GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION

Linkage Master Programmes Double Degree FIA-UNIBRAW and Japanese Universities Universitas Brawijaya 2006

1. THE THEORY OF PUBLIC THE THEORY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Linka
g
e Master Pro
g
rammes
gg
Double Degree FIA-UNIBRAW and Japanese Universities
Universitas Brawijaya
Lecturer : Prof. Dr. Ir. Ginandjar Kartasasmita
[email protected]
www.
g
inand
j
ar.com
gj
Assistant Professor :Dr.Ir. Deddy S. Bratakusumah, BE, MURP, M.Sc.
[email protected]

2. GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION

3. INSTITUTION
INSTITUTIONS ARE STRUCTURES
AND
MECHANISMS
OF SOCIAL ORDER
AND
COOPERATION
GOVERNING THE
COOPERATION
GOVERNING THE
BEHAVIOR
OF TWO OR MORE
INDIVIDUALS
.
INSTITUTION IS COMMONLY APPLIED TO CUSTOMS AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS CUSTOMS AND BEHAVIOR PATTERNS IMPORTANT TO A SOCIETY
, AS WELL AS
TO PARTICULAR FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS
OF
GOVERNMENT
AND
PUBLIC SERVICE
OF
GOVERNMENT
AND
PUBLIC SERVICE
.
(WIKIPEDIA, 2006)
3

4. INSTITUTION
THE ELEMENTS OF
INSTITUTION ARE
:
THE ELEMENTS OF
INSTITUTION ARE
:
1. VALUE,
2. STRUCTURE
,,
3. PROCESS
4

5. ORGANIZATION
THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITATIVE THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHORITATIVE AND HABITUAL PERSONAL
INTERRELATIONS IN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM
(WALDO, 1955)
5

6. ORGANIZATION
ORGANIZATIONS ARE SOCIAL UNITS ORGANIZATIONS ARE SOCIAL UNITS (OR HUMAN GROUPINGS)
DELIBERATELY CONSTRUCTED AND
RECONSTRUCTED TO SEEK SPECIFIC GOALS
(ETZIONI, 1961)
6

7. ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS
1. DIVISIONS OF LABOR, POWER, AND
COMMUNICATION RESPONSIBILITIES,
DIVISIONS WHICH ARE NOT RANDOM OR DIVISIONS WHICH ARE NOT RANDOM OR TRADITIONALLY PATTERNED, BUT DELIBERATELY PLANNED TO ENHANCE THE DELIBERATELY PLANNED TO ENHANCE THE REALIZATION OF SPECIFIC GOALS,
2.
THE PRESENCE OF ONE OR MORE POWER
2.
THE PRESENCE OF ONE OR MORE POWER CENTERS WHICH CONTROL THE CONCERTED EFFORTS OF THE ORGANIZATION AND DIRECT T
HEM TOWARD ITS GOALS; THESE POWER
CENTERS ALSO MUST STRUCTURE, WHERE
NECESSARY TO INCREASE ITS EFFICIENCY
7
NECESSARY
,
TO INCREASE ITS EFFICIENCY
,

8. ORGANIZATION CHARACTERISTICS
3. SUBSTITUTION OF PERSONNEL, i.e,
UNSATISFACTORY PERSONS CAN BE
REMOVED AND OTHERS ASSIGN THEIR
TASKS THE ORGANIZATION CAN ALSO TASKS
.
THE ORGANIZATION CAN ALSO
RECOMBINE ITS PERSONNEL THROUGH TRANSFER AND PROMOTION. TRANSFER AND PROMOTION.
(ETZIONI, 1961)
8

