-VDA-Special-Characteristics Special characteristics.pdf

1,204 views 45 slides May 20, 2024
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About This Presentation

SC - VDA


Slide Content

Contents Page
1 Preface 7
2 Objectives of the process covering special characteristics;
definitions and limitations 8
3 Categories of special characteristics 11
4 The process of applying special characteristics in the
product creation process 13
4.1 Description of the development process sequence 15
4.1.1 Requirements regarding the concept 16
4.1.2 Concept filter 16
4.1.3 Requirements regarding the design 17
4.1.4 Design filter 17
4.2 Description of the process sequence in production 18
4.2.1 Requirements regarding production planning 19
4.2.2 Production planning filter 19
4.2.3 Requirements regarding the production process filter 20
4.2.4 Production process filter 20
4.3 References to validation methods 21
4.4 Expanded details of the process description covering
significant and critical characteristics 22
4.5 Identification 23
4.6 Consequences 23
4.6.1 Recommended activities in product development 24
4.6.2 Recommended activities in process development 24
4.7 Documentation and archiving 25
5 Interaction with the FMEA 27
4 5

28 Process description covering special characteristics
30
1 Preface
33
36 This VDA publication serves as a starting point for determining, specifying,
39
tracking, documenting and archiving special characteristics.
47
Throughout the supply chain, special characteristics
59
- are to be agreed between customer and supplier and
83 are to be identified within an organisation.
87
This publication is a recommendation for the practical use of significant and
critical characteristics, while complying with the framework conditions set out
in standards and in legislation.
As a process model the VDA publication "Maturity Level Assurance for new
Parts" has been taken by way of example. If preferred, a company's own in-
10 house product creation process can be used.
This 2nd edition updates the changes of the process description due to the
revisions of 4th edition of VDA Volume 1 "Documented Information and
Retention", the 1S
t
edition of IATF 16949:2016-10 "Quality management
system requirements for automotive production and relevant service parts
organizations", and the 1st edition of "AIAG & VDA FMEA Handbook".
Additional changes of links to standards and VDA Volumes are updated.
12
13
15
18
A Appendix
A.1 Example: Fuel tank vent
A.2 Example: Light sensor
A.3 Example: Headlights
A.4 Example: Input shaft to steering system
A.5 Example: Steering wheel interlock
A.6 Example: Electric parking brake
A/ Example: Electronic control unit earthing cable
A.8 Example: Sliding roof drive motor
List of figures:
Figure 1: How robust design and robust processes influence special
characteristics
Figure 2: Lots of characteristics
Figure 3: Maturity level model from VDA Volume
"Maturity level assurance for new parts"
Figure 4: Development process sequence
Figure 5: Process sequence in production
The terms "major characteristics" and "critical characteristics" are replaced by
"special characteristics".
6 7

2 Objectives of the process covering
Special Characteristics; definitions and limitations
The objective of this process description is to describe a multidisciplinary
approach, to:
• to identify special characteristics,
• to classify special characteristics,
• to document special characteristics, and
• to establish safeguards (quality control loops) in the entire value
stream, in order to assure an efficient and effective production control.
The purpose of the method is:
• to promote pre-emptive functional and manufacturing robustness,
• to improve product quality in terms of safety, compliance with regulatory
as well as legal requirements and functional fulfilment,
• to create a common understanding of characteristics management in
the involved areas(e.g. product view vs. process view),
• to minimize manufacturing defects,
• to optimize inspection costs and
• to make sure that appropriate safeguards are defined for confirmed
special characteristics
Systems, components or parts with an immediate influence on:
• safety
• compliance with type approval relevant, legal and regulatory
requirements
• function
may require extra care and attention.
The following is understood by special care:
• design and assurance of the function or characteristics by means of
suitable design solutions (robust design).
• design and execution of manufacturing processes using suitable
process solutions (robust process)
• Identification of special characteristics
• safeguarding the special characteristics by means of suitable process
control measures, such as
1. compliance with process parameters (e.g.. process capabilities (Ppk),
failure rates (ppm))
2. failure detection inspections.
Among other matters, this care and attention refers to requirements which
extend over and above the general technical care required, where one or more
of the following aspects may be involved.
Development process
â Design of characteristics
â Ensuring the function required
â Calculations and simulation
â Tests and trials
â Monitoring during operation
â Validation of fail-safe features, robust operation)
â Emergency running concepts
â Acceptance checks and releases
â Documentation and archiving
Production process
â Process design
â Process, measurement and test/inspection equipment capability
â Process control covering manufacturing, test/inspection, maintenance,
handling, storage, packing, conservation, shipping, transport fixings and
transport
â Documentation and archiving
â Traceability
â Certification for customers
The extra work which may be involved with the heightened level of care and
attention is justified by the possible consequences of a failure of the function.
Characteristics of a product which do not have adequate robustness, which
are difficult to comply with in production and which, in the event of deviation,
lead directly to serious consequences can be identified as special
characteristics. Special characteristics are suitable to communicate and
safeguarded in the supply chain.
8 9

functional robust not functional robust
Design robust to fulfill the function?
Figure 1: How robust design and robust processes influence special characteristics
Special characteristics here are the result of a multidisciplinary decision-
making process. Taking into account the product and process development
results, a decision is made on the identification of special characteristics.
"As much as necessary; as little as possible" is the watchword in guaran-
teeing adequate security. These mean that, the more robust and validate the
design, the fewer special characteristics will be necessary.
Special characteristics are characteristics which require special care and are
not controlled by other processes.
The expression "other controlled processes" covers processes which (like the
special process) classify characteristics and, if appropriate, define any
requirements over and above the general technical level of care required.
Examples include:
ISO 26262 - Road vehicles — Functional safety,
ISO 14001 - Environmental management systems
ISO 45001 - Occupational health and safety management systems
2000/53/EG Vehicle end-of-life directive
VDA 4994 - Global Transport Label
3 Categories of Special Characteristics
Special characteristics are a subset of the total characteristics. Nature of
special characteristics, the non-fulfilment or non-compliance with which has
consequences/effects that can be categorised as follows:
cc/s cc = critical characteristics. Safety/security requirements/product
safety/safety-relevant consequences with immediate danger to life
and limb. The causal relationship between the characteristics and its
consequences must be predictable and must not be outside the
realm of probability.
Criteria may be:
â Protection for passengers in accidents
â Prevention of:
• momentary loss of sight of the road
• brake failure
• steering failure
• drive function failure
• sudden loss of power
• uncontrolled drive
• leakage of fuel / risk of fire
• insecure loads / trailers / parts
• injury when travelling or when using the vehicle in any way
cc/h cc = critical characteristics. Homologation relevant, legal and public
authority requirements at the time the product is introduced to the
market.
â Registration-related (e.g.., locking system, headlights)
â Homologation (e.g.., exhaust gases, vehicle emissions,
regulations issued by vehicle registration authorities)
â Legislation-related (recycling, warranty)
sc/f sc = significant characteristics. Functions and requirements
â Important functional requirements
(4 F (Form, Fit, Function and perFormance), tolerances, etc.).
10 11

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4 The process of applying special characteristics in the
product creation process
all Characteristics
Cher aclerislIcs
deslun concept not totItist
Characteristics
design nol roLuss
Characteristics (Geis, ccin, WI)
ManorecturIng process not rails(
= special charecteriste
As a process model the VDA publication "Maturity level assurance for new
parts" has been taken as an example. If preferred, a company's own in-house
product creation process can be used. The requirements relating to
significant and critical characteristics must be taken into account when car-
rying out maturity level assurance.
The considerations highlighted in the following illustration show areas with a
direct relationship to significant and critical characteristics.

Concept phase

Production


* or via customer specifications
Figure 2: Lots of characteristics


oug....f4Airrono


D Note 1:
D Note 2:
D Note 3:
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management
12 Frocidemerd•
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13 Product
development
14 Innovation/
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reecpprorpeple
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ter 111P corilreLl
le be issued Term related to characteristics see DIN EN ISO 9000:2015/3.10
Special characteristics see IATF 16949:2016-10/8.3.3.3.
The categories cc/s, cc/h and sc/f are neutral, informative
terms and are not prescriptive. They are put forward as
proposals to achieve desired uniformity.
111110,1.,
leloase fof lull
production
developmeel
0.1 Project
management
0,2 Innovation/
concept/
reliability
03 Procurement
process
04 Risk
management
Figure 3: Maturity level model from VDA Volume "Maturity level assurance for new parts"
The following sequential illustration is provided for clarity. The process model
is based on simultaneous engineering, in which process steps overlap in
terms of time.
The customer can request special characteristics.
The supplier negotiates
• the special characteristics requested by the customer,
• coordinates with the development and production department regarding
feasibility, testing concept and effort,
12
13

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S c-
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Mono-
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System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Safety requirements
Fungi Inn, and ! Concept filter
Concept Yellcfated?
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:
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Concnpi chang '
Requirements mon For
the contract to be Issuocli
Concept
change
Relevant functions, requirements and
characteristics for
Safety, registration and function
Detailed description; performance
specification; experience from
previous projects; design layout; .-•
simulation; trials;
Spec
[Dad
special
thalat-
todstics
Prototype CP
Design filter
Design validated?
Design change
possible?
Design
change
Specifying the supply chain
and placing the order
ML3
Relearol Of lethrtkel
No special
characteristics as
validation by
robust design
is documented
Technical documentation Incl.
specified special characteristics
Concept, requirements & functions at vehicle level,
experience from previous projects,
safety requirements, homologation-relevant,
legal and public authority regulations,
customer requirements
• takes the additional expenditure into account in negotiations with the
customer, and
• makes a contractual agreement with the customer until the project starts.
If special characteristics specified by the supplier require measures to be
taken by the customer, the supplier agrees these measures with the cus-
tomer.
The multidisciplinary team must not filter out the agreed special character-
istics required by the customer.
14
4.1 Description of the development process sequence
Time Workflow Characteristics
neeciectlione
Figure 4: Development process sequence
15

