BATTLE OF GHAZALA is the 50 slides that are to be need to exec.ppt

battle of ghazala is story of ghazala

1. BATTLE OF
GAZALA

2. BATTLE OF GAZALABATTLE OF GAZALA
•BACKGR
•DEPL PRIOR TO OP
•COMPARISON OF FORCES
•SYNTHESIS OF PLAN
•PLAN
•CONDUCT
•CAS
•ANALYSIS

3. BRIT SIT
•WITHIN THEATER
–REORG OF FORCES SPEC ARMD FMNS – ALL DIVS REORG
INTO SELF CONTAINED GPS UNDER DIV COMD
–IN ARMD DIVS SINGLE ARMD BDE GP WITH TWO INF BDE
GPS REPLACED TWO ARMD BDES & SP GP
–CREATION OF POST OF DMT & EMPHASIS ON TRG
–SEL & DEV OF GAZALA AS SPRINGBOARD FOR OFFENSIVE
•GEN STRAT SIT
–CHURCHILL’S INSISTENCE ON RESUMPTION OF OFFENSIVE
BUT AUCHINLECK DUG HIS HEELS IN ON THE ACCT OF MIL
SIT SPEC STR & TECH QUALITY OF EQPT HOWEVER
CHURCHILL WROTE TO ATTK IN JUN OR RESIGN & TO TAKE
OVER COMD OF 8 ARMY DURING BATTLE
BACKGR

4. AXIS SIT
•WITHIN THEATER
–DEV OF DEFs IN FRONT OF GAZALA LINE
–RFTs ENABLED ROMMEL TO RETAKE THE
OFFENSIVE
•GEN STRAT SIT
–GERMAN HIGH COMD STILL PREOCCUPIED WITH
RUSSIA & FAILED TO ESTB A NEXUS BETWEEN
AFRICA, MIDDLE EAST & RUSSIA
–DISAGREEMENT OF VIEWS OF ATTK ON TOBRUK &
MALTA
–AS A COMPROMISE HITLER & MUSSOLINI ALLOWED
ROMMEL TO UNDERTAKE OFFENSIVE BUT NO
FURTHER THAN TOBRUK
BACKGR

5. TOPO
AREA OF OP
•

6. OPPOSING DEPL
PRIOR TO OP

7. BRITISH DEPL
SEL OF DEF LINE AFTER WDR FROM BENGHAZI
•CHOICES AVAL
–LINE GAZALA – BIR HACHIEM
–LINE ACROMA – EL ADAM – ELDUDA WITH GAMBUT & BARDIA PASSES
•ANALYSIS
–LINE GAZALA – BIR HACHIEM
•ADVANTAGES
–TAC AS FAR AS FEASIBLE
–NO LOSS OF TERRITORY
•DISADVANTAGES
–NO NATURAL STR
–LINEAR
–POOR LATERAL COMM
–SUP OF WATER TO BIR HACHIEM DIFFICULT
–LINE ACROMA – EL ADAM – ELDUDA
•ADVANTAGES
–NO FLANK
–GOOD LATERAL COMM
–ESCARPMENT LENT STR TO DEF
–GOOD AIRFDS CLOSE
–ADM EASY
•DISADVANTAGES
–LOSS OF TERRITORY
–IF RD TO EAST IS CUT RESP OF MAINT BY NAVY WAS DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT
–FARTHER AWAY FROM DJEBEL AKHDAR FROM WHERE GERMAN WDR COULD BE INTERCEPTED
GAZALA CHOSEN AS A COMPROMISE BETWEEN AUCHINLECK’S
DESIRE TO FIGHT A DEF BATTLE & CHURCHILL’S
INSISTENCE TO ATTK

8. BRITISH DEPL
1 SA DIV
1 ARMD
DIV
50
DIV
150
BDE
1 FR
BDE
3 IND
MB
29
IND
MB
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
201
GB
6 SA
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
HQ 30CORPS
32
ATB
7 ARMD
DIV
151
69
3
SA
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB
32
AB
2
AB
7
MB
4
ABBOXES
MINEFDS
TOBRUK
PERIMETER

9. BRITISH DEPL
•NORTHERN SEC – 13 CORPS
–20 MILES LONG FROM COAST TO
TRIGH CAPPUZO UNDER RESP OF 13
CORPS
–FOL FORCES DEPL:-
•BOX OF 1 SA DIV FROM COAST TO
ALEM HAAMZA
•BOX OF 50 DIV WITH 2 X BDES
•1 & 32 ARMY TK BDES BEHIND THE
BOX OF 50 DIV
•CORPS HQ AT EL ADEM
•SOUTHERN SEC – 30 CORPS
–30 MILES LONG WITH TWO ISOLATED
BDE SIZE BOXES UNDER RESP OF 30
CORPS
–FOL FORCES DEPL:-
•150 BDE BOX IN SIDI MUFTAH
•1 FREE FRENCH BDE IN BIR HACHIEM
•CORPS HQ NORTH OF BIR EL GUBI
•SOUTHERN FLANK PROTECTION
–3 IND MOT BDE SOUTH OF BIR
HACHIEM
–7 MOT BDE AT RETMA
–23 IND BDE AT BIR EL GUBI
•STRONG PTS IN DEPTH
–201 GDS BDE AT KNIGHTS BR
–COMMONWEALTH KEEP
–ACROMA
–EL ADEM (CORPS & DIV HQ)
•TOBRUK GAR
–2 SA DIV
–9 IND BDE
•ARMR
–1 ARMD DIV
•HQ AT EL ADEM
•22 ARMD BDE ON TRIGH BIR HACHIEM
•2 ARMD BDE ON TRIGH CAPPUZO
–7 ARMD DIV
•HQ AT BIR BEUID
•4 ARMD BDE WEST OF BIR BEUID
•ARMY TPS
–8 ARMY HQ AT GAMBUT
–5 IND DIV LESS 2 X BDES
–10 IND BDE GP
•MINEFDS. A MINEFD MARSH FROM
COAST TO BIR HACHIEM COVERING
FRONT OF ALL FWD BOXES