9. ORGANIZATION THEORIES
1.THE STRUCTURE OF AN ORGANIZATION
AFFECTS ITS BEHAVIOR,
2.THE STRUCTURE OF AN ORGANIZATION
CS O O S O S
AFFE
C
T
S
THE BEHAVI
O
R
O
F IT
S
W
O
RKER
S
,
PARTICIPANTS, AND PERHAPS EVEN CASUAL
MEMBERS MEMBERS
,
3.ORGANIZATIONAL PROCESSES ALSO AFFECT
ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL ORGANIZATIONAL AND INDIVIDUAL BEHAVIOR,
9

10. ORGANIZATION THEORIES
4.ORGANIZATIONS CAN BE RATIONALLY (OR
SCIENTIFICALLY
)
DESIGNED STRUCTURALLY
)
AND PROCEDURALLY TO ACHIEVE THEIR GOALS IN AN EFFECTIVE AND EFFICIENT MANNER MANNER
,
5.ORGANIZATIONS CAN USEFULLY BE
CONCEPTUALIZED AS SYSTEMS THAT CONCEPTUALIZED AS SYSTEMS THAT RESPOND TO AND AFFECT THEIR ENVIRONMENTS AND SEEK TO GAIN ENVIRONMENTS AND SEEK TO GAIN INFORMATION ABOUT THE EFFICACY OF
THOSE RESPONSES
10

11. ORGANIZATION THEORIES
6.ORGANIZATIONS MAY HAVE CULTURES THAT
PARTIALLY DEFINE HOW THEIR MEMBERS
CONCEPTUALIZE ORGANIZATIONAL
ACTIVITY AND THE ENVIRONMENT
(MARCH, 1965)
11

12. ORGANIZATION THEORIES
IN GENERAL, ORGANIZATIONAL THEORY IS “GENERIC” IN THE SENSE THAT IT DOES
NOT MAKE DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS AND PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS ALL ORGANIZATIONS SHARE SOME ALL ORGANIZATIONS SHARE SOME CHARACTERISTICS, AND NEARLY ALL SIGNIFICANT ONES ARE REGULATED BY SIGNIFICANT ONES ARE REGULATED BY GOVERNMENTS IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER
(
BOZEMAN
,
1987
)
12
(,)

13. PUBLIC ORGANIZATION
PUBLIC SECTOR (OR GOVERNMENTAL) ORGANIZATIONS FACE LEGA
L
-
CONSTITUTIONAL. POLITICAL. AND
MARKET CONDITIONS THAT DISTINGUISH MARKET CONDITIONS THAT DISTINGUISH THEM FROM MOST PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS ORGANIZATIONS
(ROSENBLOOM & KRAVCHUCK 2005) (ROSENBLOOM & KRAVCHUCK
,
2005)
13

14. ORGANIZATION STRUCTURE
Directorate General Directorate
/
Bureau
/
Division Section
14

15. WHAT IS BUREAUCRACY?
LITERALLY RULE BY OFFICIALS; THE LITERALLY
,
RULE BY OFFICIALS; THE
ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY OF THE
STATE OR, MORE BROADLY, A RATIONAL
AND RULE-GOVERNED MODE OF ORGANIZATION
(HEYWOOD, 2002)
15

16. BUREAUCRACY CONCEPTS
1.SPECIALIZED JURISDICTIONS, OFFICES,
AND TASKS THAT IS A DIVISION OF AND TASKS
,
THAT IS
,
A DIVISION OF
LABOR AND AUTHORITY REGARDING THE
ACHIEVEMENT OF THE ORGANIZATION’S
GOALS,
2.A HIERARCHY OF AUTHORITY TO
COORDINATE THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
SPECIALIZED OFFICES AND INTEGRATE
THEIR JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY THEIR JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
16

17. BUREAUCRACY CONCEPTS
3
A CAREER STRUCTURE IN WHICH
3
.
A CAREER STRUCTURE IN WHICH INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEES OF THE
BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION MOVE
THROUGH VARIOUS SPECIALIZATIONS AND RANKS. MOVEMENT IS BASED ON MERIT AND/OR SENIORITY MERIT AND/OR SENIORITY
17

