9_Churchland_against_Dualism.pdf

THE PHILOSOPHER

1. Churchland(s) critique Dualism
(Paul Churchlandhere.)

2. Paul
Churchland
Paul
 Churchland
•
Churchland
isamaterialist/
physicalist
.
Churchland
is
 a
 materialist/
physicalist
.
•
Thoughttakesplaceinthebrainwhichisapurely
•
Thought
 takes
 place
 in
 the
 brain
, 
which
 is
 a
 purely
 
physical object –particles in motion, or something 
like that.
•Note that there are various materialist theories of 
the mind.  (The main ones are functionalism and the 
identity theory, but Churchlandis an eliminativist.)

3. “
Dualism
”
definedbroadly
“
Th d liti ht i d
Dualism
 defined
 broadly
 …
“
Th
e
d
ua
li
s
ti
c approac
h

t
o m
i
n
d
encompasses
several quite different theories, but they are all
dth tth ti l t f i
a
g
ree
d
th
a
t

th
e essen
ti
a
l
na
t
ure o
f
consc
i
ous
intelligence resides in something nonphysical,
ithifbdth f i
n some
thi
n
g
f
orever
b
e
y
on
d
th
e scope o
f

sciences like physics, neurophysiology, and
ti
”
compu
t
er sc
i
ence.
”
(Churchlandp. 305)

4. Today,physical

geometrical
Today,
 physical
 
geometrical
“
Itisnowneitherusefulnoraccuratetocharacterize It
is
now
neither
useful
nor
accurate
to
characterize

ordinary matter as that-which-has-extension-in-space.
Electrons
,
for exam
p
le
,
are bits of matter
,
but our best
,p, ,
current theories describe the electron as a point- particle with no extension whatever (it even lacks a determinate spatial position). ” p. 306 (The “mechanical philosophy has been replaced by 
“physicalism”, the claim that everything is “physical” –
whateverthatmeans) whatever
 that
 means
.
)

5. Varietiesof
“
dualism
”
Varieties
 of
 
dualism
•
Substancedualism
•
Substance
 dualism
 
–Mind and body are different substances (e.g. 
Descartesandthe
“
ghostinthemachine
”
)
Descartes
, 
and
 the
 
ghost
 in
 the
 machine )
Ptdli
•
P
roper
t
y 
d
ua
li
sm 
–The mind is the brain.  But the brain has special 
tltith t
d’td
thil
men
t
a
l proper
ti
es 
th
a
t
 d
on
’t
 re
d
uce
t
o p
h
ys
ica
l 
properties.

6. What does “reduce” mean?
•The notion of mental properties reducingto 
physical properties is crucial to this topic.
•It’s also ver
y
 trick
y
 to define!
yy
•Examples of successful reduction to physics 
include include
–Water is H
2
O
–
Lightningisastreamofelectrons Lightning
 is
 a
 stream
 of
 electrons
–Heat is molecular motion (kinetic energy)

7. A physical explanation of lightning

8. VarietiesofPropertyDualism Varieties

of

Property

Dualism
•
Theterminologyhereisconfusing
•
The
 terminology
 here
 is
 confusing
.
Si“d li ”hi khhid
•
Si
nce property 
“d
ua
li
sts
”
 t
hi
n
k
 t
h
at t
h
e m
in
d
 
and brain are one and the same substance, 
’h
i
?
aren
’t t
h
ey mon
ists
?
•So a better term for this approach may be 
“dual‐as
p
ect monism”
, or “neutral monism”.  
p,
There is a family of such views.

9. VarietiesofPropertyDualism Varieties

of

Property

Dualism
•
Thecommongroundoftheseviewsisthat
•
The
 common
 ground
 of
 these
 views
 is
 that
, 
while the mind is the brain, the brain itself 
isn
’t(entirely)physical
Nocompletephysical
isnt
 (entirely)
 physical
.  
No
 complete
 physical
 
explanation of the brain is possible.
•(In particular, consciousness is a feature of the 
bih’bddhill) b
ra
in t
h
at can
’t 
b
e un
d
erstoo
d
 p
h
ys
ica
ll
y.
)

10. •
Someof
Churchland
’s
argumentsapplytojust
•
Some
 of
 Churchlands
arguments
 apply
 to
 just
 
substance dualism, other arguments apply to 
propertydualismaswell property
 dualism
 as
 well
.