Special characteristics which have already been specified must be included
directly in the technical documentation of the development, with no filtering.
In the design filter the first step is to determine whether the design is
validated and secure.
Methods for validation are set out
in Section 4.3 "References to
validation methods".
Relevant characteristics validated
by robust design (see Section 4.4)
or secured design are no Special
Detailed description, perk...Mance
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Design
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No special
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mann design
II docurosniad
Characteristics and are not
any further.
Otherwise, a design modification must be considered.
The validation must be demonstrated and documented.
Itahnirsidotornernittorilmi.
seedbed special cliaractigestla
Prototype CP
.
;
Requirements mornt for
the contract la be issued
System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Safely requirements
C
oncept
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s":2M11,1=2°'"
System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Safety requirements
Relevant functions, requirements and
charactedslies for
registration and function
4.1.1 Requirements regarding the concept
As a first step an examination is made (
rao
of the relevant functions and require- .
ments regarding the vehicle concept
and experience from previous projects.
System layout, requirements specifi-
cations and safety demands form the
basis for the risk analysis.
In addition, there are different types of failure and their consequences. These
results flow into the concept filter so that relevant functions, requirements and
characteristics can be determined.
4.1.2 Concept filter
The special characteristics agreed with the customer and specified by him
from functions, safety requirements or legal and public authority specifica-
tions are to be taken over directly without filtering. Special characteristics
from previous projects are passed through the filter and do not necessarily
have to be adopted.
In the concept filter the first step is to clarify if the concept is validated.
Methods of concept validation
are set out in Section 4.3:
"References to validation
methods".
In terms of the concept,
requirements can be validated
by, for example:
• error tolerances
• redundancies
• secure fall-back levels
Functions and requirements which have been validated in the concept are no
special characteristics and need not be tracked further.
The validation must be demonstrated and documented.
In the case of functions, requirements and characteristics not validated by the
existing concept, a change in the concept is considered.
16
If a change in the concept is not possible, or if the concept change does not
result in successful validation, these functions, requirements and
characteristics are considered further in the design.
4.1.3 Requirements regarding the design
The non-validated functions
and requirements which have
been identified are taken into
account when drawing up the
performance specification and
deciding on the course of the
development.
The information gained from the detailed description, from the performance
specification, together with experience from previous projects and layouts, as
well as the results of simulations, trials, assessments and verifications are
also included in the design filter for further consideration.
If a prototype control plan (prototype CP) is required, the relevant character-
istics are included in this.
4.1.4 Design filter
The special characteristics which have been specified and have been
identified with the aid of the filters must be recorded in the technical
17
Concept, requirements & functions at vehicle
level, experience from previous projects,
safely requirements. hornologation-relevant,
legal and public authority regulations,
customer requirements

Relevant !unctions 1.1W (Irttonit thntl
Characteristics for
1....._lafety, registration and function_,


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specification. exponsoce from
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Not sufficient secured
special characteristics
(Concept Phase, Robust
litHea.allechoylcel
some
Design) are to be analyzed
and documented within
the framework of the
manufacturing feasibility study and testability analysis, risk analysis,
production planning and the test/inspection concept. The results must be
documented in the pre-launch control plan (pre-launch CP).
documentation for the project and must be forwarded to the production
planning department and, if appropriate, also to the customer.
4.2 Description of the process sequence in production
Time Workflow Characteristics
Technical documentation incl.
specified special characteristks
Manufacturing feasibility study
and Otstsefley analysis; task
altslyelE ptaductlon planning;
fast concept
aae 011. lent
end...inns
Pnlatditilieh OP
V
Special characteristics to be
validated by process layout
Manufacturing feasibility study
and testability analysis; risk
analysis; production planning'
test concept
Production-
concept
change
Special
characteristics nor
tricked further es
validation is
documented by
sibust promise
Control Plan
Lessons
teamed
Validation of
production concept,
lest/Inspection planning
sloavoube soling
Comodmiled
nouts.
pro..
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1..11. ant et wiebte
Production process filter
Prodeaten proms vseldsiedi
-- Production proems
chomp possible?
Sewell
ebencieriellos not
incited further as
validation le
documented by
t robust amebae
Special characteristics
requiring
process control
Production process and
product approval (PPP)
Project closure
Responsibility transferred
le Production
Stert requallflcallon
Figure 5: Process sequence in production
18
4.2.1 Requirements regarding production planning
4.2.2 Production planning filter
Predefined special characteristics (Customer or own definition) must be
adopted directly in the next stage without filtering.
In the production planning
filter it must be clarified
whether the production
concept is validated and
therefore secured.
Production plennIng fillor
F
t;r:'ecitZtorthebi" re]
dmsfritented
v,eldetion la
thaleasaint
Methods for validation are set
out in Section 4.3: "References
to validation methods".
Specini chat:amorist:Ls to be
valideted by process layout
V
Production
contopl
change
hiaredaClerblit iealdbaay May
and testability outlets; risk
enelyels; production plumage
aal comp
Characteristics which have been
validated in the production concept are no special characteristics and are not
tracked any further.
Validation of the production concept must be demonstrated and documented.
If special characteristics cannot be validated by the production concept, the
first step is to consider a change to the product concept. If a change is not
possible of if the change does not result in successful validation, the
characteristics must be carried forward to the production process filter.
19
L
Technical documentation incl.
specified special characteristics
V

Spacial charactetislict to be
validated by process layout
s
Validation of
production concept,
test/Inspection planning
ML4
runt
da-oan
Validation of
production concept,
test/Inspection planning
Lessens
armed
Production rocess fi ter
pemtevrellet•OZ
pertibas?
A
Special characteristics
requiring
process control
SPeCtal
charealattailac 1101
backed further.
validation Is
documented
by robust process
Control Pion
Production-
process
change
'ct
aral
br. pm, oal q.1•Al
4.2.3 Requirements regarding the production process filter
The validation of the production concept and
test/inspection planning can generate indicators
for further special characteristics in the process.
The special characteristics to be secured
are further considered.
4.2.4 Production process filter
Special characteristics may require special process control, if
• they are extremely sensitive to manufacturing conditions and/or the
slightest changes in material characteristics
• the manufacturing tolerances can be maintained only with considerable
effort.
Special characteristics already specified must be carried forward directly.
In the production process filter it is clarified whether the special characteristics
are validated and secured by the production process.
Methods for validation are
set out in Section 4.3:
"References to validation
methods".
The characteristics which
have been validated and
secured by a robust
production process are no
special characteristics and
are not tracked any further.
The robust production
process must be proven
and documented.
If special characteristics cannot be validated and secured by the production
process, the first step is to consider a change to the production process. If a
change is not possible of if the change does not result in successful
validation, the characteristics and the methods used to check and monitor
them are incorporated in the control plan (serial CP).
If special characteristics cannot be checked directly on the product, the
necessary associated process parameters must be monitored, and the
product must be checked on a random sample basis.
The results of the checks and monitoring must be recorded.
4.3 References to validation methods
Risk detection and actions to minimize risks, including verification and
validation of the implementation of these actions, are among the methods
used to validate and secure product and process.
Methods of risk analysis and risk assessment are described in VDA
publications, among others, such as:
>. Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
â Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
The most important elements in all risk analyses are:
)=• Functions
)=. Characteristics
â Possible failure modes; deviations; non-conformances
â Possible effects of failure modes
â Risk assessment
â Specifying appropriate actions
Alternatively, the following activities can also be carried out:
)=. Design of Experiment (DoE)
â Hazard analysis and risk assessment (HARA)
)%. Event Tree Analysis (ETA )
â Value Analysis (VA) / Value Engineering (VE)
â List comparison
)=. Team of experts
Completion of
Production planning
nic000rtiorcheorett
israoruHossur thortacnon.
20
21

4.4 Expanded details of the process description covering Proof of robust process is the obligation of the process planning department
responsible and can be provided, e.g.. by capability certification.
Control Plan (CP)
significant and critical characteristics
Premises
â The special characteristics must be determined on an inter-disciplinary
basis.
â Experience gained from previous projects is an input factor in determin-ing
significant and critical characteristics.
â Special characteristics must be determined without any consideration of
the work involved, within the framework of what is specified as legally
reasonable.
â Experience from product observation must be taken into account.
â If changes are made to product and/or process the exercise of deter-
mining special characteristics must be carried out again. This applies
particularly where production is transferred to another location.
â A proportion of safety-relevant critical characteristics and homologation-
related characteristics may be specified by the customer. However, as a
general principle, the supplier must also, on his own responsibility, identify
special characteristics.
Robust design
The term "robust design" describes a design which reacts without undue
sensitivity to fluctuations and interference factors (for example, if individual
features exceed tolerance limits), i.e.. it continues demonstrably to fulfil the
functions which are expected and required.
Proof of robust design is the obligation of the development function
responsible and can be provided, e.g.. by Design of Experiments (DoE).
Robust process
"Robust process" is understood as a process which reacts without undue
sensitivity to fluctuations and interference factors (e.g.., voltage fluctuations;
insulation defects on varnished wire, tool wear), i.e.. the manufactured product
traceable continues to perform as required, see the VDA publication: " Robust
production process".
The control plan describes the planned activities to validate and secure the
product and process characteristics. The control plan is defined in IATF
16949:2016-10/8.5.1.1 and in the appendix A.
4.5 Identification
To IATF 16949:2016-10/8.3.3.3 the special characteristics are to be marked
with symbols and documented in product production documents which
indicate the inquiry and introduction or measures control for these special
characteristics. This symbol provides a clear and simple identification.
Against this background the symbols should not contain too much specific
information.
It is recommended that the so-called "frame for check gauge" be used to
identify characteristics. This airship-shape symbol contains an identifying
letter for the category of the characteristics (s, h or f) and, for each category,
a sequential number to differentiate it in the release document.
Any further information associated with the characteristics (who what, how
and how many, with what documentation) can ideally be included in a table.
4.6 Consequences
The process used to determine special characteristics must be demon-
strated. Associate documents must be stored, Section 4.7: "Documentation
and retention".
The following activities regarding special characteristics must be agreed on
an inter-disciplinary basis:
â The special characteristics relating to technical documentation are
forwarded to the relevant production department
â Special characteristics which have been identified in the technical
documentation must be taken into account in all essential documents for
controlling the production process
â It must be specified how compliance with the special characteristics is to
be demonstrated
22 23

â Monitoring of the special characteristics must be specified
â The organisation shall establish traceability plans based on the level of
risk and ensure that identification and traceability requirements are
implemented for products with special characteristics.
In the supply chain the customer must advise his suppliers of special
characteristics and agree on the way they are to be monitored.
The fact that the customer specifies special characteristics does not release
the supplier from his own responsibility to identify special characteristics and
to deliver conforming products.
4.6.1 Recommended activities in product development
â Product development — design layout (including, for example, emergency
running, redundancies, operating and display concept)
â Concept revision
â Manufacturing feasibility study — stimulus for carrying out a detailed
manufacturing feasibility study for this characteristics
â Design of Experiment (DoE)
â Special attention to special characteristics in test/inspection planning and
documentation as required in the prototype control plan (prototype CP)
4.6.2 Recommended activities in process development
â Process development — the need to carry out trial manufacturing on a large
scale must be checked and specified if required, together with
recommended quantities
â Manufacturing feasibility study/testability analysis — stimulus for carrying
out a detailed manufacturing feasibility study for this characteristics
â Provisional process capability study
â Particular consideration of special characteristics in the test/inspection
planning and documentation, in pre-launch and serial control plan
â Proof of full production capability/suitability for product launch; special
requirements covering long-term process capability
4.7 Documentation and retention
Documented information according ISO 9000:2015-11/3.8.5 encloses:
â Information (Documents) to operate the organization
Examples of Information (documents) with reference to the special
characteristics:
• Design documents and/or production documents (if demanded)
• Risk analyses (as Process-FMEA)
• Special procedure for products with special characteristics
• Regulations to the contact with safety-relevant bolt connections
• Control plans
▪ Provisions to the process qualification, e.g.. process capability, process
parameter, test process suitability
• Working instruction
â Evidence (Records) of results achieved Examples of evidence (records)
documents with reference to the special characteristics:
• Test results of products with special characteristics, incl. test results
• Verification of the gauge calibration
• Evidence of process capability, including quality charts
• Evidence of verification process
The retention period distinguishes between information (documents) and
evidence (records), which includes operating and archiving period.
Information (Requirements documents)
The operating period begins with the release and ends when the document is
invalid, e.g.. because of a change (new version) or the expiry of a set period
(deviation permit), or the end of production of the product / process.
The archiving period begins when the document is invalid, in accordance with
the quality management system requirements for controlling documents and
data (e.g.., appropriate identification). The archiving period ends with the
specified point in time of deletion/destruction of the documentation.
24 25

