consent quashing of FIRs in various high courts in India

constitution

1. Principal, King George's Medical College vs. Vishan Kumar Agarwal Brief Facts – · Dr. Vishan Kumar Agarwal passed his M.B.B.S. examination from Lucknow University in July 1971 and completed a one-year compulsory rotating internship thereafter. He was registered as a medical graduate by the State Medical Council. · In August 1972, he was appointed as a Medical Officer at the Civil Hospital, Lucknow, which is approved by the Medical Council for compulsory internship. · In October 1974, he applied for admission to the M.D. course in Physiology at King George's Medical College, Lucknow, which was scheduled to commence on January 1, 1975. · The Principal of the Medical College rejected Dr. Agarwal's application on the ground that he did not fulfill the qualification prescribed under Ordinance 1 of Chapter III of the Lucknow University Ordinances. Specifically, the issue was whether Dr. Agarwal had completed the required three years of work as a Medical Officer (equivalent to one year of housemanship) by the time he applied for admission in October 1974. · Dr. Agarwal had started working as a Medical Officer in August 1972, so by October 1974, he had only completed two years and two months of service, falling short of the three-year requirement.

2. Rule involved – 1. No candidate shall be eligible to appear at the examination for the degree of Doctor of Medicine or Master of Surgery unless : (a) he has obtained the degree of M.B.B.S. of the University of Lucknow.... (b) he has, after passing the M.B.B.S. examination, completed one year's compulsory rotating houseman ship.... (c) he has, after full registration, done one year's housemanship or equivalent job: Provided that for basic science, one year's demonstratorship or equivalent job in the subject will be considered equivalent to one year's housemanship. Provided also that works in the following capacities will be considered as equivalent to one year's housemanship; (i) Three years' work as a Medical Officer in a hospital approved by the Medical Council for compulsory internship. (ii). . . (iii). . . (d) He has subsequent to 1(c) put in two years' work in the subject in department concerned in the college

3. Issue – The question which arises for consideration is whether the qualification prescribed by paragraph (i) of the second proviso to Clause (c) of Ordinance 1 is required to be fulfilled by the candidate on the date on which he applies for admission to the M.D. course of studies or whether, as contended by the respondent, it is enough if that qualification is fulfilled on the date of the examination.

4. Judgement – Eligibility criteria has to be fulfilled by the candidate on the date on which he applies for admission to the M.D. or M.S. course of studies. It is not sufficient that he fulfils the requirements of these clauses on the date of the examination. But, two other people, one (Miss) Rashmi Saxena and Dr. Mrs. Ratna Prabha Gupta, were admitted by the University to the same course of post graduate studies, Though they were not qualified under the first proviso to Clause (c), she was admitted to the course by the University. It has to be borne in mind that the University granted this concession though, under Clause (c), no power is conferred upon it to relax the requirement of the period of one year which is permissible under the third proviso to Clause (d) and thus and it would be unfair to treat Dr. Agarwal differently. The Court clarified that while the interpretation of the Ordinance (requiring fulfilment of conditions at the time of application) would hold for future cases, in Dr Agarwal's case, the relaxation granted to others entitled him to the same benefit.

5. Harminder Singh vs. State of Punjab This case was decided on the lines of Sengara Singh and Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors., AIR 1984 SC 1499.

6. Facts Agitation by Police Personnel: • Petitioner a member of the Punjab Police Force, including Constables, Head Constables, Assistant Sub-Inspectors, and Sub-Inspectors, were dissatisfied with their service conditions. • This dissatisfaction led to an agitation in 1979, which included processions and demonstrations. Disciplinary Action by the State: • The State of Punjab initiated disciplinary action against approximately 1100 police personnel who participated in the agitation. • These personnel were dismissed from service on the grounds that their participation in the agitation violated the rules governing police discipline. • Additionally, criminal cases were filed against many of the agitators. Reinstatement of Some Dismissed Personnel: • After the dismissals, the State constituted a high-powered Committee consisting of senior police officers (including the Director General of Police, Deputy Inspector General of Police, and others) to review the cases of the dismissed personnel. • Based on the Committee's recommendations, the State reinstated about 1000 of the dismissed personnel and withdrew the criminal cases against them. • However, the remaining 117 personnel (the appellants in this case) were not reinstated, and their dismissals were upheld. Writ Petitions in the High Court: • The appellants filed writ petitions in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking reinstatement on the grounds that they were similarly situated to those who had been reinstated. • The High Court dismissed their petitions, citing an earlier judgment (ILR 1980 (2) P&H 122) which had rejected similar claims. The High Court did not address the fact that the situation had changed after the constitution of the Committee and the reinstatement of 1000 personnel. Writ Petitions in the High Court: • The appellants filed writ petitions in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, seeking reinstatement on the grounds that they were similarly situated to those who had been reinstated. • The High Court dismissed their petitions, citing an earlier judgment (ILR 1980 (2) P&H 122) which had rejected similar claims. The High Court did not address the fact that the situation had changed after the constitution of the Committee and the reinstatement of 1000 personnel.

7. Issue – Whether a selective dismissal was justified? Judgement – · State’s decision arbitrary and there was discriminatory treatment. The Court held that this differential treatment violated Article 14 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to equality and prohibits arbitrary state action. · The Court criticized the State for its lack of transparency and for failing to provide a reasonable basis for the differential treatment. · The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and quashed the High Court's order dismissing the writ petitions.

8. 1. The Manager, Government Branch Press and Ors. vs. D.B. Belliappa AIR 1979 SC 429 Facts – · The respondent, D.B. Belliappa , was appointed as a temporary Junior Compositor in the Government Branch Press, Mercara, Karnataka. His appointment was  temporary  and governed by the terms of his service, which allowed for termination  without notice  and  without assigning any reason . · Show Cause Notice - On December 29, 1966 , Belliappa was served with a show-cause notice alleging that he had taken copies of ballot papers related to an election outside the press premises. He was asked to explain why disciplinary action should not be taken against him. · Termination - On January 3, 1967 , Belliappa's services were terminated by an order stating that his appointment was purely temporary and could be terminated at any time without notice or reason. The termination order did not mention any specific reason for the action, nor did it refer to the allegations in the show-cause notice. He submitted a representation claiming that termination was motivated by personal animosity but same was rejected. · Respondent filed writ petition before High Court of Mysore challenging his termination. The  High Court  allowed Belliappa's writ petition, holding that his termination violated  Article 16(1)  of the Constitution, which guarantees equality of opportunity in public employment. The Court found that Belliappa was singled out for termination while his juniors were retained, and there was no valid reason for this differential treatment. · The appellants (the Manager, Government Branch Press, and others) challenged the High Court's decision in the Supreme Court .

