas
at
pains
toavoidthe
problem. Instead,Platorevelsinthe
description
ofthe
cynicalegoism
whichhe
presents
astheonly
sourcefromwhich
protectionism
springs. (For
Plato'ssilenceon
equalitarianism, cp.especially
note
14
to
this
chapter,
and
text.)
A.E.
Taylor,
Plato:TheManandHisWork
(1926),
p.268,contendsthatwhileCalliclesstartsfrom
*
nature
',Glauconstarts
from
'
convention '.
51
Cp.Republic,35Qa ;my
furtherallusionsinthetextareto
35Qb,36od,
ff.
Forthe
'
rubbing
in
',cp.359a~362c,andtheelaborationdownto
3676.
Plato's
description
ofthenihilistictendenciesof
protectionism
fills
altogether
nine
pages
intheEveryman
editionofthe
Republic ;anindicationofthe
significance
Platoattachedtoit.
(There
isa
parallelpassage
intheLaws,
Sgoa,f.)
52
WhenGlauconhasfinishedhis
presentation,
Adeimantus takeshis
place(with
a
veryinterestingandindeedmost
pertinentchallenge
toSocrates
tocriticize
utilitarianism), yet
notuntilSocrateshasstatedthathethinks
Glaucon's
presentation
anexcellentone
(362d).
Adeimantus'
speech
isan
amendmentofGlaucon's,anditreiteratestheclaimthatwhatIcall
protec-
tionismderivesfrom
Thrasymachus'
nihilism
(seeespecially3673,ff.)
After
Adeimantus,Socrateshimself
speaks,
fullofadmirationforGlauconaswell
asAdeimantus,becausetheirbeliefin
justice
isunshakenin
spite
ofthefact
that
theypresented
thecase
forinjustice
so
excellently,
i.e.thetheory
thatitisgood
toinflict
injustice
as
long
asonecan
'
getaway
withit'.Byemphasizing
theexcellenceofthe
argumentsprofferedbyGlauconandAdeimantus,
'
Socrates
'
(i.e.Plato)implies
thatthesearguments
areafair
presentation
oftheviewsdiscussed
;andhe
ultimately
stateshisown
theory,
notinorder
toshowthatGlaucon's
representation
needsemendation,but,ashe
emphasizes,
inordertoshow
that,contrary
tothe
opinions
ofthe
protectionists,justice
is
good,and
injustice
evil.
(It
shouldnotbe
forgotten cp.note49
tothis
chapter
thatPlato'sattack isnotdirected
against
thecontract
theory
as
suchbut
solelyagainstprotectionism ;
forthecontract
theory
issoon
(Rep.,
SGgb-c ;cp.
texttonote
29
tochapter5)adoptedby
Platohimself,atleast
partially ;including
the
theory
that
people
'
gather
intosettlements
'
because
'
everyone
expects
inthisway
tofurtherhisowninterests
'.)

CHAPTER
7/NOTES1-4 225
Itmustalsobementionedthatthe
passage
culminateswiththe
impressive
remarkof
*
Socrates
'
quoted
inthetexttonote
37
tothis
chapter.
This
shows,finally,
thatPlatocombats
protectionismonlybypresenting
itasan
immoralandindeed
unholy
formof
egoism.
Finally,
in
forming
ourjudgementonPlato's
procedure,wemustnot
forget
thatPlatolikesto
argueagainst
rhetoricand
sophistry ;andindeed,
thatheisthemanwhoby
hisattacksonthe
*
Sophists
'
createdthebad
associationsconnectedwiththatword. Ibelievethatwethereforehave
every
reasontocensorhimwhenhehimselfmakesuseofrhetoricand
sophistry
in
placeof
argument. (Cp.
alsonote10to
chapter8.)
63Wemay
takeAdamandBarkeras
representative
ofthePlatonists
mentionedhere.Adam
says(note
to
3586,ff.)
ofGlauconthatheresuscitates
Thrasymachus' theory,andhe
says(note
to
3733,ff.)
ofThrasymachus
that
hisis
'
thesame
theory
which isafterwards
(in3586, ff.)representedby
Glaucon '.Barker
says(op.cit.,159)
ofthe
theorywhichIcall
protectionism
andwhichhecalls
*
pragmatism ',that itis
c
inthesame
spirit
as
Thrasymachus
'.
64
Thatthe
greatscepticCarneadcsbelievedinPlato's
presentationcan
beseenfromCicero(DeRepublic^III,8
;13;23),whereGlaucon'sversion
is
presented,practically
without
alteration,
asthe
theoryadoptedbyGarneades.
(See
alsotexttonotes65and66andnote56
to
chapter10.)
Inthisconnection Imayexpressmyopinion,
thatonecanfinda
great
dealofcomfortinthefactthatanti-humanitarians have
always
found it
necessary
to
appeal
toourhumanitariansentiments
;andeveninthefact
that
they
oftensucceedin
persuading
usoftheir
sincerity.
Itshowsthat
they
arewellawareofthefactthatthesesentimentsare
deeply
rootedinmostof
us,andthatthe
despised
'
many
'
arerathertoo
good,
toocandid,andtoo
guileless,
thantoobad
;whilethey
areeven
ready
tobetoldby
their
unscrupulous
leadersthat
they
areunworthyegoists,andthat
'
they
filltheir
bellieslikethebeasts'.
NOTESTOCHAPTER 7
1
Cp.
texttonotes
2/3
to
chapter
6.
2
Similarideashavebeen
expressedbyJ.
S.Mill
;thushewritesinhis
Logic(isted.,pp.557f.)
:
'
Although
theactionsofrulersareby
nomeans
wholly
determinedby
theirselfishinterests,
itisas
securityagainst
those
selfishintereststhatconstitutionalchecksare
required.' Similarlyhewrites
inThe
SubjectionofWomen
(p.251
oftheEveryman
edition
;
italics
mine)
'
Whodoubtsthattheremay
be
greatgoodness,
and
greathappinessand
greataffection,undertheabsolute
government
ofagoodman?Mean-
whilelawsandinstitutions
require
tobe
adapted,
notto
goodmen,
buttobad.'Much
asI
agree
withthesentencein
italics,
I
disagree
withtheother
part
ofthis
quotation
:/doubt.My
reasonsfor
doubting
are
given
below.
3
Cp.
forinstanceE.
Meyer's
remark
(Gesch.
d.
Altertums,V,p.4)
that
poweris,
inits
veryessence,indivisible '.
4
Cp.Republic,56213-5656.
Inthe
text,
Iam
alludingespecially
to562C
:
*
Doesnottheexcess
'
(ofliberty)
'
bringmentosuchastatethattheybadly
wanta
tyranny
?
'
Cp.
furthermore563d/e
:
*
Andintheend,asyouknow
wellenough,theyjustdonottakeany
noticeofthe
laws,whetherwrittenor
unwritten,since
theywanttohaveno
despot
ofanykindoverthem.This
thenisthe
origin
outofwhichtyrannysprings.' (For
the
beginning
ofthis
passage,
seenote
19
tochapter4.)
OtherremarksofPlato'sonthe
paradoxes
offreedomandofdemocracy
are :
Republic,564%
:
*
Thentoomuchfreedomisliabletochange
intonothing

226 CHAPTER
7/NOTES5-6
elsebuttoomuch
slavery,
intheindividualaswellasinthestate . .Hence
itisreasonabletoassumethat
tyranny
isenthronedbynootherformof
govern-
mentthanbydemocracy. OutofwhatIbelieve isthe
greatestpossible
excessoffreedom
springswhatisthehardestandmost
savage
formof
slavery.'
Seealso
Republic,565C/d
:
*
Andarenotthecommon
people
inthehabit
ofmakingonemantheirchampion
or
partyleader,andof
exalting
his
position
andmakinghim
great
?
' '
Thisistheirhabit.'
*
Thenitseemsclearthat
whenevera
tyrannygrowsup,
thisdemocratic
party-leadership
isthe
origin
fromwhich it
springs.
5
Theso-called
paradoxoffreedom
isthewell-knownideathatfreedomin
thesenseofabsenceofanyrestrainingcontrolmustleadtoverygreatrestraint,
sinceitmakesthe
bully
freetoenslavethemeek.Thisidea
is,
ina
slightly
differentform,andwitha
very
different
tendency, clearlyexpressedby
Plato.
Lesswellknownisthe
paradoxof
tolerance :Unlimitedtolerancemustlead
tothe
disappearance
oftolerance. Ifweextendunlimitedtoleranceevento
thosewhoare
intolerant,
ifwearenot
prepared
todefendatolerant
society
against
the
onslaught
oftheintolerant,thenthetolerantwillbe
destroyed,
andtolerancewiththem.Inthisformulation,
Idonot
imply,
forinstance,
thatweshould
alwayssuppress
theutteranceofintolerant
philosophies ;
as
long
aswecancounterthem
by
rationalargumentand
keep
themincheck
bypublicopinion,suppressionwould
certainly
bemostunwise.Butwe
shouldclaimthe
rightevento
suppressthem,
foritmayeasily
turnoutthat
they
arenot
prepared
tomeetusonthelevelofrationalargument,butbegin
bydenouncing
all
argument ;theymay
forbidtheirfollowerstolistento
anything
as
deceptive
asrational
argument,andteachthemtoanswer
argumentsby
theuseoftheirfists.Weshouldthereforeclaim,
inthename
oftolerance,the
right
nottotoleratetheintolerant.Weshouldclaimthat
anymovement
preaching
intolerance
places
itselfoutsidethelaw,andwe
shouldconsiderincitementtointoleranceand
persecution
ascriminal,exactly
asweshouldconsiderincitementtomurder,orto
kidnapping ;oraswe
shouldconsiderincitementtotherevivaloftheslavetrade.Anotherofthe
lesswell-known
paradoxes
isthe
paradoxofdemocracy,
ormore
precisely,
of
majority
rule
;
i.e.the
possibility
thatthe
majoritymay
decidethata
tyrant
shouldrule.ThatPlato'scriticismofdemocracycanbe
interpreted
inthe
way
sketchedhere,andthatthe
principle
of
majority-rulemay
leadtoself-
contradictions,wasfirst
suggested,
asfarasIknow,by
LeonardNelson. I
donot
think,however,
thatNelson,who,
in
spite
ofhis
passionate
humani-
tarianismandhisardent
fight
forfreedom,adoptedmuchofPlato's
political
theory,
and
especially
Plato's
principle
of
leadership,wasawareofthefact
thatanalogousargumentscanberaised
againstanyofthedifferent
particular
formsofthe
theory
of
sovereignty.
Allthese
paradoxes
canbe
easilyavoidedifweframeour
politicaldemands
insomesuchmannerasthis.Wedemanda
government
thatrulesaccording
tothe
principlesof
equalitarianismand
protectionism ;thattolerates all
whoare
prepared
to
reciprocate,
i.e.whoaretolerant
;
thatiscontrolled
by,
andaccountable
to,the
public.Andwemayaddthatsomeformof
majority
vote,together
withinstitutionsfor
keeping
the
public
wellinformed,
isthe
best,
though
not
infallible,meansof
controllingsucha
government. (No
infallible
means
exist.)Cp.
also
chapter6,thelastfour
paragraphs
inthetext
prior
tonote
42;texttonote20to
chapter17;note
7(4),
to
chapter24;and
note6tothe
presentchapter.
6
Furtherremarksonthis
point
willbefoundin
chapter19,
below.
6
The
following
remarksonthe
paradoxoffreedommaypossiblyappear
to
carry
theargument
toofar
;since,however,thearguments
discussedinthis
place
areofasomewhatformalcharacter,
itmaybe
just
aswelltomakethem

CHAPTER
7/NOTES7~I2 227
more
watertight,
evenifitinvolvesabitof
hair-splitting. Besides,my
experience
indebatesofthiskindleadsmeto
expect
thatthedefendersof
the
leader-principle,
i.e.ofthe
sovereignty
ofthebestorthe
wisest,may
actually
offerthe
followingcounter-argument
:
(a)
if
'
thewisest
'
should
decidethatthemajority
shouldrule,thenhewasnot
reallywise.Asa
furtherconsiderationtheymaysupport
thisby
theassertion
(b)
thatawise
manwouldneverestablisha
principlewhichmight
leadto
contradictions,
likethatof
majority-rule.Myreply
to
(b)
wouldbethatweneed
only
to
alterthisdecisionofthe
'
wise
'
maninsuchaway
thatitbecomesfreefrom
contradictions.
(Forinstance,hecoulddecideinfavourofa
government
boundtoruleaccording
tothe
principle
of
equalitarianismand
protectionism,
andcontrolledbymajority
vote.Thisdecisionofthewisemanwould
give
up
the
sovereignty-principle ;andsinceitwould
therebybecomefreefrom
contradictions,
itmay
bemade
by
a
'
wise
'
man.Butof
course,
thiswould
notfreethe
principle
thatthewisestshouldrulefromits
contradictions.)
Theotherargument,namely(a),
isadifferentmatter. Itleads
dangerously
closeto
defining
the
'
wisdom
'
or
'
goodness
'
ofa
politician
insuchaway
thatheiscalled
*
wise
'
or
'
good
'
only
ifheisdeterminednotto
giveup
his
power.Andindeed,the
onlysovereignty-theory
which isfreefromcon-
tradictionswouldbethe
theory
whichdemandsthat
only
amanwhois
absolutely
determinedto
cling
tohispower
shouldrule.Thosewhobelieve
inthe
leader-principle
should
frankly
facethis
logicalconsequence
oftheir
creed. Iffreedfromcontradictions it
implies,nottheruleofthebestor
wisest,buttheruleofthe
strongrnaii,ofthemanof
power. (Cp.
alsonote
7
to
chapter24.)
7
Cp.passage(7)
innote4
to
chapter
'2.
8
Cp.Apology,32c.TheThirty
triedto
implicate
Socratesintheircrimes,
butheresisted. Thiswouldhavemeantdeathtohimiftheruleofthe
Thirty
hadcontinuedalittle
longer. Cp.
alsonotes
53and
56
to
chapter
10.
9
Cp.
Plato'sPhaedo
,96-99.
ThePhaedo
is,
I
believe,
still
partlySocratic,
but
verylargely
Platonic.The
story
ofhis
philosophicaldevelopment
told
by
theSocratesofthePhaedohas
given
risetomuchdiscussion. It
is,
Ibelieve,
anauthenticautobiography
neitherofSocratesnorofPlato. Itis
simply
Plato's
interpretation
ofSocrates'development.
Socrates'attitudetowards
science
(an
attitudewhichcombinedthekeenestinterestinrationalargument
withakindofmodest
agnosticism)
wasincomprehensible
toPlato.Hetried
to
explain
itbyreferring
tothebackwardnessofAthenianscienceinSocrates'
day,
as
opposed
to
Pythagoreanism.
Platothus
presents
this
agnostic
attitude
insuchaway
thatitisno
longerjustified
inthe
light
ofhis
newlyacquired
Pythagoreanism. (Andhetriestoshowhowmuchthenew
metaphysical
theoriesofthesoulwouldhave
appealed
toSocrates'burning
interestinthe
individual
;cp.
notes
44
and
56
to
chapter10,andnote
58
to
chapter8.)
10
Itistheversionthatinvolvesthe
square
rootoftwo,andthe
problem
of
irrationality ;
i.e.itistheveryproblem
that
precipitated
thedissolution
of
Pythagoreanism. Byrefuting
thePythagorean
arithmetizationof
geometry,
it
gave
risetothe
specificdeductive-geometrical
methodswhichweknow
fromEuclid.Theuseofthis
problem
intheMenomightbeconnectedwith
thefactthatthereisatendency
insome
parts
ofthis
dialogue
to
*
showoff
'
theauthor's(hardlySocrates')acquaintance
withthe
'
latest
'
philosophical
developments
andmethods.
11
Gorgias,52id,
f.
12
Cp.Grossman,
PlatoTo-Day,
118.
'
Facedby
thesethreecardinalerrors
ofAthenianDemocracy
..*How
truly
GrossmanunderstandsSocratesmay
beseenfrom
op.
cit.
993
:
'
Allthatis
good
inourWesternculturehas
sprung
fromthis
spirit,
whetheritisfoundin
scientists,or
priests,
or
politicians,
or
quiteordinarymenandwomenwhohaverefusedto
preferpolitical
falsehoods

228 CHAPTER
7/NOTES13-23
to
simple
truth . .intheend,
theirexample
isthe
only
forcewhichcanbreak
thedictatorship
offorceand
greed
. . .Socratesshowedthat
philosophy
is
nothing
elsethanconscientious
objection
to
prejudiceandunreason.'
18
Cp.Grossman, op.cit.,117
f.
(firstgroup
ofitalics
mine).
Itseems
thatGrossmanhasforthemoment
forgotten,
thatinPlato's
state,education
isaclassmonopoly.
Itistruethatinthe
Republic
the
possession
ofmoney
isnota
key
tohigher
education. Butthisis
quiteunimportant. The
importantpoint
isthat
only
themembersofthe
ruling
classareeducated.
(Cp.
note
33
to
chapter4.)Besides,
Platowasinhislaterlife
anything
but
anopponent
ofPlutocracy,whichhemuch
preferred
toaclasslessor
equali-
tarian
society
:
cp.
the
passage
fromtheLaws,744-bff.,quoted
innote20
(i)
to
chapter
6.Fortheproblem
ofstatecontrolineducation,cp.
alsonote
42
tothat
chapter,andnotes
39-41,chapter4.
14
Burnettakes
(GreekPhilosophy, I,
1
78)
the
Republic
tobe
purely
Socratic
(or
even
pre-Socratic)
.Buthedoesnoteven
seriouslyattempt
toreconcile
this
opinion
withan
important
statementwhichhe
quotesfromPlato's
SeventhLetter
(326a,cp.
Greek
Philosophy1,2
1
8)whichhebelievestobeauthentic.
Cp.
note
56(5,d)
to
chapter
10.
15
Laws,942b,quoted
intexttonote
33,chapter
6.
10
Republic,54oc.
17
Cp.
the
quotations
fromthe
Republic,473c-e,quoted
intexttonote
44,
chapter
8.
18
Republic,4g8b/c. Cp.
theLaws,634d/e,
inwhichPlato
praises
the
Dorianlawthat
'
forbidsanyyoungmanto
questionwhichofthelawsare
right
andwhichare
wrong,andmakesthemallunanimousin
proclaiming
thatthelawsarcall
good
'.Onlyanoldmanmaycriticize,addstheold
writer
;andevenhemay
doso
only
ifnoyoungmancanhearhim.See
alsonote21tothis
chapter,andnotes
40
and
23
to
chapter4.
19
Republic,497d.
20
Op.cit.,537c-54ob.
21
Op.cit.,539d.
Grote,thegreatdemocrat,commentsonthispoint(i.e.onthe
'
brighter
*
passages537c~54o)verystrongly
:
c
Thedictum
forbidding
dialecticdebate
withyouth
. .is
decidedly
anti-Socratic. . .It
belongs
indeedtothecaseof
Meletusand
Anytus,
intheirindictment
against
Socrates. . .Itisidentical
withtheirchargeagainsthim,of
corrupting
the
youth.
. . .Andwhenwe
findhim
(
=
Plato)forbidding
allsuchdiscourseatanearlier
agethan
thirty
yearsweremarkasa
singular
coincidencethatthisistheexact
prohibition
whichCritiasandCharicles
actuallyimposedupon
Socrates
himself,during
theshort-liveddominionofthe
ThirtyOligarchs
atAthens.'
(Grote,
Plato
andtheother
CompanionsofSocrates,ed.
1875,
vl-HI*2
39-)
22
Toynbee
hasadmirablyshownhow
successfully
aPlatonic
system
of
educating
rulersmaywork inanarrested
society ;cp.A
StudyofHistory,
III,especially33
ff.
;cp.
notes
32(3)
and
45(2)
to
chapter4.
Itmaybe
remarkedthattheidea,contestedinthe
text,thatthosewhoare
good
in
obeying
willalsobegood
incommanding,
isalsoPlatonic.
Cp.Laws,7626.
23
Somemayperhaps
askhowanindividualistcandemanddevotionto
anycause,and
especially
tosuchanabstractcauseasscientific
inquiry.But
sucha
question
would
only
revealtheoldmistake
(discussed
inthelast
chapter),
theidentificationofindividualismand
egoism.Anindividualist
canbeunselfish,andhecandevotehimselfnot
only
tothe
help
of
individuals,
butalsotothedevelopment
oftheinstitutionalmeansfor
helpingother
people. (Apart
from
that,
Idonotthinkthatdevotionshouldbedemanded,
butonly
thatitshouldbe
encouraged.)
Ibelievethatdevotiontocertain
institutions,
forinstance,tothoseofademocratic
state,andeventocertain
traditions,may
fallwellwithintherealmofindividualism,provided
thatthe

CHAPTER
7/NOTES24-25 22Q
humanitarianaimsoftheseinstitutionsarenotlost
sight
of.Individualism
mustnotbeidentifiedwithananti-institutional
personalism.
This isa
mistake
frequentlymadeby
individualists. They
are
right
intheir
hostility
to
collectivism,but
they
mistakeinstitutionsforcollectives
(which
claimtobe
aimsin
themselves),andthereforebecomeanti-institutional
personalists ;
whichleadsthem
dangerously
closetothe
leader-principle. (I
believethat
this
partlyexplains
Dickens'hostileattitudetowards
Parliament.) Formy
terminology ('
individualism
'
and
*
collectivism
')
seetexttonotes
26-29
to
chapter
6.
24
Cp.Samuel
Butler,Erewhon
(1872),p.135,
oftheEveryman's
edition.
25
Gp.
fortheseevents :Meyer,
Gesch.d.Altertums,V,pp.522-525,and
488
f.
;
seealsonote69
to
chapter
10.TheAcademy
wasnotoriousfor
breedingtyrants.Among
Plato's
pupils
wereGhairon,later
tyrant
ofPellene,
andHermias,later
tyrantofAtarneusandAssos.
(Cp.Athen.,XI,508.)
(1)
Plato'slackofsuccessasaneducatorisnot
verysurprising
ifwelook
atthe
principles
ofeducationandselection
developed
intheFirstBookofthe
Laws(from637dand
especially6433
:
'
Letmedefinethenatureandmeaning
ofeducation
'
totheendof
6sob).
Forinthis
longpassage
heshowsthat
thereisone
greatinstrumentof
educating,
orrather,of
selecting
themanone
cantrust. Itiswine,drunkenness,whichwillloosehis
tongue,
and
give
you
anideaofwhatheis
really
like.
'
Whatismore
fitting
thantomake
useofwine,
firstofalltotestthecharacterofaman,and
secondly,
totrain
him?Whatis
cheaper,
andless
objectionable
?
'
(649d/e)
.So
far,
Ihave
notseenthemethodof
drinking
discussedbyany
oftheeducationistswho
glorify
Plato.Thisis
strange,
forthemethodisstillinuse
;notsomuchin
thePlatonicsecondaryschools,but
surely
intheuniversities.
(2)
Infairnesstothe
leader-principle,
itmustbeadmitted,however,
thatothershavebeenmorefortunatethanPlatointheirselection. Leonard
Nelson
(cp.
note4
tothis
chapter),
forinstance,whobelievedinthis
principle,
seemstohavehada
uniquepowerbothof
attractingandof
selecting
anumber
ofmenandwomenwhohaveremainedinthemost
trying
and
tempting
circumstancestruetotheircause.ButtheirsisabettercausethanPlato's
;
itisthehumanitarian ideaoffreedomand
equalitarianjustice.
(3)Thereremains thisfundamental weakness inthetheory
ofthe
benevolentdictator,a
theory
still
flourishing
evenamong
somedemocrats.
Ihaveinmindthe
theory
ofthe
leadingpersonalitywhoseintentionsare
forthebestofhis
peopleandwhocanbetrusted.Evenifthat
theorywere
inorder
;evenifwebelievethatamancancontinue,withoutbeing
controlled
or
checked,
insuchanattitude :howcanweassumethathewilldetecta
successorofthesamerareexcellence?
(Cp.
alsonotes
3
and
4
to
chapter9,
andnote69
to
chapter10.)
(4)Concerning
the
problem
of
power,
mentionedinthetext,
itisinterest-
ing
to
compare
the
Gorgias(5256,f.)
withthe
Republic(6i5d,f.).Thetwo
passages
are
closelyparallel.
Butthe
Gorgias
insiststhatthe
greatest
criminals
are
always
'
menwhocomefromtheclasswhich
possessespower
'
;private
personsmaybebad,
itis
said,butnotincurable. Inthe
Republic,
thisclear
warningagainst
the
corrupting
influenceofpower
isomitted.Mostofthe
greatest
sinnersarestill
tyrants ;but,
itis
said,
'
therearealsosome
private
peopleamongthem'.
(In
the
Republic,
Platoreliesonself-interestwhich,
he
trusts,
will
prevent
the
guardians
frommisusing
theirpower ;cp.Rep.,
466b/c,quoted
intexttonote
41,chapter
6. Itisnot
quite
clearwhy
self-
interestshouldhavesuchabeneficialeffecton
guardians,
butnoton
tyrants.)

