Crisis management case studies

1. ًابحرم

ًابحرم
WelcomeWelcome

2. Crisis ManagementCrisis Management
Khaled A. AnterKhaled A. Anter

3. Let’s start with getting Let’s start with getting
to know each otherto know each other

4. Ground rulesGround rules
Start at 9:00Start at 9:00
First break at 10:30 am (15 min.)First break at 10:30 am (15 min.)
Second break at 12:00 pm (45 min. include. Second break at 12:00 pm (45 min. include.
Prayer)Prayer)
Finish at 2:00 pmFinish at 2:00 pm
Cell. Phones silent/no calls during sessionCell. Phones silent/no calls during session
Stop presenter & ask if you have a questionStop presenter & ask if you have a question
Relax & have fun Relax & have fun

5. Henry FordHenry Ford
(1863-1947(1863-1947((
““you can not build a reputation you can not build a reputation
based on what you are going to dobased on what you are going to do””

6. What is a crisisWhat is a crisis??
A crisis (from the Greek κρίσις - krisis; plural:
"crises"; adjectival form: "critical") is any event
that is, or expected to lead to, an unstable and
dangerous situation affecting an individual, group,
community or whole society.
More loosely, it is a term meaning 'a testing time'
or an 'emergency event'.

7. Definition of a crisis
Crisis is the situation of a complex
system (family, economy, society) when the
system functions poorly, an immediate decision is
necessary, but the causes of the dysfunction are
not known.

8. What is a crisis managementWhat is a crisis management??
Crisis management is the process by which an
organization deals with a major event that
threatens to harm the organization, its
stakeholders, or the general public.

9. Three most common elements to
crises
 (a) a threat to the organization,
(b) the element of surprise,
(c) a short decision time.

10. Venette definition
Argues that "crisis is a process of transformation
where the old system can no longer be
maintained.“
Therefore the fourth defining quality is the need
for change.
If change is not needed, the event could more
accurately be described as a failure or incident

11. Risk assessment Vs. Crisis managementRisk assessment Vs. Crisis management
Risk assessmentRisk assessment involves assessing potential
threats and finding the best ways to avoid those
threats, Crisis management involves dealing with
threats before, during, and after they have
occurred.

12. Crisis ManagementCrisis Management
It is a discipline within the broader context of
management consisting of skills and techniques
required to identify, assess, understand, and cope
with a serious situation, especially from the
moment it first occurs to the point that recovery
procedures start.

13. Management
misconduct
Deception
Skewed
Management
values
malevolence
Confrontation
Technological
Natural
Types
of
Crises

14. Phases of a CrisisPhases of a Crisis
Signal detection Signal detection
Preparation and prevention Preparation and prevention
Containment and damage control Containment and damage control
Business recovery Business recovery
Learning Learning

15. Models and theories associated with Models and theories associated with
crisis managementcrisis management
Management Crisis PlanningManagement Crisis Planning
Contingency planningContingency planning
Business continuity planningBusiness continuity planning
Structural-functional systems theoryStructural-functional systems theory
Diffusion of innovation theoryDiffusion of innovation theory
Role of apologies in crisis managementRole of apologies in crisis management
Crisis leadershipCrisis leadership
Unequal human capital theoryUnequal human capital theory

16. Case studiesCase studies
““1010 casescases””

17. Case - ICase - I
TylenolTylenol®® (J&J) - 1982 (J&J) - 1982

18. IncidentIncident
Seven individuals died Seven individuals died
inin metropolitan Chicago metropolitan Chicago
65 milligrams of cyanide 65 milligrams of cyanide

19. ApproachApproach
Recalled and destroyed 31 million capsules Recalled and destroyed 31 million capsules
Cost of $100 million Cost of $100 million
CEO, James Burke, appeared in television ads CEO, James Burke, appeared in television ads
News conferences informing consumers of the News conferences informing consumers of the
company's actions company's actions
Tamper-resistant packaging was rapidly Tamper-resistant packaging was rapidly
introduced introduced
$100,000 reward offered by Johnson & Johnson $100,000 reward offered by Johnson & Johnson
on murdereron murderer’’s heads head

