1962 war.ppt

1962 war

2. PREVIEW
•PHASEI POLITICALBACKGROUND
•PHASE IIOP LEGHORN
•PHASE IIIBATTLES IN NEFA
•PHASE IVBATTLES IN LADAKH SECTOR
•PHASE V LESSONS LEARNT

3. WAR IN OUTLINE
TheWarbrokeoutwithanIndianoffensive
on10Oct1962inNamkaChuvalleyinNEFA
TheBattleofNamkaChu:10Octto22Oct
TheBattleofWalong(LohitValley)
TheBattleofSeLaandBomdiLa:17to20
Nov
TheBattleofRezangLa:17to20Nov
ChinesedeclaredaunilateralCeaseFireon
21Nov1962andwithdrewtopositions20Kms
BehindLACwhichexistedsince1959

4. OCT 1950China invaded Tibet
JUN 1951Tibet signed treaty with China
1954India -China Agreement –Tibet recog as
part of China (India gave up rights, trading
posts, withdrew mil escorts from Yatung and
Gyantse).
17 JUL 1954China raises border issue (Indian
tps crossed Niti pass and Wuje in Tibet)
OCT 1954Nehru makes goodwill vis to China.
Question of Indian territories raised.
01 SEP 1956Differences on ‘Shipki La’ –main
Pass on Pilgrim Route to Kailash & Mansarovar.
POLITICAL BACKGROUND

5. PANDIT NEHRU ON HIS GOODWILL VISIT TO
CHINA WITH CHOU EN-LAI in 1954

6. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
CHINESEINTRUSIONSININDIA
(a)LADAKH:
(i)MAR1956toOCT1957IntrusionIn
AksaiChin&ConstructionOf180Km
Longrd.
(ii)JUL1958atKhurnakFort(Pangong
Lake).On18OCT1958Indiaformally
drewChineseattentiontoconstruction
ofrd.
(b)NORTHEAST:
(i)Intrusionof50Chinesesoldiersin
WalongintheLohitValleyinNEFA

7. CHINESE INTRUSION IN LADAKH

8. NEFA

9. CHINESE STAND ON BORDER ISSUES
23 JAN 1959 LETTER OF CHINESE PREMIERE CHOU
EN-LAI HIGHLIGHTS THE CHINESE STAND AS UNDER : -
Sino-Indian border never formally delimited.
Historically no agreement signed between the
two govts.
Chinese maps may be changed after surveys and
understanding with other countries ( in this case
Tibet).
Asked for status quo.
INDIAN STAND ON BORDER ISSUES
NO TO CHINESE PROPOSAL OF ACCEPTING THE ‘Mc
Mahon LINE’ AS IB IN NEFA, IN EXCHANGE OF ‘AKSAI
CHIN’.
No To Proposal Of Reciprocal Acceptance Of Present
Actualities In Both Sectors (As It Would Compromise
Territorial Integrity Of Country).

10. THE MCMOHAN LINE

11. POLITICAL BACKGROUND
19APR1960:DELHISUMMIT
(a)BothsidestokeeptoLAC;nofwd
territorialclaimsasprecondition
(b)Geographicalprinciplesaswatersheds,
rivervalleysforallsectorstobeconsidered.
(C)Thereexistsdisputeswithregardtothe
boundarybetweenthetwocountries.
(D)Toensuretranquilitybothsidesshould
refrainfrompatrolling.
(E)Pendingasettlementoftheboundary
questionbetweenthetwocountriesthrough
discussion,bothsidesshouldkeeptotheLAC
andshouldnotputfwdclaimsasprecond,but
individualadjustmentsbemade.

12. FORWARD POLICY
ThefailureofDelhiSummitresultedinthe
adoptionofthe‘ForwardPolicy’.
Theobjectivesofthispolicywere:
(a)BlockpotentiallinesoffurtherChinese
advance.
(b)EstbIndianpresenceinAksaichin.
Theforwardpolicyhaditsinherentflaws
basedontheunfoundedassumptionthatthe
provocationoftheChineseinAksaiChinand
themiddlesectorswouldevincenomil
response.

13. STATE OF ARMED FORCES
ARMED FORCES NEGLECTED (CONGRESS
RESENTEDARMYPERSWHOSERVEDBRITISH)
ONEOFITSPOLICYCONCLUSIONS WASTHAT
THEREWASNODANGERTOINDIAEXCEPTFROMPAK
DEFEXPENDITUREMIN,MAXFORDEV
BY19533,50,000MENORGINTO6INFDIV&1
ARMDDIV
LATE1959SUDDENREALISATIONOFBDYDISPUTE
LEDTOEXPANSIONOFARMY
NEWDIV(17INFDIV)PLACEDUNDERNEWFMN-
XXXIIICORPS(ResponsibleforSikkim,bdyofBhutan,
NEFA&McMohanline,EPak,Nagaland)AND4INFDIV
TRANSFERRED FROMPUNJABTONE(Responsiblefor
McMohanline/360Miles)

14. EVENTS LEADING TO THE CRISES
03Jun1962:SinoIndTreatyof1954lapsedbecauseInd
refusedtheChineseofferforrenewal.
Apr1962:Chinaresumedpatrollinginfwdareas
May1962:ChinathreatentoattackinChipChapvalley
butdidnotlendingcredencetoFwdPolicy.
04Jun1962:SitingoftheDholaPostbyIndPlexAssam
Rifles
08Sep1962:Strof60ChinesetroopsAdvfromThagLa
ridgeandsettledintodominatingpositionaroundDhola
Post
09Sep1962:OPLEGHORNPLANNED
16Sep1962:ChinalodgedcomplaintwithIndia
IndGovtmaintainedthatThagLaRidgewasthe
boundary
09Oct1962:IndoffensiveattheThagLaRidge
10Oct1962:Sino-IndiawarbrokeoutinNamkaChu
valleyinNEFA