23O CHAPTER8/NOTESI-IO
NOTESTOCHAPTER8
1
Republic,4756;cp.
also
e.g.485^ f.,5010.
2
Op.cit.,sSgb,
f.
3
Op.cit.,38gc/d ;cp.also,Laws,7300,
ff.
4
Withthisandthethree
followingquotations,cp.Republic,4076and
4o6c.
Seealso
Politicus,293a, f.,2950-2966,
etc.
5
Cp.Laws,72oc.
Itis
interesting
tonotethatthe
passage(7i8c~722b)
servestointroducetheideathatthestatesmanshoulduse
persuasion,together
withforce
(7220) ;andsinceby
'
persuasion
'
ofthemasses,Platomeans
largelylyingpropaganda cp.
notes
9andiotothis
chapterandthe
quotation
from
Republic,4i4b/cquoted
thereinthetext itturnsoutthatPlato's
thought
inour
passage
fromtheLaws,
in
spite
ofthisnovel
gentleness,
isstill
possessed
by
theoldassociations the
doctor-politician administering
lies.Lateron
(Laws,857c/d),
Plato
complains
aboutan
oppositetype
ofdoctor :onewho
talkstoomuch
philosophy
tohis
patient,
insteadofconcentratingonthecure.
Itseems
likelyenough
thatPlato
reports
heresomeofhis
experiences
when
hefellillwhile
writing
theLaws.
8
Republic,389^Withthe
following
short
quotationscp.Republic,459C.
7
Cp.Kant,OnEternal
Peace,Appendix. (Werke,
ed.
Cassirer,1914,
vol.
VI,457.)Cp.Campbell's
translation
(1903),pp.
162ff.
8
Cp.Grossman, PlatoTo-Day(1937),130;cp.
alsothe
immediately
precedingpages.
ItseemsthatCrossman stillbelievesthat
lyingpropaganda
wasintended
only
forthe
consumption
ofthe
ruled,andthatPlatointended
toeducatetherulerstoafulluseoftheircriticalfaculties
;
forIfindnow
(in
The
Listener,
vol.
27,p.750)
thathewrites :
*
Platobelievedinfree
speech,
freediscussion
only
fortheselectfew.'Butthefactisthathedidnotbelieve
initatall.Bothinthe
RepublicandintheLaws
(cp.
the
passagesquoted
in
notes18-21to
chapter7,and
text),
he
expresses
hisfearlestanybodywhois
not
yet
senileshould
speakfreely,andthusendanger
the
rigidity
ofthearrested
doctrine,andthereforethe
petrifactionofthearrested
society.
Seealsothe
nexttwonotes.
9
Republic,4i4b/c.
In
4i4d,
Platoreaffirmshis
hope
of
persuading
'
the
rulersthemselvesandthe
militaryclass,andthentherestofthe
city',
ofthe
truthofhislie.Laterheseemstohave
regretted
hisfrankness
;
forinthe
Statesman,271a,f.,he
speaks
asifhebelievedinthetruthofthesameMyth
oftheEarthbornwhich,
inthe
Republic,
hehadbeenreluctant
(see
note 11
tothis
chapter)
to
proffer
evenasan
fc
inspired
lie'.
(What
Itranslateasan
'
inspired
'
or
'
ingenious
lie
'
is
usually
translated
'
noblelie
'
or
*
noble
falsehood
'
oreven
*
spirited
fiction
'.)
Secalsonotes10and18tothis
chapter.
10
Cp.Republic,5196,
f,
5quoted
inthetexttonote
35
to
chapter5;on
persuasion
and
force,
seealso
Republic,366d,
discussedinthe
presentnote,below,
andthe
passages
referredtoinnotes
5and18tothis
chapter.
TheGreekword
usually
translatedbypersuasion
canmean
(a)
'
persuasion
by
fairmeans
'
and
(b)
'
talking
over
by
foulmeans
'
;
i.e.
'
make-believe
'
(seebelow,sub.
(D),
i.e.
Rep.,4i4c)andsometimes itmeanseven
'
persuasion
bygifts',
i.e.
bribery(seebelow,sub.
(D),
i.e.
Rep.,39oe). Especially
inthe
phrase
'
persuasionandforce
',theterm
'
persuasion
'
isoften
interpreted
in
sense
(a),andthe
phrase
isoften
(and
sometimes
appropriately)
translated
*
by
fairorfoulmeans
'
(cp.
Davies'andVaughan's
translation
'
by
fairmeans
orfoul
',ofthe
passage(C),Rep.,sGsd,quotedbelow).
I
believe,however,
thatPlato,when
recommending
*
persuasionandforce
'
asinstrumentsof
politicaltechnique,
usesthewordsinamoreliteral
sense,andthatherecom-
mendstheuseofrhetorical
propagandatogetherwithviolence.
The
followingpassagesare
significant
forPlato'suseoftheterm
per-

CHAPTER8/NOTES11-15 231
suasioninsense
(b),and
especially
inconnectionwith
politicalpropaganda.
(A)Gorgias,453a
to
466a,especially454b~455a ;Phaedrus,aGob,ft.,Theaetetus,
201a
;Sophocles,222C
;Philebus,583.
Inallthese
passages,persuasion(the
'
artof
persuasion
'
as
opposed
tothe
'
artof
imparting
true
knowledge ')
isassociatedwithrhetoric,make-believe,and
propaganda.
Inthe
Republic,
364e~365d
deservesattention.
(B)
In
3646 ('theypersuade ',
i.e.mislead
into
believing,
'
notonlyindividuals,butwholecities
'),
thetermisusedmuch
inthesamesenseasin
4i4b/c(quoted
inthetexttonote
9,
this
chapter)
the
passage
ofthe
'
inspired
lie'.
(C)365d
is
interesting
becauseitusesaterm
which
Lindsay
translates
veryaptlyby
'
cheating
'
asakindof
paraphrase
for
'
persuading
'.
('In
ordernottobe
caught
. .wehavethemastersof
persuasion
atour
disposal ;
. .thusbypersuasionand
force,weshall
escape
punishment. But,
itmaybe
objected,
onecannot
cheat,or
force,
the
gods
.
.')
Furthermore
(D)
in
Republic,3906,f.,theterm
'
persuasion
'
isusedinthe
senseof
bribery. (Thismustbeanolduse
;the
passage
is
supposed
tobea
quotationfromHesiod. Itis
interesting
thatPlatowhosooften
argues
against
theideathatmencan
'
persuade
'
orbribethe
gods,
makessomecon-
cessiontoitinthenext
passage,399a/b.)
Nextwecometo
4i4b/c,
the
passage
ofthe
'
inspired
lie
'
;immediately
afterthis
passage,
in4
1
40(rp.
also
thenextnoteinthis
chapter),
'
Socrates
'
makesthe
cynical
remark
(E)
:
'
Itwouldneedmuch
persuading
tomake
anybody
believeinthis
story
'.
Lastly,
Imaymention
(F)Republic,51idand
533e,wherePlato
speaks
of
persuasion
orbelieforfaith
(the
rootoftheGreekwordfor
'
persuasion
'
is
thesameasthatofour faith
')
asalower
cognitivefaculty
ofthesoul,
corresponding
totheformationof
delusive)opinion
about
things
influx
(cp.
note21to
chapter3,and
especiallytheuseof
persuasion
'
inTim.,5ie),
as
opposed
torationalknowledge
ofthe
unchanging
Forms.Forthe
problem
of
'
moral
'
persuasion,
seealso
chapter6,especially
notes52/54and
text,
and
chapter10,especially
texttonotes
56and
65,andnote
69.
11
Republic,4i5a.Thenext
quotation
isfrom
4I5C. (See
alsothe
Cratylus,398a.)Gp.
notes
12-14
tothe
presentchapterand
text,andnotes
2
7(s)
2
9>and
31
to
chapter4.
Formyremarkinthetext,
earlierinthis
paragraph,concerning
Plato's
uneasiness,cp.Republic,4i4c-d,andlastnote,(E)
:
'
Itwouldneedmuch
persuading
tomakeanybody
believeinthis
story,'says
Socrates.
*
Youseem
toberatherreluctanttotell
it,'replies
Glaucon
*
Youwillunderstandmy
reluctance
',saysSocrates,
'
whenIhavetoldit.'
'
Speakanddon'tbe
frightened ',saysGlaucon. This
dialogue
introduceswhatIcallthe
first
idea
of
theMyth(profferedby
PlatointheStatesmanasatrue
story ;cp.
note
9
to
this
chapter ;seealsoLaws,74oa)
.Asmentionedinthe
text,Platoindicates
thatitisthis
*
firstidea
'
whichisthereasonforhishesitation,forGlaucon
replies
tothisidea :
'
Notwithoutreasonwere
you
solongashamedtotell
your
lie.'NosimilarrhetoricalremarkismadeafterSocrateshastold
'
the
restofthe
story',i.e.,theMyth
ofRacialism.
12
The
passage
isfromthe
Republic,546a,
ff.
;cp.
texttonotes36-40
to
chapter5.Theintermixtureofclassesis
clearlyforbiddenin
435C
also
;
cp.
notes27(3)and
31
to
chapter4,andnote40
to
chapter6^
13
Republic,547a. (Cp.
alsotexttonote
39/40
to
chapter5,andtonotes
43
and
52
tothe
presentchapter.)
14
Op.cit.,4i5c.
15
Cp.Adam'snoteto
Republic,4i4b,ff.,
italicsmine.The
greatexception
isGrote
(Plato,
andtheOther
CompanionsofSocrates,London,1875,III,240),
whosums
up
the
spirit
ofthe
Republic,andits
opposition
tothatofthe
Apology
:
6
Inthe . .
Apology,wefindSocrates
confessing
hisown
ignorance.
. .But
theRepublicpresents
himinanewcharacter. . .Heishimselfonthe
throneof
KingNomos :theinfallible
authprity,temporal
aswellas
spiritual^

232
CHAPTER8/NOTES16-23
fromwhichall
public
sentimentemanates,andbywhomorthodoxy
is
determined. . .Henow
expectsevery
individualtofallintothe
place,and
contractthe
opinions,prescribedbyauthority ;includingamong
these
opinions
deliberateethicaland
politicalfictions,
suchasaboutthe . .earthbornmen. . .
NeithertheSocratesoftheApology,
norhisnegativeDialectic,couldbe
allowedtoexistinthePlatonic
Republic.' (Italicsmine
;seealsoGrote,
op.cit.,p.
1
88.)
Thedoctrinethat
religion
is
opiumfor
the
people,although
notinthis
particular
formulation,turnsouttobeoneofthetenentsofPlatoandthePlatonists.
(Cp.
alsonote
17andtext,and
especially
note18tothis
chapter.)
It
is,
apparently,
oneofthemoreesotericdoctrinesofthe
school,
i.e.itmay
be
discussedonlybysufficientlyelderlymembers
(cp.
note18to
chapter7)
of
theupper
class.Butthosewholetthecatoutofthe
bag
are
prosecuted
for
atheismby
theidealists.
16
ForinstanceAdam,Barker,Field.
17
Gp.Diels,
Vorsokratiker
2
,Gritiasfragm.25. (Ihave
pickedjust
four
characteristic linesoutofmorethan
forty.)
Itmayberemarkedthatthe
passage
commenceswithasketchofthesocialcontract
(which
evensome-
whatresembles
Lycophron's equalitarianism ;cp.
note
45
to
chapter6).
OnGritias,cp.especially
note
48
to
chapter
10.
18
Cp.
theLaws,goge.
Gritias'viewseemstohavebeen
part
ofthe
Platonicschooltradition,asindicatedby
the
followingpassage
fromAristotle's
Metaphysics(io74b3)
whichatthesametime
providesanother
example
of
theuseoftheterm
'
persuasion
'
for
'
propaganda
'
(cp.
notes
5and10to
this
chapter)
.
*
Therest . .hasbeenaddedintheformofamyth,witha
viewtothe
persuasion
ofthemob,andto
legaland
general(political)
expediency
..'
Cp.
alsoPlato's
attempt
inthe
Politicus,2713, ,to
argue
infavourofthetruthofamyth
inwhichhe
certainlydidnotbelieve.
(See
notes9
and
15
tothis
chapter.)
19
Laws,go8b.
20
Op.cit.,goga.
21
Fortheconflictbetweengoodandevil,see
op.cit.,go/j-goG.
See
especiallygo6a/b(justice
versus
injustice). Immediatelypreceding
is
go3c,
a
passagequoted
aboveinthetexttonote35
to
chapter5andtonote
27
to
chapter
6.Seealsonote
32
tothe
presentchapter.
22
Op.cit.,go5d-go7b.
23
Theparagraph
towhichthisnoteisappended
indicatesmyadherence
toan
c
absolutist
'
theory
oftruthwhichisinaccordancewiththecommon
ideathatastatementistrue
if(andonlyif)
it
agrees
withthe
facts
itdescribes.
This
'
absolute
'
or
*
correspondence theory
oftruth
'
(whichgoesbackto
Aristotle)
wasfirst
clearlydevelopedby
A.Tarski
(DerWahrheitsbegriff
inden
formalisierten Sprachen,
Polished.
ig33,Germantranslation
ig36),
andisthe
basisofatheory
of
logic
calledby
himSemantics
(cp.
note
2g
to
chapter3
andnote5(2)
tochapter5);seealsoR.
Carnap's
Introduction to
Semantics,
ig42,
which
develops
the
theory
oftruthindetail. Iam
quotingfromp28 :
*
Itis
especially
tobenoticedthatthe
concept
oftruthinthesense
justexplained
wemay
callitthesemantical
concept
oftruth is
fundamentally
different
fromconcepts
like
"
believed
",
"
verified",
"
highlyconfirmed",
etc.'
Asimilar,thoughundevelopedviewcanbefoundinmyLogik
der
Forschung,
ch.
84,
on
'
Truth
'
and
c
Confirmation
'
(pp.203ff.);
thiswaswrittenbefore
Ibecame
acquainted
withTarski'sSemantics,whichisthereasonwhymy
theory
is
onlyrudimentary. The
pragmatisttheory
oftruth
(which
derives
from
Hegelianism)
wascriticizedbyBertrandRussellfromthe
point
ofview
ofanabsolutist
theory
oftruthas
early
as
igo7 ;and
recently
hehasshown
theconnectionbetweenarelativist
theoryoftruthandthecreedoffascism,.
SeeRussell,
Letthe
PeopleThink,pp.77,79.

CHAPTER8/NOTES24-32 233
24
Imean
especially Republic,4740-502(1.The
followingquotation
is
op.cit.,4756.
25
Fortheseven
quotations
which
follow,
inthis
paragraph,
see :
(i)and
(2),Republic,4760 ;(3),(4),(5),op.cit.,5ood~e ;(6)and
(7)
:
op.cit.,
5Oia/b ;with
(7),cp.
alsothe
parallelpassageop.cit.,4840. Sec,furthermore,
Sophist,253d/e ;Laws,964a~966a (esp.9650/0).
26
Gp.op.cit.,50
ic.
27
Cp.especiallyRepublic,5oga,
f.See5090
:
'
Thesuninducesthe
sensible
things
to
generate
'
(although
heisnothimselfinvolvedinthe
process
of
generation) ;similarly,
e
youmaysay
ofthe
objects
ofrational
knowledge
thatnot
onlydotheyoweittotheGoodthattheycanbeknown,buttheir
realityandeventheiressenceflowsfromit
;although
the
good
isnotitself
anessencebuttranscendsevenessencesin
dignity
and
power.' (With^ogb,
cp.Aristotle,DeGen.etCon.,336a15,31,and
Phys.,ig4b13.)In
5iob,
theGoodisdescribedastheabsolute
origin(notmerelypostulated
or
assumed),
andin
51ib,
itisdescribedas'thefirst
origin
of
everything
'.
28
Cp.especiallyRepublic,5o8b,ff.See5o8b/c
:
*
WhattheGoodhas
begotten
initsownlikeness
'
(viz.truth)
'
inthe
link,
inthe
intelligibleworld
betweenreasonandits
objects
'
(i.e.
the
Ideas)
'
inthesamewayas,
inthe
visibleworld,that
thing
'
(viz.lightwhichisthe
offspring
ofthe
sun)
'
which
isthelinkbetween
sightandits
objects
'
(i.e.
sensible
things).
29
Cp.op.cit.,505a ;534^
ff.
30
Cp.op.cit.,505d.
31
Philebus,66a.
32
Republic,5o6d,
fF.
,and
509-511.
ThedefinitionoftheGood,here
quoted,
as
*
theclassofthedeterminate
(orfinite,or
limited)
conceivedasa
unity
'
is,
Ibelieve,notsohardto
understand,andisinfullagreementwithotherofPlato'sremarks.The
'
classofthedeterminate
*
istheclassoftheFormsorIdeas,conceivedasmale
principles,
or
progenitors,
asopposed
tothefemale,unlimitedorindeterminate
space(cp.
note
15(2)
to
chapter3).
TheseFormsor
primogenitors are,of
course,good,
insofaras
they
areancientandunchangingoriginals,
andin
sofaraseachofthemisoneas
opposed
tothemany
sensible
thingswhichit
generates.
Ifweconceivetheclassorraceofthe
progenitors
asmany,
then
they
arenot
absolutelygood ;thustheabsoluteGoodcanbevisualizedifwe
conceivethemasa
unity,
asOne astheOne
primogenitor. (Cp.
also
Arist,Met.,988a10.)
Plato'sIdeaoftheGoodis
practicallyempty.
It
gives
usnoindication
ofwhatis
good,
inamoral
sense,
i.e.whatweought
todo.Ascanbeseen
especiallyfromnotes27and28tothis
chapter,
allwehearisthattheGood
is
highest
intherealmofFormor
Ideas,akindof
super-Idea,
fromwhich
theIdeas
originate,andreceivetheirexistence. Allwecould
possibly
derive
fromthisisthattheGoodis
unchangeableand
prior
orprimary
andtherefore
ancient
(cp.
note
15(2)
to
chapter3),andOneWhole
;and,therefore,that
those
thingsparticipate
initwhichdonot
change, i.e.,thegood
iswhat
preserves(cp.
notes2and
3
to
chapter4),andwhatisancient,especially
theancientlaws
(cp.
note23
to
chapter4,
note
7,paragraphonPlatonism,
to
chapter5,andnote18to
chapter7),andthatholismis
good(cp.
note21
tothe
presentchapter) ;i.e.,weareagain
thrownback,in
practice,
to
totalitarian
morality(cp.
texttonotes
40/41
to
chapter6).
IftheSeventhLetteris
genuine,
thenwehavethere
(3i4b/c)
another
statementby
PlatothathisdoctrineoftheGoodcannotbeformulated
;
for
he
says
ofthisdoctrine :
'
Itisnot
capable
of
expression
likeotherbranches
of
study.' (Cp.
alsonote
57
to
chapter10.)
Itis
againGrotewho
clearlysawandcriticizedthe
emptiness
ofthe
PlatonicIdeaorFormofGood. After
askingwhatthisGood
is,he
says

234
CHAPTER8/NOTES33-40
(Plato,III,241f.)
:
'
This
question
is
put
. .But
unfortunately
itremains
unanswered. . .In
describing
theconditionofothermen'sminds that
they
divineaRealGood . .do
everything
inordertoobtain
it,but
puzzle
themselvesinvainto
graspanddeterminewhatitishe
'
(Plato)
'
has
unconsciously
describedtheconditionofhisown.' Itis
amazing
toseehow
fewmodernwritershavetakenany
noticeofGrote'sexcellentcriticismof
Plato.
33
Forthenext
quotationscompare
:
(i)
:
Republic,5Oob-c ;(2)
:
op.
cit.,485a/b.
This
passage
isveryinteresting.
It
is,asAdamreaffirms
(note
to
485bg)
thefirst
passage
inwhich
'
generation
'
and
'
degeneration
'
areemployed
inthishalf-technical sense. Itreferstothe
flux,andto
Parmenides' changeless
entities.Anditintroducesthemainargument
in
favouroftheruleofthe
philosophers.
Seealsonote26
(i)
to
chapter3
andnote2
(2)
to
chapter4.
IntheLaws
68gc-d,when
discussing
the
'
degeneration
'
(688c)
oftheDorian
kingdombroughtaboutby
the
'
worst
ignorance
'
(theignorance,namely,ofnot
knowinghowtoobey
thosewho
arcrulersby
nature
;
see
68gb),
Platoexplainswhathemeansbywisdom :
only
suchwisdomasaimsatthe
greatestunity
or
*
unisonity
'
entitlesaman
to
authority.Andtheterm
'
unisonity'
is
explained
inthe
Republic,59
ib
and
d,
astheharmonyoftheideasof
justice(i.e.
of
keeping
one's
place)
and
oftemperance (ofbeing
satisfiedwith
it).Thusweareagainthrownback
toour
startingpoint.
34
Forthe
problem
ofthe
priestcaste,secthe
Timaeus,24a.
Ina
passage
which
clearly
alludestothebestor
*
ancient
'
stateofthe
Republic,
the
priest
castetakesthe
placeofthe
'
philosophic
rare
'
ofthe
Republic. (Gp.,however,
theattackson
priests,andevenonEgyptianpriests,
intheearlierStatesman,
2god,f.)
TheremarkofAdam's,quoted
inthetextinthe
paragraph
afterthe
next,
isfromhisnoteto
Republic,547a3(quotedaboveintexttonote
43
to
chapter5).
35
Gp.
forinstance
Republic,484^5000,
ff.
38
Republic,535a/b.
AllthatAdam
says(cp.
hisnoteto
535b8)
aboutthe
termwhichIhavetranslatedby
'
awe-inspiring
'
supports
theusualview
thatthetermmeans
'
grim
'
or
'
awful
',especially
inthesenseof
'
inspiring
terror'.Adam's
suggestion
thatwetranslate
*
masculine
'
or
*
virile
'
follows
the
generaltendency
totonedownwhatPlato
says.Lindsay
translates :
*
of . .
sturdy
morals
J
.
37
Op.cit.,54oc.
Itismost
interesting
tonotehowPlatotransformsthe
ParmenidianOnewhen
arguing
infavourofanaristocratic
hierarchy.The
opposition
onemany
isnot
preserved,but
gives
risetoasystemofgrades
:
theoneIdeathefewwhocomeclosetoitthemorewhoaretheir
helpers
themany,
i.e.themob
(this
division isfundamental inthe
Statesman). As
opposed
to
this,
Antisthenes'monotheism
preserves
the
original
Eleatic
opposition
betweentheOne
(God)
andtheMany(whom
he
probably
consideredasbrotherssince
equal
intheirdistancefrom
God).
Antisthenes
wasinfluencedby
Parmenides
through
Zeno'sinfluenceuponGorgias.
Probably
therewasalsotheinfluenceofDemocritus,whohad
taught
:
'
The
wiseman
belongs
toallcountries
alike,
forthehomeofa
great
soulisthe
wholeworld.'
38
Republic,sood.
89
The
quotations
arefrom
Republic,459b,andff.
;Cp.
alsonote
34
to
chapter4.Cp.
alsothethreesimilesofthe
Statesman,wheretheruleris
compared
with
(i)
the
shepherd,(2)
thedoctor,(3)
theweaverwhosefunctions
are
explained
asthoseofamanwhoblendscharactersby
skilfulbreeding
(3iob,f.)
40
Op.cit.,4603.MystatementthatPlatoconsidersthisla,w
veryimportant

CHAPTER8/NOTES41-47 235
isbasedonthefactthatPlatomentions itintheoutlineofthe
Republic
inthe
Timaeus,i8d/e.
41
Op.
cit.
y4600.The
suggestion
is
'
soontakenup',
viz.in
4680,cp.
the
nextnote.
42
Op.cit.,4680.
48
Forthe
story
oftheNumberandthe
Fall,cp.
notes 1
3and
52
tothis
chapter,
notes
39/40
to
chapter5,
andtext.
44
Republic,4730-6.Concerning
thetermwhichIhavetranslatedby
'
oligarchs
*
cp.
theendofnote
57,
below. Itis
equivalent
to
*
hereditary
aristocrats '.
Thephrasewhich,for
stylisticreasons,Ihave
put
inbrackets,
is
important,
forinitPlatodemandsthe
suppressionof
all
'
pure
'
philosophers(andunphilosophical
politicians).Amoreliteraltranslationofthe
phrasewouldbethis :
'
while
themany
'
(whohave)
'
natures
'
(disposed
or
gifted)
*
for
driftingalong,
nowadays,
inonealoneofthesetwo,
areeliminated
byforce
'.Adamadmits
thatthemeaningofPlato's
phrase
is
'
thatPlatorefusestosanctiontheexclusive
pursuit
of
knowledge
'
;buthis
suggestion
thatwesoftenthemeaning
of
thelastwordsofthe
phrasebytranslating
:
'
are
forcibly
debarredfrom
exclusivelypursuing
either
'
(italics
his
;cp.
noteto
473d24,
vol.
I,330
ofhis
ed.ofthe
Republic)
hasnofoundationinthe
original, only
inhistendency
toidealizePlato.Thesameholdsfor
Lindsay's
translation
('
are
forcibly
debarredfromthis
behaviour').WhomdoesPlatowishto
suppress?
I
believethat
'
themany
'
whoselimitedor
incomplete
talentsor
*
natures
'
Platocondemns
here,areidentical
(as
faras
philosophers
are
concerned)
withthe
'
manywhosenaturesare
incomplete ',mentionedin
Republic,495d ;
andalsowiththe
*
many
'
(philosophers)
'
whosewickedness isinevitable
',
mentionedin
4896(cp.
also
49067491a);cp.
notes
47,56,
and
59
tothis
chapter(andnote23
to
chapter5).Theattack
is,therefore,directedonthe
onehand
against
the
*
uneducated
'
democratic
politicians,ontheother
handmost
probablymainlyagainstAntisthcnes,the
4
uneducatedbastard
',
the
equalitarianphilosopher.
45
Kant,OnEternalPeace,SecondSupplement(Werke,
ed.Cassirer,1914,
vol.VI,456).
Italicsmine
;
IhavealsosomewhatabbreviatedKant's
lengthyperiod ;cp.Campbell's
translation
(1903),
160.
46
Cp.
forinstanceGomperz,
Greek
Thinkers,V,12,2(Germaned.,
vol.II
2
,382) ;
or
Lindsay's
translationofthe
Republic.
47
ItmustbeadmittedthatPlato'sattitudetowardsAntisthenes raisesa
highlyspeculativeproblem ;
thisisofcourseconnectedwiththefactthat
very
littleisknownaboutAntisthenesfromfirst-ratesources.Eventheold
Stoictraditionthatthe
Cynic
schoolormovementcanbetracedbackto
Antisthenes isat
present
often
questioned (cp.,
for
instance,G.C.Field's
Plato,1930,
orD.R.
Dudley,A
HistoryofCynicism,1937)althoughperhaps
noton
quite
sufficientgrounds(cp.
Fritz'sreviewofthelast-mentionedbook
inMind,vol.
47,p.390).
Inviewofwhatweknow,especially
from
Aristotle,
aboutAntisthenes,
it
appears
tome
highlyprobable
thattherearemany
allusionstohiminPlato's
writings ;andeventheonefactthatAntisthenes
was,apart
fromPlato,the
onlymemberofSocrates'innercirclewhotaught
philosophy
atAthens,wouldbeasufficient
justification
for
searching
Plato's
workforsuchallusions.Nowitseemstomerather
probable
thataseriesof
attacksinPlato'sworkfirst
pointed
out
byDuemmler
(especiallyRep.495d/e
mentionedbelowinnote56
tothis
chapter ;Rep.,535e, f.,Soph.,25ib)
represents
theseallusions.Thereisadefiniteresemblance
(or
soatleastit
appears
to
me)
betweenthese
passages
andAristotle'sscornfulattackson
Antisthenes.
Aristotle,whomentionsAntisthenes'name,speaks
ofhimasof
a
simpleton,andhe
speaks
of
'
uneducated
peoplesuchastheAntistheneans
'
(cp.
note
54
to
chaptern). Plato,
inthe
passagesmentioned,speaks
ina