11. Argumentsagainstdualism Arguments

against

dualism
1.Interaction 
p
roblem
(
How do such different thin
g
s as 
p
(g
mind and matter interact?)
2.  Ockham’s Razor(Dualism has no explanatory value, 
dkhili d)
an
d
 ma
k
es t
hi
ngs more comp
li
cate
d
.
)
  
3.  Neural dependenceof mental phenomena.  (Why 
doesmessingiththebrainaffecttho ghtif does
 messing
 w
ith
 the
 brain
 affect
 tho
u
ght
, 
if
 
thinking occurs elsewhere?)
4
Evolutionaryhistory
argument(Wecanexplainin
4
.  
Evolutionary
 history
argument
.  
(We
 can
 explain
, 
in
 
purely physical terms, the originof the mind.  Now 
how could we explain, in physical terms, the origin of 
somethingnon
physical?That’sabsurd
)
something
 non
‐
physical?
  
That’s
 absurd
.
)

12. 1. Interaction problem
(against Cartesian substance dualism)
If
"
mind
stuff
”
issoutterlydifferentfrom
"
matter
stuff
”
inits
If

mind
-
stuff
is
so

utterly
different
from

matter
-
stuff
in

its

nature—different to the point that it has no mass whatever, no
shape whatever, and no position anywhere in space—then how
isitpossibleformymindtohaveanycausalinfluenceonmy is
it
possible
for

my
mind
to
have
any

causal
influence
on

my

body at all?
As Descartes himself was aware (he was one of the first to formulate the law of the conservation of momentum), ordinary matter in s
p
ace behaves accordin
g
to ri
g
id laws, and one
pgg
cannot get bodily movement (= momentum) from nothing. How is this utterly insubstantial "thinking substance" to have an
y
influence on
p
onderous matter?
(p
. 306
)
yp (p)

13. Populardualism Popular
 dualism
•
“
theghostinthemachine
”
•
the
 ghost
 in
 the
 machine
•Similar to Conway’s substance dualism
Gh’lhilbh
•
Gh
osts aren
’t pure
ly p
h
ys
ica
l, 
b
ut 
h
ave some 
physical properties, so that interaction with 
d’iibl
matter 
d
oesn
’t seem 
imposs
ibl
e. 
•However, even popular dualism faces a strong 
challenge from the other three arguments.

14. Ockham’s Razor
•This is a methodological principle associated with 
di lhil hWillifOkhlth h
me
di
eva
l p
hil
osop
h
er 
Willi
am o
f
 O
c
kh
am, a
lth
oug
h
 
others said it much earlier.
•The principle says we should not propose more causes 
than are neede
d
to account for the 
p
henomena.  Amon
g
 
pg
explanations that adequately predict the data, simpler 
explanations are more likely to be true.  •Albert Einstein: “Everything should be made as simple as 
possiblebutnotsimpler
”
possible
, 
but
 not
 simpler
.

15. 2. Ockham’s Razor ar
g
ument
g
(Against all kinds of dualism)
“The materialist postulates only one kind of substance
(physical matter), and one class of properties
(h i l i) h hd li l (
p
h
ys
i
ca
l
propert
i
es
)
, w
h
ereas t
h
e
d
ua
li
st postu
l
ates
two kinds of matter and/or two classes of properties.
And to no ex
p
lanator
y
advanta
g
e …”
(p
. 312
)
py g
(p)
•N.B. 
p
h
y
sical and non‐
p
h
y
sical 
p
ro
p
erties are two
py
pypp
kinds?  Compare to:
–There are two nationalities, British and Foreign
Thttiidddthldd
–
Th
ere are 
t
wo 
ti
me per
io
d
s, nowa
d
ays an
d
 th
e o
ld
en 
d
ays

16. 2. Ockham’s Razor ar
g
ument
g
(Against all kinds of dualism)
“This is not yet a decisive point against dualism, since
neither dualism nor materialism can yet explain all of
hh b lidBhbji
t
h
e p
h
enomena to
b
e exp
l
a
i
ne
d
.
B
ut t
h
e o
bj
ect
i
on
does have some force, especially since there is no
doubtatallthatphysicalmatterexists,whilespiritual doubt
at
all
that
physical
matter
exists,
while
spiritual

matter remains a tenuous hypothesis. ”
(p. 312)

17. “
hi db llhhil i
”
“
t
h
ere
i
s no
d
ou
b
t at a
ll
t
h
at p
h
ys
i
ca
l
matter ex
i
sts
”
Is this true?  What does it mean? That substances with somephysical properties exist?  
Or that substances with onlyphysical objects exist?
(N.B. many philosophers, such as Lady Anne Conway, 
dlldhl)
property 
d
ua
lists, neutra
l monists, 
d
eny t
h
e 
latter.
)
Churchlandis slipping in a contentious premise.