10. ANALYSIS OF BRITISH DEPL
•INHERENT WEAKNESSES OF GAZALA
POSN:-
–OPEN FLANK
–NO NATURAL STR
–DIFFICULTY IN ADM
–LACK OF LATERALS
•RITCHIE PROVED HIMSELF INCAPABLE OF ANY
ORIGINAL PLAN & A TRUE ARDENT OF
HOBATARIAN DOCTRINE
•TOO FWD DEPL:-
–BULK OF ARMY WRAPPED AS GIFT TO
ROMMEL IN FWD AREAS WITHOUT ANY
REGARDS TO ADV TPS/ POSNS AS
O'CONNOR HAD DONE AGAINST ITALIANS
INVITING SURPRISE & EARLY DECISIVE
CLASH
–FIRST 60 MILES OF ROMMEL’s ADV WOULD
TAKE HIM TO 8 ARMY REAR
–AMBIVALENCE OF GAZALA LINE BEING TAKEN
BOTH AS A DEF POSN AS WELL AS A
SPRINGBOARD FOR OFFENSIVE AS PRESENCE OF
HUGE DUMPS AT BELHAMED & TOBRUK CRAMPED
MENTAL & PHYSICAL FREEDOM OF COMDS
•MOB FORCES WERE NOT CONC:-
–DISPOSN OF FORCES IN DISREGARD TO
LESSONS LEARNT IN MOB & ARMD
WARFARE
–HOBARTIAN DOCTRINE AGAIN RESULTED
IN COMPARTMENTATION OF INF & ARMR
DEPL OF MOB TPS
•MOREOVER INSTEAD OF MAKING 13
CORPS RESP FOR ALL FIXED DEFS 30
CORPS WAS ALSO GIVEN RESP FOR
FIXED DEFS SOUTH OF TRIGH CAPPUZO
•BETWEEN SIDI MUFTAH & BIR HACHIEM
20 MILES STRETCH OF MINEFD WAS NOT
DIR DEF OR COVERED BY ARTY
•30 CORPS LAY STRETCHED ALL
OVER THE DESERT:-
–7 MOT BDE & 3 IND MOT BDE
SEPARATED & WERE TOO STRONG
FOR RECCE WHILE TOO WEAK FOR
DELAYING ACTION
–1 & 7 ARMD DIV TOO SEPARATED &
SPRINKLED
–ANY ADV BY GERMAN ARMR WOULD
HAVE SUCCESSIVELY PLOUGHED
THROUGH WHOLE OF 30 CORPS
•ALTHOUGH ON 20 MAY
AUCHINLECK SUGGESTED THAT
BOTH THE ARMD DIVS BE KEPT
CONC IN AREA AROUND TRIGH
CAPPUZO EAST OF SIDI MUFTAH
BUT IT WAS NOT CARRIED OUT

11. BRITISH APRC IN REGARDS TO
ROMMEL’s INTENTIONS
•IN 8 ARMY IT HAD BECOME AN HABIT TO PLAN BUT
THEN FIGHT OWN PRIVATE BATTLES AS UNDER
RITCHIE 8 ARMY WAS PRESIDED OVER & NOT COMD
•ARMY COMD APRC THAT ROMMEL COULD ATTK
EITHER ALONG COAST RD, ALONG TRIGH CAPPUZO
OR AROUND BIR HACHIEM WITH TOBRUK AS OBJS
WHILE 30 CORPS COMD IN WHOSE AREA TWO OF
THE THREE ATTK POSSIBILITIES FELL FELT THAT
ROMMEL WOULD ATTK THROUGH THE UNCOVERED
MINEFD & ACCORDINGLY PREP WITHOUT INFO
ARMY COMD
•DIFFERENCES OF OPINION REFLECTED IN DISPOSN &
DISPERSION OF FORCES WITH THE OPINION THAT
ENOUGH TIME WOULD BE AVAL FOR CONC AFTER
THE DIR OF MAIN BLOW HAS BEEN JUDGED
•FINALLY IT WAS AGREED THAT THE MOST
THREATENED APCH WAS THE CENTRAL ONE ALONG
TRIGH CAPPUZO

12. AXIS DEPL

13. COMPARISON OF FORCES - AXIS FORCES
•GERMAN
–15 PZ DIV
–21 PZ DIV
–90 LT DIV
•ITALIAN
–ITA 20 CORPS
•ARIETE DIV
•TRIESTE DIV
–10 & 21 ITA CORPS WITH 4 X
UNMOT INF DIVS
•A/TK GUNS
–48 X DUAL PURPOSE 88 MM
–76 MM FROM RUSSIAN
FRONT
–50 MM LB
•530 x AC (350 X FIGHTERS
140 X BOMBERS)
•UNMOT ITA INF DIV -
MORE OF A BURDEN
•AXIS ARMR :
–560 X TKS
•19 X PZ III J SPEC
•50 X LT GERMAN TKS
•230 X OBSOLETE ITA
TKS
–PZ III J SPEC WITH
STRONG ARMR & 50 MM
LB GUN BUT
•GERMAN ARTY WAS
KEPT CONC WITH A MOB
RES OF 56 X GUNS DIR
UNDER ROMMEL