20. ConclusionConclusion
Tylenol remains a top seller, controlling about Tylenol remains a top seller, controlling about
35% of the pain killer market in North America 35% of the pain killer market in North America

21. Case - IICase - II
Odwalla FoodsOdwalla Foods - 1996 - 1996

22. IncidentIncident
Apple juice causes an Apple juice causes an
outbreak of outbreak of E. coli E. coli infectioninfection
Unpasteurized Unpasteurized
Forty-nine cases were Forty-nine cases were
reported reported
Death of a small childDeath of a small child
16 criminal counts of 16 criminal counts of
distributing adulterated juice distributing adulterated juice
OdwallaOdwalla pled guilty pled guilty

23. ApproachApproach
Within 24 hours, Within 24 hours, OdwallaOdwalla conferred with the FDA and conferred with the FDA and
Washington state health officials Washington state health officials
Schedule of daily press briefingsSchedule of daily press briefings
Press releases which announced the recall Press releases which announced the recall
Expressed remorse, concern and apology Expressed remorse, concern and apology
Detailed symptoms of Detailed symptoms of E. coli E. coli poisoningpoisoning
Developed effective thermal processesDeveloped effective thermal processes
All of these steps were communicated through close All of these steps were communicated through close
relations with the media and through full-page relations with the media and through full-page
newspaper ads newspaper ads

24. ConclusionConclusion
Despite a net loss for most of 1997, Odwalla worked to Despite a net loss for most of 1997, Odwalla worked to
rehabilitate its brand name. In addition to advertising its rehabilitate its brand name. In addition to advertising its
new safety proceduresnew safety procedures, Odwalla released its line of food , Odwalla released its line of food
bars (its first solid food product line) and entered the bars (its first solid food product line) and entered the
$900$900  million fruit bar market.million fruit bar market.
  Another new product was the Another new product was the Future ShakeFuture Shake, a "liquid , a "liquid
lunch" aimed at younger consumers. Because of these lunch" aimed at younger consumers. Because of these
efforts, Odwalla was again profitable by the end of efforts, Odwalla was again profitable by the end of
1997, reporting a profit of $140,000 for the third 1997, reporting a profit of $140,000 for the third
quarter quarter

25. Case - IIICase - III
Pepsi -Pepsi - 1993 1993

26. IncidentIncident
Claims of syringes being Claims of syringes being
found in cans of diet found in cans of diet
PepsiPepsi
Pepsi urged stores not to Pepsi urged stores not to
remove the product from remove the product from
shelves shelves
Situation investigated Situation investigated
led to an arrest led to an arrest

27. ApproachApproach
Pepsi made public and then followed with their first Pepsi made public and then followed with their first
video news release video news release
First video showing the production process to First video showing the production process to
demonstrate that such tampering was impossible within demonstrate that such tampering was impossible within
their factories their factories
A second video news release displayed the man arrestedA second video news release displayed the man arrested
A third video news release showed surveillanceA third video news release showed surveillance  where a where a
woman was caught replicating the tampering incident woman was caught replicating the tampering incident

28. ApproachApproach
The company simultaneously publicly worked with the The company simultaneously publicly worked with the
FDA during the crisisFDA during the crisis
The corporation was completely open with the public The corporation was completely open with the public
throughout throughout
Every employee of Pepsi was kept aware of the detailsEvery employee of Pepsi was kept aware of the details
After the crisis had been resolved, the corporation ran a After the crisis had been resolved, the corporation ran a
series of special campaigns designed to thank the public series of special campaigns designed to thank the public
for standing by the corporation, Coupons for further for standing by the corporation, Coupons for further
compensation compensation

29. ConclusionConclusion
This case served as a model for how to handle This case served as a model for how to handle
other crisis situations other crisis situations