9. Issue – Whether Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution apply to the termination of a temporary employee's services. Judgement – The Court held that Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution apply even to temporary government employees. The Court noted that Belliappa's termination was arbitrary and discriminatory, as three junior employees in the same temporary cadre were retained in service. The appellants failed to provide any valid reason or justification for treating Belliappa differently from his juniors. The show-cause notice could not be used to justify the termination, as the termination order itself stated that no reason was being assigned. The expression "matters relating to employment used in Article 16(1) is not confined to initial matters prior to the act of employment, but comprehends all matters in relation to employment both prior, and subsequent, to the employment which are incidental to the employment and form part of the terms and conditions of such employment, such as, provisions as to salary, increments, leave, gratuity, pension, age of superannuation, promotion and even termination of employment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the High Court's decision. The termination of Belliappa's services was declared void, and the appellants were directed to reinstate him with all consequential benefits.

10. 1. The General Manager, Southern Railway vs. Rangachari, [1962] 2 SCR 586 Facts – The respondent, K. Rangachari, was employed as a Court Inspector in Class III of the Southern Railway. He was initially recruited to the grade of Rs. 200–300 and was later promoted to officiate in higher grades (Rs. 260–350) on an ad hoc basis. On 16.06.1959, he was interviewed by a selection committee, and his promotion was regularized, allowing him to continue officiating in the higher grade. Reservation Policy of the Railway Board: On 27.04.1959 and 12.06.1959, the Railway Board issued circulars directing the reservation of selection posts in Class III of the railway service in favour of members of the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Scheduled Tribes (STs). These circulars provided for a quota of reservation for SCs and STs in selection posts, including the post of Court Inspector, which Rangachari held. The circulars also had a retrospective effect, applying from 04.01.1957, meaning that past promotions would be reviewed to ensure adequate representation of SCs and STs. Rangachari’s Challenge: Rangachari filed a writ petition in the Madras High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the Railway Board’s circulars. He argued that the reservation of selection posts for promotion was not covered under Article 16(4), which, according to him, only applied to initial appointments and not to promotions. He also contended that the retrospective application of the circulars would adversely affect his position, as it could lead to his reversion. High Court’s Decision: The Madras High Court ruled in favour of Rangachari, holding that Article 16(4) did not permit reservation in promotion posts. The High Court interpreted the term "posts" in Article 16(4) as referring to ex-cadre posts (posts outside the regular service cadre) and not to posts within the service. The court issued a writ of mandamus restraining the Railway Board from implementing the reservation policy for selection posts. The General Manager of the Southern Railway appealed to the Supreme Court, challenging the High Court’s decision.

11. Issue – Whether Article 16(4) of the Constitution allows reservation in promotion posts (selection posts) or is it limited to initial appointments. Whether the term "posts" in Article 16(4) includes posts within the service cadre or only ex-cadre posts. Whether the retrospective application of the reservation policy was valid. Law in question – Article 16(1) - " There shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State." Article 16 (4) – “ Nothing in this article shall prevent the State from making any provision for the reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizens which, in the opinion of the State, is not adequately represented in the services under the State. ”

12. Judgement – The Supreme Court, by a majority, held that Article 16(4) permits reservation not only in initial appointments but also in promotion posts (selection posts). The Court rejected the High Court’s interpretation that "posts" in Article 16(4) referred only to ex-cadre posts and held that it includes posts within the service cadre. The Court emphasized that the purpose of Article 16(4) was to ensure adequate representation of backward classes in all aspects of employment, including promotions, to achieve social justice. However, the Court also cautioned that reservations should not undermine the efficiency of administration, as mandated by Article 335 of the Constitution. Dissenting Opinion – Justice K.N. Wanchoo and Justice N. Rajagopala Ayyangar dissented, holding that Article 16(4) only permitted reservation in initial appointments and not in promotion posts. They argued that reservation in promotion posts could adversely affect the efficiency of administration. Final outcome – The appeal was allowed, and the High Court’s decision was reversed. The respondent’s writ petition was dismissed.

13. Roshan Lal Tandon vs. Union of India (UOI) AIR 1967 SC 1889 Facts – The petitioner, Roshan Lal Tandon, was employed as a skilled fitter in the Northern Railway. He was selected for the post of Train Examiner in Grade 'D' (scale Rs. 180–240) and was confirmed in that grade on 25.10.1959. Prior to the impugned notification, promotion to Grade 'C' (scale Rs. 205–280) was based on seniority-cum-suitability, irrespective of whether the employee was a direct recruit or promoted from the artisan staff. Railway Board’s Notification (27.10.1965): The Railway Board issued a notification altering the recruitment and promotion policy for Train Examiners. The key changes introduced by the notification were: · Recruitment to Grade 'D': Vacancies in the entry grade (Grade 'D') were to be filled exclusively by promotion from artisan staff, and no longer by Apprentice Train Examiners. · Promotion to Grade 'C': 80% of vacancies in Grade 'C' were reserved for Apprentice Train Examiners who had completed their training. These apprentices were to be directly absorbed into Grade 'C' without any selection process. 20% of vacancies were reserved for departmental Train Examiners (like the petitioner), but their promotion was to be based on selection (merit) rather than seniority-cum-suitability. · The notification also provided that existing Apprentice Train Examiners who had been absorbed in Grade 'D' before 31.03.1966 would be accommodated in Grade 'C' against the 80% quota without undergoing any selection.

14. Petitioner’s Challenge: The petitioner challenged the notification, arguing that it violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. He contended that once direct recruits and promotees (like him) were integrated into Grade 'D', they formed one class, and no discrimination could be made between them for promotion to Grade 'C'. The petitioner argued that the notification unfairly favored Apprentice Train Examiners by allowing them to be promoted to Grade 'C' without any selection, while departmental Train Examiners (like him) had to undergo a selection process for the remaining 20% of vacancies. Respondent’s Defense: The Union of India (respondent) defended the notification, stating that it was introduced to ensure that technically qualified personnel were available for the maintenance and safety of railway rolling stock. The respondent argued that the increase in the complexity of railway operations necessitated a more technically trained workforce, and the notification was aimed at achieving this goal. The respondent also claimed that the notification did not violate Articles 14 and 16, as it was based on reasonable classification.

15. Issue – Whether the Railway Board’s notification violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by discriminating between Apprentice Train Examiners and departmental Train Examiners in matters of promotion to Grade 'C'. Whether the petitioner had a contractual right to be promoted based on seniority-cum-suitability, which could not be altered to his disadvantage by the notification.

16. Judgement – The Supreme Court held that the impugned part of the notification was discriminatory and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court observed that once direct recruits and promotees were integrated into Grade 'D', they formed one class, and no discrimination could be made between them for promotion to Grade 'C'. The Court emphasized that the condition of service (promotion based on seniority-cum-suitability) applicable to the petitioner at the time of his appointment could not be altered to his disadvantage by the notification. The Court rejected the respondent’s argument that the notification was based on reasonable classification, holding that the classification between Apprentice Train Examiners and departmental Train Examiners was arbitrary and had no rational basis. The Court also held that the relationship between the government and its employees is not purely contractual but is governed by statutory rules, which can be altered unilaterally by the government. However, such alterations must not violate constitutional guarantees like Articles 14 and 16.