Evidence (Quality records)
The operating period depends on the type of use and begins when the quality
record is created, e.g.. the documentation of a test result, a completed
process control chart, a process capability record, or an initial sample
inspection report. The records must not be modified once they
have been completed.
A further use of records is common, e.g.. for analysis purposes.
The archiving period begins after finalization of the record and ends with the
specified point in time of deletion/destruction. The VDA Volume 1
"Documented Information and Retention" includes an overview of terms and
definitions and also a classification system with examples, which show the
respective retention period.
The operating period begins with the day of the release and ends with the
specified point in time of the deletion/destruction of the documentation and
must comply with the valid legal and normative requirements.
Recommendation for retention period (operating and archiving period)
â 30 years for special characteristics cc/s and cc/h.
â 10 years for special characteristics sc/f.
In addition, consideration must be given to customer-specific requirements or
other stipulations.
5 Interaction with the FMEA
The special characteristics are identified with the described filters. The filters
can be applied by the FMEA team.
Special characteristics are documented in the Process-FMEA.
An assessment of the Severity (S) as S=10, S=9 or S=8 does not automat-
ically result in a cc/s or cc/h or sc/f.
For representation of the special characteristics in the FMEA see the
AIAG & VDA FMEA Handbook, appendix D1 "Special Characteristics".
26 27

A Appendix
Abbreviations used in this document
cc/h
cc/s
CP
DIN
EN
ETA
FMEA
FTA
IATF
ISO
ML
MLA
OEM
sc/f
SOP
VA
VE
Critical characteristics based on homologation relevant, legal
and public authority requirements at the time the product is
brought onto the market
Critical characteristics based on safety
Control Plan
Deutsche Industrie Norm (German industrial standard)
European standard
Event Tree Analysis
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis
Fault Tree Analysis
International Automotive Task Force
International Standardization Organization
Maturity level
Maturity level assurance
Original equipment manufacturer
Significant characteristics based on function or requirement
Start of Production
Value analysis
Value engineering
Examples
The following examples illustrate practical use in different degrees. The
methodical procedure is shown in each case.
The examples have been provided by various VDA member companies and
make no claim to comprehensiveness in terms of their contents. No
guarantee of any kind applies in any case.
A.1 Example: Fuel tank vent
A.2 Example: Light sensor
A.3 Example: Headlights
A.4 Example: Input shaft to steering system
A.5 Example: Steering wheel interlock
A.6 Example: Electric parking brake
A.7 Example: Electronic control unit earthing cable
A.8 Example: Sliding roof drive motor
Other abbreviations
DMR Diameter in Appendix A5
ECU Electronic control unit in Appendix A6
EPB Electronic parking brake in Appendix A6
28 29

( Signal preparation module
Engine ECU
A.1 Example : Fuel tank vent
System: Fuel tank vent
Function: Vent valve is controlled by the engine ECU
Characteristic: Open the valve to vent the fuel tank
Cocept. reanierrerois& funotkns eyehole
level oprirce f•2, OreaTat =TICS.
safety WOR.I.J.6x -44sPx-reivrt.
%pi and =VC auttc./wej-Vaio-s
ccsayrir is
System layout
mamma. speosesco
Rex ranse
Silej mcserenem
PAU
....rammstsecrt.
Ss raw•fl
lI
Features affected: Certification, length of guarantee,
Consequences:
If the valve is controlled by the rear signal preparation
module via the CAN bus, all the components involv
will be subject to certification and the longer
guarantee period.
Change of concept:
Control with a direct link between engine ECU and valve
ewers town noinwoi re
crersciereses
Sulky, ,egefr tone Memo
Direct line
..11...1*
/141
SYstem laYout
Requirements spear/cation
Risk artatysis
Safety requirements
lr .iieftemde ipiar
Mu )
Engine ECU
Fuel tank vent
A.1 Example : Fuel tank vent
The function "fuel tank vent" is to be installed in a vehicle
The function is initiated by the engine ECU
Concept: Initial launch-pad for solutions
A. Install a valve at the tank
B. Electrical connection from the existing signal preparation module (SPM H)
at the rear of the vehicle with a short line to the valve
C. Control signal from the ECU via the data bus to the SPM H
D. Control the valve via the SPM H
National regulations: Exhaust-relevant! homologation => cc/h
111
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ei

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ex3

A.2 Example : Light sensor
>
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A.1 Example : Fuel tank vent
Summary
The "fuel tank vent" function is checked for special characteristics and, because
it is seen to be subject to certification regulations, it is classified as "cc/h".
A change of concept is required and is documented. As a result of the change
of concept the characteristic ( cc/h) is secured and is not considered further in
subsequent development processes.
The actions are documented to certify :
• that this function has been investigated
• what actions were taken to secure the function
• information for subsequent models
• why this special characteristic is not examined further
in subsequent development processes.
Note:
For the production process the "connecting wire" is identified as "cc/h". It must
be ensured that this wire is installed.
In a vehicle, the function : "switch on lights automatically in dark conditions" is to be provided.
Concept : Initial launch-pad for solutions
A. Fit the light sensor to the windscreen
B. When dark conditions are detected, send a signal on the data bus
C. Control the headlights and rear lights by the signal preparation modules (SPMs)

Risk analysis:
If there is a defect in the light sensor the lights may
go out so that the view forwards Is lost
This is a safety risk and the function is identified as
"safety-relevant" In the development phase
documentation
Change of concept:
Switch on lights with Ignition ON
Switch off lights when bright conditions are detected
Design change:
Self-diagnosis is implemented in the light sensor. if an
error or an implausible status is detected, no signal o
a "dark conditions" signal is issued.
Always switch on lights with ignition "Off:
"Brightness" signal lights off
Licht sensor with
self-diagnosis
141.1
kwenwewis
MU )
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clunaffiala tr
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signal preparation module Rotary lighting switch ITDate bus
l'a.e.s le,erua
Concept filter
kaLo
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cream!. orwaxart
tar,10, r. eirs,0
livel avow* tram Avaxa mica
safely Piternmen.teenticsolo-nit
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aklarnattletrunIlyS
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Prototype CP
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▪ 110 Kw. I
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ML3
TVGhlliCar 6=4,5.mA-snits:I
Ipm,fird wa: la I charaarn Uses
A.2 Example : Light sensor
Function: Lights on if dark conditions are detected : ccls
A.2 Example : Light sensor
Summary:
The function is checked for special characteristics. In the risk analysis the function is
classified as a "safety risk" and identified as "safety-relevant".
A change of concept is necessary and documented.
A residual risk still exists, so the function remains identified for the design phase.
In the design layout the implementation of a self-diagnosis function is introduced as
a change.
In the design filter it is noted that, with the concept design layouts, a safe status is
always achieved in the event of a defect. The design is secured.
Further examination in subsequent processes is not necessary.
The actions are documented to certify:
• that this function has been investigated
• what actions were taken to secure the function
• information for subsequent models
• why this special characteristic is not examined
further in subsequent production processes.
Note:
No action and no special characteristics in the production process

iw
sl
ii
PIP
e
eH

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dw
ex3

Function: "Lights ON" with rotary lighting switch
= ccls
Risk analysis:
If a connector becomes loosethe lights may fail,
so that the view forward is lost.
This is a safety risk and the function is identified
as "safety-relevant" in the development phase
documentation.
No change of conceptis possible. The relevant
function is forwarded to the design phase.
Design change:
Use connectorwith a safety latch.
Automatic latching cannot be achieved.
Concept nyairerrenls& funcbes &Miele
level, experience fern previoln pnajecis
safely sesioned. hcandogafen-sheent
*PS rAP.0.4.146..1)0tVOZOV.
refs v aaararrRwenra
Concept
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A.3 Example : Headlights
The headlight function is to be provided in a vehicle.
Concept : Initial launch pad for solutions
A. Switch on the lights manually with the rotary lighting switch
B. The light switch sets the "lights on" signal on the data bus
C. The headlights and rear lights are controlled by the signal
preparation modules (SPMs)
A.3 Example: Headlights

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A.3 Example : Headlights
Summary:
The "headlights" function is checked for special characteristics. In the risk analysis
the plug connector is classified as a "safety risk" and identified as "safety-relevant ".
A change of concept is not possible, so the function remains identified for further
consideration in the design phase.
In the design layout the use of a latch prevents the connector from becoming loose
and the risk is secured.
However, the connector is prevented from becoming loose only if the latch has
engaged securely. An assembly error is still possible.
The "engagement of the connector latch" is identified as a cc/s and is forwarded to
the assembly process.
Note:
An action is required in the production process to ensure that the latch is engaged
securely.