30. Case - IVCase - IV
BhopalBhopal disaster 1984 disaster 1984

31. IncidentIncident
One of the world's One of the world's
worstworst  industrial catastrophesindustrial catastrophes
A leak ofA leak of  methyl methyl
isocyanateisocyanate  gas and other gas and other
chemicals from the plantchemicals from the plant
Exposure of hundreds of Exposure of hundreds of
thousands of people thousands of people
Confirmed a total of 3,787 Confirmed a total of 3,787
deathsdeaths
leak caused 558,125 injuries leak caused 558,125 injuries

32. ApproachApproach
Illustrates the importance of incorporatingIllustrates the importance of incorporating  cross-cross-
cultural communicationcultural communication  in crisis management plansin crisis management plans
Operating manuals printed only in English is an Operating manuals printed only in English is an
extreme example of mismanagement extreme example of mismanagement
Indicative of systemic barriers to information diffusionIndicative of systemic barriers to information diffusion
Symbolic intervention can be counter productive (Symbolic intervention can be counter productive (Union Union
CarbideCarbide’’s upper management arrived in India but was unable to assist in the s upper management arrived in India but was unable to assist in the
relief efforts because they were placed under house arrest by the Indian relief efforts because they were placed under house arrest by the Indian
governmentgovernment) )

33. ConclusionConclusion
Seven ex-employees, including the former UCIL Seven ex-employees, including the former UCIL
chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing chairman, were convicted in Bhopal of causing
death by negligencedeath by negligence and sentenced to and sentenced to two years two years
imprisonmentimprisonment and a and a fine of about $2,000fine of about $2,000 each, each,
the maximum punishment allowed by law. An the maximum punishment allowed by law. An
eighth former employee was also convicted, but eighth former employee was also convicted, but
died before judgment was passed died before judgment was passed

34. Case - VCase - V
FordFord and and FirestoneFirestone Tire and Tire and
Rubber CompanyRubber Company 2000 2000  

35. IncidentIncident
15-inch Wilderness AT, 15-inch Wilderness AT,
radial ATX and ATX II tire radial ATX and ATX II tire
treads were separating treads were separating
from the tire core from the tire core
leading to grisly, leading to grisly,
spectacular crashes spectacular crashes
These tires were mostly These tires were mostly
used on the Ford Explorer, used on the Ford Explorer,
the world's top-selling the world's top-selling
(SUV) (SUV)

36. ApproachApproach
First, they blamed consumers for not inflating First, they blamed consumers for not inflating
their tires properly their tires properly
Then they blamed each other for faulty tires and Then they blamed each other for faulty tires and
faulty vehicle design faulty vehicle design
Then they said very little about what they were Then they said very little about what they were
doing to solve a problem that had caused more doing to solve a problem that had caused more
than 100 deaths than 100 deaths
They got called to Washington to testify before They got called to Washington to testify before
Congress Congress

37. ConclusionConclusion
Bridgestone/Firestone recalled 6.5 million tires Bridgestone/Firestone recalled 6.5 million tires
Total cost = 1 Billion $ Total cost = 1 Billion $

38. Case - VICase - VI  
Exxon Valdez oil spill Exxon Valdez oil spill
19891989  

39. IncidentIncident
Spilled millions of Spilled millions of
gallons of crude oil into gallons of crude oil into
the waters off Valdez the waters off Valdez ––
AlaskaAlaska
The size of the spill is The size of the spill is
estimated at 40,900 to estimated at 40,900 to
120,000 m3 120,000 m3
Hundreds of miles of Hundreds of miles of
coastline were polluted coastline were polluted
and salmon spawning and salmon spawning
runs disrupted runs disrupted