17. S.M. Pandit and Ors. vs. The State of Gujarat and Ors., AIR 1972 SC 252 Facts – Prior to 1950, the posts of Deputy Collectors in the Bombay Civil Service were filled partly by direct recruitment and partly by promotion from the cadre of Mamlatdars. In 1950, the Bombay Government decided to fill the posts of Deputy Collectors only by promotion from the cadre of Mamlatdars. At the same time, it introduced a system of direct recruitment to the posts of Mamlatdars. The government also decided that 50% of the posts of Deputy Collectors would be reserved for directly recruited Mamlatdars (those who were directly recruited to the Mamlatdar cadre) and the remaining 50% for promotee Mamlatdars (those who were promoted to the Mamlatdar cadre from lower ranks).

18. Bombay Civil Services Classification and Recruitment Rules “(1) Appointment to the posts of Deputy Collector shall be made either by nomination or by promotion of suitable Mamlatdars. Provided that the ratio of appointment by nomination and by promotion shall as far as possible, be 50: 50. Provided further that half the vacancies reserved for appointment by promotion shall be filled by directly recruited Mamlatdars who have put in at least seven years service in the post including the period spent on probation. (2) Appointment by nomination shall be made on the result of a competitive examination in accordance with the rules hereto appended as Annexure I, from among candidates who ; (a) are not less than 20 and more than 25 years of age ; (b) possess a Bachelor's degree in Arts, Science, Agriculture, Commerce law, Engineering or a similar or higher degree of a recognised University ; and (c) Possess adequate knowledge of Marathi or Gujarati. (3) Candidates appointed by nomination shall be on probation for a period of two years, the probation being regulated according to the rules appended hereto as annexure 'II'. (4) x x x x”

19. After the formation of the State of Gujarat in 1960, the Gujarat Government framed its own rules in 1966 for the recruitment of Deputy Collectors. These rules were similar to the 1959 Bombay Rules and provided that: 50% of the posts would be filled by direct recruitment through a competitive examination. The remaining 50% would be filled by promotion from the cadre of Mamlatdars. Half of the promotion quota (i.e., 25% of the total posts) was reserved for directly recruited Mamlatdars who had completed at least 7 years of service.

20. Gujarat Government Rules (1966): “(1) Recruitment shall be made on temporary posts which are existing since two years and which are likely to be continued for one year and more excepting those posts which have been created for special work in Revenue Departments and all permanent posts in the cadre of Deputy Collectors. (2) Appointment on this post shall be made in either of the following ways: (a) By promotion of Mamlatdars of Gujarat Civil Service Class on proved merit and efficiency. (b) By direct selection on the result of competitive examination in accordance with rules made by Government. (3) The ratio of appointment in the available vacancies, by direct selection and promotion would be 50 : 50. But half the vacancies reserved for appointment by promotion shall be filled by directly recruited Mamlatdas, who have put in at at least seven year's service including the period spent on probation.”

21. Challenge to the Rules: The respondents (original writ petitioners) challenged the second proviso to Rule 1 of the 1959 Bombay Rules and Rule 3 of the 1966 Gujarat Rules on the grounds that they violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. They argued that once directly recruited Mamlatdars and promotee Mamlatdars were integrated into the same cadre of Mamlatdars, they formed one class, and no discrimination could be made between them for promotion to the post of Deputy Collector. High Court’s Decision: The Gujarat High Court held that the impugned rules were violative of Articles 14 and 16. The High Court observed that both directly recruited Mamlatdars and promotee Mamlatdars formed one class, and the government could not discriminate between them in matters of promotion.

22. Issues – Whether the second proviso to Rule 1 of the 1959 Bombay Rules and Rule 3 of the 1966 Gujarat Rules violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by discriminating between directly recruited Mamlatdars and promotee Mamlatdars in matters of promotion to the post of Deputy Collector. Whether directly recruited Mamlatdars and promotee Mamlatdars formed one class or separate classes for the purpose of promotion.

23. Judgement – The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals and upheld the decision of the Gujarat High Court. The Court held that directly recruited Mamlatdars and promotee Mamlatdars formed one class because: · They were designated as Mamlatdars. · They had the same pay scale. · They discharged the same functions. · Their posts were interchangeable. · There was no separate seniority list for directly recruited Mamlatdars and promotee Mamlatdars. The Court emphasized that once employees from different sources (direct recruits and promotees) are integrated into one cadre, they form one class, and no discrimination can be made between them for further promotion.

24. Reserve Bank of India and Ors. vs. N.C. Paliwal and Ors, 1977 SCR (1) 377 Background of the RBI’s Administrative Structure: The RBI’s administrative machinery was divided into five groups of departments: Group I: General departments (e.g., Banking Department, Issue Department, Public Debt Division, Exchange Control Department). Group II to V: Specialized departments (e.g., Agricultural Credit Department, Economic Department, Industrial Development Bank of India). Each group had its own seniority list, and employees could only seek confirmation and promotion within their respective groups. Clerical Staff Structure: There were two grades of clerks in each group: Grade I and Grade II. The pay scales and conditions of service for Grade I and Grade II clerks were the same across all groups. Promotion from Grade II to Grade I was automatic, and Grade II clerks officiating in Grade I received an additional allowance of Rs. 25/- per month.

25. Optee Scheme of 1965: Due to greater promotional opportunities in specialized departments, employees in general departments demanded equal opportunities. In 1965, the RBI introduced the Optee Scheme, which allowed confirmed Grade II clerks and officiating Grade I clerks in general departments to opt for transfer to specialized departments. Under this scheme, 50% of vacancies in specialized departments were reserved for such transferees. The transferees were absorbed as confirmed Grade II clerks in specialized departments, and their seniority was determined based on their length of service from the date of recruitment or graduation. Combined Seniority Scheme of 1972: In 1972, the RBI introduced the Combined Seniority Scheme to integrate the clerical staff of general and specialized departments into a single seniority list.The scheme also provided for the integration of non-clerical staff with clerical staff. The scheme aimed to equalize promotional opportunities for all employees, regardless of their department. Under the scheme: Grade II clerks and Field Investigators were placed in a combined seniority list based on their date of first appointment. Grade I clerks and Assistants were placed above Grade II clerks in the seniority list. Non-clerical staff who opted to switch to the clerical cadre were given seniority based on one-third of their non-clerical service.