Relevant functions, requirements and
characteristics for
specifying the supply chain
~Bg151lallOn an
"
... ...
CIO otANIfit Pr
t—
thelealed deleapa:Ndsfrwronc.
pecification; experience from
previous projects; design layout;
covedng simulation; trials;
assessment; verification
Relevant for homologation are:
• the diameter of the
designed break point:
Dspec = 13.1 ± 0.1 mm
• the roughness of the
bearing peg: Rz = 6.3
Relevant for function is:
Design
mileage
Design filter
-
1.1 Proirppo cP •
. ............
I he ecesrat
ednireatedelet eel
raetdd.
ais...ftera ha
Rom einds.
Tialaffeal detetnahledda Met
specified characteristics
rtvw.s.
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wrnsra.d
eam
A.4.1 Description of the development process sequence
A.4.1.1 Requirements regarding the concept
The concepts and functions at vehicle
level, experience from previous projects
‘5140.
System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
In the case of the input shaft to a steering gear, the customer has specified as
a critical safety characteristic (cc/s) the hardness of the bearing seat, which
must be 650HV +110HV1.
The system layout, requirements specification, risk analysis and safety
requirements reveal no further relevant requirements and functions relating to
safety, homologation and function.
A.4.1.2 Concept filter
The critical safety characteristic
(cc/s) specified by the customer,
that thehardness of the bearing „.„„,„„,„
seat must be 650HV+110HV1,
is taken forward as a relevant
safety characteristic without
passing through the concept filter.
The concept is examined.
Risks are detected for the
diameter of the designed
sPegc11,2S41,",:n.:;'d`e'r'''"
break point, the roughness
of the bearing peg and the roughness of the gearing. These cannot be
changed by a change in concept and are considered further as being
relevant. These fixed characteristics are allocated to the relevant
requirements and functions for safety, homologation and function. They then
go forward for further examination in terms of the design.
Other requirements and functions which have been secured by the concept
have been confirmed by trials and tests and are not considered further as
relevant regarding special and critical characteristics.
40
The trials and tests are described in instruction ref. V18/05. The results are
documented.
A change to the concept is considered, to take account of the requirements,
functions and characteristics not secured by the existing concept.
If the modified concept does not achieve the necessary level of assurance,
these requirements, functions and characteristics are examined further at the
design level.
A.4.1.3 Requirements regarding the design
The characteristics which have been identified are set out in detail.
• the gearing roughness level Rz = 12
These identified requirements, functions and characteristics are taken into
consideration when drawing up the performance specification and preparing
the layout in the development phase.
A.4.1.4 Design filter
The design layout of the
designed break point is
examined in Trial V18/09.
The trial confirms that the
diameter of the designed break
point Dspec = 13.1 ± 0.1 mm is a
robust design.
The results of the trial are filed
in the "NF9 steering gear" file.
The design diameter is secure and does not represent a special
characteristics.
41
ate heti
and relevant functions, together with
IproductIondtelopment
requirements relating to safety, security,
homologation and function are examined
for possible special characteristics.
Requirements rngrnt, for
the contract to be issued
Concept, requirements 8 functions al vehicle level,
experience from previous projects,
safety requirements, homologation-relevant,
legal and public authority regulations,
customer requirements
to b. Weed f
Relevant functions, requirements and
characteristics for
Safety, registration and function

System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Safety requirements
fuocuon.
nIt rp.Z.
j [T•1•[1•11111,1

L
Technical documentadod Incl.
specified special characteristics
Manufacturing feasibility study
and testability analysis; risk
analysis; production planning;
test concept
\
MO
No further requirements, functions and characteristics representing special
characteristics are noted in the development.
In the technical documentation covering the development the following
special characteristics are specified and forwarded to the production planning
department.
Safety-relevant special characteristic:
• cc/s: Hardness of the bearing seat 650HV+110HV1.
Homologation-relevant special characteristic:
• cc/h: Surface roughness of the bearing peg Rz = 6,3
Function-relevant special characteristic:
• sc/f: Gearing roughness level Rz = 12
Once specified, these special characteristics are included in the prototype
control plan.
A.4.2 Description of the production process sequence
A.4.2.1 Requirements regarding production planning
The special characteristics
forwarded from the techni-
cal documentation in the
development phase and
specified for consideration
at the production planning
stage are processed further
and included in the control plan for the pre-production phase.
These special characteristics are:
Safety-relevant:
• cc/s: Hardness of the bearing seat 650HV+110HV1.
Homologation-relevant:
• cc/h: Surface roughness of the bearing peg Rz = 6,3
Function-relevant:
• SC/f: Gearing roughness level Rz = 12
These and all other special characteristics are verified within the framework of
the manufacturing feasibility analysis and testability, risk analysis, production
planning, test/inspection concept and the design review. Checks must also be
made to determine whether test/inspection specifications contain product
characteristics and any requirements regarding process parameters.
42 43

Spacial characteristics to be
validated by process layout
GaNsollsrtoolnulcattNalls
astalestalollOy martyr n, rub
.1.41,111A
Production pli1111911U filter
Er/MAI:it
P10-1Pilhelt PP
„-17=17.
—!=.
"
ht rtrr—tro
Priximitek
PI
Came.
Specisi ohivacIvrisucv no he
validated by process layout
Validation of
production concept,
test/inspection planning
LocoulaIN0 el
ortarl.allon phorcou


Validation of
production concept,
tesginspection planning
Production-
process
change
Farmer erackvikto reel. Nk4
ervt/vrevetrukakver.aveark,s
41116-
Production process filter
y evpliuFttunpmcw,,
Special characteristics
requiring
process control
Special
Chem-M.01.1M,, not
(racked further as
validation is
documented
t by robust process
A.4.2.2 Production planning filter A.4.2.3 Requirements regarding the production process filter
The special cc/s safety charac-
teristic specified by the customer
for the hardness of the bearing
seat (650HV+110HV1) does not
pass through the production
planning filter. Instead, it is for-
warded as a special safety
characteristic.
The actions taken to validate the
production planning and test/
inspection planning do not reveal
any further special characteristics.
The relevant requirements, functions
and characteristics which have been
identified are set out in more detail.
A.4.2.4 Production process filter
The other information gained flows into the production planning filter in order
to identify the special characteristics.
The purpose of the production planning filter is to clarify whether the produc-
tion concept is secure. The homologation-related special characteristic cc/h
(the surface roughness of the bearing peg Rz = 6,3) is secured by the design
of the tool. This characteristic is therefore no longer included as a special
characteristic in the production process.
Proof of security is demonstrated and is documented in the production
planning papers.
The function-relevant special characteristic sc/f (gearing roughness level Rz =
12) cannot be secured by the production concept.
A change to the production concept does not result in a secure product. This
special characteristic is therefore included in the production process filter and
in the control plan for pre-production.
44
The special cc/s safety
characteristic specified
by the customer for the
hardness of the bearing
seat (650HV+110HV1)
does not pass through
the production process
filter. Instead, it is for-
warded as a special
safety characteristic.
The function-relevant
special characteristic
sc/f (gearing roughness
level Rz = 12) can be
secured in the process, based on lessons learned from a previous project.
This robust process is documented in the production description, with proof of
capable production. No consideration is given to a change in the production
process. The special characteristic is secured by the production process.
Because it is now secure, the special characteristic is not incorporated in the
control plan for full production.
45

Concept, requirements & functions at vehicle level,
experience from previous projects,
safety requirements, homologation-relevant, legal
and public authority regulations,
customer requirements
Innovation release for lull
production development
System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Safety requirements
A.4.3 Result A.5 Example: Special characteristics for a steering wheel interlock
The safety-relevant special characteristic cc/s specified by the customer
(hardness of the bearing seat 650HV+110HV1) by-passes all the filters
and is carried forward to the control plan for full production. It must be taken
into account in the manufacturing process and covered by documentation.
The homologation-relevant special characteristic cc/h (roughness of the
bearing peg Rz = 6,3) was secured by the production concept and is not
included as a special characteristic in the manufacturing process. The fact
that it has been secured by the production concept is documented.
The function-relevant special characteristic sc/f (gearing roughness level Rz =
12) is secured in the production process by a robust process. Experience
from previous projects is available here.
In total, on safety-relevant special characteristic is carried over into the
control plan for full production. The special characteristics relating to homo-
logation and function have been secured and are not included in the control
plan.
Requirements mgmt for the
contract to be issued
A.5.1 Process steps for the OEM: MLO and ML1
A.5.1.1 Determining the functions at vehicle level
Vehicle
Transport the passengers from A to B under the control of the driver
Protect the passengers from injury
Protect all persons involved from serious injury in an accident situation
Protect passengers from environmental influences
Protect the vehicle against theft
Comply with noise requirements
Minimize vehicle operating costs
A.5.1.2 Identifying and describing functions relevant to
special characteristics, based on external and
internal requirements at vehicle level
Vehicle
Transport the passengers from A to B under the control of the driver
*s__ Protect the passengers from injury
No►s_ Protect all persons involved from serious injury in an accident situation
Protect passengers from environmental influences
mlh_ Protect the vehicle against theft
Comply with noise requirements
*f_ Minimize vehicle operating costs
46 47

Vehicle
Transport the passengers from A to B under the control of the driver
s_Protect the passengers from injury
s_Protect all persons involved from serious injury in an
accident situation
Protect passengers from environmental influences
h_Protect vehicle against theft
Comply with noise requirements
f_Minimize vehicle operating costs
Warnii SYgern
ir.o.note

Enable the vehicle to be steered
h_Prevera steering movement with key removed
[_Minimize repair costs (insurance classification)
Comply with noise requirements for the steering function
h _Public authority requirement: steering system must he
uniquely identified for traceability
Brake system
Slaw the vehicle as desired by the driver
_Slaw the vehicle as desired by the system
with noise requirements for the brake system
A.5.1.3 Breakdown of identifications for part-functions and
part-systems
A.5.1.4 Identifying and classifying functions relevant to special
Vehicle Steering system Steering wheel interlock
characteristics, based on a risk analysis
h_Protect vehicle against
theft
h_Prevent steering wheel movement h_Engage steering column in locked
with key removed key position
Vehicle
Transport the passengers from A to B
Controllability of vehicle performance Impossible to steer the vehicle
significantly restricted
under the control of the driver — Enable the vehicle to be steered
Steering system
— in the "open" position
Steering wheel interlock
Steering column blocked with key in the
"open" position
Release the steering column with the key
Identification of requirements relating to homologation at part-system level:
The steering system must be uniquely identified for traceability
The chain of defects is assessed as safety-relevant and this causes the function
"Transport the passengers from A to B under the control of the driver" to be classified at
vehicle level with S_ as a function for which a special characteristic is relevant.
The classification is then broken down into part-functions and part-systems.
A.5.1.5 Deriving special characteristics by the OEM
em
Brake 061ein
s Stow the vehicle as desired by the driver
s Stow the vehicle as desired by the system
(;empty with noise requirements for the brake system
tearing system
h_steering system must be uniquely identified for traceability
Steering wheel interlock
h_Engage steering column in locked
Steering column in key position release openly and safely
Comply with noise requirements for the steering wheel interlock
Steering column protect against damage from misuse
Steering gear
Special characteristics relating to the steering wheel interlock:
Hardness of the interlock component: sc/f_material hardness 268HB
Steering system
Enable the vehicle to be steered
h_Prevent steering movement with key removed
f_Minimize repair costs (insurance classification)
Comply with noise requirements for the steering function
h_Public authority requirement: steering system must be uniquely identified for traceability
r
H
skip
i
teedng
we1
o
h;
n
Itee
Steering wheel inrt
H_Steeri
Steering i
Noise req
Steering c
Steering gear
A characteristic can be specified on the basis of a homologation requirement
at part-system level:
*The steering system must be uniquely identified for traceability => cc/h
If the steering wheel interlock is subjected to misuse forces, a "hard" interlock
(a latching peg, for example) can damage the steering column, perhaps
resulting in high repair costs. For this reason, the *hardness of the interlock
component is determined as sc/f.
filly
A.5.1.6 Transferring the information from the OEM to the steering
system supplier (for example, in the development requirements
specification)
Steering wheel interlock functions for which special characteristics are
relevant:
h_lock the steering column with the key in the "closed" position
s_guarantee release of the steering column with the key in the
"open" position
f_protect the steering column from damage in the event of misuse
Special characteristics relating to the steering column:
The steering column must be uniquely identified for traceability cc/h
48 49