40. ApproachApproach
Exxon, did not react quickly in terms of dealing with Exxon, did not react quickly in terms of dealing with
the media and the public the media and the public
The company had neither a communication plan nor a The company had neither a communication plan nor a
communication team in place to handle the event communication team in place to handle the event
Exxon established its media center in Valdez, a location Exxon established its media center in Valdez, a location
too small and too remote to handle the onslaught of too small and too remote to handle the onslaught of
media attentionmedia attention
The company acted The company acted defensivelydefensively in its response to its in its response to its
publicpublic
Even laying blame, at times, on other groups such as Even laying blame, at times, on other groups such as
the the Coast Guard Coast Guard

41. ConclusionConclusion
Litigation was filed on behalf of 38,000 litigants Litigation was filed on behalf of 38,000 litigants
A jury awarded plaintiffs US$287 million in A jury awarded plaintiffs US$287 million in
compensatory damages and US$5 billion in compensatory damages and US$5 billion in
punitive damagespunitive damages
As of 2010 there are approximately 98As of 2010 there are approximately 98  cubic cubic
metres (3,500metres (3,500  cucu  ft) or 26,000 gallons) of Valdez ft) or 26,000 gallons) of Valdez
crude oil still in Alaska's sand and soil crude oil still in Alaska's sand and soil

42. Case - VIICase - VII
TheThe  ChernobylChernobyl disaster disaster
26 April 1986 26 April 1986

43. IncidentIncident
Reactor four suffered a Reactor four suffered a
catastrophic power increase catastrophic power increase
leading to explosions in its leading to explosions in its
core core
This dispersed large This dispersed large
quantities of radioactive fuel quantities of radioactive fuel
and core materials into the and core materials into the
atmosphere atmosphere
The accident occurred during The accident occurred during
an experiment scheduled to an experiment scheduled to
test a potential safetytest a potential safety

44. ApproachApproach
The reactor had not been encased by any kind of The reactor had not been encased by any kind of
hardhard  containment vesselcontainment vessel
Because of the inaccurate low readings, the Because of the inaccurate low readings, the
reactor crew chiefreactor crew chief  assumed that the reactor was assumed that the reactor was
intactintact
The readings of another dosimeter brought in by The readings of another dosimeter brought in by
04:30 were dismissed under the assumption that 04:30 were dismissed under the assumption that
the new dosimeter must have been defective the new dosimeter must have been defective

45. ApproachApproach
"We didn't know it was the reactor. No one had "We didn't know it was the reactor. No one had
told us.told us.““
LieutenantLieutenant  Volodymyr Pravik, who died on 9 May 1986 ofVolodymyr Pravik, who died on 9 May 1986 of  acute acute
radiation sicknessradiation sickness

46. ConclusionConclusion
The The distrustdistrust that many people (both within and that many people (both within and
outside theoutside the  USSR) had in theUSSR) had in the  SovietSoviet  authoritiesauthorities
Over 30 years is estimated at US$235Over 30 years is estimated at US$235  billion (in billion (in
2005 dollars)2005 dollars)
5% - 7% of government spending in Ukraine 5% - 7% of government spending in Ukraine
still related to Chernobyl still related to Chernobyl

47. Case - VIIICase - VIII
FukushimaFukushima I nuclear accidents I nuclear accidents
20112011

48. IncidentIncident
Following the9.0 Following the9.0
magnitudemagnitude  Tōhoku Tōhoku
earthquake and earthquake and
tsunamitsunami  on 11 March on 11 March
20112011
Experts consider it to be Experts consider it to be
the second largest the second largest
nuclear accident after nuclear accident after
thethe  Chernobyl disasterChernobyl disaster
More complex as all More complex as all
reactors are involved reactors are involved

49. ApproachApproach
Tokyo drinking water exceeded the safe level for Tokyo drinking water exceeded the safe level for
infants infants
Prompting the government to distribute bottled Prompting the government to distribute bottled
water to families with infants water to families with infants
A nuclear emergency was declared by the A nuclear emergency was declared by the
Government at 19:03 on 11 March Government at 19:03 on 11 March
Initially a 2Initially a 2  km, then 10km, then 10  kmkm  evacuation zone was evacuation zone was
ordered ordered