236 CHAPTER8/NOTE48
similarway,butrathermore
sharply.
Ihaveinmind,
firstthe
passage
from
the
Sophist,25ib,which
correspondsveryclosely
indeedtoAristotle's first
passage.Regarding
thetwo
passagesfromthe
Republic,wemustremember
that,according
tothe
tradition,Antistheneswasa
'
bastard
'
(hismother
camefrombarbarianThrace),andthathetaught
intheAtheniangymnasium
reservedfor
*
bastards *.Nowwe
find,
in
Republic,5356,
f.
(cp.endofnote
52
tothis
chapter)anattackwhichisso
specific
thatanindividual
person
mustbeintended. Plato
speaks
ofsomebody
witha
*
crippled
soul
"
who,
thoughhelovestruth
(as
aSocraticwould)doesnotattain
it,sincehe
'
wallows
in
ignorance
'
(probably
becausehedoesnot
accept
the
theory
of
Forms) ;
andhewarnsthe
city
nottotrustsuch
'
cripplesandbastards '.Ithink
it
likely
thatAntisthenes isthe
object
ofthis
undoubtedlypersonal
attack
;
the
recognition
thattheenemy
hatesliesseemstomean
especiallystrong
argument,occurring
asitdoesinanattackofextremeviolence. Butifthis
passage
referstoAntisthenes,thenitisverylikely
thatavery
similar
passage
referstohim
also,
viz.
Republic,495d/e,
wherePlato
again
describeshisvictim
as
possessing
a
disfigured
or
crippled
soulaswellas
body.Heinsistsinthis
passage
thatthe
object
ofhis
contempt,
in
spite
of
aspiring
tobea
philosopher,
isso
depraved
thatheisnotevenashamedof
doingdegrading ('
banausic
'
;
cp.note4
to
chapter
11
)manuallabour.NowweknowofAntisthenesthat
herecommendedmanuallabourwhichheheldin
high
esteem
(for
Socrates'
attitude,cp.Xenophon,Mem.,II,7,10),andthathe
practisedwhathe
taught ;afurther
strongargument
thatthemanwiththe
crippled
soulis
Antisthenes.
Nowinthesame
passage,Republic,495d,
thereisalsoaremarkabout
*
themany
whosenaturesare
incomplete ',andwhonevertheless
aspire
to
philosophy.
Thisseemstorefertothesamegroup(the
*
Antistheneans
'
of
Aristotle)
of
'
many
natures
'
whose
suppression
isdemandedin
Republic,
473c-e,
discussedinnote
44
tothis
chapter. Cp.
also
Republic4890,
mentioned
innotes
59and
56
tothis
chapter.
48Weknow(fromCicero,DeNaturaDeorum,andPhilodemus,De
Pietate)
thatAntistheneswasamonotheist
;andtheforminwhichhe
expressed
his
monotheism
(there
is
onlyOneGod
*
according
tonature
',i.e.,
totruth,
although
therearemany
'
according
toconvention
')
showsthathehadin
mindthe
opposition
nature conventionwhich,
inthemindofaformermember
oftheschoolof
Gorgiasand
contemporary
ofAlcidamasandLycophron
(cp.
note
13
to
chapter5)musthavebeenconnectedwith
equalitarianism.
Thisinitselfdoesnotofcourseestablishtheconclusionthatthehalf-
barbarianAntisthenesbelievedinthebrotherhoodofGreeksandbarbarians.
Yetitseemstome
extremelylikely
thathedid.
AsW.W.Tarn
(Alexander
theGreatandthe
UnityofMankind
;cp.
note13
(2)
to
chapter5)
hasshown,theideaofthe
unity
ofmankindcan
probably
betracedbackatleasttoAlexandertheGreat. Ithinkthatby
a
very
similar
lineof
reasoning,wecantraceitfartherback
;to
Diogenes,Antisthenes,and
possibly
toSocratesandthe
'
GreatGeneration
'
ofthePericleanage(cp.
note
27
to
chapter10,and
text).
Thisseems,evenwithout
considering
the
moredetailedevidence, likelyenough ;fora
cosmopolitan
ideacanbe
expected
tooccurasa
corollary
ofsuch
imperialist
tendenciesasthoseofthe
Periclean
age(cp.Rep.,494c/d,mentionedinnote
50(5)
tothis
chapter,
andtheFirst
Alcibiades,1050,
if.
;seealsotexttonotes
9-22,36and47
to
chapter10).
Thisis
especiallylikely
ifother
equalitarian
tendencies exist.
Idonotintendtobelittlethe
significance
ofAlexander'sdeeds,buthisideas
seemtome,
ina
way,
arenaissanceofsomeofthebestideasof
fifth-century
Athenian
imperialism.
Proceedingnowto
details,
Imay
firstsay
thatthereis
strongevidence
thatatleastinPlato's
(andAristotle's)time,
the
problem
of
equalitarianism

CHAPTER8/NOTES49-50 237
was
clearly
seentobeconcernedwithtwo
fullyanalogousdistinctions,that
betweenGreeksandbarbariansontheonesideandthatbetweenmasters
(or
freemen)andslavesontheother
;cp,
withthisnote 1
3
to
chapter5.Nowwe
have
verystrong
evidencethatthe
fifth-centuryAthenianmovement
against
slaverywasnotconfinedtoafewintellectualists like
Euripides,Antiphon,
Hippias,etc.,butthatithadconsiderable
practical
success. Thisevidence
iscontainedintheunanimous
reports
oftheenemiesofAthenian
democracy
(esp.
the'OldOligarch', Plato,Aristotle; cp.
notes
17,
18and
29
to
chapter4,and
36
to
chapter10).
Ifwenowconsiderthe
scanty
availableevidence
concerningcosmopolitism,
it
appears,
I
believe,
inadifferent
light.ThustheOldOligarch(2,7)
attacks
Athensforaneclective
cosmopolitanway
oflife.Plato'sattackson
cosmopolitan
orsimilartendencies,scanty
as
theyare,are
especially
valuable.
(Ihave
inmind
passages
like
Rep.,5626/5633,whichshouldbecompared
with
theironical
description
in
Menexenus,245c-d,
inwhichPlato
sarcastically
eulogizesAthensforitsconsistenthatredofbarbarians
;Rep.,494c/d ;of
course,the
passageRep.,4690-47ic,mustbeconsidered inthiscontext
too.)MuchasIadmireTarn's
analysis,
Idonotthinkthathedoesfull
justice
tothevariousextantstatementsofthis
fifth-centurymovement,
for
instancetoAntiphon(cp.p.149,
note6ofhis
paper)
or
Euripides
or
Hippias,
orDemocritus
(cp.
note
29
to
chapter10)
orto
Diogenes(p.150,
note
12)
andAntisthenes. Idonotthinkthat
Antiphon
wanted
only
tostressthe
biologicalkinship
betweenmen,
forhewasundoubtedly
asocialreformer
;
and
'
bynature
'
meanttohim
*
intruth'.Itthereforeseemstome
practically
certainthatheattackedthedistinctionbetweenGreeksandbarbariansas
being
fictitious.Tarncommentson
Euripides'fragment
whichstatesthata
noblemancan
range
theworldlikean
eagle
theairbyremarking
that
'
he
knewthatan
eagle
hasa
permanent
home-rock
'
;butthisremarkdoesnot
dofull
justice
tothe
fragment ;forinordertobea
cosmopolitan,oneneed
not
giveup
one'spermanenthome.Inthe
lightofall
this,
Idonotseewhy
Diogenes'meaningwas
purely
*
negative
'
whenhe
replied
tothe
question
*
whereareyoufrom?
'
bysaying
thathewasa
cosmopolitan,
acitizenofthe
wholeworld.
Antisthenes'monotheism alsomustbeconsidered inthe
light
ofthis
evidence.Thereisnodoubtthatthismonotheismwasnotofthe
Jewish,
i.e.tribalandexclusive
type.(Should
the
story
of
Diog.Laert.,VI,13,
that
Antisthenestaught
inthe
Gynosarges,
thegymnasium
for
'
bastards
',be
true,
thenhemusthave
deliberatelyemphasized
hisownmixedandbarbarian
descent.)Tarnis
certainlyrightwhenhe
points
out
(p.145)
thatAlexander's
monotheismwasconnectedwithhisideaofthe
unity
ofmankind. Butthe
sameshouldbesaidofthe
cynicideas,whichwereinfluenced,asIbelieve
(see
thelast
note),byAntisthenes,andinthiswayby
Socrates.
(Cp.especially
theevidenceof
Epictetus, I,9,i,withD.L.,VI,2,63-71 ;
also
Gorgias,4926
withD.L.,VI,105.)
Inviewofallthisitdoesnotseem
veryunlikely
thatAlexander(whowas,
asTarn
hints,not
particularlyimpressedby
histeacher
Aristotle)mayhave
beengenuinelyinspired,
asthetradition
reports,byDiogenes'
ideas
;and
whatheheardfromDiogeneswas
likely
tobeinthe
spirit
ofthe
equalitarian
tradition.
49
Cp.Republic,46913-47ic,especially47ob~d,
and
46gb/c.Hereindeed
wehave
(cp.
thenext
note)
atraceofsomething
liketheintroductionofanew
ethicalwhole,moreembracingthanthe
city;namelythe
unity
ofHellenic
superiority.
Aswastobe
expected(see
thenextnote
(i)(b)),
Platoelaborates
the
point
insomedetail.
60
Inthis
note,furtherarguments
arecollected
bearingonthe
interpreta-
tionof
Republic,4736,
andthe
problemof
Plato'shumanitarianism. Iwishto

238
CHAPTER8/NOTE50
expressmy
thankstomycolleague,
Dr.H.D.Broadhead,whosecriticismhas
greatlyhelpedmetocompleteand
clarifymyargument.
(1)OneofPlato'sstandard
topics(cp.
the
methodological remarks,
Rep.,3686,445C,577c
andnote
32
to
chapter5)
isthe
oppositionandcom-
parisonbetweentheindividualandthewhole,
i.e.the
city.Theintroduction
ofanewwhole,more
comprehensive
thaneventhe
city,
viz.mankind,would
beamostimportantstep
foraholisttotake
;
itwouldneed
(a)preparation
and
(b)
elaboration,
(a)
Insteadofsucha
preparationwe
get
theabove
mentioned
passage
onthe
oppositionbetweenGreeksandbarbarians
(Rep.,
46Qb~47
1
c)
.
(b)
Insteadofan
elaboration,we
find,
if
anything,
awithdrawal
oftheambiguousexpression
'
raceofmen
',inthesix
repetitions
orvariations
(viz.4876,49gb,50oe,5010,536a-b,
discussedinnote
52below,andthe
summary54od/e
withthe
afterthought54ib)
ofthe
key-passageunder
consideration
(i.e.,
of
Rep.,473d/e).
Intwoofthem
(4876,5006)
the
city
alone ismentioned
;
inalltheothers,Plato'sstandard
opposition city
individual
replaces
thatof
cityhumanrace.Butevenintheimmediatecontinua-
tionofthe
passage
underconsideration,
in
Republic,473e,
thesamestandard
opposition
isusedinwhatlookslikean
explanation
ora
paraphrase
ofthe
questionableexpression
:
'
nootherconstitutioncanestablish
happiness
neitherin
privateaffairs
norinthoseofthe
city
'.Nowhere isthereafurther
allusiontothe
allegedly
Platonicideathat
sophocracy
alonecan
save,not
only
the
sufferingcities,butall
sufferingmankind. Inviewofallthisitseems
clearthatinallthese
placesonly
hisstandard
oppositionlingered
inPlatb's
mind
(without,however,thewishto
give
it
anyprominence
inthis
connection),
probably
inthesensethatonsophocracydepends
thehappinessofanystate,
aswellasthatofallitsindividualcitizensandtheir
progeny(inwhichotherwise
evilmust
grow).
(2)
Platousestheterm
'
man
'
or
'
human
'
regularly
inanaturalistic
or
biological
sense
(inopposition
to
animals,e.g.
to
eagles ;
orto
deities),
andwithoutany
humanitarian
implication ;thatisto
say,nowheredothese
termsindicatethattheyareusedto
expresssomething
thattranscendsthe
distinctionsofnation,race,orclass.
(Fichte'sviews
quoted
in
chapter12,
texttonote
79,
area
pointedexpression
ofsuchauseofthe
terms.)A
numberofPlatonic
passagesindicating
this
anthropological (asopposed
to
humanitarian) usage
are :Phaedo,8ab
;Republic,459b/c,
faob.
Cratylus,
392b;Parmenides,1346;Theaetetus,io7b ;Laws,688d,737b. Crito,466;
Protagoras,344C. Republic,5i4b;522C.Laws,Sgob,
isevenan
example
of
a
disparaging
use.
(3)
ItisofcoursetruethatPlatoassumesaFormorIdea
ofMan
;but
itisamistaketothinkthatit
representswhatallmenhaveincommon
;
rather,
itisanaristocraticidealofa
proudSuper-Greek ;andonthisisbased
a
belief,notinthebrotherhoodofmen,butina
hierarchy
of
*
natures
',
aristocraticorslavish,
inaccordancewiththeir
greater
orlesserlikenessto
the
original,
theancient
primogenitor
ofthehumanrace.(TheGreeksare
morelikehimthanany
other
race.)Thus
'
intelligence
isshared
by
the
gods
with
only
a
very
fewmen
'
(Tim.,5ie;cp.Aristotle,inthetexttonote
3,
chaptern). (4)The
*
City
inHeaven'
(Rep.,5920)
anditscitizensare,
asAdam
rightlypointsout,notGreek
;butthisdoesnotimply
that
they
belong
to
'
humanity
'
ashethinks
(note
to
470630,and
others) ;they
are
rather
super-exclusive, super-Greek (they
are
'
above
'
theGreek
city
of
4706,ff.)
moreremotefromthebarbariansthanever.
(5)Finally,
itmaybe
mentionedthatthe
passage499c/d
rescindsthedistinctionbetweenGreeks
andbarbariansnomorethanthatbetweenthe
past,
the
present,andthe
future :Platotrieshereto
give
drastic
expression
toa
sweepinggeneralization
in
regard
totimeand
space ;hewishesto
saynomorethan :
*
Ifat
any
timewhatever,orifatanyplacewhatever
'
(wemayadd :eveninsuchan

CHAPTER
8/NOTES51-53 239
extremelyunlikelyplace
asabarbarian
country)
'
sucha
thing
didhappen,
then. ..'Theremark
Republic,494c/dexpresses
asimilar,thoughstronger,
feeling
of
being
facedwith
somethingapproachingimpiousabsurdity,
a
feeling
herearousedby
Alcibiades'
hopes
forauniversalempire
ofGreeksand
foreigners. (Iagree
withField,PlatoandHis
Contemporaries^
130,
note
i,and
Tarn,cp.
note
13(2)
to
chapter'5!)
Tosum
up,
Iamunabletofind
anything
but
hostility
towardsthe
humanitarianideasofa
unity
ofmankindwhichtranscendsraceandclass,
andIbelievethatthosewhofindthe
opposite
idealizePlato
(cp.
note
3
to
chapter6,and
text)andfailtoseethelinkbetweenhisaristocraticandanti-
humanitarian exclusivenessandhisTheory
ofIdeas.Seealsothis
chapter,
notes
51and
57,
below.
51
Theallusion
is,
I
believe,
totwo
places
inthe
Story
oftheNumber
wherePlato
(byspeaking
of
*
yourrace
')
referstotheraceofmen :
'
con-
cerningyourownrace
'
(5463/b;cp.
note
39
to
chapter5,and
text)
and
'
testing
themetalswithin
your
races
'
(546d/e,
f.
;cp.
notes
39and
40
to
chapter5,andthenext
passage). Cp.
alsothearguments
innote
52
to
this
chapter,concerning
a
'
bridge
'
betweenthetwo
passages,
i.e.thekey
passage
ofthe
philosopherking,andthe
story
oftheNumber. (See
also
next
note.)
52
Republic,546d/e,
f.The
passagequoted
hereis
part
ofthe
Story
ofthe
NumberandtheFallofMan,546a~547a,quoted
intexttonotes39/40
to
chapter5;seealsonotes
13and
43
tothe
presentchapter.My
contention
(cp.
texttothelast
note)
thattheremarkinthe
philosopherkingpassage,
Republic,4730(cp.
notes
44and
50
tothis
chapter)
foreshadowsthe
Story
of
theNumber,
is
strengthenedby
theobservationthatthereexistsa
bridge,
as
itwere,betweenthetwo
passages.The
Story
oftheNumberisundoubtedly
foreshadowedbyRepublic,5363/b,a
passagewhich,ontheotherhand,may
bedescribedastheconverse
(and
soasa
variation)
ofthe
philosopherking
passage ;forit
says,generallyspeaking,
thattheworstmusthappen
ifthe
wrongmenareselectedas
rulers,anditevenfinishesup
withadirectreminis-
cenceofthe
greatwave :
'
ifwetakemenofanotherkind . .thenweshall
bringdownuponphilosophy
another
deluge
of
laughter
'.Thisclear
reminiscence
is,
Ibelieve,anindicationthatPlatowasconsciousofthe
characterofthe
passage(whichproceeds,
asitwere,fromtheendof473c-e
backtoits
beginning),
whichshowswhatmusthappen
iftheadvicegiven
in
the
passage
ofthe
philosopherking
is
neglected.Nowthis
'
converse
'
passage(536a/b)
or
'
bridge
'
containsunambiguous
referencestoracialism,
foreshadowing
the
passage
onthesame
subject
towhichthe
present
noteis
appended. (Thismaybe
interpreted
asadditionalevidencethatracialism
wasinPlato'smind,andalluded
to,whenhewrotethe
passage
ofthe
philo-
sopherking.)
Inow
quote
the
beginning
ofthe
*
converse
'
passage536a/b
:
'
Wemust
distinguishcarefully
betweenthetrue-bornandthebastard. For
ifanindividualora
city
doesnotknowhowtolookupon
matterssuchas
these,they
will
quiteinnocentlyaccept
theservicesofthe
disfiguredandthe
bastardsinanycapacity ;perhaps
as
friends,orevenasrulers.'
(Gp.
also
note
47
tothis
chapter.)
Forsomething
likean
explanation
ofPlato's
preoccupation
withmatters
ofracial
degenerationandracial
breeding,cp.
texttonotes
6,7,and63
to
chapter10,inconnectionwithnote
39(3)
to
chapter5.
63
A.E.
Taylor,
Plato
(1908,1914),pp.
122f. I
agree
withthisinteresting
passage
asfarasitisquoted
inthetext. Ihave,however,omittedtheword
4
patriot
'
after
'
Athenian
'
sinceIdonot
fullyagree
withthischaracterization
ofPlato.ForPlato's
*
patriotism
'
cp.
texttonotes
14-18
tochapter4.
For
theterm
'
patriotism ',andthe
'
paternal
state
',cp.
notes23-26and45
to
chapter
10.

24O
CHAPTER8/NOTES54-59
54
Republic,494-b
:
*
Butwillnotonewhoisofthis
typebefirstin
every-
thing,
fromchildhoodon?
'
66
Op.cit.,4960
:
'
Ofmyown
spiritualsign,
Ineednot
speak.'
58
Cp.whatAdam
says
inhised.ofthe
Republic,
notesto
495d23and
495631,andmy
note
47
tothis
presentchapter. (See
alsonote
59
tothis
chapter.)
67
Republic,4960-*!. (IdonotthinkthatBarker,GreekPoliticalTheory
I,107,
n.
2,makesa
goodguesswhenhe
says
ofthe
passagequoted
that
'
it
is
possible
. .thatPlatois
thinking
ofthe
Cynics
'.The
passagecertainly
doesnotrefertoAntisthenes,andDiogenes,whomBarkermusthaveinmind,
was
hardlyfamouswhenitwaswritten,quiteapart
fromthefactthatPlato
would
hardly
havereferredtohiminthis
way.)
Earlierinthesame
passage
ofthe
Republic,
thereisanotherremarkwhich
may
beareferencetoPlatohimself. Speaking
ofthesmallbandofthe
worthyandthosewhobelong
to
it,hementions
*
a
nobly-bornandwell-bred
characterwhowassavedbyflight
'
(or
*
by
exile
'
;saved,that
is,fromthe
fateofAlcibiadeswhobecameavictimof
flatteryanddesertedSocratic
philosophy).Adamthinks
(note
to
49,6b9)
that
'
Platowas
hardly
exiled
',
butthe
flight
toMegara
ofSocrates'
disciples
afterthedeathoftheirmaster
may
wellstandoutinPlato'smemory
asoneofthe
turning-points
inhislife.
Thatthe
passage
referstoDiois
hardlypossible
sinceDiowaswell
beyond
the
criticalyouthfulagewhenhewasexiled,andtherewasnot
(as
inPlato's
case)
a
parallelism
withtheSocraticcompanion
Alcibiades
(quiteapart
fromthefactthatPlatohadresistedDio'sbanishment,andhadtriedto
get
it
rescinded).
Ifweassumethatthepassage
referstoPlato,thenweshall
havetoassumethesameof5O2a
:
*
Whowilldoubtthe
possibility
that
kings
oraristocratsmayhaveadescendantwhoisaborn
philosopher
?
'
;
forthe
continuationofthatpassage
issosimilartothe
previous
that
theyseemto
refertothesame
'
nobly-born
character '.This
interpretation
of5023
is
probable
in
itself,forwemustrememberthat
Plato,whoalwaysshowedhis
familypride,
forinstance,
intheeulogyonhisfatherandonhis
brothers,
whomhecalls
*
divine
'
(Rep.,368a ;
IcannotagreewithAdamwhotakes
theremarkasironical
;cp.
alsotheremarkonPlato's
alleged
ancestor
Godrusin
Symp.,2o8d)
claimeddescentfromAttica'stribal
kings.
Ifthis
interpretation
is
adopted,
thereferencetosonsofaristocraticand
kingly
familiesin
499bwouldhavetobeconsideredinthesame
light,
i.e.asa
preparation
for
5023.Butthiswouldsolveanother
puzzle.
Ihaveinmind
49gband
5O2a.
Itis
difficult,
ifnot
impossible,
to
interpret
these
passages
as
attempts
toflattertheyoungerDionysius,
sincesuchan
interpretationcould
hardlybereconciledwiththe
unmitigated
violenceandthe
admittedly(576a)
personalbackground
ofPlato'sattacks
(572-580)upon
theolder
Dionysius.
Itis
important
tonotethatPlato
speaks
inallthree
passages(473d,499b,
5O2a)about
hereditarykingdoms(whichhe
opposes
so
strongly
to
tyrannies)
andabout
*
dynasties
'
;butweknowfromAristotle's
Politics,I292b2(cp.
Meyer,
Gesch.d.
Altertums,V,p.56)and
i293aii,that
'
dynasties
'
are
hereditary
oligarchicfamilies,andthereforenotsomuchthefamiliesofa
tyrant
like
Dionysius,butratherwhatwecallnowaristocraticfamilies,likethatofPlato
himself.
(Thesearguments
aredirected
againstAdam'ssecondnoteto
499bi3.
Aristotle'sstatement is
supportedbyThucydides, IV,78,and
Xenophon, Hellenica,V,4,46.)
68
Inafamous
passage
inthePhaedo
(8gd)
Socrateswarns
against
mis-
anthropy
orhatredofmen
(with
whichhe
comparesmisology
ordistrustin
rationalargument). Seealsonote28and
56
tochapter10,andnote
9
to
chapter7.
68
Republic,489b/c.Theconnectionwiththe
previouspassages
ismore
obviousifthewholeof
488and
489
isconsidered,and
especially
theattackin