26. The Combined Seniority Scheme consisted broadly of two parts. One part provided for the integration of the clerical staff of the General Departments with the clerical staff of the Specialised Departments and the other, for the switchover and integration of the non-clerical staff with the clerical staff in all the Departments of the Reserve Bank Clauses (8) and (9) dealt with the first part and they provided inter alia as follows : 8. Combined Seniority between clerical staff in different departments The seniority lists of the staff mentioned below working in the general side and Specialised Departments (i.e. in all the Groups I to V of the Departmentwise grouping) will be merged into one with effect from 7th May, 1972 in accordance with the provisions of Clause 10 in the manner set out below : (a) All Clerks Grade II, Field Investigators and Clerks Grade 1 (with less than one year total officiating service) will be placed in the combined seniority list, relative seniority of an employee being fixed according to the elate of his first appointment as Clerk/Field Investigator. (b) All confirmed Clerks Grade I, Clerks Grade I officiating as such on 7th May, 1972 with one year or more total officiating service, Assistants (temporary, officiating as well as confirmed) and Field Inspectors will be placed in the combined seniority list ranking as a group above the employees listed under Sub-clause (a) above. The relative seniority of an employee will be fixed on the basis of the total length of service put in by him from the date he first started officiating as Clerk Grade I/Field Inspector after deducting therefrom periods during which he reverted as clerk Grade II/Field Investigator otherwise than on account of proceeding on leave. (c) Fixation of seniority as referred to in Sub-clauses (a) and (b) above will be subject to the proviso that the inter-se position as between two employees in the existing groupwise/departmentwise seniority lists is not disturbed to the detriment of any senior employee within the same group/department except as provided for in Clause 6 and Sub-clause (e) below. (d)x x x (e) The seniority of class III personnel having been fixed as provided for in Sub-clauses (a) and (b) above the seniority of an optee, selected clerk in the existing specialised departments Whose seniority compared to his juniors in the existing General side is adversely affected will be protected to the extent of his entitlement had he not opted/been selected under the optee/selected scheme : Provided that he shall apply in this regard in writing within one month from the date of notification of the combined seniority list. Applications for such adjustments will not be entertained after expiry of the period stipulated above.

27. 9. (i) (a) Employees officiating as Clerks Grade I on 1st May, 1972. An employee officiating as a Clerk Grade I as on 7th May 1972 will continue to officiate without prejudice to the claims of employees whose position may be above him in the combined seniority list. If he reverts, his next promotion will be according to his substantive seniority in the combined list. Reversion only on account of proceeding on leave will not be deemed as reversion for the purpose of this clause. (b) Promotion as Clerks Grade 1 between 7th May 1972 and the notification of the combined seniority list. Promotions during this period will be made with reference to the existing departmental/groupwise seniority list but without prejudice to the claims of seniors in the combined seniority list. When the combined seniority list, becomes available, a review of all such promotions made in the interregnum will be made and senior employees not officiating in the higher grades will be promoted by replacing the junior employees. The review will be completed within a period of two weeks. (c) Promotions as Clerks Grade I thereafter. Promotions will be made from the combined seniority list

28. The second part was provided for in Clauses (1) to (7) and these clauses, so far as material read thus :aa 1. Combined seniority between clerical staff and eligible non-clerical staff opting for switchover : (a) All employees in Class III non-clerical cadre substantively in the categories that have been listed as groups I, III, IV and V in the annexure (Reference is not to the departmentwise groups) who are graduates or have passed both parts of Institute of Bankers Examination will be eligible to exercise an option in accordance with Sub-clause (a) or (b) of Clause 2 to be transferred, automatically and without any screening, to posts in the clerical cadre which are vacant and are other than of a purely stop gap or short term nature, subject to Sub-clause (b) below. Actual transfer to positions involving clerical duties will be effected in a phased manner as laid down in Clause 7. (b) On such option being exercised within the period of two months as per Clause 2 (a), or one month as per Clause 2 (b) as the case may be, the position of such optee will be fixed in the combined seniority list by counting for the purpose of seniority in the clerical cadre one-third of his total non-clerical service in Class III in the Bank until 7th May 1972 or the date of acquiring the qualification i.e. the date of publication of the results of the examination, as the case may be (vide Clauses 3(a) and 3(b). 2.(a)x x x (b) Any employee who acquires the qualification for eligibility after the 7th May 1972, will have, within one month of acquiring the said qualification, to exercise his option whether he desires to switch over to the clerical cadre with his seniority being determined as per Clause I(b). The option once exercised shall be final subject to the right of revocation and with the same consequences, as at Sub-clause (a) above. Those eligible but not exercising the option within the aforesaid period of one month shall lose the right of option thereafter.

29. 3. (a) The notional seniority in the clerical cadre of those employees who are eligible for switchover on the 7th May 1972 and exercise their option under Clause 2(a) will be fixed with effect from 7th May 1972. (b) In respect of employees who acquire the eligibility qualification in future and exercise their option under Clause 2(b), their notional seniority in the clerical cadre will be fixed with effect from the date of acquiring such qualification viz. date of publication of the results of the examination. (c) Fixation of seniority whether under Sub-clause (a) or (b) will, however, be subject to the proviso that the inter-se position as between two employees in the concerned seniority list of non-clerical employees as it stood immediately before the 7th May 1972 or the date of acquiring the qualification for switchover is not disturbed to the detriment of a senior employee as in the relevant seniority list. (Illustration for fixation of seniority is Enclosure I) 4. (a) An employee opting for switchover will, for the purpose of compilation of the combined seniority list, be deemed to be a member of the clerical cadre with effect from the date as at Clauses 3 (a) and 3(b), as the case may be. (b) Until such time as he is actually transferred to the clerical cadre an optee from the non-clerical grade in which he is placed at the time of option and will accordingly remain eligible for promotion in the non-clerical cadre; Provided that an employee officiating in a category that is listed as group II, VI, VII or VIII of Annexure as the case may be confirmed in that category only if he revokes his earlier option before confirmation, for which he will have an opportunity”

30. Challenge to the Scheme: The respondents (original writ petitioners) were Grade II clerks who had opted for transfer to specialized departments under the Optee Scheme of 1965. They challenged the Combined Seniority Scheme on the grounds that it violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by: Discriminating against them in favor of employees who did not opt for transfer under the 1965 scheme. Adversely affecting their seniority and promotional opportunities. Integrating non-clerical staff with clerical staff, which they argued was arbitrary and irrational. High Court’s Decision: The Delhi High Court struck down the Combined Seniority Scheme, holding that it violated Articles 14 and 16. The High Court found that the scheme: · Discriminated against the petitioners in favor of employees who did not opt for transfer under the 1965 scheme. · Treated unequals as equals by integrating non-clerical staff with clerical staff.

31. Issues – Whether the Combined Seniority Scheme violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by: · Discriminating against employees who had opted for transfer under the Optee Scheme of 1965. · Integrating non-clerical staff with clerical staff in a manner that was arbitrary and irrational. Whether the RBI, as a State under Article 12, was bound by the equality clause in framing service rules.