50. ApproachApproach
Later Prime MinisterLater Prime Minister  issued instructions that issued instructions that
people within a 20people within a 20  km (12 mile) zone around the km (12 mile) zone around the
plant must leaveplant must leave
Urged that those living between 20Urged that those living between 20  km and km and
3030  km from the site to stay indoors km from the site to stay indoors
Six weeks after the crisis began, plans were Six weeks after the crisis began, plans were
announced for a large-scale study of the announced for a large-scale study of the
environmental and health effects of radioactive environmental and health effects of radioactive
contamination from the nuclear plant contamination from the nuclear plant

51. ConclusionConclusion
A private report by journalists and academics as well as an
investigation by TEPCO.
The panel said the government and TEPCO failed to prevent the
disaster not because a large tsunami was unanticipated, but
because they were reluctant to invest time, effort and money in
protecting against a natural disaster considered unlikely.
 "The utility and regulatory bodies were overly confident that
events beyond the scope of their assumptions would not occur . .
. and were not aware that measures to avoid the worst situation
were actually full of holes," the government panel said in its final
report.

52. Case-IX 
ديعصلا راطق قيرح ةثداح
رصم – طايعلا
20رياربف 2002م 

53. ثادحدلاثادحدلا
مقر راطقلا ناك832 تعلدنا دق ,‏ناوسأ يلإ ةرهاقلا نم هجوتملا 
 موي حابص نم ةيناثلا يف ةعاسلا هتابرع يدحإ يف نارينلا20 
 رياربف2002.دئاقلا تيم ةيرق دنع طايعلا ةنيدم هترداغم بقع ,‏م 
 ,‏راطقلل ةريخيلا ةبرعلا نم ثعبني افيثك اناخيد اودهاش مهنأ نوجانلا دكأ
 ,‏ةريخيلا تابرعلا يقاب يلإ ةعرسب تدتماو اهب نارينلا تعلدنا مث
 ديع ةلطع ءاضقل نيرفاسملا باكرلاب ةسدكم تناك يتلاو
.رصم ديعص يف مهارقو مهزكارم يف ىحضحلا
 جراخي مهسفنأب اوقلأو ,‏ةيجاجزلا ذفاونلا رسكب باكرلا ضعب ماقو
 .ةيميهاربلا ةعرت يف مهقرغ وأ مهعرصم يف ببست امم ,‏راطقلا
 تابرعلا نع ةيماملا عبسلا تابرعلا لصفب راطقلا دئاق ماقو
 ةيشخي هتلحر لصاو مث ,‏ثداحلاب ةينعملا تاهجلا رطخيأو ,‏ةقرتحملا
.ةديدج ةثراك ثودحو هفقوت

55. لوانتلالوانتلا
 هترايز بقع ـ ءارزولا سلجم سيئر ديبع فطاع روتكدلا دكأ
 قيرحلا نأ ـ نيباصملا يلع نانئمطلل يزكرملا طايعلا يفشتسم
 ببسب راطقلا تابرعب لعتشازاجاتوب دقوم راجفنا يدحإ هيفوب يف 
 .تابرعلا يقاب يلإ نارينلا تدتماو ,‏راطقلاب تابرعلا
 نيسمخيو ةئامثلث نم رثكأ اهتيحضح حار يتلا ديعصلا راطق ةثداح دعت
خيرات يف اهعون نم أوسلا ارفاسم  ذنم يأ ةيرصملا ةيديدحلا ككسلا
.اماع نيسمخيو ةئم نم رثكأ
 موي ةرهاقلا يف تأدب27 ليربإ 2002 ةمكاحم 11 ةئيهب لوؤسم 
 أوسأ يف لامهلاب تاماهتا نوهجاوي ذإ رصم يف ةيديدحلا ككسلا
 ةايحب ىدوأ يرصم راطق ثداح361. اصخش 
.يريمدلا ميهاربإ يرصملا لقنلا ريزو ةلاقتسا ىلإ ةثراكلا تدأ