CHAPTER
g/NOTES
1-2
241
4896upon
the
'
many
'
philosophers
whosewickedness is
inevitable,
i.e.the
same
'
many
*
and
*
incomplete
natures
*
whose
suppression
isdiscussedin
notes44and47
tothis
chapter.
AnindicationthatPlatohadoncedreamtof
becoming
the
philosopher
kingandsaviourofAthenscanbefound,Ibelieve,
intheLaws,7043-707^
wherePlatotriesto
pointoutthemoraldangersofthe
sea,of
seafaring,trade,
and
imperialism. (Cp.Aristotle,Pol.,13260-13273,andmy
notes
g
to22
and
36
to
chapter10,and
text.)
See
especiallyLaws,7O4d
:
'
Ifthe
cityweretobebuiltonthe
coast,and
well
suppliedwithnaturalharbours . .thenitwouldneedamightysaviour,
andindeed,a
super-human legislator,
tomakeher
escapevariabilityand
degeneration.* DoesthisnotreadasifPlatowantedtoshowthathisfailure
inAthenswasduetothesuper-human
difficultiescreatedby
the
geography
ofthe
place
?
(But
Platostillbelievesinthemethodof
winning
overa
tyrant ;
cp.Laws,7ioc/d,quoted
intexttonote
24
to
chapter4.)
60
Suchdreamshavesometimesbeeneven
openly
confessed. F.Nietzsche,
TheWilltoPower
(ed.1911,BookIV,Aphor.958)
writes :
*
InPlato'sTheages
iswritten :
"
Every
oneofuswantstobethelordofallmen,
ifitwere
only
possibleandmostofallhewouldliketobetheLordHimself." Thisis
the
spiritwhichmustcome
again.'
Ineednotcommentupon
Nietzsche's
political
views
;butthereareother
philosophers, Platonists,whohave
naively
hintedthatifaPlatonistwere,bysome
luckyaccident,to
gainpower
inamodern
state,hewouldmovetowardsthePlatonicIdeal,andleave
things
atleastnearer
perfection
thanhefoundthem.The
argument
inthe
next
chapter
isdirected
partlyagainstsuchromanticdreams.
61
Op.cit.,52oa~52ic,
the
quotation
isfrom
52od.
62
Gp.
G.B.
Stern,The
UglyDachshund, 1938.
NOTESTOCHAPTER9
1
Mydescription
ofUtopian
social
engineering
seemstocoincidewith
thatkindofsocial
engineering
advocatedbyM.EastmaninMarxism Isit
Science?
;
see
especiallypp.22f. Ihavethe
impression
thatEastman'sviews
represent
the
swing
ofthependulum
fromhistoricismto
Utopianengineering.
ButImaypossibly
bemistaken,andwhatEastman
reallyhasinmindmay
bemoreinthedirectionofwhatIcall
piecemealengineering ;cp.
note
9
to
chapter3.
Seealsonote18
(3)
to
chapter5.
2
Ibelievethatthere
is,fromtheethical
point
ofview,nosymmetry
between
sufferingand
happiness,
orbetweenpainand
pleasure.
Boththe
UtilitariansandKant
(*Promoteother
people'shappiness
. .
.')seemto
me
(at
leastintheir
formulations)fundamentallywrong
inthis
point,which
is,
however,notoneforrational
argument (for
theirrational
aspect
ofethical
beliefs,
seenote11tothe
presentchapter,and
chapter24)
.Inmyopinion
(cp.
note6
(2)
tochapter5)human
suffering
makesadirectmoral
appeal,
namely,
the
appeal
for
help,
whilethereisnosimilarcalltoincreasethe
happiness
ofamanwhois
doing
wellanyway. (A
furthercriticismof
Utilitarianismwouldbethat
pain
cannotbeoutweighedbypleasure,and
especially
notoneman's
painby
anotherman's
pleasure.
Insteadofthe
greatesthappiness
ofthe
greatestnumber,oneshouldmoremodestlydemand
theleastamountof
suffering
foranybody ;and
further,thatunavoidable
suffering
shouldbedistributedas
equally
as
possible.)
Ifindthatthereis
somekindofanalogybetweenthisviewofethicsandtheviewofscientific
methodology
whichIhaveadvocatedinmyLogik
der
Forschung. Just
asin
thefieldofethicsitismuchclearertoformulateourdemandsnegatively,
i.e.,
todemandtheeliminationof
suffering
ratherthanthe
promotion
of

242 CHAPTER
Q/NOTES3-7
happiness,
soitisclearertoformulatethetaskofscientificmethodasthe
eliminationoffalsetheories
(from
thevarioustheories
tentativelyproffered)
ratherthantheattainmentofestablished truths.
3A
verygoodexample
ofthiskindof
piecemealengineering,
or
perhaps
ofthe
correspondingpiecemealtechnology,
areG.G.F.Sinkin'stwoarticles
on
*
Budgetary
Reform
'
intheAustralianEconomicRecord
(1941,pp.192fF.,
and
1942,pp.
16
fF.)
Iam
glad
tobeabletorefertothesetwoarticlessince
theymakeconscioususeofthe
methodological principlewhichIadvocate
;
they
thusshowthatthese
principles
arcusefulinthe
practiceof
technological
research.
Idonot
suggest
that
piecemealengineeringcannotbebold,orthatit
mustbeconfinedto
'
smallish
'
problems.
ButIthinkthatthe
degree
of
complicationwhichwecantackleisgovernedby
the
degree
ofour
experience
gained
inconsciousand
systematicpiecemealengineering.
4
Thisviewhas
recentlybeenemphasizedby
F.A.vonHayek
invarious
interestingpapers(cp.
forinstancehisFreedomandtheEconomic
System,Public
PolicyPamphlets,Chicago 1939).What Icall'Utopianengineering*
corresponds largely,
Ibelieve,towhatHayekwouldcall
'
centralized
'
or
'
collectivist
'
planning.Hayek
himselfrecommendswhathecalls
*
planning
forfreedom '.I
suppose
hewould
agree
thatthiswouldtakethecharacter
of
'
piecemeal engineering
'.Onecould,
Ibelieve,formulate
Hayek's
objections
tocollectivist
planningsomewhatlikethis. Ifwe
try
toconstruct
societyaccording
toa
blueprint,
thenwemay
findthatwecannot
incorporate
individualfreedominour
blueprint ;orifwedo,thatwecannotrealizeit.
Thereasonisthatcentralizedeconomic
planning
eliminatesfromeconomic
lifeoneofthemost
important
functionsoftheindividual,namely
hisfunction
asachooserofthe
product,
asafreeconsumer. Inotherwords,Hayek's
criticismbelongs
totherealmofsocial
technology.He
pointsoutacertain
technologicalimpossibility,namely
thatof
drafting
a
plan
fora
societywhich
isatonceeconomically
centralizedandindividualistic.
6
Cp.
note
25
tochapter 7.
6
The
question
whethertheendmayjustify
themeansseemstoarisefrom
akindofintuitionofahappyresult,reached
throughsuffering.Theidea
seemstobethatthe
question
is
tlargely
oneofwhetherthe
sufferingswere
worthwhile,
i.e.
justifiableby
theresult.Butwe
ought
toconsiderthesitua-
tion
altogetherdifferently.The
question
whetheracertainactionis
justified
dependsupon
thesumtotalofalltheresultswhichwecanforesee.The
immediate
'
end
'
or
'
aim
'
is
usuallyonlyone
part
ofthesetotal
results,
andifother
parts
areundesirablethenthe
question
iswhether
they
are
balancedby
thedesired
'
end'.Inotherwords,wehavenottobalance
the
past(means)against
thefuture
(ends)
butsome
parts
ofthetotalresults
against
other
parts.(The
'
totalresults
'
willofcoursebe
spreadovera
certain
period
of
time,andthe
original
'
end
'
neednotbethelastof
them.)
7
(i)
Ibelievethatthe
parallelismbetweentheinstitutionalproblemsof
civilandofinternationalpeace
ismost
important.Any
international
organiza-
tionwhichhas
legislative,
administrativeand
judicial
institutionsaswellasan
armedexecutivewhichis
prepared
toactshouldbeassuccessfulin
upholding
international
peace
asarethe
analogous
institutionswithinthestate.But
itseemstomeimportantnotto
expect
more.Wehavebeenabletoreduce
crimewithinthestatesto
somethingcomparativelyunimportant,
butwehave
notbeenabletostamp
itout
entirely.
.Thereforeweshall,fora
longtimeto
come,needa
police
forcewhich is
ready
to
strike,andwhichsometimes
doesstrike.
Similarly,
Ibelievethatwemustbe
prepared
forthe
probability
thatwemay
notbeabletostamp
outinternationalcrime. Ifwedeclare
thatouraimistomakewar
impossible
onceandfor
all,thenwemayunder-
taketoomuch,withthefatalresultthatwemay
nothaveaforcewhichis

CHAPTER
g/NOTEJ
ready
tostrikewhenthese
hopes
are
disappointed. (The
failureofthe
League
ofNationstotakeactionagainstaggressorswas,atleastinthecaseofthe
attackonManchukuo,due
largely
tothe
generalfeeling
thatthe
League
had
beenestablishedinordertoendallwarsandnottowage
them.Thisshows
thatpropagandaforending
allwarsis
self-defeating.Wemustendinter-
national
anarchy,andbe
ready
togo
towar
againstany
internationalcrime.
(Cp.especiallyH.Mannheim,WarandCrime,1941 ;andA.D.
Lindsay,
*
WartoEndWar
',
in
Background
and
Issues,1940.)
Butitisalso
important
tosearchfortheweak
spot
inthe
analogybetween
civilandinternational
peace,
thatisto
say,
forthe
point
wherethe
analogy
breaksdown.Inthecaseofcivil
peace,upheldby
thestate,thereisthe
individualcitizentobe
protectedby
thestate.Thecitizen
is,
asitwere,
a
'
natural
'
unitoratom
(although
thereisacertain
'
conventional
'
element
evenintheconditionsof
citizenship)
.Ontheotherhand,themembersor
unitsoratomsofourinternationalorderwillbestates.Butastatecan
neverbea
'
natural
'
unitlikethecitizen ;
therearenonaturalboundaries toa
state.Theboundariesofastate
change,andcanbedefined
onlybyapplying
the
principle
ofastatus
quo;andsince
every
status
quo
mustrefertoan
arbitrarily
chosendate,thedetermination oftheboundaries ofastate ispurely
conventional.
The
attempt
tofindsomenatural
'
boundariesfor
states,andaccordingly,
tolookupon
thestateasa
*
natural
'
unit,leadstothe
principleof
thenational
stateandtotheromanticfictionsofnationalism, racialism,andtribalism.
Butthis
principle
isnot
'
natural
',andtheideathatthereexistnaturalunits
likenationsor
linguistic
orracial
groups,
is
entirely
fictitious. Here,if
anywhere,weshouldlearnfrom
history ;forsincethedawnof
history,men
havebeen
continuallymixed,unified,broken
up,andmixed
again ;andthis
cannotbeundone,evenifitweredesirable.
Thereisasecond
point
inwhichtheanalogybetweencivilandinter-
national
peace
breaksdown.Thestatemust
protect
theindividualcitizen,
itsunitsoratoms
;buttheinternational
organization
alsomust
ultimately
protecthuman
individuals,andnotitsunitsoratoms,
i.e.statesornations.
The
complete
renunciationofthe
principle
ofthenationalstate
(aprinciple
whichowesits
popularitysolely
tothefactthatit
appeals
totribalinstincts
andthatitisthe
cheapestandsurestmethodbywhicha
politicianwhohas
nothing
bettertooffercanmakehis
way),andthe
recognition
oftheneces-
sarily
conventionaldemarcationofallstates,together
withthefurther
insight
thathumanindividualsandnotstatesornationsmusthetheultimateconcerneven
of
,
international
organizations,
will
help
ustorealize
clearly,andto
getover,
the
difficulties
arisingfromthebreakdownofourfundamental
analogy. (Cp.
also
chapter12,notes51-64and
text,andnote2to
chapter13.)
(2)
Itseemstomethattheremarkthathumanindividualsmustbe
recognized
tobetheultimateconcernnot
only
ofinternational
organizations,
butofall
politics,
internationalaswellas
*
national
'
or
parochial,
has
impor-
tant
applications.Wemustrealizethatwecantreatindividuals
fairly,
even
if
wedecidetobreak
up
the
power-organizationof
an
aggressive
stateor
'
nation
'
towhich
theseindividualsbelong.
Itisa
widely
held
prejudice
thatthedestruction
andcontrolofthe
military,politicalandevenoftheeconomicpower
ofa
stateor
'
nation
'
impliesmisery
or
subjugation
foritsindividual citizens.
Butthis
prejudice
isasunwarranted asitisdangerous.
Itisunwarrantedprovided
thataninternationalorganization protects
thecitizensofthesoweakenedstate
againstexploitation
oftheir
political
and
militaryweakness.Theonlydamage
totheindividualcitizenthatcan-
notbeavoidedisonetohisnational
pride ;andifweassumethathewasa
citizenofan
aggressorcountry,
thenthisisadamagewhichwillbeunavoid-
ableinanycase,provided
the
aggression
hasbeenwardedoff.

244 CHAPTER
g/NOTEJ
The
prejudice
thatwecannot
distinguish
betweenthetreatmentofa
stateandofitsindividualcitizensisalsoverydangerous,
forwhenitcomes
tothe
problem
of
dealingwithan
aggressorcountry,
it
necessarily
creates
twofactionsinthevictoriouscountries,viz.,thefactionofthosewhodemand
harshtreatmentandthosewhodemand
leniency.Asa
rule,bothoverlook
the
possibility
of
treating
astate
harshly,and,atthesametime,
itscitizens
leniently.
Butifthis
possibility
is
overlooked,thenthe
following
is
likely
to
happen.
Immediately
afterthe
victory
the
aggressor
stateanditscitizenswillbetreated
comparatively harshly.
Butthe
state,
the
power-organization,
will
probably
notbetreatedas
harshly
asmight
bereasonablebecauseofareluctanceto
treatinnocentindividuals
harshly,
thatisto
say,becausetheinfluenceof
thefactionof
leniency
willmakeitselffeltsomehow. In
spite
ofthisreluc-
tance,
itis
likely
thatindividualswillsuffer
beyond
what
they
deserve. After
ashorttime,therefore,areactionis
likely
tooccurinthevictoriouscountries.
Btjualitarianandhumanitariantendenciesare
likely
to
strengthen
thefaction
of
leniency
untiltheharsh
policy
isreversed. Butthisdevelopment
isnot
onlylikely
to
give
the
aggressor
stateachanceforanew
aggression ;
itwill
also
provide
itwiththeweapon
ofthemoral
indignation
ofonewhohasbeen
wronged,whilethevictoriouscountriesare
likely
tobecomeafflictedwiththe
diffidenceofthosewhofeelthat
theymayhavedone
wrong.
This
very
undesirable
developmentmustintheendleadtoanew
aggres-
sion. Itcanbeavoided
if,and
onlyif,fromthe
start,acleardistinction is
madebetweenthe
aggressor
state
(and
those
responsible
forits
acts)onthe
onehand,anditscitizensontheotherhand.Harshnesstowardsthe
aggressor
stateandeventheradicaldestructionofitspowerapparatus,
willnot
produce
thismoralreactionofhumanitarian
feelings
inthevictoriouscountriesifit
iscombinedwitha
policy
offairnesstowardstheindividualcitizens.
Butisit
possible
tobreakthe
politicalpower
ofastatewithout
injuring
itscitizens
indiscriminately?
Inorderto
prove
thatthisis
possible
Ishall
constructan
example
ofa
policy
whichbreaksthe
political
and
militarypower
ofan
aggressor
statewithout
violating
theinterestsofitsindividualcitizens.
The
fringe
ofthe
aggressorcountry,including
itssea-coastanditsmain
(notall)
sourcesofwater
power,coal,and
steel,couldbeseveredfromthe
state,andadministered asaninternational
territory,
nevertobereturned.
Harboursaswellastherawmaterialscouldbemadeaccessibletothecitizens
ofthestatefortheir
legitimate
economic activities,without
imposingany
economic
disadvantagesonthem,ontheconditionthat
they
inviteinternational
commissions tocontrolthe
proper
useofthesefacilities.Any
usewhich
mayhelp
tobuildup
anewwar
potential
is
forbidden,andifthereisreason
for
suspicion
thattheinternationalized facilitiesandrawmaterialsmaybeso
used,theirusehasatoncetobe
stopped.
Itthenrestswiththe
suspectparty
toinviteandtofacilitatea
thoroughinvestigationandtooffer
satisfactory
guarantees
fora
proper
use.
Sucha
procedurewouldnoteliminatethe
possibility
ofanewattack
butitwouldforcethe
aggressor
statetomakeitsattackontheinternationalized
territories
previous
to
buildingup
anewwar
potential.
Thussuchanattack
wouldbe
hopelessprovided
theothercountrieshaveretainedand
developed
theirwar
potential. Facedwiththissituationtheformer
aggressor
state
wouldbeforcedto
change
itsattitude
radically,
and
adopt
oneof
co-operation.
Itwouldbeforcedtoinvitetheinternationalcontrolofits
industryandto
facilitatethe
investigation
oftheinternational
controllingauthority(instead
of
obstructingthem)
because
onlysuchanattitudewouldguarantee
itsuse
ofthefacilitiesneededby
itsindustries
;andsuchadevelopmentwouldbe
likely
totake
place
without
any
furtherinterferencewiththeinternal
politics
ofthestate.

CHAPTER9/NOTE
8
245
Thedanger
thattheinternationalization ofthesefacilities
mightbemis-
usedforthe
purpose
of
exploiting
orof
humiliating
the
populationofthe
defeatedcountrycanbecounter-actedby
international
legalmeasuresthat
provide
forcourtsof
appeal,
etc.
Thisexample
showsthatitisnot
impossible
totreatastate
harshlyand
itscitizens
leniently.
(3)
Butissuchan
engineeringapproach
towardstheproblemof
peace
scientific?Many
willcontend,
Iamsure,thata
truly
scientificattitude
towardstheproblems
ofwarand
peacemustbedifferent.They
will
say
thatwemust
firststudy
thecauses
of
war.Wemust
study
theforcesthatleadto
war,andalsothosethatmay
leadto
peace.
Ithasbeen
recentlyclaimed,
forinstance,
that
*
lastingpeace
'
cancome
only
ifweconsider
fully
the
'
under-
lyingdynamic
forces
'
in
society
thatmayproducewaror
peace.
Inorder
tofindouttheseforces,wemust,ofcourse,studyhistory.
Inotherwords,
wemustapproach
the
problem
of
peaceby
ahistoricistmethod,and
notby
a
technologicalmethod. This,
itisclaimed,
isthe
onlyscientific
approach.
Thehistoricistmay,
withthe
help
of
history,showthatthecausesofwar
canbefoundintheclashofeconomicinterests
;orintheclashofclasses
;
orof
ideologies,
for
instance,freedomversus
tyranny ;orintheclashofraces,
orofnations,orof
imperialisms,
orofmilitarist
systems ;orinhate
;orin
fear
;orinenvy ;orinthewishtotake
revenge ;orinallthese
things
together,
andincountlessmore.Andhewill
therebyshowthatthetask
ofremoving
thesecausesis
extremely
difficult.Andhewillshowthatthere
isno
point
in
constructinganinternational
organization,
as
long
aswehave
notremovedthecausesofwar,forinstancetheeconomic
causes,
etc.
Ithinkthatthisimportantproblemmay
beusedtoshowthe
poverty
of
historicism,andindeed,
itsharmfulness. Forthis
apparentlyunprejudiced
andconvincingly
scientific
approach,
the
studyofthe
'
causesofwar
'
is,in
fact,not
onlyprejudiced,
butalsoliabletobartheway
toareasonablesolution
;
it
is,in
fact,pseudo-scientific.
Howfarwouldwe
getif,insteadof
introducing
lawsanda
policeforce,
weapproached
theproblem
of
criminality
*
scientifically ',
i.e.bytrying
to
findoutwhat
precisely
arethecausesofcrime?Idonot
imply
thatwe
cannothereortherediscover
important
factors
contributing
tocrimeorto
war,andthatwecannotavertmuchharminthisway;butthiscanwellbe
doneafterwehave
got
crimeundercontrol,
i.e.afterwehaveintroducedour
police
force.Ontheotherhand,the
studyofeconomic,psychological,
hereditary,moral,etc.,
'
causes
'
ofcrime,andthe
attempt
toremovethese
causes,would
hardlyhaveledustofindoutthata
police
force
(whichdoes
notremovethe
cause)
can
bring
crimeundercontrol.Quiteapart
fromthe
vagueness
ofsuch
phrases
as
'
thecauseofwar
',thewholeapproach
isany-
thing
butscientific. Itisasifoneinsistedthatitisunscientifictowearan
overcoatwhenitiscold
;andthatweshouldrather
study
thecausesofcold
weather,andremovethem.Or,perhaps,
that
lubricating
is
unscientific,
sinceweshouldratherfindoutthecausesoffrictionandremovethem.This
latterexampleshows,Ibelieve,theabsurdity
ofthe
apparently
scientific
criticism
;
for
just
aslubrication
certainly
reducesthe
*
causes
'
of
friction,so
aninternational
police
force
(or
anotherarmedbody
ofthis
kind)mayreduce
an
important
'
cause
'
ofwar,namely
thehope
of
'
gettingawaywithit'.
8
IhavetriedtoshowthisinmyLogik
der
Forschung.
I
believe,in
accordancewiththemethodologyoutlined,that
systematicpiecemealengineer-
ing
willhelp
ustobuildupan
empirical
social
technology,
arrivedatby
the
methodoftrialanderror.Only
inthis
way,
I
believe,canwe
begin
tobuild
up
an
empirical
socialscience.Thefactthatsuchasocialsciencehardly
existssofar,andthatthehistoricalmethodis
incapable
of
furthering
itmuch,

246
CHAPTERIO/NOTES1-6
isoneofthe
strongestargumentsagainst
the
possibility
of
large-scale
or
Utopian
social
engineering.
SeealsomyPovertyof
Historicism
(Economicsa,
1944-45).
9
J.
A.Stewarthastreatedthis
aspect
oftheTheory
ofIdeasinhisbook
Plato
1
sDoctrineof
Ideas
(1909),
128ff. Ibelieve,however,thathestresses
toomuchtheobject
of
purecontemplation (asopposed
tothat
'
pattern
'
whichtheartistnotonlyvisualizes,butwhichhelaboursto
reproduce,on
his
canvas).
10
Republic,52oc.
11
Ithasoftenbeensaidthatethicsis
only
a
part
of
aesthetics,sinceethical
questions
arc
ultimately
amatteroftaste.
(Gp.
forinstanceG.E.G.Catiin,
TheScienceandMethods
ofPolitics,315ff.)
Ifbysayingthis,nomoreismeant
thanthatethical
problems
cannotbesolvedby
scientificmethods,
I
agree.
Butwemustnotoverlookthevastdifferencebetweenmoral
'
problems
of
taste
*,and
problems
oftasteinaesthetics. IfIdislikea
novel,a
piece
of
music,
or
perhaps
a
picture,
Ineednotread
it,orlistento
it,orlookatit.
Esthetic
problems(with
the
possibleexception
of
architecture)
are
largely
ofa
privatecharacter,butethical
problemsconcernmen,andtheirlives.
Tothisextent,thereisafundamental differencebetweenthem.
12
Forthisandthefollowingquotations,cp.Republic,5Ood~5Oia (italics
mine) ;cp.
alsonotes
25,26,37,38(especially25and
38)
to
chapter
8.
13
Cp.
forthis
development
also
chapter13,especially
note
7,andtext.
14
Itseemsthatromanticism, inliteratureaswellasin
philosophy,may
betracedbacktoPlato. ItiswellknownthatRousseauwas
directlyinfluenced
byhim
(cp.
note ito
chapter6).RousseaualsoknewPlato'sStatesman
(cp.
theSocialContract,Book
II,ch.VII,andBook
III,ch.
VI)
withits
eulogy
ofthe
earlyhill-shepherds.
But
apart
fromthisdirectinfluence,
itis
probable
thatRousseauderivedhis
pastoralromanticism and*lovefor
primitivity
indirectly
fromPlato
;
forhewas
certainly
influencedby
theItalianRenais-
sance,whichhadrediscovered Plato,and
especially
hisnaturalismandhis
dreamsofa
perfectsociety
of
primitiveshepherds(cp.
notes 11
(3)
and
32
tochapter4andnoteitochapter6).
Itis
interesting
thatVoltairerecognized
atoncethe
dangers
ofRousseau'sromanticobscurantism
;just
asKantwas
not
preventedby
hisadmirationforRousseaufrom
recognizing
this
danger
whenhewasfacedwithitinHerder's
*
Ideas
'
(cp.
alsonote
56
to
chapter
12,and
text).
NOTESTOCHAPTER 10
1
Cp.Republic,4igaff.,42ib,4650ff.,and
5196.
2
Iam
thinking
not
only
ofthemedieval
attempts
toarrest
society,attempts
thatwerebasedonthePlatonic
theory
thattherulersare
responsible
forthe
spiritual
welfareoftheruled,andonmanypractical
devices
developedby
Platointhe
RepublicandintheLaws
;
Ithinkalsoofmany
later
developments.
3
Ihave
tried,inotherwords,to
apply
asfaras
possible
themethodwhich
IhavedescribedinmyLogik
der
Forschung.
4
Cp.especiallyRepublic,5666 ;seealso
below,note
63
tothis
chapter.
5
Inmystory
thereshouldbe
'
novillains . .Crimeisnot
interesting
. .
Itiswhatmendoattheir
best,withgood
intentions . .that
really
concerns
us'.Ihavetriedasfaras
possible
to
apply
thismethodological principle
to
myinterpretation
ofPlato.(The
formulationofthe
principlequoted
inthis
noteIhavetakenfromG.B,Shaw's
Preface
toSaint
Joan;
seethefirstsentences
inthesection
'
Tragedy,notMelodrama
'.)
6
Fortheterms
*
closed
society
'
and
'
opensociety ',andtheiruseina
somewhatsimilarsensebyBergson,
seetheNotetotheIntroduction.My
characterization oftheclosed
society
as
magicalandofthe
opensociety
as