System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
11111t
ik

Safety reetaramantf.
'Mk
111$11
/
<entnat VA Me
Con—
mew
"11:71A4Z.P
ROI•VAIV function. ternMelhafilt and
characteristics for
Sandy. registration and function
A.5.2 Process steps at Tier 1 level (ML1)
System structure of the steering wheel interlock:
Steering column tube
End-stop damper in
Latch
Latching unit
Latch spring
steering column tube
Steering column
tube cover Housing (left)
Steering wheel
Housing (right)
interlock
Drive unit Motor with pinion
Gear
Controller PCB
Setting unit
Steering wheel interlock
characteristics
A.5.2.1 Taking s, h and f characteristics to the part-functions
(concept level)
The steering wheel interlock concept:
50
Function network in the steering wheel interlock system:
Steering column tube
's provide rotating bearing point for latching unit
Steering column tube
s_ fix and position the drive unit
Latch
s_ release steering column in unlatched position
Housing (right)
s_ provide bearing for setting unit with housing (left)
Housing (right)
Steering wheel interlock r s_ provide bearing for bolt with adjustment in x-plane
s_ release steering column in key "open" Gear
position s_ transfer torque from motor to trigger with def. translation
Trigger
s_ convert torque from gear into axial movement of bolt
Bolt
s_ move latch in accordance with trigger movement
Housing (right)
s provide bearing for gear
Steering wheel interlock characteristics
s_ gap between released latch and steering column = 3 mm
51

Motor with
pinion
Controler
PCB
Controler
PCB
ISecuring system Securing system
Steering column tube
Latch unit
Locking unit
Housing
Steering column tube
Latch unit
Locking unit
Housing
Gear
Release
V
Design filter
Deilen validated?
hasten chimps
- --
• Hoapticiat
chroxier I si II
,11 validation by
I robust design
h documeaisd
Detailed description; performance
speclficalion; eve lance from previous
ofecle; design lay ut; simulation; trials
assessment; verification
Plisd
tothlto
--------- )
Prototyp CP
-----
Design
change
Technical documentation incl.
specified special characteristics
Steering wheel interlock
h_ lock steering column with key in
"closed" position
Steering wheel interlock
f protect steering column from damage
in case of misuse
Steering column tube
s_h_ provide rotating bearing point for latching
esring column tube
s_h_fix and position the drive unit
Housing (right)
s_h_ provide bearing for setting unit with housing (left)
Housing (right)
s_h_ provide bearing for bolt with adjustment in x-plane
e G ar
s_n_ transfer torque from motor to trigger with def. translation
1 Trigger
s_h_ convert torque from gear into axial movement of bolt
Set spring
h_provide tension between gear and trigger
Bolt
s_h_ move latch in accordance with trigger movement
Housing (right)
s_h_provide bearing for gear
Steering wheel interlock characteristics
h_Overlap between latched bolt and steering column >= 5 mm
Latch
f ensure definite shear without damage to steering column
in case of misuse
A.5.3 Process steps at Tier 1 level (ML2 and ML3)
A.5.2.2 Risk analysis at concept level
Steering wheel interlock
h_ lock the steering column with the
key in the "closed" position
Steering column not locked with key
in the "closed" position
Steering wheel interlock
s_ ensure steering column is released
with key in the "open" position
Steering column is blocked with the
key in the "open" position
Controller PCB
s_h_ provide current based on control
signals from vehicle ECU
Motor incorrectly supplied with current
Following recognition of the risk in the controller PCB (motor incorrectly
supplied with current) the concept was expanded by a function at system level,
which secures against the risk.
New: s_secure the latched positions.
This action removes the PCB functions from the concept filter and need not be
considered further with regard to special characteristics!
A.5.3.1 Taking s, h and f functions to the design characteristics level and
adopting the specified characteristic for the interlock characteristic
for the interlock component (latch):
Special characteristic f E_material hardness 268HB
52 53

Steering column tube
s_h_provide rotating bearing point for peg unit
Steering column tube
s_h_position and fix drive unit
Right-hand housing
j.! s_h_provide bearing for positioning unit in
• association
Rgbbliand housing
a_h_arc-ndo beanng for locating bob to move in x.
Gear wheel
s_h_transfer torque from motor to driver with defined
transfer characteristics
Trigger
s_h_convert torque from gear wheel into axial movement
of locating bolt
Locating spring
h_provide pre-tension force between gear wheel and trigger
Locating bolt
s_h_move peg in accordance with trigger movements
Steering wheel interlock
h engage steering column interlock in "key
closed" position
Right-hand housing
s_h_provide bearing for gear wheel
• Stwe.g wheel interlock characteristics
s_gap IsCivi•Cl. released peg and steering column >= 3 mm
Left-hand housing characteristics
s_h_lenght = BO mm 20 2
Right-hand housing characteristics
s_h_lenght = 80 mm 00 2
Peg characteristics
s_width = 24 mm t0.1
Locating bolt characteristics
s_h_lenght = 50 mm t0.1
Trigger characteristics
s_h_lenght = 12 mm tO 1
Gear .reei raereadealcs
s_h_lenght = 7 mm 00 1
Lek-hand housing characteristics
s_h_lenght = 80 mm t0.2
12bahlittlo4 housing characteristics
4._.n_kyrtahe • 80 mm 00 2
Steering column tube characteristics
s_h_housing positioning length = BO min t02
MOWN aacirra tax aaax4eraCas
s_a_ ttl.tat, upper housing position and b '
p
serred
eg •• 18 ern 00 5 oonng
Steering column tube characteristic
s_h_Space between upper housing position and bearing
for peg = 13 mm ±005
Stanch g OOlumn tube characteristic
s_h_langbt for housing positioning = 80 mm ±0 2
Left-hand housing characteristics
<
s_h_lenght = 80 mm ±0 2
Right-hand housing characteristics
s_h_lenght = 80 mm ±0.2
Left-hand housing characteristics
/s_h_control dimension for positioning peg = DMR 2.6 mm +0.1
Gam-Wheat elnuatteielara
< s_n_coaxitady Of hearing point diameter with housing = 0.08
_Trigger characteristics
s_h_lenght = 12 mm *0.1
Locating spring characteristics
h_spring force (deleted following confirmation that design is
robust against process fluctuations!) = 8,4 N ±0.6
Locating bolt characteristics
s_h_lenght = 50 mm
Wit-hand Musing chanicleastIcs
s h_cams1 dirnansinn !Or eeeptianingt peg DOM t6 mrn.6.1
Lail-nand housing characteristics
s_h_tenght = 80 mm ±0.2
CT.-lend
mm
n?characteristics
.
7t
Gear W11001 chartatenellas
s_h_lenght = 7 mm ±0.1
Right-hand housing
S_Z_provide bearing for gear wheel
Steering wheel interlock characteristic
h_overlap between latched bolt and steering column >= 5 mm
Left-hand housing characteristics
= 80 mm ±0.2
Right-hand housing
s_h_lenght = 80 mm ±0.2
cn
m
z.
are
ai
a
Steering column tube characteristics
s_h_space between upper housing position and bearing for
peg = 13 mm 00 05
Steering column tube characteristics
s_h_lenght for housing positioning = BO mm 00 2
Peg characteristics
s_widen = 24 mm
Left-hand housing characteristics
s_h_lenght = 80 mm tO 2
Right-hand housing characteristics
s_h_lenght = 80 mm tO 2
Left -hand housing characteristics
s_h_control dimension for positioning peg = DMR 2.6 mm =0 1
• Right-hand housing characteristics

-..........,,..,
s_h_control dimension for positioning peg = DMR 2.6 mm -0.1
Left-hand housing characteristics
s_h_lenght = 80 mm -20 2
Right-hand housing characteristics
s_h_lenght = BO film tO 2
Gear wheel characteristics
shcoaxiality or bearing point diameter with housing = 0.08
Gar.whael Winderean
s_h_lenght = 7 mm tO 1
Steering column tube
a_n_ftnir,+3.2 roaring. bearing point for peg unit
Steering column tube
klutealca and fix drive unit
Pe
ensure steering column releases in "unlatched"
position
Right-hand housing
s_h_provide bearing for positioning unit in association
with left-hand housing

of=b
`, 3 2,
E
3 c,
z rrr
O
3 F.
g
ro
Steering wheel interlock
s_ensure steering column releases in "unLdIched"
position
F1101.1-hird housing
i_n_p•orklie bearing for locating bolt to
lotree V, eetrb
Gear wheel
kh_lrargqr tawm frwn =Mr tC, MOW Mr. ad," Mnil.
chimmorlgra.
Itridrievcri. Writhe, from gear wheel into axial movement of
*rate* bolt

Trigger characteristics
s_h_lenght = 12 mm t0.1
Locating bolt characteristics
s_h_lengh1= 50 mm 30 1

Locating bolt characteristics
s_h_move peg in accordance with trigger movements

A.5.4 Process steps at OEM and Tier 1 level (ML3)
Production-
concepl
I change
Manotactviing faealtablty study
and testability smartie,. risk
PiPPYstai ProdOctlori planning;
cettcepi
Production sCliannIng fitter
0/11C•p---17r
Preolailisch OP
''''
cherecleilelice net
tracked further as
velidetion Is
documented by
XitifittPAPPint
Spaniel chsreciralslice to his
validated by process layout
V
Steering wheel interlock characteristics
s_gap between released latch and steering
column >=3 mm
Latch characteristic
s width= 24 mm ± 0.1
Bolt characteristics
s_h_length = 50 mm +0 1
Trigger characteristics
s_h_length= 12 mm ±0.1
Gear characteristics
s_h_length= 7 mm ±0.1
Characteristics of housing (left)
s_h_length= 80 mm ±0.2
Characteristics of housing (right)
s_h_length= 80 mm ±0.2
Characteristics of steering column tube
s_h_length of housing positioning= 80 mm ±0.2
Characteristics of steering column tube
s_h_gap between upper housing position and bearing
for latch = 13 mm ±0.05
s: Gap between released latch and steering column
[steering wheel interlock] >=3 mm
All other dimensions are identified as individual dimensions in the
component drawing:
s: control dimension for positioning peg = DMR 2.6 mm +0.1
[left-hand housing]
s: control dimension for positioning hole = DMR 2.6 mm -0.1
[right-hand housing]
s: coaxiality of bearing point diameter with housing = 0.08 [gear]
f E: Material hardness [barrier latch] = 268 HB
steering column in the vehicl- <
Flt stewing wheel Male* to the stowing column
h_lock the steering column in 'key closed" position
jelienle steering column in 'key open" position
Sioanng colon. net releeend "kiny own' poulhon
deal noworwearemonni for %looms whorl inladeekt
Una** sleeking column Iran Unmoor st once et
001411..lelteleiht pindbruyil
Lemma economic assembly
trilialrint; age sieving *hal neatest( tern
ea
politicks
operators
s_h_postion slosatsp retool emetic), on amens *slum
/
a h as aleanrio seheet Wort:ink ha togyercink
SiOlgillg WWI inuidock
1yeasas peg beer be. 'wen' Pate.
Pep tosition not open
•wows scresdanal
lessens column
A.5.3.2 Carrying out the design filter:
The characteristic cc/h is shown in the development stage to be
robust against process fluctuations (DoE trials).
Certification is described in the technical documentation covering
the development and the characteristic not be considered as
special characteristic.
A.5.3.3 Including the sc/cc in the technical documentation:
The characteristics of the chain of dimensions covering the
gap between the unlatched bolt and the steering column
are not considered as separate items. Instead, the complete
dimensional chain is considered as a single cc/s characteristic.
This is documented in the assembly drawing (s).
A.5.4.1 Deriving special characteristics on the basis of the
OEM's Process FMEA
The latch position "open" is not robust. Due to the high effect "steering
blocked while driving", a cc/s is identified and marked for this purpose.
Install :Merino system
s_enebre Wide lobe Owed
ven?=Tiblig'il'der'veireenrt'l= key removed
alleirtai0 repair costs (Instal= dot. e:at
WM meet Moulemeireskramailoalsowem
f_comply with delivery limes (JIT)
i
Yrdae steering gear In the vehicle <
The "latch position when received" is recorded in the assembly drawing as an
action from the Process FMEA (cc/s) and forwarded to the supplier.
cc/s: Latch position when received [steering wheel interlock] = open
A.5.4.2 Carrying out the production planning filter by the Tier 1 supplier
The characteristic cc/s: coaxiality of the bearing point diameter with the
housing = 0.08 [gear] is no special characteristic because the two diameters
are produced when gripped in a machine and therefore, as a concept, no
error can occur in terms of coaxiality. The machine capability is demonstrated
and documented.
56 57