56. Case - XCase - X
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill The Deepwater Horizon oil spill ––
20102010
““The Macondo incidentThe Macondo incident””
Gulf of MexicoGulf of Mexico

57. IncidentIncident
It is the largest accidental marine oil It is the largest accidental marine oil
spill in the history of the petroleum spill in the history of the petroleum
industry industry
The spill stemmed from a sea-floorThe spill stemmed from a sea-floor  oil oil
gushergusher  that resulted from the April 20, that resulted from the April 20,
2010,2010,  explosion ofexplosion of  Deepwater Deepwater
HorizonHorizon
BPBP released a 193-page report on its released a 193-page report on its
web site. The report says web site. The report says BPBP
employees and those of employees and those of TransoceanTransocean
did not correctly interpret a pressure did not correctly interpret a pressure
test, and both companies neglected test, and both companies neglected
signs such as a pipe called signs such as a pipe called a risera riser  losing losing
fluid. It also says that while BP did not fluid. It also says that while BP did not
listen to recommendations listen to recommendations
byby  HalliburtonHalliburton  for more centralizersfor more centralizers

58. ApproachApproach
Short-term efforts:Short-term efforts:
Remotely operated underwater Remotely operated underwater
vehicles to close the blowout vehicles to close the blowout
preventerpreventer  valves on the well headvalves on the well head
Placing a 125-tonne Placing a 125-tonne
(280,000(280,000  lb)lb)  containment containment
domedome  (which had worked on leaks in (which had worked on leaks in
shallower water) over the largest leak shallower water) over the largest leak
and piping the oil to a storage vessel and piping the oil to a storage vessel
on the surface on the surface
Positioning a riser insertion tube into Positioning a riser insertion tube into
the wide burst pipe the wide burst pipe

59. ApproachApproach
TransoceanTransocean's's  Development Driller IIIDevelopment Driller III  started drilling a first started drilling a first
relief well, relief well,   GSF Development Driller IIGSF Development Driller II  started drilling a started drilling a
second relief second relief
Each relief well is expected to cost about $100Each relief well is expected to cost about $100  millionmillion
BPBP began pumping cement from the top, sealing that part began pumping cement from the top, sealing that part
of the flow channel permanently of the flow channel permanently
Two weeks later, it was uncertain when the well could be Two weeks later, it was uncertain when the well could be
declared completely sealeddeclared completely sealed
Even in properly sealed wells, the cementEven in properly sealed wells, the cement
plugs can fail over the decades and metal plugs can fail over the decades and metal
casings that line the wells can rust casings that line the wells can rust

60. ConclusionConclusion
At first, At first, BPBP files a 52 files a 52  page page exploration and exploration and
environmental impact plan environmental impact plan for thefor the  MacondoMacondo well. The well. The
plan stated that it was "plan stated that it was "unlikely that an accidental surface or unlikely that an accidental surface or
subsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activitiessubsurface oil spill would occur from the proposed activities””
Mark E. HafleMark E. Hafle, a senior drilling engineer at BP, warns , a senior drilling engineer at BP, warns
that the metal casing for thethat the metal casing for the  blowout preventerblowout preventer  might might
collapse under high pressure collapse under high pressure
TheThe  White HouseWhite House  oil spill commission released a final oil spill commission released a final
report detailing faults by the companies that led to the report detailing faults by the companies that led to the
spillspill
The panel found that The panel found that BPBP, , HalliburtonHalliburton, and , and
TransoceanTransocean had attempted to work had attempted to work more cheaply more cheaply and and
thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakage thus helped to trigger the explosion and ensuing leakage