18. BUREAUCRACY CONCEPTS
4.A BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURE THAT
TENDS TO BE PERMANENT IT REMAIN TENDS TO BE PERMANENT
.
IT REMAIN
INTACT REGARDLESS OF THE FLOW OF
MEMBERS IN AND OUT OF IT. SOCIETY
BECOMES DEPENDENT ON THE BUREAUCRACY’S FUNCTIONING TO THE EXTENT THAT CHAOS RESULTS IF IT IS EXTENT THAT CHAOS RESULTS IF IT IS DESTROYED,
5
BY IMPLICATION BUREAUCRACIES ARE
5
.
BY IMPLICATION
,
BUREAUCRACIES ARE
LARGE ORGANIZATIONS.
(
WEBER
,
1947
)
18
(,)

19. BUREAUCRACY FUNCTIONS
PROCEDURALLY, BUREAUCRACY IS †IMPERSONAL OR DEHUMANIZING †
FORMALISTIC
†
FORMALISTIC
†RULE-BOUND †
HIGHLY DISCIPLINED
†
HIGHLY DISCIPLINED
(ROSENBLOOM & KRAVCHUCK 2005) (ROSENBLOOM & KRAVCHUCK
,
2005)
19

20. THE POWER POSITION OF THE POWER POSITION OF BUREAUCRACY
BUREAUCRACY IS †HIGHLY EFFICIENT †POWERFU
L
†EVER-EXPANDING
(ROSENBLOOM & KRAVCHUCK 2005) (ROSENBLOOM & KRAVCHUCK
,
2005)
20

21. INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS RELATIONS

22. IGR CONCERN
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATION WERE THUS CONCERNED WITH
POLICY
,
THAT IS
,
WITH
,,
CHOOSING COURSES OF ACTION AND ASSESING THEIR PRACTICAL EFFECTS
(WRIGHT, 1988)
22

23. CENTRE-PERIPHERY RELATIONSHIPS
†
FEDERAL SYSTEMS
†
FEDERAL SYSTEMS
†UNITARY SYSTEMS
23

24. FEDERAL STATES
CENTRAL /
FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT
SOVEREIGNITY
(
SEPARATE
CHECKS AND
(
SPHERES OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY)
CHECKS AND BALANCES
PROVINCIAL / STATE GOVERNMENT
(ADAPTED FROM HEYWOOD 2002)
24

25. FEDERALISM
A TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF A TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF POWER BASED ON THE SHARING OF SOVEREIGNITY BETWEEN CENTRAL SOVEREIGNITY BETWEEN CENTRAL (NATIONAL) AND PERIPHERAL ONES
25

26. UNITARY STATES
CENTRAL
GOVERNMENT
SOVEREIGNITY (CONSTITUTIONAL SUPREMACY
)
DEVOLVED
/

)
/
REGIONAL BODIES
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
(ADAPTED FROM HEYWOOD 2002)
26

27. UNITARY
THESE VEST SOVERIGN POWER IN A THESE VEST SOVERIGN POWER IN A SINGLE, NATIONAL INSTITUTION
27

28. DECENTRALIZATION AND LOCAL AUTONOMY AUTONOMY

29. WHAT IS DECENTRALIZATION?
DECENTRALIZATION IS THE TRANSFER OF DECENTRALIZATION IS THE TRANSFER OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR PUBLIC FUNCTIONS FROM THE CENTRAL FUNCTIONS FROM THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TO SUBORDINATE OR QUASI-
INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT
ORGANIZATIONS AND/OR THE PRIVATE
SECTOR
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
29

30. WHAT IS DECENTRALIZATION?
DECENTRALIZATION IS THE EXPANSION OF DECENTRALIZATION IS THE EXPANSION OF LOCAL AUTONOMY THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AWAY OF POWERS AND RESPONSIBILITIES AWAY FROM NATIONAL BODY
(HEYWOOD 2002) (HEYWOOD
,
2002)
30