32. Judgement – The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and upheld the validity of the Combined Seniority Scheme. The Court held that: · The RBI was competent to integrate different cadres (general and specialized departments) into a single cadre. The integration did not violate Articles 14 and 16, as it was a policy decision aimed at equalizing promotional opportunities for all employees. · The integration of non-clerical staff with clerical staff was not arbitrary. The rule of giving one-third weightage to non-clerical service for determining seniority was a reasonable way to balance the interests of both groups. · The scheme did not adversely affect the seniority of existing employees in a manner that required a hearing. The scheme was a policy decision, and the Court could not interfere with it merely because it caused some hardship to certain employees. · The scheme did not discriminate against employees who had opted for transfer under the Optee Scheme of 1965. The RBI was not bound to wait until all transferees were promoted before introducing the new scheme.

33. G.S. Ramaswamy and Ors. Vs. Inspector-general of Police, Mysore, 1964 SCR (6) 279 Facts – The petitioners were sub-inspectors in the former Hyderabad State. Under the Hyderabad District Police Manual, promotions to the rank of circle inspector were made from an eligibility list of sub-inspectors considered fit for promotion. The petitioners’ names were included in the eligibility list published in October 1956, before the States Reorganisation Act, 1956 came into force on November 1, 1956. The Act led to the formation of the new State of Mysore, which included territories from the former States of Bombay, Hyderabad, Madras, and Coorg. Public servants from these States, including the petitioners, were transferred to the new State of Mysore. Under Section 115 of the Act, the conditions of service of transferred employees could not be varied to their disadvantage without the approval of the Central Government. Section 116(2) allowed the new State to pass orders affecting the continuance of public servants in their posts. After the reorganization, the petitioners were promoted to the rank of circle inspectors on a temporary or officiating basis. These promotions were made based on the eligibility lists received from the former States. However, when senior circle inspectors returned from deputation or leave, the petitioners were reverted to their original rank of sub-inspectors. The petitioners challenged their reversion, arguing that it amounted to a reduction in rank and violated their rights under the Hyderabad District Police Manual and the States Reorganisation Act.

34. Petitioners’ Contentions: The petitioners claimed that their inclusion in the eligibility list gave them an indefeasible right to promotion as circle inspectors.They argued that their reversion was illegal and amounted to a reduction in rank, which was prohibited under the Constitution and the States Reorganisation Act. They also relied on Rule 2(c) of the Mysore Seniority Rules, which provided that seniority among temporary appointees should be determined by the date of continuous officiation. Rule 2 (c) of Mysore Seniority Rules is: " Seniority inter se of persons appointed on temporary basis will be determined by dates of their continuous officiating in that grade and where the period of officiation is the same the seniority inter se in the lower grade shall prevail." State’s Defense: The State argued that the eligibility list did not confer an absolute right to promotion. The petitioners were promoted on a temporary basis, and their reversion was due to exigencies of service (i.e., the return of senior officers). The State contended that the reversion did not amount to a reduction in rank since the petitioners were never confirmed as circle inspectors and had no right to the post. The State also argued that the provisional seniority list prepared after the reorganization justified the reversion of the junior-most officers.

35. Issue – Whether the inclusion of the petitioners’ names in the eligibility list gave them an indefeasible right to promotion as circle inspectors. Whether the reversion of the petitioners amounted to a reduction in rank under the Constitution or the States Reorganisation Act. Whether Rule 2(c) of the Mysore Seniority Rules applied to the petitioners’ case and prevented their reversion.

36. Judgement – The Supreme Court dismissed the petitions and upheld the reversion of the petitioners. The Court held: No Indefeasible Right to Promotion: The inclusion of the petitioners’ names in the eligibility list did not confer an absolute right to promotion. Under the Hyderabad District Police Manual, promotions were subject to annual review, and officers could be reverted if their performance was unsatisfactory. The petitioners were promoted on a temporary basis and had no right to continue in the higher post. Reversion Not a Reduction in Rank: The reversion of the petitioners did not amount to a reduction in rank because they were never confirmed as circle inspectors. The reversion was due to exigencies of service (i.e., the return of senior officers) and not due to any fault on the part of the petitioners. The Court held that reversion in such circumstances was a normal administrative action and did not violate the Constitution or the States Reorganisation Act. Rule 2(c) of Mysore Seniority Rules: The Court held that Rule 2(c) only governed the seniority of officers while they were officiating in a higher post and did not prevent their reversion. In the special circumstances of the case (i.e., the reorganization of States and the preparation of a provisional seniority list), the State was justified in reverting the junior-most officers, even if they had been promoted earlier.

37. Mohammad Shujat Ali and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors, (1975) 3 SCC 76 Facts – Prior to the reorganisation of states on 1st November 1956, the State of Hyderabad had its own Engineering Service structure, which included Supervisors and Sub-Engineers. The petitioners were Supervisors in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad, holding US or OCE certificates from the Osmania Engineering College. After the reorganisation, the Telangana region of Hyderabad was merged with the State of Andhra to form the new State of Andhra Pradesh. Integration of Services: The petitioners were integrated into the Engineering Service of Andhra Pradesh. The Hyderabad Rules governing their service conditions were replaced by the Andhra Rules, and later by the Andhra Pradesh State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1962. The petitioners contended that their conditions of service, particularly regarding promotion, were altered to their disadvantage without the prior approval of the Central Government, as required under Section 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. Promotion Dispute: Under the Hyderabad Rules, non-graduate Supervisors (like the petitioners) were eligible for promotion to 50% of the posts of Sub-Engineers. After reorganisation, the Andhra Rules and later the Andhra Pradesh Rules reduced the promotion quota for non-graduate Supervisors to 33.33%, and further to 1 out of 18 vacancies (later amended to 1 out of 24 vacancies). The petitioners argued that this reduction in promotion opportunities violated their right to equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as well as the protection afforded by Section 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act.

38. Equivalence of Qualifications: The petitioners also challenged the decision of the Government of Andhra Pradesh to treat their US and OCE certificates as inferior to LCE, LME, or LEE diplomas, which were held by other Supervisors. They contended that this classification was unreasonable and discriminatory, as it affected their chances of promotion. Judicial Proceedings: The petitioners filed writ petitions in the Andhra Pradesh High Court, which were dismissed by a Full Bench. They then approached the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution, challenging the validity of the Andhra Pradesh Rules and the orders passed by the Government of Andhra Pradesh.

39. Issues – Whether the reduction in promotion opportunities for non-graduate Supervisors violated their right to equality under Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Whether the classification of Supervisors based on educational qualifications (graduate vs. non-graduate) was reasonable and constitutional. Whether the conditions of service of the petitioners were varied to their disadvantage without the prior approval of the Central Government, in violation of Section 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. Whether the Hyderabad Rules or the Andhra Rules should govern the promotion of Supervisors after the reorganisation.

