Apidays New York 2024 - Post-Quantum API Security by Francois Lascelles, Broadcom & Layer7
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May 23, 2024
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About This Presentation
Post-Quantum API Security: Preparing your APIs for Q-day
Francois Lascelles, Distinguished Engineer at Broadcom and CTO at Layer7
Apidays New York 2024: The API Economy in the AI Era (April 30 & May 1, 2024)
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Post-Quantum API Security: Preparing your APIs for Q-day
Francois Lascelles, Distinguished Engineer at Broadcom and CTO at Layer7
Apidays New York 2024: The API Economy in the AI Era (April 30 & May 1, 2024)
------
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Size: 1.72 MB
Language: en
Added: May 23, 2024
Slides: 15 pages
Slide Content
Post-Quantum API Security
Preparing your APIs for Q-day
April 30, 2024
Francois Lascelles
API Security CTO, Broadcom
•Our digital world relies on secure
communications and privacy of data at
rest
–Authentication, authorization, encryption,
integrity
–In the foundation of this security is public key
cryptography
–Using ubiquitous algorithms RSA, EC, …
Understanding the Quantum Threat
Today Q-day
•When quantum computing becomes
available
1
–Using Shor’s algorithm and a few
thousand stable qubits
–You can easily break RSA, EC
–Services relying on these common
standards would be left open to breach,
impersonation, fraud, etc
011010
1
We’ll get back to that
•You won’t need a Quantum computer to protect against a Quantum computer
attack
•Post-quantum crypto (PQC)
•Quantum-resistant
•Compatible with today’s infrastructure
•Standards
–NIST formalizing PQC algos this year (2024)
What is the solution?
Don’t Panic
–Secure connections
–Identity introspection, JWKS
–Data access
–Shared state (KV, counting)
–Microservices
–Client-server
–Access control mechanisms
–Authentication (JWT)
–Subject confirmation (mTLS, signatures)
–Token mediation
API specific exposure
API Secure Connection Points and Access Control Mechanisms Affected
APIClient
Data
Identity
State
Example API exploit: JWT based API access control
Identity
App
+
User
API
Authenticate, get JWT
Call API with JWT
Get JWK
(public key)
{
"sub": "1234567890",
"name": "John Doe",
"iat": 1516239022,
"scope”: ”limited”,
”group”: ”tenant1"
}
I trust the JWT and its
claims because the
signature proves possession
of a private key associated
with the public one
011010
Get JWK
(it’s public)
{
"sub": "1234567890",
"name": "whomever",
"iat": ”whenever",
"scope”: "whatever”,
”group”: ”any_claim"
}
•Apply Shor
•Deduct the private key
•Forge my own tokens
•Claiming anyidentity
•Claiming anypermissions
•Setting anyexpiration
•As many as I want
•Whenever I want
Call API with JWT
Legit JWT Forged JWT
•To counter this threat, token issuer
need to switch to PQC
–Token issuers need to be able to sign
tokens utilizing these new standards
•Resource servers need to be able to
validate those PQC signatures
•The standards that specify JWT
signing need to evolve to
accommodate this
–JWT -> JWS -> JWA
Post-quantum JWT
How does Dilithiumperform compared to RSA2048?
Is there a PQC taxto pay?
Not bad
Token size 3.6KB
vs < 1KB
•While the bar is dropping to crack today’s security, quantum computers are getting
stronger, faster
Timeline
When is Q-Day?
2019 Google Sycamore
53 qubits
2022 IBM Osprey
433 qubits
2023 IBM Condor
1121 qubits
203X(?)
1M qubits (?)
Timeline
Working backwards from Q-Day
Q-day
total
remediation
duration
secure-for
period
Deadline to
start PQC
retrofit
•How long it takes to retrofit your
infrastructure
•Harvest now, decrypt later
•How long is a secret going through your
API subject to privacy?
•Intercepting API traffic is in some cases,
an easier target than data at rest
•Some of the most critical targets tend to be large organizations
–Government-managed infrastructure systems
–Large private corporations
•The same organizations can be slow to adapt
•Some environments have very complex multi-layered architectures
•Some legacy infrastructure may lack the required crypto-agility
•You can’t flick the switch for all systems at once
–Therefore, there needs to be a period of overlapping support
–This adds to the scope
Time to retrofit
(In some cases, this will take years)
•See: Quantum-readiness –Migration to post-quantum crypto
–NIST, CISA, NSA
•Assign a team to plan and scope the migration
•Prepare a crypto inventory
–Where and how is crypto used in your organization
•Prioritize
–Most likely or damaging targets
•Discuss with technology providers
–Demand crypto-agility
Establish a quantum-readiness roadmap