18. Explanatoryimpotenceofdualism Explanatory
 impotence
 of
 dualism
“
Comparenowwhattheneuroscientistcantellus Compare
now
what
the
neuroscientist
can
tell
us

about the brain, and what he can do with that
knowled
g
e
,
with what the dualist can tell us about
g,
spiritual substance …
… Can the dualist tell us an
y
thin
g
about the internal
yg
constitution of mind-stuff?... …dualism is less a theory of mind than it is an empty space waiting for a genuine theory of mind to be put
in it” (p.313)

19. “In sum, the neuroscientist can tell us a great deal
about the brain, about its constitution and the physical
laws that govern it; he can already explain much of
our behavior in terms of the physical, chemical, and
ltil ti fthbi dhh th
e
l
ec
t
r
i
ca
l
proper
ti
es o
f
th
e
b
ra
i
n; an
d
h
e
h
as
th
e
theoretical resources available to explain a good deal
moreasourexplorationscontinue
”
more
as
our
explorations
continue
. . . .

20. •
Whatkindofexplanatoryresources(bycontrast)
•
What
 kind
 of
 explanatory
 resources
 (by
 contrast)
 
does dualism have?
‐‐Ha!  (There are no explanations of mental 
phenomenaintermsof
“
ectoplasm
”
oranyspiritual
phenomena
 in
 terms
 of
 
ectoplasm
 or
 any
 spiritual
 
substance.)
If the non‐physical is inscrutable, then we can’t use 
hypotheses about it to explain things.  So it’s anti‐
scientific, in a sense.

21. C.f. neuroscientist Raymond Tallis, talking about  understanding criminal behaviourin terms of 
neuroscience.  (Battle of Ideas Festival, October 
2007Ld) 2007
, 
L
on
d
on
)
“This conclusion is (to put it charitably) premature.
Observations of brain activity in the laboratory can
explain very few things about us … Actually we have
no neural explanation for very basic things …
[i i t]H h [
mean
i
ng, consc
i
ousness, e
t
c.
]

H
ow muc
h
can
science tell us about behaviour? Not much. ”

22. NeuroscientistDavid
Eagleman
Neuroscientist
 David
 Eagleman
“
Ihavenodoubtthatwewillcontinuetoaddtothe I
have
no
doubt
that
we

will
continue
to
add
to
the

pier of knowledge, appending several new slats in
each generation. But we have no guarantee how far
’ll
Th b d i b d h
we
’ll
get.
Th
ere may
b
e some
d
oma
i
ns
b
eyon
d
t
h
e
tools of science –perhaps temporarily, perhaps
always
.”
always
.
(
NewScientist
September272010)
(
New
 Scientist
, 
September
 27
, 
2010)

23. •
Notethataneutralmonistisquitehappywith
some
Note
 that
 a
 neutral
 monist
 is
 quite
 happy
 with
 some
 
progress in neuroscience.  E.g. they might say:
“I agree that understanding the brain in physical 
terms can take us 
q
uite a lon
g
 wa
y
.  We don’t know 
qgy
exactly how far though.”

24. LimitsofPhysicalexplanation Limits
 of
 Physical
 explanation
•Neutral monism however sets a limitto the 
extentofascientificunderstandingofthe extent
 of
 a
 scientific
 understanding
 of
 the
 
mind.
–Like King Knut, ordering the tide not to come in?

25. Poor old Knut …

26. Is continued scientific progress inevitable? “Chalmers claimed that consciousness would forever resist rational explanation … On the contrary,
[neuroscientist Christof] Ko ch argues that scientific
dt h l i ld l t h ll d
an
d
t
ec
h
no
l
og
i
ca
l
d
eve
l
opmen
t
s
h
ave a
ll
owe
d

humanity to understand phenomena previously
resistanttorationalexplanationandthatthiswill resistant
to
rational
explanation
and
that
this
will

undoubtedlyalso be the case for the problem of how a
physical system can give rise to subjective
experience.” [my emphasis ‐‐RJ] UeliRutishauser, eSkeptic, May 2, 2012.

