A Saudi-Qatari Détente?

Arabia Foundation blog post "A Saudi-Qatari Détente?"

1. A SAUDI-QATARI
DÉTENTE?
THE ARABIA FOUNDATION

WWW.ARABIAFOUNDATION.ORG

2. An invitation from the king of Saudi Arabia to his Qatari
counterpart to attend the December 9 Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC) summit in Riyadh has set the stage for
potential progress on a protracted dispute that left the
council deeply divided and arguably undermined US
efforts to build a united front against Iran. It remains to
be seen whether the Qatari emir will accept the
invitation. Qatar’s decision earlier in the week to exit
OPEC, another forum where Saudi Arabia has
considerable influence, does not bode well. But even if
he does, expectations of a breakthrough must be
tampered by a healthy dose of realism and seen in light
of stubborn geopolitical facts.

3. The Saudi king’s invitation is not the first gesture
from Riyadh toward Doha in the wake of the
brutal assassination of Saudi journalist Jamal
Khashoggi. Hopes of a breakthrough first
surfaced after an unexpected comment by
Muhammad bin Salman (MBS)—Saudi Arabia
crown prince and de facto ruler—during a
landmark “Davos in the Desert” investment
conference held in Riyadh in October. MBS
shocked the audience by offering words of
praise for rival Qatar, stating that “despite the
differences we have, [Qatar] has a great
economy and will be doing a lot in the next five
years.” The Qatari-owned Al Jazeera news
network was quick to headline, “Under pressure
from Khashoggi killing, MBS praises Qatar.”

4. The significance of this mild yet rare compliment is more apparent
when contrasted with the information-warfare campaigns the two
countries have been engaged in since the onset of the crisis in June of
2017, both in the Arab and Western press. Both sides have attempted
to depict the other as a supporter of terror, and both sides have
derided their opponent’s ruler. Saudi media, for example, calls Qatar’s
emir “the reckless prince,” while Qatari media refers to MBS as “the
boy.”

5. On the Saudi side, the architect of these smear
campaigns, a senior advisor to the royal court and a
close confidante of the crown prince, has been let
go because of his suspected involvement in the
killing of Jamal Khashoggi. A tough political
operative who was instrumental in assisting MBS to
consolidate power, he often spearheaded the most
vicious criticism of Qatar, even vowing to turn the
small peninsula into an island by digging a moat
visible from space. The reshuffle in Riyadh, coupled
with the king’s invitation and the crown prince’s
comments, is certainly a noteworthy development
that could contribute to a thawing of relations
should Qatar reciprocate. But these factors are also
up against realities that predate MBS, Qatar’s
current emir, and the most recent downturn in
bilateral relations. At the heart of the matter is
good-old-fashioned geopolitics and considerable
history.

6. Ultimately Qatar is a small, if influential, country with a
significantly larger neighbor that has historically dominated the
resource-rich Arabian Peninsula. A weaker state like Qatar faces
one of two choices according to realist theory: either to
“bandwagon” by hitching its fate to the more powerful neighbor in
the hope of establishing a mutually beneficial relationship, or to
“balance” by partnering with other hegemons to counteract
perceived threats from the powerful neighbor.

7. To varying degrees, with Bahrain on one end of the spectrum and
Oman on the other, the smaller states of the Arabian Peninsula have
historically chosen to bandwagon with Saudi Arabia under the
nominal umbrella of the GCC. Qatar, on the other hand, began to
break with this consensus as far back as 1996, when Saudi Arabia
took a hard stand against a coup in Doha that saw the emir
overthrown by his own son. Qatar’s steady march away from Saudi
Arabia and the GCC coincided with technological breakthroughs in
the global market for liquified natural gas (LNG) that enhanced
Doha’s economic influence. In 1996, Sheikh Hamad built Qatar’s first
LNG liquefication plants and an export terminal at Ras Laffan. The
gamble paid off spectacularly; thanks to LNG exports, Qatar’s
economy skyrocketed from about $8 billion in gross domestic
product in 1995 to over $210 billion in less than a decade. At the
same time, the LNG terminal allowed the tiny emirate to bypass
pipelines that extended through Saudi territory.

8. The launch of Al Jazeera that same year
heralded Qatar’s use of soft power
through the medium of satellite
television to spread its influence. As the
first twenty-four-hour Arabic-language
regional news channel, beaming into
homes across the Middle East, Al
Jazeera allowed Doha to project power,
providing a platform for allies and its
own views as Doha criticized its Saudi
rivals. Qatar actively courted the Muslim
Brotherhood, along with other Islamists,
and gave them a platform on Al Jazeera
in order to cultivate a transnational
network of nonstate clients and allies.
Q a t a r

9. Qatar’s full shift from an initially defensive posture to a campaign for regional
influence became clear with the Arab uprisings of 2011. It sensed an
opportunity to reshape the region by throwing its weight behind the ascended
forces of political Islam. Whether in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, or elsewhere, Saudi
Arabia stood for the status quo while Qatar fueled the promise of a future
where the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam prevailed. In this quest for
outsized regional power, Turkey’s President Ragip Tayyip Erdoğan and his
Islamist AKP Party proved to be the perfect partners, providing the geopolitical
heft that Qatar lacked and offering yet another buffer against potential Saudi
domination. In 2014, three years prior to the current diplomatic standoff, Qatar
offered Turkish troops a foothold on the Arabian Peninsula, a first since the
collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I. The base was announced as
part of a defense agreement to “confront common enemies” and now hosts an
estimated three thousand Turkish troops. In Riyadh, which sees Istanbul as a
rival regional heavyweight, the message was not lost on anyone.

10. Hence, the current boycott is not simply the making of impetuous young
royals that can be easily reversed, as many have come to believe. It has
deep-seated roots tracing back over two decades to Qatar’s 1995 coup
and the 2011 Arab Spring. If the Trump administration is to seize the
current diplomatic opening and take advantage of the new tone in
Riyadh, it must set realistic expectations. The United Arab Emirates and
Bahrain remain more intransigent in their position toward Qatar, and US
plans for an “Arab NATO,” a coalition of Arab allies to counter Iran, are
simply improbable at this point. De-escalation and conflict management
are the necessary first steps if there is to be any significant progress
toward resolving the crisis.

11. A plausible path forward is for the US to work toward becoming a guarantor of
a new accord based on the spirit of the three 2013–14 agreements between
Qatar and its Gulf neighbors, including Saudi Arabia. These countries need
Doha to stop undermining their security by ending support for the now much-
diminished Muslim Brotherhood and by halting “antagonistic media”
campaigns, mainly by Al Jazeera. At the same time, for Qatar, preserving its
sovereignty is paramount. US security assurances coupled with the GCC’s tacit
acceptance of the Qatari-Turkish partnership could sufficiently address this
issue.
As the indispensable security guarantor of all parties to the dispute,
Washington can ensure compliance on all sides, threatening to name and
shame, and even to impose punitive measures on any country that violates
the terms of the new agreement. Surely such an accord will not resolve all
outstanding issues, but it could prove to be a tangible first step back from this
destructive interregional competition and a solid step toward focusing on
counterbalancing Iran.

12. THANK YOU!

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