5 It won’t happen to me! I’ve been doing this job for 15 years … I’m CAREFUL! I don’t want to get (someone) in trouble! Attitudes
6 BETARI BOX MODEL MY ATTITUDE AFFECTS MY BEHAVIOR AFFECTS YOUR ATTITUDE AFFECTS YOUR BEHAVIOR AFFECTS BETARI BOX MODEL
7 What’s Your Excuse? Get it done. Undiscussed incompetence - unsafe practices that stem from skill deficits that can’t be discussed. Just this once - unsafe practices that are justified because they are exceptions to the rule. This is overboard - unsafe practices that bypass precautions management or workers consider excessive Are you a team player - unsafe practices that are justified for the good of the team, company or customer. What’s Your Excuse? What’s your Excuse?
8 Communication Principles of Health & Safety Communication Address communication barriers Effective communication increases motivation The more people a “communication” goes through, the more distorted it becomes Commuication
Time Management 9 Time Management
10 Employee Buy-In How to get employees engaged in your workplace safety message: Watching it (training videos) Hearing it (discussion & feedback on safety issues) Reading it (posters, email newsletter) Employee Buy-in
11 Employee Buy-In Employee Involvement – Why? Provides the means for everyone to develop and express their own commitment to safety and health Involves the persons most in contact with potential safety and health hazards Utilizes everyone’s wide range of experience Everyone is more likely to support and use programs in which they have input Employee Buy-in
12 Employee Buy-In Employee Involvement - How? How do you get employees involved in the safety and health process at your workplace? Key question: What is keeping employees from participating in the safety and health process? Employee Buy-in
13 Employee Buy-In Recognition for Achieving Goals (individual and/or facility) Safety Events Discussion of and feedback on safety issues Questionnaires/Suggestion Boxes Build safety into your facility’s communications Potential Ways to get Employee Involvement Employee Buy-in
14 Employee Buy-In Protect employees’ voices Give employees something meaningful to do Show results Provide positive consequences Make people aware of their impact on safety Employee Buy-in
17 Safety Excellence What is “Safety Excellence” Safety means prevention of injury or loss Excellence means superiority Safety Excellence
18 Safety Excellence Why Move to Safety Excellence? An average of 4,713 people annually are killed on the job over the past 4 years. ^ Over 250,000 productive years of life lost annually – more than from cancer & cardiovascular disease combined ^ According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics Safety Excellence
19 Compliance Why not be satisfied with compliance? Won’t it get the job done? What more do we need? Compiance
20 Compliance There are still too many incidents in the workplace costing too many lives. The traditional compliance-based approach doesn’t seem to be doing the job. WHY NOT????? Compiance
21 Compliance Is it the safety program? or Is it the management system driving the organization’s behavior? Compiance
22 It is the culture Culture is the major determinant in the behavior of an organization and it’s people Implementing a behavior-based safety process without a solid cultural foundation to support it is cause of most behavior-based safety failures It is the culture
23 Culture Culture determines behavior, both social and organizational. Culture
24 It is the Culture It is the culture
25 It is the Culture It is the culture
26 It is the Culture It is the culture
27 It is the Culture It is the culture
28 It is the Culture It is the culture
29 It is the Culture It is the culture
30 It is the Culture It is the culture
31 It is the Culture It is the culture
32 It is the Culture It is the culture
33 Culture Study Major Disasters Common Threads Space Shuttle Challenger Space Shuttle Columbia Three Mile Island Chernobyl Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Edwin L. Zebrowski, “Lessons-Learned from Man-Made Catastrophes” 1991 Culture Study
34 Culture Study The Common threads that emerge from these accidents identify cultural elements that allowed them to happen Do any of these common threads exist in your workplace? Culture Study
35 Shuttle Culture Study Unclear who was responsible for what Rigid communication channels Decision-makers too distant from the field Mindset that success is routine, fortifying a belief that everything is ok, “we’re in good shape” Shuttle Culture Study