CHAPTERID/NOTE7 247
rationalandcriticalofcoursemakesit
impossible
toapply
thesetermswithout
idealizingthe
society
in
question.Themagical
attitudehasbynomeansdis-
appeared
fromour
life,noteveninthemost
*
open
'
societiessofar
realized,and
Ithinkit
unlikely
thatitcanever
completelydisappear.
In
spite
of
this,
it
seemstobe
possible
to
givesomeusefulcriterionofthetransitionfromtheclosed
society
tothe
open.Thetransitiontakes
placewhensocialinstitutionsarefirst
consciouslyrecognized
asman-made,andwhentheirconsciousalterationisdis-
cussedintermsoftheir
suitability
fortheachievementofhumanaimsor
pur-
poses.Or,putting
thematterinalessabstractway,
theclosed
society
breaks
downwhenthe
supernaturalawewithwhichthesocialorderisconsidered
givesway
toactive
interference,andtotheconscious
pursuit
of
personal
or
group
interests. Itisclearthatculturalcontact
through
civilizationmay
engender
suchabreakdown,andevenmorethe
development
ofan
impover-
ished,
i.e.landlesssectionofthe
ruling
class. Imay
mentionherethatIdonot
liketo
speak
of
'
socialbreakdown
'
ina
generalway.
Ithinkthatthebreak-
downofaclosed
society,
asdescribedhere,
isa
fairly
clear
affair,butin
general
theterm
'
socialbreakdown
'
seemstometo
conveyvery
littlemorethanthat
theobserverdoesnotlikethecourseofthe
development
hedescribes. Ithink
thatthetermismuchmisused.ButIadmit
that,withorwithoutreason,the
memberofacertain
societymighthavethe
feeling
that
*
everything
is
breaking
down.'Thereislittledoubtthattothemembersoftheancientregime
orof
theRussian
nobility,
theFrenchortheRussianrevolutionmusthaveappeared
asa
complete
socialbreakdown
;buttothenewrulersit
appearedvery
differently.
Toynbee(cp.A
StudyofHistory,V,23-35 ;338)
describes the
appearance
ofschisminthebody
social
'
asacriterionofa
societywhichhasbroken
down. Sinceschism,
intheformofclassdisunion,undoubtedly
occurredin
Greeksocietylongbeforethe
Peloponnesianwar,
itisnot
quite
clearwhy
he
holdsthatthiswar
(and
notthebreakdownof
tribalism)markswhathe
describesasthebreakdownofHelleniccivilization.
(Gp.
alsonotes45(2)
to
chapter4,
andnote8tothe
presentchapter.)
Concerning
the
similaritybetweentheGreeksandtheMaoris,some
remarkscanbefoundinBurnet's
Eaily
Greek
Philosophy
2
,especiallypp.
2
and
9.
7
Iowethiscriticismofthe
organictheoryofthe
state,together
with
many
other
suggestions,
to
J.Popper-Lynkeus ;hewrites
(Dieallgemeine
Ndhrpflicht,2nded.,1923,pp.71f.)
:'TheexcellentMenenius
Agrippa
. .
persuaded
the
insurgentplebs
toreturn
'
(toRome)
*
bytellingthemhis
simileofthe
body'smemberswhorebelledagainst
the
belly.
. .Why
did
notoneofthem
say
:
"
Right,Agrippa
!Iftheremustbea
belly,
thenwe,
the
plebs,wanttobethe
bellyfromnowon
;andyou
. .mayplay
the
r61eofthemembers !
"'
(For
the
simile,cp.Shakespeare's Coriolanus,Act
i,
Scene
i.)
Itis
perhapsinteresting
tonotethatevenamodernand
apparently
progressivemovement like
'
Mass-Observation
'
makespropaganda
forthe
organictheory
of
society(on
thecoverofits
pamphlet,
FirstTear'sWork,
1
937-38.)
Ontheotherhand,
itmustbeadmittedthatthetribal
'
closed
society
'
has
something
likean
*
organic
'
character,justbecauseoftheabsenceof
socialtension.Thefactthatsucha
society(as
thatofthe
Greeks)
isbased
on
slavery
doesnotcreateinitselfasocialtension,becausetheslavesare
nomore
part
of
societythanthecattle
;
their
aspirationsand
problems
do
notcreate
anything
thatisfeltbytherulersasa
problem
withinsociety.
Populationgrowth,however,doescreatesucha
problem.
In
Sparta,
which
didnotsendoutcolonies,
itledfirsttothe
subjugation
of
neighbouring
tribes
forthesakeof
winning
their
territory,andthentoaconsciousefforttoarrest
allchangebymeasuresthatincludedthecontrolof
population
increaseby

248 CHAPTERID/NOTES8-15
theinstitutionofinfanticide, birthcontrol,and
homosexuality. (Gp.
also
note
34
to
chapter4;furthermore
63
to
chapter10,and39(3)
to
chapter5.)
8
I
suppose
thatwhatIcallthe
*
strainofcivilization
'
issimilartothe
phenomenon
whichFreudhadinmindwhen
writingCivilizationandits
Discontents. Toynbeespeaks
ofaSenseofDrift
(AStudyofHistory,V,412ff.),
butheconfines itto
'
ages
of
disintegration ',whileIfindmy
strain
very
clearlyexpressed
inHeraclitus
(infact,tracescanbefoundinHesiod) long
beforethetimeatwhich,according
toToynbee,
his
'
Hellenic
society
'
begins
to
'
disintegrate
'.WhenMeyer
describesthe
disappearance
of
'
Thestatus
of
birth,whichhaddeterminedeveryman's
place
in
life,
hiscivilandsocial
rightsandduties,togetherwiththe
securityofearning
his
living
'
(Geschichte
desAltertums, III,542),he
givesan
aptdescription
ofthestraininGreek
society
ofthefifth
century
B.C.
9
Another
profession
ofthiskindwhichledto
comparative
intellectual
independence,wasthatofawandering
bard. Iam
thinkingheremainly
of
Xenophanes,
the
progressivist ;cp.
note
7,
the
paragraph
on
'
Prota-
goreanism ',to
chapter5.(Homer
alsomaybeacasein
point.)
Itisclear
thatthis
professionwasaccessibleto
very
fewmen.
I
happen
tohaveno
personal
interestinmattersofcommerce,orin
commerciallyminded
people.Buttheinfluenceofcommercial initiative
seemstomerather
important.
Itis
hardlyanaccidentthattheoldestknown
civilization,thatofSumer,was,asfarasweknow,acommercialcivilization
with
strong
democraticfeatures
;andthattheartsof
writingandarithmetic,
andthe
beginnings
of
science,were
closely
connectedwithitscommercial
life.(Gp.
alsotexttonote
24
tothis
chapter.)
10
Thucydides, I,93(Imostlyfollow
Jowett'stranslation).
Fortheproblem
ofThucydides
5
bias,cp.
note
15(i)
tothis
chapter.
11
Thisandthenextquotation
:
op.
cit.
9I,107.Thucydides'story
ofthe
treacherous
oligarchs
can
hardlybe
recognized
in
Meyer'sapologetic
version
(Gesch.
d.Altertums,III,594),
in
spite
ofthefactthathehasnobettersources
;
itis
simply
distorted
beyondrecognition. (ForMeyer'spartiality,
seenote
15(2)
tothe
presentchapter.)
Forasimilar
treachery(in479B.C.,onthe
eveof
Plataea)cp.
Plutarch's
Aristides, 13.
18
Thucydides ,III,82-84.The
following
conclusionofthe
passage
is
characteristicoftheelementofindividualismandhumanitarianism present
inThucydides,
amemberoftheGreatGeneration
(seebelow,andnote
27
tothis
chapter)and,asmentionedabove,amoderate :
'
Whenmentake
revenge,they
arereckless
;theydonotconsiderthe
future,anddonot
hesitatetoannulthosecommonlawsof
humanityonwhichevery
individual
must
rely
forhisowndeliveranceshouldheeverbeovertakenbycalamity ;
theyforget
thatintheirownhourofneed
they
willlookfortheminvain.'
ForafurtherdiscussionofThucydides'
biasseenote
15(
i
)
tothis
chapter.
18
Aristotle, Politics,VIII,(V),9,10/11 ;i3ioa.
Aristotledoesnot
agree
withsuchopenhostility ;hethinksitwiserthat
'
true
Oligarchs
should
affect
tobeadvocatesofthe
people'scause
'
;andheisanxiousto
givethem
good
advice :
'
They
shouldtake,or
they
shouldatleast
pretend
totake,the
oppositeline,byincluding
intheiroaththe
pledge
:Ishalldonoharmto
the
people.'
14
Thucydides, II,9.
15
Gp.
E.
Meyer,
Geschichtedes
Altertums,IV
(1915),368.
(i)
InordertojudgeThucydides'apparentimpartiality,
or
rather,
his
involuntary bias,onemustcompare
histreatmentofthemost
important
affairofPlataeawhichmarkedtheoutbreakofthefirst
part
ofthePelopon-
nesianwar
(Meyer,followingLysias,
callsthis
part
theArchidamianwar
;
cp.Meyer,
Gesch.d.
Altertums,IV,307,andV,p.VII)
withhistreatmentof
theMelianaffair,Athens'first
aggressivemoveinthesecond
part(thewar

CHAPTERID/NOTES
I6-I8 249
ofAlcibiades)
.TheArchidamianwarbrokeoutwithanattackondemocratic
Plataeaa
lightning
attackmadewithoutdeclarationofwarbyThebes,a
partner
oftotalitarian
Sparta,whosePlataeanfriends,the
oligarchic
fifth
column,hadbynightopenedthedoorsofPlataeatotheenemy.Though
most
important
astheimmediatecauseofthewar,theincidentis
comparatively
briefly
relatedbyThucydides (II,1-7) ;hedoesnotcommentuponthe
moral
aspect,apart
from
calling
*
theaffairofPlataeaa
glaring
violationof
the
thirtyyears
truce
'
;buthecensures
(II,5)
thedemocratsofPlataeafor
theirharshtreatmentofthe
invaders,andeven
expresses
doubtswhether
they
didnotbreakanoath.Thismethodof
presentation
contrasts
strongly
withthefamousandmost
elaborate,though
ofcourse
fictitious,Melian
Dialogue(Thuc.,V,85-113)
inwhichThucydides
triestobrandAthenian
imperialism. Shocking
astheMelianaffairseemstohavebeen
(Alcibiades
mayhavebeen
responsible ;cp.Plutarch,Ale.,16),
theAtheniansdidnot
attackwithout
warning,andtriedto
negotiate
before
using
force.
(2)
E.Meyer
isoneofthe
greatestmodernauthoritiesonthis
period.
Butto
appreciate
his
point
ofviewonemustreadthe
following
scornful
remarksondemocratic
governments (there
area
greatmanypassages
ofthis
kind)
:
'
Muchmore
important
'
(viz.,
thantoarm)
*
wasittocontinuethe
entertaininggame
of
party-quarrels,andtosecureunlimitedfreedom,as
interpretedbyeverybodyaccording
tohis
particular
interests.'
(V,61.)
Butisitmore,I
ask,thanan
'
interpretationaccording
tohis
particular
interests
'
whenMeyer
writes :
'
Thewonderfulfreedomofdemocracy,and
ofher
leaders,have
manifestlyproved
their
inefficiency.' (V,69.)About
theAtheniandemocraticleaderswhoin403
B.C.refusedtosurrenderto
Sparta(and
whoserefusalwaslatereven
justifiedby
successalthough
no
such
justification
is
necessary),Meyersays
:
*
Someoftheseleadersmight
havebeenhonestfanatics
;
. .
theymighthavebeenso
utterlyincapable
ofanysoundjudgement
that
theyreally
believed
'
(whattheysaid,namely :)
*
thatAthensmustnever
capitulate.' (IV,659.)Meyer
censuresother
historiansinthe
strongesttermsfor
being
biassed.
(Cp.e.g.
thenotesinV,
89and102,wherehedefendsthe
tyrantDionysius
I
againstallegedly
biassed
attacks,and
113bottomto
114top,whereheisalsoexasperatedbysome
anti-Dionysian
*
parroting
historians
'.)ThushecallsGrote
'
an
English
radicalleader
',andhiswork
*
nota
history,butan
apology
forAthens
',
andhe
proudly
contrastshimselfwithsuchmen :
'
Itwillhardlybe
possible
todeny
thatwehavebecomemore
impartial
in
questions
of
politics,
and
thatwehavearrived
thereby
atamorecorrectandmoreembracing
historical
judgement.' (All
thisinIII,239.)
Behind
Meyer'spoint
ofviewstands
Hegel.
This
explainseverything
(as
willbe
clear,
I
hope,
tothereadersof
chapter12).Meyer'sHegelianism
becomesobviousinthe
followingremark,whichisanunconsciousbutnearly
literal
quotation
from
Hegel ;
itisin
III,256,whenMeyerspeaks
ofa
*
flat
andmoralizingevaluation,which
judgesgreatpoliticalundertakings
with
the
yardstick
ofcivil
morality
'
(Hegelspeaksofthe
litany
of
private
virtues
'),
'
ignoring
the
deeper,
the
truly
moralfactorsofthe
state,andofhistorical
responsibilities
'.
(Thiscorresponds exactly
tothe
passages
fromHegel
quoted
in
chapter12,below
;cp.
note75
to
chapter12.)
Iwishtousethis
opportunityoncemoretomakeitclearthatIdonot
pretend
tobe
impartial
inmy
historicaljudgement.OfcourseIdowhatIcantoascertainthe
relevantfacts.ButIamawarethatmy
evaluations
(asanybodyelse's)
must
dependentirelyonmypoint
ofview.ThisIadmit,although
I
fully
believe
inmypoint
ofview,i.e.,thatmy
evaluationsare
right.
lf
Cp.Meyer,op.
cit.
9IV,367.
17
Cp.Meyer,op.
cit.
9IV,464.
18
Itmusthoweverbe
kept
inmind
that,asthereactionariescomplained,
O.S.I.E. VOL.I i

250
CHAPTER
JO/NOTESIQ-25
slaverywasinAthensontheverge
ofdissolution. Cp.
theevidencementioned
innotes
17,
18and
29
to
chapter4;furthermore, notes
13
to
chapter 5,
48
to
chapter8,and
27-37
totne
presentchapter.
19
Cp.Meyer,op.cit.,IV,659.
Meyercommentsupon
thismoveoftheAtheniandemocrats :
*
Nowwhen
itwastoolate
theymadeamovetowardsa
political
constitutionwhichlater
helpedRome . .to
lay
thefoundationsofits
greatness.'
Inotherwords,
insteadof
crediting
theAthenianswithaconstitutionalinventionofthefirst
order,he
reproaches
them
;andthecredit
goes
toRome,whoseconservatism
ismoreto
Meyer's
taste.
TheincidentinRoman
history
towhichMeyer
alludesisRome'salliance,
orfederation,withGabii.But
immediately before,andonthe
verypage
onwhichMeyer
describesthisfederation
(inV,135)wecanreadalso :
'
Allthesetowns,when
incorporated
withRome,
losttheirexistence . .
withouteven
receiving
a
politicalorganization
ofthe
typeofAttica's
"
demes".'Alittle
later,
inV,147,
Gabiiis
again
referred
to,andRome
inher
generous
*
liberality
'
again
contrastedwithAthens
;butattheend
ofthesame
page,andatthe
beginning
ofthe
next,Meyerreports
without
criticismRome's
lootinganddestructionofthe
greatcity
ofVeii.
TheworstofalltheseRomandestructions is
perhaps
thatofCarthage.
Ittook
place
atamomentwhenCarthagewasno
longer
a
danger
toRome,
anditrobbedRome,and
us,ofmostvaluablecontributionswhichCarthage
couldhavemadetocivilization. I
only
mentionthe
great
treasuresof
geographical
informationwhichwere
destroyed
there.(Thestoryofthe
declineof
Carthage
isnotunlikethatofthefallofAthensin
404B.C.,discussed
inthis
chapterbelow
;seenote
48.The
oligarchsofCarthagepreferred
the
falloftheir
city
tothe
victory
of
democracy.)
Later,undertheinfluenceofStoicism,derived
indirectlyfromAntisthenes,
Romebegan
to
develop
a
very
liberalandhumanitarianoutlook. Itreached
the
height
ofthis
development
inthosecenturiesof
peace
afterAugustus
(cp.
forinstanceToynbee,A
StudyofHistory,V,343-346),
butitisherethat
someromantichistoriansseethe
beginning
ofherdecline.
Regarding
thisdecline
itself,
it
is,ofcourse,equally
romanticandeven
silly
tobelieve,asmany
stilldo,thatitwasduetothe
degeneration
caused
bylong-continued peace,
ortodemoralization, ortothe
superiority
ofthe
younger
barbarian
peoples,
etc.
;inbrief,to
over-feeding. (Cp.
note
45
(3)
tochapter4.)Apartfromthe
devastating
resultofviolentepidemics
(cp.H.Zinsser,Rats,Lice,and
History,1937,131ff.)
theuncheckedand
progressive
exhaustionofthe
soil,andwithitabreakdownofthe
agricultural
basisoftheRomaneconomic
system(cp.
V.G.Simkhovitch,
*
Hay
and
History ',and
*
Rome'sFallReconsidered
',inTowardsthe
Understandingof
Jesus,
1
927)seemtohavebeenoneofthemaincauses.Cp.
alsoW.Hegemann,
EntlarvteGeschichte
(1934).
20
Thucydides,VII,28
;cp.Meyer,op.cit.,IV,535.Theremarkthat
*
thiswould
yieldmore
',enables
us,ofcourse,tofixanupper
limitforthe
ratiobetweenthetaxes
previouslyimposedandthevolumeoftrade.
21
Thisisanallusiontoa
grim
littlepunwhichIowetoP.Milford :
'
A
Plutocracy
is
preferable
toa
Lootocracy.'
22
Plato,Republic,42$b.
28
Cp.Meyer,
Geschichtedes
Altertums,IV,577.
24
Op.cit.,V,27.Cp.
alsonote
9
tothis
chapter,
andtexttonote30
to
chapter4.
25
ThisisadmittedbyMeyer(op.cit.,IV,433f.),whoina
veryinteresting
passagesays
ofthetwo
parties
:
'
eachofthemclaimsthatitdefends
"
the
paternal
state
"
..
,andthatthe
opponent
isinfectedwiththemodern
spirit
ofselfishnessand
revolutionary
violence. In
reality,
botharein-

CHAPTER
IO/NOTES26-37 25!
fected. . .Thetraditionalcustomsand
religion
aremore
deeplyrootedin
thedemocraticparty ;
itsaristocraticenemieswho
fightunderthe
flag
of
therestorationoftheancienttimes,are . .
entirelymodernized.'
Cp.
also
op.cit.,V,4f.,14,andthenextnote.
26
FromAristotle'sAthenian
Constitution, ch.
34, 3,welearnthatthe
ThirtyTyrantsprofessed
atfirstwhat
appeared
toAristotlea
'
moderate
'
programme, viz.,thatofthe
*
paternal
state'.Forthenihilismandthe
modernity
of
Gritias,cp.
his
theory
of
religiondiscussedin
chapter8
(see
especially
note
17
tothat
chapter)andnote48
tothe
presentchapter.
27
Itismost
interesting
tocontrast
Sophocles'
attitudetowardsthenew
faithwiththatof
Euripides. Sophoclescomplains (cp.Meyer,op.cit.,IV,
III)
:
*
Itiswrong
that . .the
lowlybornshould
flourish,whilethebrave
and
nobly
bornareunfortunate.'
Euripidesreplies(withAntiphon ;cp.
note
13
tochapter5)
thatthedistinctionbetweenthe
noblyandthelow
born
(especiallyslaves)
is
merely
verbal :
'
Thenamealone
bringsshame
upon
theslave.'Forthehumanitarian elementin
Thucydides, cp.
the
quotation
innote12tothis
chapter. Forthe
questionhowfartheGreat
Generationwasconnectedwith
cosmopolitantendencies,cp.especiallynote
48
tochapter
8.
28
'
Misologists ',
i.e.hatersofrational
argument,
arecomparedby
Socrates
to
'
misanthropists ',thehatersofmen
;cp.
thePhaedo,8gc.In
contrast,
cp.
Plato's
misanthropical
remarkinthe
Republic,4g6c-d(cp.
notes
57and
58
to
chapter8).
29
The
quotations
inthisparagraph
arefromDemocritus'
fragments,
Diels,
Vorsokratiker
2
,fragmentsnumber
41;179;34;261
;62
;55;251 ;
247(genuinenessquestionedby
DielsandbyTarn,cp.
note48
to
chapter8);
118.
30
Cp.
texttonote
16,chapter
6.
31
Cp.Thucydides,II,37-41.Cp.
alsotheremarksinnote16to
chapter
6.
32
Cp.
T.Gomperz,
GreekThinkers,BookV,ch.
13,3(Germ,ed.,II,407).
33
Herodotus'workwithits
pro-democratic tendency(cp.,
for
example,
III,80)appeared
abouta
year
ortwoafterPericles'oration
(cp.Meyer,
Gesch.d.
Altertums,IV,369).
34
Thishasbeenpointed
outforinstancebyT.Gomperz,
Greek
Thinkers,
V,13,
2(Germ,ed.,II,406f.);the
passages
inthe
Republic
towhichhe
drawsattentionare :557d
and
56ic,
ff.The
similarity
is
undoubtedly
intentional. Gp.
alsoAdam'seditionofthe
Republic,
vol.
II,235,
noteto
557d26.
SeealsotheLaws,Gggd/e, if.,and
7O4d~7O7d. Forasimilar
observationregarding
Herodotus III,80,seenote
17
to
chapter
6.
36
SomeholdtheMenexenustobe
spurious,
butIbelievethatthisshows
only
theirtendency
toidealizePlato.TheMenexenus isvouchedforby
Aristotle,who
quotes
aremarkfromitasduetothe
'
SocratesoftheFuneral
Dialogue' (Rhetoric, I,9,30
=
I367b8 ;andIII,14,u=
14^30). See
alsoendofnote
35,
andnote61tothis
chapter,
note
19
to
chapter6,and
note48
tochapter
8.
36
TheOld
Oligarch's(or
the
Pseudo-Xenophon's)
Constitution
of
Athens
was
published
in424
B.C.
(according
toKirchhoff,quotedbyGomperz,
Greek
Thinkers,Germ,cd.,I,477).
Foritsattributionto
Critias,cp.J.
E.
Sandys,
Aristotle'sConstitutionofAthens,IntroductionIX,especially
note
3.
Seealsonotes18and48
tothis
chapter.
ForitsinfluenceuponThucydides,
cp.
notes10andntothis
chapter ;uponPlato,cp.especially
note
59
to
chapter8,andLaws,joq.a-'jQ'jd. (Cp.Aristotle, Politics,I326b-i327a ;
CiceroDe
Republica, II,3and
4.)
87
Iam
alluding
tothetitleofM.Rader'sbookNo
Compromise
The
Conflict
betweenTwoWorlds
(1939),
anexcellentcriticismofthe
ideology
of
fascism.