61. ConclusionConclusion

BPBP released a statement in response to this, saying, released a statement in response to this, saying, ""Even prior Even prior
to the conclusion of the commissionto the conclusion of the commission’’s investigation, BP instituted s investigation, BP instituted
significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk significant changes designed to further strengthen safety and risk
management “ management “
TransoceanTransocean, however, blamed , however, blamed BPBP for making the decisions for making the decisions
before the actual explosion occurred and government officials before the actual explosion occurred and government officials
for permitting those decisionsfor permitting those decisions
HalliburtonHalliburton stated that it was acting only upon the orders of stated that it was acting only upon the orders of BPBP
when it injected the cement into the wall of the well when it injected the cement into the wall of the well
HalliburtonHalliburton also blamed the governmental officials and also blamed the governmental officials and BPBP. It . It
criticized criticized BPBP for its failure to run a for its failure to run a  cement bond logcement bond log  testtest
In the report, In the report, BPBP was accused of nine faults was accused of nine faults

62. ““Better management of decision-making processes Better management of decision-making processes
within within BPBP and other companies, better and other companies, better
communication within and between communication within and between BPBP and its and its
contractors and effective training of key contractors and effective training of key
engineering and rig personnel would have engineering and rig personnel would have
prevented the prevented the MacondoMacondo incident incident””
TheThe White HouseWhite House oil spill oil spill
commission panel final reportcommission panel final report

63. Lessons learned in Lessons learned in
Crisis ManagementCrisis Management

64. Lessons learned in Crisis Lessons learned in Crisis
ManagementManagement
A study identified organizations that recovered and A study identified organizations that recovered and
even even exceededexceeded pre-catastrophe stock price pre-catastrophe stock price
The average cumulative impact onThe average cumulative impact on  shareholder shareholder
valuevalue  for the for the recoverersrecoverers was was 5% plus 5% plus on their original on their original
stock valuestock value
The The non-recoverersnon-recoverers remained more or less unchanged remained more or less unchanged
between days 5 and 50 after the catastrophe, but between days 5 and 50 after the catastrophe, but
suffered a net negative cumulative impact of almost suffered a net negative cumulative impact of almost
15%15% on their stock price up to on their stock price up to one year one year afterwards. afterwards.

65. ImportantImportant
““It is highly recommended to those who It is highly recommended to those who
wish to engage their senior management in wish to engage their senior management in
the value of crisis managementthe value of crisis management””

66. Crisis as an OpportunityCrisis as an Opportunity

67. Crisis as an OpportunityCrisis as an Opportunity
Management must move from a mindset that Management must move from a mindset that manages
crisis to one that to one that generates crisis leadership
Most executives focus on communications andMost executives focus on communications and  public public
relationsrelations  as a as a reactive strategyreactive strategy
Potential damage to reputation can result from the Potential damage to reputation can result from the
actual management of the crisis issue actual management of the crisis issue
Companies may stagnate as theirCompanies may stagnate as their  risk risk
managementmanagement  group identifies whether a crisis is group identifies whether a crisis is
sufficiently sufficiently ““statistically significantstatistically significant””

68. Crisis leadershipCrisis leadership
  ””Immediately addresses both the damage Immediately addresses both the damage
and implications for the companyand implications for the company’’s present s present
and future conditions, as well as and future conditions, as well as
opportunities for improvementopportunities for improvement””  

69. Government and crisis managementGovernment and crisis management
United States United States National GuardNational Guard  at the federal level at the federal level
U.S.U.S.  Federal Emergency Management Federal Emergency Management
AgencyAgency  ((FEMAFEMA) within the) within the  Department of Department of
Homeland SecurityHomeland Security  administers theadministers the  National National
Response PlanResponse Plan  ((NRPNRP) )
This plan is intended to This plan is intended to integrate public and integrate public and
private responseprivate response by providing a common by providing a common
language and outlining language and outlining