37 Shuttle Safety Culture Safety is not a priority – it is a corporate value All levels of management accountable Safety performance measured & tied to compensation / incentives Safety integrated into all operations Shuttle Safety Culture
38 Shuttle Culture Study Safety resources and techniques were available but not used There was undefined responsibility, authority, and accountability for safety Shuttle Safety Culture
41 Shuttle Culture Study Belief that rule compliance is enough for safety (If we’re in compliance – we’re ok) Team-player emphasis with no tolerance for whistle-blowers “culture of silence” Shuttle Safety Culture
43 Shuttle Culture Study Emergency drills & procedures for severe events were lacking Design and operating features were confusing and complex but were allowed to exist although recognized as hazardous elsewhere Shuttle Safety Culture
45 Shuttle Culture Study Problems experienced from other locations not applied as “lessons learned” Lessons learned not built into the system Defects / errors became acceptable Shuttle Safety Culture
36 Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill From the article in June 20, 2010 Patriot News Harrisburg Tangled, oily mess “ … The six-member panel of Coast Guard and Minerals and Management Services officials pressed for answers about what occurred on the rig on April 20 before it exploded. They wanted to know who was in charge, and heard conflicting answers. They pushed for more insight into an argument on the rig that day between a manager for BP, the well’s owner, and one for Transocean, the rig’s owner, and asked Curt R. Kuchta, the rig’s captain, how the crew knew who was in charge.” Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
40 Tangled, oily mess continued: ’It’s pretty well understood amongst the crew who’s in charge,’ he said ‘How do they know that?’ a Coast Guard investigator asked. ‘I guess, I don’t know,’ Kuchta said. ‘But it’s pretty well – everyone knows.’” … “Amid this tangle of overlapping authority and competing interests, no one was solely responsible for ensuring the rig’s safety, and communication was a constant challenge.” Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
42 Taken from Tangled, oily mess “… Steve Bertone, the chief engineer for Transocean, wrote in his witness statement that he ran up to the bridge where he heard Kuchta screaming at a worker, Andrea Fleytas, because she had pressed the distress button without authorization. Bertone turned to another worker and asked him if he had called to shore for help but was told he did not have permission to do so. Another manager tried to give the go-ahead, the testimony said, but someone else said the order needed to come from the rig’s offshore installation manager.” Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
44 Taken from Tangled, oily mess “… …they asked for and received permission from federal regulators to exempt the drilling project from federal law that requires a rigorous type of environmental review, internal documents and federal records indicate. … Regulations have not kept up with the risks that deepwater drilling poses. …regulators have not required technology and strategies for deepwater spills to be improved.” Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
46 Taken from Tangled, oily mess “… a hodgepodge of oversight agencies granted exceptions to rules, allowed risks to accumulate and made a disaster more likely on the rig, particularly with a mix of different companies operating on the Deepwater whose interests were not always in sync.… … As early as June 2009, BP engineers had expressed concerns in internal documents about using certain casings for the well because they violated the company’s safety and design guidelines. But they proceeded with those casings.” Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill
47 Culture Study Would you agree that what was true of the NASA culture study of 1991 would also be true of a study of this oil spill in 2010? All of us need to do better - NOW Culture Study
39 Why is Culture Important? It is an atmosphere we work in that shapes our behavior Unwritten rules that define what’s really important in an organization Invisible force that largely dictates the behavior of employees & management Why is Culture Important?