15. SITING OF DHOLA POST

16. PHASE II
OP LEGHORN

17. OP LEGHORN: IND OFFENSIVE ON THE THAG LA
09Sep1962:OPPlanned
12Sep1962:GOCXXXIIICorpshighlightedsalient
problemsoflaunchingOPLEGHORN toGOC-IN-C
EasternComdanddidnotrecommendtheattackonThagLa
RidgefromDholaPost.
ORGOFEASTERNCOMDOFINDARMYASON02OCT
1962
HQEASTERNCOMD -GOC-IN-CLTGENLPSEN
XXXIIICORPS,Shillong-LTGENUMRAOSINGH
4INFDIV,Tezpur -MAJGENNIRANJANPRASAD
7INFBDE,Tawang -BRIGJPDALVI
HQ&01BNATTAWANG
2
nd
BNATDIRANGDZONG
3
rd
ATBOMDILA
5INFBDE-THREEBNSCATTEREDINNEFA
11INFBDE-DETACHEDFROM4INFDIVINNAGALAND
04Oct1962:IVCorpsraisedunderLTGENBMkaulwas
entrustedwithconductoftheOPby7InfBde

18. -OPtoevictChinesefromThagLaCode
Named“OPLEGHORN” ByAHQOnOrders
fromGovtOn09Sep1962.
-7InfBdeofXXXIIICorpsgivenTask.
-Tpstobereadyforbattleandifpossible
toencircletheChineseinvestingthepost.
-Withoutanyregardformilconsiderations,
anInfBdeorderedintoextremelydifficult
andunknowncountry.
-Norecceorplgonhowtpsweretobe
supplied.
-Milplanningandconductofmilopstooka
backseattopolconsiderations.
OP LEGHORN

19. •SalientproblemshighlightedbyGOCXXXIIICorpsand
subsequentrftsaskedfornotconsideredbytheGOC-in-C
EasternCommand.
•AnewCorpsraised–IVCorpsunderthecommandofLt
GenBMKaultosidelineLtGenUmraoSingh.
•Trn:
-Theriverfastflowinganddeep.
-OnIndsidethegroundrosefromtheriverbanksteeplyto
Hathungla
-DZatTsangdharwasatthecrestoftheridge
-Indpositionsandlinesofcommndominatedbythe
Chinese.
•OP:
-9Punjabwithonecoyof2RajputalreadyatDhola
-On6Oct1/9GRand2Rajput(stillincottonuniforms)
marchoverKarpoLaat16000fttoTsangdharat14500ft
-On9
th
thetwobnspositionedatIIIandIVBridges
-At0430hrson10
th
astheRajputsmarchesaheadthe
ChineseemergedfromtheirpositionandattkonTseng-jong.
-Indtroopssufferedhvycasandoffensivesuspended.

20. OP LEGHORN
1/9 GR, 2 RAJPUT, 4 Grenadieras

21. PHASE III
NEFA SECTOR

22. BATTLE OF NAMKA CHU

23. BATTLE OF TAWANG, SELA AND BOMDI LA
62 INF
BDE
48
INF
BDE

24. BATTLE IN WALUNG

25. PHASE IV
LADAKH SECTOR

29. LESSONS LEARNT
oNEED TO MODERNISE ARMED FORCESAND
MAINTAIN ADEEQUATE FORCE LEVEL AT ALL TIME
REALISED
oLACK OF CAPABILITIES OF IAFIN SUPPORT OF
GROUND FORCES STRONGLY FELT,MODERISATION OF
IAF AND BETTER INTEGRATION WITH OPS ON GROUND
MOOTED.
oRELEGATION OF MIL INTSIDE LINED IN FAVOUR OF IB
RESULTED IN POOR INT. NEED TO DEVELOP MIL INT
WING OF ARMY FELT.

30. LESSONS LEARNT
WAR SAW RAPID CHANGE IN CDRS AND
FREQUENT ORG CHOPPING AND CHANGING
ADDED CONFUSION.
NEGLECTOF ARMED FORCES WHEN
ALLOCATION OF FUNDS
CONCERNED,CORRECTIVE MEASURES ON WAR
FOOTING INITIATED.
POLITICISING OF HIGHER ECHELONS OF ARMY
AND MAJOR IMPACT ON EVENTS LEADING TO
DEFEAT IN CONFLICT HIGH LIGHTED.
INTERFERENCE OF CIV IN ARMY MATTERS
REDUCED

31. oDECISION TO FORM NEW CORPS OVERNIGHT AND
DESIGNATING OFFR FROM SERVICESWITH NO
COMBAT EXPERIENCE.
oINTERFERENCE BY HIGHEST ECHELONS OF ARMY IN
BN LEVEL BATTLES,DISREGARDING OPINION OF CDRS
IN FD MAJOR CAUSE FOR DEFEAT AT NAMKA CHU.
oNO RD COMNNETWORK ,LIMITED NO OF AIR FIELDS \
DZS IN TACTICAL BATTLE AREA.
LESSONS LEARNT