Establishing of intergrity windows evaluation OW's.ppt

les règles internationales de mise en œuvre du plan de gestion intégrité

1. Establishing Integrity Operating Establishing Integrity Operating
Windows (IOW’s)Windows (IOW’s)
IPEIA ConferenceIPEIA Conference
February 2, 2006February 2, 2006
Banff, AlbertaBanff, Alberta
John Reynolds
Steamboat Springs, CO, USA
Recently retired from
Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.

2. 2
Outline for this PresentationOutline for this Presentation
•The 10 Shell (US) Process Safety Initiatives (PSI)
•The Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) Initiative
•Corrosion Control Documents (CCD)
•Integrity Operating Windows (IOW)
•Standard and Critical IOW’s
•Integration of IOW’s into the 10 PSI’s
•Training of Operators on IOW’s
•The Pressure Equipment Integrity Pyramid

3. 3
Ten Process Safety Initiatives Ten Process Safety Initiatives
(PSI) – Initiated in May, 2000(PSI) – Initiated in May, 2000
•Pressure Equipment Integrity (PEI) - IOW creation process
•Ensure Safe Production (ESP) - IOW monitoring process
•Operator Training and Procedures - IOW knowledge
transfer
•Management Of Change (MOC) - IOW change process
•Investigations – 3 Levels up to RCA
•Protective Instrument Systems (IPF – “SIL”)
•Reliability Centered Maintenance (RCM)
•Causal Learning
•Audits and Assessments
•Process Hazards Analysis (PHA)

4. 4
Process Safety Initiative Process Safety Initiative
MetricsMetrics
•Each of the 10 PSI’s were required to have four main
metrics to track implementation progress (10 X 4 = 40
metrics total)
•For the PEI process safety initiative we tracked:
-Numbers of Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s) completed
-Numbers of process units with RBI completed
-Numbers of process units with all IOW’s implemented
-Numbers of operators trained on their CCD & IOW’s
•But there was only one bottom line metric for the
aggregate of the ten process safety initiatives –>
numbers of process safety incidents per
year

5. 5
Results of the Process Safety Results of the Process Safety
InitiativesInitiatives
YTD Totals
19
23
20
15
9
3
0
5
10
15
20
25
199920002001
200220032004Numbers of
Process Safety
Incidents
in last 6 years –
A real success
story

6. 6
Primary Aspects of the Primary Aspects of the
Pressure Equipment Integrity Pressure Equipment Integrity
(PEI) Initiative(PEI) Initiative
•Identify all necessary Integrity Operating Windows
(IOW’s)
•Create OEMI Teams (Operations - Engineering -
Maintenance - Inspection) in each operating area to
create and manage CCD’s and IOW’s
•Create Corrosion Control Documents (CCD’s), which
document all process IOW’s
•Train operators on the CCD and IOW’s
•Implement IOW’s and Risk-Based Inspection (RBI)
•Implement PEI Focused Asset Integrity Reviews (FAIR
®
) to
monitor progress of the PEI Initiative

7. 7
ESP
RBI
CCD’s & IOW’s
OEMI Teams
101 Essential Elements
PEI PSI PEI PSI
PyramidPyramid

8. 8
Corrosion Control Documents – Corrosion Control Documents –
ContentsContents
•Relatively comprehensive documents for managing equipment degradation
•Description of the process unit and process conditions
•Shutdown and start up conditions that may affect corrosion and degradation
mechanisms, as well as normal operation
•Process Flow Diagram (PFD) and Materials and Corrosion Diagram (modified
PFD showing construction materials)
•Corrosion Control Loops (areas of similar corrosion within the PFD) e.g.
overhead system, slurry system, reflux system, etc.
•All potential types of degradation (and fouling) in each process unit and
history of problem areas
•Quantitative and predictive models for degradation mechanisms
•Vital corrosion control procedures, injections, inhibitors, etc.
•Recommended inspection & corrosion monitoring, process changes,
construction materials changes, etc.
•Integrity Operating Windows (IOW’s)