31. THE REASONS
ONE OF THE MOST CRUCIAL AND RECURRING ONE OF THE MOST CRUCIAL AND RECURRING DEBATS IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD IS ABOUT THE DEGREE OF CONTROL THAT ABOUT THE DEGREE OF CONTROL THAT CENTRAL GOVERNMENTS CAN AND SHOULD
HAVE OVER DEVELOPMENT PLANNING AND
ADMINISTRATION
(CHEEMA AND RONDINELLI, 1984)
31

32. THE REASONS
IMPROVE EFFICIENCY - BASIS FOR
REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ROLE: ROLE:
1.
BETTER MATCH BETWEEN SERVICE
1.
BETTER MATCH BETWEEN SERVICE PROVISION AND VOTER PREFERENCES
2.BETTER ACCOUNTABILITY THROUGH CLOSER
LINKAGES OF BENEFITS WITH COSTS LINKAGES OF BENEFITS WITH COSTS
3.INCREASED MOBILIZATION OF LOCAL
REVENUES
4.BETTER PARTICIPATION OF CLIENTS IN
SELECTION OF OUTPUT MIX
(GERVAIS 1999)
32
(GERVAIS
,
1999)

33. TYPES OF DECENTRALIZATION
DECENTRALIZATION INCLUDE DECENTRALIZATION INCLUDE
:
1. POLITICAL 2. ADMINISTRATIVE
3. FISCAL
4. MARKET
33

34. POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION
POLITICAL DECENTRALIZATION AIMS TO GIVE CITIZENS OR THEIR ELECTED
REPRESENTATIVES MORE POWER IN
PUBLIC DECISION
MAKING
PUBLIC DECISION
-
MAKING
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
34

35. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION
FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION INVOLVES SHIFTING SOME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR SHIFTING SOME RESPONSIBILITIES FOR EXPENDITURES AND/OR REVENUES TO
LOWER LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT
THE IMPORTANT IS: T
HE EXTENT TO WHICH LOCAL ENTITIES ARE
GIVEN AUTONOMY TO DETERMINE THE
ALLOCATION OF THEIR EXPENDITURE ALLOCATION OF THEIR EXPENDITURE
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
35

36. ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION SEEKS TO REDISTRIBUTE AUTHORITY,
RESPONSIBILITY AND FINANCIAL
RESOURCES FOR PROVIDING PUBLIC SERVICES AMONG DIFFERENT LEVELS OF GOVERNMENT GOVERNMENT
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
36

37. ECONOMIC OR MARKET ECONOMIC OR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION
ECONOMIC OR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION ECONOMIC OR MARKET DECENTRALIZATION WILL INCLUDE PRIVATIZATION AND DEREGULATION THEY SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY DEREGULATION
.
THEY SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY
FOR FUNCTIONS FROM THE PUBLIC TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR
(WORLD BANK, 2001)
37

38. FORMS OF DECENTRALIZATION
FORMS OF DECENTRALIZATION INCLUDE:
1
DECONCENTRATION
1
.
DECONCENTRATION
2. DELEGATION TO SEMI-
AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES
3. DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
4
TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM
4
.
TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM PUBLIC TO NONGOVERNMENT INSTITUITION INSTITUITION
(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984)
38

39. DECONCENTRATION
DECONCENTRATION INVOLVES THE DECONCENTRATION INVOLVES THE REDISTRIBUTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES ONLY WITHIN THE RESPONSIBILITIES ONLY WITHIN THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT
(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI 1984) (CHEEMA & RONDINELLI
,
1984)
39

40. DELEGATION TO SEMI-AUTONOMOUS AGENCIES
ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION IS ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION IS THE DELEGATION OF DECISION-MAKING AND MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY FOR AND MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY FOR SPECIFIC FUNCTIONS TO ORGANIZATIONS
THAT ARE NOT UNDER THE DIRECT
CONTROL OF CENTRAL GOVERNMENT MINISTRIES
(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984)
40