70. Government and crisis managementGovernment and crisis management
The The NRPNRP is a companion to the is a companion to the National National
Incidence Management SystemIncidence Management System
FEMAFEMA offers free web-based training on the offers free web-based training on the
National Response Plan National Response Plan through the Emergency through the Emergency
Management InstituteManagement Institute
Common Alerting ProtocolCommon Alerting Protocol  ((CAPCAP) is a relatively ) is a relatively
recent mechanism that facilitates crisis recent mechanism that facilitates crisis
communication across different mediums and communication across different mediums and
systems “A consistent emergency alert format “

71. RememberRemember!!

75. The Crisis Management ToolboxThe Crisis Management Toolbox
I.Individual Preparedness Plan Checklist
II.Coordination Authority Public Checklist
III.Command Centers
IV.Incident Command System (Common Terminology)
V.Designating a Spokesperson, backup spokesperson
VI.Media Policies and Procedures (Practicing Tough
Questions/Prepared Statements)
VII.Drill, drill then drill !

76. Practice Model - IPractice Model - I

77. ةيلهللا زاغلا ةكرشةيلهللا زاغلا ةكرش
رصم – زاغ) ةيلهللا زاغلا ةكرش ةرادإ سلجم سيئر تنأرصم – زاغ) ةيلهللا زاغلا ةكرش ةرادإ سلجم سيئر تنأ))
 ةحفاكم ةطخ لمع حرتقي ةكرشلاب ناملا لوئسم كيلإ رضح ةحفاكم ةطخ لمع حرتقي ةكرشلاب ناملا لوئسم كيلإ رضح
 ةصاخلا زاغلا عيزوت ةكبش نم زاغ بيرست ةلاحل تامزأ ةصاخلا زاغلا عيزوت ةكبش نم زاغ بيرست ةلاحل تامزأ
كتكرشبكتكرشب
؟ةمزلا ةذهل لامتحإ ةهجاومل لعفت اذام؟ةمزلا ةذهل لامتحإ ةهجاومل لعفت اذام

78. Practice Model - IIPractice Model - II

79. ةينطولا تارايسلا ةعانص ةكرشةينطولا تارايسلا ةعانص ةكرش
ساش) ةينطولا تارايسلا ةكرشب ةملسلا ةرادإ ريدم تنأساش) ةينطولا تارايسلا ةكرشب ةملسلا ةرادإ ريدم تنأ))
 دوقولا تاساود ةمزأ نم ثدح ام ليصافتل كتءارق دعب دوقولا تاساود ةمزأ نم ثدح ام ليصافتل كتءارق دعب
 ةهجاوم ةطخ لمع تررق ةيملاعلا اتويوت ةكرشب ةبيعملا ةهجاوم ةطخ لمع تررق ةيملاعلا اتويوت ةكرشب ةبيعملا
كتعانص هجاوت دق ىتلا تامزاكتعانص هجاوت دق ىتلا تامزا
 عضت فيك و اهضرتفت فوس ىتلا تاهلويرانيسلا ىهل ام عضت فيك و اهضرتفت فوس ىتلا تاهلويرانيسلا ىهل ام
؟ اهططخ؟ اهططخ

80. Practice Model - IIIPractice Model - III

81. خيشلا مرش – زوريفلا عجتنمخيشلا مرش – زوريفلا عجتنم
خيشلا مرشب ةحايسلل عجتنم حاتتفإب تمقخيشلا مرشب ةحايسلل عجتنم حاتتفإب تمق
  تفلكت هب اهعضوب تمق ىتلا ةيلكلا تارامثتسلا تفلكت هب اهعضوب تمق ىتلا ةيلكلا تارامثتسلا3030 نويلم  نويلم 
ضورقلا لاومأ نم ىرصم ةينجضورقلا لاومأ نم ىرصم ةينج
تآجافملا نم كرامثتسإ ىمحت نأ ديرتتآجافملا نم كرامثتسإ ىمحت نأ ديرت
؟لعفت اذام؟لعفت اذام

82. Last wordsLast words

83. Thank youThank you
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