9. 9
Corrosion Control Documents – Corrosion Control Documents –
ConstructionConstruction
•Unit specific CCD’s completed by an OEMI team
which includes:
-Site corrosion engineer/specialist
-Unit process engineer
-Unit inspector
-One or more experienced unit operations representatives
-Facilitator (knowledgeable / experienced corrosion engineer)
•Final document represents an agreement
between the OEMI Team involved and clearly
benefits by the synergistic interaction of all
team members

10. 10
Establishing Integrity Operating Establishing Integrity Operating
WindowsWindows •Historical operating, maintenance & inspection records
•Design data; lab data; operating data
•Metallurgical and corrosion data and modules
•Process chemistry and engineering knowledge
•Reactive chemistry knowledge
•Recommended practices (industry and company)
•Process and corrosion modeling tools
•Subject matter expertise and experience (heavy dose)
Result: Reasonable, practical IOW’s – not too conservative
– not non-conservative

11. 11
Integrity Operating WindowsIntegrity Operating Windows
Operating
Window
Operating
Window

12. 12
Integrity Operating Windows – Integrity Operating Windows –
ExamplesExamples
•Typically fall into 2 categories:

•Physical
-Various limits on pressures and temperatures, including design,
operating, partial pressures, dew points, dry points, heating and
cooling rates, delta P, etc.
-Flow rates, injection rates, inhibitor dosage, amperage levels on Alky
contactor motors, slurry content, hydrogen flux, vibration limits,
corrosivity probes, etc.
•Chemical
-pH, water content, acid gas loading, sulfur content, salt content in
crude, NH
4
HS content, NH
3
content, TAN, acid strength, amine
strength, inhibitor concentration, chloride contamination levels,
oxygen content, etc.

13. 13
IOW Example – Hot Hydrogen IOW Example – Hot Hydrogen
ServiceService•Mechanical design window
set by the design code e.g.
ASME
•IOW set by material limit for
high temperature hydrogen
attack in API RP 941
•SOR process temperature
definitely within the IOW
•EOR process temperature
possibly beyond the IOW –
need to know the hydrogen
partial pressure and
duration of EOR conditions
Temperature
Pressure
Mechanical Design Limits
SOR Process Temp
EOR Process Temp IOW
Based on H2 pp Based on
Total Pressure

14. 14
Integrity Operating Windows – Integrity Operating Windows –
Typical Numbers per Operating UnitTypical Numbers per Operating Unit
(before & after an intensive review)(before & after an intensive review)
•Typically start with 5 -10 IOW’s that may
already be in place, along with other
operating quality variable limits
•Typically end up with 30 – 50 IOW’s with
about
5 -10% being critical limits (requires drastic
and/or immediate action), and the rest being
standard limits (requires attention within a
specified timeframe to get back into control)

15. 15
Definitions: Definitions: IOW Critical LimitIOW Critical Limit
A limit at which the operator has one last
opportunity to return the process to a safe
condition and, if exceeded, could result in
one of the following in a fairly short
timeframe:
•A Catastrophic Release of Hydrocarbons or Hazardous fluids
•Loss of Containment
•Non-orderly Shutdown
•Significant Environmental Impact
•Other Unacceptable Risk

16. 16
Critical IOW Limit – Critical IOW Limit –
ExamplesExamples•Boiler Feed Water Level
-Lost of boiler feed water level could quickly cause boiler tube
rupture
•Hydroprocess Reactor Temperature
-Metal temperatures below the MDMT could give rise to brittle
fracture
•Heater Tube Skin Temperature
-Tube could rupture quickly if overheated, caused, for example, by
a no flow or hot spot condition.
•Sulfuric Acid Strength in Alkylation
-Too low acid strength could cause runaway reaction

17. 17
Definition: Standard LevelDefinition: Standard Level
A limit that, if exceeded over a defined
period of time, could cause one of the
following to eventually occur:
•A catastrophic release of hydrocarbons or hazardous fluids
•Loss of containment
•Non-orderly shutdown
•A negative impact to the long term unit performance and
its ability to meet turnaround run length
•Excessive financial impact

