Antietam and the McClellan Missteps 2 D Essay examples
AMEDD CAPTAINS CAREER COURSE
GENERAL MCCLELLAN AND THE BATTLE OF ANTIETAM
SUBMITTED TO MR. KEN FRANK
SMALL GROUP 7
MISSION COMMAND PAPER
BY
CPT CHRIS KOLBOSKY
AMEDD CENTER AND SCHOOL, FT. SAM HOUSTON, TX
03 FEBRUARY 2014
INTRODUCTION
Building a movement always challenges the status quo. Leaders must act, they must willingly risk the
things they love and unfortunately, many leaders are frozen by the lethargy of indecision i. Union
General George B. McClellan, who was meticulous in his planning and preparations, was also known
for not aggressively challenging his opponents on a fast moving battlefield environment. He
chronically overestimated the strength of the enemy and was reluctant to apply principles of mass, ...
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Confederate politicians, including President Jefferson Davis, believed the prospect of foreign
recognition would increase if they won a victory on Northern soil; such a victory might gain
recognition and financial support from Britain and France, something that was vastly needed xiii.
While in pursuit, two soldiers in General McClellan s 75,500 man Army of the Potomac, stumbled
upon an amazing find. On the morning of September 13, in a clover field on the outskirts of Frederick,
MD, CPT Barton Mitchell and 1SG John Bloss found a bulky envelope by the road xiv. In it was a
sheet of paper wrapped around three cigars and marked Confidential . It was headed Special Orders
No 191 and signed by Command of GEN. R.E. Lee xv. Before noon, it was in the hands of General
McClellan xvi. From Special Order 191, McClellan learned the objectives, the timetables, and the
makeup of the four columns of Lee s Army xvii. The order indicated that Lee had divided his Army
and dispersed portions geographically to Harpers Ferry, WV and Hagerstown, MD, thus making each
subject to isolation and defeat if McClellan could move quickly enough xviii. Rather than using the
advantage to reposition his forces in overwhelming numbers, he waited 18 hours before taking
advantage of his intelligence. As it happened, it was just enough time for General Lee to evade
outright disaster xix.
While Lee had only 15,000 men at Sharpsburg and the first troops of