40. Judgement – The Supreme Court dismissed the writ petitions and appeals, holding that: The classification of Supervisors into graduate and non-graduate categories for promotion was reasonable and did not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The reduction in promotion opportunities for non-graduate Supervisors did not amount to a variation of their conditions of service under Section 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act, as it only affected their chances of promotion, not their right to be considered for promotion. The Central Government's approval for the changes in service conditions was implied through a memorandum dated 11th May 1957, which allowed State Governments to alter conditions of service relating to promotion. The Hyderabad Rules did not apply to promotions to the post of Assistant Engineer, as the cadre of Sub-Engineers had been abolished, and the next stage of promotion was governed by the Andhra Rules.

41. The State of Jammu and Kashmir vs. Triloki Nath Khosa and Ors., ( 1974 ) 1 SCC 19 Facts – The respondents were diploma holders in engineering and were serving as Assistant Engineers in the Jammu and Kashmir Engineering Service. They were promoted to the post of Assistant Engineers from the Subordinate Engineering Service between 1960 and 1966. Their conditions of service were initially governed by the 1939 Rules, which did not distinguish between degree holders and diploma holders for the purpose of promotion. Changes in Service Rules: In 1962, the Jammu and Kashmir Civil Services (Revised Pay) Rules were introduced, which divided Assistant Engineers into Grade I and Grade II based on their date of appointment, without any distinction based on educational qualifications. In 1968, the Revised Pay Rules were amended to introduce a Qualification Bar for diploma holders, preventing them from crossing a certain pay scale. In 1970, the Jammu and Kashmir Engineering (Gazetted) Service Recruitment Rules were introduced, which stipulated that only degree holders (those with a bachelor's degree in engineering or equivalent qualifications) with at least 7 years of service would be eligible for promotion to the post of Executive Engineers.

42. Challenge to the Rules: The respondents challenged the 1970 Rules on the grounds that they violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution by discriminating against diploma holders in matters of promotion. They argued that once direct recruits and promotees were integrated into a common cadre of Assistant Engineers, they formed a single class, and no further classification based on educational qualifications could be made for the purpose of promotion. High Court's Decision: The Single Judge of the Jammu and Kashmir High Court dismissed the petition, but the Division Bench allowed the appeal, holding that the 1970 Rules were unconstitutional as they violated the right to equality. The High Court held that once employees were integrated into a common cadre, they could not be classified further based on their educational qualifications for the purpose of promotion. Supreme Court's Appeal: The State of Jammu and Kashmir appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the classification based on educational qualifications was reasonable and had a nexus with the objective of achieving administrative efficiency.

43. Issues – Whether the classification of Assistant Engineers based on educational qualifications (degree holders vs. diploma holders) for the purpose of promotion to the post of Executive Engineers violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Whether the 1970 Rules, which made only degree holders eligible for promotion, were unconstitutional. Whether the integration of direct recruits and promotees into a common cadre of Assistant Engineers precluded any further classification based on educational qualifications for promotion

44. Judgement – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and upheld the validity of the 1970 Rules, holding that: Classification Based on Educational Qualifications: The classification of Assistant Engineers into degree holders and diploma holders for the purpose of promotion was reasonable and had a nexus with the objective of achieving administrative efficiency. The Court held that higher educational qualifications are a relevant consideration for promotion, as they are presumptive evidence of a higher mental equipment and efficiency. Integration into a Common Cadre: The Court rejected the argument that once direct recruits and promotees were integrated into a common cadre, they could not be classified further for the purpose of promotion. It held that the integration of employees into a common cadre did not preclude the State from making a reasonable classification based on educational qualifications for promotion.

45. Distinction from Roshan Lal's Case: The Court distinguished the present case from Roshan Lal Tandon vs. Union of India, where it was held that once employees were integrated into a common cadre, they could not be classified based on their source of recruitment (direct recruits vs. promotees) for the purpose of promotion. In the present case, the classification was based on educational qualifications, not on the source of recruitment, and was therefore valid. Reasonableness of Classification: The Court emphasized that the reasonableness of a classification must be judged based on whether it has a rational nexus with the objective sought to be achieved. In this case, the objective was to improve administrative efficiency, and the classification based on educational qualifications was held to be reasonable. No Retrospective Application: The Court rejected the argument that the 1970 Rules had a retrospective effect, holding that the rules operated prospectively by governing the future right of promotion of existing employees.

46. State of Mysore and Ors. vs. P. Narasing Rao, [ 1968 ] 1 SCR 407 Facts - The respondent, P. Narasing Rao, was employed as a tracer in the Engineering Department of the erstwhile Hyderabad State on a pay scale of Rs. 65 – 90. In the Hyderabad State, there was no distinction in pay scales between matriculate and non-matriculate tracers; all tracers were placed in the same pay scale. After the reorganization of states in 1956, a part of Hyderabad State became part of the new Mysore State, and the respondent was allotted to Mysore State. Reorganization of Tracers in Mysore State: In the new Mysore State, the cadre of tracers was reorganized into two grades: · Matriculate tracers (those who had passed the Secondary School Leaving Certificate (S.S.L.C.) examination) were placed in a higher pay scale of Rs. 50 - 120. · Non-matriculate tracers (those who had not passed the S.S.L.C. examination) were placed in a lower pay scale of Rs. 40 - 80. The respondent, being a non-matriculate, was given the option to either accept the new pay scale of Rs. 40 - 80 or retain his old pay scale of Rs. 65 - 90. He refused to exercise the option and insisted on being placed in the higher pay scale of Rs. 50 - 120.

47. Further Revision of Pay Scales: In 1961, the pay scales of tracers in Mysore State were further revised: · Matriculate tracers were placed in a pay scale of Rs. 80 - 150. · Non-matriculate tracers were placed in a pay scale of Rs. 70 - 110. The respondent claimed that he was entitled to the higher pay scale of Rs. 80 - 150, but his claim was rejected. Writ Petition in the High Court: The respondent filed a writ petition in the Mysore High Court, challenging the classification of tracers based on educational qualifications and seeking a writ of mandamus to fix his pay in the higher pay scale applicable to matriculate tracers. The High Court allowed the writ petition, holding that the classification violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution, as there was no valid reason for making a distinction between matriculate and non-matriculate tracers, since both were doing the same kind of work Appeal to the Supreme Court: The State of Mysore appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the classification based on educational qualifications was reasonable and had a nexus with the objective of achieving administrative efficiency.

48. Issues – Whether the classification of tracers into matriculate and non-matriculate categories for the purpose of pay scales violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Whether the classification based on educational qualifications was reasonable and had a rational nexus with the objective of achieving administrative efficiency. Whether the conditions of service of the respondent were adversely affected by the classification, in violation of Section 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956.