252 CHAPTERID/NOTES38-4!
88
Schools
(especially Universities) haveretainedcertainfeaturesof
tribalismeversince.Manyofthemarenotbad.Butwemustnotthink
only
oftheiremblems,oroftheOldSchoolTicwithallitssocial
implications
of
caste,etc.,butalsoofthe
patriarchalandauthoritariancharacterofso
many
schools. ItisnotanaccidentthatPlato,whenhefailedtore-establish
tribalism,foundedaschoolinstead
;norisitanaccidentthatschoolshave
sooftenbeenbastionsofreaction,andschoolteachersdictatorsin
pocket
edition.
Asanillustrationofthetribalisticcharacterofthese
earlyschools,
I
give
herealistofsomeofthetaboosofthe
earlyPythagoreans. (The
listisfrom
Burnet'sEarly
Greek
Philosophy
2
,106,whotakesitfromDiels,Vorsokratiker
a
,
pp.282ff.Burnet
speaksrightlyof
genuine
taboosofa
thoroughlyprimitive
type'.)Toabstainfrombeans.Notto
pickupwhathasfallen.Notto
touchawhitecock.Nottobreakbread.Notto
step
overacrossbar.Not
tostirthefirewithiron.Nottoeatfromawholeloaf.Notto
pluck
a
garland.
Nottositona
quart
measure.Nottoeattheheart.Nottowalkon
highways. Nottolettheswallowsshareone'sroof.Whenthe
pot
istaken
offthe
fire,nottoleavethemarkofitintheashes,buttostirthem
together.
Nottolookinamirrorbesidea
light.
After
risingfromthebedclothes,to
rollthem
togetherandtosmoothoutthe
impress
ofthe
body.
39
An
interestingparallelism
tothis
development
isthedestructionof
tribalismthrough
thePersian
conquests.
Thissocialrevolution led,as
Meyerpoints
out
(op.cit.,
vol.
Ill,167ff.)
totheemergence
ofanumberof
prophetic,
i.e.inour
terminology,
ofhistoricist,religions
of
destiny,degenera-
tion,andsalvation,amongthemthatofthe
*
chosen
people ',the
Jews(cp.
chapter i).
Someofthese
religions
werealsocharacterizedby
thedoctrinethatthe
creationoftheworldisnotyetconcluded,butstill
going
on.Thismust
becompared
withthe
earlyGreek
conception
oftheworldasanedifice
andwiththeHeracliteandestructionofthis
conception,
describedin
chapter
2
(see
note itothat
chapter).
Itmaybementionedherethateven
Anaximander felt
uneasy
abouttheedifice.Hisstressupon
theboundlessor
infinitecharacterofthe
building-material expresses
alsoa
feeling
thatthe
buildingmaypossess
nodefiniteframework,thatitmay
beinflux
(cp.
next
note).
The
development
oftheDionysianandtheOrphicmysteries
inGreece
is
probablydependentupon
the
religiousdevelopment
oftheeast
(cp.
Herodotus,II,81).Pythagoreanism,
asiswellknown,hasmuchincommon
withOrphicteaching,especiallyregarding
the
theory
ofthesoul
(see
also
note
44below).
But
Pythagoreanismhada
definitely
'
aristocratic
'
flavour,
as
opposed
totheOrphicteachingwhich
represented
akindof
'
proletarian
'
versionofthismovement. Meyer(op.cit.,Ill,p.428, 246)
is
probably
rightwhenhedescribesthe
beginnings
of
philosophy
asarationalcounter-
current
against
themovementofthe
mysteries ;cp.
Heraclitus*attitudein
thesematters
(fragm.5,14,15;and
40,129,
Diels
2
;124-129 ;and
16-17,
Bywater).Hehatedthe
mysteries
and
Pythagoras ;the
Pythagorean
Plato
despised
the
mysteries(Rep.,3646,
f.
;cp.howeverAdam'sAppendixIVto
BookIXofthe
Republic,
vol.
II,378ff.,ofhis
edition.)
40
ForAnaximander
(cp.
the
precedingnote)
seeDiels
2
,fragm.9
:
'
The
origin
of
things
istheindeterminate
;fromwhere
they
are
generated,
thither
they
must
dissolve,bynecessity.
For
theymustdopenance
tooneanother
fortheir
injustice,according
totheorderoftime/Thatindividualexistence
appeared
toAnaximander as
injustice,
hasbeen
pointed
outbyGomperz
GreekThinkers,Germ,
ed.,
vol.
I,p.46).Notethe
similarity
toPlato's
theory
of
justice.
11
Parmenideswasthefirsttoseekhissalvationfromthisstrainby

CHAPTERID/NOTES42-44 253
interpreting
hisdreamofthearrestedworldasarevelationoftrue
reality,
andtheworldoffluxinwhichhelivedasadream.
(
Thereal
being
is
indivisible. Itis
always
an
integratedwhole,whichneverbreaksaway
fromitsorder
;
itnever
disperses,
andthusneednotre-unite.' (D
2
,fragm.
2.)
ForParmenides, cp.
alsonote22to
chapter3,
andtext.
42
Gp.
note
9
tothe
presentchapter(and
note
7
tochapter5).
48
Cp.Meyer,
GeschichtedesAltertums,III,443,
andIV,iaof.
44
J.Burnet,
'
TheSocraticDoctrineoftheSoul
',Proceedingsof
theBritish
Academy,VIII
(1915/16),235
if.Iamthemoreanxioustostressthis
partial
agreement
sinceIcannot
agree
withBurnetinmostofhisothertheories,
especially
thosethatconcernSocrates*relationstoPlato
;
his
opinion
in
particular
thatSocrates is
politically
themorereactionary
ofthetwo
(Greek
Philosophy, I,210)appears
tome
simply
untenable. Cp.
note56
tothis
chapter.
Regarding
theSocraticdoctrineofthesoul,
IbelievethatBurnetis
right
in
insisting
thatthe
saying
'
carefor
your
souls
'
isSocratic
;
forthis
saying
expresses
Socrates'moralinterests. ButIthinkit
highlyimprobable
that
Socratesheldanymetaphysical theory
ofthesoul.Thetheoriesofthe
Phaedo,the
Republic,etc.,seemtomeundoubtedlyPythagorean. (For
the
Orphic-Pythagorean theory
thatthebody
isthetombofthesoul,cp.Adam,
'AppendixIVtoBookIXofthe
Republic ;
seealsonote39
tothis
chapter.)
AndinviewofSocrates'clearstatementinthe
Apology,igc,
thathehad
'
nothing
whatevertodowith
speculations
onnature
'
(see
note56(5)
to
this
chapter),
Istronglydisagree
withBurnet'sopinion
thatSocrateswasa
Pythagorean ;andalsowiththe
opinion
thatheheldany
definitemeta-
physical
doctrineofthe
'
nature
'
ofthesoul.
IbelievethatSocrates'
saying
*
careforyour
souls
'
isan
expression
of
hismoral
(andintellectual)
individualism. Fewofhisdoctrinesseemtobe
sowellattestedashisindividualistictheory
ofthemoralself-sufficiency
of
thevirtuousman.
(See
theevidencementionedinnotes25
tochapter5
and
36
to
chapter6.)
Butthisismost
closely
connectedwiththeidea
expressed
inthesentence
'
careforyour
souls'.Inhis
emphasis
on
self-sufficiency,
Socrateswishedto
say
:They
candestroyyourbody,
but
they
cannotdestroy
your
moral
integrity.
Ifthelatterisyour
mainconcern,they
cannotdoany
really
seriousharmto
you.
It
appears
thatPlato,whenbecomingacquainted
withthePythagorean
metaphysicaltheory
ofthesoul,
feltthatSocrates'moralattitudeneededa
metaphysical foundation, especially
a
theory
ofsurvival.Hetherefore
substitutedfor
'
they
cannotdestroyyour
moral
integrity
'
theideaofthe
indestructibility
ofthesoul.
(Cp.
alsonotesgf
tochapter7.)
Againstmyinterpretation,
itmay
becontendedby
bothmetaphysicians
and
positivists
thattherecanbenosuchmoralandnon-metaphysical
idea
ofthesoulasIascribetoSocrates,sinceanyway
ofspeaking
ofthesoulmust
be
metaphysical.
IdonotthinkthatIhavemuchhope
ofconvincing
Platonic
metaphysicians ;butIshallattempt
toshow
positivists(ormaterialists,
etc.)
thatthey
toobelieveina
*
soul
',inasensevery
similartothatwhichI
attributetoSocrates,andthatmostofthemvaluethat
'
soul
'
morehighly
thanthebody.
Firstof
all,even
positivistsmay
admitthatwecanmakea
perfectly
empiricaland
*
meaningful ',although
somewhat unprecise,
distinction
between
'
physical
'
and
*
psychical
*
maladies. In
fact,
thisdistinction isof
considerable
practicalimportance
fortheorganization
of
hospitals,
etc.
(It
is
quiteprobable
thatoneday
itmaybesupersededbysomething
more
precise,
butthatisadifferent
question.)Nowmostof
us,even
positivists,would,
if
wehadtochoose,prefer
amild
physicalmalady
toamildformof
insanity.
Even
positivists
wouldmoreover
probablyprefer
alengthy
andintheend

254
CHAPTER10/NOTES45-47
incurable
physical
illness
(provided
itwasnottoo
painful,etc.)
toan
equally
lengthyperiod
ofincurable
insanity,and
perhaps
eventoa
period
ofcurable
insanity. Inthisway,
Ibelieve,wecansaywithoutusingmetaphysical
termsthatthey
carefortheir
'
souls
'
morethanfortheir
*
bodies
'
;andthis
way
of
speakingwouldbe
quiteindependent
of
anytheorytheymight
have
concerning
the
'
soul
'
;evenif
theyshouldmaintain
that,
inthelast
analysis,
itis
onlypart
ofthe
body,andall
insanityonly
a
physicalmalady,ourcon-
clusionwouldstillhold.
(Itwouldcometo
something
likethis :thatthey
valuetheirbrainsmore
highly
thanother
parts
oftheir
bodies.)
Wecannow
proceed
toasimilarconsiderationofanideaofthe
'
soul
'
whichiscloserstilltotheSocraticidea.Many
ofusare
prepared
toundergo
considerable
physicalhardship
forthesakeof
purely
intellectualends.We
are,
for
example,ready
tosuffer
in,ordertoadvancescientificknowledge ;
andalsoforthesakeof
furthering
ourownintellectual
development,
i.e.for
thesakeof
attaining
*
wisdom '.
(For
Socrates' intellectualism, cp.
for
instancethe
Crito,44d/c,and
47b.)
Similar
things
couldbesaidofthe
furthering
ofmoral
ends,
forinstance,equalitarianjustice,peace,
etc.
(Gp.
Crito,47e/48a,
whereSocrates
explains
thathemeansby
'
soul
'
that
part
of
uswhichis
*
improvedbyjusticeanddepravedbyinjustice '.)Andmany
ofuswould
say,with
Socrates,thatthese
things
aremore
important
tousthan
things
likehealth,even
thoughweliketobein
good
health.Andmany
may
even
agreewithSocratesthatthe
possibility
of
adopting
suchanattitude
iswhatmakesusproud
tobemen,andnotanimals.
All
this,
I
believe,canbesaidwithoutany
referencetoa
metaphysical
theoryofthe
(
natureofthesoul'.AndIseenoreasonwhyweshould
attributesucha
theory
toSocratesinthefaceofhisclearstatementthathe
had
nothing
todowith
speculations
ofthatsort.
46
Inthe
Gorgias,which
is,
I
believe,Socraticin
parts(although
the
Pythagorean
elementswhichGomperz
hasnotedshow,
I
think,thatitis
largely
Platonic
;cp.
note
56
tothis
chapter),
Plato
puts
intothemouthof
Socratesanattackon
'
the
portsand
ship-yards
andwalls
'
ofAthens,andon
thetributesortaxes
imposedupon
herAllies.Theseattacks,
as
theystand,
are
certainlyPlato's,whichmayexplainwhytheysoundverymuchlike
thoseofthe
oligarchs. ButIthinkit
quitepossible
thatSocratesmay
have
madesimilarremarks,
inhis
anxiety
tostressthe
thingswhich,
inhis
opinion,
matteredmost.Buthewould,
I
believe,haveloathedtheideathathis
moralcriticismcouldbeturnedintotreacherous
oligarchicpropaganda
against
the
opensociety,and
especially,against
its
representative,
Athens.
(For
the
question
ofSocrates'
loyalty,cp.esp.
note
53
tothischapter,
arid
text.)
46
The
typicalfigures,
inPlato'sworks,areGalliclesandThrasymachus.
Historically,
thenearestrealizationsare
perhaps
TheramenesandCritias
;
Alcibiadesalso,whosecharacteranddeeds,however,are
very
hardto
judge.
47
The
following
remarksare
highlyspeculativeanddonotbearuponmy
arguments.
Iconsider it
possible
thatthebasisoftheFirstAlcibiades isPlato'sown
conversionbySocrates, i.e.,thatPlatomay
inthis
dialogue
havechosenthe
figure
ofAlcibiadestohidehimself.There
might
havebeena
strong
induce-
mentforhimtotellthe
story
ofhisconversion
;
forSocrates,whenaccused
of
beingresponsible
forthemisdeedsofAlcibiades, Gritias,andCharmides
(seebelow),
had
referred,
inhis
apology
beforethecourt,
toPlatoasa
living
example,
andasa
witness,ofhistrueeducationalinfluence. Itseemsnot
unlikely
thatPlatowithhis
urge
to
literarytestimony
feltthathehadtotell
thetaleofSocrates'relationswithhimself,atalewhichhecouldnottell
incourt
(cp.Taylor,Socrates,note ito
p.105).Byusing
Alcibiades'name
andthe
special
circumstances
surroundinghim
(e.g.
hisambitious
political

CHAPTERID/NOTES48-49 255
dreamswhichmight
wellhavebeensimilartothoseofPlatobeforehiscon-
version)hewouldattainhis
apologeticpurpose(cp.
texttonotes
49-50),
showing
thatSocrates'moralinfluencein
generalandonAlcibiades in
particularwasvery
differentfromwhathis
prosecutors
maintained ittobe.
Ithinkitnot
unlikely
thattheCharmides isalso,largely,
a
self-portrait. (It
isnotwithoutinteresttonotethatPlatohimselfundertooksimilarconversions,
butasfaraswecan
judge,
inadifferentway;notsomuchby
direct
personal
moral
appeal,
butratherby
aninstitutionalteaching
ofPythagoreanmathe-
matics,asa
pre-requisite
forthedialecticalintuitionoftheIdeaoftheGood.
Cp.
thestoriesofhisattemptedconversionofDionysius II.)
FortheFirst
Alcibiadesandrelated
problems,
seealsoGrote's
Plato,I,especiallypp.351-355.
48
Gp.Meyer,
Geschichtedes
Altertums,V,38,(andXenophon'sHellenica,II,
4,22).
Inthesamevolume,on
pp.19-23and
36-44(seeespeciallyp.36)
canbefoundalltheevidenceneededfor
justifying
the
interpretationgiven
inthetext.The
Cambridge
Ancient
History(1927,
vol.V
;cp.especiallypp.
369ff.)gives
a
very
similar
interpretation
oftheevents.
Itmay
beaddedthatthenumberoffullcitizenskilledby
theThirty
during
the
eightmonthsofterrorapproachedprobably1,500,which
is,as
farasweknow,notmuchlessthanone-tenth(probablyabout8percent.)
ofthetotalnumberoffullcitizensleftafterthewar,ori
per
cent,permonth
anachievementhardlysurpassed
eveninourown
day.
Taylorwrites,oftheThirty(Socrates,
Short
Biographies, 1937,p.100,
note i
)
:
'
Itisonly
fairtorememberthatthesemen
probably
"
losttheir
heads
"
underthe
temptationpresentedby
theirsituation. Critiashad
previouslybeenknownasamanofwideculturewhose
politicalleanings
were
decidedly
democratic.' Ibelievethatthis
attempt
tominimizethe
responsibility
ofthe
puppetgovernment,and
especially
ofPlato'sbeloved
uncle,mustfail.Weknowwellenoughwhattothinkoftheshortlived
democraticsentiments
professed
inthose
days
atsuitableoccasionsby
the
young
aristocrats. Besides,
Critias'father
(cp.Meyer,
vol.IV,p.579,
and
Lys.y
1
2,66),and
probably
Critiashimself,had
belonged
tothe
oligarchy
ofthe
FourHundred
;andCritias
5
extant
writingsshowhistreacherous
pro-Spartan
leanings
aswellashis
oligarchic
outlook
(cp.
forinstanceDiels
a
,45)
andhis
cynicism(cp.
note
17
to
chapter8)andhisambition
(cp.
Diels
a
,15;cp.
also
Xenophon'sMemorabilia, I,2,24;andhis
Hellenica,II,3,36and
47).
But
thedecisivepoint
isthathe
simply
triedto
give
consistent effecttothe
programme
ofthe
'
OldOligarch *,theauthorofthePseudo-Xenophontic
Constitution
of
Athens
(cp.
note36
tothe
presentchapter)
:toeradicate
democracy ;andtomakeadeterminedattempt
todosowith
Spartanhelp,
shouldAthensbedefeated.Thedegree
ofviolenceusedisthe
logical
result
ofthesituation. ItdoesnotindicatethatCritiaslosthishead
;rather,that
hewasverywellawareofthe
difficulties,
i.e.ofthedemocrats' stillformidable
power
ofresistance.
Meyer,whose
greatsympathy
forDionysius
I
proves
thatheisatleast
not
prejudicedagainsttyrants,saysaboutCritias
(op.cit.,V,p.17),
aftera
sketchofhisamazinglyopportunistic politicalcareer,that
'
hewas
just
as
unscrupulous
asLysander *,the
Spartanconqueror,
andtherefore the
appropriateheadofLysander'spuppetgovernment.
Itseemstomethatthereisa
strikingsimilarity
betweenthecharacters
of
Critias,thesoldier,aesthete,poet,andscepticalcompanion
ofSocrates,and
ofFrederickIIofPrussia,called
'
theGreat
',whoalsowasasoldier,an
aesthete,a
poet,anda
scepticaldisciple
ofVoltaire,aswellasoneoftheworst
tyrantsandmostruthless
oppressors
ofmodern
history.(OnFrederick,cp.
W.Hegemann,
EntlarvteGeschichte,1934;see
especiallyp.90
onhisattitude
towards
religion,
reminiscentofthatof
Critias.)
*49
This
point
is
very
well
explainedbyTaylor,Socrates,Short
Biographies,

256
CHAPTERlO/NOTES50-53
1937,p.103,whofollowshereBurnet'snotetoPlato's
Eutyphro,40,4.The
onlypoint
inwhichIfeelinclinedtodeviate,but
onlyveryslightly,from
Taylor's
excellenttreatment
(op.cit.,103,120)
ofSocrates' trialisinthe
interpretation
ofthetendenciesofthe
charge,especially
ofthechargeconcern-
ing
theintroductionof
'
novel
religiouspractices
'
(op.cit.,109and
inf.).
50
Evidencetoshowthiscanbefoundin
Taylor'sSocrates,113-115 ;cp.
especially115,
note
i,whereAeschines
I,173,
is
quoted
:
'
Youput
Socrates
the
Sophist
todeathbecausehewasshowntohaveeducatedCritias.'
61
Itwasthe
policy
ofthe
Thirty
to
implicate
asmanypeople
intheir
actsofterrorismas
theycould
;cp.
theexcellentremarksbyTaylor
in
Socrates,101f.
(especially
note
3
to
p.101).
52
AsGrossmanandothersdo
;cp.Grossman,PlatoTo-Day,91/92.
I
agree
inthis
point
with
Taylor,Socrates,
116
;
seealsohisnotes iand2to
that
page.
Thatthe
plan
oftheprosecutionwasnottomakeamartyrofSocrates
;
thatthetrialcouldhavebeenavoided,ormanageddifferently,hadSocrates
been
prepared
to
compromise, i.e.,toleaveAthens,orevento
promise
to
keepquiet,
allthisseems
fairly
clearinviewofPlato's
(orSocrates')
allusions
inthe
Apology
aswellasintheCrito.
(Cp.Crito,456and
especially52b/c,
whereSocrates
says
thathewouldhavebeen
permitted
to
emigratehadhe
offeredtodosoatthe
trial.)
63
Cp.especiallyCrito,530/0,whereSocrates
explainsthat,
ifhewereto
accept
the
opportunity
for
escape,hewouldconfirmhis
judges
intheirbelief
;
forhewho
corrupts
thelawsis
likely
to
corrupt
theyoung
also.
The
ApologyandCritowere
probably
writtennotlong
afterSocrates'
death.TheCrito
(possibly
theearlierofthe
two),
wasperhaps
writtenupon
Socrates'
request
thathismotivesin
declining
to
escape
shouldbemade
known. Indeed,suchawishmayhavebeenthefirst
inspiration
ofthe
Socratic
dialogues.
T.Gomperz(GreekThinkers,V,u,i,Germ,ed.,II,
358)
believestheCritotobeoflaterdateand
explains
itstendencybyassuming
thatitwasPlatowhowasanxioustostresshis
loyalty.
'
Wedonotknow
',
writesGomperz,
'
theimmediatesituationtowhichthissmall
dialogueowes
itsexistence
;butitishardtoresistthe
impression
thatPlatoisheremost
interestedin
defending
himselfandhisgroupagainst
the
suspicion
ofharbour-
ingrevolutionary
views.'AlthoughGomperz'ssuggestionwould
easily
fit
intomygeneralinterpretation
ofPlato'sviews,
IfeelthattheCritoismuch
more
likely
tobeSocrates'defencethanPlato's.ButI
agree
with
Gomperz's
interpretationofits
tendency.
Socrateshad
certainly
the
greatest
interest
in
defending
himself
against
a
suspicionwhichendangered
hislife'swork.
Regarding
this
interpretation
ofthecontentsoftheCrito,
I
againagreefully
withTaylor(Socrates,124f.).Butthe
loyaltyoftheCritoanditscontrast
totheobvious
disloyalty
ofthe
Republicwhich
quiteopenly
takessideswith
SpartaagainstAthensseemstorefuteBurnet'sand
Taylor'sviewthatthe
Republic
is
Socratic,andthatSocrateswasmore
stronglyopposed
todemocracy
thanPlato.
(Cp.
note
56
tothis
chapter.)
Concerning
Socrates'affirmationofhis
loyalty
todemocracy,cp.especially
the
followingpassages
oftheCrito :
5id/e,wherethedemocraticcharacter
ofthelawsis
stressed, i.e.,
the
possibility
thatthecitizenmightchange
the
lawswithout
violence,by
rational
argument(as
Socrates
putsit,hemaytry
toconvincethe
laws) ;52b,f.,whereSocratesinsiststhathehasno
quarrel
withtheAthenianconstitution
;53c/d,wherehedescribesnotonly
virtue
and
justice
but
especially
institutionsandlaws
(those
of
Athens)
asthebest
thingsamongmen
;54c,
wherehe
says
thathemay
beavictimofmen,
butinsiststhatheisnotavictimofthelaws.
Inviewofallthese
passages(andespecially
of
Apology,32C;cp.
note8to
chapter7),wemust,
I
believe,discounttheonepassagewhichlooksvery

CHAPTER
lO/NOTES54-55 257
different,
viz.
526,
whereSocratesbyimplication praises
theconstitutions
of
SpartaandCrete.
Consideringespecially52b/c,whereSocratessaidthat
hewasnotcurioustoknowotherstatesortheirlaws,onemaybe
tempted
to
suggest
thattheremarkon
SpartaandCretein526
isan
interpolation,made
bysomebodywhoattempted
toreconciletheCritowithlater
writings,especially
withthe
Republic.Whetherthatissoorwhetherthe
passage
isaPlatonic
addition,
itseemsextremelyunlikely
thatitisSocratic.Oneneed
only
rememberSocrates'anxietynottodo
anythingwhich
might
be
interpreted
as
pro-Spartan,
an
anxiety
ofwhichweknowfrom
Xenophon'sAnabasis,III,
i,5.
Therewereadthat
*
Socratesfearedthathe
'
(i.e.,
hisfriend,theyoung
Xenophon
anotherofthe
young
black
sheep)
'
might
beblamedforbeing
disloyal ;
forCyrus
wasknowntohaveassistedthe
Spartans
inthewar
against
Athens.'
(Thispassage
is
certainlymuchless
suspect
thantheMemorabilia
;
thereisnoinfluenceofPlato
here,andXenophonactually
accuseshimself,
byimplication,
ofhaving
takenhis
obligations
tohis
country
too
lightly,
and
of
having
deservedhisbanishment,mentionedin
op.cit.,V,3,7,andVII,
7,57-)
54
Apology,soc/sia.
65
Platonists,ofcourse,wouldall
agree
with
Taylorwho
says
inthelast
sentenceofhisSocrates :
'
Socrateshad
just
one
*'
successor
"
Plato.'Only
Groteseemssometimestohaveheldviewssimilartothosestatedinthetext
;
whathe
says,
forinstance,inthe
passagequoted
hereinnote21to
chapter7
(see
alsonote
15
to
chapter8)
canbe
interpreted
asatleastan
expression
of
doubtwhetherPlatodidnot
betray
Socrates. Grotemakesit
perfectly
clear
thatthe
Republic(notonly
the
Laws)wouldhavefurnishedthetheoreticalbasis
forcondemning
theSocratesofthe
Apology,andthatthisSocrateswouldnever
havebeentoleratedinPlato'sbeststate.Andheeven
points
outthatPlato's
theoryagrees
withthe
practical
treatmentmetedouttoSocratesby
the
Thirty.
FortheremarksontheLaws,madelaterinthisparagraph,cp.especially
the
passages
oftheLawsreferredtoinnotes1
9-23
to
chapter
8.Even
Taylor,
whose
opinions
onthese
questions
are
diametricallyopposed
tothose
presented
here
(see
alsothenext
note),
admits :
'
Thepersonwhofirst
proposed
tomake
false
opinions
in
theology
anoffence
against
the
state,wasPlatohimself,
inthe
tenthBookoftheLaws.
9
(Taylor,op.cit.,108,note
i.)
Inthe
text,
Icontrast
especially
Plato's
ApologyandCritowithhisLaws.
Thereasonforthischoiceisthat
nearlyeverybody,evenBurnetandTaylor
(see
thenext
note)
would
agree
thatthe
Apologyandthe*Crito
represent
the
Socraticdoctrine,andthattheLawsmaybedescribedasPlatonic. Itseemsto
methereforevery
difficulttounderstandhowBurnetand
Taylor
could
possibly
defendtheir
opinion
thatSocrates'attitudetowardsdemocracywasmore
hostilethanPlato's.
(Thisopinion
is
expressed
inBurnet'sGreek
Philosophy,I,
209f.,andin
Taylor'sSocrates,150f.,and
170f.).
Ihaveseenno
attempt
to
defendthisviewof
Socrates,whofought
forfreedom
(cp.especially
note
53
to
this
chapter)
anddiedfor
it,andof
Plato,whowrotetheLaws.
BurnetandTaylor
holdthis
strangeviewbecausethey
arecommittedto
the
opinion
thatthe
Republic
isSocraticandnotPlatonic
;andbecause it
maybesaidthatthe
Republic
is
slightly
lessanti-democraticthanthePlatonic
StatesmanandtheLaws.Butthedifferencesbetweenthe
Republic
andthe
StatesmanaswellastheLawsare
veryslightindeed,especially
ifnotonly
the
firstbooksoftheLawsareconsideredbutalsothelast
;
in
fact,theagreement
ofdoctrineisrathercloserthanoneshould
expect
intwobooks
separatedby
atleastonedecade,andprobablybythreeormore,andmostdissimilarin
temperament
and
style(seenote6to
chapter4,andmany
other
places
in
thisbookwherethe
similarity,
ifnot
identity,betweenthedoctrinesofthe
Lawsandthe
Republic
is
shown.)
Thereisnotthe
slightest
internal
difficulty