27. •
NBBewarethe“argumenttothefuture”(afallacy)
•
N
.
B
. 
Beware
 the
 “argument
 to
 the
 future”
 (a
 fallacy)
. 
ith tidill
d
bdi d
‐‐argu
ing 
th
a
t
 ev
id
ence w
ill
 some
d
ay
b
e 
di
scovere
d
 
which will (then) support your point. 
“Dualists will look pretty silly when the inevitable  progressofscienceyieldsafullphysical progress
 of
 science
 yields
 a
 full
 physical
 
understanding of consciousness.”
“As neuroscience continues to flounder in its futile  attempttounderstandthemindinmaterialterms attempt
 to
 understand
 the
 mind
 in
 material
 terms
, 
people will come to accept dualism”

28. 3.  Neural dependence of mental 
phenomena 
(against substance dualism)
“If there really is a distinct entity in which reasoning, emotion,andconsciousnesstakeplace,andifthat emotion,
and
consciousness
take
place,
and
if
that

entity is dependent on the brain for nothing more than
sensory experiences as input and volitional
executions as output, then one would expect reason,
emotion, and consciousness to be relatively
il bltdittl thlb i
nvu
l
nera
bl
e
t
o
di
rec
t
con
t
ro
l
or pa
th
o
l
ogy
b
y
manipulation or damage to the brain . But in fact the
exactoppositeistrue
”
(
Churchland
p313)
exact
opposite
is
true
.
(
Churchland
, 
p
. 
313)

29. “Alcohol
,
narcotics
,
or senile de
g
eneration of nerve
,, g
tissue will impair, cripple, or even destroy one's
capacity for rational thought. Psychiatry knows of
h ndredsofemotion
controllingchemicals(lithi m
h
u
ndreds
of
emotion
-
controlling
chemicals
(lithi
u
m
,
chlorpromazine, amphetamine, cocaine, and so on)
that do their work when vectored into the brain. And
the vulnerability of consciousness to the anesthetics, to caffeine, and to something as simple as a sharp blowtothehead showsitsveryclosedependenceon blow
to
the
head
,
shows
its
very
close
dependence
on

neural activity in the brain. ”

30. •If you put the wrong kind of gas in your car, 
does it give you (the driver) a stomach ache?  
–No, since the driver is a separate substancefrom 
the car.
•So, for a substance dualist, why does eating 
thewrongchemicalsaffectyourthought? the
 wrong
 chemicals
 affect
 your
 thought?

31. (EvenDescartesseestheproblem
Meditation6
)
(Even
 Descartes
 sees
 the
 problem
. 
Meditation
 6
.
)
“Nature teaches me by the sensations of pain, hunger, thirst etc that I am not merely lodged in my body as thirst
, etc
. that I am not merely lodged in my body as
a pilot in a ship, but that I am so closely united to it
that I seem to com
p
ose with it one whole. For if that
p
were not the case, when my body is hurt, I, the thinking thing, should not feel pain, but would
h d h l
perceive
t
h
e
woun
d
just

as

t
h
e
sai
l
or
perceives

something damaged in his vessel. For all these sensations of hunger thirst pain etc are in truth just sensations of hunger
, thirst
, pain
, etc
. are in truth just
confused modes of thought produced by the apparent
intermin
g
lin
g
of mind and bod
y
”
gg y

32. •
Descartesisforcedtoadmitan
“
apparent
•
Descartes
 is
 forced
 to
 admit
 an
 
apparent
 
intermingling” of mind and body, even 
though(onhisview)theyareinreality though
 (on
 his
 view)
 they
 are
 in
 reality
 
separate substances.
•How can a substance dualist explain this 
“apparent intermingling”? Only by “extremely ad hocexplanations”,  saysMichael
Tooley
.Canwethinkofsome?
says
 Michael
 Tooley
.
  
Can
 we
 think
 of
 some?