14. COMPARISON OF FORCES - BRITISH
•13 CORPS
–1 SA DIV
–50 DIV
•30 CORPS
–1 ARMD DIV
–7 ARMD DIV
•TOBRUK GAR
–2 SA DIV
–IND BDE
•OTHER FMNS
–ARMR & MOT
•1 ARMY TK BDE
•32 ARMY TK BDE
•3 IND MOT BDE
•29 IND MOT BDE
•7 MOT BDE
–INF
•1 FREE FR BDE
•201 GDS BDE
•RES
–5 IND DIV LESS 2 X BDES
–10 IND BDE GP
•600 X AC (380 X FIGHTERS, 140 X
BOMBERS)
•4 X INF DIVS
•2 X ARMD DIVS
•2 X INDEP MOT BDE GPS
•2 X ARMY TK BDES
•1 ARMD DIV HAD 2 X
ARMD BDES INSTEAD OF
ONE
•IN ALL 14 X TK UNITS
WITH 4 X ON THE WAY
•TOTAL TKS 850 WITH 420
MORE AVAL AS RFTS
•ARTY WAS DISTR ALL
OVER & NO CONC WAS
CARRIED OUT

15. COMPARISON OF FORCES - ANALYSIS
•STR
–BRITISH HAD 3 : 1 SUP IN TKS IN OPENING BATTLE WHILE
4 : 1 DURING ATTRITION AS ONLY 170 OF NEWLY ARRIVED
400 GRANT TKS WERE BEING USED
–BRITISH HAD 3 : 2 SUP IN ARTY
•QUALITY OF EQPT
–PZ III J SPEC WAS SUPERIOR WITH 75 MM GUN & 50 MM
ARMR BUT PZ II HAD ONLY 30 MM ARMR WHEREAS BRITISH
CRUISER HAD 40 MM, MATILDA HAD 78 MM & VALENTINE
HAD 65 MM
–WHILE BRITISH HAD 170 X GRANT TKS WHICH WAS SUP – 75
MM GUN & 57 MM ARMR – BUT THE GUN WAS SIDE MTG
–BRITISH NEW A TK GUN 6 LBS WAS 30% SUP TO GERMAN 50
MM LB & WAS AVAL IN SUFFICIENT Nos
•TRG. GERMANS WERE SUPERIOR
•MORALE & LDRSHIP . GERMANS WERE SUPERIOR

16. SYNTHESIS OF
PLAN

17. FACTORS AFFECTING BRITISH PLAN
•CHURCHILL'S INTERFERENCE &
INSISTENCE UPON EARLIER
RESUMPTION OF OFFENSIVE
•CHOICE OF GAZALA AS A DEF LINE
•PREP OF GAZALA LINE AS A
SPRINGBOARD FOR OFFENSIVE
•INEPTNESS OF RITCHIE AS ARMY COMD

18. FACTORS AFFECTING GERMAN PLAN
•ROMMEL WAS A FOLLOWER OF
“ NO PLAN SURVIVES CONTACT
WITH THE EN”
… MOLTKE
•RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED BY HIGH COMD
ABOUT REL OF FORCES SPEC AIR
FORCE FOR ATTK AGAINST MALTA
AFTER CAPTURE OF TOBRUK
•AVAL OF INFO REGARDING BRITISH
DEPL WAS NOT COMPLETE

19. AXIS PLAN
•HOLDING ATTK BY ITA 10 & 21 CORPS BETWEEN COAST & NORTH OF TRIGH
CAPPUZO
• DAK WITH 90 LT DIV & ITALIAN 20 CORPS MAKING A 3 PRONGED
OUTFLANKING MNVR SOUTH OF BIR HACHEIM & THEN TURN
NORTH TO TAKE TOBRUK
ITA 20
CORPS
15 & 21
PZ DIVS
90 LT DIV
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS

20. BRITISH PL
AN
VAGUE
1 SA DIV
1 ARMD
DIV
50
DIV
150
BDE
1 FR
BDE
3 IND
MB
29
IND
MB
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
201
GB
6 SA
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
32
ATB
7 ARMD
DIV
151
69
3
SA
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB
32
AB
2
AB
7
MB
4
ABBOXES
MINEFDS
TOBRUK
PERIMETER

21. CONDUCT
26/ 27 MAY 1942
•AT 262100 MAY ROMMEL STARTED AT THE HEAD OF 3 PRONGED OUTFLANK MOV FROM ROTONDA TO SOUTH OF
BIR HACHIEM REACHING THERE IN EARLY MORNING 27 MAY WHILE ITA 10 & 21 CORPS MADE FACES NORTH OF
TRIGH CAPPUZO
1 SA DIV
1 ARMD
DIV
50
DIV
150
BDE
1 FR
BDE
3 IND
MB
29
IND
MB
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
201
GB
6 SA
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
32
ATB
7 ARMD
DIV
151
69
3
SA
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB
32
AB
2
AB
7
MB
4
AB
ITA 20
CORPS
15 & 21
PZ DIVS
90 LT DIV
•ALTHOUGH FROM AN 26 MAY TO 270730 MAY 52 MSGS WERE SENT BY ARMD CARS OF 7 ARMD BDE BUT NO ONE
LISTENED AS A LISTENING WATCH WAS NOT ORDERED – AND WHEN RECEIVED IT WAS DEALT WITH SKEPTICS
ISM – CORPS & DIV COMD AT VARIANCE IN THEIR APRC & REACTION TO ROMMEL’S ADV
•WHEN ROMMEL TURNED NORTH AFTER COMING LVL WITH BIR HACHIEM EVEN FRANTIC EFFORTS TO ROUSE 8
ARMY INTO ACTION DID NOT WORK
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS

22. CONDUCT
27 MAY 1942
•RETMA GAR WAS ATTK BY 90 LT DIV WHILE IT LEISURELY BREAKFASTED
•15 PZ DIV SWEPT ASIDE 4 ARMD BDE & CAPTURED HQ 7 ARMD DIV WITH ITS GOC
•21 PZ DIV ROUTED 3 IND MOT BDE & TURNED TOWARDS NORTH & BIR HACHEIM WITH ITA DIVs
•TRIESTE DIV WHICH HAD LOST WAY BUMPED INTO SIDI MUFTAH BOX WHICH WAS UNKNOWN TO AXIS INT
1 SA DIV
1 ARMD
DIV
50
DIV
150
BDE
1 FR
BDE
3 IND
MB
29
IND
MB
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
201
GB
6 SA
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
32
ATB
7 ARMD
DIV
151
69
3
SA
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB
32
AB
2
AB
7
MB
4
AB
ARIETE
DIV
21 PZ
DIV
90 LT DIV
•7 MOT BDE FELL TO ITS RALLYING PT AT BIR EL GUBI BUT FOUND THAT THE HALF GAR HAD GONE FOR SWIM
TO TOBRUK
•HQ 8 ARMY KNEW NOTHING OF WHAT HAS BECOME OF 7 ARMD DIV
15 PZ
DIV
270600
MAY
TRIESTE
DIV
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS

23. CONDUCT
27 MAY 1942 - AN
•ROMMEL NOW FELL ON 22 ARMD BDE WHICH WAS ALSO CAUGHT WHILE READYING ITSELF – AFTER A GALLANT
FIGHT IT FELL BACK TO KNIGHTS BR BOX HELD BY GDS BDE
1 ARMD
DIV
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
6 SA
BDE
3
SA
•DESPITE NO INSTRS FROM ABOVE & CONFUSION AT ARMY HQ STUBBORN RESISTANCE BY BRITISH SOLDIER
SAVED THE DAY AS WHEN ROMMEL WAS STOPPED 3 MILES NORTH OF TRIGH CAPPUZO & GERMAN LOST ½ TK
STR AT THE HANDS OF ARMR UNITS HITHERTO UNKNOWN TO THEIR INT
1 SA DIV
50
DIV
29
IND
MB
201
GB
32
ATB
150
BDE
1 FR
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
151
69
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB
32
AB
2
AB
ARIETE
DIV
TRIESTE
DIV
21 PZ
DIV
90 LT DIV15 PZ
DIV
•ROMMEL’s HOPES TO REACH SEA AGAIN SQUASHED BUT BRITISH DID NOTHING TO EXPLOIT ROMMEL’S LOSS
OF BAL – BUT THEY WERE EVEN UNAWARE OF THE FATE OF THEIR OWN 7 ARMD DIV
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS

24. CONDUCT
28/ 29/ 30 MAY 1942
•INCESSANT BRITISH RESISTANCE FRUSTRATED ROMMEL AS DAK TRIED TO PUSH BEYOND KNIGHTS BR & 90 LT
NEAR EL ADEM WHILE ITA MOB CORPS BETWEEN BIR HACHIEM & BIR EL HARMAAT – HOWEVER BRITISH
UNABLE TO CAPITALISE – ROMMEL SAVED THE DAY WITH PERS LDRSHIP WHEN HE BROUGHT SUP COLM
THROUGH A SANDSTORM – FIGHTING CONT WITHOUT ANY MAJ BRITISH REACTION – HOWEVER SIT FOR
ROMMEL WAS BECOMING PRECARIOUS
1 ARMD
DIV
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
6 SA
BDE
3
SA
1 SA DIV
50
DIV
29
IND
MB
201
GB
32
ATB
150
BDE
1 FR
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
151
69
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB 32
AB
2
AB
TRIESTE
DIV
ARIETE
DIV
21 PZ
DIV
90 LT DIV15 PZ
DIV
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS

25. CONDUCT
30 MAY 1942
1 ARMD
DIV
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
6 SA
BDE
3
SA
•ROMMEL RIGHTLY SENSING THE SIT ABANDONED HIS PLANS FOR TOBRUK FOR THE TIME BEING & PULLED HIS
TPS INTO TRIANGLE WITH HIS BACK COVERED BY BRITISH MINEFD – HIS METHOD WAS A GENIUS – HE
PROPOSED TO BREAKTHROUGH FROM THE EASTERN SIDE THROUGH THE MINEFD BETWEEN SIDI MUFTAH & BIR
HACHEIM – UNCOVERED MINEFD GAP - TO SHORTEN HIS L OF C
•ALTHOUGH IT WAS AN INTRICATE MOV IT WAS CARRIED OUT WITH PANACHE
•NOW ROMMEL WAS HOLDING IN THE CEN OF THE GAZALA LINE & BRITISH THOUGHT HIM OF AS TRAPPED BUT
WERE CONFUSED ON HOW BEST THEY COULD EXPLOIT THE SIT
1 SA DIV
50
DIV
29
IND
MB
201
GB
32
ATB
150
BDE
1 FR
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
151
69
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB 32
AB
2
AB
TRIESTE
DIV ARIETE
DIV
DAK
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS

26. CONDUCT
1 ~ 4 JUN 1942
1 ARMD
DIV
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
6 SA
BDE
3
SA
•AS BRITISH DECIDED WHAT TO DO, ROMMEL OVERCAME SIDI MUFTAH BOX, TORE THROUGH MINEFD & SNUGLY
PREP HIMSELF IN THE CAULDRON FOR LONG AWAITED BRITISH C ATTK
1 SA DIV
50
DIV
29
IND
MB
201
GB
32
ATB
150
BDE
1 FR
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
151
69
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB 32
AB
2
AB
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS
DAK &
ITA MOB
CORPS

27. BRITISH RESPONSE TO
ROMMEL’S ‘CAULDRON’
•8 ARMY COMDS AT LOSS WHAT TO DO
•DOLING AWAY THE CHANCE TO C ATTK ON 28 MAY DUE
TO LACK OF DRIVE & CORRECT INFO
•FOL SUGGESTIONS PRESENTED:-
–ATTK BY 1
ST
SA DIV ALONG COAST
–5 IND DIV TO ATTK RD BIR HACHEIM ON ROMMEL L OF C
–DIR ASLT ON THE CAULDRON BY ARMR & INF
•FIRST IT WAS AGREED THAT ROMMEL L OF C BE ATTK
BUT THEN IDEA WAS DROPPED FOR ADM REASONS
•FINALLY IT WAS DECIDED THAT 5 IND DIV WITH 22 ARMD
BDE (STUART TKS) TO ASLT CAULDRON WHILE AN ARMY
TK BDE (I TKS) ATTKS FROM NORTH & PLAN WAS CODE
NAMED ABERDEEN
•IT TOOK 8 ARMY 8 DAYS TO RESPOND & 4 DAYS JUST TO
PLAN THE RESPONSE

28. BRITISH C ATTK ON
‘CAULDRON’
PLAN ABERDEEN

29. 1 ARMD
DIV
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
6 SA
BDE
3
SA
•PHASE I
•9 & 10 IND BDE OF 5 IND DIV TO ATTK FROM EAST & CAPTURE ASLAGH (OUTER IM OF CAULDRON)
•32 ARMY TK BDE TO ATTK FROM NW & CAPTURE SIDRA RIDGE AREA
•PHASE 2
•22 ARMD BDE TO PASS THROUGH 5 IND DIV & PEN DEEP INTO CAULDRON
•COMD
•TO ALTN BETWEEN 5 IND DIV & 7 ARMD DIV
•HOWEVER INITIALLY 7 ARMD DIV GOC WAS COMD
1 SA DIV
50
DIV
29
IND
MB
201
GB
1 FR
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
151
69
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB 32
AB
2
AB
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS
DAK & ITA
MOB
CORPS
ABERDEEN
PLAN
32
ATB
9 & 10 IND BDE
22 ARMD
BDE

30. 1 ARMD
DIV
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
6 SA
BDE
3
SA
•DELAYED FOR FURTHER PREP FOR 24 HRS
•ON 5 JUN ATTK STARTED WELL AT 0300 HRS
•BUT 22 ARMD BDE DID NOT ARRIVE IN TIME & INF WAS FURIOUSLY C ATTK
•WHEN 22 ARMD BDE FINALLY ADV IT WENT 3 MILES AHEAD & WAS TORN APART BY ROMMEL A/ TK GUNS, ARTY
& ARMR – ARMR FELL BACK LEAVING INF NAKED TO GERMAN C ATTK
1 SA DIV
50
DIV
29
IND
MB
201
GB
1 FR
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
151
69
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB 32
AB
2
AB
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS
DAK & ITA
MOB
CORPS
ABERDEEN
CONDUCT
32
ATB
•ROMMEL C ACTIONS
•WITHIN 6 HRS ROMMEL C ATTK ABERDEEN LT FLANK RESTING ON UNCOVERED MINEFD CAPTURING GOC
7 ARMD DIV & ROUTING BRITISH
•21 PZ DIV STRUCK IN THE FLANK OF 32 ARMY TK BDE & DRIVEN INTO A GERMAN MINEFD TO BE TAKEN
CARE OF BY A/ TK GUNS
•BRITISH LOST 110 TKS ON 5 JUN
•FIGHTING CONT ON 6 JUN WHILE GOC 7 ARMD DIV ESCAPED & TRIED TO REC SIT
•HOWEVER GERMAN SUP TAC HAD COST BRITISH 168 CRUISER & 50 I TKS, 4 ARTY REGTS, IND BDE & 7 ARMD DIV
SP GP

31. REASONS FOR FAILURE OF ABERDEEN
•PLAN
–PLAN WAS HATCHED BY DIFFERENT MINDS WHO EXEC IT IN THEIR OWN WAY
–DIR ASLT ON THE CAULDRON
•COMD
–COMD WAS GIVEN TO GOC 7 ARMD DIV BUT SPHERE OF RESP WAS NOT
CLEARLY ARTICULATED
–COMD SHOULD HAVE BEEN WITH CORPS COMD SO THAT THE C ATTK COULD
HAVE BEEN COORD PROPERLY
•POOR INTER ARM COOP
–BRITISH AS USUAL FAILED TO ACHIEVE INTG & COMB ARM COOP
–TKS & INF LAUNCHED SEPARATELY AS SEPARATE FORCES
•TIMING OF C ATTK
–DELAY IN LAUNCHING OF C ATTK BY 24 HRS ENABLED ROMMEL TO STR
CAULDRON WITH MINEFDS
–DELAY IN ARRIVAL OF 22 ARMD BDE ENABLED ROMMEL TO MAUL UNSP IND
BDE
•CONC
–BRITISH AS USUAL CMT PIECEMEAL BDE SIZE FORCES TO BE DEVOURED BY
ROMMEL
•NO CLOSE AIR SP WAS PLANNED WHILE ARTY DID NOT ACHIEVE CONC
OF FIRE AT THE RE PLACE
•LACK OF INFO – 32 ARMY TK BDE RAN INTO A MINEFD
•BRITISH UNDER EST THE STR OF ROMMEL’S DEF