18. 18
Standard Level ExamplesStandard Level Examples
•REAC NH
4HS Concentration
-Corrosion of the air cooler and downstream piping
•Heater Tube Skin Temperature
-Metallurgical creep could lead to eventual tube failure.
•Crude Fractionator Dew Point Temperature
-Sustained operation below dew point could cause damage to
fractionator internals or potential loss of containment.
•pH of Crude Tower Overhead
-Sustained operation below standard pH level could lead to
corrosion of tubing and piping and potential loss of
containment.
•Desalter Outlet Salt Content
-Sustained operation above standard level could lead to
corrosion and potential loss of containment

19. 19
Integrity Operating Windows – Integrity Operating Windows –
SuccessesSuccesses•In the CCD review, one IOW team noticed that a previous project
had installed the wrong construction materials – immediate
inspection revealed significant HTHA damage
•An operator on the team disagreed with the unit process
engineer and said that “we actually operate much hotter than you
think because we use the by-pass” – immediate inspection
revealed significant localized damage
•A corrosion engineer questioned the higher level of NH
4HS in the
REAC system of an HCU – immediate inspection revealed a
previously-missed localized spot of significant corrosion
•An IOW was set on NH
4HS concentration at another refinery,
which then began to take routine lab samples – soon thereafter
discovered the concentration was too high and took steps to
increase wash water and adjust feedstock

20. 20
Operator Training on CCD’s and Operator Training on CCD’s and
IOW’sIOW’s
•Level 1
-Awareness and Overview of the PEI Process Safety Initiative
-SSA Video / CCD / RBI / OEMI / Operator Training
•Level 2
-Introduction to Corrosion Control Documents
-What they contain; where they’re stored; how to use them
•Level 3
-Details contained within each operator’s unit-specific CCD
-Specific IOW’s and the reasoning behind them
-What can happen if the IOW is exceeded

21. 21
ESP
RBI
CCD’s & IOW’s
OEMI TEAMS
101 Essential Elements
PEI PSI PEI PSI
PyramidPyramid

22. 22
Implementing Risk-Based Inspection Implementing Risk-Based Inspection
(RBI)(RBI)•Another major part of our pressure equipment integrity
process safety initiative
•We use both a Shell developed more qualitative RBI (S-
RBI), as well as the more quantitative API RBI, both
successfully for different needs at different sites
•But RBI will not be covered today – a topic for another
day, if you like
•Suffice it to say that any inspection program, be it
risk-based, condition-based, or time-based may not
be fully reliable without effective identification and
implementation of integrity operating windows
(IOW’s)

23. 23
Integration of CCD’s, IOW’s & Integration of CCD’s, IOW’s &
RBIRBI
Confidence in plant integrity
Creating the CCD:
 Type of degradation
 Location of degradation
 Susceptibility to degradation
 Degradation rates
IOW limits:
Determination & management of the operating limits to avoid degradation
RBI planning:
Method of inspection
Where to inspect
Frequency of
inspection
Feedback

24. 24
Integration of Multiple Work Processes Integration of Multiple Work Processes
Leading To Sustained Asset IntegrityLeading To Sustained Asset Integrity
Design and
Materials Selection
Corrosion
Control & IOW’s
Risk-Based
Inspection
Long Term Asset Integrity
Asset integrity management is a balancing process
designed to achieve lowest total cost of ownership
Focused Asset Integrity ReviewsFocused Asset Integrity Reviews

25. 25
Along with Asset Integrity Comes Along with Asset Integrity Comes
Proven Better Process Safety Proven Better Process Safety
PerformancePerformance
YTD Totals
19
23
20
15
9
3
0
5
10
15
20
25
199920002001
200220032004
Numbers of Process
Safety Incidents
in last 6 years in
Shell (US) Refining
Operations – Facts,
not just hopes for
the future

26. 26

27. 27

28. Shell Experience with Integrity Shell Experience with Integrity
Operating Windows (IOW’s)Operating Windows (IOW’s)
Time for DiscussionTime for Discussion
[email protected]
Recently retired from
Shell Global Solutions (US) Inc.