49. Judgement – The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the Mysore High Court, holding that: Classification Based on Educational Qualifications: The classification of tracers into matriculate and non-matriculate categories was reasonable and did not violate Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court held that higher educational qualifications (such as passing the S.S.L.C. examination) are a relevant consideration for fixing higher pay scales, as they are presumptive evidence of a higher mental equipment and efficiency. The Court emphasized that Articles 14 and 16 do not prohibit reasonable classification, and the classification in this case had a rational nexus with the objective of achieving administrative efficiency. Conditions of Service: The Court rejected the respondent's argument that his conditions of service were adversely affected by the classification, in violation of Section 115(7) of the States Reorganisation Act, 1956. The Court held that the classification did not adversely affect the respondent's conditions of service, as he was given the option to retain his old pay scale or accept the new pay scale. Promotion Opportunities: The Court noted that both matriculate and non-matriculate tracers were eligible for promotion based on merit-cum-seniority, and the respondent's seniority was not affected by the classification.

50. Ramana Dayaram Shetty vs. International Airport Authority of India and Ors., ( 1979 ) 3 SCC 489 Facts – The International Airport Authority invited tenders for the establishment of a second-class restaurant and two snack bars at the International Airport in Bombay. The tender submitted by the fourth respondent was accepted. However, it was later discovered that the fourth respondent did not meet the tender condition requiring at least five years’ experience as a registered second-class hotelier. Despite this, the Airport Authority reaffirmed the fourth respondent’s tender, citing his significant experience with reputed clients, even though he was not a registered second-class hotelier. Ramana Dayaram Shetty, the appellant, initially considered submitting a tender but refrained from doing so due to his failure to meet the specified conditions in the invitation. Upon learning that the fourth respondent’s tender was accepted despite non-compliance with the stipulated conditions, Shetty filed a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Bombay High Court. The petition was dismissed, prompting Shetty to appeal to the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution.

51. Issue – Whether the International Airport Authority is considered “State” under Article 12 of the Indian Constitution? Whether the tender confirmed by the respondents is constitutionally valid?

52. Judgement – The Supreme Court in Ramana Dayaram Shetty v The International Airport Authority & Others first addressed whether the International Airport Authority qualified as “State” under Article 12, as this determination would establish the maintainability of the petition. Fundamental rights violations can be claimed only against the State or its instrumentalities. The Court examined the International Airport Authority Act, 1971 and found that the Central Government exercised substantial control over the Authority’s affairs, thereby classifying it as “State” under Article 12. Validity of the Tender: The Court in R D Shetty v Airport Authority concluded that the acceptance of the tender was a violation of Article 14. The Court’s reasoning included: Non-Compliance with Tender Conditions: The tender conditions explicitly required that the bidder must have at least five years’ experience as a registered second-class hotelier, which the fourth respondent did not meet. The tender process did not stipulate that the general capability to run a second-class hotel would suffice; rather, it laid down specific eligibility criteria which could not be disregarded by the Airport Authority. Arbitrary Decision-Making: The Airport Authority had reserved the right to reject tenders and negotiate directly, but this power did not extend to selectively waiving conditions for one bidder while adhering to them for others. The Authority’s decision to accept the fourth respondent’s tender despite non-compliance with essential criteria constituted arbitrary action, thereby violating the principle of equality enshrined in Article 14. Violation of Equal Opportunity: The petitioner, Ramana Dayaram Shetty, was effectively denied a fair opportunity to compete for the tender due to the arbitrary relaxation of conditions for the fourth respondent.

53. Radha Charan Patnaik vs. State of Orissa and Ors., AIR 1969 Ori 237 Facts – Radha Charan Patnaik, an advocate of the Orissa High Court, challenged the advertisement dated 11.09.1963 issued by the Registrar of the Orissa High Court inviting applications for the post of District Judge under Rules 8(2)(ii) and 6 of the Orissa Superior Judicial Service Rules, 1963. Rules Challenged: Rule 8(2)(ii): Prescribed that candidates for direct recruitment to the Senior Branch of the Service must be between 35 and 45 years of age. Rule 6(2): Disqualified married women from being appointed to the service, stating that no married woman shall be entitled as of right to be appointed, and if a woman appointed to the service marries later, the State Government may ask her to resign if the efficiency of the service so requires.

54. Rule 8 (2) is this; "8 (2) Candidates for direct recruitment to the Senior Branch of the Service shall- (i) be at least 7 years standing at the Bar, and (ii) not be under 35 and over 45 years of age." It is in conformity with this Rule that, in paragraph 2 of the advertisement, it was stated thus: "A candidate for the post shall- X X X (ii) be at least 7 years standing at the Bar by the 22nd October, 1968; (iii) not be under 35 and over 45 years of age on the 22nd October, 1968." Rule 6(2) - "6 (2). No married woman shall be entitled as of right to be appointed to the Service and where a woman appointed to the service subsequently marries, the State Government may, if the maintenance of the efficiency of the service so requires, call upon her to resign."

55. Petitioner’s Age: The petitioner was about 34 years old at the time of the advertisement and argued that the age restriction violated Article 233(2) of the Constitution, which only requires a candidate to be an advocate or pleader with 7 years of standing, without any age limit. Petitioner’s Arguments: The age restriction of 35-45 years under Rule 8(2)(ii) was unreasonable and violated Article 233(2), which only requires 7 years of standing at the Bar. The rule was also discriminatory and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The disqualification of married women under Rule 6(2) was unconstitutional as it was based on sex discrimination. Intervention : A lady advocate intervened in the case, challenging Rule 6(2) on the grounds that it discriminated against married women, barring them from applying for the post of District Judge.

56. Judgement – Validity of Rule 8(2)(ii): The court held that the age restriction of 35-45 years was a reasonable classification for ensuring the maturity and efficiency of District Judges. The court found that the rule did not violate Articles 14 and 16 as it was based on a rational nexus with the object of maintaining an efficient judiciary. Validity of Rule 6(2): The court struck down Rule 6(2) as unconstitutional and discriminatory because it disqualified married women from appointment while allowing married men to be appointed. The court held that the disqualification based on sex was unreasonable and violated Article 14.

57. State of Mysore vs. S.R. Jayaram , [ 1968 ] 1 SCR 349 Facts – The Public Service Commission conducted a competitive examination for recruitment to Class I posts, including Assistant Commissioners in the Mysore Administrative Service and Assistant Controllers in the Mysore State Accounts Service. The respondent, S.R. Jayaram, ranked 4th in the merit list and indicated his preference for the post of Assistant Commissioner, which had better career prospects compared to the post of Assistant Controller. Appointment Dispute: Despite ranking 4th, the respondent was appointed as an Assistant Controller, while candidates ranked 5th to 8th were appointed as Assistant Commissioners. The respondent challenged this decision, arguing that the Government’s discretion under Rule 9(2) was arbitrary and violated his right to equality and equal opportunity in public employment.