33. Whatisan
adhoc
explanation?
What
 is
 an
 ad
 hoc
explanation?
•
An
adhoc
explanationisanadditiontoatheorythat
An
 ad
 hoc
explanation
 is
 an
 addition
 to
 a
 theory
 that
 
has no theoretical motivation, but is proposed simply 
to save the theory from being falsified by the 
empirical evidence. “You claim that Smith can read minds, but in careful
scientific tests his answers were no better than
random guesses”
--“Well, I
g
uess the
p
resence of sce
p
ticalscientists
gp
p
disrupts his telepathic ability”

34. ExtremelyAdhoc? Extremely
 Ad
 hoc?
•
Duetotheinteractionbetweenmindandbody, Due
 to
 the
 interaction
 between
 mind
 and
 body,
 
damage to the body can cause damage to the mind 
as well.
(E.g. suppose that, to stop people driving so fast, 
they hooked up the car to the driver in such a way 
that driving fast makes you feel tired!)
•Or maybe the mind “outsources” certain grunt work 
hbhhhb
to t
h
e 
b
rain.  In t
h
at case, w
h
en t
h
e 
b
rain goes 
wrong it will affect thought as well.

35. 4.Evolutionaryhistoryargument 4.
  
Evolutionary
 history
 argument
Wecanexplaininpurelyphysicaltermsthe We
 can
 explain
, 
in
 purely
 physical
 terms
, 
the
 
originof the mind.  Now, how could we 
explaininphysicaltermstheoriginof explain
, 
in
 physical
 terms
, 
the
 origin
 of
 
something non‐physical?  That’s absurd.
(E.g. how could a machine create something 
hil?)
non‐mec
h
an
ica
l?)

36. “What is the ori
g
in of a com
p
lex and so
p
histicated
gpp
species such as ours? … Th anks to the fossil record,
comparative anatomy, and the biochemistry of
proteinsandn cleicacids thereisnolongeran proteins
and
n
u
cleic
acids
,
there
is
no
longer
an
y
significant doubt on this matter. Each existing species
is a survivin
g
t
yp
e from a number of variations on an
gyp
earlier type of organism; each earlier type is in turn a surviving type from a number of variations on a still earliertypeoforganism;andsoondownthe earlier
type
of
organism;
and
so
on
down
the

branches of the evolutionary tree … ” (p. 313)

37. “The mechanism of development that has structured this
tree has two main elements:
(1) the occasional blind variation in types of
reproducing creatures, and
(2) the selective survival of some of these types due to
th
e
r
e
lati
ve
r
ep
r
oduc
ti
ve
a
dv
anta
ge
e
n
joyed
by

e e ve epoduc ve dv gee joyedby
individuals of those types.
Overperiodsofgeologicaltime suchaprocesscan Over
periods
of
geological
time
,
such
a
process
can

produce an enormous variety of organisms, some of
them ver
y
com
p
lex indeed.”
yp

38. “… the im
p
ortant
p
oint about the standard
pp
evolutionary story is that the human species and all of
its features are the wholly physical outcome of a
p rel ph sicalprocess p
u
rel
y
ph
y
sical
process
. …
Ifthisisthecorrectaccountofourorigins thenthere If
this
is
the
correct
account
of

our
origins
,
then
there

seems neither need, nor room, to fit any nonphysical
substances or properties into our theoretical account
of ourselves. We are creatures of matter. And we
should learn to live with that fact. ” (p. 314)

39. •
Theproblemwiththisargument(inmyview)isthat
•
The
 problem
 with
 this
 argument
 (in
 my
 view)
 is
 that
 
while the factof evolution is well understood, its 
causesare not.
•The fossil record and molecular biology enable us to 
constructa
“
familytree
”
foralllivingorganismsand
construct
 a
 
family
 tree
 for
 all
 living
 organisms
, 
and
 
to estimate dates for when new species appeared.

40. •
But
Churchland
goesontosaythatthemechanisms
•
But
 Churchland
goes
 on
 to
 say
 that
 the
 mechanisms
 
of random variation and natural selection are 
sufficient to cause all of evolution.
“Over periods of geological time, such a process can produceanenormousvarietyoforganisms someof produce
an
enormous
variety
of
organisms
,
some
of

them very complex indeed.”
• There is practically no empirical evidence for this, 
however, and no convincing theoretical argument 
either.
  
(To
 some
 it
 seems
 absurd.)
either.(Tosomeitseemsabsurd.)