Validation of
producilon concept,
teat/Inspection planning
Special characteristics
requiring
Mans control
Lesson*
to
''''''''
chareoleeletIce trot;
I tracked further**
validation Is
: documented by
tobtaitrocus
rroon ood
• ,11. ar• 4.1S.
Producioan nroo.o.o ono,
prodon npoopirol iPOSI
ProrliKtkon o
reaneleee
Pliorhopqn
prooro.
CI
Manufacture of the controller PCB
(_Robust function over product life
Inadequate robustness over
product life
Assembly step xxxx
(\ —8efiew cddering process
f Cdiduding lido between
components and PCB
Solder contacts not fully formed.
. Components on PCB are damaged
, Operator al fellow soldering machine
c
od.
f_eolder moll lenveralure = 230'C i 10'
;older Clem - 220.0
Solder lanymmlivu ,..- 7.10'C
pasta
Assembly step yyyy
lec
tr
ic

p
a
r

in


•ra

-
59
A6. Example: Electric parking brake
A.5.5 Process steps at Tier 1 and Tier "n" levels
Pnoiroel emir*
lierpoontWir trrodonod
to Production.
PIA opor Oro soon
A.5.5.1 Deriving special characteristics on the basis of the
Process FMEA by the Tier 2 (n) supplier
Process-related variation of the process characteristic solder melt
temperature lead to a special characteristics sc/f.
A.5.5.2 Carrying out the production process filter at Tier 1 level
The production process filter at Tier 1 level does not identify further special
characteristics. The identified special characteristics are included in the Tier 1
supplier's control plan.
58

A.6 Electric parking brake - special characteristic
An initial manufacturing feasibility study and risk analysis in the
concept phase covering this product resulted in a total of 1585
special characteristics relating to safety and function.
Such a number causes the characteristics
to lose their significance and makes the process
impossible to handle.
A reduction in the number of
special
characteristic is essential.
To do so, filters were used in the
concept phase
design phase
production planning phase
in full production
In drawing up the
analysis it was assumed
that all characteristics,
whether presently
regarded as secure or
not, must be tracked by
the development
function, through to full
production
A.6 Possible means of reducing the numbers
Concept filter
• In specifying special characteristic, general design considerations were backed up by
experience from products already in production and subject to the same demands (field
observations and quality statistics)
Design filter
• In addition, information was gained from laboratory investigations against specifications
and tests under extreme conditions, as well as the associated, detailed results.
Information from tolerance studies and failure analyses was also used. Where
appropriate, results and findings from in-vehicle validations (e.g., winter and summer
tests) can also be called on.
Production planning filter
• Use was made of findings from process studies on current production lines (types and
frequency of failures, MFU, PFU, MSA) and
• by taking account of proven manufacturing technologies and
• the planning and shaping of robust production processes.
Production process filter
• Additional important information was gained from careful analysis of machines and
processes used in similar large-scale production and assembly , as well as
• the analysis of known product data such as ppm and events at customers' premises and
in the field

Concept, requirements & functions et vehicle level,
experience horn previous creeds
safety requirements, Porne.OgitetlieverWitec
legal end public .wanly rrysir.,31
Ir000reteon reins* for NI
eisouctleo cievtiocrtivor

System layout
Requirements specificaticn
Risk analysis
Satiety to uernienin.
Requirement mg t
the centred to be Issued

A.6 Possible means of reducing the numbers
Ways of reducing the number of special characteristics
were examined by studying the following parts and sub-assemblies of
the electric parking brake.
• Axial bearings
• Motor assembly
• Torque support
• Shaft / nut / lubrication system
• Slipping clutch
• Force sensor
▪ ECU
A.6 Axial bearings
• FMEA for the EPB axial bearing
The FMEA results in severity figures of 8, 9 qr 10
for the risk areas of
• friction, wear
• type and quantity of grease
• type of bearing (ball, roller, ....)
• bearing ventilation
• residual magnetism

In today's thinking a figure
of 9 or 10 does not automatically
result In a special characteristic
sc/f ore critical characteristic cc/h
or cc/s
• Concept filter
• Use a similar, proven design: axial bearings in
ca. 12 million units in use with no known problems
• In designing the bearing layout a larger-dimension
bearing was selected, giving a bearing static
performance figure of 40 kN, ca. 20 times the
safety margin

rt. ywit taadcatio.nisubraurts and
Sam:fru:to bir
Wry, •40,.trrtlern and Melon
Detailed description: Pfialtorgafil,ca
speafication; bpanenco for
previous project: design layout
covenng simulation, tnals,
assessment; venfication
n__ ....dm oblyatir.c.
abbarlicatton, exparbara From orcyloin
Pnobattl; design layout; aUnulatIon;
blab. ansetrnt. ',newton
Prototype CP
No loriciv
Scum Nyman
validation by
robuat @alio
it N. rociumyttact,
L
Teciowel cicarnimilekm Ina
waned spade chrarlaiistics
Roller bearing ('A' sample)
\
\ I/
44;7'
(4144LiW
A.6 Axial bearing
n Design filter
• Results from laboratory investigations
• Preliminary trials with 3-part bearing OK.
(ca 20 units < 100 000 cycles)
• No wear, grooves or rifling
• Trials with production bearings also OK.
(ca 40 units, some achieving 2 x life)
• Manufacturer's findings OK.
From the design and quality stand-points the
axial bearing is seen as a robust design.
No sc or cc are taken from the FMEA and
included in drawings or the list of sc / cc.
However: Information from the supplier regarding
the evaluation of individual risks in our FMEA, to
be included in his risk analysis.
If additional risks are detected, further discussion
is required with the supplier.
• Production planning filter
Not relevant
• Production process filter
Not relevant
A.6 Axial bearing
Axial ball bearing
(competitor)
Roller bearing (from production)

MU notworelrorfJosr.reausoorracloCt
Infamir.
p
.1141ratan•i•lisrctlan
Detailed description: PM..ce
specitcation; experience Porn
Orneroaccriocor. Orlar alma
covering simulation: fobs;
assessment; verification
Sedatiod docurnislikkal ingt-
spocritcr) oprircral OnarDOPITIfitlel
Derailed doccrIptIon;porfarmanor
cpeclfloalon; osporicnce from playlet..
prolate; design 'gout; cinutekee;
trials; seuesnarnt; vorlflectIon
Design
sfio
Design filter
1 No special
4-1.ftnempo oc
te4E0 CP by
rabuot donor..
1
kr Cocurouled
11 itla•rtwro.4..
ocreerouvo
A.6 Motor assembly
• FMEA for electric parking brake motor assembly
The FMEA results in severity figures of 8, 9 or 10
for the risk areas of M
• shaft parallelism
ss Innovation oo ror
p dud! 0 I p nt
full
Concept, requirements 8. functions et vehicle level
expenence horn previous projects
safety requirements, homologabon-relevant
legal and public eultority regulations,
customer requirements
RVIAMMI
in. roman re n. L.31,4
• rectangularity
a life of 100 000 cycles
( brush; commutator....)
• performance graph
• sealing function
• jammed motor
( magnets, gearing, cup,
• rotation detection
• EMC
• over-heating
In today's thinking a figure
of 9 or 10 does not automatically
result in a special characteristic
sc/f or a critical characteristic
cc/h or ss/s
I
air-gap, )
System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Work rcorrewratc
System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Safely requirements
1.1=7.7.=
c
Concept filler
. %ern
• Concept filter
• Design layout as for window-lift drive (large-scale production)
Imee•PETAleketa-
v" —
- the difference is in gearing and winding
Newly developed ECU checks motor operation
(thermal protection; reduced supply voltage if a dynamic
block occurs).
New sealing concept
nparmwm
11.41,1,110.03
r172.-jr.t.••.1
h=ipbo1.1.• sedr
Relevant functons, requirements and
chareclenstos for
ripberMen .pulTur%11.
V'
A.6 Motor assembly
• Design filter
Laboratory investigations (60 units) up to
twice the specified life. Carbon brushes
show wear at the edges
• Special characteristics in the drawings
• 5 cc/s and 83 sc/f