58. Rules- "8. List of successful candidates in the examination. - The names of candidates successful in the examination shall be published in the Mysore Gazette, by the Commission in the order of merit. 9. Appointment of Probationers. - (1) Subject to the rules regarding reservation of posts for backward classes contained in the Government Orders Nos. GAD 26 ORR 59, dated the 13th May, 1959, and No. GAD 32 ORR 59, dated the 18th July, 1959, and the provisions of sub-rule (2) the candidates successful in the examination whose names are published under rule 8 shall be appointed as Probationers to Class I posts in the order of merit, and thereafter to Class II posts in the order of merit. (2) While calling for applications, the candidates will be asked to indicate their preferences as to the cadres they wish to join. The Government, however, reserves the right of appointing to any particular cadre, any candidate whom it considers to be more suitable for such cadre."

59. High Court Decision: The Mysore High Court held that the Government had the power under Rule 9(2) to decide the cadre of appointment but found that the Government had not applied its own mind and had merely acted on the recommendation of the Public Service Commission. The High Court directed the Government to reconsider the respondent’s appointment. Appeal to Supreme Court: The State of Mysore appealed the High Court’s decision, arguing that the Government had the discretion under Rule 9(2) to appoint candidates to any cadre it deemed suitable. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that Rule 9(2) was unconstitutional as it allowed arbitrary exercise of power, violating Articles 14 and 16. Issue – The respondent challenged the latter part of Rule 9(2), which gave the State Government the power to appoint candidates to any cadre it deemed suitable, arguing that it violated Articles 14 (Right to Equality) and 16 (Equality of Opportunity in Public Employment) of the Constitution.

60. Judgement – Validity of Rule 9(2): The Supreme Court held that the latter part of Rule 9(2), which gave the Government the power to appoint candidates to any cadre based on its discretion, was unconstitutional The Court ruled that this provision vested arbitrary power in the Government, allowing it to ignore the merit and preferences of candidates, thereby violating Articles 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution. Merit-Based Appointments: The Court emphasized that the purpose of a competitive examination is to ensure equality of opportunity and to recruit the most meritorious candidates. The Court found that Rule 9(2) undermined this objective by allowing the Government to bypass the merit list and make arbitrary appointments. Respondent’s Appointment: The Court held that the respondent, having ranked 4th in the merit list, had a legitimate claim to the post of Assistant Commissioner. The Court directed the State Government to appoint the respondent as an Assistant Commissioner with effect from 20.10.1962 (the original date of his appointment as Assistant Controller) and to grant him all consequential benefits.

61. Abid Hussain V/s. Union of India.‚Ä®1987 (1) S.L.R. 495. Facts – Employees in the Western Railway, Central Railway, and Eastern Railway were being paid overtime allowances for extra duty hours exceeding 96 hours in two weeks. However, employees in the Northern Railway performing the same duties were denied such overtime allowances. Petitioners’ Argument: The petitioners contended that there was no justification for the differential treatment between employees of the Northern Railway and those of the other three Railways. They argued that the denial of overtime allowances was discriminatory and violated their right to equality under the Constitution. Judgement – The Court found that there was no rational basis for denying overtime allowances to employees in the Northern Railway while granting them to employees in the other three Railways. The differential treatment was held to be arbitrary and discriminatory, violating Article 14 of the Constitution. The Court directed the Union of India and the Railway Administration to pay overtime allowances to the Air-conditioned Coach-In-Charges-Attendants in the Northern Railway with effect from 1-7-1984. The payment was to be made on the same basis as it was being paid to employees in the Western Railway, Central Railway, and Eastern Railway.

62. 1. C.B. Muthamma vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., [ 1980 ] 1 SCR 668 Facts – The petitioner alleged that she was denied promotion to Grade I of the IFS due to gender discrimination. She claimed that she faced hostile discrimination throughout her career, including at the time of her recruitment, when the Chairman of the Union Public Service Commission (UPSC) tried to dissuade her from joining the IFS and gave her low marks in the interview. She also highlighted that she was required to give an undertaking at the time of joining the service that she would resign if she got married. Discriminatory Rules: Rule 8(2) of the Indian Foreign Service (Conduct and Discipline) Rules, 1961, required a woman member of the service to obtain government permission before marrying. It also allowed the government to force her to resign if her family and domestic commitments were deemed to interfere with her duties. Rule 18(4) of the Indian Foreign Service (Recruitment, Cadre, Seniority, and Promotion) Rules, 1961, stated that no married woman shall be entitled as of right to be appointed to the service.

63. Rule 8(2) of the Indian Foreign Service (Conduct & Discipline) Rules, 1961 “In cases where Sub-rule (1) does not apply, a woman member of the service shall obtain the permission of the Government in writing before her marriage is solemnised. At any time after the marriage, a woman member of the Service may be required to resign from service, if the Government is satisfied that her family and domestic commitments are likely to come in the way of the due and efficient discharge of her duties as a member of the service.” Rule 18 of the Indian Foreign Service (Recruitment Cadre, Seniority and Promotion) Rules, 1961 “(1).... (2).... (3).... (4) No married woman shall be entitled as of right to be appointed to the service.”

64. Judgement – Gender Discrimination in Service Rules: The Court held that Rule 8(2) and Rule 18(4) were discriminatory and violated Articles 14, 15, and 16 of the Constitution. The Court noted that these rules reflected a misogynistic mindset and were a hangover of outdated masculine culture.

65. P. Savita and Ors. vs. Union of India (UOI) and Ors., AIR 1985 SC 1124 Facts – Prior to the Third Pay Commission's recommendations, all Senior Draughtsmen were paid the same scale of pay. The Third Pay Commission recommended dividing Senior Draughtsmen into two groups with different pay scales based on seniority: · 50% of Senior Draughtsmen were placed in the higher pay scale (Rs. 425-700). · The remaining 50% were placed in the lower pay scale (Rs. 330-560). Appellants’ Grievances: The appellants argued that all Senior Draughtsmen performed the same duties and discharged identical functions, and therefore, there was no justification for the differential pay scales. They contended that the classification was based solely on seniority and not on any intelligible differentia such as qualifications, experience, or nature of work.

66. Government’s Justification: The government defended the classification, stating that it was based on seniority-cum-fitness and that such differentiation was permissible under the law. However, the government failed to provide any rational basis for the classification or explain why Senior Draughtsmen performing the same work should be paid differently. High Court’s Decision: The Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed the appellants’ petition, holding that the government had the discretion to fix different pay scales for different groups of employees. The High Court relied on earlier Supreme Court judgments, including Kishori Mohanlal Bakshi vs. Union of India, which held that the abstract doctrine of equal pay for equal work had no connection with Article 14.

67. Judgement – The Supreme Court held that the classification of Senior Draughtsmen into two groups with different pay scales was arbitrary and violated Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. The Court emphasized that equal pay for equal work is a constitutional principle under Article 39(d) (Directive Principles of State Policy) and must be read in conjunction with Article 14. No Intelligible Differentia: The Court found that there was no rational basis for the classification, as all Senior Draughtsmen performed the same duties and discharged identical functions. The classification was based solely on seniority, which the Court held was insufficient to justify differential pay scales for employees performing the same work.