258 CHAPTERIO/NOTE56
in
assuming
thatthe
RepublicandtheLawsarebothPlatonic
;butBurnet'sand
Taylor'sownadmissionthattheir
theory
leadstotheconclusionthatSocrates
wasnotonlyanenemyofdemocracy
butevena
greaterenemy
thanPlato
showsthe
difficulty
ifnot
absurdity
oftheirviewthatnotonly
the
Apology
andtheCritoareSocraticbutthe
Republic
aswell.
(For
allthese
questions,
seealsothenext
note.)
56
Ineedhardlysay
thatthissentenceisan
attempt
tosumupmy
inter-
pretation
ofthehistoricalroleofPlato's
theory
of
justice(for
themoralfailure
ofthe
Thirty,cp.Xenophon's Hellenica,II.,4,40-42) ;and
particularly
of
themain
political
doctrinesofthe
Republic ;an
interpretation
whichtries
to
explain
thecontradictionsamong
the
earlydialogues,especially
the
Gorgias,
andthe
Republic,
as
arisingfromthefundamentaldifferencebetweentheviews
ofSocratesandthoseofthelaterPlato.Thecardinal
importance
ofthe
question
whichis
usually
calledtheSocraticProblemmayjustifymyentering
hereintoa
lengthyand
partlymethodological
debate.
(1)TheoldersolutionoftheSocraticProblemassumedthata
group
ofthe
Platonic
dialogues,especially
the
Apologyandthe
Crito,
isSocratic
(i.e.,
inthe
main
historically correct,andintendedas
such)
whilethe
majority
ofthe
dialogues
are
Platonic,includingmany
ofthoseinwhichSocratesisthemain
speaker,
asforinstancethePhaedoandthe
Republic.Theolderauthorities
justified
this
opinion
oftenbyreferring
toan
'
independentwitness
',Xenophon,
andbypointingoutthe
similaritybetweenthe
Xenophontic
Socratesandthe
Socratesofthe
*
Socratic
'
group
of
dialogues,
andthedissimilaritiesbetween
the
Xenophontic
*
Socrates
'
andthe
'
Socrates
'
ofthePlatonic
group
of
dialogues.The
metaphysicaltheory
ofFormsor
Ideas,more
especially,
was
usually
consideredPlatonic.
(2)Against
this
view,anattackwaslaunched
byJ.Burnet,whois
supported
by
A.E.
Taylor.
Burnetdenouncedthe
argument
onwhichthe
'
older
solution
'
isbasedascircularand
unconvincing.
Itisnotsound,hemain-
tained,
toselecta
group
of
dialoguessolely
becausethe
theory
ofFormsis
lessprominent
inthem,tocallthemSocratic,andthentosay
thatthe
theory
ofFormswasnotSocrates'butPlato'sinvention.Anditisnotsoundto
claimXenophon
asan
independent
witnesssincewehavenoreasonwhatever
tobelieveinhis
independence,and
good
reasontobelievethathemusthave
knownanumberofPlato's
dialogueswhenhecommenced
writing
the
Memorabilia. Burnet
suggestedproceedingfromthe
assumption
thatPlato
really
meantwhathe
said,andthat,whenhemadeSocratespronounce
acertain
doctrine,he
believed,andwishedhisreadersto
believe,thatthisdoctrine
wascharacteristicofSocrates'
teaching.
(3)Although
Burnet'sviewsontheSocraticProblemappear
tome
untenable,
Ibelievethat
theyhavebeenmostvaluableand
stimulating.A
bold
theory,
evenifitis
false,alwaysmeans
progress ;andBurnet'sbooks
arefullofboldandmostunconventionalviewsonhis
subject.
Thisisthe
moretobe
appreciated
asahistorical
subject
shows
always
a
tendency
to
becomestale.ButmuchasIadmireBurnetforhisbrilliantandboldtheories,
andmuchasI
appreciate
their
salutaryeffect,
Ican
hardlyever,on
considering
theevidenceavailabletome,convince
myself
thatthesetheoriesaretenable.
Burnet,
inhisinvaluableenthusiasm
was,
I
believe,not
always
criticalenough
towardshisownideas.Thisiswhy
othershavefoundit
necessary
tocriticize
theseideasinstead.
Regarding
theSocraticProblem,
Ibelievewithmany
othersthatthe
viewwhichIhavedescribedasthe
'
oldersolution
'
is
fundamentally
correct.
Thisviewhas
latelybeenwellde^nded,against
Burnetand
Taylor,especially
byG.G.Field(fea
andHis
Contemporaries, 10^30)andA.K.
Rogers(The
SocraticProblem,1933) ;andmany
otherscholarsseemtoadheretoit.In
spite
ofthefactthatthe
arguments
sofaroffered
appear
tome
convincing,

CHAPTERIO/NOTE56 359
Imaybe
permitted
toaddtothem,using
theresultsofthe
present
book.
Butbeforeproceeding
tocriticizeBurnet,
Imay
statethatitistoBurnetthat
weoweour
insight
intothe
followingprinciple
ofmethod. Plato'sevidenceis
the
onlyfirst-rate
evidenceavailabletous
;
allotherevidenceis
secondary. (Burnet
has
applied
this
principle
toXenophon ;butwemust
apply
italsoto
Aristophanes,whoseevidencewas
rejectedby
Socrateshimself,inthe
Apology ;
seeunder
(5),below.)
(4)Burnet
explains
thatitishismethodtoassume
'
thatPlato
really
meantwhathesaid'.According
tothismethodological principle,
Plato's
'
Socrates
'
mustbeintendedasa
portraitof
thehistoricalSocrates.
(Cp.
Greek
Philosophy, I,128,
1212
f.,andnoteon
p.349/50 ;cp.Taylor'sSocrates,14f.,
32f.,153.)
IadmitthatBurnet's
methodologicalprinciple
isasound
starting
point.
ButIshall
try
toshow,under
(5)
thatthefactsaresuchthat
they
soonforce
everybody
to
give
it
up,including
Burnetand
Taylor.They
are
forced,
likeallothers,to
interpretwhatPlato
says.
Butwhileothersbecome
consciousofthis
fact,andthereforecarefulandcriticalintheir
interpretations,
itisinevitablethatthosewho
cling
tothebeliefthat
theydonot
interpret
Platobut
simplyacceptwhathesaidmakeit
impossible
forthemselvesto
examinetheir
interpretations critically.
(5)ThefactsthatmakeBurnet'smethodology inapplicableandforce
himandallothersto
interpretwhatPlato
said,are,of
course,thecontradictions
inPlato's
allegedportrait
ofSocrates.Evenifwe
accept
the
principle
that
wehavenobetterevidencethanPlato's,weareforcedby
theinternal
contradictions inhis
writing
nottotakehimathisword,andto
giveup
the
assumption
thathe
*
reallymeantwhathesaid'.Ifawitnessinvolveshimself
incontradictions,thenwecannot
accept
his
testimony
without
interpreting
it,evenifheisthebestwitnessavailable. I
give
first
onlytwo
examples
of
suchinternalcontradictions.
(a)TheSocratesofthe
Apologymakesadirectandclearstatementthat
heisnotinterestedinnatural
philosophy(and
thereforenota
Pythagorean)
:
'
The
simple
truth
is,OAthenians,thatIhave
nothingwhatevertodowith
speculationsaboutnature.* Socratesassertsthatmanywhoare
present
atthetrialcould
testify
tothetruthofthisstatement
;they
haveheardhim
speak,
butneitherinfewnorinmanywordshasanybody
everheardhim
speak
aboutmattersofnatural
philosophy. (Ap.,19,c-d.)Ontheotherhand,
wehave
(a')
thePhaedoandthe
Republic.
Inthese
dialogues,
Socrates
appears
asa
Pythagoreanphilosopher
of
'
nature
'
;
somuchsothatbothBurnetand
Taylor
maintainthathewasinfacta
leadingmemberofthe
Pythagorean
schoolof
thought.
NowIholdthat
(a)
and
(a')flatly
contradicteachother
;andthis
situationismadeworseby
thefactthatthedramaticdateofthe
Republic
is
earlierandthatofthePhaedolaterthanthatofthe
Apology.
Thismakesit
impossible
toreconcile
(a)
with
(a')byassuming
thatSocrateseithergaveup
Pythagoreanism
inthelast
years
ofhis
life,betweenthe
Republicandthe
Apology,
orthathewasconvertedto
Pythagoreanism
inthelastmonthofhis
life.
Idonot
pretend
thatthereisnoway
of
removing
thiscontradictionby
some
assumption
or
interpretation.
Burnetand
Taylormay
havereasons,
perhaps
even
goodreasons,for
trusting
thePhaedoandthe
Republic
rather
thanthe
Apology. (Buttheyought
torealize
that,assuming
thecorrectness
ofPlato's
portrait,anydoubtofSocrates'
veracity
inthe
Apologymakesof
himonewholiesforthesakeof
saving
his
skin.)Such
questions,however,
donotconcernmeatthemoment.Mypoint
isratherthatin
accepting
evidence
(a')
as
against(a),BurnetandTaylor
areforcedtoabandontheir
fundamentalmethodological assumption
'
thatPlato
really
meantwhathe
said
*
;theymust
interpret.

26O CHAPTERID/NOTE56
But
interpretationsmadeunawaresmustbeuncritical
;thiscanbe
illustratedby
theusemadebyBurnetand
Taylor
of
Aristophanes'
evidence.
They
holdthat
Aristophanes'jestswouldbe
pointless
ifSocrateshadnotbeen
anatural
philosopher.
Butitsohappens
thatSocrates
(Ialwaysassume,
withBurnet.and
Taylor,
thatthe
Apology
is
historical)
foresawthisvery
argument.
Inhis
apology,
hewarnedhis
judgesagainstprecisely
thisvery
interpretation
of
Aristophanes, insisting
most
earnestly(Ap.,igc,
ff.
;seealso
aoc-e)
thathehadneitherlittlenormuchtodowithnatural
philosophy,
but
simplynothing
atall.Socratesfeltasifhewere
fightingagainst
shadows
inthismatter,against
theshadowsofthe
past(Ap.,i8d-e) ;butwenowcan
say
thathewasalso
fighting
theshadowsofthefuture.Forwhenhechal-
lenged
hisfellow-citizens tocomeforward thosewhobelieved
Aristophanes
anddaredtocallSocratesaliarnotonecame. Itwas
2,300years
beforesome
Platonistsmadeup
theirmindstoanswerhis
challenge.
(b)
Inthe
Apology(4oc,ff.)
Socratestakesupan
agnostic
attitudetowards
theproblem
ofsurvival
;(b')
thePhaedoconsistsmainlyofelaborate
proofs
oftheimmortality
ofthesoul.This
difficulty
isdiscussedby
Burnet
(in
his
editionofthePhaedo
',1911,pp.
xlviii
ff.),
inawaywhichdoesnotconvince
meatall.
(Cp.
notes9
tochapter7,and44
tothe
presentchapter.)
But
whetherheis
right
ornot,hisowndiscussion
proves
thatheisforcedto
give
up
his
methodological principle
andto
interpretwhatPlato
says.
(d)Apart
fromthesetwo
flagrantcontradictions, Imaymentiontwo
furthercontradictionswhichcould
easily
be
neglectedby
thosewhodonot
believethattheSeventhLetteris
genuine,
butwhichseemtomefataltoBurnet
whomaintainsthattheSeventhLetterisauthentic. Burnet'sview
(untenable
evenifwe
neglect
thisletter
;cp.
forthewhole
question
note26
(5)
tochapter
3)
thatSocratesbutnotPlatoheldthe
theory
ofForms,
iscontradicted in
342a,
ff.ofthisletter
;andhisviewthatthe
Republic,more
especially,
is
Socratic,in326a(cp.
note
14
tochapter7).Ofcourse,
allthesedifficulties
couldberemoved,but
onlybyinterpretation.
(e)Thereareanumberofsimilaralthough
atthesametimemoresubtle
andmore
important
contradictionswhichhavebeendiscussedatsome
length
in
previouschapters,especially
in
chapters6,7and8. Imaysumup
the
most
important
ofthese.
(e^Theattitudetowardsmen,especially
towardsthe
young,changes
inPlato's
portrait
inawaywhichcannotbeSocrates'
development.
Socrates
diedforthe
right
totalk
freely
totheyoung,whomheloved.Butinthe
Republic,wefindhim
takingup
anattitudeofcondescensionanddistrust
whichresemblesthe
disgruntled
attitudeoftheAthenian
Stranger(admittedly
Plato
himself)
intheLawsandthe
general
distrustofmankind
expressed
so
ofteninthiswork.
(Cp.
texttonotes
17-18
to
chapter4;18-21tochapter
7;and
57-58
to
chapter8.)
(e2)Thesamesortof
thing
canbesaidaboutSocrates'attitudetowards
truthandfree
speech.Hediedforit.Butinthe
Republic,
'
Socrates
'
advocates
lying ;
inthe
admittedly
PlatonicStatesman,alieisofferedastruth,
andintheLaws,freethought
is
suppressedby
theestablishment ofan
Inquisition. (Gp.
thesame
places
as
before,andfurthermorenotes
1-23
and40-41
to
chapter8
;andnote55
tothe
presentchapter.)
(*3)TheSocratesofthe
Apology
andsomeother
dialogues
is
intellectually
modest
;
inthe
Phaedo,he
changes
intoamanwhoisassuredofthetruthofhis
metaphysicalspeculations.
Inthe
Republic,
heisa
dogmatist,adoptinganatti-
tudenotfarremovedfromthe
petrified
authoritarianismoftheStatesmanandof
theLaws.
(Gp.
texttonotes8-14
to
chapter7;and
15and
33
to
chapter8.)
(*4)TheSocratesofthe
Apology
isanindividualist
;hebelievesinthe
self-sufficiency
ofthehumanindividual. Inthe
Gorgias,heisstillanindivi-
dualist. Inthe
Republic^heisaradical
collectivismvery
similartoPlato's

CHAPTERID/NOTE56 261
position
intheLaws.
(Cp.
notes25and
35
to
chapter5;
texttonotes26,
32,36and
48-54
to
chapter
6andnote
45
tothe
presentchapter.)
(e5)Againwecan
say
similar
thingsaboutSocrates'
equalitarianism. In
theMenoyhe
recognizes
thataslave
participates
inthegeneralintelligence
ofallhuman
beings,andthathecanbe
taught
even
puremathematics ;
in
the
Gorgias,
hedefendsthe
equalitariantheoryof
justice.Butinthe
Republic,
he
despises
workersandslavesandisasmuch
opposed
to
equalitarianism
as
isPlatointheTimaeusandintheLaws.
(Cp.
the
passagesmentionedunder
(*4);furthermore,notes18and
29
to
chapter4;note10to
chapter7,and
note
50(3)
to
chapter8,whereTimaeus,510
is
quoted.)
(06)TheSocratesofthe
ApologyandCritois
loyal
toAthenian
democracy.
IntheMenoandinthe
Gorgias(cp.
note
45
tothis
chapter)
thereare
suggestions
ofahostilecriticism
;
inthe
Republic(and,
Ibelieve,
inthe
Menexenus),heis
anopenenemy
of
democracy ;and
although
Plato
expresses
himselfmore
cautiously
intheStatesmanandinthe
beginning
oftheLaws,
his
political
tendenciesinthelater
part
oftheLawsareadmittedly(cp.
texttonote
32
to
chapter6)
identicalwiththoseofthe
'
Socrates
'
ofthe
Republic. (Cp.
notes
53and
55
tothe
presentchapterandnotes
7and
14-18
to
chapter4.)
Thelast
pointmaybefurther
supportedby
the
following.
Itseemsthat
Socrates,inthe
Apology,
isnot
merelyloyal
toAthenian
democracy,
butthat
he
appealsdirectly
tothedemocratic
partybypointing
outthat
Chaerephon,
oneofthemostardentofhis
disciples,belonged
totheirranks.
Chaerephon
plays
adecisive
part
inthe
Apology,
sincebyapproaching
theOracle,heis
instrumentalinSocrates'
recognition
ofhismissionin
life,and
thereby
ulti-
mately
inSocrates'refusalto
compromise
withtheDemos. Socratesintro-
ducesthis
importantpersonbyemphasizing
thefact
(Apol.9soe/2ia)
that
Chaerephon
wasnot
only
his
friend,butalsoafriendofthe
people,whose
exileheshared,andwithwhomhereturned
(presumably,
he
participated
inthe
fightagainst
the
Thirty) ;thatisto
say,
Socrateschoosesasthemain
witnessforhisdefenceanardentdemocrat. (There
issome
independent
evidencefor
Chaerephon'ssympathies,
suchasin
Aristophanes' Clouds,104,
501ff.)WhydoesSocratesemphasize
hisrelationswithamilitantmember
ofthedemocratic
party
?Wecannotassumethatthiswas
merelyspecial
pleading,
intendedtomovehis
judges
tobemoremerciful :thewhole
spirit
ofhis
apology
is
against
this
assumption.
Themost
likelyhypothesis
isthat
Socrates,bypointing
outthathehad
disciples
inthedemocraticcamp,
intendedto
deny,byimplication,
thecharge(which
alsowas
onlyimplied)
thathewasafollowerofthearistocratic
party
andateacherof
tyrants.The
spirit
ofthe
Apology
excludesthe
assumption
thatSocrateswas
pleading
friendship
withademocraticleaderwithout
beingtrulysympathetic
withthe
democraticcause.Andthesameconclusionmustbedrawnfromthe
passage
(Apol.,32b~d)
inwhichhe
emphasizes
hisfaithindemocratic
legality,and
denouncesthe
Thirty
innouncertainterms.
(6)
Itis
simply
theinternalevidenceofthePlatonic
dialogues
which
forcesustoassumethatthey
arenot
entirely
historical.Wemusttherefore
attempt
to
interpret
thisevidence,byproffering
theorieswhichcanbe
critically
compared
withtheevidence,using
themethodoftrialanderror.Nowwe
haveverystrong
reasontobelievethatthe
Apology
isinthemain
historical,
foritisthe
onlydialoguewhichdescribesa
publicoccurrenceofconsiderable
importanceandwellknowntoa
greatnumberof
people.Ontheotherhand,
weknowthattheLawsarePlato'slatestwork
(apart
fromthedoubtful
Epinomis),andthat
they
are
frankly
'
Platonic
J
.It
is,therefore,the
simplest
assumption
thatthe
dialogues
willbehistoricalorSocraticsofaras
they
agree
withthetendenciesofthe
Apology,andPlatonicwherethey
contradict
thesetendencies.
(Thisassumptionbrings
us
practicallybacktothe
position
whichIhavedescribedaboveasthe
*
oldersolution
*
oftheSocraticProblem.)

262 CHAPTERID/NOTE56
Ifweconsiderthetendenciesmentionedaboveunder
(e^)
to
(*6),we
findthatwecan
easily
orderthemostimportant
ofthe
dialogues
insucha
way
thatforanysingle
ofthesetendenciesthe
similarity
withtheSocratic
ApologydecreasesandthatwiththePlatonicLawsincreases. Thisisthe
^series.
Apology
andCritoMeno
Gorgias
Phaedo
Republic
Statesman Timaeus
Laws.
Nowthefactthatthisseriesordersthe
dialoguesaccording
toallthe
tendencies
(e^)
to
(e6)
isinitselfacorroborationofthetheory
thatweare
herefacedwithadevelopment
inPlato'sthought.Butwecangetquite
independent
evidence.
'
Stylometric
'
investigationsshowthatourseries
agrees
withthe
chronological
orderinwhichPlatowrotethedialogues. Lastly,
the
series,atleastup
totheTimaeus,exhibitsalsoacontinuallyincreasing
interestin
Pythagoreanism(andEleaticism).
Thismustthereforebeanother
tendency
inthe
development
ofPlato's
thought.
A
very
differentargument
isthis.Weknow,fromPlato'sown
testimony
inthe
Phaedo,thatAntistheneswasoneofSocrates'mostintimatefriends
;
andwealsoknowthatAntisthenesclaimedto
preserve
thetrueSocratic
creed. ItishardtobelievethatAntistheneswouldhavebeenafriendofthe
Socratesofthe
Republic.
Thuswemustfindacommon
point
of
departure
forthe
teaching
ofAntisthenesandPlato
;andthiscommon
pointwefind
intheSocratesofthe
Apologyand
Crito,andinsomeofthedoctrines
put
into
themouthofthe
*
Socrates
'
oftheMeno,Gorgias,andPhaedo.
These
arguments
are
entirelyindependent
of
anyworkofPlato'swhich
haseverbeen
seriouslydoubted
(as
theAlcibiadesIortheTheages
orthe
Letters).They
arealso
independent
ofthetestimony
ofXenophon. They
arebased
solelyupon
theinternalevidenceofsomeofthemostfamousPlatonic
dialogues. But
theyagree
withthis
secondaryevidence,especially
withthe
Seventh
Letter,whereinasketchofhisownmental
development(325f.),
Plato
even
refers,unmistakably,
tothe
key-passage
ofthe
Republic
ashisowncentral
discovery
:
*
Ihadtostate . .that . .neverwillthehumanracebesaved
fromits
plight
beforeeithertheraceofthegenuineand
qualifiedphilosophers
gainspoliticalpower,
orthe
kings
inthecitiesbecomegenuinephilosophers,
withthehelp
ofGod.'
ft(3263 ;cp.
note
14
to
chapter7,and
(d)
inthisnote,
above.)
Icannotseehowitis
possiblewithBurnettoaccept
thisletteras
genuine
withoutadmittingthatthecentraldoctrineofthe
Republic
is
Plato's,
notSocrates'
;thatisto
say,without
givingupthefictionthatPlato's
portrait
ofSocratesinthe
Republic
ishistorical.
(For
furtherevidence,cp.
forinstance
Aristotle,Sophist.EL,iSsby
:
'
Socratesraised
questions,
but
gave
noanswers
;
forheconfessedthathedidnotknow.'This
agrees
withthe
Apology,
but
hardlywiththe
Gorgias,and
certainly
notwiththePhaedoorthe
Republic. See
furthermore Aristotle'sfamous
report
onthe
history
ofthe
theoryofIdeas,
admirablydiscussedbyField,op.
cit.
;cp.
alsonote26to
chapter3.)
(7)Againstevidenceofthischaracter,the
type
ofevidenceusedby
Burnetand
Taylorcanhavelittle
weight.The
following
isan
example.
Asevidenceforhis
opinion,thatPlatowas
politicallymoremoderatethan
Socrates,andthatPlato's
familywasrather
'
Whiggish ',Burnetusesthe
argument
thatamemberofPlato's
family
wasnamed
'
Demos '.
(Gp.Gorg.,
4816,5i3b.
It
is,however,doubtfulwhetherDemos'father
Pyrilampes
therementioned is
really
identicalwithPlato'suncleand
stepfathermentioned
in
Charm.,58a,andParm.,i26b,
i.e.whetherDemoswasarelationof
Plato's.)
What
weightcanthisevidencehave,
I
ask,compared
withthehistorical
recordofPlato'stwo
tyrant
uncles
;withtheextant
politicalfragmentsof
Gritias
(which
remaininthe
familyevenifBurnetwere
right,
whichhe
hardly
is,
in
attributingthemtohis
grandfather ;cp.
Greek
Phil.,I,338,
note
i);
withthefactthatCritias'fatherhadbelonged
totheOligarchyoftheFour