11111,,.04,4nrulbltC study
rss tossoluty snows; em
stea li; produalann ptimino;
test concept
Prcuiiction planning Fl rc
CralCrta
Spezial cheracteristles to be
relldsted by process layout
Production.
••••••pt
On1,4
•—•
,1.1,0041
as validation is
documented bY
nabLeal=22EL1
Special ensranariales to be
validated by process layout
Validation of
production concept,
teetrinspection planning
C.I..121,
heeeeev mrpeg
Volicisifon of
Production concept
lastanspection planning
t•eryneomen
1,1•144.1.1
Production.
l 6
• ana sf,nmerelnIsal
ooeureen reraten• art ma.
nd
Fro., own, pr.ke
Production process rIFte4

nottial chn-octsrisnos
requiring
process Control
gyeoal
• •Arraclar,11,
lisirvvd rad.ii or
ratldsbeni.
rio.moriall
trlatagvt»:::
ontrol Plan]
Lour,* I
salad
A.6 Motor assembly
L
ann
Torttoldgli dOCLIMOTIIMOM MCI.
effled ward choractertatice
110••• r irlimrs
Manufacturing feasibility study
and testability snaysis; risk
analysis; production pionning;
test concept
• Production planning filter
The use of proven manufacturing methods for mechanical
parts with capability indices (Cpk) between 1.85 & 2.11
mean that no further sc / cc are generated.
15 sc/f from the drawings need not be tracked further,
because it is possible to demonstrate the robustness of
the manufacturing processes.
Checks on the supplier's production planning for
electronics
result in 5 more cc/s and 3 more sc/f
A.6 Motor assembly
• Production process filter
120 million units delivered to date.
No known problems with shaft, sheet package,
housing, commutator, insulation, magnets,
magnet ring, brush system, throttle and capacitor.
This permits the elimination of 3 sc/f.
Data from experience reveal 4 more sc/f and
one cc/s for the cup, wiring and winding.
The ECU must be considered and further
special characteristics will probably be added
Prima mew.. srbierw.
ampraraosrat atru.Stri,
lox rbaumbvisp,

Brush / commutator after 2 x life cycle
n rotes. for lug
product development
• FMEA for electric parking brake torque support
• The FMEA results in severity figures of 8, 9 or 0
for
• press fastening
• material strength
• notching effect
• Bowden cable interface
(dimensional)
• tolerances on form & positron
• geometry
In today's thinking a figure of 9
or 10 does not automatically
result in a significant
characterbtic sc/f or a critical
characteristic cc/h or cc/s
n Concept filter
Multiple safety level for tensile & torsion resistance
in the layout
• problematic design with stamped form part rejected
• change to stable design with cold-formed part
nee,l
Concept filter
_e.2:mece _
-calyccorawge --
Relevant functions, tequeoments and
cheractenst. for
Safety, ofiglemcon end hdificaerf
apply chain
mph..
Requirements m qpnt for
the coot-met to I. Issued
System layout
Respiremants spseificatim
Risk analysis
&ear,. lean + erne,.
Concept requirements @ functions at vetdde level
expenentoe from prevbus
Pnrf
safety requirements, hamologation-relevent,
legal end ;-slip aellaanlfr iitcsfiebaot
A.6 Brush / commutator
A.6 Torque support BBF-23456-A

Derailed description: perlonnerue
specification; experience nom
ct4m,, ..r IapocL
covering simulebon; trials:
assessment; verification
WY In &mesa M2.1.714ei•
snavr4ee•Lbul er
server,. ea,
or glans*, era
r. ereeeern• ere.
Design filter
..e.mllem release be fell
VeduerSenqweeleeeseenfi
▪ Concept filter
Design:
Stee /brass/AG 633 combination with lubrication
Design:
Steel/bronze with L32 rejected (wear)
• The FMEA for the shaft/nut/lubrication system
shows severity figures of 8, 9 or 10 for
• Material strength
• Surface quality
• Lubrication
In today's thinking a figure
of 9 or 10 does not
automaticaly result in •
special characteristic
sc/fora critical characteristic
cc/h or cc/s
r,tr nue...ern5 mon, for
bra earease :to be 1..1
J
se.
Q
ZL
...na MCFY, errourre-barem ark
ohneVarereleci fin r-
`duf veer. reps elan rwl
Concept, requirements d Unctions at vehicle level,
experience from previous probeern,
safety requiremerrts, homologelion-relevent,
legal and public euthonty regulabons,
customer requirements
us
System layout
Respinaments specification
Risk analysis
Sabre neadraments
A.6 Torque support BBF-23456-A
• Design filter
60 units operated to 2 x life 5 OK.
Pressure marks visible on Bowden cable location.
1 million load changes on separate test-rig S OK.
Pull-off force and torsional moment documented
with a safety factor of 10
• Drawings
• 2 cc/s
• 2 sc/f
▪ material and pull-off force in the
shaft assembly drawing
▪ guide surface dimension and
Bowden cable dimension
• Production planning filter
No experience from earlier designs S maintain sc / cc
• Production process filter
No experience from previous production maintain sc / cc
A.6 Shaft / nut / lubrication system
r
.1
fpaala•M
M1.•••••
a kaa,...M
a.•• 01.1=.31.L.;

o.t•l.d description; parromience
specifier on; experience from previous
project.; design leresk
Phis; aueamerrt; rmitleetion
V
Design filter
----
Tsehnicsi docioneritation Mr.
sidircrfleirl specter chestectettsUss

+Ps et
Me strums
kir...MM. III
relkresam oy 1
Potent drew,
1.144E1%V...41J
Steel / brass /Ag633 combination to DV
Result: Very slight traces of wear
A.6 Shaft / nut / lubrication system
• Design filter
20 steel/brass units tested to 2 x life.
Practically no wear detected 4 OK
Test on 20 x steel/bronze units broken off
because of extensive wear
• Drawings
4 x sc/f and 1 x cc/s (material) each for shaft and nut
Also 1 x sc/f and 4 x cc/s for sub-assembly
with lubrication
• Production planning filter
Initial process trials indicate that the steel/brass/AG633
combination has the capacity to absorb process
fluctuations such as flaking and layering during rolling.
Further investigations required 4 maintain the sc / cc
• Production process filter
Very different manufacturing process compared with previous production 5 maintain the sc / cc
A.6 Wear on nut / shaft
Steel / bronze / L32 combination to DV
Result: Massive wear, finally destroying the thread

rm.-reve nem hi
ecieducitredeiveraemece.
Concept requirements it fundions at vein de level,
experience from previous projects,
safety requirements, homologatIon-relevert,
legal end public ktiverMyregusewl
wcnarver moriesserts
repirwir.
Relevant functions, requirements end
cnarecterlsbos for
ritrlapl
V
.o.. v.r nselleell.reqUernarcr 0-0
,Zere.r. nitdrYlorsevidrieleorm_,
Detailed description: perbrmence
specification: experience from
previous projects; design layout
co,o-m.nomia•en.
wrdocon
I Design filter
60 units tested to 2 x life. No wear detected 4 OK.
Displacement force and torque tested under
higher temperature stress 4 OK.
• Drawings
16 x sc/f and 2 x cc/s
Detailed description; performanu
epecificalf on; experience hem previous
Were.. • Gelgn rms.,: annulate..
Mole; =easement; verification
Prototype cP
Design filter
No epe del I
icesmrlo e•CIC S
1 validation by
tAfrdlat11.4c;
Tconnica/ doeurnerstenon run!
sped/led egotist charactmlsocs
keens Fr tele,.
A.6 Slipping clutch
Sy.t.m layout
Raosilramants apaclacklon
Mak analyals
$0./.y 7.111111.1
• The FMEA for the slipping clutch ABC-654002
shows severity figures of 8, 9 or 10 for
• Torque transfer
N Firm retention on the shaft
• Wear
In today's thinking a figure Roqiunmeri, mgmt for
ern e corset to be !awed
of 9 or 10 does not
automatically result Ina spedal
characteristic
sc/f or a critical characteristic
cc/h or cc/s
a Concept filter
Technical design layout by plastics and mechanical
experts, using a plastic material (XZ 100) shown as
suitable in comparable applications.
Use a known gear shape and axial spacings known
to be appropriate.
Firm axial / radial retention ensured by knurling and
tight over-moulding
A.6 Slipping clutch

Prr-rieurnk OP
rSpecial chest-
Levu.. t not toe :re st
vallaalon
by roburt concept
vasourectunng reastillity abadY
end Unreality wrote; nick
snstreis, production planning:
test cement
Special cheracterletics to be
',Lidded by omens. layout
Special clurectrinettee to On
validated by oneness irveta
V
YmOdation
Producttbo cencepl.
trielAnspactlen RUM.:
Validation of
producbon concept
teetinepection planning
C4,110:••• or
• F.-0.n
Production process filter
.410 1.0..
.
-411111111r
500010
cluancleo sttc s not,
pecked further es
validation Is Li
documented
stAlttintiMIlt;
P auces.
Special character* gcs
requiring
prObeSS COMM{
PAM or snob.. In•
1.90.rian
Control Plan
001.1100/41•1•I
.1110,160101111,01,

1



A.6 Slipping clutch
Ind. Tertot4o ii COCuntelatellun Ind.
Spetrieni special chataarrIstica
Manufacturing fsesIbIllty study
and testebillty analysis; rink
armlyele; production planning;
ter concept
• Production planning filter
Manufacturing process: Detailed investigation
by supplier is required.
Known assembly process; in terms of process
planning the results from ca. 24 million units
already delivered 4 no further sc / cc
A.6 Slipping clutch
• Production process filter
For technical manufacturing reasons the electric
parking brake must be calibrated and during
this the slipping clutch is 100% checked,
including checks on forces and torques.
It is not necessary to specify further sc / cc.
Production passed
prodocrairpieval TPA)
..doss
btTM
1.19.10n complalen, bemire,
rapen.111.• to Prod..
Elba nquallallen

A.6 Force sensor
• FMEA for B58 electric parking brake
n Force sensor consisting of shaft, nut, spring,
return spring, support washer, spring guide,
leaf spring, magnet, Hall-IC, ECU and ECU for
position to transmission housing
-46P
. : .4r

• FMEA indicates severity levels of 10 for
n Friction
n Changes in magnetic conditions following calibration (changes in X
and Z planes; 20 pm ca. 1% error (± 10% is the limit)
• 4 already > 300 items with a severity level of 10
n The problems cannot be handled by a consideration of sc and cc
• => In the view of development and quality departments the task
is not yet finally completed.
• => A study based on the requirements of IEC 6150811S0 26262
is essential
A.6 Results
• Overall it was possible to reduce the number of special characteristics
listed and in the drawings to 271
• Of these 55 are cc/s requiring special archiving
• These 55 cc/s plus a further 27 sc/f are handled according to
instructions either in production or by suppliers
• In the FMEA there are still ca. 1200
severity levels of 8, 9 or 10 f In today's thinking a figure of 9 or 10 does not automatically result in
a special characteristic sc/f or a critical characteristic cc/h or cc/s
• Highly complex problems require other solution methods — for example
IEC 61508, ISO 26262

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A.6 Further action
• Results, experience and decisions must be documented and archived, for example :
* under CAProjecffolderlEPB1... inc. e-mail archive EPB,
* under LILabordatenbanklEPB1...,
* In the folder Validation trials EPB design
* in the EPB FMEA under "Comments" and in the change record
*
• Decisions regarding the sc and cc which have been defined must be checked
on the basis of results of product monitoring in the field. This must be carried out
regularly, at least once a year, by risk analysis within the framework of the
requalification checks
• The entire procedure is obligatory and described in detail in Process Instruction
No....
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System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Safely requirements
Pagans ad
aqua,. eel
*OWN natal p
durs,alla
Concept
change
Relevant functions, requirements and
characteristics for
Safety, registration and bamboo
"VZ.V4 ravdvain
":)
butovation came ter full
production dexatopnmel
Concept, requirements 8 functions al vehicle level.
experience from previous projects.
safety requirements, homologaliondelevant,
legal end public authority regulations,
customer requirements
System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Safety reouirements
Requirements mgmt, for
the contract to be Issued