41. E.g.philosopherThomasNagel E.g.
 philosopher
 Thomas
 Nagel
 
(Mind and Cosmos, p. 6, OUP, 2012.) “
Itisprimafaciehighlyimplausiblethatlifeaswe It
is
prima
facie
highly
implausible
that
life
as
we

know it is the result of a sequence of physical
accidents to
g
ether with the mechanism of natural
g
selection. We are expected to abandon this naïve response, not in favor of a fully worked out physical/
hil l ibif f l i
c
h
em
i
ca
l
exp
l
anat
i
on
b
ut
i
n
f
avor o
f
an a
l
ternat
i
ve
that is really a schema for explanation, supported by
someexamples Whatislacking tomyknowledge is some
examples
.
What
is
lacking
,
to
my
knowledge
,
is

a credible argument that the story has a nonnegligible
p
robabilit
y
of bein
g
true…
.
pyg

42. “Natural selection has alwa
y
s been the most contested
p
art of
yp
evolutionary theory. Many people who have no problem with
evolution bridle at the thought that it’s all driven by a mindless
andunguidednaturalprocess Indeed whilemostscientists and
unguided
natural
process
.
Indeed
,
while
most
scientists

accepted the notions of evolution and common ancestry soon
after Darwin proposed them in 1859, natural selection wasn't
id l db bi l i il b
w
id
e
l
y accepte
d
b
y
bi
o
l
og
i
sts unt
il
a
b
out 1930. …
… Dawkins [observes] that natural selection is on wobblier
legsthantheothertenetsofevolutionarytheory suchas legs
than
the
other
tenets
of

evolutionary
theory
,
such
as

evolutionary change and the branching pattern of life.
"Nowadays it is no longer possible to dispute the fact of
lti it lf btit ld(j t)bd btdtht t l
evo
l
u
ti
on
it
se
lf
…
b
u
t

it
cou
ld
(j
us
t)

b
e
d
ou
bt
e
d
th
a
t
na
t
ura
l

selection is its major driving force.”
Jerry A. Coyne, “The Improbability Pump”,The Nation,April 22, 2010

43. Differentversionsofpropertydualism Different
 versions
 of
 property
 dualism
•One question about property dualism is whether the 
mental properties of the brain have an impact on its 
physical properties.  The possible theories here are:
1.  Epiphenomenalistproperty dualism
2.  Interactionistproperty dualism

44. Epiphenomenalist
propertydualism
Epiphenomenalist
property
 dualism
•On this view the 
p
h
y
sical 
p
ro
p
erties of the brain act 
pypp
upon the mental properties, but not vice‐versa.
•Conscious experiences are “mere epiphenomena”, 
withnopowertocauseanything with
 no
 power
 to
 cause
 anything
.
“Think of our conscious mental states as little
sparkles of shimmering light that occur on the
wrinkled surface of the brain, sparkles which are
c
a
used
t
o
occu
r
by
p
h
ys
i
c
al a
c
ti
v
it
y
in th
e
b
rain
,
bu
t
c used ooccu byp ysc c v y eb ,bu which have no causal effects on the brain in return.”

45. Epiphenomenalist
propertydualism
Epiphenomenalist
property
 dualism
•
Itisthenanillusionthatmentaleventscause It
 is
 then
 an
 illusion
 that
 mental
 events
 cause
 
physical events.
•This view is attractive to neuroscientists.  The
y
 can 
y
ignore the mental aspects of the brain, while doing 
their work, without denying their existence.
“It is a bargain struck between the desire to respect a
rigorously scientific approach to the explanation of
b
ehavior, and the desire to respect the testimony of
introspection.” (p. 308)

46. Interactionist
PropertyDualism
Interactionist
Property
 Dualism
•“
Thementalpropertiesofthebrainareanintegrated The
mental
properties
of
the
brain
are
an
integrated

part of the general causal fray, in systematic
interaction with the brain’s physical properties. One’s
actions, therefore, are held to be caused by one’s desires and volitions after all. ” (p. 308)

47. How can property dualism be formulated?
•The basic challenge of property dualism (and neutral 
monismetc)istoformulateitpreciselyinaway monism
, 
etc
.
)
 is
 to
 formulate
 it
 precisely
 in
 a
 way
 
that makes sense.
• Churchlandargues that there seems to be no way to 
dothis do
 this
.

48. Question:Doatomshavemental Question:
 Do
 atoms
 have
 mental
 
properties?
•The brain, says the property dualist, has mental 
properties in addition to physical properties.
•But the brain is made of atoms.  So do atoms have 
mental properties as well?
•The claim that atoms have mental properties is 
called panpsychism, and seems a little crazy.