32. 1 ARMD
DIV
HQ 13 CORPS
HQ 1 ARMD DIV
6 SA
BDE
3
SA
1 SA DIV
50
DIV
29
IND
MB
201
GB
1 FR
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
151
69
2
SA
1
SA
1
ATB 32
AB
2
AB
GP CRUEWELL
ITA 10 & 21 CORPS
ROMMEL
BREAKOUT
32
ATB
•ROMMEL NOW BROKE OUT FORM THE CAULDRON AS UNDER
•CAPTURED BIR HACHIEM ON NI 10/11 JUN FORCING 8 ARMY TO HINGE GAZALA LINE TO FORM A DEF LINE
NORTH OF TRIGH CAPPUZO PARALLEL TO IT L OF C
•ON 11 JUN 21 PZ DIV & ARIETE DIV STRUCK NORTH OF CAULDRON
•15 PZ DIV, 90 LT & TRIESTE DIV ADV TO EL ADEM
•BRITISH AGAIN AT LOSS WHAT TO DO ALTHOUGH BRITISH HAD 250 CRUISER & 80 I TKS WHILE ROMMEL WAS
DOWN TO 160 GERMAN & 70 ITALIAN TKS
•13 & 30 CORPS COMD ISSUED ORDERS WITHOUT COORD & EMP ARMD FMNS PIECEMEAL
•30 CORPS COMD PLACED 7 ARMD DIV UNDER COMD 1 ARMD DIV & ORDERED THEN TO ATTK 15 PZ DIV
SOUTHWARDS WHILE ROMMEL ATTK WITH 21 PZ DIV INTO THE REAR OF 7 ARMD DIV – COMD 1 ARMD DIV
ADVISED AGAINST CONT ATTK BUT WAS TOLD TO DO SO
•8 ARMY LOST 200 CRUISER & 60 I TKS ON 11 & 12 JUN
•BY NI 13 JUN ROMMEL WAS IN FULL CON OF AREA EXCEPT VIA BALBIA AS KNIGHTS BR WAS ALSO EVAC

33. 6 SA
BDE
9 IND
BDE
2 SA DIV
ROMMEL
BREAKOUT
•ON 14 JUN RITCHIE SUGGESTED A GEN WDR TO FRONTIER INCL EVAC OF TOBRUK
•SIG BY CHURCHILL THAT TOBRUK MUST BE HELD
•RITCHIE DID NOT TELL C-IN-C THAT 13 CORPS HAD ALREADY STARTED WDR
•C-IN-C OVERRULED WDR & ORDERED
•TOBRUK MUST BE HELD
•8 ARMY TO HOLD LINE ACROMA – ELADEM SOUTHWARDS
•RITCHIE COMPROMISED BUT IN REALITY 1 SA DIV & 50 DIV HAD ALREADY STARTED WDR ALONG VIA BALBIA &
AROUND BIR HACHIEM
•CONFUSION OVER INTERPRETATION OF ORDERS
•BRITISH WDR IN GAZALA GALLOP
•8 ARMY WDR BACK TO FRONTIER WHILE LEAVING ONLY A SCREEN ON THE PRESCRIBED LINE & TOBRUK GAR
•ON 17 JUN A DISASTROUS CHG BY 4 ARMD BDE DASHED ANY HOPES OF REL TOBRUK FROM OUTSIDE

34. CAS
•AXIS CAS
–NOT KNOWN
•BRITISH CAS
–A WHOLE ARMY
ROUTED

35. ANALYSIS OF OP

36. EFFs OF OP
•AXIS
–GREAT MORALE
BOOSTER
•BRITISH
–LOSS OF FACE
–MORALE AT THE
LOWEST EBB
–DEFICIENCIES IN COMD,
ORG, TRG & EQPT
HIGHLIGHTED

37. PRIME REASONS FOR BRITISH FAILURE
•BRITISH GENSHIP
–LACKING IN KNOWLEDGE ABOUT USE OF ARMR
–WEAK ARMY COMD WHO REQ C-IN-C TO HOLD HIS HAND IN TIMES OF CRISIS
–LACK OF MENTAL FLEXIBILITY
–FAULTY APRC ON PART OF COMDS AT ALL LVLS ABOUT ROMMEL’S ABILITY TO STRIKE
–8 ARMY NOT COMD BUT PRESIDED OVER
•BAD DISPOSN OF FORCES
–DESPITE THE AVAL OF FORCES, FRONT WAS NOT STR
–CHOICE OF DEF LINE
–PRESENCE OF DUMPS INTERFERED WITH MOB
–UNCOVERED MINEFD
•COMPARTMENTATION OF FORCES
–ARMR & INF AS SEPARATE ENTITIES
–STATIC BOX PLACED UNDER ARMD FMN
–COMPLETE DISREGARD TO PRINCIPLES OF MOB WARFARE
–DISPERSION & PIECEMEAL EMP OF ARMD FMNS
•DELAYED & PIECEMEAL C ATTK
•LACK OF TRG & INFERIORITY OF EQPT
–DEFS OF GRANT TK “SKYSCRAPER WITH GUN”
–LACK OF TR MILEAGE LTD TRG
•LACK OF COORD & PASSAGE OF INFO
–DUE TO LACK OF LISTENING WATCH NO INFO PASSES BY ADV TPS REACHED CONCERNED
–WDR OF 13 CORPS NOT COMM TO C-IN-C
•FAULTY INT
–MORE RELIANCE ON ULTRA
–FAULTY REPORTING ABOUT QUANTUM OF RFTS REACHING ROMMEL DESPITE IMPROVED AXIS NAVAL SIT IN
MEDITERRANEAN