Relevant
funreons, requirements and
cha-ncreristics for
,
Oat' legalalall and battalion
en piecing me Omer
Cala."
answer., performance
spate tun. a ',amp b en
rucetats
Cvro.NulaNa; tlesx,ut
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esaanani;
rrg;;;;;
c-p
PO.5.1110 Ofter
Detailed description; performance
specification; experience from previous
ojecta; design layout; simulation; trials;
assessment; verincalCon
-----
Prototype CP
---
lead
(
":g741="
1‘,
specified
documentation Incl.
specified special characteristics
Design
change
I No spaniel
Ichteselerlike as
vailtletton by
I ,shoat dadan
a dOCOIlladdd
A.7.1 Description of the process sequence
a) The development process sequence
A.7.1.1 Requirements regarding the concept
Firstly, the relevant requirements
and functions regarding the vehicle
concept are examined, with experi-
ence from previous projects.
There are no customer requirements
regarding the ECU which give rise to
special characteristics.
The system layout, requirements specifications and safety requirements form
the basis for the risk analysis. This highlights out failure modes and their
consequences. These results flow into the concept filter to enable a determi-
nation of relevant requirements, functions and characteristics. One of the
important requirements is set out in the requirements specification and
demands compliance with EMC (electromagnetic compatibility) limits.
A.7.1.2 Concept filter
The concept is examined.
Compliance with the EMC
requirements is assessed
critically.
The requirement cannot
Be changed by a modi-
fication of the concept.
It is therefore regarded
as a relevant homologation
requirement and is carried
forward to the design
phase for further
examination.
Other functions and requirements which were secured at the concept phase
have been confirmed by tests and are not forwarded to the design phase as
relevant functions and requirements. The associated tests and their results
are documented in the development report EB14-2010.
A.7.1.3 Requirements regarding the design
The ECU is laid out in detail.
Appropriate actions are speci-
fied in the layout to ensure
compliance with homologation
requirements regarding out-
ward radiation and resistance
to inward radiation.
Experience regarding EMC
from previous projects is taken into account.
Following measurements in the EMC laboratory, the layout, components and
housing are optimized. The changes made are verified by further
measurements with the ECU (test report PB-E 07/2010).
Final confirmation that the EMC requirements are satisfied can be obtained
only by later measurements in the target vehicle.
A.7.1.4 Design filter
Measurements in the EMC building with the ECU installed in the target
vehicle indicate that all requirements can be met, provided there is a
satisfactory ground connection to the vehicle. However, tests with an
inadequate ground connection show that the limit figures are exceeded.
The ground connection
is therefore classified as
a critical characteristic
cc/h.
These tests also reveal
that an inadequate
ground connection also
leads to safety-relevant
functional failures of the
ECU. It is therefore also
classified as a critical
characteristic cc/s.
No further special characteristics were noted in the design phase.
84 85

The ECU and earthing cable are pre-assembled by the supplier and delivered
as a single unit to the customer. The earthing cable is installed by the OEM.
The customer must be informed of these special characteristics.
In the customer documentation (drawing issued for quotations, technical
customer documentation) the ground connection for the earthing cable is
identified and classified with s and h.
A.7.2 Consequences
In discussions between the customer and the production planning
department, as well as the customer's quality assurance department,
agreement is reached on the tightening torque and test/checking measures
(100% test/inspection).
The customer includes the special characteristics, the associated data and
the test/inspection measures in his control plan.
A.8 Example : Sliding roof drive motor

Design drawing (section)
86 87

System layout
Reek/in:moots specification
Rink anotysis
Safety roquiteMenis
sue eta Mrs
csinsem
strange
hiL2
sPITZ:17,
supply
Concept filter
- &,ncspl Vallttatad?
Cern:opt change
noettipie?
B
Relevant functions, requirements and
characteristics for
Safely, registration and function
unmans ma
inearnanarre not
rmelrinp warm
ansinceinnixa
( MLQ
J
Innotration release for full
pioductleet developmeet
Concept, requirements 8 functions at vehicle level,
experience from previous projects,
safety requirements, hornologationirelevani,
legal and public authority regulations,
customer requirements
System layout
Requirements specification
Risk analysis
Safety requirements
Requirements mgmt for
the contract to be Issued

Relevant ronitheins, requirements and
theracierislics far
palely, registration grid funratiot.,
"VpianeraigrZgm
Detailed description; performance
specification; experience from
previous projects; design layout;
covering simulation; teals:
assessment; verification
-------
-------------- Prototype CP
-
1
------- 1
Detailed descrIprbon: perfOrmance
pecification; experience from previous
ognisi. design layout; simulation; trials
assessment; verification
L
Design filter
Daman validated?
Ono slump; --
possaget
3
LL
Technical documentation incl.
s special characteristics
Design
change
---
Prototype CP
.
I
.........
I No
ichatectertelles
validation by I
I robust dellan I
I. documented
1
A.8.1 Description of the process sequence
a) The development process sequence
A.8.1.1 Requirements regarding the concept
Firstly, the relevant requirements and
functions regarding the vehicle concept
are examined, with experience from
previous projects.
There are no customer requirements
regarding the sliding roof drive motor
which give rise to special characteristics.
The system layout, requirements specifications and safety requirements form
the basis for the risk analysis. This highlights failure modes and their conse-
quences. These results flow into the concept filter to enable a determination
of relevant requirements, functions and characteristics. One of the important
requirements is set out in the requirements specification and demands
compliance with the limit figures for the closing force of the sliding roof.
A.8.1.2 Concept filter
The concept is examined.
The requirements for the
closing force are analysed.
These requirements cannot
be changed by a modification
to the concept.
The closing force is examined
further as a safety-relevant and
homologation-relevant require-
ment and is carried forward to
the design phase for further
examination. Because of American FMVSS traffic homologation regulations
there is also an homologation relevance here.
Other functions and requirements which
were secured at the concept phase
rhealevevabnetefunnccotinofinrs
d
m
a
e
n
db
r
y
eg
te
u
s
i
t
rrnnt
s
e
an
e
da
s
r
.
e not forwarded to the design phase as
Proof of compliance is documented in test report EV32/SC/2009.
A.8.1.3 Requirements regarding the design
The functions and requirements
Which have been identified are
taken into account when drawing
up the performance specification
and the design layout.
The position of the ring magnet
is identified as a safety-relevant characteristic because this has a crucial
influence on the closing force.
Closing force measurements on assembled samples are used to determine
the optimum position of the ring magnet.
A.8.1.4 Design filter
In design discussions it
determined that the position
of the ring magnet cannot
be secured by design
measures alone. The SE
team and the production
department therefore agree
that the position of the ring
magnet must be classified
as a cc/s to be handled as
a test dimension.
No further special characteristics are determined in the design phase.
The special characteristic is specified in the technical documentation of the
development phase (in particular in the drawing — see the illustration on the
first page of this example) and is forwarded to the technical documentation
department for production planning.
88 89

1e13 771
Cheek One 4e10.1 plan on
eemNurr see/1 era terse no
The information which has been obtained flows into the production planning
phase.
A.8.2.2 Production planning filter
The safety relevant special
characteristic (cc/s — ring
magnet position) cannot be
secured by the production concept alone.
A change to the production concept
will not result in security.
limuleemee kfielerliv•ege,
endl elekseley soslyda:6.1,
snehee.ereeecies. pismire;
eeo.
Production planning filter
oktuq
Special
.1. characteristics
ia
L—IPPOITAIL.1
.aeiaitel o0 mom. tevom
5 —
A.8.2 Description of the production process sequence
b) The production process sequence
A.8.2.1 Requirements regarding production planning
After special characteristics
have been specified in the
technical documentation, RI
they must be analysed within
the framework of the manu-
A.8.2.3 Input data for the production process filter
When securing the production planning
and the test/inspection planning, it may
be seen that there are further special
characteristics in the process.
Special characteristics to be
validated by process layout
...
i Technical documentation incl.
specified special characteristics
The special characteristics which have
been identified are examined further.
Validation of
production concept,
test/inspection planning
facturing feasibility and testability
analysis, the risk analysis, production
planning and the test/inspection concept. From this, the concept requirements
for the production process are derived.
The positioning of the ring magnet is analysed in the Process FMEA (see the
following extract):
1 MG Val
This special characteristic is forwarded to the production process filter and
the production control plan for pre-production.
90
A.8.2.4 Production process filter
In the production process
filter it is clarified whether or
not the special characteristics
are secured by the production
process.
The special characteristics
Pads of production tools and
cannot be secured by the
p d II 1 11 hi
production process and it
is not possible to modify
the production process.
The special characteristics
Pf4n.antallep ir.imier or
neeonseeklse Fe %educes,
Start requalification
and the specified method
of monitoring (random sample checks) are carried over into the control plan
for full production.
Machine / Unit /
Tool /
Test/inspection
equipment Process
Characteristics
Product
ldentific.
ation
Mainte-
nance
plan
Quarantine
Prod. / process
spec. tolerance
(ref. document)
Record
s

_
Responsible /
Test/inspection
method
JMP1A11 No.8
Force/travel
monitoring
Monitor
fitment
force
PMV Yes 100% automatic
JMK500A11
digital gauge
Mitutoyo ID-F
Ring
magnet
fitment
dimension
S PMV EDS
Every 8 hrs and
when setting up.
Machine operator/
5 parts
91
Machine
- Position the ring magnet
- Ring magnet is damaged on armature shaft
- No ring magnet fitted to armature shaft
<s,• Ring magnet positioned too close to armature drive
- 050 Ring magnet positioned too close lo communicator
incorrect ring magnet fitted to armature shaft (no. of poles/field strength)
Press the ring magnet in position
- Armature drive damaged as ring magnet is fitted
- Armature drive deformed as ring magnet is fitted
- Engagement head deformed as ring magnet is fitted
- Two ring magnets filled to armature shaft
-Check the ring magnet
- Ring magnet not checked
Defective ring magnet not detected
Production process and
product approval (PPM
Production process filter
Special characteristics
requiring
process control
Validation of
production concept,
lest/Inspection planning
chniiree$teserbleZ
apactid
ehareeleiltece geil
elicited (unborn,
vaildation
documented
by robust process
Crimea [
famed
Manufacturing feasibility study
and testability analysis; risk
analysis; production planning;
eel

Quality Management in the Automotive Industry
The current position regarding VDA publications covering quality management
in the automotive industry (QAI) is shown in the Internet under
http://www.vda-qmc.de.
You may also order via this home page.
Available from :
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Telefax : +49 (0) 30 89 78 42-605
E-Mail : [email protected]
Internet : www.vda-qnnc.de
92
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