49. •
Solet
’
ssupposethatatomsdon
’
thaveanymental
So
 lets
 suppose
 that
 atoms
 dont
 have
 any
 mental
 
properties.
•In that case, atoms are entirely physical. •But if atoms are entirely physical, then a collection of 
atoms 
(
e.
g
. a brain
)
 must also be entirel
y
 p
h
y
sical.
(g)ypy

50. •
Hereagain
Churchland
makesthefalseassumption
Here
 again
 Churchland
makes
 the
 false
 assumption
 
that all non‐physical properties are mental.
•(Like a British person meeting a foreigner.  “Oh, 
y
ou’re forei
g
n?  Bon
jour.  Comment 
ç
ava?”)
yg
j
ç
•If atoms have non‐
p
h
y
sical 
p
ro
p
erties
,
 then the
y
 
pypp ,y
won’t be mental properties.

51. Mentalpropertiesare
“
emergent
”
?
Mental
 properties
 are
 
emergent?
“mental
p
ro
p
erties are here said to be emer
g
en
t
pp
g
properties, properties that do not appear at all until
ordinary physical matter has managed to organize
itself thro ghthee ol tionar process intoas stem itself
,
thro
u
gh
the
e
v
ol
u
tionar
y
process
,
into
a
s
y
stem

of sufficient complexity. Examples of properties that
are emer
g
ent in this sense would be the
p
ro
p
ert
y
of
gppy
being solid, the property of being colored, and the property of being alive. All of these require matter to besuitablyorganizedbeforetheycanbedisplayed be
suitably
organized
before
they
can
be
displayed
.
With this much, any materialist will agree. ”

52. Weak emergence
Consideracollectionofdots(smallcircles)The Consider
 a
 collection
 of
 dots
 (small
 circles)
.  
The
 
shape of the wholecollectionmight not be a 
circle.  It could, for example, be a square (as 
h)
s
h
own
)
.  
A whole can have properties that the individual 
partsdonot
Yetthepropertiesofthewholecan
parts
 do
 not
. 
Yet
 the
 properties
 of
 the
 whole
 can
 
be inferredfrom the properties of the parts.
52

53. Stron
g
emer
g
ence needed for PD
g
g
•A property dualist cannot say that mental properties 
are weakly emergent on the physical properties of 
atoms. •For, in that case, the mental properties of the brain 
llbif dfihilid
can a
ll
 b
e 
in
f
erre
d
 f
rom 
its p
h
ys
ica
l propert
ies, an
d
 
so the physical description of the brain is complete.
•Strong emergence says that the mental properties 
donotreduce
tothephysicalones
do
 not
 reduce
 to
 the
 physical
 ones
.

54. StrongEmergence
=
Irreducible
Strong
 Emergence
  
Irreducible
“But an
y
p
ro
p
ert
y
dualist makes the further claim that
yp p y
mental states and properties are irreducible, in the
sense that they are not just organizational features of
ph sicalmatter asarethee amplescited The are ph
y
sical
matter
,
as
are
the
e
x
amples
cited
.
The
y
are

said to be novel properties beyond prediction or
ex
p
lanation b
y
p
h
y
sical science.”
pypy
(N.B. even the best possible physical description of  the system is held to be incompleteby property 
dualists.)

55. Areatomspurelyphysical? Are
 atoms
 purely
 physical?
•A 
p
ro
p
ert
y
 dualist had better sa
y
 ‘no’.
ppyy
•A 
p
ro
p
ert
y
 dualist should den
y
 that even atoms have 
ppyy
completedescriptions in physical terms.  (Or even 
that atoms, as entities, don’t exist!  The world is 
lumpythat
’
sall)
lumpy
, 
thats
 all
.
)
•
(Thereisalong
‐
runningdebatewithinphysicsitself
•
(There
 is
 a
 long
running
 debate
 within
 physics
 itself
 
about whether the best models are complete.)

56. •
Strongemergenceishighlymysterious. Strong
 emergence
 is
 highly
 mysterious.
•
Byitsverynatureitisimpossibletounderstand
•
By
 its
 very
 nature
, 
it
 is
 impossible
 to
 understand
 
rationally how emergent properties arise.  (Like 
tr
y
in
g
 to 
p
redict un
p
redictable events.)
ygpp
•Wh
y
 are some thin
g
s conscious?  We have no idea
,
 
yg,
according to property dualism.