CHAPTERIO/NOTE56 263
Hundred
(Lys.,12,66) ;andwithPlato'sown
writingswhichcombine
familypride
withnot
only
anti-democraticbutevenanti-Atheniantendencies?
(Gp.
the
eulogy,
inTimaeus,2oa,ofanenemyofAthenslikeHermocratesof
Sicily,
father-in-lawof
Dionysius I.)Thehidden
purpose
behindthis
argu-
ment
is,ofcourse,to
strengthen
the
theory
thatthe
Republic
isSocratic.
Anotherexample
ofbadmethodmaybetakenfrom
Taylor,who
argues
(Socrates,note2on
pp.148
f.
;cp.
also
p.162)
infavouroftheviewthatthe
PhaedoisSocratic
(cp.my
note
9
to
chapter7)
:
*
InthePhaedo . .thedoctrine
that
"
learning
is
justrecognition
"
is
expressly
saidbySimmias
'
(this
isa
slip
of
Taylor'spen ;the
speaker
is
Gebes)
'
speakingtoSocrates,tobe
"
thedoctrine
you
areso
constantlyrepeating."
Unlessweare
willing
to
regard
thePhaedoasa
giganticand
unpardonable mystification,
thisseems
tome
proof
thatthe
theoryreallybelongs
toSocrates.'
(For
asimilar
argu-
ment,
seeBurnet'seditionofthePhaedo,p.xii,endof
chapterII.)Onthis
Iwishtomakethe
followingcomments :
(a)
ItishereassumedthatPlato
consideredhimselfwhen
writing
this
passage
asa
historian,
forotherwisehis
statementwouldnotbe
'
a
giganticandunpardonable mystification
'
;
in
otherwords,
themost
questionableandthemostcentral
point
ofthe
theory
isassumed,
(b)
ButevenifPlatohadconsideredhimselfahistorian
(Ido
notthinkthathe
did),
the
expression
"
a
gigantic
. .etc.'seemstobetoo
strong. Taylor,notPlato,puts
'
you
J
initalics. Platomightonlyhave
wishedtoindicatethatheis
going
toassumethatthereadersofthe
dialogue
are
acquainted
withthis
theory.Orhe
might
haveintendedtorefertothe
Meno,andthustohimself.
(This
isthe
explanation
which
appears
tomethe
most
acceptable
of
all.)Orhispenmighthaveslipped
forsomeotherreason.
Such
things
areboundtooccur,eventohistorians. Burnet,
to
givean
example,certainly
didconsiderhimselfahistorianwhenhewroteinhis
Greek
Philosophy, I,64,
ofXenophanes
:
'
the
story
thathefoundedtheEleatic
schoolseemstobederivedfroma
playfulremarkofPlato'swhichwould
also
proveHomertohavebeenaHeraclitean.'To
this,Burnetaddsthe
footnote: 'Plato,Soph.,242d.
SeeE.Gr.Ph.
2
,p.140'.NowIbelieve
thatthisstatementofahistorian
clearlyimplies
three
things,(i)
thatthe
passage
ofPlatowhichreferstoXenophanes
is
playful,
i.e.notmeant
seriously,
(2)
thatthis
playfulness
manifests itselfinthereferencetoHomer,that
is,
(3)byremarking
thathewasaHeraclitean,whichwould,ofcourse,bea
veryplayful
remarksinceHomerlived
long
beforeHeraclitus. Butnoneof
thesethree
implications
canbe
upheld.
Forwefind,(i)
thatthe
passage
inthe
Sophist(242d)
whichreferstoXenophanes
isnot
playful,
butis
especially
recommendedby
Burnethimselfinthe
methodological appendix
tohis
Early
Greek
Philosophy
asbeingimportant
andasfullofvaluablehistorical
information
;(2)
thatitcontainsnoreferenceatalltoHomer,and
(3)
that
another
passage
whichdoescontainthisreference
(Theaet.,1796)
andwith
whichBurnet
mistakenly
identified
Sophist242d
inGreek
Philosophy,
I
(the
mistakeisnotmadeinhis
Early
Greek
Philosophy
2
),doesnotrefertoXenophanes,
nortoHomerasaHeraclitean
;butit
saysjust
the
opposite,namely,
that
someofHeraclitus'ideasareasoldasHomer
(whichis,
ofcourse,muchless
playful).
This
heap
of
misunderstandings, misinterpretations, andmis-
quotationscanbefoundinone
single
historicalremarkofsuchanoutstanding
professional
historianasBurnet.Fromthiswemustlearnthatsuchthings
do
happen,
evenwiththebestofhistorians :allmenarefallible.(A
more
serious
example
ofthiskindof
fallibility
istheonediscussedinnote26
(5)
to
chapter3.)
Butifthatis
so,canitbe
right,
I
ask,
todismissthe
possibility
ofa
comparatively
minormistakeinastatementmadeby
Plato(whoperhaps
hadnoideathathisdramatic
dialogueswouldeverbeconsideredashistorical
evidence)
orto
argue
thatsuchamistakewouldbea
*
gigantic
andunpardon-
able
mystification
*
?Thiskindof
specialpleading
isnotsoundmethodology*

264 CHAPTERID/NOTES57-59
(8)Thechronological
orderofthosePlatonicdialogueswhich
play
a
r6leinthesearguments
ishereassumedtobe
nearly
thesameasthatofthe
stylometric
listofLutoslawski
(TheOriginandGrowth
of
Plato
9
s
Logic,1897).
Alistofthose
dialogues
which
play
aroleinthetextofthisbookwillbe
foundinnote
5
to
chapter3.
Itisdrawnup
insuchaway
thatthereismore
uncertainty
ofdatewithineach
group
thanbetweenthe
groups.Aminor
deviationfromthe
stylometric
lististhe
position
ofthe
Eutyphrowhichfor
reasonsofitscontent
(discussed
intexttonote60tothis
chapter)appears
to
metobe
probably
laterthantheCrito
;butthis
point
isoflittle
importance.
(Cp.
alsonote47
tothis
chapter.)
67
Thereisafamousandratherpuzzlingpassage
intheSecondLetter
(314x1)
:
'
Thereisno
writing
ofPlatonorwillthereeverbe.What
goes
by
hisname
reallybelongs
toSocratesturnedyoungandhandsome.'The
most
likely
solutionofthis
puzzle
isthatthe
passage,
ifnotthewhole
letter,
is
spurious. (Gp.Field,
PlatoandHis
Contemporaries,
200
f.,wherehe
gives
anadmirablesummary
ofthereasonsfor
suspecting
the
letter,and
especially
the
passages
'
3i2d~3i3cand
possiblydownto
3i4c
'
;concerning 314*:,
an
additionalreason
is,perhaps,
thatthe
forgermighthaveintendedtoallude
to,orto
give
his
interpretation of,asomewhatsimilarremarkintheSeventh
Letter,341b/c,quoted
innote
32
tochapter8.)
Butifforamomentweassume
withBurnet
(GreekPhilosophy, I,212)
thatthe
passage
is
genuine,
thenthe
remark
'
turnedyoungandhandsome
'
certainly
raisesa
problem,especially
asitcannotbetaken
literally
sinceSocrates is
presented
inallthePlatonic
dialogues
asoldand
ugly(theonlyexception
isthe
Parmenides,whereheis
hardlyhandsome,although
still
young).
If
genuine,
the
puzzling
remark
wouldmeanthatPlato
quiteintentionallygave
anidealizedandnotahistorical
accountofSocrates
;anditwouldfitour
interpretationquite
welltoseethat
Platowasindeedconsciousof
re-interpreting
Socratesasayoungandhandsome
aristocratwho
is,ofcourse,Platohimself.
(Gp.
alsonote11
(2)
tochapter4,
note20
(i)
to
chapter6,andnote
50(3)
to
chapter8.)
58
Iam
quoting
fromthefirstparagraph
ofDaviesandVaughan's
Introductory
Notetotheirtranslationofthe
Republic. Gp.Grossman,Plato
To-Day,96.
59
(i)The
'
division
'
or
'
split
'
inPlato'ssoulisoneofthemostoutstand-
ingimpressions
ofthe
Republic.Only
amanwhohadto
struggle
hardfor
upholding
hisself-controlortheruleofhisreasonoverhisanimalinstincts,
couldemphasize
this
point
asmuchasPlatodid
;cp.especially
the
passages
referredtoinnote34
to
chapter5
andnote
15(i)-(4) ;17;and
19,
to
chapter3,whichnotonlyshowanamazingsimilaritywith
psycho-analytical
doctrines,butmight
alsobeclaimedtoexhibit
strongsymptoms
of
repression.
(Cp.
alsothe
beginning
ofBook
IX.)
ThosePlatonistswhoarenot
prepared
toadmitthatfromPlato's
longing
andclamouring
for
unityandharmonyand
unisonity,wemay
concludethat
hewas'himselfdisunitedanddisharmonious,mayberemindedthatthis
way
of
arguing
wasinventedby
Plato.
(Gp.Symposium,2Ooa, f.,where
Socrates
argues
thatitisa
necessaryandnota
probable
inferencethathewho
lovesordesiresdoesnot
possesswhathelovesand
desires.)
WhatIhavecalledPlato's
politicaltheoryof
thesoul
(see
alsotexttonote
32
tochapter5),
i.e.thedivisionofthesoul
according
totheclass-divided
society,
has
long
remainedthebasisofmost
psychologies.
Itisthebasisof
psycho-
analysis
too.According
toFreud's
theory,whatPlatohadcalledthe
ruling
part
ofthesoultriesto
uphold
its
tyrannyby
a
'
censorship ',whilethe
rebellious
proletariananimal-instincts,which
correspond
tothesocialunder-
world,really
exerciseahidden
dictatorship ;
for
they
determinethe
policy
ofthe
apparent
ruler.SinceHeraclitus'
'
flux
'
and
'
war
*>Jthe
realmof
social
experience
has
strongly
influencedthe
theories,metaphors,
arid
symbols'

CHAPTERID/NOTE60
265
bywhichwe
interpret
theworld(andourselves)
toourselves. Imention
onlyDarwin's
adoption(under
theinfluenceofMalthus)
ofthe
theory
of
competition.
(2)Aremarkmay
beaddedhereon
mysticism,
itsrelationtotheclosed
andopensocietyandtothestrainofcivilization.
AsMcTaggarthasshown,inhisexcellentstudyMysticism(cp.Philosophical
Studies,editedby
S.V.
Keeling,1934,esp.pp.47f.),
thefundamentalideasof
mysticism
aretwo :
(a)
thedoctrineofthe
mysticunion,i.e.,theassertionthat
thereisa
greaterunity
intheworldofrealitiesthanthatwhichwe
recognize
intheworldof
ordinaryexperience,and
(b)
thedoctrineofthe
mysticintuition,
i.e.theassertionthatthereisaway
of
knowing
which
*
brings
theknown
intocloserandmoredirectrelationwithwhatisknown
*
thanistherelation
betweenthe
knowingsubjectandtheknown
object
inordinaryexperience.
McTaggartrightly
asserts
(p.48)
that
'
ofthesetwocharacteristicsthe
mystic
unity
isthemorefundamental
',sincethe
mystic
intuition is
'
an
example
ofthe
mysticunity
\Wemayaddthatathirdcharacteristic,
lessfunda-
mental
still,
is
(c)
the
mysticlove,whichisanexample
of
mysticunity
and
mystic
intuition.
Nowitis
interesting(and
thishasnotbeenseenbyMcTaggart)
thatin
the
history
ofGreek
Philosophy,
thedoctrineofthe
mysticunitywasfirst
clearly
assertedbyParmenidesinhisholisticdoctrineoftheone
(cp.
note
41
tothe
presentchapter) ;nextbyPlato,whoaddedanelaboratedoctrineof
mystic
intuitionandcommunionwiththedivine
(cp.chapter8),
ofwhich
doctrinethereare
justthevery
first
beginnings
inParmenides
;andnext
by
theNeo-Platonicswhoelaboratedthedoctrineofthe
mysticlove,ofwhich
only
the
beginningcanbefoundinPlato
(forexample,
inhisdoctrine,Rep.,
475ff.,thatthe
philosopher
lovestruth,whichis
closely
connectedwiththe
doctrinesofholismandthe
philosopher'scommunionwiththedivine
truth).
Inviewofthesefactsandofourhistorical
analysis,weareledto
interpret
mysticism
asoneofthe
typical
reactionstothebreakdownoftheclosed
society ;areactionwhich,
inits
origin
at
least,
isdirectedagainst
theopen
society,andwhichmay
bedescribedasan
escape
intothedreamofa
paradise
inwhichthetribal
unity
revealsitselfastheunchangingreality.
This
interpretation
isindirectconflictwiththatofBergson
inhisTwo
SourcesofMorality
and
Religion ;for
Bergson
assertsthatitis
mysticism
which
makesthe
leap
fromtheclosedtothe
opensociety.
Itmayberemarkedthatinthenineteenth
century,especially
in
Hegel
and
Bergson,wefindan
evolutionary mysticism,which,byextollingchange
seemstostandindirect
opposition
toParmenides'andPlato'shatredof
change.And
yet,theunderlyingexpedience
ofthesetwoformsof
mysticism
seemstobethesame,asshownby
thefact,thatan
over-emphasison
change
iscommontoboth.Botharereactionstothe
frighteningexperience
ofsocial
change ;theonecombinedwiththe
hope
that
changemay
bearrested the
otherwithasomewhat
hysterical(andundoubtedlyambivalent)acceptance
of
change
as
real,
essentialandwelcome.
Gp.
alsonotes
29,32and
58
to
chapter24.
-
60
The
Eutyphro,
an
earlydialogue,
is
usuallyinterpreted
asanunsuccessful
attempt
ofSocratestodefine
piety.Eutyphro
himselfisthecaricatureofa
popular
'
pietist
'
whoknows
exactlywhatthe
gods
wish.ToSocrates'
question
'
Whatis
piety
andwhatis
impiety
?
'
heismadetoanswer :
*
Piety
is
acting
asIdo!Thatisto
say,prosecutingany
one
guilty
ofmurder,
sacrilege,
orofany
similarcrime,whetherhebe
your
fatheroryourmother ..
;
whilenotto
prosecutethemis
impiety
'
(5,d/e.)Eutyphro
is
presented
as
prosecuting
hisfatherfor
havingmurderedaserf.
(According
totheevidence
quotedbyGrote,Plato,I,noteto
p.312,every
citizenwasboundby
Attic
lawto
prosecute
insuch
cases.)

266 CHAPTERID/NOTES61-67
81
Menexenus, 23513.Cp.
note
35
tothis
chapter.
62
Theclaimthatifyouwant
securityyoumust
giveupliberty
hasbecome
amainstayoftherevolt
againstfreedom. But
nothing
islesstrue.There
is,
ofcourse,noabsolute
security
inlife.Butwhat
security
canbeattained
depends
onourownwatchfulness,enforcedby
institutionstohelp
uswatch
i.e.by
democratic institutionswhicharedevised
(using
Platoniclanguage)
to
enabletheherdtowatch,andto
judge,
their
watch-dogs.
63
Withthe
*
variations
'
and
'
irregularities ',cp.Republic,547a,quoted
inthetexttonotes
39and
40
to
chapter5.
Plato'sobsessionwiththe
problems
of
propagation
andbirthcontrolmayperhaps
be
explained
in
partby
thefact
thatheunderstoodthe
implications
of
populationgrowth.Indeed
(cp.
textto
note
7
tothis
chapter)
the
*
Fall
',
thelossofthetribal
paradise,
iscausedby
a
'
natural
'
or
'
original
'
faultofman,
asitwere :by
a
maladjustment
inhis
naturalrateof
breeding. Cp.
alsonotes
39(3)
toch.
5,and34
toch.
4.
Withthenext
quotation
furtherbelowinthis
paragraph,cp.Republic,5666,
andtexttonote20to
chapter4.Grossman,whosetreatmentofthe
period
of
tyranny
inGreek
history
isexcellent
(cp.
Plato
To-Day,27-30),
writes :
'
Thusitwasthe
tyrantswho
really
createdtheGreekState.They
broke
downtheoldtribal
organization
of
primitivearistocracy
..'
(op.cit.,29).
This
explainswhy
Platohated
tyranny,perhaps
evenmorethanfreedom :
cp.Republic,577c. (See,however,note
69
tothis
chapter.)
His
passages
on
tyranny,especially565-568,
areabrilliant
sociologicalanalysis
ofacon-
sistent
po\er-politich.
Ishouldliketocallitthefirst
attempt
towardsa
logicofpowei. (Ichosethistermin
analogy
toF.A.vonHayek'suseofthe
term
logicof
choiceforthepureeconomic
theory.)The
logicofpower
is
fairly
simple,andhasoftenbeen
applied
ina
masterlyway.The
opposite
kindof
politics
ismuchmoredifficult
;partly
becausethe
logicof
anti-powerpolitics,
i.e.the
logic
offreedom,
ishardlyunderstood
yet.
64
ItiswellknownthatmostofPlato's
politicalproposals,including
the
proposedcommunismofwomenandchildren,were
'
intheair
'
inthe
Periclean
period.Gp.
theexcellentsummary
inAdam'seditionofthe
Republic,
vol.
I,pp.354
f.
66
Gp.
V.Pareto,
TreatiseonGeneral
Sociology, 1843(English
translation :
TheMindand
Society,1935,
vol.
Ill,pp.1281) ;cp.
noteito
chapter13,
where
the
passage
isquotedmore
fully.
86
Cp.
theeffectwhichGlaucon's
presentation
of
Lycophron'stheoryhad
onCarncades
(cp.
note54
to
chapter6),andlater,onHobbes.The
professed
'
a-morality
'
ofsomany
Marxistsisalsoacasein
point.
Leftists
frequently
believeintheirown
immorality. (This,although
notmuchtothe
point,
is
sometimesmoremodestandmore
pleasantthanthedogmaticself-righteousness
ofmanyreactionary moralists.)
67
Money
isoneofthe
symbols
aswellasoneofthedifficultiesofthe
open
society.
Thereisnodoubtthatwehavenot
yetmasteredtherationalcontrol
ofitsuse
;
its
greatestmisuseisthatitcanbuypoliticalpower.(Themost
directformofthismisuseistheinstitutionoftheslave-market
;but
just
thisinstitution isdefendedin
Republic,56$b;cp.
note
17
to
chapter4;and
intheLaws,Platoisnot
againstmoney ;cp.note20
(i)
to
chapter6.)From
the
point
ofviewofanindividualistic
society,money
is
fairlyimportant.
Itis
part
oftheinstitutionofthe
(partially)freemarket,which
gives
theconsumer
somemeasureofcontrolover
production. Withoutsomesuch
institution,
theproducermay
controlthemarkettosucha
degree
thatheceasesto
produce
forthesakeof
consumption,whiletheconsumerconsumes
largely
forthesake
of
production. Thesometimes
glaring
misuseofmoney
hasmadeusrather
sensitiveonthis
point,andPlato's
oppositionbetweenmoneyand
friendship
isonlythefirstofmanyconsciousorunconscious
attempts
toutilizethese
sentimentsforthe
purpose
of
politicalpropaganda.

CHAPTERlO/NOTES68/70 267
68
The
group-spirit
oftribalism
is,ofcourse,not
entirely
lost. Itmanifests
itself,for
instance,
inthemostvaluable
experienc
esof
friendship
and
comradeship ;
also,
in
youthful
tribalisticmovements likethe
boy-scouts (or
theGerman
Youth
Movement),
andincertainclubsandadult
societies,
asdescribed,
for
instance,by
SinclairLewisinBabbitt.The
importance
ofthis
perhaps
most
universalofallemotionalandaesthetic
experiencesmustnotbeunderrated.
Nearly
allsocialmovements,
totalitarian aswellashumanitarian, are
influencedby
it. It
plays
an
important
roleinwar,andisoneofthemost
powerfulweapons
oftherevolt
against
freedom.Aconsciousandnotunsuc-
cessful
attempt
toreviveitforthe
purpose
of
arrestingsocietyandof
perpetuat-
ing
aclassruleseemstohavebeenthe
English
PublicSchool
System. ('No
onecangrowup
tobeagoodmanunlesshisearliest
yearswere
given
to
noblegames
'
isitsmotto,takenfrom
Republic,558b.)
Another
productandsymptom
ofthelossofthetribalistic
group-spirit
is,of
course,Plato's
emphasisupon
the
analogybetween
politicsandmedicine
(cp.chapter8,especially
note
4),an
emphasiswhich
expresses
the
feeling
thatthebody
of
society
is
sick,
i.e.the
feeling
of
strain,ofdrift.
'
Fromthe
timeofPlatoon,themindsof
politicalphilosophersseemtohaverecurred
tothis
comparisonbetweenmedicineand
politics,'saysG.E.G.Catlin(A
Studyof
the
PrinciplesofPolitics,1930,
noteto
458,
whereThomas
Aquinas,
G.
Santayana,andDeanInge
are
quoted
to
support
hisstatement
;cp.
also
the
quotations
in
op.
cit.
9noteto
37,fromMill's
Logic}.
Gatlinalso
speaks
most
characteristically (op.cit.,459)
of
'
harmony
'
andofthe
'
desirefor
protection,whetherassuredby
themotherorbysociety
'.
(Gp.
alsonote
18to
chapter5.)
69
Gp.chapter7(note24andtext
;seeAthen.,XI,508)
forthenamesof
sevensuch
disciples
ofPlato
(includingDionysius
IIand
Dio).
I
suppose
thatPlato's
repeated
insistenceupon
the
use,
riot
only
of
force,butof
s
per-
suasionandforce
'
(cp.Laws,722b,andnotes
5,10,and18to
chapter8),
was
meantasacriticismofthetacticsofthe
Thirty,whosepropaganda
was
indeed
primitive. Butthiswould
imply
thatPlatowaswellawareofPareto's
recipe
for
utilizing
sentimentsinsteadof
fighting
them.ThatPlato'sfriend
Dio
(cp.
note25tochapter7)
ruled
Syracuse
asa
tyrant
isadmittedevenby
Meyer
inhisdefenceofDiowhosefatehe
explains,
in
spite
ofhisadmiration
forPlatoasa
politician,bypointing
outthe
'
gulfbetween
'
(thePlatonic)
4
theoryand
practice' (op.cit.,V,999).Meyersays
ofDio
(he.cit.),
'The
ideal
kinghadbecome,externally,inciistinguibhable fromthecontemptible
tyrant.'
Buthebelieves
that,internally
asit
were,Dioremainedan
idealist,
andthathesuffereddeeplywhen
politicalnecessityforcedmurderand
similarmeasuresupon
him. Ithink,however,thatDioacted
according
to
Plato's
theory ;
a
theorywhich,by
the
logic
of
power,wasdriveninthe
Lawstoadmiteventhe
goodness
of
tyranny(7096,
ff.Atthesame
place,
theremay
alsobea
suggestion
thatthedebacleofthe
Thirtywasduetotheir
greatnumber :Gritiasalonewouldhavebeenall
right).
70
Thetribal
paradise is,ofcourse,amyth(althoughsome
primitive
people,
mostofalltheEskimos,seemtobehappyenough).
Theremay
havebeennosenseofdriftintheclosed
society,butthereisampleevidence
ofotherformsoffearfearofdemoniacpowersbehindnature.The
attempt
torevivethis
fear,andtouseit
against
the
intellectuals,the
scientists, etc.,
characterizesmany
latemanifestations oftherevolt
againstfreedom. It
istothecreditofPlato,the
disciple
of
Socrates,thatitneveroccurredtohim
topresent
hisenemiesasthe
offspring
ofthesinisterdemonsofdarkness.
Inthis
point,
heremained
enlightened.Hehadlittleinclinationtoidealize
theevilwhichwastohim
simplydebased,or
degenerate,
or
impoverished
goodness. (Only
inone
passage
intheLaws,8g6eand
8g8c,
thereiswhat
may
bea
suggestion
ofanabstractidealizationof
evil.)

268 CHAPTERIO/NOTE70
Anotemay
beaddedhereinconnectionwithmyremarkonthereturn
tothebeasts.SincetheintrusionofDarwinismintothefieldofhumanproblems
(an
intrusionforwhichDarwinshouldnotbe
blamed)
therehavebeenmany
'
social
zoologists
'
whohave
proved
thatthehumanraceisboundto
degenerate
physically,
becauseinsufficient
physicalcompetition,andthe
possibility
of
protecting
thebodyby
theeffortsofthemind,prevent
naturalselectionfrom
actingupon
ourbodies.Thefirsttoformulatethisidea
(not
thathebelieved
in
it)
wasSamuelButler,whowrote :
c
Theoneserious
dangerwhichthis
writer
'
(anErewhonian
writer)
'
apprehended
wasthatthemachines
'
(and,
wemayadd,
civilizationin
general)
*
wouldso . .lessenthe
severity
of
competition,
thatmanypersons
ofinferiorphysiquewould
escape
detection
andtransmittheir
inferiority
totheirdescendants.'
(Erewkon,1872;cp.
Everyman's edition,p.161.)ThefirstasfarasIknowtowritea
bulky
volumeonthis
problemwasW.
Schallmayer,
oneofthefoundersofmodern
racialism. In
fact,Butler's
theory
hasbeen
continually
rediscovered
(especi-
allyby
'
biological
naturalists
'
inthesenseof
chapter5,above).According
toamodernwriter
(G.H.Eastbrooks,Man:TheMechanical
Misfit,1941),
manmadethedecisivemistakewhenhebecamecivilized,and
especially
whenhe
began
to
help
theweak
;
before
this,hewasanalmost
perfect
man-
beast
;butcivilization,withitsartificialmethodsof
protection,
must
ultimately
destroy
itself.In
reply
tosuch
arguments,weshould,
I
think,
firstadmit
thatmanis
likely
to
disappearonedayfromthisworld
;butweshouldadd
thatthisisalsotrueofeventhemost
perfectbeasts,
to
saynothing
ofthose
whichare
only
'
almost
perfect
'.The
theory
thatthehumanracemight
havelivedalittle
longer
ifithadnotmadethefatalmistakeof
helping
the
weakismost
questionable ;butevenifitweretrueismere
length
ofsurvival
oftherace
really
allwewant?Oristhealmost
perfectman-beastsoeminently
valuablethatweshould
prefer
a
prolongation
ofhisexistence
(he
didexist
for
quitea
longtime,anyway)
toour
experiment
of
helping
theweak?
Mankind,
I
believe,hasnotdoneso
badly.
In
spite
ofthetreasonof
someofitsintellectualleaders,
in
spite
ofthe
stupefying
effectsofPlatonic
methodsineducationandthe
devastating
resultsof
propaganda,
therehave
beensomeamazing
successes.Many
oftheweakhavebeen
helped,andfor
ahundred
years,slavery
hasbeen
practically
abolished.Some
say
itwill
soonbere-introduced. Ifeelmore
optimistic ;andafter
all,
itwilldepend
onourselves. Butevenifallthisshouldbelost
again,andevenifwehadto
returntothealmost
perfectman-beast,
allthiswouldnotalterthefactthat
slaveryonce,
forashorttime,disappeared
fromthefaceoftheearth.This
fact,
I
believe,may
comfortsomeofusforallour
misfits,mechanicaland
otherwise
;andtosomeofusitmayevenatoneforthefatalmistakeour
forefathersmadewhen
they
missedthe
goldenopportunity
of
arresting
all
change
of
returning
tothe
cage
oftheclosed
societyandof
establishing,
for
everand
ever,ahuge
zooofalmost
perfectmonkeys.
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