48 “Perceptions are reality” The ultimate “customer” of safety is the employee Measures differences in the way employees & management think about safety Gaps in perceptions provide starting point for improving safety culture Employee Perception Survey
49 Notice to Participants : This is a confidential survey. Please do not put your name on the form. Please answer each question by circling the most accurate answer using a scale of 1 to 5. Employee Perception Survey Never Seldom Sometimes Often Always or or Almost Rarely Always 1 Unsafe conditions are corrected immediately 1 2 3 4 5 2 When I see a hazard I correct it or report it to 1 2 3 4 5 a supervisor 3 Management measures the safety efforts of 1 2 3 4 5 supervisors 4 Supervisors actively look for safety hazards 1 2 3 4 5 5 Supervisors face consequences for poor safety 1 2 3 4 5 performances 6 Management recognizes and rewards good 1 2 3 4 5 safety efforts 7 My supervisor lets me know if I am working 1 2 3 4 5 safely 8 Supervisors regularly observe employees to 1 2 3 4 5 make sure they are working safely 9 I receive positive feedback from my supervisor 1 2 3 4 5 for working safely 10 I receive adequate training about how to do my 1 2 3 4 5 job safely 11 Employees are free to bring up safety concerns 1 2 3 4 5 without worry for their job 12 I regularly hear about the importance of safety 1 2 3 4 5 from managers Employee Perception Survey
50 Behavior Based Checklist Behavior Based Checklist
51 Reactive vs. Proactive The difference between being Reactive vs. Proactive Reactive VS. Proactive
52 Safety is a separate “add-on” program Safety committee members are policemen Safety generally viewed as negative by employees Safety is integrated into all operations Safety committee members are resources & advisors Safety viewed as positive Reactive vs. Proactive Reactive VS. Proactive
53 Accidents are believed to be caused by careless employees & are unavoidable Focus on OSHA compliance Safety is dictated down to employees Accidents are seen as defects in the system & can be prevented by fixing the system Focus on continuous improvement Employees are empowered & involved in the process Reactive vs. Proactive Reactive VS. Proactive
54 What Ails Us? Symptoms Coughing Pale Skin Constricted pupils Pain Deformity Nausea/vomiting Signs Elevated temperature High/low blood sugar Rapid pulse Shallow respiration What Ails Us?
55 What Ails An Organization Symptoms Uncorrected hazards Low employee involvement Fear Lack of feedback Poor safety practices Near-misses Leaders not walking the talk Signs High incident rates High frequency rates Low safety audit scores Increased cost per employee work-hour What Ails An Organization
56 You have to know where you are before you can plot a course for improvement First Things First
57 Awareness Safety Handouts Warning Signs Recognition Written Safety & Health Program Training Safety Responsibilities Assigned Management Support Safety Inspections Accident Investigations Incentive Programs Shift Management View of Safety Management Commitment Accountability Safety Goals Established Safety Activities Measured Culture No longer a program, it’s a culture Safety is an integral part of operation Leadership & Employee involvement Low Risk High Risk Where are You?
58 3 Steps to a REAL Safety Culture To get there you must take AIM A ssess your current culture I mplement changes M aintain the culture change 3 Steps to a REAL safety Culture
59 Hazard Assessment Employers must assess the workplace to determine if hazards requiring PPE use are present or likely to be present. If hazards requiring PPE are found or are likely, employers must: - Select and have affected employees use appropriate PPE, - Inform affected employees as to which PPE was selected, - Select PPE that properly fits each affected employee. Hazard Assessment
60 Hazard Assessment Form Hazard Assessment Form
61 Housekeeping Workplaces must be kept clean, orderly and sanitary. Workroom floors must be maintained as clean and dry as possible . Housekeeping
62 Housekeeping Tips Immediately clean up anything on the floor that creates a slip hazard: water, grease, paper, dust or other debris. Keep walkways clear of boxes and other obstructions. Close cabinets used for storage when not in use. Never block fire exits or fire equipment. Housekeeping Tips
63 Housekeeping Tips Make sure stacked materials do not impede vision. Don’t store items in or on electrical panels or control boxes. Pick up and store tools in their proper location immediately after use. Keep ventilation systems clear of dust and debris and stored materials. Housekeeping Tips
64 Housekeeping Tips Make sure receptacles for waste and debris are conveniently located. Remove combustible waste often to minimize the fire hazard. Set a good example for other employees by maintaining good housekeeping in your work area. Housekeeping Tips
65 Personal Factor Warning Signs Death of spouse Marital separation Personal injury/illness Change in financial state Change in work Foreclosure of loan Son/daughter leaves home Change in work hours Change in social activity Poor overall morale Fatigue Drinking/drugs Personal Factor Warning Signs