41. DEVOLUTION TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT
ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION ANOTHER FORM OF DECENTRALIZATION SEEKS TO CREATE OR STRENGTHEN INDEPENDENT LEVELS OR UNITS OF INDEPENDENT LEVELS OR UNITS OF GOVERNMENT THROUGH DEVOLUTION OF
FUNCTION AND AUTHORITY
(CHEEMA & RONDINELLI, 1984)
41

42. TRANSFER OF FUNCTIONS FROM PUBLIC TO NON-GOVERNMENT INSTITUITION
DECENTRALIZATION TAKES PLACE IN MANY COUNTRIES THROUGH THE TRANSFER OF
SOME PLANNING AND ADMINISTRATIVE
RESPONSIBILITY OR OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY
,
OR OF PUBLIC
FUNCTIONS, FROM GOVERNMENT TO VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE, OR NON
-
VOLUNTARY, PRIVATE, OR NON GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS
(C
HEEMA
&
R
O
NDINELLI
,
1
98
4
)
(C & O , 98 )
42

43. WHAT IS LOCAL AUTONOMY?
LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN BE SAID TO BE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CAN BE SAID TO BE AUTONOMOUS IF THEY ENJOY A SUBSTANTIAL DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE ALTHOUGH DEGREE OF INDEPENDENCE
,
ALTHOUGH
AUTONOMY IN THIS CONNECTION IS
SOMETIMES TAKEN TO IMPLY A HIGH
MEASURE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, RATHER
THAN SOVEREIGN INDEPENDENCE
(ADAPTED FROM HEYWOOD, 2002)
43

44. FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION FISCAL DECENTRALIZATION

45. DECENTRALIZATION OF DECENTRALIZATION OF SPENDING
EFFICIENCY IN ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES
IS BEST SERVED BY ASSIGNING
RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH TYPE OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY FOR EACH TYPE OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE TO THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT THAT MOST CLOSELY GOVERNMENT THAT MOST CLOSELY REPRESENTS THE BENEFICIARIES OF THESE OUTLAYS OUTLAYS
(TER-MINASSIAN, 1997)
45

46. CENTRALIZED PROVISION
FOR CENTRALIZED PROVISION CAN BE MADE
–AT LEAST ON ALLOCATIVE GROUNDS- ONLY
FOR NATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS THAT IS FOR NATIONAL PUBLIC GOODS
,
THAT IS
,

GOODS WHOSE BENEFITS EXTEND NATION WIDE OR WHOSE PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO WIDE OR WHOSE PROVISION IS SUBJECT TO SUBSTANTIAL ECONOMIES OF SCALE
(TER-MINASSIAN, 1997)
46

47. REVENUE
-
RAISING
REVENUE
RAISING
RESPONSIBILITY
BY SEPARATING SPENDING AUTHORITY FROM BY SEPARATING SPENDING AUTHORITY FROM REVENUE-RAISING RESPONSIBILITIES, THESE
ARRANGEMENTS OBSCURE THE LINK
BETWEEN THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC BETWEEN THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AND THEIR PRICE, NAMELY, T
HE TAXES LEVIED TO FINACE THEM. THUS
T
HEY DO NOT PROMOTE FISCAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN SUBNATIONAL
POLITICIANS AND THEIR ELECTORATE POLITICIANS AND THEIR ELECTORATE
(TER-MINASSIAN, 1997)
47

48. CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX CENTRAL GOVERNMENT TAX ASSIGNMENT
CENTRAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD BE
ASSIGNED TAXES THAT HAVE CERTAIN
CHARACTERISTICS: CHARACTERISTICS: 1.
THEY ARE LEVIED ON THE MOBILE TAXE
1.
THEY ARE LEVIED ON THE MOBILE TAXE BASE,
2. THEY ARE MORE SENSITIVE TO CHANGES
IN INCOME THAT IS THEY HAVE HIGHER IN INCOME
,
THAT IS
,
THEY HAVE HIGHER
INCOME ELASTICITY,
3 THEY ARE LEVIED ON TAX BASES THAT ARE 3
.
THEY ARE LEVIED ON TAX BASES THAT ARE
DISTRIBUTED UNEVENLY ACROSS REGION
(TER-MINASSIAN, 1997)
48

49. SUBNATIONAL TAX
SUBNATIONAL TAX CHARACTERISTICS
1
THE TAX BASE SHOULD BE RELATIVELY
1
.
THE TAX BASE SHOULD BE RELATIVELY IMMOBILE, TO ALLOW LOCAL AUTHORITIES
SOME LEEWAY IN VARYING RATES WITHOUT
LOSING MOST OF THEIR TAX BASE LOSING MOST OF THEIR TAX BASE
,
2.THE TAX YIELD SHOULD BE ADEQUATE TO
MEET LOCAL NEEDS AND SUFFICIENTLY MEET LOCAL NEEDS AND SUFFICIENTLY BOUYANT OVER TIME (THAT IS, IT SHOULD
EXPAND AT LEAST AS FAST AS
EXPENDITURES) EXPENDITURES)
3.THE TAX YIELD SHOULD BE RELATIVELY
STABLE AND PREDICTABLE OVER TIME
49

50. SUBNATIONAL TAX
4.IT SHOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO EXPORT
MUCH, IF ANY, OF THE TAX BURDEN TO NON-
RESIDENTS RESIDENTS
5.THE TAX BASE SHOULD BE VISIBLE, TO
ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY
6.THE TAX SHOULD BE PERCEIVED TO BE
REASONABLY FAIR BY TAXPAYERS
7.
T
HE TAX SHOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY TO
ADMINISTER EFFICIENTLY AND EFFECTIVELY
(BIRD & VAILLANCOURT, 1998)
50

51. INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER
SINCE MOST MAJOR TAXES ARE TYPICALLY SINCE MOST MAJOR TAXES ARE TYPICALLY ASSIGNED TO THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT,
WHILE SUBSTANTIAL AND GROWING
EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES ARE DEVOLVED TO REGIONAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS
,
SIZEABLE VERTICAL
,
IMBALANCES EMERGE AT THE SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENT LEVEL
51

52. INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER
THERE ARE ALSO HORIZONTAL IMBALANCES THERE ARE ALSO HORIZONTAL IMBALANCES
,

BECAUSE THE CAPACITY TO RAISE OWN
REVENUES DIFFERS ACROSS JURISDICTIONS
,

,
DEPENDING ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF THEIR ASSIGNED TAX BASES, AND ALSO BECAUSE DIFFERENT REGIONS MAY FACE DIFFERENT COSTS AND DEMAND PRESSURES IN MEETING THEIR ASSIGNED EXPENDITURE THEIR ASSIGNED EXPENDITURE RESPONSIBILITIES
52

53. INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFER
THESE IMBALANCES MUST BE ADDRESSED THESE IMBALANCES MUST BE ADDRESSED THROUGH INTERGOVERNMENTAL TRANSFERS,
OR BORROWING BY DEFICIT JURISDICTIONS
,

,
OR A COMBINATION OF THE TWO
(TER-MINASSIAN, 1997)
53

54. LOCAL FINANCE IN INDONESIA
SOURCES
LOCAL REVENUES
EQUITY FUND
OTHERS
LOCAL TAXES
RETRIBUTIONS
SHARING REVENUES
GIFT
RETRIBUTIONS
REVENUES FROM
LOCAL ASSETS
GENERAL
ALLOCATED FUND
EMERGENCY FUND
LOAN
LOCAL

ASSETS
OTHERS
SPECIAL ALLOCATED
FUND
LOAN
54

55. THANK YOU
55