38. PRIME REASONS FOR GERMAN SUCCESS
•GENSHIP
–ROMMEL SHOWED HIMSELF MASTER OF MNVR
–MENTAL FLEXIBILITY
–PERS LDRSHIP
–SEIZING OF SIT – CHANGE OF POSTURE & MOV INTO
CAULDRON – BREAKOUT FROM CAULDRON
–CORRECT APRC IN REGARDS TO BRITISH REACTIONS
•SURPRISE
–TIME AS A WPN
–SURPRISED BRITISH WITH THE ABILITY TO RECOVER
•SECURITY
–COMM SECURITY
–KEPT HIS PLANS EVEN HIDDEN FROM HIS ALLIES
•INT
–COMM INT ENABLED ROMMEL TO HAVE A CLEAR PICTURE
OF BRITISH STR & DISPOSN

39. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
MAINT OF AIM
BRITISH
•8 ARMY FELL BETWEEN
TWO STOOLS
–USE OF A DEF LINE AS
SPRINGBOARD
–LOSS OF TOBRUK
–SHILLY SHALLYING
ALL AROUND
AXIS
•RESOLUTE & SINGLE
•INITIAL AIM OF REACHING
ACROMA BY EVENING 27
JUN TO DOMINATE WDR
ROUTE OF 8 ARMY WAS
TOO AMBITIOUS BUT HE
ACHIEVED AFTER INITIAL
SETBACK
•MAINT EVEN IN ADVERSITY
•AIM OF WAR DEDUCED FROM NATIONAL STRAT & AIM OF
BATTLE FROM TAC CONSIDERATIONS MUST BE PURSUED
RELENTLESSLY TO AVERT DEFEAT & ACHIEVE VICTORY
ECO

40. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
OFFENSIVE ACTION
BRITISH
•DISPERSION OF
ARMR DENIED
OFFENSIVE ACTION
•LACK OF PREP
•LACK OF UNITY OF
COMD
AXIS
•PERSISTENT ATTKS
•MAKING EN CONSCIOUS
OF EXPOSED FLANKS
•COMD’s WILL – PERS
LDRSHIP & ALWAYS
PRESENT ON THE SCENE
•EXPLOITATION OF SIT &
EN WEAKNESSES –
SHIFTING OF WT
•OFFENSIVE ACTION IS NEC TO ACHIEVE DECISIVE RESULTS & MAINT
FREEDOM OF ACTION
•PERMITS COMD TO EX INITIATIVE & IMPOSE HIS WILL UPON EN; TO SET
PACE & DETERMINE COURSE OF BATTLE; EXPLOIT EN WEAKNESSES &
MEET UNEXPECTED DEVS
•APPLIED IN DEFINING AIM, SEL OF OBJS TO ACHIEVE AIM, MIL ORG,
COMD & STAFF RELATIONSHIP & EX OF COMD
•EMANATES FROM MOB, CONC, MORALE & UNITY OF COMD

41. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
CONC
BRITISH
•AS USUAL COMPARTMENTED
& DISPERSED
•SUP DOLED AWAY STARTING
FROM PRE DISPOSN TO
EVENTUAL EMP
•PRESENTED ARMD FMNS IN
COLUMNS TO BE MAULED BY
ROMMEL
•LACK OF CONC OF ARTY
FIRE
AXIS
•SHIFTING OF WT
•TIMELY CMT &
DISENGAGEMENT
•SEL OF MSUS AS OBJ
FROM WHERE A MULTI
DIR THREAT COULD BE
DEV WHILE REMAINING
CONC
•IMPLIES APPLICATION OF CBT POWER SUPERIOR TO
THAT OF EN AT PT OF DECISION RELEVANT TO TIME &
SPACE DIMENSIONS
•PROPER APPLICATION PERMITS INFERIOR FORCES TO
ACHIEVE DECISIVE CBT SUPERIORITY

42. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
ECO OF EFFORT
BRITISH
•FAILED TO CONC & GEN
CBT POWER
•FAULTY ORG OF ARMR
•FAULTY DISTR OF
FORCES
AXIS
•INBUILT IN ORG OF ARMR
FORCES
•CHANGE OF POSTURE
•LDRSHIP
•COROLLARY OF PRINCIPLE OF CONC
•WITHIN TIME & SPACE DIMENSIONS, CONC OF CBT POWER
WHICH ENSURES SUCCESS REFLECTS ECO OF EFFORT
•A MIL ORG IS EITHER DESIGNED TO ACCOMPLISH AN ASG MSN
OR IS WASTEFUL
•REINFORCES REQS OF UNITY OF COMD, PROPER EVAL OF
RISKS & CLARITY OF PURPOSE

43. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
MOB
BRITISH
•LACK OF MENTAL FLEXIBILITY
•LOC OF DUMPS – PSY BURDEN
•MINEFDS & BOXES WHICH WERE
TO PROTECT CAGED THE BRITISH
IN LIMITING THEIR MOB
•PROBLEMS IN COMM & COORD
FROM START TILL END
–PASSAGE OF INFO WHILE
ROMMEL OPENED HIS OFFENSIVE
–NO COORD BETWEEN BOTH
CORPS WHEN ROMMEL BROKE
OUT FROM CAULDRON
AXIS
•MENTAL FLEXIBILITY
•OFFENSIVE ATTITUDE
•MOB WAS THE ESSENCE
•IMPLIES SPEED, VERSATILITY & FREEDOM OF MOV
SUPERIOR TO THAT OF EN IN PREVAILING TIME & SPACE
DIMENSIONS
•REFLECTED IN WPN, TPN, COMM, LOG, ORG & EX OF
COMD

44. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
UNITY OF COMD
BRITISH
•LACK OF RESOLUTION BECAUSE
OF DIVIDED VIEWS
•GOOD INDL COMDS –
INCOHERENT TEAM MEMBERS
•CORPS COMDS
OVERSHADOWED ARMY COMDS
BECAUSE OF HIS LACK OF
EXPERIENCE & SVC
•COORD AMISS
•FALSE REPORTING – ARMY
COMD DID NOT INFO C-IN-C THAT
THE WDR OF 13 CORPS HAS
ALREADY BEGUN
AXIS
•UNITY OF COMD –
ROMMEL CEN OF
GRAVITY
–COORD CEN
–COMD CEN
•OVERCAME ITALIAN
PROCRASTINATION
•DECISIVE APPLICATION OF FULL NATIONAL, MIL & CBT
POWER REQS UNITY OF COMD
•ACHIEVES UNITY OF EFFORT BY COORD ACTION OF ALL
FORCES TOWARDS ONE GOAL
•IN WAR THE MAN IS PARAMOUNT

45. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
SURPRISE
BRITISH
•LACK OF SECURITY
•FAULTY INT
•DISREGARD OF INITIAL
REPORTING OF
ROMMEL’S ADV
•NO PROPER DEF ECHS
AXIS
•COMM SECURITY
•COMM INT
•SWIFTNESS DUE TO MENTAL
MOB & OFFENSIVE ATTITUDE
•TRG OF TPS
•DECEPTION TO SHOW GREATER
STR
•TIME AS A WPN
•REC SWIFTLY, ACTING BOLDLY,
APRC RIGHTLY
•SURPRISE CAN DECISIVELY SHIFT BAL OF POWER &
BRING SUCCESS OUT OF PROPORTION OF THE FORCE
APPLIED
•IMPLIES SURPRISING EN BY SUSTAINING DURATION OF
CAMPAIGN, IN EQPT, ORG & BY STRIKING EN AT A TIME &
PLACE & IN A MANNER FOR WHICH EN IS NOT PREP

46. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
SECURITY
BRITISH
•LACK OF COMM SECURITY
•LACK OF PHYSICAL
SECURITY DUE TO GAPS
•UNCOVERED MINEFD
BETWEEN BIR HACHEIM &
SIDI MUFTAH
•ALWAYS WORRIED ABOUT
FLANK PROTECTION
AXIS
•COMM INT
•COMM SECURITY
•BOLD ACTION – A PUNCH
PROTECTS HIMSELF
•SECURITY OF PLANS
•MEASURES OF SECURITY ARE MEASURE OF MIL POWER
•ACHIEVED BY MEASURES TAKEN TO ACHIEVE SURPRISE
& DENY INFO OF FRIENDLY FORCES
•DOESNOT IMPLY UNDUE CAUTION & AVOIDANCE OF RISK
•ENHANCED BY OFFENSIVE ACTION

47. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
SIMPLICITY OF PLAN
BRITISH
•NO PLAN
•CONFUSED STATE OF MIND
TO REACT
•ORG OF COMD
CUMBERSOME
•OP ABERDEEN CLASSIC
EXAMPLE OF HALF COOKED
PLANS, SHABBY EXEC &
HABIT TO GLOSS OVER &
DISREGARD THE FACTS
AXIS
•FLEXIBILITY TO EXPLOIT
•DESPITE INITIAL
SETBACK, QUICKLY REC
& ACHIEVED AIM
•SIMPLICITY IS REFLECTED IN THE EQPT, ORG, LOG,
HABITS, PLANS & ORDERS
•SIMPLICITY IMPLIES IN EXEC OF PLAN BY REDUCING
CONFUSION & DISORDER IN ENDURING THE BATTLE

48. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
ADM
BRITISH
•DUMPS INTERFERED WITH
LIBERTY TO CHOSE DEF
LOC
AXIS
•BETTER ADM
ARRANGEMENTS
•ROMMEL HIMSELF
BROUGHT SUP COLUMN
DURING SANDSTORM ON
3
RD
DAY OF BATTLE
•ADM ARRANGEMENTS MUST BE DESIGNED TO GIVE THE
COMD THE MAX FREEDOM OF ACTION IN EXEC OF PLAN

49. PRINCIPLES OF WAR
MORALE
BRITISH
•NO LDRSHIP TO LOOK TO
•ORDERS, DISORDERS,
CTR ORDERS -
CONFUSION
AXIS
•ROMMEL CEN OF
GRAVITY
•MORALE IS A REFLECTION OF FAITH IN CAUSE OF WAR,
LDRSHIP & IDEOLOGY
•MORALE WINS WARS
•IN WAR MORALE TO MATERIAL IS AS 10 TO 1